



Yashoda L
Dr. Vishnu Sharma
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS



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CHAPTER 1

AN OVERVIEW ON THE PROFILING POLITICAL LEADERS

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ABSTRACT:

One is faced with two threads when analyzing the historical evolution of the psychological evaluation of political leaders: advancements in the academic multidisciplinary field of political psychology and applications in support of policy inside the government. In this chapter the author discusses the history of leader profiling.

KEYWORDS:

Debate, Leader, Political, Profiling, Policy.

INTRODUCTION

There has been much discussion over how a leader's personality affects the direction of political events. The "great man" school of historical thought, of which Thomas Carlyle was a main exponent, has often described the progression of political leaders. In keeping with Carlyle's philosophy, we often analyze a country's foreign policy in terms of its leaders' personalities. As a result of their ignorance and hubris, George III and Lord North are supposed to have caused Great Britain to lose its American possessions. Woodrow Wilson won the war but failed to secure a lasting peace in 1919 because he mishandled negotiations, conflated rhetoric with reality, and was unwilling to make concessions. Adolph Hitler ignited Europe two decades later with a foreign strategy that seemed to be based on his own psychological pathology. Maybe the allure of these well-known instances stems from a human predisposition to simplify complicated circumstances, assigning the reasons for other people's actions to their character traits rather than their surroundings. It would be challenging to represent the key historical events of the 20th century as just the result of historical and political factors, disregarding the influence of figures like Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Mao Zedong [1]–[3].

The idea that foreign policy decision makers often react to realistic assessments of conditions and operate within the given limits and possibilities is set against these personality interpretations. Wilson's shortcoming was not a personality flaw, but rather American unwillingness to keep troops in Europe beyond 1918 and to cede national sovereignty to a supranational league. According to historian A. J. P. Taylor, even in Hitler's case, his foreign policy was similar to that of his predecessors, the professional diplomats at the foreign ministry, and in fact, of nearly all Germans: liberate Germany from the confines of the peace treaty, rebuild a sizable German army, and then use Germany's inherent strength to make her the most powerful nation in Europe.

These two borders, which on the one hand hold the simplistic idea that individual personalities have no impact and, on the other, the naïve belief that political results are just the projection of leaders' personalities, define the academic landscape.

Between these two extremes, Greenstein suggests that a leader's personality may be particularly important in four situations: when the actor occupies a strategic location; when the situation is ambiguous or unusual; when there are no obvious precedents or standard role requirements; and when spontaneous or especially effortful behavior is required. These circumstances emphasize the significance of the environment in which the actor is acting, noting that the influence of a leader's personality grows to the extent that the environment permits restructuring.

These prerequisites may be satisfied most often in the area of foreign policy among the numerous facets of politics. The following situations, according to Hermann, are those in which a leader's personality is most likely to have an impact on foreign policy: when the means of assuming power are dramatic; when the head of state is charismatic; when the head of state has significant control over foreign policy; when the foreign policy organization of the country is less developed and differentiated; it often seemed, during the relatively recent period of the superpower struggle, that the competing Western and Eastern blocs' formidable powers had considerably diminished and confined the ability of individual leaders to influence the course of events in the field of foreign policy. Nonetheless, few would contest the impact of the leadership decisions taken by John F. Kennedy, Fidel Castro, and Nikita Khrushchev in October 1962; Richard Nixon in China; Jimmy Carter at Camp David; and Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Boris Yeltsin in the latter years of the cold war.

DISCUSSION

The History of Leader Profiling: Two Historical Strands

One is faced with two threads when analyzing the historical evolution of the psychological evaluation of political leaders: developments within the academic field of political psychology and applications in support of policy inside the government. The two initiatives had quite distinct objectives and were born out of various disciplinary viewpoints. The objectives were to advance understanding of leadership psychology among the academic community and to aid in high-level negotiations and political-military crises inside the government. The government program was first developed mostly by social psychology and political science experts, with clinically trained psychiatrists playing a significant role. The applied strand stressed a more comprehensive approach, integrating psychobiography and psychodynamic psychology, producing qualitative case studies. The academic approach placed more emphasis on individual traits or trait constellations leading to the development of rigorous quantitative methodologies to assess leader traits. The strands did not, of course, evolve in total isolation, and government initiatives in practical political psychology were strengthened by contributions from academic political psychology. Additional fields including political sociology, clinical psychology, cultural anthropology, and history helped to broaden the focus of the fundamental disciplines and advanced the study in both contexts. Having said that, the developmental routes were really quite unlike.

The evolution of quantitative techniques in academia and the development of the qualitative case study approach in government are represented by two historical summaries in Part I of this book. According to a survey of scholarly literature published in, academics outside of the government have a history of emphasizing just certain aspects of each person, such as important views or salient personality features. Attempts to study trait manifestations using quantitative approaches are often made in conjunction with this concentration on a small number of crucial qualities as opposed to the whole person. This methodological approach has enabled the standardization of

measuring techniques and the ability to conduct statistical or controlled experiments on a large number of people. Predictions of expected behavior under various contingencies are based on comparisons of a number of people who share similar traits to varying degrees and who behave differently as a result in reaction to the same stimuli, often in laboratory settings rather than in real-world circumstances.

Most of these researchers have focused on various aspects of cognition while mostly disregarding the area of emotion and drives. The united terrain of cognition and affect is mostly uncharted territory if the terrain of political cognition has been substantially studied and the terrain of affect has received some early incursions. This chapter contains the accounts of a few brave explorers who have traveled into this dangerous region. David D. Winter has investigated the connection between cognition and motivations, focusing particularly on the connections between the demands for power, accomplishment, and affiliation as well as their relative importance. Margaret G. Hermann has investigated the characteristics of ethnocentrism, suspiciousness, self-confidence, and cognitive complexity in addition to systematically evaluating the desires for power, accomplishment, and affiliation. She has been able to develop six foreign policy orientations, which effectively represent a typology of political personalities, by examining the relationships between these needs and traits; these personality types represent patterns she has identified in the political world but are unrelated to conventional clinical personality types. As seen by his work on the motivational underpinnings of a typology of political belief systems, Stephen G. Walker's research has also focused on the connection between motives and beliefs. George Marcus has contributed significantly to the understanding of the connection between affect and political leadership, highlighting the function of affect and its influence on political judgment and decision-making.

The development of the comprehensive approach illustrated by the Camp David profiles of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, in which the analysis of the leader's personality served as the basis for a diagnosis of likely behavior under various contingencies, was sparked by psychobiographic and descriptive studies of leaders like Adolf Hitler and Nikita Khrushchev, as shown in the historical overview of qualitative case studies in government in Chapter 3, which also includes examples of Adolf Hitler and Nikita Khrushchev. The objective was to determine how the political personality of the leader affects aspects of leadership behavior such negotiation style, crisis management, and strategic decision making. These studies are influenced by psychodynamic theory, and as a result, they often create a psychographic image that serves as the basis for evaluating political personality. A focus is placed on describing the political environment in which the leader functions as well as the cultural, historical, and political contexts that shaped the leader's personality. In order to anticipate future conduct often based on observations of the individual's prior reactions under comparable situations, it is an aim to uncover recurring patterns of behavior.

In general, this volume describes three different psychological assessments of political leaders: those that look at their cognitive abilities, personality traits, and thorough qualitative case studies that combine a psychobiographic analysis with a psychodynamic examination of their character and personality structure. Thorough analyses based on the therapeutic case study technique include phenomenological, psychodynamic, and psychogenetic viewpoints. In the psychobiographical examination, they outline significant occasions that influenced the leader's psychology before evaluating the aspects of political personality in an effort to pinpoint the fundamental personality/character structure. They look for recurring patterns in political conduct

as well as ways to identify whether public activities are motivated by personal interests. In chapter four, Jerold M. Post explains the practical approach he created in a government environment using his background in clinical psychology. The approach placed emphasis on integrating psychobiography with the analysis of political personality, with consequences for discussions, leadership style, and tactical and crisis decision-making. Stanley A. Renshon, a political scientist with psychoanalytic training, explains his methodology in Chapter 5 using a model that highlights three crucial facets of character: ambition, integrity, and relatedness.

The methods of manifest and latent content analysis are also used in studies of personality characteristics. When leaders' prepared speeches include overtly motivating imagery, it might be possible to discern needs that point to a leader's inclination for either conflict- or cooperation-solving tactics and a risk-taking attitude. Latent content analysis may be used to find politically important personality characteristics by categorizing the grammar and syntax of more spontaneous utterances in interviews. In Chapter 6, research psychiatrist Walter Weintraub outlines his approach for evaluating major personality qualities using grammatical and syntactic analysis. This method was first developed for use with a population of mental patients and then adapted for use with political leaders. Both Margaret G. Hermann and David D. Winter, social psychologists, have created techniques for analyzing motivating imagery. In Chapter 7, Winter discusses his approach to examining the needs for affiliation, success, and power. Hermann outlines her methodology for examining these demands in chapter 8, along with a variety of other characteristics she believes are crucial for influencing political conduct.

To determine the leader's views about politics, studies of cognitive content—belief systems and cognitive maps—use manifest content analysis. Inferences regarding the probable influence of leaders' ideas on their conduct in the world are drawn from these overt surface characteristics in public or private utterances. In chapter nine, authors Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young address the Operational Code technique, which examines the leader's ideas on the nature of the political universe as well as the guidelines for conducting political life. Latent content analysis is used in other studies of cognitive style, such as integrative complexity and causal attribution, to determine the organization of a leader's thinking processes. Inferences about a leader's underlying optimism and pessimism as well as a competitive vs cooperative attitude to problem solving in various situations are made from these more subtle characteristics. In chapter 10, Peter Suedfeld, Karen Guttieri, and Phillip E. Tetlock address integrative cognitive complexity in relation to the actions of leaders. The third chapter of this book is split into two parts, each of which contains a number of psychological evaluations of two political figures: William Jefferson Clinton and Saddam Hussein. A thorough qualitative case study assessment that combines a psychobiographic analysis and a character analysis is initially offered for each leader. Stanley Renshon gives a psychoanalytically oriented portrait of President Clinton in part A, drawing on his Neustadt Award-winning study of Clinton, *High Hopes*. Jerold M. Post gives a psychodynamic image of Saddam Hussein in part B, building on the political psychology profile of Hussein he provided in evidence during hearings on the Gulf crisis before the House Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Following these thorough qualitative analyses are s that use explicit and latent quantitative content analysis to examine the personality characteristics, leadership style, beliefs, and cognitive style of each leader. They provide complementary appraisals of these leaders and provide examples of how various assessment methodologies may be used[4].

Each leader offers a unique set of problems for evaluation, inference, and prediction. President Clinton is the head of a democratic regime that functions in a complicated institutional environment where political power is shared by several departments of government that cater to various constituencies and split among strong bureaucratic agencies. Contrarily, in the framework of an authoritarian state, Saddam Hussein is a somewhat independent leader who essentially controls the political authority. The contributors talk about how their analyses of Clinton and Hussein serve as examples of how to utilize sources and what kinds of situations to expect while doing this sort of research.

The writers and cases in this collection reflect the state of the art in political leader profiling when taken as a whole. The potential for future advancement and the need for more study in this field of political psychology. While it is unlikely that psychological assessments of leaders will soon be reduced to a single technique, this debate does identify potential approaches for combining findings, methodologies, and research issues. In order to set the tone for the subsequent sections, which exhibit various contemporary methodologies in their most recent iteration, here is a summary of the key advancements and turning points in the academic and research psychology community's study of political leaders.

Langer, Wedge, and Post were asked to profile current foreign leaders, as is mentioned in the following, "Leader Personality Assessments in Support of Government Policy." At times of transition, dangers, conflicts, and opportunities, their work was often urgently needed and used as guidelines for government policy. Academic political psychologists, in contrast, are more motivated by concerns of historical interest and intellectual curiosity than by demands of governmental policy. They often have easier access to a greater variety of knowledge and more free time to ponder, debate, and rearrange their findings and interpretations. This is particularly true when creating profiles of historical figures; while political scientists and historians are undoubtedly interested in figuring out the perplexing personality dynamics of a Woodrow Wilson, an Adolf Hitler, or a Nikita Khrushchev, there are no longer any urgent policy considerations that would require rushing the task. Moreover, we probably have access to more knowledge on these leaders today, many years after their passing, than we had while they were still alive and in office. For instance, we may now supplement Langer's first wartime analysis of Hitler with subsequent works by Binion, Erikson, Fromm, and Waite in addition to the thorough analysis of Hitler biographies and psychobiographies by Rosenbaum, Kershaw, and Langer. Academic profilers have it easier compared to their colleagues who work in the government.

Academic political psychologists have also had the time and tools to consider their methods for evaluating the personalities of political figures they have never met. They have created canons of theory and practice for researching personality remotely as a consequence. This article examines the academic aspect of personality profiling for leaders. It starts with the academic development, expansion, and criticism of psychobiography and associated approaches that are comparable to the methods used by doctors who have direct access to a patient. The discussion then shifts to the creation of reliable, objective methods for remotely assessing certain personality traits and disorders.

The short analysis of Otto von Bismarck's dream by the psychologist Hanns Sachs in the nineteenth century may have been the first effort to link a leader's foreign policy to that leader's psychological traits. According to Sachs, Bismarck had a dream in which he was stuck on a constrained Alpine mountain road in 1863. He whacked a boulder with his riding whip, which

collapsed to expose an easy, wide route leading down to an Austrian woodland valley where Prussian soldiers were displaying flags. Underneath Bismarck the statesman's conscious political plans to entice war with Austria in order to achieve German unification, according to Sachs' interpretation of the dream, were unconscious personal fantasies of infantile masturbation, erotic conquest, and even an identification with the Biblical Moses.

Psychobiography work

What are clinical at-distance assessments or psychobiographies? The systematic application of psychological theory or concepts—typically derived from psychoanalysis or another kind of personality theory and research—to the interpretation of specific known biographical "facts" is one appropriate definition of psychobiography, according to Glad (1973). Which details? Some psychobiographers concentrate on drawing a picture of their "subject's" general personality, or on characterizing "what type of person they are." Some psychobiographers have a more specific objective in mind, such as explaining certain perplexing "facts" or patterns that defy normal explanations like rational self-interest, the logic of the circumstance, or societal roles and expectations. Therefore, a psychobiography differs from a traditional biographical account in that it may not necessarily include all of the details and instead focuses on actions that are "unusual, abnormal, or pathological," in the words of Freud, rather than behavior that is in line with conscientious goals and reasonable means.

Psychobiography's Three Goals

What steps should a psychologist, a psychiatric patient, or a historian take to create a psychobiography? Greenstein has separated the procedure into three distinct parts. Simple explanations of the surprising and uncommon behaviors—or, in Greenstein's words, the "identifying phenomenology"—that need to be explained serve as the foundation for further analysis. The phenomenology may cover the whole person's life path, as previously said, or it may cover simply a portion of the person's life. For instance, George and George examined a variety of behaviors over Woodrow Wilson's whole adult life. Runyan, on the other hand, concentrated his research on the Dutch artist Vincent Van Gogh on a single issue: "Why did Van Gogh chop off his ear?" The action that has to be described by psychological notions and theories is chopping off one's ear. Note that since Van Gogh's behavior was uncommon, we go to psychology for an explanation. If the majority of individuals chopped off an ear, we would likely search for an explanation outside of psychology, maybe in history or anthropology. Generally speaking, it is feasible to get a decent amount of consensus about this first phase of the psychobiography process.

The psychobiographer builds a psychological explanation—or, in Greenstein's words, "the dynamics"—after determining what has to be explained. What set of presumptive psychological ideas, specifically, may be used to change the phenomenology from something that is "surprising and unexpected" to something that is comprehensible, plausible, or "normal"? Here, dispute is more likely to occur. For instance, Runyan lists thirteen ideas that purport to explain Van Gogh's behavior. Runyan goes on to provide various standards by which we might assess different psychobiography explanations or dynamics, including thoroughness, congruence with other biographical facts that are known, parsimony, and the capacity to forecast new actions. The challenge, of course, is to prevent circular explanations, in which the explanation's veracity is limited to the behavior it purports to describe. Explaining Woodrow Wilson's refusal to compromise as a result of his obsessive-compulsive personality and then trying to use his

unwillingness to compromise as evidence to support our argument don't really help our knowledge. We must, at the absolute least, provide further biographical information to support our interpretation. Better still, we should work to provide an independent gauge of the psychological processes that have been hypothesized[5]–[7].

Lastly, some psychobiographers attempt to identify the genetic basis for the presumptive dynamics in their subject's early experiences, development, or upbringing. A history of the development of a psychological trait may increase our trust in the accuracy of the analysis, but it is not required for the third task. In reality, these narratives are sometimes extremely contentious since it is frequently difficult to find independent corroborating evidence from historical sources, which are typically sparser in their coverage of early years, that the relevant trauma, experience, or events truly occurred. Many psychobiographers are thus forced to revert to vague, circular explanations that use speculative language like "X must have sensed that..." or "most children respond to this by growing[8]–[11]."

The case of Woodrow Wilson is illustrated in a psychobiography

By using psychobiographical analyses of Woodrow Wilson, the twenty-eighth president of the United States, we may demonstrate Greenstein's three objectives. The research *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel Home: A Personality Study* by Alexander and Juliette George has emerged as a standard of the psychobiographical approach and contributed to the definition of the discipline. The same authors eventually updated their results in light of academic discussion and debate and summarized their analysis in a later paper.

CONCLUSION

Political leaders are essential because they form alliances with other stakeholders, decide how resources are allocated via governmental policies, and make choices that may significantly affect a country's well-being and its population. Effective leadership is characterized by bravery, strength, the capacity for effective communication, knowledge, judgment, integrity, and interpersonal abilities. Vision and the ability to put that vision into action are two qualities that are very crucial. That is an essential quality for a leader to possess. "The ear of the leader must resound with the sounds of the people," as President Woodrow Wilson famously observed. Active listening and nonverbal communication are two methods a leader may utilize to improve their listening skills.

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CHAPTER 2

AN EXPLORATIVE STUDY ON THE WILSON'S PHENOMENOLOGY

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ABSTRACT:

Phenomenology is a philosophical movement that dates back to the early 20th century. Its main goal is the direct investigation and description of phenomena as they are consciously experienced, without theories about how they might be caused, and as free of untested assumptions and preconceptions as possible. In this chapter author is discusseshuman motives and their measurement.

KEYWORDS:

Dynamic, Leader, Political, Phenomenology, Politics.

INTRODUCTION

Woodrow Wilson is unquestionably the leader whose performance in office demanded psychological analysis. There is broad consensus over what has to be stated. Wilson displayed a consistent pattern in which he seemed to undermine his exceptional leadership abilities and defeat or undo his significant accomplishments, starting with his presidency of Princeton University and continuing through his participation in the Versailles Peace Conference and his final speaking tour urging Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations. The following characteristics of this pattern were present in their fullest form: Wilson set out lofty objectives in sweeping moralistic oratory rhetoric. But, when in opposition, he would not give ground, even when doing so would unmistakably advance his ultimate objectives. He also declined to play hardball and respond vehemently and forcefully, on the other side[1]–[3].

Instead, he retaliated with repeated and strenuous speech-making efforts. As a result, Wilson often developed suspicions about former allies and even actively turned against them. In the end, his initial objectives were often overlooked in the political scuffles. Even winning seldom made him feel very satisfied. Wilson consistently failed himself, to put it plainly.

Most of the components in this sequence are best shown by Wilson's actions at and after the Versailles Peace Conference. In order to achieve his vision of a "fair peace," he was first unwilling to employ American economic and military strength to reverse the Allied war objectives and secret treaties. Instead, he dedicated all of his time and effort to crafting the Covenant of the League of Nations' imaginative language. Colonel House, a personal friend and advisor to him, advised them to compromise, but this advice only served to sever their bond. Wilson then refused to modify or compromise when Republicans headed by Senator Lodge obstructed his campaign for ratification of the treaty, despite the pleas of the League's most ardent supporters, including Edward Gray and even his own wife. Wilson has a severe stroke while on a hectic national speaking tour in support of the pact, virtually ending his political career. These themes are examined, as well as two additional psychological evaluations of

Wilson that will be briefly covered later, as well as some of the personal-ity explanations and interpretations of them offered by George and George.

Wilson's Self-Defeating Pattern Dynamics

The Georges' study of Wilson's behavior dynamics was based on Lasswell's theory that power-seeking conduct is a coping mechanism for inner insecurities and poor self-esteem as well as Alfred Acller's classic ideas. According to The Georges, Wilson's phenomenology was primarily driven by an obsession with dominance and control—a "deep-seated, unconscious desire in imposing ordered systems onto others as a method of gaining a feeling of authority." They outlined how this dynamic operates by drawing on a range of psychodynamic theories in ways that unquestionably match the Wilson pattern:

Compulsives are sensitive to interference in the activities they pursue for the satisfaction of power. They could misinterpret suggestions. They often struggle to delegate tasks to others since they believe they can handle things more adeptly than others. Sometimes, this belief is overstated to the point that people start to think they are the only ones. Compulsives often exhibit the attributes of negativity, secrecy, and revenge.

The Georges further on their assessment of this dynamic by suggesting that Wilson's need for power was really a "more fundamental need for self-esteem, or security." So, their whole dynamic explanation would be as follows, emphasizing psychological concepts: Wilson's impulse to rule was fueled by his want to defend and repair his shattered self-esteem, which was further moderated by his desires for acceptance and deference. He was often successful, particularly while he was ascending the political ladder. Nonetheless, he refrained from a fight when this combination sparked a reaction-formation against aggression and disruptive anxiety at the thought of competition. His ravenous ambition and obsessive intransigence, however, caused denial and warped perspective when a situation became emotionally heated. When this occurred, he often failed[4], [5].

DISCUSSION

Genesis of Wilson's Personality Dynamics

Wilson's conflicted relationship with his father, Joseph Ruggles Wilson, a towering presence of a Presbyterian preacher who made perfectionist demands on those around him, including his children, and responded to errors with scorn and sarcasm, is where the Georges believe Wilson's inner doubts and low self-esteem originated. According to the Georges' theory, young Woodrow Wilson became anxious and resentful as a result of these parental expectations. They also contend that he suppressed his negative emotions and embraced his father's standards in an effort to lessen worry by assuring his father of his success.

It is hardly unexpected that the Georges' reconstruction of the development of Wilson's personality has met with some disagreement from historians and Wilson biographers given the dearth of archives and knowledge regarding father-child dynamics in the Wilson family.

1. Alternate Wilson's Personality Interpretations
2. Interpretation by Freud and Bullitt

The two right-hand columns provide succinct summaries of two different analyses of the forces that underlie Wilson's phenomenology. Each is debatable and has significant methodological

flaws. The combined study by Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, completed in 19305 but released in 1967, is tainted by the writers' animosity against their topic as well as a very clumsily mechanical manner of interpretation. Freud and Bullitt concentrated on Wilson's father's prominent position, much like the Georges. They said that Woodrow "never resolved the central problem of the Oedipus complex." Because of this, he both had a deep sense of fatherhood and suppressed anger at him, which he usually directed on his friends who served as his metaphorical "younger brothers." His passivity was even more covert, the outcome of a covert affinity with his mother.

Weinstein's translation

Wilson, according to Weinstein and his colleagues, was suffering from cerebral vascular disease, which showed up as recurrent strokes and culminated in the last, severe stroke of 1919. This condition was the underlying reason of Wilson's actions with regard to foreign policy, they claim. Weinstein contends that Wilson's self-defeating tendency was influenced by a number of psychological changes brought on by these medical conditions, including euphoric overconfidence, stubbornness and irritability, suspicion, and delusions. It is evident from the biographical information that is now accessible that Wilson struggled with a number of ill-defined physical issues throughout of his life. Nonetheless, as Post[6]–[8].

Summary Features of a Single Case Study Psychobiographies

The George and George study of Woodrow Wilson, like other psychobiographies, depends on a critical comprehension of the available evidence—possibly mainly the written words—of the subject being researched. Psychobiographers need to be empathetic and detached in order to do this task well. They also need to be aware of their own emotional responses to their subject. Psychobiographers immerse themselves in this "data" and then analyze the data using all of their mental faculties. The biographer allows all of this information to freely flow into him. He is the conduit through which the disorganized raw data "are" digested, ultimately to be rendered back in an orderly verbal re-creation of an understandable human being what kind of person "he" was, what his defining attitudes and defenses were and how they evolved, what made him anxious, what made him happy, what goals and values he adopted, and how he went about pursuing them.

This procedure often requires switching back and forth repeatedly between biographical truth and theoretical notion. It naturally utilizes all of the psychobiographer's mental faculties, including their sense of curiosity, sensitivity to "facts," ability for rational reasoning, fine-tuned awareness of emotions, and mobile, even playful intuition. The persona of any political actor is always expressed in a context, which includes "institutional variables, situational variables, and those aspects of political culture that the leader has internalized during the course of his or her political socialization or that affect his or her performance even if not internalized," according to successful psychobiographers. In this regard, longitudinal psychobiographies are especially helpful because they enable us to distinguish between political behaviors that are merely the result of role and those that reflect strong person-ality influences engaged by political circumstances, as well as how past life experiences shape current political behavior.

A complex and vivid case study, according to some psychologists, is a masterpiece that can only be diminished by the "improvements" of psychological research. The argument surrounding Woodrow Wilson's personality dynamics, on the other hand, raises the significance of clearly

defined factors and objective metrics. If only we could test Wilson's superego strength and self-esteem to see whether he really did score below and above average. We could compute Wilson's scores over time and determine if they match the pattern required by Weinstein et al's assertions. 's if we had well-validated measures of the "psychological impacts of stroke." Political psychologists have recently developed several techniques for measuring personality variables at a distance in an effort to resolve disputes of this kind regarding evidence and inference as well as to introduce objective standards of scientific measurement into the process of conducting psychobiographies and personality assessments of leaders. The impartiality with which they may be applied and the validity that has been shown via prior replicable study are two features that, as with every scientific measurement, define the methodological credentials of these at-a-distance measurements.

Since researchers lack direct access to political leaders, the majority of personality factors have operational definitions in terms of tests or other procedures that cannot be utilized on them. That is to say, the majority of notable con-temporal leaders⁴ are often not testable, and even if they were, it would typically be difficult to share the findings due to ethical concerns. The difficulty with former leaders is that they are no longer alive and have carried their psychological traits—such as Oedipus complexes, authoritarianism, or a desire for power—along with them. So, the need for personality tests that may be administered remotely, without physical touch or access. Because that words are a resource that both living and deceased leaders often have in great quantity, many at-a-distance metrics incorporate some kind of content analysis of written or spoken content. For previously unexperienced scorers to use them with high reliability, these measures are usually carefully created, including examples and training methods.

Certified variables

The person-ality variables used by at-a-distance researchers are often operationally defined, and their reliability has been shown by thorough study. Elms, for instance, examined the personalities and public conduct of four important U.S. foreign policy advisors in the 20th century in terms of Machiavellianism, ego idealism, and authoritarianism—three variables having a strong track record of research-based validity. These three concepts have relatively clear, operationally defined, and restricted meanings compared to the ambiguities of everyday language that are present in words like stubbornness.

The sections that follow provide an analysis of the studies linking political behavior and consequences to several single personality traits. The fundamental components of personality may be conveniently divided into three categories. Motives are the many categories of objectives that guide people's actions. Among the most commonly researched motivations are those of power, success, and affinity. Measures of defensive mechanisms might also be included in this since many motivations or desires entail conflict and are guarded against or modified as a result. Cognitive styles that be more broadly based as well as more specialized cognitive views, attitudes, and values. Temperament and interpersonal characteristics: Recurring individual differences in style elements including vigor, friendliness, impulse control, emotional stability, and interpersonal communication methods.

1. Human Motives and Their Measurement
2. Major Dimensions of Motivation

In order to explain how leaders behave and political consequences, psychobiographical studies often cite a broad range of various reasons, "goals," or other dynamic processes—sometimes constructed ad hoc, other times borrowed from psychological theory. Many typologies or dimensions of motivation or objectives have been put forward by psychologists. For instance, Freud divided all human motivations into two major categories: aggressive or death drives and libidinal or love reasons. The associated motivational notions of communion and agency adopted by subsequent theorists, as well as more current concepts of attachment and narcissism, show traces of these groups.

Murray and his collaborators suggested a totally different approach to figuring out the core human motivations. They created a list of twenty fundamental motivations or "needs" that they considered were required to adequately account for the significant aims and endeavors of the fifty-one male college students and other young people after conducting an in-depth examination of them. They may then be categorized or arranged into two core categories that closely resemble the dualisms of Freud, Bakan, and others: interpersonal harmony seeking and individual forceful striving. These two dimensions shall be known as affiliation and power, respectively, for the purpose of clarity and standard language. Research conducted across cultures supports the universality of connection and power as motivating factors. This alignment of theory, empirical study, and cultural evidence leads to the conclusion that power and affiliation are almost always used to organize and describe objectives.

Assessing Motives

Freud believed that free association and dream interpretation were the "royal way" to understanding people's motivations since worry and the use of defense are likely to prevent individuals from being aware of their own actual motivations. The validity of self-reports on motives is severely constrained by social desirability, impression management, and the plain inaccessibility of implicit brain processes, according to psychologists in more recent years. Thus, several psychologists have used indirect methods to assess motivations. Several of these techniques are based on the Thematic Apperception Test, created by Murray and Morgan, in which participants recount narratives in response to a succession of hazy or ambiguous images.

Measurements Based on TAT

As McClelland and his coworkers' empirically obtained approach for scoring motives in the TAT served as the foundation for the majority of political psychology's objective measurements of motivations at a distance, including Sections 7 and 8, its key characteristics may be briefly discussed here. Each specific motivation must first be stimulated in order to be measured, preferably through a variety of experimental techniques. By administering tests to student government candidates as ballots were being tallied, presenting a video of President John F. Kennedy's inauguration, and role-playing a protest group poised to face the police, for instance, the power motivation has been stoked. The TAT tales created by participants in each of these several motive-arousing circumstances are then contrasted with TAT stories created by participants in a control, nonaroused group. The distinctions between the two sets of tales serve as the foundation for the rating system after extensive revision and improvement. For the two core dimensions of affiliation and power motivation, as well as a third dimension of accomplishment motivation, experimentally determined scoring systems of this sort have been devised. These TAT scoring methods have been modified by political psychology scholars to evaluate motive imagery in a broad range of different types of verbal content, including as

speeches, interviews, novels, diplomacy papers, dream reports, folktales, and even television shows. These motivation imagery scores are often unconnected to subjects' assertions or conscious views about their objectives. Moreover, among politicians, motivation imagery scores are often unrelated to policy statements; in other words, it is feasible to advocate for or criticize any given political objective or program with or without the use of accomplishment, affiliation, and/or power imagery.

This method has been used to study political figures such as U.S. presidents and Supreme Court justices, rulers of several nations and factions in sub-Saharan and southern Africa in the middle of the 1970s, general secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, members of the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee, and various important groups of world leaders. The psychobiographical examination of certain leaders, such former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, and U.S. presidents Woodrow Wilson and Richard Nixon, has also included systematic and objective motivation imagery content analysis.

Analytical Techniques

Luck conducted a comparison of Hitler, Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Liu Shao-chi while using a very different theoretical and methodological approach. Luck also constructed a priori objective assessments of several fundamental psychoanalytic motivating ideas.

Cognitive Style and Cognitions Particular Cognitive Beliefs

Hermann created at-a-distance measures for a number of particular interpersonal style and belief factors that have been thoroughly investigated in personality study. Two facets of a larger authoritarianism are nationalism as a cognitive conviction and mistrust as a feature of interpersonal behavior. These two variables are linked to strong, unfavorable attitudes toward other countries and low levels of resource commitment in international relations among heads of state. While Hermann did not test war and peace outcomes specifically, we would unquestionably assume that these two personality traits would often incline leaders toward war by escalating an atmosphere of animosity on a global scale. There is further discussion on these factors.

The classic personality variable of locus of control or attributional style is reflected in the assumption that one can influence occurrences. Theoretically, by avoiding resource commitment, these leaders are seen to protect their own authority by keeping their choices for foreign policy open. and self-efficacy, also known as a feeling of perceived competence and environmental control.

Holsti identified a belief pattern of inherent ill faith in John Foster Dulles' public utterances regarding the Soviets over a period of many years using assessment assertion analysis methodologies. Dulles ascribed friendly Soviet conduct to Soviet weakness rather than to Soviet friendliness, according to Holsti, who discovered a constant negative association between Dulles' perceptions of Soviet strength and his opinion of Soviet goodwill. Inherent ill faith may be the foundation of Jervis's idea of the "deterrence" model of international relations and conflict as a personality trait or cognitive construct.

Codes for Operations

Leites used the term "operational code" to describe the collection of axioms, postulates, and premises that seem to serve as the foundation of more particular beliefs and actions in his seminal study of the foundations of Soviet thought. Operational codes were intuitively drawn from political literature in Leites' work. Later on, George, Holsti, and Walker extended the idea of an operational code by proposing a number of common dimensions or problem typologies that might be used to build operational codes for particular people. Two categories of beliefs have been honed and developed: those that relate to the leader's philosophical assumptions about the nature of the political system and those that relate to the leader's decisions and strategic moves.

Operational codes, as they were first designed, are similar to portraits in that, at their finest, they accurately depict the person being presented, but different pictures of various leaders cannot be easily compared. Walker's reconstruction of Woodrow Wilson's operational code therefore confirmed Post's development of some objective, quantitative approaches for evaluating operational codes. They have been used in research on a number of US presidents from the second half of the 20th century.

1. Cognitive Approach
2. Cognitive Difficulty

Cognitive complexity is often linked to more nuanced and more adaptive behavior in personality theory and research, particularly in ambiguous or perplexing circumstances. Hermann calculated the ratio of certain words and phrases labeled as high complexity to words and phrases labeled as low complexity in order to quantify cognitive difficulty at a distance. The ability to convey favorable feelings toward other countries and to get positive responses from other countries is connected with cognitive complexity among heads of state[9].

Suedfeld and his colleagues have modified a laboratorial measure of integrative complexity for at-distance research using a two-stage theory of cognitive complexity that includes differentiation and then integration. Integrative complexity has been linked to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, according to a number of studies. In contrast to two of Janis's "non-groupthink" crises, when conflict was managed, Tetlock observed much lower levels of integrative complexity in speeches and public remarks made by U.S. officials during three crises that showed the "groupthink" pattern that led to armed confrontation.

Suedfeld and Tetlock studied the communications and declarations made during two crises that resulted in war and three crises that were amicably resolved. They discovered greater levels of integrative complexity when conflict was averted, as they would have predicted. In a thirty-year study of United Nations statements on the Middle East, Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez discovered substantial reductions in integrative complexity in the years leading up to the outbreak of war in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Raphael discovered a similar inverse association between degrees of tension over Berlin's status and the integrative complexity of speeches and declarations concerning the Berlin question, despite the fact that the post-World War II Berlin scenario never resulted in a shooting conflict.

Yet, one research refutes the idea that integrative complexity and conflict are related. Levi and Tetlock evaluated both official diplomatic communications from Japan to the United States and

intragovernmental Japanese papers, and they found no evidence of a decline in integrative complexity during the last months of 1941, immediately before the Pearl Harbor assault.

Suedfeld and Bluck found that the "attackers" displayed a decline in integrative complexity between three months and a few weeks prior to the attack, whereas the "to-be-attacked" nations displayed increases during the month prior to the attack in a subsequent analysis of communications from Pearl Harbor and eight other "surprise attacks." According to Suedfeld and Bluck, the target country works even harder to be adaptable and comprehend the other side when the attacking nation reinforces its bargaining stance. Yet after the invasion, the country that was invaded soon returns to pre-war levels of integrative complexity[10], [11].

Jaques has proposed a different theory of cognitive complexity that includes the four stages of shaping, reflective articulation, extrapolation, and system change. Unfortunately, this idea has not yet been applied to the dispassionate evaluation of political figures.

CONCLUSION

Phenomenology aids in our comprehension of the significance of people's actual experiences. In a phenomenological investigation, the emphasis is on how individuals saw a phenomenon and what they really went through. For social scientists, phenomenology gives a particularly compelling perspective on cognition. It considers consciousness to be a product of experience rather than the activity of a detached intellect. It assumes that all awareness is deliberate; in other words, whenever we attempt to make sense of anything, we do it with a specific goal in mind. The foundation of phenomenological analysis is debates and reflections on firsthand sensory perception and experiences of the topic under study. Your capacity to approach a project devoid of past preconceptions, definitions, or theoretical frameworks serves as the strategy's starting point.

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CHAPTER 3

STUDY ON THE COGNITIVE MAPPING

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ABSTRACT:

Any visual depiction of a person's (or a group's) mental model for a certain procedure or topic is referred to as a cognitive map. There are no restrictions on how the ideas and the connections between them should be visually depicted in cognitive maps, therefore they are not subject to any visual norms. In this chapter author is discusses themental functioning and the Rorschach test.

KEYWORDS:

Cognitive, Leaders, Political, Policies, Traits.

INTRODUCTION

The cognitive mapping approach may be used to represent the causal claims or beliefs of certain political leaders, especially when such assertions or views entail connections between objectives, goals, and results or impacts. Different leaders' maps may be compared and assessed based on attributes including density, balance, connections between peripheral and policy variables, and other factors. Hart employed this method to research Latin American leaders, and Hart and Greenstein examined the cognitive maps of Wilson and Eisenhower, the presidents of the United States. To analyze diplomatic events like the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference and the 19705 weapons reduction discussions, Bonham mentions uses of cognitive mapping. In a study of British leaders during the crises of 1938–1939, Walker and Watson investigated the link between cognitive mapping and several indicators of cognitive complexity[1], [2].

Explaining Style

Explanatory style is a result of decades of study on factors including patterns of cause attribution and internal vs external locus of control. An optimistic explanatory approach entails attributing particular, transient, external causes to "bad" occurrences. It is associated with enthusiasm, tenacity, and successful accomplishment. Zullo et al. discovered that throughout the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the ensuing US military buildup for the Vietnam War, Lyndon Johnson had a very optimistic explaining style. Johnson chose not to run for reelection, however, after the 1968 Tet Offensive exposed the limitations of American strength and achievement. His explanation style score dropped into the pessimistic or melancholy category at this point. These findings are fascinating, but further study will be necessary to understand if optimism encourages a generalized aggressive foreign policy or only a zealous and persistent pursuit of any foreign policy. Satterfield's research on various global leaders suggests that an optimistic explanatory style is linked to hazardous, aggressive policies, acts, and occurrences, particularly when paired with low integrative complexity.

DISCUSSION

Mental Functioning and the Rorschach Test

Most psychologists contend that the Rorschach inkblot test reflects the structure of the mind or a wide range of processes of mental functioning, such as complexity, accuracy, abstraction and integration, conventionality, capacity for fantasy and inner reflection, anxiety, introspection, and emotional regulation. This is true even though it has frequently been claimed that the test measures all kinds of psychological traits, including ends, goals, or motives. The Rorschach-based study of Nazi leaders is a notable study that highlights the wide range in intelligence and mental functioning among different Nazi leaders, despite the fact that the best methods of administration and interpretation of the Rorschach test are up for debate and the test has not been frequently used in assessing political leaders.

A new method of administering a personality test via proxy is combined with Rorschach interpretation in a new study of Rudolf Hoess, the first commander of the Auschwitz concentration camp. In this case, two psychologists who were well-versed in Hoess's life's specifics completed the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory in Hoess's place.

Behavior and Qualities

The public, outwardly apparent, stylistic facets of personality are referred to as the realm of characteristics.

Extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience are five characteristic factors or dimensions that personality psychologists think are important. Rubenzer, Faschingbauer, and Ones asked 115 writers of presidential biographies to complete three separate standard instruments in order to quantify these five characteristic dimensions across all forty-one U.S. presidents from Washington through Clinton. They studied the character traits of Washington and Lincoln and found modest connections between presidential performance evaluations and the "openness to experience" factor for all presidents [3], [4]. Simonton examined a number of trait characteristics for U.S. presidents, in this instance by having students rate complete adjective checklists or lists of trait phrases after reading short personality summaries taken from presidential biographies.

Several academics have investigated specific characteristics of diverse groupings of political leaders. In a study of more than 200 male United States diplomatic service officials, military officers, and domestic affairs experts, Etheredge employed questionnaires and standard personality tests to evaluate attributes directly. He discovered that males who were competitive and dominant were more inclined to describe Soviet foreign policy as "active," "strong," and "menacing." They were also more inclined to support the use of force in a variety of situations involving fictitious international disturbance or Soviet "expansion," which is consistent with their opinions. Men who had high levels of self-esteem and interpersonal trust, however, were opposed to using force.

Etheredge then used a distance analysis of American presidents and foreign policy advisors from the 20th century to validate similar findings. Judges who read passages from popular biographies evaluated traits. Etheredge discovered that those leaders deemed to be high in dominance advocated in favor of employing force and against arbitration and disarmament in a series of foreign policy debates between 1898 and 1968. The Soviet Union's collaboration was backed by

leaders who were rated as having strong extraversion, while the Soviet Union's opposition came from more introverted leaders.

Based on Bales' definition of two different types of group leaders, Hermann's interpersonal style variable of task versus interpersonal focus may include a range of characteristics, including extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Task-oriented leaders often engage in foreign policy, as could be anticipated, but Hermann's findings also imply that, depending on the impact of other factors, this activity may be focused on either an expansionist or just a self-reliant foreign policy. Weintraub created content analysis metrics for multiple qualities and several decision-making philosophies. Later, he used same techniques to analyze the news conference remarks of US presidents from Eisenhower through Reagan.

Several inferences from the study literature included in this Summary of Single-Variable Research Results are suggested. Foreign policy behaviors are broadly divided into two categories: war disposition and peace disposition, to make comparison and integration of findings easier.

According to the, it is evident that a war disposition in foreign policy is linked to power aims, a dominant behavioral style, and simple cognitive processes that include nationalistic ideas and mistrust. On the other hand, peaceful dispositions come from having affiliative aims, a trusting, extraverted behavioral style, as well as cognitive complexity and self-esteem[5].

Multivariate Strategies and Personality Orientations

According to the conclusions outlined, forecasts of political conduct are probably best produced utilizing combinations of variables, ideally those that are gathered from several aspects or levels of investigation. But, personality is a complex and integrated totality rather than just a collection of discrete and isolated individual factors. In contrast to affiliation goals and trust, extraversion may have quite different impacts when paired with power goals and mistrust. Hermann has created several techniques for creating integrated, multivariate profiles, but personality research is currently searching for the best study plan to handle such complexity.

For the Purpose of Integrating Personality and Foreign Policy

The eight motivations, cognitions, and qualities that Hermann had previously researched as distinct variables were combined in a variety of ways to create a series of six personality orientations. Hermann then presents these orientations along with their component factors. These particular orientations, which center on ideas about the function of the country in relation to foreign policy, were generated from a body of work on political psychology, but they may also be seen as metaphors for certain typical personality traits in politics more broadly.

The Situationist Challenge and personality testing

Several theorists have argued about the relative contributions of personality and contextual elements to the explanations of behavior over the last 25 years. It is obvious that situational considerations often trump the impact of "deeper" personality traits. Moreover, the possibilities and restrictions of specific places in formal and informal organizations and institutions place boundaries on the influence of personality.

Hermann put a focus on how different personality traits combine and interact, but she also proposed a number of additional elements, such as situational circumstances, that "filter" or

moderate the impact of personality on foreign policy conduct. For instance, a keen interest in international affairs is likely to intensify the impacts of personality, while education, experience, and environmental sensitivity are likely to have the opposite effect.

Presidents Hermann and George H. W. Bush, Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, and Hafez al-Assad of Syria. For instance, Reagan demonstrated elements of both the "expansionist" and the "developmental" orientations based on his ratings on the eight component variables. Bush, on the other hand, was seen as more of a media integrator. Gorbachev's pattern of scores categorized him as a "developmental" leader, ready to use any strategies and solicit any assistance to advance his nation. Despite Gorbachev's greatest efforts, the Soviet Union ultimately proved to be an ineffective political force[6], [7].

Hermann's model reflects some of the most sophisticated and cutting-edge trends of contemporary personality theory and research applied to the interpretation and understanding of foreign policy behavior. It does this by combining the interactive effects of eight objectively defined, major personality variables with these filters of interest, learning, and situation. This model's startling corroboration in the Reagan, Bush, and Gorbachev examples should promote further research and use of it.

The Distance Evaluation

We must understand that forecasts of leaders' conduct must always be made in contingent or conditional "if/then" terms, no matter how accurate psychobiographical profiling or at-a-distance metrics may be. In other words, a leader's personality will always have an impact on the circumstances in which they find themselves, and personality profiling can never accurately forecast those circumstances. On the other hand, we should be able to advance academically and make significant contributions to the creation of policy by creating sophisticated methods to represent the interaction of personality aspects with one another, as well as with the situation and surroundings.

Winter et al. followed up on their research of Bush and Gorbachev by demonstrating how forecasts based on a leader's personality profile must be "conditionally hedged" in the event that unexpected changes in the situation arise. Specifically, they noted George H. W. Bush's impulsivity and tendency to react defensively, with anger, when threatened by someone perceived as different, as happened when Saddam Hussein's armed forces invaded Kuwait in 1990. This is despite the fact that their original profile of George H. W. Bush had described him as a "peacemaker, concerned with development, and not prone to seek political ends through violence and war." Bush continued to battle in the Gulf War in ways that matched his personality as a whole.

Winter et al. found that personality profiles may still provide helpful "if/then" guidance to understanding leader behavior even in the face of situational uncertainty and shocks.

With the use of psychobiographical profiles and objective at-a-distance measurements, academic research and practice for profiling and evaluating political leaders have made significant strides in recent decades.

Subsequent chapters of this book include more in-depth explanations of these techniques and instances of how they were used to two political figures—Saddam Hussein and William Jefferson Clinton—from quite different political environments.

Patterns of Self-Identification

"The crucial role of auto-suggestion in the career of Hitler" is the focus of this section. As the soldier Hitler was recuperating in the hospital in the autumn of 1918, "He was given the order to rescue his despondent nation from an upper world. In the shape of a divine vision, this calling was revealed to Hitler. He made the decision to enter politics right then and then. He believed that his goal was to set Germany free."

He identified himself in several ways while carrying out that objective, including the following:

Hitler spoke to himself as "the drummer, marching ahead of a great movement of freedom to come" at a number of gatherings. He changed the message from "the drummer" to one in which he identified himself as John the Baptist, referring to himself as a voice wailing in the desert.

Messiah: Beginning in the early 1920s, it was evident that Hitler was becoming more and more of a deity. In response to a report that he was engaged to his doctor's daughter in the spring of 1923, Hitler wrote to the physician, saying, "I allow you therefore to inform the press that I will never commit myself to a woman or marry a woman. The German People are and always will be my one and only genuine bride. This would serve to remind individuals acquainted with Christian literature that the Church was Christ's one and only legitimate bride.

Hitler had a special admiration for Cromwell and often referred to him as an adversary of Catholicism, communism, the universal vote, and parliamentarianism. Hitler especially idolized Cromwell for acting as his own dictator and was intrigued by his murder of Charles I, which undoubtedly had an impact on his 1930 campaign slogan "Heads shall roll."

Frederick the Great: It is certain that the early years of Frederick's childhood, during which he violently resisted his strict father, fascinated Adolf Hitler. Nonetheless, the author points out that Hitler seemed to identify with Frederick's father, who would have "beheaded his own son to impose discipline. That is how German justice ought to operate. A beheading or acquittal."

General Bleucher, also known as "Marshall Vorwaerts," was the impetus behind the German resistance to Napoleon and a symbol of their faith and bravery. He served as an inspiration to Adolf Hitler. According to Hitler, Napoleon's nervous breakdown was caused by Bleucher's relentless offensive strategy.

Hitler was most interested in Napoleon in the history of Europe. Hitler's description of Napoleon as "Napoleon the Jacobin, Napoleon the soldier, the publicist, the coiner of words, the dictator, the Emperor" shows how fascinated he was with and tried to mimic the Frenchman. Napoleon, who insisted that his subjects follow his example so that "Napoleon became France and France Napoleon," served as the inspiration for Hitler's own management style. Hitler, like Napoleon, focused heavily on appealing to the nation's young. Hitler cultivated a following of "little Hitlers" by mocking the elderly and the wealthy. Both presidents were "like avalanches," serving as conduits for the core desires of their respective countries. Hitler saw himself as "the scourging Messiah," whereas Napoleon regarded himself as the "flagellum Dei."

Method for Making Speeches

The following subjects were included under the last title of "speechmaking method": speech preparation, entrance, interruptions, speech, posture, oratory, end, avoidance of names and personages, and exit strategy.

Hitler was thorough in his speech preparation because he understood the importance of his oratory. He worked on each speech for four to six hours and used cues on ten to twelve foolscap pages. He would never read a speech since he knew that doing so would take away from its spontaneity. The notes were solely for cuing. Each element of his speech, including the arrival, leave, and martial music, was meticulously planned since he was very interested in the audience's response. He gave speeches that lasted an average of two and a half to three hours, during which time he focused on persuading the audience to agree with his beliefs rather than soliciting applause. His talks had a rhythm, with the opening two thirds being in march tempo. He would expertly dismantle the objections he had presented while often contesting his own beliefs. He transitions between exhortation, promise, dedication, and the rhapsodic conclusion in the closing portion of the speech. "The last eight to ten minutes of Hitler's speech resembled an orgasm of words," a critic wrote. It resembles the heartfelt conclusion of the romantic comedy *Liebestod*.

Comment

Several of the topics covered in this book are highly fascinating, especially Hitler's preoccupation with himself as a political actor, his obsessive worry for how he comes across, his growing Messiah complex, and his identification with himself as the savior of the German people. And although a policymaker reading this evaluation may feel that he or she has a better knowledge of Hitler after reading this account, it is not at all evident how to transfer these understandings into recommendations for public policy, which was perhaps the motivation for hiring the Langer research.

The Mind of Adolf Hitler, by Langer

The psychoanalyst Walter Langer's evaluation of Adolf Hitler is widely regarded as the first at-a-distance leader personality assessment conducted in support of U.S. government policy. In order to better comprehend the psychology of the German people and the morale of the American people, "Wild Bill" Donovan of the OSS requested Langer to establish a Psychoanalytic Field Unit.

In the spring of 1943, Donovan told Langer that they need "a realistic analysis of the German situation" due to the spectacular nature of Hitler's leadership. If Hitler is in charge, what sort of a guy is he, Donovan questioned? What goals does he have? How does he come across to Germans? How does he get along with his colleagues? What is his history? Most importantly, we want to learn as much as we can about his psychological makeup—the characteristics that make him who he is. We should also be aware of what he may do if things start to go against him.

Langer immediately saw that Hitler was more complex than the irrational paperhanger portrayed in popular culture. He was perplexed as to how this shady no-gooder, who had never advanced past the rank of lance corporal, "in the course of a relatively few years talk his way into the highest political offices, hoodwink the experienced leaders of the major powers, turn millions of highly civilized people into barbarians, order the extermination of a large segment of the population, build and control the mightiest war machine ever known, and plunge the world into history's most horrific conflict." Langer searched the United States and Canada for people who had contact with Hitler and individually interviewed each of them. He did this with the help of three researchers in New York with psychoanalytic training who evaluated the literature on file in the New York Public Library. Langer conducted a paper under extreme time constraints, which

was circulated among official circles in the autumn of 1943 but wasn't released until 1969. The research, which takes a psychobiographical approach, explores the formative experiences in Hitler's youth and how they influenced his developing personality, putting forth the strong psychodynamic forces that would later manifest themselves in such devastating ways on the political arena.

It's helpful to learn from Langer's study's design. The "Hitler as He Believes Himself to Be" part is followed by "Hitler as He Knows Himself," "Hitler as the German People Know Him," and "Hitler as His Associates Know Him." Hitler is only shown in Langer's "Hitler, Psychological Analysis and Reconstruction" and "Hitler, His Likely Conduct in the Future" after being examined via these four lenses.

Langer chose phrases from Hitler's writings and remarks to his colleagues to use in the presentation of the section titled "Hitler as He Knows Himself." The decision-making process followed Langer's psychoanalytic framework. Hitler had a great understanding of his own destiny, he said. When Strasser indicated that Hitler was incorrect during a policy debate early in his career, Hitler said, "I cannot be mistaken. I speak and act historically. Langer noted that his lofty self-perception extended beyond his position as a statesman. Hitler also thought he had special abilities on the battlefield. "I don't play in battle. I refuse to take commands from the generals. I'm the one in charge of the conflict. He also believed himself to be an exceptionally talented jurist. The German people's highest court "was the last twenty-four hours" "He thinks no one in German history is as qualified as he is to lead the Germans to the positions of dominance which all German politicians have thought they deserved but were unable to attain," Rauschning said in response to Hitler's elevated trust in his own abilities. In addition to his impressive skills, Langer noted that Hitler took tremendous delight in his violence and hardness: "I am one of the harshest men Germany has had for decades, probably for centuries, endowed with the greatest authority of any German leader. But above all, I believe in my achievement. I have a firm belief in it.

Hitler equated himself with Christ in his messianic leadership, but Christ was a gentle, loving being, and Hitler's pride in his harshness was in opposition to that. He dealt with it by changing the definition of Christ's essence, saying, "My Christian conviction refers to my Lord and Savior as a warrior. It identifies the person who, in God's reality, was greatest as a warrior rather than a sufferer and who called men to battle against the Jews after seeing them for what they were. I read the verse that describes how the Lord finally rose in power and grabbed the scourge to expel the rod of vipers and adders from the Temple. What a great battle the world had against the Jewish poison. Langer came to the conclusion that Hitler increasingly saw himself as a substitute for Christ. When addressed with the salute "Heil Hitler, our Savior," he shone with pride. Hitler's propaganda machine painted the following inscription on a hillside, reinforcing his conviction of his own place in history and his affiliation with the Messiah: "We believe in Holy Germany. Oh my God, Hitler is big! We trust in the Holy Hitler!"

Langer recounts accounts of Hitler's obsession with his mausoleum, which would become Germany's holiest site after his death. Hitler said, "I know how to preserve my grip on people after I have gone on. I know how to build a monument seven hundred feet high that will have a profound psychological impact. They will look up to me as the Fuhrer and remember and speak about me when they go home. My life won't end in the simple way of dying. On the contrary, it will start then.

Hitler believed in his own success and infallibility, a diplomat said. He became enraged since this was connected to a reluctance to criticism. "Opposition to his intentions, from whatever side it may come, is a definite sacrilege, to which the only reaction is an instant and conspicuous exhibition of his power. To contradict him in his eyes is a crime." Consequently, Langer said that Hitler believed in his own grandeur, a belief that was strengthened by the reaction to his vehement speech.

Hitler was said to have a great sensitivity to his audience. Hitler "responds to the vibration of the human heart with the delicacy of a seismograph... enabling him with a certainty with which no conscious gift could endow him to act as a loudspeaker pro-claiming the most secret desires, the least permissible instinct, the sufferings and personal revolts of the entire nation" (Hitler, p. 2). Hitler emphasized that "the mass prefers to surrender to the strong rather than to the weakling; the majority, too, prefers the ruler to a pleader" in *Mein Kampf*, Langer said.

His ferocious speech whipped up the crowd into a frenzy. He was like a guy entranced, repeating himself into a frenzy throughout his speeches, which caused his collar to droop, his forelock to unglue, and his eyes to glaze over. He was "in the midst of a miracle," another bystander said. He was a guy who had been altered and was possessed. His hypnotic self-presentation was mirrored by the Nazi propaganda apparatus, which portrayed him as "the Resurrection of the German family and home; the Acme of German dignity and purity." He is the greatest architect in history as well as the greatest military genius. He is a never-ending well of knowledge. He established new social ideals and is an active guy. He really is the epitome of all qualities[8].

Langer intended to examine the psychological foundations of Hitler's belief in his own grandeur in this long-term psychobiographic research. The inner emptiness that supported and motivated the messianic self-concept and public position is powerfully captured by Langer. Langer mentioned the information indicating that Alois's biological father may have been a member of the Rothschilds, a Jewish family for whom Hitler's grandmother worked as a maid, while detailing the illegitimacy of Hitler's father. The crucial question, according to Langer, was what Hitler believed and feared. the betrayal of the November criminals, disobeying Marxism, and Jewish dominance of the globe. His captivating rhetoric was to progressively center on the Jew as the object of his hate and the "cause" for Germany's inferiority.

Instead than psychoanalyzing Hitler, this discussion of Langer's research aims to illustrate the analytical strategy used in this ground-breaking investigation. In the same manner that he attempted to comprehend the patients who sat on his psychoanalytic couch, Langer studied Hitler. *The Mind of Adolf Hitler* incorporates a psychobiographic analysis, a psychodynamic profile, and a portrayal of the public man, differentiating between those aspects of the public persona that are contrived for public consumption and those that are powerfully psychologically driven to fill the inner void. This is all that needs to be said about the life history of Hitler that Langer has elaborated. Even though it is a strong and convincing research, Langer admits that he is unsure of the extent to which decision-makers relied on his work. He did state that Lord Chalfont of Great Britain promptly recognized him as the author of the Hitler study, indicating that the research had been distributed to American friends.

Although the extent of this study's impact on the course of the war is unclear, it is of utmost significance because it served as the prototype for subsequent efforts to support government policy. This study was psychodynamically oriented and clinically informed assessment of a foreign leader at a distance[9], [10].

CONCLUSION

Concept mapping is seen as a technique that might help learning in a suitable educational environment. A re-conception of the teacher's role in which teaching, learning, and change are considered as integral parts of good teaching may be necessary for certain individuals in light of such an ecological approach. A cognitive map may be used to clarify hazy ideas, deconstruct challenging research issues, and identify priorities for more study. Users are asked to draw a map of a process, idea, or issue during cognitive mapping sessions. The mental models of users are shown in the cognitive map. It develops into a note-taking format that links each information or concept to every other fact or idea while using comprehension and focus abilities.

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CHAPTER 4

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL PERSONALITY PROFILING

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ABSTRACT:

The characteristic "organized" in political personality denotes a degree of interrelationship among the constituent elements, suggesting that a change in one, such as a rising need for social acceptance, would modify other elements and possibly result in a decreased willingness to challenge authority. In this chapter author discusses the Khrushchev at a Distance.

KEYWORDS:

Intelligence, Leader, Political, Profiling, Psychologists.

INTRODUCTION

In contrast to his predecessor, Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev emerged on the political stage in 1953 with a very different political demeanor. In order to evaluate this complex leader for the Kennedy administration, the CIA held a meeting in 1960. The CIA had accumulated a large amount of publicly available information, including interviews, publications, and videos. Twenty psychiatrists, psychologists, and experts in internal medicine made judgments of his political personality and health based on their study of the speeches, interviews, and movies. Bryant Wedge, a psychiatrist with training in psychoanalysis who served on the panel, summarized the conference's findings in a memo to President Kennedy in 1961, just before President Kennedy and First Party secretary Khrushchev met in Vienna for a significant summit meeting. He focused on the implications for negotiations [1], [2].

According to Wedge, Khrushchev had a hypomanic personality and was a persistent optimist who seizes opportunities. Nonetheless, his impulsivity was also highlighted. There was no purpose in attempting to convince or persuade Khrushchev of anything, even if it was said that he could accept dissent. Wedge made suggestions on how to handle him when he was being completely out of line. He also stressed the key distinctions between Stalin and Khrushchev. It is significant to note that, based on what was basically a phenomenological study, the physicians' conference came to the conclusion that Khrushchev fit a certain clinical character type. The distinct personality type they mutually decided upon has significant ramifications for negotiations. The Khrushchev study was a thorough description of Khrushchev's personality style based on an in-depth analysis of how he currently functions as a leader, in contrast to Langer's study of Hitler, which took a heavily psychobiographical approach and combined it with a phenomenological portrait to infer the psychological conflicts underlying political behavior. Wedge points out that he has no idea who saw his message or how it was used.

The Center for the Study of Personality and Political Behavior was founded. The pilot program to evaluate leader personality remotely was first established at the CIA's Office of Medical Services' Psychiatric Staff in 1965. It was decided that the experimental effort should be legally

included under the Directorate of Intelligence, which delivered completed intelligence to intelligence consumers across the government, since the results of the initiative were favorably welcomed by top U.S. government officials. This transition resulted in the creation of the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, an interdisciplinary behavioral science unit with lead analysts at the doctoral level trained in organizational, social, and clinical psychology, psychiatry, political sociology, history, cultural anthropology, and political science with a focus on leadership studies. ² A senior advisory team made up of well-known political psychologists from several disciplines was assembled.

The main analysts carefully collaborated with the senior panel to create an intellectual framework for the studies so that they would be structured in a way that would be most helpful to senior consumers. There was a keen interest among top consumers—in especially the president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense—in knowing "what made this leader tick?" These older citizens were aware that politics is about individuals. They were interested in the life events and pressing concerns that had molded the leader's beliefs. For this reason, the psychobiographic analysis, which made up a significant portion of the clinical case study on mental illness, was modified to place less emphasis on the crucial life experiences that contributed to future leaders' strengths than they did on the early experiences that made them vulnerable to mental illness. Moreover, one of the goals of evaluating a person in light of their previous conduct is to determine how they have responded in comparable situations in the past since this provides the greatest predictor of future behavior, all other things being equal [3], [4].

However, the qualitative information required to create a thorough psychobiography was frequently lacking at first, especially for what became known as "pop-up" leaders, or those who appeared out of nowhere as a result of a coup d'etat or other dramatic event whose actions required an immediate response. Often speeches or a news conference were the only information accessible to such leaders. Here, the advanced content-analytic techniques used by the senior panelists were of immeasurable benefit in delivering the first estimates of leader personality and mental models. These methods have sometimes been used in the future to prevent a surprise. Since the succession was far from apparent, Margaret Hermann undertook a comparative analysis of potential candidates to succeed Leonid Brezhnev, the head of the Communist party. This approach allowed for the identification and separation of the candidate most likely to be ideologically inflexible from the one most likely to be adaptable.

Senior consumers, however, preferred thorough, in-depth political personality profiles that positioned the leader in his or her longitudinal context and offered insights on the historical dynamics that influenced the leader's political personality for summit meetings and other high-level engagements. The 1978 Camp David discussions gave the opportunity for such a situation.

DISCUSSION

The Camp David Profiles

The psychological portraits of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, or the Camp David profiles, undoubtedly informed and influenced President Jimmy Carter's understanding of the protagonists and the strategy he developed for the conduct of the negotiations, even if the extent of their influence on those decisions is unclear. These were, in fact, among the most significant effects on Carter's personal diplomacy with Begin and Sadat, according to him. Carter discussed the depth of his research into the histories and characters of these radically diverse leaders in his

presidential memoirs *Keeping Faith*. Carter took a trip to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in August 1978, just before the historic Camp David discussions, to unwind before what he knew would be a difficult and trying endeavor. After spending the day fly fishing in the Snake River for cutthroat trout, Carter engaged himself in psychological studies of Begin and Sadat.

Our strategy would be novel and maybe unheard-of in history. Three global leaders would be cut off from the outside world. We would need to put in a tremendous amount of personal effort. / needed to comprehend these folks! I was studying psychological profiles of two of the main characters that a group of professionals from our intelligence community had created. This group could produce comprehensive biographies of any significant global leader utilizing data gathered from a close examination of events, written and spoken remarks, known medical histories, and interviews with close associates of the leaders being studied. I was really curious about Begin and Sadat. Why had they become the country's leaders? What motivated them in the first place? What were the priorities in their lives? What experiences from the past had influenced how they had developed as people? What religion did they practice? familial ties? their state of health? political convictions and restrictions? ties to other leaders? likely response to pressure in an emergency? Deficiencies and strengths? Political commitments on your part? opinions of the United States and me? Who could they actually rely on? How did they feel about one another? . . .

I sometimes took a moment to reflect on the negotiation approach I would employ at Camp David, and I took meticulous, thorough notes. These few hours spent outside of Washington were the perfect opportunity for me to focus almost entirely on a single, pressing issue: Middle East peace. My time spent studying at the foot of the Grand Tetons would pay me well over the days to come at Camp David [5], [6].

The personality profiles supplied to Carter may be discussed thanks to the article "Personality Profiles in Support of the Camp David Summitrecent ""s declassification. Because of their historical relevance, the Camp David profiles' history is covered in depth. This is the first-time a thorough analysis of the creation and use of the profiles has been offered. President Carter halted a briefing during a visit to the CIA headquarters in August 1978 to ask the gathered analysts and intelligence managers how they might assist him with the upcoming summit, which had just been announced. He was especially interested in being "steeped in Begin and Sadat's personas.

The CIA's CAPPB prepared three political personality profiles in response to this request: a profile of Menachem Begin that highlighted his personality's increasing tendency toward oppositionism and rigidity; a profile of Anwar Sadat titled "Sadat's Nobel Prize Complex" that highlighted his growing preoccupation with his role in history and the leverage it could provide in negotiations; and a paper that discussed the implications of the Colossus of Rhodes for negotiations. The profiles were created based on in-depth psychological analyses of Begin and Sadat's personalities and political behavior conducted in 1977.

When a coup, murder, or electoral shock puts to the fore a leader who was previously unknown to the foreign policy establishment, the CAPPB often received requests for "instant magic" and an immediate, in-depth personality profile of the leader. The CAPPB has frequently polled important intelligence consumers, such as the National Security Council, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense, to identify leaders of particular interest in order to anticipate the requirements of the community. This poll would often show a wide range of responses. For the

first time, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt had the highest priority interest in the poll, which was conducted in the summer of 1976.

The CAPPB would examine a wide variety of data while doing personality evaluations for different leaders. As well as offering important background information and insights, official and unofficial biographies often included television, newspaper, and magazine features. The difference between the authorized and unauthorized biographies—between the idealized leader as he wished to be perceived and the more realistic flesh-and-blood leader, with all his warts, blemishes, and psychological sensitivities—was found to be instructive. While many would dismiss the authorized biography as being exaggeratedly biased in a positive direction. Requirements were conveyed to the field when there were significant gaps in the data or unresolvable disputes. In many cases, answers to the questions posed to the field, which had not previously been asked, were easily accessible in the field in terms of psychologically relevant information. Debriefing top officials who had extensive touch with the leader in issue yielded very rich material. Although ambassadors and others who had dealt with the leader over time frequently reported on important issues, like economic plans or weapons procurement programs, they infrequently reported on the leader's character, attitudes, and negotiating style—knowledge that was frequently lost during the changeover between administrations [1], [7].

Some significant themes emerged when interview perceptions of government employees who had interacted with Sadat were combined with psychobiographic analysis. It was often noted that Sadat was preoccupied with "the broad picture," worried about his place in history, and detested specifics. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger often overcame diplomatic deadlocks over technical minutiae by appealing to Sadat's long-term objectives. Herman Eilts, the American ambassador to Egypt, recounted a humorous and endearing incident that perfectly encapsulated this trait; this anecdote would seldom be publicized, but we in the CAPPB believed it to be extremely revealing. The event was a luncheon that President Sadat threw soon after a negotiating breakthrough. The Egyptian and Israeli negotiation teams had reached a deadlock amid disagreements about the number and deployment of soldiers as well as the positioning of sensors. In spite of the protests of his advisors, Sadat had reached a major compromise in response to Kissinger's shrewd advice to set aside this little disagreement for the sake of history.

President Sadat, Madame Sadat, a strong woman in her own right, Secretary of State Kissinger, and Ambassador Eilts were all there at the luncheon. Without your wide perspective of history and your determination to be weighed down by minute details, we never would have reached this day, Secretary Kissinger added while raising his glass. President Sadat said, "Actually, Henry, it was your negotiation talents that took us to this day. Kissinger said, "Well, no, your Excellency, it was your capacity to think in strategic terms that. Madame Sadat stopped Ambassador Eilts at this moment and sighed loudly, "Oh, oh, here we are again."

The research "Personality Profiles in Support of the Camp David Summit" examined the interaction between Sadat's unique self-perception and this "big picture" mindset as one of its primary conclusions. The growth of Sadat's original foreign policy has benefited from his self-assurance, unique self-view, adaptability, and ability to break out from the cultural isolation of the Arab world. He views himself as a grand strategist and is willing to give up certain tactical advantages if he is convinced that his overall objectives will be accomplished. His self-assurance has enabled him to take risky actions, often disobeying the advice of his experts.

Sadat's unique sense of self was so evident that the key research on Sadat that CAPPB prepared was named "Sadat's Messiah Complex." This essential trait was shown by Sadat's innovative diplomacy in November and December 1977, which was highlighted by his historic journey to Jerusalem during which he disregarded the advice of his advisors. Sadat's extreme self-confidence was magnified to grandiose extremes when he was the subject of intense media attention and gave important interviews to people like Walter Cronkite, John Chancellor, and Barbara Walters. This phenomenon was initially referred to as "the Barbara Walters syndrome" by the CAPPB.

In the months that followed, his grandiosity exponentially increased. The substantial rise in his usage of the first-person singular pronoun was one of the most intriguing developments. Sadat stopped mentioning the issues with Egypt's economy. Instead, he spoke about "my economy." Reports that Sadat's plans for Egypt and himself were in jeopardy infuriated him, and he reportedly refused to trust them. As a result, Sadat's circle of advisors shrank to sycophants who only gave him the information he wanted to hear, which caused him to lose touch with political reality. Sadat's ostentation grew to such an extent that the CAPPB's profile on Carter was headlined "Sadat's Nobel Prize Complex." This facet of Sadat's personality was in the forefront of Carter's thoughts, according to his memoirs.

Strong and fearless, Sadat was well aware of both the general public's attitude throughout the globe and his status as the most significant leader among the Arabs. He constantly gave me the idea that he saw himself as the heir apparent to the ancient pharaohs, and he believed himself to be a man of destiny. When Menachem Begin took office in a surprising electoral upset, he was a virtual unknown with whom there had been little official interaction, in contrast to Anwar Sadat, who was well known to a number of US ambassadors. Nonetheless, there was a wealth of material available in the open literature since Begin had written in two autobiographical writings, *White Nights* and *The Revolution*, about the events that had influenced his personality and political views. He stressed the Holocaust's fundamental significance, which would be encapsulated in his well-known adage, "Never again!" Beginning as leader regularly made controversial remarks, typically in response to a reporter's inquiry, losing sight of the situation and the potential political repercussions. This quality was there throughout his career, in fact. Begin fondly recalls the many arguments he had with his Soviet jailers about specifics of Soviet law in *White Nights*, his autobiographical account of his political exile in Siberia, in which he often defeated his captors due to his better grasp of Russian law. For his personal well-being, nevertheless, this was a very detrimental action. The description stressed his attention to legalistic details as well as his tenacity for oppositionism due to his promise to "never again" submit to overwhelming force.

Carter demonstrated in *Keeping Faith* how well-versed in Begin's past he was. Carter said that Begin, like Sadat, regarded himself as a man of destiny and persisted on referring to disputed territories by biblical names like Judea and Samaria in order to highlight Israel's historical right to the land of Israel. A request by the CAPPB to focus one of the sometimes held dinner symposiums given by Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, on the subject of personality and the Middle East war resulted from the significance of the contrasts in personality between Sadat and Begin. Several senior individuals who had been directly involved in Middle East negotiations took part in this dinner seminar, which was held in the spring of 1978. These participants included Ambassador-at-large Alfred Atherton, Ambassador to Egypt Herman Eilts, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Harold Saunders, and Dr. William Quandt,

the senior Middle East expert at the National Security Council. The conversation purposely avoided talking about policy or substantive issues, focused instead on the stark personality contrasts between the two main characters and how they might influence the negotiation process. This was the focus of the third paper the CAPPB wrote for Carter. It dealt with the problematic ramifications for concurrent negotiations of the divergent cognitive styles of Begin and Sadat, the legalistic wordsmith consumed with detail and precision and prone to power struggles and Sadat, the "big picture" man who abhorred details.

This article informed and affected Garner's mediator position in these very private conversations, limiting direct contact between the two main characters, as well as the way he tried to bridge the divide between Begin and Sadat. Begin's "preoccupation with words, names, and terminology might substantially inhibit free-flowing communication," according to Carter, who expressed alarm. He once deftly placed into Sadat's lips his own worries about Begin's obsession with technicalities and the difference between Begin's and Sadat's styles.

During our awkward and rather brief conversation, Begin was getting ready to depart when I informed him that Sadat had voiced worry about Begin's focus on the little matters at the cost of the bigger concerns. Begin remarked with a short glance up, "I can manage both." Following achieving diplomatic success, President Carter thanked the CIA for its assistance in gathering information, praising in particular the personality profiles: "After spending 13 days with the two principals, I wouldn't alter a word." The Camp David profiles emphasized the specific relevance of leader personality evaluation in summit discussions and the importance of it for advancing government policies.

For the CAPPB, it's safe to say that President Carter's acknowledgment of the importance of the Camp David profiles of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat was a game-changer. The in-depth research they produced would no longer be seen as cutting edge. They are now seen as a need for every summit and a crucial tool for handling political and military crises. The CAPPB routinely polled top officials at the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the National Security Council to identify leaders of priority interest because of the lead time needed to build in-depth political personality profiles. While political-military crises and other unexpected international events often resulted in a sudden need for an evaluation of a political leader, the survey findings were a key component in determining the program's aims. A lot of embassy reporting would be focused on political, economic, or military issues, but leader personalities would get minimal attention. Nonetheless, there was often much untapped information about the leaders of concern. The background details crucial to a political psychologist were often absent since biographical papers generally started with the leader's rise to power. Nonetheless, inquiries to the embassy might often close these gaps. Similar to this, an open source search often turned up a gold mine of information from regional publications. As these sources were often talented observers who had never been debriefed from the standpoint of political psychology, the chance to meet with senior embassy officials who had spoken with the person of concern was very beneficial.

The name of the CAPPB was changed to the Political Psychology Center and then to the Political Psychology Division as the academic interdiscipline of political psychology arose. With the help of a senior panel of respected academic political psychologists, the division's analytical technique was thoroughly reviewed and improved in order to make sure that the studies were meeting the demands of senior policy consumers.

The approach's continued focus on making sure the participants under study were properly grounded within their various civilizations was a crucial component. This was done by often pairing a psychologist or psychiatrist with a subject-matter specialist. Thus, a cultural anthropologist with particular expertise in culture and personality would be a core member of the analytical team when evaluating a leader from sub-Saharan Africa, for example; similarly, a political sociologist with specific experience in the region would be a core member of the analytical team when evaluating a leader from South Asia.

The intelligence budget was significantly reduced as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, particularly when compared to the amount of money spent on technological rather than human intelligence. The extent of the resources allocated to creating thorough political personality profiles was drastically curtailed as a result of this cutback. However, there have been a number of intelligence "surprises" in recent years, such as the failure to anticipate nuclear testing by Pakistan and India as well as significant terrorist events, such as the bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya as well as the September 11 suicide hijackings that resulted in the destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization.

The Rumsfeld Commission was established in response to India and Pakistan's nuclear tests to look into this intelligence blunder. A key finding was that human intelligence and leadership analysis were underdeveloped, and that there was an excessive dependence on technology intelligence. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld named not knowing the motivations of potentially hostile opponents as his worst dread during his confirmation hearings. The need for a strong applied political psychology capability has been highlighted by some recent intelligence "surprises," and more resources are currently being applied to human intelligence and the study of the personalities and political behavior of foreign leaders, including both national leaders and terrorist leaders [8], [9].

CONCLUSION

The process of establishing consistency and uniformity with regard to the application of the procedure across the organization is known as institutionalization. The company benefits when all groups and individuals adhere to the same standards. Bricks and mortar of care institutions, regulatory policies and legal frameworks, professional accountability and paternalism in clinician-patient interactions, and patients' adaptive behavior to institutionalized care were all recognized. It produces predictable interaction patterns based on shared expectations and adds to overall stability. A social institution is an organized, interconnected set of social responsibilities and conventions that contribute to satisfying society's fundamental requirements on a social level.

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CHAPTER 5

METHODS FOR ASSESSING LEADER PERSONALITIES

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ABSTRACT:

An individual's leadership talents in multiple areas are identified by the leadership evaluation tools, which also highlight the best aspects of each. Knowing how a person might fit into a certain function in an organization based on that role's needs is beneficial. In this chapter author is discusses the developing political personality profiles.

KEYWORDS:

Decision-Making, Environment, Leader, Leadership, Political.

INTRODUCTION

The contrast between qualitative and quantitative techniques of leadership evaluation developed by the contributors to this book was observed in I. In section 2, Post and Renshon's qualitative approaches are used to pinpoint the structure of the person's personality and character. The quantitative techniques used by Weintraub, Winter, Suedfeld, Gruttieri, and Tetlock allow for a more thorough examination of the many facets of a leader's personality, such as beliefs, cognitive style, and other characteristics. Hermann, Walker, Schafer, and Young each place their own evaluations of leaders inside a typology that is characterized by a certain confluence of assumptions, motives, or characteristics. As shown in the following graph, each of these investigations outlines specific methods for identifying various causal mechanisms, which are processes that operate inside the person and link their environment and results[1], [2].

World political structural theorists frequently make the assumption that the causes of agency are transparently "thin" models of rational choice in response to environmental factors. These mechanisms are not autonomous in their effects and only partially account for the variation in outcomes across circumstances. These mechanisms may have a significant independent influence on choices and outcomes, according to decision-making theorists who have long contended that they are not rational processes endogenous to structural circumstances. To test the compatibility of a structural theory with a specific example under examination, it is required to evaluate the circumstances in which "personality" as a causal mechanism becomes more significant. The goal at this point is to specifically ascertain whether the case in question complies with the covering-law generalization from a structural theory about a universe of cases or deviates from it as a result of the operation of intermediary causal mechanisms between structural conditions and decision outcomes.

The causal mechanism may function autonomously in some situations, rendering the generalization invalid, or endogenously inside the theory, making the generalization valid in certain cases. An unconvincing argument in favor of the latter possibility is that sometimes causal mechanisms can interfere with the effects of structural conditions that are found at macrolevels of analysis. Making the case that these interruptions are more likely to be the norm

than the exception is a powerful point. The latter view criticizes basic structural models' innate underspecification, particularly when used for the examination of particular circumstances. In an attempt to settle the debate about whether the psychological processes that make up personality—beliefs, characteristics, and psychodynamic processes—are likely to have an independent impact on outcomes, Greenstein developed the terms "action dispensability" and "actor dispensability."

The authors examine the micro foundations of political conduct in the sections that follow by using various content analysis techniques to analyze a range of causal processes. These techniques act on many levels of the leader's psyche. Together, the writers discuss the leader's personality's characterological structure, emotional qualities, and cognitive states as well as the corresponding processes of object assessment, mediator of self-other connections, externalization, and ego protection. The first two articles by Post and Renshon examine how a leader's fundamental personality structure generates externalization and ego defense mechanisms and how they reflect the influence of psychobiographical events on the development of the leader's personality. The next three by Weintraub, Winter, and Hermann, respectively, concentrate on motivational and affective qualities that function as processes moderating the interaction between self and others in order to go further into certain aspects of the leader's personality. The last two articles, written by Walker, Schafer, and Young and Suedfeld, Guttieri, and Tetlock, respectively, are cognitive analyses of the process of object appraisal. They show how the leader's beliefs direct their course of action in the political world and how different facets of their cognitive style affect how they reason and make decisions.

The authors of these do not all make this supposition in their analyses, despite the fact that it is possible to postulate a straightforward linear model of causation in which the deep structure of the personality shapes and restrains the operation of motivational, affective, and cognitive mechanisms. Post and Renshon's thorough investigations make an effort to pinpoint pattern and shaping factors, but they are constantly conscious of the intricate interactions with the environment. The investigations of the other authors do not also assume a straightforward linear model of causality. Rather, depending on how thorough and clear their theories of personality are on links among ideas, motives, and character, they often express varied degrees of agnosticism about this possibility. In the end, we will revisit a discussion of the options for incorporating these findings[3]–[5].

Evaluation of Leaders from a Distance: Political personality analysis

The political personality profile was created to give senior policymakers a thorough psychological depiction of the leader in context. It does this by describing the leader's life trajectory, which helped shape important attitudes, as well as by highlighting specific aspects of the leader's behavior that are particularly important to policymakers dealing with the leader. So, in addition to the standard components of clinical psychological evaluation, management style, negotiation style, crisis decision-making, strategic decision-making, cognitive style, and leadership style are all taken into consideration when evaluating political personality. Of course, the cultural and political backdrop shapes each of these dimensions of political leadership, but each of these leadership traits is also influenced by the fundamental personality of the leader.

The word "personality" refers to a methodical pattern of conduct that is constant throughout a wide variety of actions and over an extended period of time. By finding the deeply established patterns that are consistent and, thus, have significant predictive consequences, we aim to define

the core political personality in the political personality profile. The political personality profile's main objective is to determine which political problems and decisions are particularly salient for the leader's personality. Nevertheless, it is crucial to stress that not all political circumstances engage the political personality. The aim is to determine which topics "hook" the leader's political personality and distinguish them from others that do not, to use more colloquial language.

It is crucial to include the past experiences that moulded and gave form to that political personality in order to be able to identify those problem areas and deeply established patterns that persist over time. It extends beyond the home setting and must also take into account the historical, political, and cultural background, as Brewster-Smith has noted. Contrary to the approaches of political psychology scholars who have concentrated on specific elements of political personality, such as political cognition, political drives and motives, and other traits, this emphasis on the life course and the entirety of the political personality, integrating longitudinal life course analysis with the cross-sectional analysis of personality, stands in opposition to those approaches.

Creating Political Personality Profiles: A Technique

The process for creating political personality profiles is based on the anamnesis, a clinical case study technique that combines a longitudinal and cross-sectional approach. The subject's life history is examined as part of the longitudinal analysis, which builds a psychobiography. In an effort to identify the fundamental personality traits of the subject, the cross-sectional technique examines the subject's cognition, emotion, and interpersonal connections.

But, while employing this methodology to study politics, the method used must go well beyond clinical case studies, concentrating on life path and personality traits that have an especially strong impact on political leadership. In contrast to the clinical case study of the psychiatric patient, where the primary task is to analyze the traumatic events that predisposed to the current illness, the goal of the psychobiographic reconstruction of a political leader's life course is to understand shaping life events that influenced core attitudes, political personality, leadership, and political behavior. Similar to this, the objective of a cross-sectional personality study of a political leader is to identify characteristic adaptive styles and those aspects of cognition, attitude, affect, and interpersonal relationships that bear on particular elements of leadership functioning, such as leadership style, crisis decision-making, negotiating style, as well as the identification of those political issues that are especially salient. This article's conclusion includes a summary of the longitudinal and cross-sectional factors taken into account while creating a political personality profile.

Contextualizing The Leader

The leader is seen as residing within a series of fields, including the cultural, political, and historical context of his country, the specific aspects of the leader's background that shaped the individual, and the nature of the current political situation. This is based on Brewster-Smith's map of personality and politics, as modified in Stone and Schaffner. It is impossible to overstate the significance of such political and cultural setting. In his pioneering analysis of action dispensability, Greenstein noted that the nature and adaptability of the political system have a role in how much a leader's personality influences political conduct. There is a significant difference between a leader operating in a closed system like a dictator and one operating in a

collective leadership in terms of how personality will effect political conduct. The way in which the culture defines the expectations of the leader also affects how the leader is formed and chosen. Political figures that violate cultural standards won't last very long. The extent to which the leader's political behavior is constrained by his job, by the culture of the political system, and by other factors is often evaluated while creating a political personality profile.

A very useful model is Erik Erikson's psychoanalytic framework, which links personality development to the cultural setting. It underlines the close dynamic interaction between the environment and the growing personality. The importance of the cultural, political, and historical framework in which the leader emerges is stressed by Brewster-Smith. Leader context—the setting that formed the formation of the leader and the context that continues to impact and shape the behavior and decision-making of the leader—is our emphasis. Leader personality does not exist in a vacuum. Yet one must fully comprehend the culture, particularly the political culture, in which the leader's family was entrenched before even contemplating the unique circumstances surrounding the formation of the future leader. The writings of Pye and Kellerman are particularly informative in this respect.

variables important to the study of politics and personality.

Political Leaders' Life Courses: A Psychobiography

The major goal of creating the psychobiographic component of the political personality profile is to influence events. It's possible to sum up many years in a single statement, yet it can take several pages to describe and examine the specifics of a significant day. Consequently, the psychobiographic profile is not only a linear and chronological picture of life experiences, but rather one that is collapsing and growing. Early leadership achievements and failures should be carefully noted and analyzed since they often have a disproportionate weight in shaping the course of future events. The style of writing the psychobiography should prepare the reader for the in-depth study of leadership and description of the political personality that will come later.

Specifying the origins of political identity is a focus of the psychobiographic reconstruction. In reconstructing the lives of political leaders, Erikson's focus on the construction and vicissitudes of personal identity is particularly useful since political identity is also consolidated at the same time as personal identity. This calls a thorough investigation of earlier generations. Consequently, Hussein's growth as a leader was greatly influenced by King Abdullah, the Jordanian monarch's grandfather. Abdullah, a towering political figure with charm, was embarrassed of his chronic paranoid schizophrenic son Talal. He began preparing his grandson early for the role of future king by choosing him to play a special part in Jordanian history. When an assassin's bullet killed his grandpa, the youngster, then fifteen, stood at his side on the Al Aqsa Mosque stairs. Young Hussein was also hit by a bullet but apparently escaped death because to the medal his grandpa had given him earlier that day, which was likely a significant factor in shaping Hussein's sense of destiny.

The mother of David Hawke, a former Australian prime minister, provides a psychobiographical nugget from which we might deduce the extent to which a political leader was fashioned to realize a parent's personal ambitions. Once her newborn baby was given to her, she stated that she saw her kid will become prime minister one day when she glanced in the crib. Her prediction came true, providing strong evidence that she had molded her kid to fit her own narcissistic fantasies. In her autobiography, Indira Gandhi discussed the importance of both her father,

Jawaharlal Nehru, who served as president of India four times, and her grandfather, Motilal Nehru, a well-known nationalist leader who served twice. Indira Gandhi said she did not play with dolls but rather with toy metal soldiers while her parents were away in jail, as they often were during her politically turbulent youth when they were fighting for independence. A soldier wearing a white shield with a red cross on it stood at the head of the line of troops, giving the impression that she was Joan of Arc. She repeatedly marched the men into the flames, indicating the beginning of her career's lengthy tendency for confrontation and maybe foreshadowing her eventual martyrdom death when she was assassinated by Sikh bodyguards in the Golden Temple. It is essential to note that she was referred to by her political adversaries as "the goddess of destruction" and was seen as a leader who often encouraged political strife and lacked her parents' conciliatory abilities.

Important Life Transitions

Erikson charts the evolution of a person's personality across their lifetime, identifying the significant crisis that occurs at each stage of development. The three main life transitions—the young adult, the mid-life, and the late adult transitions—are the subject of Dan Levinson's work on the life cycle, which draws on Erikson. According to Levinson, navigating one life change effectively means overcoming the difficulties of the one before it. Levinson's research has significant implications for how the leader's political conduct is affected by the life cycle. Understanding the impact of significant life events in forming political personality depends especially on his attention on the function of what he calls the Dream and the significance of the mentor throughout adolescence.

Childhood role models and heroes: The Building Blocks of the Dream

It is crucial to look for the Dream, the culmination of political desire that, for some, may act as a lode star, the basis of political ambition. Identification of early role models and heroes is crucial. The seeds of young Anwar Sadat's subsequent position as a mediator between Egypt and Israel, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize, were planted when he, as a young kid, associated with Mohandas Gandhi and would wrap himself in a sheet and walk his goat about while on a self-imposed fast.

The Dream, which is established throughout youth, may be the inspiration for greatness in the future; this journey might be sped up while dealing with serious illness. Throughout the years, Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, and King Hussein both survived by carefully weighing the political dangers. Both Hussein and Arafat, in their pursuit of an independent Palestinian homeland, have never been ready to split with the extreme absolutists in the Palestinian cause. Yet after facing their death and realizing how little time they had left to achieve their objectives, both leaders accepted significant risks for peace. The only time Arafat parted ways with the radical rejectionists and agreed to take part in the Oslo negotiations was after his helicopter crashed in the Libyan desert, killing the pilot and necessitating a medical evacuation six weeks later to the King Hussein Hospital in Amman for emergency brain surgery to remove blood clots on the brain. This action resulted in the remarkable handshake with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in the Rose Garden and the Nobel Peace Prize. A few weeks later, King Hussein had kidney cancer surgery at the same hospital. He then engaged in separate peace talks with Israel in an effort to atone for having lost control of Jerusalem's sacred sites in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, as well as to fulfill his historical purpose. Undoubtedly, his grandfather Motilal, who had met with Israeli Jews and Palestinians to try to achieve peace, provided a good

example for such efforts, but the timing, occurring as it did after his encounter with mortality, suggests that this served as an impetus to abandon his customary caution and boldly strike out as he faced the ebbing of his life. Of course, it is impossible to know with absolute certainty what motivates and influences a leader from afar, but as this example demonstrates, the more thoroughly we comprehend the origins of the leader's identity and goals, the more confidently we can infer psychological factors that influence political behavior.

Yet, intemperate behaviors have sometimes resulted from responses to dashed fantasies of grandeur, which have had a destabilizing effect. The White Revolution, often known as the Shah of Iran's purpose for his country, was his plan to modernize Iran and make it a Middle Eastern power. He substantially increased the speed of his efforts after learning from his French physicians in 1973 that he was unwell with a slowly growing tumor. He disassociated himself from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and quadrupled the oil earnings flowing into Iran, a country with a shoddy infrastructure. Rising expectations as a result of this caused a societal structure to become deeply unsatisfied, which paved the way for Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution. The Shah put his personal time above political time in his haste to realize his goals before he passed away.

The Mentor's Function

It is crucial to do a detailed investigation of the mentor's function since it has a significant impact on a leader's political behavior. Young Losif Dzhughashvili, who was subjected to the strict Orthodox seminary's requirements in Tbilisi, revolted by sneaking in Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin's writings. After reading Lenin's revolutionary works, he especially grew to respect and idealize him. As a result, he left the seminary to work for the revolution and help his idealized master realize his ambition. Yet there was a startling difference between Lenin as a distant role model and Lenin as a mentor. A mentor may be seen as a barrier to achieving power as well as a source of valuable political ideas, a teacher in the practice of politics, and a role model for political conduct. Once a devoted follower, Stalin became resentful under Lenin's direction and started vying for power and authority for himself, which resulted in a significant clash between Stalin and his master while Stalin was only entering his forties. Stalin continued to increase his influence after Lenin had a crippling stroke[6], [7]. Menachem Begin is another example of a positive role models lifelong effects, though their admiration for Vladimir Jabotinsky was not as intense as that between Stalin and Lenin. Jabotinsky's aspirations for a safe Jewish homeland had a profound impact on Begin and became a defining characteristic of his political persona.

Early experiences have an impact

A particularly rich source of information for analyzing the political conduct of leaders is autobiographical memoirs. We were lucky to have access to Menachem Begin's memoirs, *White Nights*, which described his years of political exile in Siberia, and *The Rebellion*, which described his leadership of the Irgun, an underground resistance organization, during the Israeli independence war. Begin describes how the Holocaust traumatized him and caused him to swear "Never Again," a psychological commitment that would later influence his oppositional political stance. Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez described the effects growing up under the shadow of a political jail during the Franco era had on him.

Psychologically Important Problems

Looking back, it's critical to recognize the difference between political actions taken by a leader in the context of his position and those taken in the context of his political image. It is essential to distinguish between topics that may be seen rationally and those that have a profound psychological impact. President of the Republic of China Chiang Ching-kuo made wise and impartial decisions about Taiwan's economic strategy, choosing top economists to serve as his advisors and contributing to the island nation's economic miracle. The fact that his father, Chiang Kai-shek, served as his principal political mentor, however, meant that any attempt to improve ties with mainland China would have to be made after his passing since it would be impossible to do so with the same level of reasonable impartiality. This illustration shows how crucial it is to determine which problems are relevant to the leader's political psychology. No matter how strong the familial influences, the leader is nevertheless subject to the political environment's vicissitudes, to which he must respond and adapt. In Laswellian terminology, the leader who cannot adjust to external conditions because he stubbornly sticks to an internally programmed life script has shifted his own wants onto the state and has justified it in the sake of the common good. Leadership that is ineffective or conflicted eventually results from the gap between private and public demands.

Studying political personalities

The objective of the cross-sectional analysis, or political personality research, is to identify and describe the nature of the subject's personality, with special reference to the political personality. The concept of personality suggests a structured link between cognition, feelings, and interpersonal interactions. In light of this, the organizational notion of personality suggests a connection between belief systems, value systems, attitudes, leadership style, and other personality traits. To put it another way, a person's personality places limitations on how they process information, how wide a range of beliefs and attitudes they hold, and how they relate to the leadership circle, including who they choose to serve in the inner circle. All of these factors have an impact on how political decisions are made.

Careful consideration is given to all of the conventional factors evaluated in the clinical case study¹, just as with the longitudinal analysis and psychobiographic reconstruction in the preceding section, but new factors specific to political leadership are also examined. Intelligence, knowledge, drives and affects, including hostility, activity and passivity, shame and guilt, evaluation of reality, judgment, interpersonal relationships, including the capacity for empathy, identity and ambivalence, and typical ego defenses are traditional components of particular importance to political personality. Health, cognitive/intellectual style, and the impulses for power, accomplishment, and affiliation are other factors that apply to political leaders. The latter are crucial when trying to determine if the leaders desired their positions of authority in order to exercise power, be remembered in history, or just to enjoy the spotlight that comes with being in a position of authority.

Defenses of the ego and personality types

As this recurrent way of mediating between the subject's internal and external worlds forms the core of personality and the cornerstone of character structure, it is especially crucial to recognize the distinctive pattern of ego defenses. It takes pattern recognition, not intuition, to recognize patterns in ego barriers. While it is not necessary to have clinical training to be sensitive to and

recognize these patterns, well-trained therapists will consistently be able to spot the same distinctive ego defenses.

Therapists and researchers studying personality development have pinpointed numerous personality types, each of which has its own distinct cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal style as well as a characteristic array of ego defenses mediating between internal urges and the outside environment. A hierarchy of defenses, from the most basic to the most developed, might be helpful in analyzing ego defenses. 3 As shown by the so-called psychotic trinity of denial, distortion, and delusional projection, defenses do have a tendency to accumulate. Paranoid psychoses and severe paranoid disorders are associated with this primordial, severely disturbed pattern. Contrarily, the neurotic defenses—which include detachment, displacement, isolation, repression, and response formation—are related with the obsessive-compulsive personality pattern, which will be discussed in more depth momentarily.

It is particularly useful to recognize a pattern of ego defenses when forecasting behavior under stress since this is when these coping strategies not only come into action but may also be exacerbated. This is especially true when people become older and experience more severe illnesses. People do not get more mellow as they age instead, they become a true self-caricature. As a result, the slightly obsessive person whose ability to make decisions remained unaffected throughout their early and middle years may later become immobilized by indecision. When faced with a crisis and forced to make a choice in the face of confusing or contradictory facts, this is likely to be very challenging for the person.

Under pressure, the suspicious person might become downright paranoid. The head of the Soviet secret police, Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria, was able to take advantage of Stalin's paranoid inclinations by murdering his competitors. Similar to Stalin and Beria, interpersonal interactions are greatly influenced by personality, which has a considerable negative impact on relationships inside the leadership circle. In order to protect his fragile ego from criticism, the narcissist may feel compelled to surround himself with sycophants who may seriously skew his understanding of political reality.

Each of these patterns of personality organization has the potential to be psychologically crippling in its extreme caricatured forms, at which point they would be regarded as personality disorders. According to the standard psychiatric diagnostic reference, the key characteristics of personality disorders are deeply ingrained, rigid, maladaptive patterns of relating to, perceiving, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are severe enough to significantly impair adaptive functioning or cause subjective distress. As a result, they are ubiquitous personality qualities that show up in a variety of significant social and interpersonal circumstances[8].

CONCLUSION

A leader who exhibited the traits of these disorders would not remain in the position of power for very long. The majority of the major personality disorders, such as the avoidant personality, the dependent personality, and the schizoid personality, are manifestly inconsistent with sustained political leadership. The narcissistic personality and the obsessive-compulsive personality, on the other hand, are disproportionately present among political leaders. While the paranoid mentality is uncommon among political leaders, it may have disastrous effects on global relations when it does. Significant examples of leaders with full-blown personality disorders can be found in the

pages of history, especially in closed societies ruled by dictators. As was previously mentioned, severe personality disorders are inconsistent with sustained political leadership, at least in democracies. However, under the pressure of crisis decision-making, each of the distinct personality patterns can at least temporarily show features of the disorder. Character, or the character armor, is another name for the pattern of protections. Character disorders are another name for the personality disorders discussed in this topic.

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CHAPTER 6

THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PERSONALITY TYPES, BELIEF SYSTEMS, AND LEADERSHIP STYLES

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ABSTRACT:

In order to maximize team performance, a great leader must assess each team member's strengths and limitations. Research has shown that a person's personality type is connected to their personality style and affects how they react to a leader's style. In this chapter author is discusses thenarcissistic personality.

KEYWORDS:

Cognitive, Disorder, Decision, Personality, Political.

INTRODUCTION

Certain leadership styles and belief systems are often linked to certain personality types. The variety of views that a person may eventually adopt will often be constrained by a key component of personality—emotional demands and desires. Those who are paranoid and live in constant dread of their adversaries are not likely to build a positive and benign outlook. As a result, discussions of cognitive aspects should pay more attention to how beliefs are emotionally determined as well as how personality styles influence how we make decisions and absorb information. The cognitive strategies that are often linked to certain personality types and emotional requirements may be identified. Prior political science research on emotional aspects have tended to be more narrowly focused on a small number of qualities or wants as opposed to more expansive constellations of linked traits and needs, or personality types[1], [2].

The article's description of the differences between personality types offers a way to explain an empirical finding that has perplexed belief system theories for some time: some people appear to be able to tolerate a great deal of inconsistency in their statements, professed beliefs, and actions without experiencing any negative effects from cognitive dissonance. It is exceedingly risky to deduce fundamental political convictions from public remarks for a personality type typically seen in political leaders, the narcissistic personality, such that the measuring of their declared opinions will show more "ambiguity tolerance." The narcissistic person frequently, in fact it is a characteristic, publicly espouses beliefs only for immediate instrumental purposes, that is, for the immediate political or personal utility derived from their public association with these beliefs. This is a much greater extent than for other personality types. From a methodological standpoint, it is crucial to approach these people's public declarations of their ideas quite differently from how one would consider the declarations of those who are more prone to consistency.

Biases that are "motivated," or driven by emotional motivations, "unmotivated information-processing variables," or a mix of these may result in errors of perception and skewed, seemingly illogical conclusions. Although certain personality types may be more prone to errors in

perception and computation than others, all personality types will sometimes be vulnerable to particular sorts of poor decision-making behavior. For instance, a person with a paranoid personality feels a strong urge to uphold his beliefs for a number of mostly emotional reasons. He had the tendency to detect hostile intent in his opponents. The paranoid personality will be most prone to motivated biases, most likely to ignore information at odds with this worldview, and least likely to revisit previous policies in light of fresh facts. In contrast, the obsessive-compulsive personality may make poor decisions as a result of a more intricate interplay between emotional demands and cognitive variables. The examination of political leaders has not made enough use of knowledge about these personality characteristics. Political and military leaders usually exhibit two of these personality types: the narcissistic personality and the obsessive-compulsive personality. Even though it is less common, the paranoid personality type may have significant political repercussions. We'll go into more detail about these three personality types and look at unique facets of the related styles that have an impact on how politics works.

Relationships between cognitive beliefs, information processing preferences, organizational propensities, and political preferences in personality and political behavior. The link between each of the three personality types—narcissistic personality, obsessive-compulsive personality, and paranoid personality—and two sets of crucial political functioning characteristics will be covered in this section. The identification of specific cognitive components associated with each generic personality type will come first. We'll look at two distinct cognitive factors: cognitive processes and cognitive beliefs. Second, this part will examine certain organizational tendencies and policy preferences that each personality type is likely to produce. The image of the antagonist, the views about the function of conflict and the image of the international system, as well as the beliefs about how war may break out in a crisis, will all be examined in connection to personality types. There may be correlations between a certain personality type and a certain operational code belief system [3], [4]. Affective demands and emotional impulses might limit the specific kind of cognitive belief system that emerges since cognitive beliefs are intimately related to other personality traits. Moreover, it is assumed that systematic distortions that impair information processing are related with certain leader personality types more commonly the stronger and more rigid the personality characteristics. Crisis behavior will be the specific kind of policy choice addressed here for illustrative reasons. Crisis behavior would include topics like basic approaches to international crisis negotiation, propensity for using force in a crisis, and negotiating tactics for that personality type in that crisis.

DISCUSSION

The Narcissist in Power

If narcissistic characters were removed from the ranks of the public, it is likely not an exaggeration to say that the population would be drastically reduced. A wide variety of actions are included by the term "narcissism." Self-confident, egotistical people are at the healthier end of the narcissistic continuum. However, malignant narcissism, also known as primitive narcissism, is an extremely severe and dangerous personality disorder that is characterized by extreme self-absorption, an inability to empathize with others, a paranoid outlook, an absence of conscience, and a willingness to use any amount of aggression to further one's own interests [5], [6].

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or DSM-IV, outlines the clinical definition of narcissistic personality disorder in the following material. A few of the characteristics listed are obviously relevant to how political leaders make decisions and behave.

The following are the key characteristics of narcissistic personality disorder: a grandiose sense of self-importance or uniqueness; obsession with fantasies of limitless success; exhibitionistic need for constant attention and admiration; distinctive responses to threats to self-esteem; and distinctive disturbances in interpersonal relationships, such as lack of empathy, entitlement, interpersonal exploitiveness, and relationships that waver between being romantic and platonic. Extreme egotism, egocentrism, and self-absorption are common manifestations of an inflated feeling of self-importance. While abilities and accomplishments are sometimes overstated in an unreasonable manner, tiny losses may cause a person to feel particularly unworthy.

There is an obsession with dreams concerning unattainable objectives. Achieving unrestricted money, power, brilliance, beauty, or celebrity is one of these objectives. In the quest of achievement, these dreams often take the place of practical action. Even when the objectives are met, it is often not enough since the aspirations have a driving aspect that cannot be fulfilled. There is a perpetual quest for acclaim and attention, and there is a greater emphasis on appearance than on content. This characteristic is also unchangeable, so there is a persistent need for assurance, worry about how well he is doing and what others think of him, and an exaggerated reaction to failure or criticism that may result in emotions of fury, inferiority, embarrassment, humiliation, or emptiness.

Relationships between people are often strained. These people are unable to relate with others because they are so self-absorbed. As others are really considered as extensions of the self and are only around to provide praise and pleasure, it is possible to dump someone abruptly when they are no longer seen to be psychologically helpful. Interpersonal connections often have an exploitative character. These people, who have a lot of charisma, are sometimes called "sharks."

The sense of entitlement these people exude is one component of what makes them "unique." They anticipate special treatment from others, demand that others carry out their wishes, and get incensed when those expectations are not met. They often disregard others' needs and rights. As a result, it is very difficult to maintain strong bonds of loyalty over time.

Since there are overt and covert aspects for each of the categories, there are many seeming paradoxes in the narcissistic personality. Consequently, emotions of inadequacy are concealed by an overt image of arrogant grandiosity, which helps to explain the narcissist's constant pursuit of fame and glory. When one's self-esteem is endangered, there is a need for recognition and a propensity to alter one's perception of reality. A corruptible conscience sits underneath the outward appearance of fervent morality.

The Narcissistic Personality: Leadership Implications

The section that follows highlights how narcissistic personality traits affect leadership behavior by amplifying the traits that were previously presented. The way the narcissistic personality strives to satisfy his or her psychological demands via the practice of leadership is one facet of the narcissist in power. The fundamental objective of the self-oriented narcissist is really to get fame, glory, and recognition despite their seeming prolonged concentration of their resources to

socially constructive projects and the selfless justifications. These people's overwhelming self-absorption, tremendous ambition, and lofty ambitions are the root causes of their relentless pursuit for approval and admiration. Nonetheless, there is an inner emptiness and doubt about one's identity that underlies and drives this search. For instance, Helen Tartakoff has written on the Nobel Prize complex, which is the pursuit of attention by narcissists with intellectual prowess[7].

Narcissists often and usually disrupt their social interactions. Personal exploitation is a trait, and the needs and emotions of others are disregarded. The narrator surrounds himself with admirers and needs them to shower him with praise all the time. Yet, it is a one-way street, and dedicated followers may be abruptly and without warning dismissed when they are no longer beneficial to the narcissist's psychological economy. The people discarded, who erroneously thought they were highly appreciated by their hero, may usually find this abrupt fall from favor perplexing. They did provide valuable psychological supplies of adoration, but they were not appreciated as distinct people with their own needs; rather, they were seen as a narcissist's extension. The narcissist often exudes extraordinary charm and is lovely to be around, which adds to the deceptive spell he casts over his close friends. As a result, it is often difficult to maintain faithful connections over time.

Sensitivity to insult and criticism is the antithesis of the need for praise. The narcissist is weak, easily injured, and employs complex strategies to prevent being damaged. The narcissist is able to surround themselves in what Volkan refers to as "the glass bubble" and put on a façade of icy indifference. As the Little Prince, narcissists believe they are surrounded by an impenetrable yet transparent shield as they dwell alone in a beautiful isolation, a wonderful but lonely life.

Narcissists cannot afford to admit ignorance because they are so susceptible to psychological harm. Due to the underlying assumption of ignorance that the learning process entails, which hinders profoundly the reception of constructive criticism, this in turn creates significant learning challenges. The narcissist typically adopts a pose of dogmatic certainty without any supporting information. The sensitivity to constructive criticism is tied to this discomfort with learning. No one can impart fresh information to the narcissist, and no facet of his understanding should be criticized, if he wants to maintain his sense of perfection and brilliance.

Volkan has stressed that the narcissist in a position of authority has specific psychological benefits that help him maintain his exaggerated view of himself. By discounting or even eradicating people who endanger his brittle self-esteem, he may really reshape his world. As a result, the narcissistic leader has a propensity to be surrounded by sycophants who are aware of their boss's need for unquestioning admiration and agreement and who have been made sensitive by the sudden departure of advisors who ventured to provide criticism or bad news. Hence, the narcissistic leader might be in touch with reality psychologically while being completely out of touch with political reality by surrounding himself with fearful sycophants. In these situations, the astute advisor will learn to make suggestions to the narcissist in a manner that makes the leader think it was his own idea, for instance, "I agree with your opinion that. "

The narcissist's conscience is mostly driven by self-interest. The narcissist does have a conscience, but it is a flexible conscience, unlike the sociopath who lacks an internal compass and an internalized set of scruples and standards. He honestly feels that he has strong moral principles, yet he is capable of making quick decisions when "circumstances change." He often conducts himself in a manner that contrasts sharply with the righteous anger with which he

judges the moral failings of others. The unwary may be entirely convinced of the narcissist's sincerity when he communicates the authenticity of his views, and at that moment, he is honest.

Since these ideas often change, it is difficult to associate the narcissistic personality with any consistent notions about the outside world, the enemy, or other concepts. Also, more than any other personality type, one should consider the narcissistic personality's words to be carefully considered for impact. So, when dealing with a narcissistic personality, giving much weight to the analysis of basic determining views from speeches is likely to mislead the naive political analyst. The narcissist does not communicate strongly held views via words. Their only purpose is instrumental, to strengthen his own position and get support and admiration. The importance of the ego is the narcissist's only fundamental conviction. What is beneficial to him is beneficial to his nation. The intriguing aspect of this situation is how this mentality transcends "naked" self-interest. The person starts to think that his reelection or reappointment is indeed critically necessary for the preservation of the national interest and national security.

The consequences of the central tendency for the narcissist's perception of the enemy are fascinating. For starters, the narcissistic personality is profoundly unable to comprehend or sympathize with other people's opinions, interests, or points of view. The narcissist has a propensity to drastically overestimate the level of influence they can have on the internal politics or foreign policies of other countries, which is maybe even more important. Referencing one's own personal experiences is by far the most crucial cognitive heuristic for the narcissistic personality when attempting to comprehend the universe.

These traits of the narcissist may lead to major issues with problem-solving and information processing. The narcissistic reacts to a completely different kind of agenda than the paranoid, who imagines issues that don't exist, or the obsessive-compulsive, who responds to genuine problems but in a fruitless, counterproductive way. What are the risks to our country and what may be done to address them are not the issues for the narcissist. So how can I take use of this circumstance to protect or improve my own reputation? Information gathering is done as openly as possible in an effort to win over the public's adoration and make the leader "appear good."

In general, the narcissistic personality would choose a management style in which they are in the center and there is a strong focus on group support and collaboration. In order to satisfy the narcissist's need for reassurance and prevent the narcissist in power from appearing terrible, there would be significant pressure to avoid division due to the narcissist's sensitivity to slights and the underlying fragility of his or her self-esteem. It is also challenging to provide new knowledge to a complete narcissist because of their desire to be omniscient and know everything. That behavior would be considered ignorant, which is unacceptable. The group's goal is not to create new alternatives or to increase cognitive capacity for evaluating these possibilities, nor is it even mainly to divide work; rather, it is to give a way for the narcissistic person to feel validated and supported in their desire for attention. But as long as they don't attempt to claim credit for the ideas, it may work if the narcissist's followers can present ideas to him or her in a manner that makes them seem to be extensions of the narcissist's own thoughts. In the narcissist's social circle, bright people who want to stand out from the crowd tend to fade quickly. In a sneaky manner, the narcissist often pits one counsel against another to make sure he is the major domo, the ultimate leader. Groupthink is a disease of collective decision-making that is most likely to be sparked by the narcissist in a position of authority.

The Compulsive Personality at the Top

It is common to find the obsessive-compulsive personality among corporate and government executives, scientists and engineers, academic researchers, and military commanders. Organizational skills, attention to detail, and a focus on logical processes are all assets of this personality type that may significantly aid in career success. Nevertheless, if these characteristics are overemphasized, the advantages might turn into disadvantages. The O-C personality disorder is comprised of this extreme. The O-C personality heavily relies on intellectualization as an ego shield, stressing reason and detesting emotion, which suggests lack of control.

The O-C personality disorder has the following key characteristics, which are best summarized as follows: preoccupation with matters of rules, order, organization, efficiency, and detail, with a loss of ability to focus on "the big picture;" indecision; insistence that others submit to his or her way of doing things; excessive devotion to work and productivity to the exclusion of pleasure; serious and formal relationships with others; and limited ability to express warm and friendly feelings. To put into caricatured perspective characteristics that, in more nuanced form, might negatively impact decision-making in times of crisis, these characteristics will be detailed in depth.

While the objective is to operate at maximum efficiency and perfection, this is obviously impossible. The most crucial chores are often delayed until the very last minute because of poor time management. The person becomes unnecessarily preoccupied with unimportant minutiae, "not seeing the forest for the trees," and loses perspective on the big picture. Making decisions is either avoided, delayed, or drawn out. This results from an excessive fear of making a mistake since the O-C personality's overriding purpose is to allow no space for error, to make no errors, and to reach perfection.

To the exclusion of enjoyment and the significance of interpersonal connections, the O-C personality puts a significant positive value on work and production. When pleasure is considered, such as a vacation, it takes much preparation and effort. Such people often put off enjoyable things since they don't have the time. O-C traits are prevalent in the ranks of workaholics. Nonetheless, despite the great focus on work, it is often busywork due to the propensity for being distracted with minutiae. As a result, instead of quickly recreating a lost list from memory, a person may spend hours searching for it.

These people tend to be too moralistic, scrupulous, meticulous, and judgemental of both themselves and others. People with this personality type place a high value on their place in the interpersonal hierarchy and are obsessed with their relative status in dominant-submissive interactions. While becoming oppositional when forced to conform to another person's will, they fiercely demand that others accept their way of doing things and are oblivious to the animosity their actions cause in others. These people are frugal with both their emotions and their financial things and have a tough time expressing kind, compassionate sentiments. In general, their interpersonal interactions lack charm, elegance, spontaneity, and humor and are serious, formal, and conventional. These people have been referred to as "living robots" by Wilhelm Reich.

Three distinct characteristics of the O-C cognitive style are highlighted by David Shapiro in his seminal book *Neurotic Styles*: rigidity, autonomy, and loss of reality. Because of their rigidity, people with compulsive disorders are sometimes referred to be dogmatic or opinionated. These people are seen as being uninfluenceable. They intentionally ignore opposing viewpoints in favor

of upholding their own, rather than opposing those that are different from their own. The O-C will be very focused and, while looking at the issue carefully, will gather the details, but not the overall picture. As was previously said, the person "loses the forest for the trees."

The obsession with attention and productivity gives these people's thinking and way of life a unique flavor. They often do enormous amounts of work, particularly in technical fields, and have exceptional concentration skills. They are very prolific. The O-C is frequently described as being "driven," but as Shapiro points out, if the person is driven, then they are the drivers, as the O-C very much marches to their own drummer and is their own harsh taskmaster. However, everything seems laborious, determined, tense, and deliberate; there is a quality of effortfulness. The shoulds and oughts to rule the O-C. These people often tell themselves what they ought to do; the concept of "wants" is foreign to them. A strict and constant condition of intentional activity must be maintained.

Therefore, the O-Cs aren't free men. These instructions, which the O-C must follow, are both onerous and provide explicit rules for conduct. These people don't feel comfortable engaging in any non-purposeful activity. It is absurd and even anxiety-producing to unwind only for the purpose of unwinding, which is why leisure time activities are planned with such gravity. The guarded state of focus, reluctance to unwind, and obsession with "should" are all efforts to maintain control. Feelings are tightly controlled, and impulsive or whimsical behavior is avoided.

The O-C personality has significant effects on how you make decisions. Avoiding errors is valued highly due to the obsession with accomplishing what is "right." As a result, O-Cs often struggle with reaching a decision's conclusion and look for further information to be sure they are not erring. To go through a decision-making process with a thoroughgoing O-C is a grueling voyage. Yet, they live in a world of ambivalence and confused sentiments, and their decision-making is like that of the "fiddler on the roof"—"on the one hand, on the other hand." And just as they seem to be reaching a choice, all of the doubts flood in to cast doubt on and often reverse the decision.

If there is a rule that can be followed, this agonizing decision-making process may be avoided. Hence, if a scenario's components match a psychological template that is well-established for the person—"When one is in circumstance a, one should perform b"—the person may apply the formula without having to think about it. Yet, the O-C will grow quite nervous if there is no formula. Hence, novel and unexpected situations are extremely dangerous. The focus on details might cause reality to be distorted. Shapiro observes that the O-C is preoccupied with formulae and is more interested in what "fits" than in what really is. He uses the example of an obsessed guy who said, "I must be in love with her—she has all the attributes I desire in a bride," about the lady he intended to marry.

Some specifics and even significant facts may be overlooked as long as the formula holds true. This results in the dogmatism mentioned before as well as the serious distortion of the ability to assess reality.

The Obsessive-Compulsive Personality: Leadership Implications

Compared to the narcissistic personality, the O-C personality will often take significantly longer to form cognitive beliefs and will be much less assured of their veracity. Although while the O-C

personality may eventually come to have a few solid, binary ideas, it is more common for the O-C personality to see the world through the lens of grayscale. In fact, the O-C personality often despairs of his or her incapacity to make clear decisions since they are seen as being so delicate and the world so complex. So, the enemy often has a complicated reputation. One is always doubtful about something.

The O-C personality's motivation in life is to acquire certainty and attempt to impose some semblance of order in an otherwise chaotic environment. The O-perception C's of the causes and characteristics of international conflict is impacted by this viewpoint. International anarchy—or, more specifically, a lack of order in the international system—is the primary cause of international war. One never knows whether there are further reasons, but anarchy is always an essential contributing component. Conflict will continue as long as there is anarchy.

More so than rigid cognitive ideas, the O-C is characterized by rigidity in cognitive processes. While the precise form of these processes may vary from person to person, all O-Cs have certain characteristics. The decisional imperative to "Act only after gathering as much information as feasible" and the imperative to "Preserve one's alternatives as long as possible" are two aspects that are shared by both the paranoid and O-C individuals. Yet, these information requirements are significantly more extensive and significant in the O-C. The O-C will want to view practically everything in detail. Owing to this lack of certainty, the O-C will have a strong inclination to select, by default, for the status quo or maybe make gradual change. The strong preference here is to act later rather than sooner, choosing procrastination rather than the dangers of rapid action or "premature closure." The O-C leans heavily on satisficing as opposed to maximizing.

The O-C personality would typically choose to concentrate on tangible and quantitative information over the non-quantifiable, non-abstract dimensions. For the personality type, which more than any other has a tendency to notice the complexity of the universe and a tendency to try to avoid "simplistic" understandings of problems, this is an ironic development. It is critical to realize how counterproductive the O-procedure C's is. The O-C reacts to uncertainty by immersing themselves in as many details as they can in a vain attempt to "completely comprehend" the situation. The O-C starts to lose perspective since this desire is so obsessive and the data search and absorption in detail is so thorough. Contrarily, the O-C is paradoxically compelled, unknowingly, to heavily rely on relatively basic cognitive shortcuts, most notably, to concentrate on tangible and quantitative facts rather than on abstract data, in the effort to comprehend the intricacies of the circumstances. He eventually just succumbs to minutiae and raw data overload and starts thinking about problems in terms of data. Quantifiable indices serve as an accessible and practical shortcut for comprehending the problem. The O-C is more data driven than the paranoid, who is more believe oriented. The lack of conclusive information is really unsettling.

The majority of O-Cs tend to favor a formalistic management style. The high desire for order and regularity that this culture has is best suited to this managerial style. Nonetheless, many O-Cs would not be satisfied with the summaries and general policy analyses of their immediate advisors due to their strong desire for raw data. Instead, they would ask for a lot of the unprocessed data and subanalyses that went into these reports via the usual methods. As a result, they struggle greatly with delegation and depending on subordinates who may make a mistake.

The O-preference C's in a crisis is to wait rather than take swift, spectacular action. By default, the O-C chooses, often, to maintain the status quo. O-C personalities will typically feel that they

are perpetually "behind the power curve" and that no matter how hard they try, they can never quite seem to be on top of situations. This is a natural result of their predisposition for procrastination and gradual solutions. When compelled to make a choice, it is strongly advised to choose a medium or mixed course—one that keeps as many of one's alternatives open as possible. In terms of bargaining, the O-C personality would prefer using both the "carrot and the stick" rather than just one, or they would follow a well-planned out order for presenting the first and then the second. If escalation were to take place, it would probably be gradual or measured rather than abrupt. Both substantial military escalation and drastic political-diplomatic solutions would be opposed by the O-C because they may limit one's alternatives. There is a propensity to prioritize method above content in military or diplomatic initiatives. For instance, the O-C personality may start to see diplomacy as being only about the protocols and the process.

After he has made a promise in negotiations, the O-C personality can be depended upon since he is a "man of his word," in contrast to the narcissistic type who may change commitments as the situation requires. Also, the O-commitment C's to establishing policy objectives and preferences might be seen as a trustworthy indicator of the organization's aims[8]–[10].

CONCLUSION

Based on common attributes, personality types categorize individuals into groups. Traits are enduring personal qualities that may be deduced from behavior. Even if they also exhibit Type A qualities, those with hardy personality traits seem to be more resilient to stress. Character, competence, compassion, and bravery are qualities that make a good leader. A person's personality traits that enable them to effectively guide a group of people in the proper path are those that they exhibit. You can make wise decisions thanks to your character. Humans respond to various circumstances, work most productively, manage disputes, communicate, and more. Since personality shapes people's behaviour, leaders need to be aware of the different personalities on their teams.

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CHAPTER 7

AN OVERVIEW ON THE PARANOID PERSONALITY

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ABSTRACT:

An excessive tendency to mistrust and suspect people without good cause is known as paranoid personality disorder (PPD), a mental health problem. Individuals with PPD are continuously on guard because they think people are attempting to humiliate, hurt, or threaten them. In this chapter author discusses the implications for political behavior.

KEYWORDS:

Disorder, Leader, Political, Paranoid, Personality.

INTRODUCTION

A persistent, long-standing suspicion and distrust of individuals in general are key characteristics of the paranoid personality disorder. Those who have this disease are overly sensitive and quickly offended. They are always looking for cues in the surroundings to validate their initial biased beliefs, attitudes, or prejudices. Their ability to affect others is severely constrained.

Shapiro goes into great length in *Neurotic Styles* on the formal characteristics of suspicious thinking, which are essential to the paranoid personality. Pervasive stiffness is a noticeable characteristic. Those that are suspicious are thinking about something and are simply looking for confirmation of that thought. Those who are suspicious don't just dismiss fresh information; they thoroughly consider it. The examination seeks to validate their presumptions by ignoring information that contradicts their alarming beliefs and focusing on data that seems to support them.

Being wary and on guard is reasonable and adaptable in many situations in life. Those with a sound psychological foundation may, nevertheless, let go of their preconceptions in the face of convincingly opposing facts. Those who are paranoid, on the other hand, have a strong opinion and are looking for proof. They will reject any proof that contradicts their preconceptions because they are hostile, obstinate, and protective. In fact, even the most sincere efforts to soothe or reason with them frequently result in rage, and the "helping one" may also fall under suspicion. Paranoids are always on the lookout for interpersonal threats and conspiracies, and they anticipate them without fail. They are prepared to imagine themselves all by themselves and surrounded by foes. This explains why the need for adversaries makes paranoia the most political of mental diseases.

Paranoids are often dogmatic and hesitant to make concessions. In a novel circumstance, they passionately and narrowly look for evidence that supports their prejudice while losing sight of the larger context. They often discover what they expected to find. There is a world filled with particular meanings and secret intentions. They are prepared to counterattack when a danger is detected, and they are prone to getting worked up about trivial issues and "creating mountains out of molehills."

They take pride in always being objective, emotionless, and reasonable, and they find it uncomfortable when others show passive, soft, sentimental, or delicate emotions. Except for a small group of people they completely trust, they shun closeness. They exaggerately want independence and total independence. Unless they are in a powerful position, they avoid engaging in group activities. They are typically envious of and rivals with those in positions of authority because they are well aware of rank, power, and their superior or inferior status. Others often experience anxiety and apprehension as a result of their watchful hypervigilance and willingness to retaliate. A paranoid must be approached with caution; one must "walk on eggshells" around them to avoid upsetting them[1], [2].

As a result, paranoid individuals have a persistent suspicion at their heart that permeates every part of their conduct and thought processes. The most essential formal characteristic of the paranoid's suspicious cognitive style, according to Shapiro, is rigidity. Paranoids have predetermined expectations when they see the world. They are already aware of the Truth and, as a result, know exactly what they are seeking for. They will scrutinize the information very thoroughly, "seeing through" anything that contradicts their expectations and focusing only on the parts of the information that support their preconceived notions. As Shapiro points out, this rigidity has a directedness. Their theories are the outcome of intensive and perceptive observation, not just an overheated imagination. Instead, they pay disproportionate attention to facts that validate their theories. What is the underlying assumption that this focused attention is confirming? The idea of external threat underlies it. Hence, a strict, deliberate search for external threat is the fundamental cognitive characteristic of the paranoid. There is also a deliberate disdain for contradictory facts since the assumption of external threat is a predetermined conclusion seeking corroborating proof.

Another important characteristic of paranoid people that affects their cognitive style, in addition to rigidity and intentionality, is hyperalertness and hypersensitivity. Paranoid animals will activate their rigid intentional cognitive mode in response to anything odd or out of the norm because they are continually on the lookout for danger and have antennas that are constantly scanning the horizon for signals of harm. So, everything unexpected is very upsetting to someone with this mindset. Their world has been upset, and their framework has been destroyed. To regain control over what had gotten out of hand is one of the objectives of the seeking that is mobilized.

Evidently, paranoid persons' assessments of reality are often warped to the extent that they purposefully look for only information that supports their theory of external threat and deliberately ignore evidence to the contrary. In actuality, their internal demands alter their perceptions of the outside world. Paranoid people don't appropriately put events in their full context when they look for information. They often miss the beauty of the scenery, whether it be a forest or meadow, as they look for a certain kind of tree.

The over-reliance on ego defense through projection, or the attributing to others of internal motives, desires, or other sentiments that are uncomfortable and so rejected in oneself, is the main cause of the paranoid style's distinctive suspiciousness. According to Shapiro, projection is an autistic interpretation that distorts the meaning of what seems to be reality. It is often noted that a paranoid thought typically contains some element of fact, that "projection is a compromise with reality," and that "the paranoid meets reality halfway." The increased urge for autonomy is a key trait of the paranoid that has profound consequences for leadership style but also influences cognitive style. Paranoids are continuously looking for proof that harmful people are trying to

manipulate them or turn against them. Being totally independent and emphasizing your autonomy is your sole line of protection in a society where everyone is a potential threat[3], [4].

Those who are paranoid try to keep their emotions under control, particularly their warm, soft, delicate, and passive emotions. This serves the purpose of resisting surrender and caving in to another. No capitulating to coercion or authority is allowed. This heightened dread of submission is a response to a strong desire to submit, a desire that the paranoid finds unacceptable and must be resisted at all costs. All spontaneity is stifled by always being on guard against one's emotions. Without spontaneity, there can be no comedy or fun, and there is undoubtedly a significant restriction on the presentation of new ideas. This ongoing internal monitoring has been described by Shapiro as "an internal police state." The paranoid is mobilized to launch a counterattack against the continual threat, like an army, and is therefore always on guard.

Hence, paranoids are engaged in a taxing and draining psychological battle on two fronts as they protect themselves against both internal and external threats. When internal conflict intensifies, suspicion increases, and through the act of projection, a more controllable exterior danger is created. The person then experiences a state of enhanced awareness, a constant state of alert guardedness against the now outward threat.

It is clear that those who have a pessimistic worldview and are always looking for evidence to support their central belief that there is external threat and that they must therefore protect themselves are severely constrained in how they understand politics and interact with it.

The explanation above makes it very evident that the O-C personality and the paranoid personality have a number of similarities. Both have a guarded rigidity, a stress on autonomy, and an attention to detail. However, there are also big disparities between these attributes. As the paranoid looks for hints, the O-C concentrates on the specifics. Whereas the paranoid seeks confirmation of a predetermined judgment of danger, the O-C seeks assurance. The paranoid is sensitive and wary, in contrast to the O-C who is stubborn and stub-born. The paranoid is controlled by fear and is always aware of imagined external threat, while the O-C is controlled by conscience, by what he or she should do. While there are many similarities, the paranoid style is more severe, unsophisticated, and mentally primitive.

DISCUSSION

The Paranoid in Power: Implications for Political Behavior

The paranoid personality has a tendency to have very firm, deeply ingrained cognitive ideas. This personality type is the most driven to preserve internal consistency among cognitive beliefs of all the kinds, often at the price of a "objective" analysis of new information. The belief system of the paranoid personality often has a strong and primary picture of the enemy. The enemy is seen as being fundamentally, all-pervasively wicked and a serious, unstoppable danger to one's own personal or national interest, as one would expect. There is little doubt that the antagonist will exploit the conciliatory intentions in response. By definition, a paranoid mentality perceives enemies everywhere. As a result, the person has polarized perceptions of the world. The world of the paranoid is a Manichean cosmos with friends and enemies; neutrals are unattainable. "You must be against me if you are not passionately in my favor."

The enemy's political and military expertise and capacity to perform dangerous measures largely unrestricted by logistical, chronological, or informational restrictions are powerfully prone to

exaggeration, as is the enemy's hostile character of intents. The paranoid personality has a tendency to see the enemy as being completely in charge of all of his or her activities, highly logical, and united. Never are people or countries forced to undertake anything because of external conditions. Instead, they always behave as a result of their unfavorable antagonistic traits. For instance, an adversary's acts are always "aggressive"—there is no such thing as an action that is only intended to safeguard their own security. The perception of the enemy's military might is weirdly divided. On the one hand, there is a propensity to overestimate the military might of the enemy in terms of how much it threatens one's own interests—the paranoid thinks that it does. Even if the enemy isn't a danger right now, it's never safe to presume that their military potential is so low that they won't ever pose a threat. The paranoid mentality, on the other hand, often overestimates his or her own capacity to momentarily undermine the talents of this foe.

The root of strife in the globe is the pernicious nature or character of other countries or people. War would never develop accidentally; it always results from the hostile party's sinister, aggressive objectives. International conflict is never ascribed to anarchy or even a lack of equilibrium between the forces in the system. The previously mentioned belief system is strongly related to the information-processing method and cognitive heuristics of the paranoid personality. This binary worldview is often reinforced by a significant and too simplified reliance on historical parallels. In other words, the paranoid personality, like the narcissistic personality, would likely to declare, "This is like what happened to me," when faced with a fresh situation in international politics. Because of their strict beliefs and the prominence of the enemy image in their worldview, paranoid people tend to analyze practically all new information from a worst-case scenario perspective. In reality, because the adversary's long-term objectives are already known, the information search pattern will only be tactical in character. The paranoid person will research potential military or political ploys an opponent may use in this situation, as well as potential countermeasures. Information on the "enemy inside" or "fifth column activity" will be a significant linked issue of interest. Those in one's own country who do not entirely share the beliefs of the paranoid leader are seen to be either suspicious themselves or, at best, naïve, unaware dupes. The opponent is believed to be highly creative and cunning in this type of covert subversion[5]–[7].

When forced to make a choice, the paranoid personality will show a great propensity to act right away rather than put it off because of the belief that "he who hesitates is lost." The paranoid personality will lean toward one of Alexander George's two management philosophies. The paranoid in positions of authority will either adopt a competitive or formalistic attitude. The choice will mostly depend on whether the person can name a few people in whom he or she can have confidence. If possible, he or she will often adopt a formalistic demeanor, channeling all interactions and information via a select group of very reliable people. Yet, the paranoid will more often choose a management style that is more similar to the competitive paradigm that George outlined. The underlying premise is that there is no one reliable source of information or center of authority. So, the paranoid leader employs a management style that aims to play one advisor or one bureaucracy off another one in order to gather a variety of knowledge and, most importantly, to avoid the growth of any possible internal dangers. Political decision-makers with a competitive management style, in particular, often display an almost insatiable need for raw data. Usually, they won't be pleased with the research and findings produced by subordinates. As

Beria did with Stalin, the cunning subordinate might capitalize on the suspiciousness of the paranoid boss to sow doubts about bureaucratic competitors.

The paranoid leader has a strong preference for the use of force over persuasion because of the paranoid's perception of the world as being very conflictual and because of the paranoid's perception of the antagonist as being unrelentingly aggressive and politically cunning. In other words, the leader would rather have a fait accompli that directly impacts the adversary's capabilities than use coercive threat to try to influence the adversary's readiness to use threat. Instead of attempting to "persuade" the enemies not to do anything or change their conduct, the goal is to change the leadership or capabilities of the enemies. There is a significant preference in times of crisis for what is thought of as preemptive intervention. The paranoid may even start a crisis or a war in the belief that taking preventive action against the enemy is necessary and that it would be best to "strike while the iron is hot"; in other words, since the enemy is getting ready to act, it would be better to act first while the military balance is more in one's favor.

The preferred technique of crisis negotiating is coercion via the threat of military retribution when the use of raw force is not seen to be practically practicable. To accomplish this compulsion, a predominance of force is preferred over a balance of force or an approximate equivalent. Since the paranoid can never be happy that they have amassed enough weapons or military capability, this predominance has no real bounds. Either the military status quo is mostly maintained by negotiations and diplomacy, or it is through exercises in Machiavellian deceit and counterdeception. Only to deceive the enemy into relaxing his guard is accommodation utilized. After thoroughly describing these pure character types for illustrative reasons, it is crucial to underline that most people, including the majority of leaders, exhibit a wide range of traits that do not match one pure type. Instead, results are influenced by the dominance of one style over another. The traits of a healthy leader personality support effective leadership, sound decision-making, accurate environmental diagnosis, and collaboration with a leadership circle that has been hand-picked for their experience and wisdom and from whom the self-assured leader can learn and seek wise counsel.

Lasting Thoughts

The single case studies offer a longitudinal perspective that is particularly valuable because it provides a framework for understanding how prior life experiences shape and influence political behavior. It also helps differentiate between political behaviors that are role dependent and those that reflect strong personality influences, where leader personality is particularly engaged by the political circumstances. Understanding psychological patterns entrenched throughout adolescence that psychologically continue to affect throughout the life cycle is a critical component connecting the psychobiographic and psychodynamic methods. The pursuit of the dreams of glory created from youth may motivate a leader throughout his or her lifetime, with specific vigor during the midlife transition and throughout the later years' transition. As has been stressed, dreams die hard. Finding persistent features of leader personality, including as cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal components, is a major focus of the technique indicated for building the political personality profile. The type of personality places constraints on information processing and the nature of interactions with the leadership circle, implying a relationship between belief systems, attitudes, and leadership style. Leadership style has a significant impact on both negotiation and crisis decision-making. As personality changes over time, the longitudinal method is useful for identifying persisting behavioral patterns [8], [9].

To demonstrate this crucial idea, a thorough description of the narcissist, obsessive-compulsive, and paranoid personality types of leaders and how they affect their political conduct has been provided. When present, these tendencies pervade all facets of political activity, including connections with the leadership circle, worldview, and decision-making in times of crisis and strategy. For the narcissist, the ego is everything, which has an impact on all facets of political conduct. The narcissist's sensitivity to slights and desire to be seen as all-knowing and flawless tend to create a leadership circle that is full of adoring followers. The narcissist's use of language is effective because their conscience is flexible; they don't have a set of beliefs, and their commitments may alter as the situation does. There is a tendency for the obsessive-compulsive to get mired in the minutiae. Particularly troublesome in times of crisis, the pursuit of certainty may cause delay and indecision. Negotiations are significantly impacted by the primacy of intellectual processes, the obsessive-strong compulsive's conscience, and the capacity to infer core values from language. The predominance of paranoid people's belief that their enemies are all around them shapes not just how they perceive political adversaries but also how much they can trust their own advisors. These psychological traits may be identified early on in a political career because they are so deeply embedded. It is also possible to predict with certainty that they will continue to influence leadership behavior throughout the political career and will intensify under stress. Certain character traits don't change with age. Certainly, these traits have a tendency to become stronger as time goes on.

Reflections on Method and Theory

Contemporary democracies provide the people in charge access to tremendous power and, by necessity, give them tremendous choice in how to wield it. Thus, it is important for democratic leaders to act with competence and integrity while using their power. The fabric of trust and optimistic anticipation that ties people to one another and their institutions is put at risk when leaders employ the powerful tools at their disposal corruptly or incompetently. In other words, the psychology of presidents is very important. The success or failure of their tenure in office is significantly influenced by their ambition, values, honesty, and approaches to handling the problems they encounter.

It makes sense that over the last 40 years, Americans have grown more and more engaged in attempting to understand the personalities of their leaders. Nonetheless, this desire has often been rebuffed and even prevented. What personal and professional qualities allow for a fair assessment of presidential candidates? Does every personal trait a candidate has fall within the purview of politics? If not, which ones do and why? Lastly, even if we are in agreement that certain personal traits do play a significant role in how presidents approach and carry out their duties, the issue of how to identify these traits without depending on candidates' perceptions of themselves remains.

Because of this, leaders have developed more sophisticated ways of portraying themselves as they would want to be seen rather than as they really are as the public has become more interested in the personal traits of its leaders. Any response to the issue of what character traits are crucial for a president must inevitably turn to psychology for support. Yet, as Greenstein noted in his fundamental analysis of the problems that political scientists encounter when turning to psychology some time ago, they often discover competing theories and open-ended problems rather than readily applicable answers. However, choosing which psychological theory or theories to use does not entirely address all the problems associated with such an endeavor. One

requires a theory of leadership performance in addition to a theory of psychology in order to connect the two.

Performing as President: Which Psychology?

Let's start by discussing trait psychology. For many years, people have regularly assessed politicians based on their political and personal qualities, such as ethics, leadership, and even IQ. There is much to be said for using attributes to assess presidential candidates. From the perspective of evaluation, traits seem distinct, particular, and measurable from a distance. Generally speaking, we can detect whether a candidate is intelligent, calm under pressure, or charming.

Moreover, there are times when the connection between a quality and a desired political ability appears obvious. Since voters are often required to trust a president's comments regarding policy actions and the reasoning behind them, it is simple to see why a candidate's honesty is vital. Concern about a candidate's intelligence would also appear to be connected, though not necessarily directly, to their capacity for understanding and maybe resolving difficult societal issues.

While trait assessments may seem intuitively attractive, there are a number of serious issues with employing isolated characteristics as the main method of candidate assessment. For instance, focusing only on intellect as measured by IQ may hide other cognitive or personal traits that might guide wise presidential judgment or decision-making. In addition, focusing on intelligence as a singular quality leaves out the question of how intelligence is used. It naturally forces us to take into account a person's motivations.

It is helpful to take into account a theory of psychological functioning that focuses on general patterns of motivation and the more particular patterns of personality and behavior that evolve from them rather than thinking about qualities in isolation. Such a theory has the benefit of offering a theoretical connection through which any specific personality attribute may be more securely rooted in a better knowledge of its function in the person's overall psychology. By doing this, it offers some insight into how certain features, when considered in the context of a person's general psychology, impact or may be better understood in connection to duties of office. Strong intelligence that is immersed in and moulded by a strong incentive to accomplish what is "right" will vary from strong intelligence that is embedded in a motivation structure where self-interest is predominate.

Psychoanalytic theory is a clear contender for such a theory. A comprehensive understanding of human motivation and psychological functioning is provided by early psychoanalytic theory and its more complex descendants. Also, it is a framework whose theoretical foundations may be discovered in ordinary conduct. As a consequence, it offers a wealth of opportunities for comprehending the duties and effectiveness of political leaders.

It does, however, have a number of shortcomings, just like any other hypothesis. There is no one single psychoanalytic theory, despite the fact that all psychoanalysts agree on the existence of unconscious motivation, the significance of early experience as the foundation of an individual's psychology, and the idea that people develop clear and understandable patterns of adult functioning that reflect how they have been able to integrate their experiences, abilities, and circumstances. Some place a priority on childhood, while others place emphasis on maturity.

Some emphasize the value of human relationships, while others concentrate on the internalization of object representations. Some people perceive motivation through the lens of primal urges, while others see it through the lens of what it takes to create and sustain a strong sense of identity. The argument made by Greenstein is clearly taken, and it applies to several schools of psychoanalytic thought as well as theories of psychological functioning more broadly. An example of such study is the theoretically advanced and contextually sensitive examination of the influence of Woodrow Wilson's formative childhood and adult experiences on his significant political achievements by the Georges.

The current framework for analyzing presidential candidates and other leaders is based on psychoanalytic theory, and it is influenced by a number of factors. One of these is the idea of creating a framework for character psychology analysis that emphasizes a character's nature and unique content rather than emphasizing its importance primarily on its dynamic functioning, does not require information that is only, if at all, available in a psychotherapeutic setting, and allows the theory of character and psychological functioning to be directly and logically linked with the analysis of leadership performance[10], [11].

CONCLUSION

Individuals with personality disorders often exhibit inflexible thinking, mood, and behavior patterns in response to a variety of demands and circumstances. The main distinction between healthy and dysfunctional personalities is this rigidity and difficulties generating nuanced reactions. Even when there is little to no proof that you are, paranoia is the belief and sensation that you are being endangered in some manner. Delusions may also be used to describe paranoid thinking. There are several various threats that might make you feel frightened and anxious. Psychotherapy for paranoid personality disorder aims to help you recognize your negative thinking patterns and balance actual and imagined risks. You could learn through this that you don't need to worry about as many things as you thought you did.

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CHAPTER 8

CHARACTER AS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE

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ABSTRACT:

The annual review's goals are to help the president improve his or her own performance, give the president and the board a chance to set new, mutually beneficial goals, and provide information on which to base annual decisions about compensation adjustments and other aspects of the president's employment. In this chapter author is discusses the character-performance framework.

KEYWORDS:

Character, Leader, Political, Presidential Performance, Trait.

INTRODUCTION

The word "character" is derived from the Greek word; describes character as "a person's patterns of qualities or his lifestyle" in his famous book on personality theory. He makes a distinction between character and personality. Character suggests "deep, stable, and essential structure," whereas personality signifies "appearance, observable conduct, surface quality," according to Allport. Baudry reiterates that the word "character" refers to the biggest collection of defining characteristics that let us recognize a certain individual. Our understanding of character is necessitated by the fact that people exhibit recurring clusters of features that are rather consistent, indicating that some underlying rules regulate the choice, arrangement, and relationships of these traits to one another[1].

Although, contrary to the beliefs of some "situational psychologists," each character element is not required to be equally present in all circumstances, the early understanding of character reflected three basic clinical observations: it was central to an individual's psychological and social functioning, its consequences could be observed in s patterns of public behavior, and it was present and observable in diverse circumstances. Circumstances may either encourage character traits or impede them. Certain circumstances may be more likely than others to activate a person's character traits because they more strongly resonate with their history or needs. Unluckily, the early notion of character emerged from therapeutic practice, which focused on function disturbance. For the analysis of character in our political leaders, who are not prone to reveal their inner-most fears and characteristics and who in fact work to present themselves in the best light possible, the view that character is essentially the sum of a person's defensive mechanisms or his or her inadequate resolution of psychological or developmental dilemmas does not provide a useful guide. Moreover, because this perspective of character focuses on explaining inadequacies and disruptions of psychological functioning, it is not very helpful since most leaders have significant character traits and abilities.

So how can we conceive character more effectively? We start by highlighting how character is distinct from other psychological traits in that it permeates time, context, and internal psychology, including belief systems, information processing, and all the other factors that orient people for work. Typically, beliefs, attitudes, and even neuroses only make up a minor portion of the whole personality system. Each individual may only be involved in a small number of functional domains that are important to them. Character, on the other hand, forms the fundamental cornerstone around which personality structures are built and function. Character sits at the center of the personality system. Beliefs, the way in which information is processed, and eventually behavioral patterns are shaped by character development and operation. Character is therefore profoundly ingrained in the most fundamental and crucial pillar of psychological functioning.

According to this viewpoint, character is not seen of as a leader's greatest attribute or flaw but rather as a collection of psychological traits that they bring to every situation. In this regard, a leader's character serves as the key to understanding their psyche. It serves as the basis for one's perspective of the outside world. It highlights the essential characteristics of individuals, including their fundamental goals, their ideas and guiding principles, and their interpersonal relationships. While character goes deep, leaders do not always need to subject themselves to psychoanalytic investigation in order to understand it. Through observing the consistent accumulation of decisions we see him make, both in and out of the public eye, we may learn about a person's character both in the presidency and in everyday life. A president's character may be seen in both his outward actions and the innermost parts of his mind.

DISCUSSION

The Character-Performance Framework

The Renshon framework, which was first used to analyze President Clinton and then Republican presidential contender Bob Dole, is based on a three-part theory of character. A person's objectives and the abilities they have acquired to realize them are the subject of their ambition. If we want to succeed, we must identify our life goals and hone the abilities that will enable us to achieve them. A person's moral, ethical, and motivating principles that serve as a true-to-self compass while making decisions make up their character integrity. Everyone has to build guiding principles for making the unavoidable, yet often ambiguous or challenging, decisions in life. Some people will strive for lofty ideas but fall short of putting them into action. Others will make decisions solely out of self-interest, but will portray them as being in the best interests of the general public. Less people will fight to uphold their principles even when it is difficult to do so. Relatedness relates to the scope of our interpersonal connections, as well as the character and quality of those connections. Every individual is real and existing among a sea of others. We may go toward, away from, or against others, or we may choose to stand apart from them, but we cannot ignore them. Others are our friends, adversaries, allies, and rivals, as well as our closest and most trusted relationships. They play an equally important role in our emotional lives as does oxygen do in our physical ones[2], [3].

The fact that these three components of character serve as a framework for study must be emphasized. They illustrate a hypothesis that holds that the three components are interdependent and necessary. Yet unlike Lasswell's theory of democratic or political character types or Barber's theory of presidential character, this framework makes no claims to being an entire list of categories that are mutually incompatible. However, from the standpoint of this framework, it is

still unclear how each of the character traits will connect to the crucial components of effective leadership, both alone and collectively, in a given situation. According to this concept, each component needs the actuality of the data to give it meaning, and any specific set of components determined by a person's psychology is a problem that arises from the facts, not from being put into a certain category. Moreover, the framework does not assume or demand anything about how, if at all, any of the character traits would connect to the two pillars of presidential performance: political leadership and sound judgment in making decisions.

Making Use of the Framework

The psychological assessment of presidential candidates' analytical framework was constructed using a theory that is specifically concerned with choosing American presidents. It was not, however, meant to be a theory of presidential character, as is emphasized in the book. A theory of character and a theory of presidential role performance make up the framework's two components.

Let's start by talking about how important ambition is for presidential candidates. The book makes the case that strong ambition was more of a given than a variable because of how the contemporary presidency operated and what was required to win it. In other words, it was reasonable to presume that almost all applicants were very ambitious since doing so would make those who didn't "truly want it" less likely to succeed. Even Ronald Reagan spent many years and a lot of time aspiring to the president despite his relatively passive executive style, which has been often criticized.

The fact that the majority of contemporary presidential candidates are very ambitious naturally raises the concerns of what their talents are and whether they help or hinder their ambition. It is conceivable that one's abilities match their level of desires, exceed them, or fall short of them. Moreover, assuming strong aspiration for the president leaves open the question of how talents and ambition on the one hand, and political performance on the other, relate to one another. Due to the universally high ambition of contemporary presidential candidates, the other two-character traits are given greater consideration as potential sources of helpful differences. Some principles and values would undoubtedly seem to be more flexible and, hence, a more helpful tool to distinguish between individuals, as would the capacity for upholding standards and values[4], [5].

This brings up a further crucial aspect of the system. Its two key components, character and performance, are inextricably linked. Character always remains. Regardless of the political roles being studied, ambition, character integrity, and relatedness are essential components of everyone's internal psychology. The opposite, however, is untrue. Character psychology is used differently in various positions. His linguistic ability, which is unquestionably crucial for a political career and is especially crucial to the leadership performance component of the contemporary president, was one of Bill Clinton's qualities that supported his ambition. Bob Dole, on the other hand, has a variety of abilities to help him achieve his goals, but speaking clearly was not one of them. Being illiterate is a fatal disadvantage in a world where "going public" is a crucial weapon of presidential leadership. Nonetheless, it is obvious that Dole's function as the minority or majority leader of the Senate placed less importance on his ability to speak in public than his bid for the president.

The framework starts out with the idea that each political function has its own unique key performance qualities. Leadership and judgment are the two key facets of presidential performance. Are these two factors of equal importance to Congressmen and judges? It is still up in the air. One may argue that both of these public jobs, as well as potentially others, need leadership or good judgment. Leadership in the judicial or legislative branches, however, would seem to be distinct from one another and from that of the president. Each performance aspect to which a character element is connected must be understood in the context of a particular person, just as each character element does.

Lastly, there is the issue of this framework's cross-cultural applicability. Will the three-character traits aid us in comprehending political positions in, say, India or Brazil? The emphasis on character results from the fact that role-enactment performance evaluations are constantly influenced by the specifics of the role within its historical, political, and cultural context.

How can one measure Japan's level of ambition? provides an example of the issue. Direct self-expression and the urge to stand out at the cost of others are frowned upon in that society. So how would one evaluate the correlation between political effectiveness and ambition there? What exactly does political leadership entail in such a setting? Before the framework can be meaningfully implemented outside of the environment for which it was established, these and related problems will need to be addressed and answered.

Evidence and Theory: Many General Thoughts and Concerns

When psychoanalytic theory is applied to biography, theory and evidence interact in a complicated way. Psychoanalytic theory is a potent tool for comprehending the inner psyche and outward conduct of persons involved in politics, especially as it has evolved since Freud initially proposed it. The exceptional contributions made by some of its early pioneers, including Harold Lasswell, Alexander and Juliette George, Erik Erikson, and others, have contributed to the development of the psychoanalytically oriented examination of political leaders and leadership. Yet, psychoanalytically oriented psychobiography is susceptible to reductionist mistakes in its different forms when practiced by some of its more ardent but less attentive practitioners.

The mistake of reductionism is giving too much credit to too little. It is a type of theoretical grandiosity that is reflected in several patterns of analysis, including a propensity to give a person's psychology too much causal weight and too little to role and circumstance; a propensity to reduce a person's psychology to one or few conflicted elements with little weight given to the abilities and areas of psychology that have brought the person to high political office; and a propensity to believe that an analyst can infer the unconscious motivation of a subject.

The flaw in all of these mistakes is the inability to consider an individual's psychology as a component of a composite explanation in which deciding how much causal weight to give each component is up for debate. Some analysts who lean toward psychoanalysis add further, more individualized faults to these theoretical ones. Character psychology and its connection to effective leadership are complicated. Those who conduct these analyses need to have had thorough training in both the theory and practice of the disciplines they want to apply. The ability to read music notation does not make one qualified to direct a symphony, nor does reading Freud alone make one qualified to conduct a psychoanalytically informed examination of a leader at a distance.

The tendency of certain practitioners, both professional and unskilled, to apply unconscious motivation in their assessments is another issue that has to be addressed in this context. Recently, a well-known analyst and his partner "explained" how President Truman's decision to unleash two atomic bombs on Japan was influenced by unconscious conflicts. Another possibility is that the mother of Richard Nixon may reveal to us the unconscious ideas she had about her son when she first got married.

Unconscious motivation is by definition unknown to the individual being motivated. Less well known is the fact that, even in a psychotherapeutic setting, accurate knowledge of the unconscious motive sometimes requires updating in light of new information. An intricate and continuous process is involved in the origination and subsequent development of behavior's unconscious roots. The mere occurrence of an event that is deemed significant by one psychoanalytic theory or another does not always imply that it has causal importance.

Think of a presidential candidate whose mother or father is cold and distant. While many people have had similar experiences growing up, these experiences may not always have the same effects. Along with understanding that certain things have happened, it's crucial to comprehend what those things meant to the people involved, the context in which they occurred, and any potential mitigating circumstances. The significance of these early experiences is diverse and complicated in psychoanalytic treatment.

Significance only becomes apparent with some clarity, if at all, after a protracted time of examination and meditation on the events, often from a variety of angles. During this process, the significance of these events for the patient progressively comes into focus, as well as their significance for the patient's growth and the ways in which they have influenced, but are not identical to, adult conduct. The examination of unconscious motivation is conjectural since there is no practical way to painstakingly track occurrences and their subjective significance to the individual[3], [6].

Proof for a Political Leader's Psychoanalytic Analysis

An analyst works at three distinct levels while creating a psychologically framed biographical analysis or candidate profile. He or she first acts on the basis of historical truth. What major events occurred? What proof is there that the event really occurred and went according to plan? Al Gore, a Democratic contender, really did learn how to clear fields as a young lad. He did. Did Bill Clinton really experience the difficult financial conditions that his claims about an outhouse on the family's property imply? No, he didn't. It is crucial to confirm the veracity of facts that are pertinent to the study.

Second, the analyst functions at the level of meaning and interpretation. What does it indicate that both George W. Bush and Al Gore come from families with a long history of distinguished public service? Furthermore, that George W. Bush's father served as president? What psychological effects did Bob Dole's horrific combat wounds have? How should we interpret Al Gore's split up youth, when he spent time both in rural Tennessee and at the opulent Mayflower Hotel in Washington?

Lastly, the analyst works at the theoretical level. How should we interpret and justify the information we uncover? Should we make use of the psychological dynamics of adult offspring of alcoholics hypothesis, as many others have, to explain the main tenets of Bill Clinton's

character? Would the idea of attachment be more relevant if it focused on his mother's early and lengthy separation from her small kid to pursue her nursing studies in New Orleans? The initial level of analysis serves as the basis for all subsequent levels.

As a result, the analyst must sample a broad variety of behavior in both comparable and unlike situations. What makes data more analytically useful? The analyst depends on the quantity of information, the reliability of the source, and its consistency with other well-known facts while analyzing factual information. The abundance of memories about a person by family, friends, and acquaintances makes it simple to learn certain information about them, albeit by no means all of them. Yet, the unwary will encounter several traps.

Public Records

All of the initial data used to support the examination of character factors and how they relate to presidential performance is considered "public data." Given this, the word merits considerable consideration. Public data is simply information that is in the public domain and is accessible to any interested party. Included are several, independently verified news stories of the events, numerous, independently verified biographical accounts, the candidates' own words, and statements made by others about them. Each kind of public data is used in a particular manner for a certain objective while keeping in mind the biases, benefits, and constraints of each source. I refer to the method used to analyze such data as "psychologically informed events analysis."

Newspaper and other journalistic stories are often used to provide record of the key details surrounding an event, such as when a presidential candidate made a certain promise or when a specific incident occurred in relation to other events, among other things. Most of the time, the stories focus on explaining events and the conditions that surround them. This information is a crucial component of the effort to exploit particular situations and settings in a conceptually relevant manner. A presidential researcher uses a variety of sources of information to try to determine what occurred, including presidential press conferences and interviews, conversations with important people, documentary evidence, etc.

Each of these sources has certain shortcomings. Each, however, may be seen as a kind of commentary meant to affect how certain narrative threads or episodes are framed and understood. A presidential news conference may thus be seen as the president's account of his actions and their motivations. The same is true for interviews with other performers, who provide their own narrative viewpoint. Even the disclosure of data that seems to be less arbitrary, such as a White House report on the number of welfare moms who received job assistance, is a component of a narrative that has a certain understanding of what it means to work and succeed. The experience and comprehension of the events as communicated by the leaders themselves is another crucial source of information for psychologically informed events and case analysis. The candidates' own statements are a crucial source of supporting evidence for descriptions of events. Unstructured interviews, press conferences, and other haphazardly filmed interactions that are a hallmark of every presidential campaign and administration are among them.

It is clear that contenders for office and presidents have hidden agendas or understandings. But, to completely discount as unimportant study of their publicly expressed ideas and actions would be a mistake. Why? Secondly, candidates' publicly expressed opinions and actions may be extremely helpful in revealing—sometimes rather starkly—what they desire to convey about

themselves to other people. Al Gore invites us to consider him as a candidate who has not been a part of the Washington establishment and who was raised with fundamental American values when he emphasizes his origins in Tennessee as a youngster. Bill Bradley, a Democrat running for president, invites us to perceive him as the product of a way of life that is fondly recalled as representing a better era and location when he emphasizes his origins in a tiny rural community.

Not that these invites are fake, that's not my point. Aspects of the applicants' experiences are evident in both scenarios. The analyst's job is to get enough knowledge to determine how representative they are. In contrast to Bradley, who hailed from a wealthy family and often traveled as a boy, including visits to Europe, Al Gore spent only the summers at his family's farm in Tennessee. Both of these facts imply that small-town qualities were not necessarily a part of either's upbringing, but rather that it is necessary to be cautious when drawing conclusions about psychology from broad social notions.

Candidates' perceptions of themselves also serve as a crucial foundation for contrasting their actions in less visible contexts. Take the 2000 presidential campaign, when John McCain, a Republican, campaigned on a platform emphasizing his honor, integrity, and position as a "truth teller," all of which he said were essential to his success in the early stages of the nomination process. Building on this character, his primary campaign topic was reforming campaign funding. He described this as the end of the influence of substantial campaign contributions on elections and policy-making.

But, a news report provided formal confirmation that McCain had twice written to request that a regulatory body he headed as the chairman of a significant Senate committee provide a decision on a proposal that would favor a significant campaign donor. Moreover, the letters were sent soon after he and his assistants met with the donors and collected more than \$20,000 from them. According to a recent report, McCain sent many letters of this kind for campaign donors while serving as head of the Senate Commerce Committee. The issue for McCain is matching his record with his rhetoric, as the headline gently phrased it. Leaders' outward actions and public pronouncements may really be a reflection of their true beliefs and methods for influencing or reacting to situations. In case study criticisms and debates about technique, this fact is often overlooked. The main goal of using these data points is to identify and put together a behavioral pattern that can be used to build a useful theoretical framework for explanation and analysis.

One common query is if the psychologically inclined researcher has spoken with the president or candidate under consideration. Your inquiry is based on the very stupid premise that an interview yields more accurate information than what is accessible in the public record. Contrary to popular belief, an interviewer with psychological training does not have the emotional equivalent of X-ray vision. The psychologically trained interviewer won't be able to get beyond the sometimes decades-long prepared responses and evasions to the psychic core of the individual. This is an erroneous and unsupported assumption. Seldom do people possess a unique psychological essence, and even when they do, no method of psychological training now available can identify it in a single, quick interview, particularly with a reluctant informant.

A political analyst with a psychological bent would often want to know something about the familial conditions in which a leader grew up and reached adulthood. A reality of contemporary life is that journalists and writers are interested in finding out more about leaders seeking for high office. A substantial biography has been written on almost every significant modern presidential candidate, and often more. In addition, despite complaints about campaign coverage,

at least two major newspapers and Bob Dole's autobiographies were published. Occasionally the candidates themselves write the memoirs, as seems to be the case with Democratic presidential contender EJill Bradley from the year 2000. While they are sometimes critiqued for being romanticized, these papers must be handled like any other piece of material used to piece together a knowledge of a leader. They may include details and descriptions that can be utilized to construct a picture of the individual. While George W. Bush's autobiography has been criticized for being nothing more than a political tool, it makes plain his true passion for flying aircraft as an Air National Guard pilot and his genuine love for his wife.

The leader's understanding of the occasions and individuals who influenced him is communicated via the usage of such knowledge in a second way. It is obvious that campaign memoirs are produced with a specific aim in mind. They often demonstrate both strategy and sincerity, foolishness and wisdom. Only in comparison to other sources can specific components be evaluated. What further sources may they be? Interestingly, a variety of important knowledge may be found in books and in the opinions of close family members. No one can afford not to read his mother's book if they want to learn more about the upbringing of Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush. His mother and wife's appearances on prominent news programs may augment that. Similarly, reading his mother's autobiography is a must for anybody who wants to comprehend the events that shaped President Clinton's psyche. Supplementing this are the interviews she conducted for national news programs. A lengthy editorial and piece regarding the senator's well-known rage in his home state's newspaper. Many big national newspapers handled the topic as a significant issue and provided their view of the facts. With the resources accessible on the World Wide Web, it is no longer essential to depend on such secondary analysis, even if one would have been satisfied to do so in the past[7], [8].

CONCLUSION

Government with a president. A presidential system has a separate executive from the legislative that is led by the head of state. In this situation, the head of the state and the head of the government are one and the same. The fact that the executive is not answerable to the legislative is another important element. The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the head of state and government of the United States of America are the President. According to Article II of the Constitution, the President is in charge of carrying out and upholding the laws passed by Congress. The head of the state and the head of the government are the same person. The fact that the executive is not accountable to the legislative is another important aspect.

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CHAPTER 9

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A PRESIDENT'S PSYCHOLOGY

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ABSTRACT:

The process through which the structured thinking and behavior patterns that make up an individual's distinct personality evolve over time is referred to as personality development. Many elements, including as heredity, environment, parenting style, and cultural issues, have an impact on personality. In this chapter author is discusses thepsychological characteristics.

KEYWORDS:

Biography, Leader, President, Politics,Psychology.

INTRODUCTION

I used the behind-the-scenes report as a basis for the political psychology of leaders in my psychologically structured biography of Bill Clinton. When the book was being written, a number of these tales became accessible early in his term. These reports and others like them often depend on in-depth and lengthy interviews with high-ranking White House staff members, including those who have daily and direct access to the president. They mostly serve as descriptions. A kind of middle-distance journalism, as described by Drew of her book, aims to capture events and people's engagement in or responses to them while they are still recent and before they have been fuzzed over and retouched in memory. It aims to provide an unfiltered insight and viewpoint from a person who has been exposed to the events[1]–[3].

In his assessment of Woodward's book, Sullivan criticized it for having "no sense of history," being unable to connect a narrative to a wider point, and reflecting "journalism of simple method." On the other hand, readers with a strong experience in presidential politics will likely find Mr. Woodward's book helpful, as Lehmann-Haupt notes. These insider stories provide a very important additional set of information that we may use to expand and enrich our knowledge of the public record and to cross-check it.If one is cautious, one may learn a lot about political leaders by reading insiders' memoirs. Memoirs by or interviews with significant insiders on historical events in which they took part are influenced by memories, viewpoints, but most importantly, motives. When the performers are really engaged in their roles, there is much to be said for the freshness of contemporary tales. The true tale in many autobiographies is either how the author battled against insurmountable circumstances or how the author played a crucial role in another person's administration, or both. You cannot evaluate the "what" in these situations, or with any other partial description of a president's actions, without first understanding more about the "who."

Use caution and know your sources

A president's psychoanalytically oriented analyst might anticipate having access to a broad spectrum of public conduct for examination. These statistics provide a sizable body of information from which an analyst may learn a lot about a president's personality and help

deduce the underlying trends. Nevertheless, these sources may also be a minefield of inaccurate information, prejudices driven by politics and personal interests, and unspoken physical risks. Those who lack accurate information have no place there. Anybody working on such a project must be aware of the key actors and their political and personal connections to the issue. Yet, if the true links are concealed and only become apparent in hindsight, even a diligent attempt to position the actors may not always succeed. For instance, in the *New Republic* and the *New Yorker*, political writer Sidney Blumenthal published a series of pieces praising then-candidate Clinton that were very complimentary and quite critical of Republican candidate Robert Dole. His latter position and behavior as President Clinton's senior personal advisor raised some concerns about his neutrality and independence throughout the campaign.

It's crucial to learn more about the individuals the candidate or leader chooses to represent or advance his interests. For instance, it is important to know that Donna Brazile, who managed Al Gore's 1988 campaign, was dismissed for distributing inaccurate information about President Bush's extramarital relationships. Understanding this information helps in identifying what seems to be a pattern of harsh language and dubious judgment. This tendency in turn calls into question the wisdom and planning of the candidate who chose her. Seeing the candidate's behavior when the analyst discovers such a trend and it becomes a hot topic is also enlightening [4]–[6]. In other words, while acquiring and assessing the information that serves as the foundation for a psychoanalytically developed analysis, there is no replacement for immersion in the reality of circumstances and relationships.

Anecdotal Proof

Like the previously mentioned insider political histories, biographies and other types of history often depend on the accumulation of narrative episodes. The individual in issue, a friend, or someone else who was there at the time may recount the experience. Someone else may even describe what others claim to have seen or heard. A psychologically framed picture or analysis may often benefit from the weight of these collected narrative tales. Such resources have been crucial—yet contentious—in the study of presidents and their presidencies' psychological makeup. Critics raise the objection that these stories are just anecdotal. The designation "anecdotal" implies that these statistics are inherently dubious. Like their colleagues who focus on statistical data, analysts with a psychoanalytic orientation who employ anecdotal case material must address the question of the quality of the data. The utilization of such information generally raises four areas of concern: validity, degree of representation, consequence, and meaning.

1. A narrative that is used to illustrate a characterisation is called an anecdote.
2. If the report is genuine, it is the first thing that has to be handled.

Yet proving that a certain incident really happened is merely the first step. Who is narrating the tale? Are they repeating what they've heard elsewhere or were they really there? What kind of connection does the storyteller have to the subject of the tale? What inspired him or her to share the tale?

What and to what extent is the occurrence representative, then? Think about the numerous accounts of President Clinton's rage in this respect. There are several examples of Clint's rage, according to Woodward. Drew also agrees. When these events are added up together with other public outbursts of wrath, such as the one during the campaign-related *Rolling Stone* interview, it

becomes evident that this is a psychological aspect of Clinton's personality that has to be addressed and explained. The volume of anecdotal evidence lends credence to the idea that there is something real to be explained. It then becomes an issue of whether the factor is consequential and, if so, what that means.

Many people associate psychoanalytic theory with an emphasis on the juvenile and adolescent origins of adult conduct. This view is, in part, true and significant from the perspective of psychoanalytic theory. How else would we understand how and why adult psychology has changed?

It is less well known that, properly speaking, knowing why someone behaves in a certain way is distinct from—and not necessarily reliant upon—knowing how that particular collection of traits came to be. A response to the causative issue is not necessary when using the knowledge of the compulsive personality that is now accessible for the purposes of political biography, as Alexander George emphasizes in his famous article. The dynamism itself, which is what the biographer is most interested in, can be very easily discerned in descriptions of the subject's conduct.

DISCUSSION

In general, the psychoanalytically inclined analyst must depend on a number of sources, none of which are likely to be completely satisfying, in order to construct an understanding of a president's formative years. The now-adult kid can provide some insight about his parent, but this is constrained by emotional ties, discretion, and even political demands. The analyst would ideally want to get input from a president's family as well. Nonetheless, it would be naive to assume that these memories would not be influenced by family members' desires and motivations to present themselves and their kid in the best possible light. The analyst may benefit the most from understanding the psychology of the parents rather than just their memories of their children's early years[7]–[9].

For instance, Virginia Kelley's autobiography contains considerably more information than she anticipated, most of it is unfavorable to her. Moreover, it raises unsettling issues with relation to Bill Clinton, her son. This raises a few problems for the psychoanalyst. Her autobiography makes it clear that her parenting style had a significant impact on her son's psyche, and not necessarily in a positive manner. She and her son agree that her influence is not the positive one they both speak about. What ought an analyst to do in such a situation?

Naturally, her book is a public record thanks to Kelley and her son, who examined the draft before it was released. They apparently support her narrative as provided by doing this. But, the information that comes out in the autobiography is harmful to the public perception that both parties had of one another. In these conditions, the only course an analyst can take is to properly contextualize the information, pointing out its limits and, where reasonable, presenting alternate hypotheses.

By being open, Kelley also gave the public access to Clinton's previously highly private and carefully curated universe of developing experiences. Often, these observations conflict with what Hillary has stated about them. In many respects, Kelley's book makes more issues public than her son has chosen or been aware of. As a result, his mother's book helps to dispel the

mystique surrounding the Clinton family and sheds light on the seriousness of the emotional problems Hillary dealt with.

The presidential performance analyst also has a duty to follow up on any public repercussions of the information he unearths. One can understand and sympathize with the difficulties Clinton encountered, as well as his attempts to overcome them. To evaluate a president's success, one must focus on his or her actions after taking office rather than on the distance they went to get there.

The Development of Psychological Understandings

The second step of the analysis, the construction of psychological meaning, starts after the analyst has gathered anecdotes, biographical data, news stories, or other material that points to anything that suggests psychologically motivated political activity. The analysis depends on clarifying the significance of the psychological components that the data showed. This entails attempting to articulate the element's operation, its psychological functions, and its place in the subject's overall psychology.

Of course, such work contains a theoretical and conceptual dilemma. Behavior is a good place to look for signs of any psychological component, such as personality and character. We also look to analyze and explain conduct. The same behavior cannot be utilized by the analyst to both cross-validate and infer an element that is used to explain the same behavior. In these situations, the analyst must evaluate a variety of actions in order to support such psychological assumptions. They must then be cross-validated with respect to both additional psychological traits that are conceptually related and distinct from the initial inference-making activities.

This does not need the analyst penetrating a president's innermost thoughts. The observer of candidates and presidents who has had psychoanalytic training often finds some knowledge into the meanings of their conduct by studying behavior in a number of circumstances to identify their most significant behavioral preferences. The analyst might next look for hints about the consistency of these behaviors. The consistency of these patterns with theoretical knowledge and an understanding of the settings in which these behaviors occurred must be checked against other, distinct actions. These patterns serve as the foundation for psychological inference.

The formulation of dynamic understandings presents a variety of challenges for the psychologically oriented political leadership analyst. The initial step is discovering and establishing the psychological components that the person uses. The second is to provide a solid argument for their true significance to what leaders do. The third step is to determine how an element functions within the larger psychological context of that individual. In the person's developmental history, the analyst must lastly make an effort to discover that aspect and its dynamic interactions. In other words, an analysis of the causes of a candidate's or president's conduct and a dynamic theoretical explanation of that behavior are two distinct endeavors. One hasn't given a dynamic justification for an adult characteristic by outlining its history.

Think about the ambition character trait. When analysts are able to provide sufficient data to back up a candidate's or president's great ambition, their work is not yet done. There are still a lot of unanswered concerns about this aspect of presidential performance. How does a person's perception of achievement relate to their ambition? Is it consistent in all situations? If not, how

are differences explained? What additional behavioral and psychological components does it seem to be linked to?

High levels of ambition, for instance, might stem from a variety of psychological motivations, such as the desire to succeed, the need to maintain one's self-esteem in the face of others' doubts, the need to appease a demanding parent, etc. We can discern such an element's origins and better understand its theoretical dynamics by looking at its contemporaneous dynamics.

Topic and Analyst

There are assumptions about behavior involved in psychological analysis. Given this, it is crucial to be precise about the inference-construction process. A pattern of facts is the basis for all inferences. In assessing these data, the idea of pattern is crucial. How many and reliable are the facts, and how consistent are they? Hence, finding patterns is a difficult task with plenty of potential dangers. It has been obvious, at least since Freud's study of Woodrow Wilson, that the analyst's own political beliefs and preferences may have a significant and misleading impact on how well we understand the psychology of leaders.

This may occur as a result of the analyst's admiration, hate, or other attitudes for the subject. Beyond such fundamental biases, and underappreciated, is the role that the analyst's own psyche, for good or bad, may play in skewing the analysis, much as a psychoanalyst's own unresolved issues can skew the way they treat their patients. The analyst has a specific responsibility to be explicit in these situations, particularly if they employ and have received training in psychoanalytic psychology. In the course of my biographical analysis of Bill Clinton, I explained why I had voted for him as well as my reasoning. No analyst is able to avoid having personal responses to the sources used to create an analysis, but one may attempt to be as open and honest as possible about one's own potential biases. At the very least, such explicitness offers a partial remedy for unintentional or, worse, systematic prejudice.

The analyst's work ultimately has to stand on its own merits rather than the emotions it stirs up in political partisans. The analyst's attitude toward the issue, whether it has been explored or not, is not what counts in the end. Rather, the following is important: Does it seem like the proposed analytic framework of analysis covers the key elements of what has to be psychologically explained? Are those categories of analysis supported by strong evidence? Finally, are the conclusions obtained about these traits supported by the president's actual actions in the real world?

Gold Standard or Pyrite for Theory Validation and Prediction of Presidential Behavior?

Prediction is the "gold standard" of theory validation in the physical sciences, and with good reason. Prediction, however, could serve the social sciences more as an ideal than as a model. Why? Because no physical science has to deal with the difficulties of personal judgment and perception.

For academics interested in life histories, theory validation has proven to be an even more challenging and confusing issue. These issues include a propensity to infer too much from too little data, a propensity to rely on psychological theory that is not well developed or explained in the study, and a tendency to overemphasize psychology at the expense of external circumstances—after all, insofar as the leader must always be analyzed in context, the contextual variables will always be there to influence the leader's decision-making. There is dispute on the

viability of prediction, even among those who study the performance of presidents using biographical history and psychoanalytically structured theory. "If, as in the scientific sciences, the psychohistorian could forecast with complete confidence that Nixon's personality would lead him to maintain Agnew as his Vice- President in 1972, it would be a "true prediction," says Mazlish in his study of the then-president Richard Nixon. Absolute certainty" is held to a high level. Unsurprisingly, Mazlish comes to the conclusion that making such a forecast is impossible and that combining psychological research with modern historical study "cannot offer us the type of assurance necessary in accurate prediction. Most importantly, it is unable to foresee a particular action, like visiting Peking Psychohistory is mostly a retroactive endeavor.

The title of Barber's book, on the other hand, is "Predicting Performance in the White House." His viewpoint, which is not very novel, is that we may better predict a person's potential patterns in the oval office if we can determine the pattern of their life before they reach it. He correctly notes that making such forecasts requires "some sharp instruments and strict attention to their usage" and that they are "not simple." Yet, he believes they are worth the risk due to the important concerns they address and the fact that the theories that purport to provide answers to them may be improved via practice. Estimating a probable pattern or trend, however, is far softer than making a firm forecast[10], [11].

The consistency of conduct serves as the primary foundation for psychological forecasting. A prediction tests our knowledge of three concepts: the psychology that drives a person's action, the external factors that will influence it, and the connection between them. Character, as opposed to attitudes or personality characteristics, shows a person's fundamental and ingrained responses to situations. Hence, we may anticipate a great deal of constancy in behavior if a person's character has mentally solidified to some level. Our trust in our assumptions about how someone would behave is based on this constancy.

It is necessary to be aware of the psychological categories that this person could most comfortably fit while making predictions about them. It also necessitates understanding the particular combination of components, the psychological and characteristic strengths and weaknesses that constitute this individual. Success is more likely to come to those with high levels of desire, the necessary skill, and the concentrated perseverance to get there. Also, individuals are more inclined to stick with the habits they have established since they have succeeded as a result of their prior conduct. It is difficult to foresee how cunning, brilliant, and highly functioning people would act since they are well aware of their circumstances and what may be required to overcome them. These people may be able to fight any negative impulses despite their own psychological tendencies, if not on their own, then most definitely with the assistance of several counselors whose only job function is to ensure the leader's success. The challenges that must be solved if character or type is to bear the weight of prediction are only made more difficult by this.

According to Lasswell, creating political typologies is a helpful process for creating and improving theories of political leadership. Barber's attempts, however, point out their limitations in terms of foretelling presidential conduct. We may see certain contradictory characteristics if we contrast the logic of political typologies with the more detailed formulations of particular leaders. By prioritizing generality over detail, an emphasis on the former undermines their justification for the latter. That is, greater generalization that is not quite true may end up being pursued at the price of better comprehension and, in this particular example, better prediction.

A Study of Consistency

Studies of presidential biography and performance that are psychoanalytically framed encounter difficult challenges as they attempt to gain confidence in their ideas and methods. Several methods used in the social sciences in general are ineffective for them. They are unable to, for instance, develop reliable probability estimates using big or many samples. The level of trust that psychoanalytic models garner ultimately depends on how critically they evaluate the data, assumptions, and conclusions.

Prediction is a risky, but not impossible, undertaking, as was previously stated. But, there is one more step that may be done in addition to the great recommendations in Runyan's pioneering discussion of the case study and ideographic methods to biographical research. It is not entirely retrospective, but it does have certain benefits to prediction and some parallels. Nonetheless, it is compelled to utilize the past extensively in order to establish ties that will lead to a president's future. This technique is what I refer to as consistency analysis. This strategy compares how well one's theoretical understanding of a president or candidate at a certain point in time is compatible with that person's actions at that same point in time[12], [13].

CONCLUSION

For two very basic and significant reasons, the psychological study of presidents and other leaders is likely to continue despite all of its disagreements and challenges. First, the presidents' use of power is connected to the underlying psychology that drives how they see and attempt to change the world. We should have practical ideas explaining why they do what they do if we wish to comprehend what they do. Second, different psychological traits that presidents and other leaders bring to their roles have an impact on what they can, won't, or won't accomplish. A leader's degree of ambition and the abilities that go along with it, their principles and values and their ability to uphold them, and how they genuinely feel about the many types of relationships they must manage all have significant practical ramifications. It is difficult to see how any theoretical position that does not demand that its practitioner be immersed in the specifics of a leader's daily existence would provide the degree of trust in the theoretical comprehension or validity demanded by this crucial role. "Political science without biography is a type of taxidermy," wrote Lasswell sixty years ago. Since Lasswell made that remark, advances in psychoanalytic theory and its more complex application in a range of contexts have led us to a place where we may well add the following to Lasswell's observation: Without the aid of contemporary psychoanalytic theory, analyzing presidential performance is like to evaluating the performance of a Formula One racing vehicle built without wheels. That is possible, but it is unlikely to have a significant theoretical or practical impact.

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CHAPTER 10

VERBAL BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

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ABSTRACT:

The study and analysis of a person's behavior using different techniques, such as interviews, direct supervision, and self-observation, is known as behavioral evaluation. It describes the method of using modern digital instruments to observe, comprehend, and forecast human behavior. In this chapter author is discusses the transformational grammar and verbal style.

KEYWORDS:

Leader, Language, Politics, Personality, Verbal Behaviour.

INTRODUCTION

There are several perspectives through which speech may be researched. The study of language can be broken down into the fields of phonology, which explains how sounds are combined to form words, syntax, which explains how sentences are constructed from words, semantics, which deals with how words are interpreted as meaning, and pragmatics, which explains how we engage in conversations. The components of nonverbal phenomena include pace, pauses, amplitude, and pitch [1]–[3]. Syntactic and specific paralinguistic variables are most suited for the study of personality characteristics among the speech data that are accessible for analysis. On the other hand, semantic factors are only marginally useful for identifying ingrained behavioral reactions. While speakers do have different vocabulary preferences, these choices are often impacted by the subject of the conversation and other environmental factors. Several researchers have emphasized a variety of syntactic metrics' sluggish pace of change and their suitability for the study of defining behavior. For instance, Steingart and Freedman wrote: Common sense implies that a person's words are considerably more impacted by temporary situational factors than his or her delivery style. Grammar would seem to provide certain benefits for the study of personality constructs from the outset.

Scorers must use delicate judgment in speech analysis systems that rely on the evaluation of meaning. Since they are independent of meaning, syntactic structures are simple to identify and grade. The grammatical forms that a speaker uses are seldom consciously chosen. We presume that distinctive nonverbal behaviors are reflected in speaking styles. So how can we go about locating linguistic patterns that are connected to certain personality traits? Two examples will be used to illustrate the technique. The first example is a guy who struggles with impulse control. He acts without thinking about the effects of his actions. As a result, he often finds himself second-guessing his choices and attempting to mitigate their negative effects. How may our subject's speech display this impulsive quality? We would anticipate him to make hasty statements and then try to retract them or modify them in some manner. How would his grammar choices reflect this tendency? We would anticipate that our topic will often employ negative words like but, although, and still. A paper that Dr. H. Aronson and I published a lot of years ago shown that

hospitalized, impulse-driven mental patients did use a considerable amount more negative expressions than a group of healthy control participants. Later, similar findings came from a sample of binge eaters, those who impulsively eat a lot of food and then work to reverse the effects of their overeating.

Let's use a person who engages in obsessive ritualistic activity as our second example. Such a person feels forced to carry out repetitive, seemingly pointless actions, such as continually washing his hands or checking to verify sure his door is secured before going to bed. When our individual makes an effort to control his compulsion, he feels nervous and is unable to do so for very long. Due to their extreme logic, compulsive patients must defend their repeating behaviors to both themselves and others. As a result, we would anticipate hearing many explanatory terms in their speech, such as because, therefore, and in order to. Dr. Aronson and I published a research that supported this hypothesis. Compulsive mental health patients did, in fact, use a lot more explanation words than a healthy control group. For a sample of delusional patients who showed a desire to defend unusual ideas, similar outcomes were attained[4], [5].

The reader would have noticed, as they read these clinical cases, how closely the linguistic structures under study resembled the coping or defensive mechanisms outlined in the psychoanalytic literature. Explanatory statements seem to represent the process of "rationalization," while negative expressions appear to reflect the mechanism of "undoing." In fact, therapists have said that practically every category we utilized in our speech analysis reflects crucial coping mechanisms for psychological stress.

We don't believe that every instance of an adversative or causative expression represents impulsivity or rationality, respectively; rather, we presume that people who have impulsive or compulsive inclinations would choose these structures more often than those who don't. Grammatical structures that are simple to identify include conjunctions and phrases that are adversative or causative. With minimal instruction, novice judges may be taught to recognize them and assign scores. Three premises underlie our approach to verbal behavior analysis: patterns of thinking and acting are reflected in speaking styles; when under stress, a speaker's choice of grammatical structures will reflect typical coping mechanisms; and personality traits are revealed by grammatical structures changing slowly.

DISCUSSION

Transformational Grammar and Verbal Style

Why do different individuals convey the same concept using various linguistic structures? Both "John loved Mary" and "Mary was loved by John" are acceptable expressions of the same sentiment. According to transformational grammarians, they represent several surface structures that are descended from a single deep structure. It is believed that all languages include transformational laws that enable their speakers to express the same idea in a variety of ways. While the two statements in our example have the same meaning, their styles are obviously different. Comparing speech preferences among various people is akin to comparing preferences for transformational rules. According to our theory, a particular person's decision to choose one grammatical structure over another is influenced by personality traits. Some individuals may find the declarative "John loved Mary" to be excessively strong and prefer the more passive and subdued "Mary was loved by John." In fact, some of our earlier research suggests that helpless or inactive mental patients do choose certain passive grammatical forms.

Verbal Data Collection

It's crucial to record speech under somewhat stressful circumstances if linguistic mannerisms are to be utilized as a gauge for how someone manages stress. Individuals subjected to low or high levels of stress won't provide us the accurate information we need. This will be shown using an example. Let's imagine that we wanted to evaluate a baseball player's capacity for catching fly balls. As no one could overcome such a hurdle, not even the best player, we wouldn't hit balls beyond his reach. Also, because virtually anybody could catch the balls, we wouldn't smash them straight to our player. We would hit challenging but catchable fly balls to fully assess a player's catching abilities. Most persons between the ages of five and eighty-five can accomplish the tough but achievable job of having a topic talk for 10 minutes on any subject or subjects he chooses. Those who are emotionally healthy and emotionally disturbed may both converse uninterrupted for 10 minutes. Free speech is the phrase used by researchers to characterize verbal data collected under the aforementioned experimental circumstances.

It's vital to change the data gathering strategy when dealing with comments made by people who are not in the same room as you. Transcripts of press conferences and in-depth interviews are utilized to gather examples of spontaneous speech. Its utilization is predicated on the idea that the stress brought on by such interactions is about equivalent to what subjects go through while speaking uninterrupted for 10 minutes. Only answers to questions with more than thirty words are utilized in order to make the interview data as equivalent as feasible to the respondents' ten-minute monologues. To reduce the impact of conversation, the initial line of a response is not taken into consideration.

Personality Reflected in Language

Prior to 1975, studies to link speech and personality were restricted to patient groups with psychological impairments who had similar symptomatic patterns of behavior. A University of Michigan psycholinguistics study team gave me the task of developing personality profiles for two participants based only on their ten-minute free-speech monologues throughout that year. The University of Michigan researchers created the speech samples using the methods previously mentioned, and only verbatim written transcripts of the electronically recorded monologues were supplied. I wasn't provided any further details about the speakers.

I tried writing personality assessments of the two speakers after scoring the transcripts and forwarded them to my University of Michigan colleagues. The University of Michigan team decided that the approach might "accurately access crucial personality aspects" after comparing my results with objective evaluations of the speakers' personalities.

Studying the Watergate Transcripts Motivated by the University of Michigan pilot project, I made the decision to use the transcripts' release as an opportunity to continue my examination of specific speakers. The Watergate transcripts provide a special opportunity for speech behavior students. According to my knowledge, no prominent political figures have ever previously had casual talks electronically recorded and made accessible to the public.

The transcripts should include pertinent information about the adaptive patterns, as reflected in their speaking styles, of the four people whose remarks make up the majority of the recorded material, as it can be assumed that the Watergate participants were under considerable stress during most of the published conversations. A normal control group and populations of

delusional, impulsive, depressed, and compulsive psychiatric patients were compared with samples of speech ascribed to Richard Nixon, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and John Dean using the linguistic categories. The findings showed neither Dean nor Ehrlichman to exhibit any unusual speech conduct. In all linguistic categories, President Nixon could not be distinguished from depressive patients, and only one category distinguished him from impulsives. Haldeman's manner seemed strange but was distinct from any of the patient populations that had previously been researched.

Reagan and Carter are contrasted

Another verbal examination of political leaders was released in 1986. I contrasted the impromptu speaking styles of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan using randomly selected excerpts from each of their presidential press conferences. The linguistic conduct of the two presidents revealed significant disparities. The language categories used by Carter revealed that he was withdrawn, competitive, and defensive when confronted. Contrarily, while speaking with the White House press, Reagan was affable, kind, sure of himself, amusing, and superficially intimate. While under duress, Reagan had a propensity to dismiss unpleasant elements of reality and, sometimes, to undo judgments that had already been taken[6].

Examine political figures

Readers may be wondering at this point what can be discovered about political leaders via verbal analysis that cannot be discovered by firsthand observation. Verbal analysis may be compared to what is previously known about political leaders since readers are already acquainted with their personality qualities. Afterwards, readers may decide for themselves if the speech patterns produced by the approach accurately represent the conduct of public officials. Verbal behavior analysis has the potential to provide information about a political figure's personality that is not already known to the public since grammatical decisions are not always chosen intentionally.

There is also another justification for researching political leaders' speech patterns. Investigators looking at significant missing persons cases may find our verbal behavior analysis approach useful. While researching historical figures, historians and biographers often have to depend on written sources like speeches, memoirs, letters, transcripts of conversations, and so on. These academics often overlook formal features of language in favor of thematic meaning. Character analysis that just relies on anecdotal evidence is prone to inaccuracy and impressionism. For historians and biographers, any technique that can adequately systematically compare behavior and speaking patterns may be helpful.

Methodological Issues in Psychobiographical Studies

Our approach is distinct from that of certain psychobiographers who make intricate psychodynamic formulations and psychogenetic reconstructions based on chosen events from the lives of historical figures. No matter how insightful the biographer may be, attempts to explain the unspoken tensions of the public can never reach beyond the level of speculative interpretation. On the other hand, many environments allow for observation and objective recording of the surface manifestations of ego and superego processes. If we want to expand our knowledge of what distinguishes the creators of history from the rest of mankind, we must pay much more attention to the conflict-free aspects of ego functioning. The technique is totally

based on publicly accessible data. It doesn't need any particular intuitive abilities and may be taught through public information.

The Verbal Categories are Described Qualifiers

Expressions of doubt, modifiers that weaken assertions without adding information, and words that give a statement a feeling of ambiguity or looseness fall under the category of qualifiers.

Almost usually, qualifiers are said before the whole verb is uttered. Hence, the message is rejected before it is sent. Qualifiers show a lack of decisiveness or an avoidance of commitment when they happen often. Also, it has been shown that worry increases the usage of qualifiers. Gerald Ford employed much more qualifiers than the other presidents in my research of the speech patterns of post-World War II leaders, giving his manner of speaking a halting, uncoordinated feel. When qualifiers are used seldom, language takes on a dogmatic tone.

When comparing how speakers employ qualifiers, it is crucial that speech samples be collected in the same manner. The usage of this category has been shown to be negatively linked with preparedness in a study evaluating the use of qualifiers. While speakers are looking through their notes for more informative terms, qualifiers are utilized as filler words and phrases. There will be a lot fewer qualifications in a prepared speech than in an on-the-spot press conference.

Retractors

Retractors, also known as adversative phrases, diminish or contradict prior statements. These contain words like but, the most often used retractor, nonetheless, and nevertheless. The speaker's style comes out as impulsive due to the frequent usage of retractors, which indicates a problem sticking to previously made judgments. Richard Nixon utilized retractor speech far more often than previous post-World War II presidents. This was especially true when Nixon displayed unusually erratic conduct during the anti-Vietnam protests.

Negatives

Not, never, and nothing are the most typical uses of the negative category. Speakers who often employ the negative tend to be unyielding and obstinate. Also, they can be overusing the coping mechanisms of negation and denial. H. R. Haldeman, dubbed the "Abominable No-Man" in Washington political circles, utilized negatives a lot more often than the other Watergate conspirators, according to my analysis of the transcripts.

Explainers

Words and statements that imply causal relationships or provide an explanation for the speaker's thoughts and actions fall under the category of explainers. The most typical justification is "because." So and because are two additional often used explainers. The speech style of speakers who often utilize explainers is didactic, apologetic, or justifying. People who don't explain things well risk coming out as rigid and categorical. Hillary Clinton often uses explainers, which contributes to her didactic speaking style.

Feeling Expressions

The speaker assigns sentiments to themselves in every phrase, which is assessed. Examples are "Jack's conduct irritates me" and "I enjoy to work outside." The listener often associates emotional expressiveness with high expressions of feeling scores. A detached, chilly speaking

style is reflected by low displays of emotion scores. Ronald Reagan's calm, unflappable speaking style was partly a result of his sparing use of emotional emotions.

Adverbial Intensifiers

Adverbial intensifiers are all adverbs that make a sentence more powerful. Adverbial intensifiers like very, really, so, and such are often utilized. Adverbial intensifiers give a speaker's words color. They have a dramatic, histrionic impact when used often. Those who listen to speakers are likely to find them boring and uninteresting if they seldom utilize adverbial intensifiers. The mid-adolescent age group has the greatest frequency of incidence of adverbial intensify among normal speakers. Both normal and mental patient populations greatly overrepresent women in this category. More depressed patients than other patient groups utilize this category. According to his use of adverb intensifiers, Eisenhower was the most dramatic of the post-World War II president speakers[7].

Specific References

Any direct allusions to the interviewer, the interviewing procedure, or the physical environment are considered direct references. Examples include "I do not plan to run for public office in 1996, as I said in response to your earlier inquiry," and "It is a joy to meet with you in such a lovely conference room. A high direct references score indicates a persuasive, maybe manipulative speaker who uses the interviewing process to sidestep a certain subject. When comments made about the interviewer are made often, the speaker may come out as invasive and in charge. A speaker who scores poorly on direct references may be reserved or shy. In my research on post-World War II presidents, I discovered that the affable and personable leaders Eisenhower and Reagan used direct allusions the most. Unsurprisingly, Jimmy Carter, who tends to be reserved and distant, received the lowest rating in this area. Depressed and impulsive individuals make the most direct references among mental patients because they desire the interviewer's help.

Unrelated References

Clauses with the speaker and persons he knows as their subjects are referred to as personal allusions. Personal examples include "I admired President Kennedy" and "Gerald Ford was my close personal friend." Non-personal clauses are those whose subjects are unknown to the speaker. A preponderance of allusions that are not personal to the speaker shows distance from the audience. A tangible attention with oneself and one's immediate surroundings may be indicated by seldom usage of nonpersonal allusions. John F. Kennedy didn't often refer to himself. This strengthened the perception of a calm, distant leader who was effectively in charge of the circumstance.

Phrases that are original or colorful

All instances of wit, metaphor, and idiosyncratic language usage fall under this category. If colorful phrases are well-crafted and unique, they could indicate the existence of a creative mind. Colorful statements, whether original or not, are often seen as entertaining by listeners. The phrases "a fitfully crimson sky" and "scenes of wild dissipation" are examples of creative expressions.

Emotional language

We previously recognized the category of manifestations of emotions as one that transmits emotion, but it is not the only one. The use of *I* rather than *we*, adverbial intensification, direct references, and personal rather than nonpersonal allusions are all characteristics that listeners associate with the emotional content of a sentence. Several of the sentiments categories will be used by most emotional communicators to show warmth.

Raw Score to Final Score Conversion

Final grades are determined by the number of occurrences per 1,000 words, excluding nonpersonal references. The raw nonpersonal reference score is multiplied by 1,000 to get the final nonpersonal reference score, which is then divided by the total of the raw nonpersonal and personal reference scores. Weintraub 1981 contains comprehensive information regarding calculating scores and sample-size difficulties. There are average verbal scores for the first seven post-World War Two presidents [8], [9].

Selecting the Personality Attributes to Examine

After deciding to investigate personality traits using verbal behavior analysis, we must next determine which features to highlight. Some personality qualities, such as impulsivity, decisiveness, and other characteristics, have previously been mentioned in the description of the approach. What characteristics should be included to have a larger foundation on which to build a personality profile? The list of characteristics that follows resembles linguistic tics that are critical to describing human behavior. After a summary of each personality feature, I point out the linguistic categories that seem to be connected to it and, where applicable, provide instances of free speech samples where the presence of the trait in question may be found.

Anxious attitude: The literature has paid little attention to anxiety as a reflection of grammatical choice, which is an internal rather than a visible condition. The majority of researchers that are interested in "anxious speech" have placed more emphasis on vocal dynamics than linguistic conduct. The overuse of many categories is a trait of the normally worried patient. Self-preoccupation may be evident in the overuse of "*I* and *me*," defensiveness in the use of "explainers" and "negatives," and indecision in the use of more qualifiers than usual. Nervous speakers often struggle to control their emotions, and they may utilize a variety of emotional phrases and adverbial intensifiers. Last but not least, the interviewer's repeated requests for assistance may be expressed in the usage of direct references. The frequent employment of numerous categories by the worried speaker implies a need to use all of his linguistic tools in order to control the inter-viewing scenario. An nervous personality points to psychopathology. Few people who experience "linguistic anxiety" are likely to be picked to govern their countries.

Moodiness: Several of the verbal transmitters of emotion have previously been named. The categories of *I/we* ratio, adverbial intensifiers, direct references, expressions of sentiment, and personal references all show excellent results. Mercurial speakers have a propensity to employ emotive categories in an inconsistent manner. Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, among the post-World War II presidents, verbally demonstrated swiftly changing emotions.

What about verbal indications of depression? The reader is recommended to a prior publication on depressed patients' speech since this subject has been thoroughly explored. As a result of our research, we can say that people with depressive illnesses tend to talk less, make more personal

references, and score highly in the following linguistic patterns: /, me, direct references, expressions of sentiment, negatives, and adverbial intensifiers. These results show the uncontrolled emotion, self-preoccupation, dependent needs, and negativity of the depressed speaker. In his address, President Nixon displayed signs of despondency brought on by the Watergate incident.

Anger-filled mood. During interviews, irritable speakers commonly exhibit their anger. They may blow up when pressed by the interviewer. Under such circumstances, the usage of qualifiers may altogether vanish. Every indication of uncertainty disappears in the midst of a fit of intense rage. Extreme negativity is another feature of furious speech. The usage of negative words might be up to five times higher in certain furious speech samples than in everyday speech. The use of rhetorical questions and direct allusions, which show an active involvement of the reader, are other results worth mentioning. Weintraub 1981 provides a more thorough description of the speech pattern connected to rage. World leaders often aim to project a calm demeanor to their audiences, therefore angry speech is rare.

Speakers in control of their emotions: Those who are emotionally in control often score poorly in several or all of the sensation categories. Speakers who are seen as warm or expressive get high marks in the areas related to emotions.

A quality of opposition: Speakers who are opposed or obstinate are known for using a lot of negative language. Impulsive speakers have utilized negatives more often than any other patient group in the psychiatric populations we have examined.

Controlling Conduct: There are at least two spoken manifestations of this personality feature. As a result of their regular emotional management, controlling speakers seldom employ the feeling categories. Controlled speakers strive to prepare for interviews by restricting journalists' queries to certain themes that they have thoroughly researched in order to avoid finding oneself in an uncontrolled scenario. Low frequency of qualifiers will show such preparedness.

Hysterical Actions: As this quality evokes the dramatic, charismatic leaders typically employ the category that lends itself best to the display of exaggeration—adverbial intensifiers—to retain an audience's attention. Compared to the previous post-World War II presidents, Eisenhower employed more adverbial intensifiers.

Passivity: The frequent use of the personal pronoun "my" is arguably the best linguistic indicator of passivity. Me is usually always the receiver rather than the originator of action since it is almost always employed as the object of a verb. Me is used substantially more by those who are regarded to have passive tendencies, such as young children, old people, women, and depressed and compulsive patients, according to studies of both normal and deviant speakers.

Dominant conduct: The characteristics of dominating conversational conduct include excessive talking, the use of numerous connectives, and interruptions. When dominating conduct crosses the line into intimidation, the speaker may start to use demands and foul language. Lyndon Johnson was the post-World War II president who used his words in the most imposing manner.

Creativity: How can verbal inventiveness be evaluated? Language may communicate creativity in one of three ways, according to Richard Ohmann. A writer or speaker may invent new words, new syntactic connections, or creative ways to put words together, and can express themselves using unique metaphors. Most inventive speakers employ any or all of these tools often via wit.

Does verbal creativity correspond to other types of creativity, or is it only a trait of those who naturally have a gift for writing or speaking? There hasn't been any systematic study on the relationship between linguistic creativity and other types of originality, despite the likelihood that there is some connection.

A pattern of conduct: The use of first names, a Ronald Reagan favorite tactic, remarks about the interviewer's personal life, and references to people or events that the interviewee could theoretically know but not via shared experiences with the interviewer, are vocal forms of familiar conduct. A high direct references score might indicate these speech tics. Many listeners find it unpleasant and improper when familiar people engage in teasing and clowning in their interactions with others. The post-World War II president who was the most well-known was Lyndon Johnson.

Resilience: The capacity to bounce back rapidly from adversity is resilience. This trait may be evaluated by observing a speaker's capacity to change his or her linguistic style throughout a conversation or, even better, over the course of many conversations spread out over days or weeks. A weak speaker can be so traumatized by a poor verbal performance that it would temporarily impair his or her capacity to answer inquiries in public. During the Water-Gate controversy, Richard Nixon suddenly abandoned his typical speaking manner. He spoke in a way that was reminiscent of a man who was sad. As the emergency was resolved, he resumed speaking in his usual style.

A reaction to stress: After verbal information has been acquired during stress interviews, this attribute may be quantified most effectively. The speaker's answers to difficult questions are graded and contrasted with their other scores when they respond to queries that are more neutral in nature. For instance, if a speaker uses more qualifiers and retractors in answer to stress questions, we can draw the conclusion that the speaker loses focus under pressure. It is probable that a speaker will depend more on his or her own resources and less on assistance from others in times of need if they use the pronouns *I* more and *we* less while responding to confrontational queries. A speaker who is unable to take full responsibility during a crisis is more likely to respond in the opposite manner by utilizing the pronouns *us* and less often *I*.

CONCLUSION

Verbal behavior is any behavior that, with the help of a listener, is encouraged. Verbal behavior suggests that a speaker and listener have a social and reciprocal connection in which the speaker benefits from the listener's conduct in order to receive reward. A person's motives, preferences, interests, emotional makeup, and manner of interacting with others and circumstances are all subjected to a series of questions on personality tests. It doesn't matter whether you're in your living room or a conference room, having strong language abilities will aid to promote necessary dialogue. Every one of us has the innate potential to express ourselves in many ways. The office and family both need effective interpersonal communication.

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CHAPTER 11

MEASURING THE MOTIVES OF POLITICAL ACTORS AT A DISTANCE HUMANITARIAN

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ABSTRACT:

A humanitarian is someone who cares about the wellbeing of all people. If a billionaire gave a large portion of his riches to help the poor with food, shelter, and education, he would be seen as a wonderful humanitarian. In this chapter author is discusses the power motivation.

KEYWORDS:

Behaviour, Leader, Motivation, Political, Power.

INTRODUCTION

Politicians deal in power, but their motivations for doing so are varied. Of sure, some people crave power for its own sake, but many others do not. Remember the farmer Cincinnatus, who was twice granted absolute authority in times of need during the early years of the Roman Republic. Each time the situation was ended, he eagerly went back to his farm. Towards the conclusion of his tenure as president, Harry Truman found the "White Prison" to be a comfortable place to renounce power. Some leaders could be looking for reassurance that they are liked or attempting to boost their self-esteem via successes and recognition from the public. Motives provide purpose and vigor for action. Motives define sources of leadership satisfaction, stress, dissatisfaction, and susceptibility. They also impact how leaders interpret the leadership position, sensitize perceptions of opportunity and risk, and alter the accessibility of various styles and talents. So, evaluating a leader's motivations is crucial to developing a profile of that leader's personality. But, figuring out a political leader's motivations is by no means simple. It is not always possible to deduce motives from behavior or results. They fluctuate in response to both internal dynamics and outside incentives. Ultimately, they are susceptible to reasoning, deceit, and distortion. Due to these factors, motivations are often assessed indirectly via content analysis of verbal behavior that involves imagination. Such a method of evaluation is well suited to evaluating political leaders' intentions from a distance[1]–[3].

This article outlines a technique for evaluating the three motivations of political leaders—accomplishment, affiliation, and power—through a thorough content study of their speeches, interviews, and other verbal output. The method's general framework was previously covered in 2. First covered in the present are the three motivations and how content analysis is used to assess them. The important research papers in political psychology employing this scoring methodology are then examined. Ultimately, challenges and problems are highlighted along with the steps and needs for motivation evaluation.

As dimensions of motivation, achievement, affiliation, and power are three essential dimensions of motivated action, according to both theoretical analyses and empirical research on human motivation.

The findings of decades of study on the related behaviors and effects are presented in this section, along with concise score descriptions for each reason. The findings of research on political psychology that included a remote evaluation of political leaders' motivations are presented in the section that follows.

Inspiration for Achievement: A Pursuit of Excellence

In texts or other spoken material, achievement motivation imagery is graded when there are allusions to excellence, accomplishing a "good" or "better" work, or completing some noteworthy feat or inventive deed. These are some instances of imagery used in political speeches or interviews with an accomplishment purpose.

"I feel that people are looking for something better and fresh." "Our future potential is the only thing we have that is bigger than our current riches." "In the history of contemporary governments, we built the least bureaucratic governmental operation." Particularly as entrepreneurs in tiny, high-tech companies—individuals who by their own efforts unite labor, capital, and technology to manufacture and sell some new product or service—people who often utilize accomplishment motivation images likely to be financially successful. They are faster and better at applying knowledge to change performance, and they are more inventive. They are restless and often on the move, have lofty but grounded goals, carefully weigh the odds, and labor tirelessly. Hence, they often succeed in such commercial environments. Achievement-motivated people can control themselves and delay gratification, perhaps because they have a sense of time as moving faster and stretching farther into the future. Achievement motivation is not related to success, though, in academic or scientific settings, in the professions, or in large bureaucratic corporations. They choose understated, even melancholy looks. They don't always adhere to strict "law and order" principles, however, and will sometimes resort to unlawful or even revolutionary methods when they feel it is essential. They are logical and cooperative during negotiations, striving for outcomes that maximize the advantages for all sides[4], [5].

In general, those who are achievement-motivated seem to be self-interested, logical thinkers. In fact, "rational actor" theories often presuppose that accomplishment drive is a universal motivator, if not the sole motivation that exists in humans. This would be incorrect, however, since there are other significant human social incentives that have quite different effects.

Motivation for Affiliation: Interest in Intimate Relationships with Others

When there are allusions to warm, intimate links between individuals or countries, when there is worry about warm relations being disrupted, or when there are nurturing actions that indicate warm relations, affiliation motivation imagery is scored in texts or other verbal material. These are some instances of affiliation-motive images from speeches or interviews with politicians.

"We have provided assistance due of humanitarian concerns." Our government needs to show sympathy.

Individuals who often express their affiliation purpose are quite different from those who are driven by success. They are people-oriented, spending time with, interacting with, and working with others. Their circle of amicable engagement is, however, restricted to individuals who are like them and with whom they get along. As a result, affiliation-motivated individuals follow the advice of friends rather than professionals and put forth more effort while working alongside friends. Those they know and trust may influence them more effectively. They may build up

more social support systems if they are surrounded by amiable, like-minded individuals. As a result, they typically have happier marriages, more subjective well-being, and better life adaptation.

But, affiliation-motivated individuals are actually less amiable and pleasant when they come across people they don't know or persons they perceive to be "different." They may become resistant or even hostile when they feel like they are being taken advantage of. High attachment drive under danger might result in stingy, protective conduct. In other words, how affiliation-motivated individuals see the other and their connection to them has a significant impact on how they act toward them. Such views often depend on nuanced signs, gestures, and patterns of reciprocation, making it possible for individuals with an attachment drive to come off as irrational and strange in their interpersonal interactions. In times of competition, their performance often declines. Such individuals are not very adept at managing, working with, or simply getting along with complete strangers and people they do not like because of their sensitivity to the indications of friendship.

DISCUSSION

Power Motivation: Concern for Impact

When there are allusions to one person, group, or country having an effect on another person, group, or nation, or when there is worry about reputation and prestige, power motive imagery is scored in texts or other spoken material. Examples of power motive imagery from political speeches or interviews include the ones below.

1. "We accepted the beliefs that rocked the globe and changed countries."
2. Doing this deal would be a shame from which our nation's good reputation could never recover.
3. "The actions suggested in your statement pose a major danger to international security."

While the idea of a power motive or "will to power" may conjure up images of Napoleon or Hitler, the ability to influence the conduct of others is a necessary component—and sometimes a beneficial one—of daily life in any kind of organized society. Individuals who often utilize power motive images tend to be outgoing, well-known, involved in organizations, and attracted to particular professions that allow them to directly influence and legitimize the conduct of others. They often have a track record of being effective managers who can boost employee morale even when they are not well-liked by their staff. ² In small gatherings, they actively define the situation, invite individuals to participate, and exert influence. They are skilled at forming alliances with others.

When power motivation is restrained by self-control, responsibility, altruism, or plain inhibition, this is its positive side. Yet there is another aspect to power drive; it may be inherent in it, but it may emerge more so when there is a lack of self-control or accountability. Individuals who score highly on the power motive imagery are open to flattery and ingratiation. They usually don't get better until after a win, not after a loss. They pay comparatively little attention to moral issues while making judgments. Moreover, they take enormous risks, exhibit verbal and physical aggression, and engage in a range of impulsive behaviors, including sexual exploitation, alcoholism, and drug abuse. Thus, the desire for power has a propensity to corrupt. Last but not least, power motivation is linked to increased sympathetic nervous system activity, lowered

immune system functioning, and resultant sensitivity to cardiovascular issues and infectious infections, particularly when mixed with stress and the drive for control[6], [7].

Motives in Political Psychology Research

This section examines a number of political psychology studies that evaluated political leaders' and organizations' motivation images, often as part of a more thorough psychological profile.

American Presidents

Winter produced motive scores of the first inaugural speeches of American presidents from Washington through Reagan, extending Donley's original work, and later added motive scores for Bush and Clinton.

According to Winter's assessment and expansion of these research, presidential purpose imagery correlates predictably with presidential acts and results. The following is a summary of these findings. Historians consider presidents who were driven by power to be "great." Yet, there is a complicated and shaky causal relationship between a president's motivational imagery and the decision to send the United States into a conflict. On the other hand, presidential power motivation is also linked to the decision to send the nation into a war. Presidents who are driven by affiliation desire peace but are susceptible to the influence of self-centered subordinates and controversy as a result. Ultimately, presidents who are driven by success often get frustrated in the hazy muck of political intrigue and haggling due to their idealistic restlessness.

Given that achievement-driven leaders are successful entrepreneurs in business, it is intriguing to investigate why this same motivation causes issues in politics. American business culture is one of "command and compliance," where a chief executive is free to insist on finding the "one best answer" to any issue. Further debate is often foregone after there is just one optimal answer. These arguments can imply that the concepts of utilitarianism and meritocracy both contain a hidden authoritarian "shadow." Yet, in democratic politics, various groups often have divergent views of what is "best," necessitating a compromise between "the best" and "the feasible" in order to achieve "the possible." It takes a lot of convincing, nagging, and inspiration to get people to agree with someone else's idea of "the greatest." Even once compromise policies are enacted in politics, they must be carried out by less-than-stellar representatives—representatives the president did not pick, does not completely trust, and cannot dismiss. They weren't barriers to political success for power-hungry leaders like Franklin Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy; rather, they were the core of a vibrant and exciting political life. Power-driven leaders may thus be inclined to bypass the politicians and address "the people" directly, to take unethical short cuts, or to exhaust themselves with micromanagement.

People running for president

In presidential elections, campaign performance is also influenced by motivations. Winter compared candidates' motivation imagery ratings to several facets of their campaign performance and strategy in a thorough examination of the 1976 election. The main outcomes. For instance, candidates with strong accomplishment motivation images kept a moderate ideological stance, earned money via significant contributions, spent money on the key New Hampshire primary, and only remained in the campaign for a short period of time. All of these findings are in line with the laboratory research that has been compiled, which portrays achievement-motivated individuals as effective businesspeople who take calculated risks. Power-driven candidates, on

the other hand, adopted more radical ideologies, focused on small donations, spent a lot of time in New Hampshire before to that state's crucial primary election, and remained in the campaign longer overall.

Adkins researched the 1992 presidential candidates and discovered similar relationships between the candidates' achievement and power motives and the degree of risk in their campaign strategy, even though these findings might be specific to the 1976 campaign and the overall political climate in the United States.

It is significantly more difficult to determine how a candidate's motivation imagery profile relates to their political performance. Winter discovered that the greater the similarity between a president's motivation imagery profile and the profile of American society at the time, the bigger the margin of victory, and the greater the likelihood that the president would win reelection. In other words, electoral success—though not always considered success in historical terms—is a result of the political actor's and the public's "fit" of motives.

By evaluating transcripts of the evidence given by fifteen justices of the United States Supreme Court during their confirmation hearings between 1925 and 1984, Supreme Court Justices Aliotta investigated their motivations. She discovered that publishing majority viewpoints was, as expected, adversely connected with achievement and affiliation and favorably correlated with power motivation. Justices who are driven by success tend to vote concurring or dissenting less often. Nonetheless, they tended to write a different viewpoint whether they did accord or disagree. This conclusion, according to Aliotta, reflects their focus on performance rather than on exposure or status. The justices who are driven by affiliation, who are also less likely to agree or dissent, often do not write separate opinions. This presumably indicates their need for acceptance and approval.

World Leaders in Politics

In the press conference transcripts of forty-five global leaders, Hermann rated affiliation and power imagery and correlated the scores of the leaders to their foreign policy inclinations. Affiliation-motivated leaders seek a cooperative and interdependent foreign policy, as anticipated by laboratory research, while power-motivated leaders are more autonomous and hostile. The quantity of hatred that leaders' countries displayed against other nations was likewise correlated with their power drive, but their affiliation motive predicted displays of friendliness.

Soviet Presidents

Hermann further outlined these connections in a study of Soviet Politburo members' motivations in the late 1970s⁵. Members with the opposite motivation pattern were substantially less prodentente than members with high affiliation and low power scores. After coming into power, each general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union delivered a report to the first party congress. Schmitt and Winter assessed the speeches and correlated each leader's score with his leadership style.

African Presidents

Twenty-two political figures from different southern African nations, including presidents of state, cabinet ministers, and exiled nationalist guerrilla commanders, provided interview transcripts for Winter. A panel of experts determined that power-motivated leaders were more

likely "to start, promote, or continue military conflict," as was predicted from laboratory experiments. It is important to observe that despite expectations based on shared method variation, these evaluations of propensity for violence were unrelated to judgments of power motive produced by the same expert judges.

Hermann: Studies of Individual Leaders

As part of a systematic psychobiography or personality portrait, some academics have employed motive imagery scoring of historical sources to draw conclusions about the motivations of specific people in recent years. Some of these studies were based on a president's, candidate's, or other leader's results from a group study, while others were intended to be studies of a single leader from the start. Winter and Carlson investigated how some of the contradictions in President Nixon's political and personal actions may be explained by the motivation imagery scores of his 1969 first inauguration speech. For instance, they propose that Nixon's political alterations and shifts—from liberal populist in college to postwar "Redhunter" to guest of Mao Zedong in 1972—can be interpreted as an example of the propensity for achievement-motivated individuals to alter their actions based on the outcomes of earlier actions. By collecting descriptions of Nixon's motivation-related conduct from the published memoirs of his key colleagues as well as from Nixon's own autobiographies, they more methodically confirmed his overall motive imagery profile. As might be predicted given his very high scores on the affiliation and accomplishment motivations, they discovered that Nixon exhibited practically all of their correlations. He had just a few correlates of the power motivation, which is in contrast to what would be predicted based on his average score for that motive [8], [9].

Ronald Reagan and Syrian President Hafez al-personalities Assad's were compared using Hermann's power and affiliation motivation imagery scores as well as other distantly assessed personality variables. In a similar vein, Snare has created portraits of Muammar Qaddafi, the leader of Libya, and post-Khomeini Iranian leaders. Snare has also scored a few of Mussolini's speeches and discovered that after his meeting with Hitler in September 1937, which began their close relationship, he significantly increased his motivation for power and decreased his affiliation. The sharp decline in the wisdom and effectiveness of Mussolini's policies starting at that point may be explained by such developments.

Other leaders who have been examined using motivation imagery scores include former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, U.S. president George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Woodrow Wilson, and John F. Kennedy.

1. Political and social process studies
2. War and Conflict Escalation

In order to clarify the motivating contributions to significant social processes like war and peace, the motive-scoring approach has also been used to score cultural works. According to extrapolations made from individual laboratory studies and earlier archival research, peacefully resolved crises would exhibit the opposite pattern to war and the aggressive resolution of crises, which would be characterized by high levels of power motivation and low levels of affiliation. He evaluated three sets of historical documents to test this theory: the Speech from the Throne, which British monarchs deliver at the start of each session of Parliament; the direct government-to-government correspondence between Germany and Great Britain in the weeks leading up to the outbreak of World War I in July 1914; and the statements and correspondence between

President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In contrast to the years when Britain maintained peace, he discovered that power motivation grew and affiliation dropped in the years right before Britain joined a war. The same tendencies were present in July 1914, when the World War I crisis became violent; in contrast, in the peacefully concluded Cuban Missile Crisis, power declined while affiliation increased.

Economic Growth and Entrepreneurship

McClelland demonstrated multiple connections between strong performance motivation and economic growth, particularly entrepreneurial activity and innovation, in his seminal research *The Achieving Society*. These relationships have been demonstrated at the individual and corporate levels via laboratory and longitudinal investigations of individuals as well as historical examinations of business records. For instance, from 1952 to 1980, Diaz rated motive imagery in the yearly letters to investors of two American and one Japanese vehicle firm. He discovered that a company's accomplishment motivation imagery ratings from one year accurately predicted that company's future relative market share. The portfolios of managers with strong accomplishment motivation expanded more quickly over a five-year period, whereas the portfolios of managers with high power motivation had more volatility, according to research by Wormley on mutual fund managers.

McClelland discovered the link between achievement motivation and economic growth at the national or cultural level by linking the achievement motive imagery scores from elementary school readers to later national economic growth. Achievement motivation imagery in folktales was linked to the prevalence of full-time entrepreneurs and more sophisticated methods of food production in preindustrial cultures.

Methods and Resources for Picking a Political Actor or Group and Scoring Motives at a Distance

The selection of the individuals or groups to be investigated is the initial stage in any at-a-distance research project. Naturally, this relies on the research topics and interests of the individual, but certain components of this choice have significant effects on the study's overall structure.

Election-related comparison content

Raw motive imagery scores, which are commonly reported as pictures per 1,000 words, are the outcome of motive imagery scoring. These scores are difficult to interpret on their own because they are undoubtedly influenced by a variety of factors in addition to the political actor's actual motivations. These factors include the type of discourse, the intended audience, the occasion, the political climate, and the compositional mode. Researchers may ask if it is ever feasible to discover the impact of individual intentions given the abundance of other potentially obscuring influences. The solution is in creating a reference sample to measure these raw values against. These comparisons allow us to control for these additional, unrelated characteristics.

The raw motive imagery scores of each individual may be combined and transformed into a standardized form after a comparison group has been determined. Raw scores may be compared to any other scores from any other source, based on any other form of material, once they have been normalized on the basis of the scores of the comparison sample. ³ In two ways, the selection of the comparison group is crucial. At the beginning, it sets the normative population to whom the subject of the study will be compared. Second, because all members of the

standardization group should be scoring the same sorts of documents, the decision of the standardization group also influences the choice of the actual documents to be evaluated. The method of choosing comparison groups is then shown with a few instances.

How to Determine Comparative Groups

It will often be clear which comparison group to choose. As a result, it is possible to compare the motivation imagery ratings of a president's first inaugural speech to those of all previous first inaugural speeches. Instead, one presidential candidate's speech might be scored and compared to all the other contenders' speeches for that year. Hermann has utilized her cumulative sample of global leaders as a reference group for the rating of additional individual leaders in the present and the future.

The motive imagery scores of white leaders, "front line" heads of state, Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, South African nationalist leaders, and South African "homeland" leaders were compared in Winter's study of 22 southern African leaders, as one example of how comparisons between various subgroups of a single larger group can sometimes be made.

When studying a single leader across time, it might be helpful to include verbal data of a similar kind. For instance, Winter used Bill Clinton as his own comparison subject while examining variations in the motivation imagery levels of his State of the Union addresses from 1993 to 1996.

Ross Perot's Story as an Example of the Difficulties in Finding Comparative Groups Sometimes it might be challenging to create or identify the right comparison group. The kind of questions that may be raised and the range of hypotheses that can be considered may both be impacted by such restrictions. For methodological reasons, if not for Perot's continued substantive significance as a political leader, the case of Ross Perot's 1992 presidential campaign may be utilized as an intriguing example. Since that Ross Perot's candidacy had attracted a lot of attention from the public and the media due to its peculiar rise and fall cycle, Winter sought to evaluate Perot's motivations as part of his research of the 1992 U.S. presidential candidates and campaign. As Perot had not yet made an official declaration of his candidacy, the exact nature and status of his campaign were unclear at the time of the first investigation. So, rather than comparing the raw scores to the other presidential candidate announcement speeches, Winter rated the transcripts of four interviews that were published in major publications in order to gain an idea of his purpose imagery profile. Then, because Perot officially left the race in July 1992 but returned in October 1992, his announcement speech on that later occasion might be contrasted with those of the other 1992 candidates.

The two estimates of Perot's motivation profile were considerably different, in standardized terms, which is noteworthy to note. A study of the disparities demonstrates how the choice of data and the establishment of comparison groups influence the possible interpretations. Perot had extremely high accomplishment, low affiliation, and slightly below average power ratings in the interviews. A profile like that is consistent with Perot's prior business success. While not much greater than affiliation or power, the latter announcement statement showed far lower levels of accomplishment motivation than the other 1992 candidates' averages.

Why the distinction? What was Perot's "real" degree of drive for success? Using different standardization samples for the two types of content resulted in the apparent difference in the two

accomplishment motivation imagery ratings, even though the raw achievement scores for the interviews and announcement were almost the same. In other words, Perot scored well on accomplishment motivation when compared to global leaders answering interview questions, but not when compared to other contenders giving an announcement speech. Was this a genuine or artifactual difference?

A number of responses to this topic, each based on a different set of comparison and standardization process assumptions, might be given. The apparent discrepancy in Perot's results could only be a result of the many comparison samples that were utilized; as a result, Perot's "real" accomplishment motivated imagery score might either be high or low. The global leaders are a political sample, making them a poor group to use as a benchmark for Perot's interview-based evaluations. It would have been wiser to use a sample of business executives; in contrast to such an audience, Perot's raw accomplishment motivation score may have been far lower.

The apparent discrepancy might be explained by the fact that Perot's declaration of candidacy was not delivered as a prepared speech like those of the other candidates to whom it was compared, but rather as the opening remark at a press conference. The gap could exist, but it's due to Perot's failure to raise his achievement imagery to the standard for political announcement speeches, a new genre for him. In other words, his declaration did not accurately represent his genuine high degree of accomplishment drive or the needs of the situation.

In essence, the four responses are methodological assumptions. The difference is genuine and represents a true drop or disengagement of Perot's accomplishment incentive throughout the course of the presidential campaign, which is why another response that incorporates a substantive explanation is more intriguing. It's possible that during the latter, October campaign he didn't "have his heart" and was only going through the motions of the declaration during the televised debates. As his chances of winning had already drastically decreased by that point, achievement-motivated candidates were more likely to withdraw from the contest. Maybe his only motivation in entering the race again was to keep his network of support intact for potential tactical uses in the future. His announcement statement lacked the same amount of drive to succeed that it would have if it had been written and delivered months earlier[10]–[12].

CONCLUSION

Humanitarian efforts aim to provide for the population's most fundamental needs, including food, water, shelter, and healthcare. These industries are all interconnected, and the standards attained in one have an impact on and even have the power to decide advancement in another. Finally, it should be noted that comparative politics deals with important topics like as war and peace, democracy and authoritarianism, market-based and state-based economies, affluence and poverty, access to healthcare, and so on. But its justification is pretty straightforward: the world is diversity, not homogeneous. Organizations must foster a climate that prevents politics from degenerating into violence. This may be accomplished by putting into practice important goals that establish standards inside the company.

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CHAPTER 12

SELECTION OF SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS

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ABSTRACT:

A document's main goal is to make it easier for its readers to get information from its creator. It is the author's responsibility to structure the text in such a way that the information it contains may be understood properly and quickly. In this chapter author discusses the assessing leadership style trait analysis.

KEYWORDS:

Document, Government, Leader, Political, President.

INTRODUCTION

Selecting particular documents is the next step after identifying the relevant political actor and comparison groups. The use of comparable documents is crucial for the same reason that it is to use comparable people: any motive imagery scores or differences are always open to a different interpretation or explanation, one in which they are caused by the characteristics of the material scored rather than actual individual differences [1], [2].

Research may be limited by the necessity for related materials. Think of a study that compared the administrations of Jefferson, Lincoln, and Kennedy in the United States. Only since Hoover have US presidents held live news conferences, and only since Kennedy have they been aired live. As a result, we are unable to compare the transcripts of these three presidents' news conferences.

Since Wilson, the annual State of the Union message from the American president to Congress has been given in person; before, the address had been presented in writing. Hence, the State of the Union addresses cannot be compared. Although while inaugural speeches date back to George Washington, they have evolved over the last 200 years in terms of literary style, audience makeup and size, and—most significantly—the role of the media.

Moreover, other presidential communication channels have seen significant modification throughout time. Telegrams, telephones, and now email have supplanted letters as the primary means of communication. So, despite the obvious situational, political, and rhetorical differences between Jefferson, Lincoln, and Kennedy, inaugural speeches may be one of the few even marginally similar sources of information for a comparison between them.

In the study of international relations, it is possible that formal or structural differences prevent diplomatic communications, speeches, interviews, diaries, and memoirs from being compared to one another or even to themselves over time. Once again, thorough selection and comparison must be undertaken, and benefits and drawbacks must be considered equally.

Using Paired Comparisons

Another method of addressing the issue of material comparability is shown by Winter's research of global crises. In pairs of crises, one of which resulted in war and the other of which was settled amicably, he aimed to contrast the motivational imagery used. He drew from a variety of situations to guarantee the generalizability of the outcomes. There isn't a single kind of similar paper for all of these situations. Yet, there were one or more types of similar papers in each pair, making it feasible to build a series of comparisons inside each pair.

For instance, President Folk's published journal and his yearly reports to Congress, as well as the diplomatic discussions with Mexico and Great Britain, both extensively discuss the Mexican War and the Oregon border issue. There are private press conferences and statements by other US officials for both Indochina in 1954 and Vietnam in 1964–1965 from which information pertinent to the subject at hand might be chosen for scoring. 4 The inaugurals of each president might be compared to those of the presidents serving directly before and after them for the Jefferson-Lincoln-Kennedy comparison that was previously addressed in order to exclude extraneous influences and further narrow the comparisons.

DISCUSSION

Texts

Texts that were copied verbatim should be scored. The Public Papers of the Presidents series offers a verbatim transcript of each statement made by the president "on the record" for use in U.S. study. This series dates back to Herbert Hoover; prior to that, significant presidential speeches and documents may be found in the series A Collection of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. There is the Congressional Record and the Congressional Globe for the United States Congress. From the seventeenth century to the present, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates has served as Great Britain's counterpart. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report contains several verbatim excerpts of speeches and interviews given by non-American officials. Since its inception in 1947, this magazine has seen a number of modifications, including a switch from microfilm of mimeographed hard copy to microfiche of printed hard copy, and most recently, the availability of online texts on the Internet. Other online resources, including Lexis-Nexis, are multiplying quickly. Several nations also provide archived papers that include political leaders' actual words.

Documentation Preparation

There are many ways to increase the objectivity of scoring. Scorers should, to the greatest degree feasible, be oblivious to the distinctions between the several papers and the study hypothesis. In rare circumstances, it may even be acceptable to conceal details like names of people or countries, dates, and other information that may be used to identify the source or in some other way skew the rating. To minimize the impacts of serial position, scorer tiredness, and other such issues, the complete set of material to be scored should be randomly mixed together.

Scoring

You may purchase the whole handbook "Integrated System for Scoring Motives in Running Text" from the author for a fee. It includes learning instructions, a variety of practice materials, professional scoring, and documentation. *Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic*

Content Analysis contains a plethora of supplementary material in addition to the original editions of the three motive score systems.

When assessing data for research, raters should have obtained a high level of congruence with expert assessment on the practice materials. Step-by-step instructions are provided in the running text handbook to do this.

Problems with measurement and interpretation Motives of Speechwriters or Leaders.

Do the scores obtained when political leaders' speeches and other written materials are rated for motive imagery represent the leaders' own intentions or the motives of their speech writers? Does anyone's personality truly come through in the scores, especially if speech writers are attempting to highlight important cultural values in order to appeal to the widest possible audience? Candidates do, however, choose their speech writers. The ability to tailor words, phrases, and imagery to a client's style and personality is a skill possessed by speech writers. The candidate and other close associates study and modify consecutive versions of any key speech, such as a declaration of candidacy or an inauguration, until they feel suitable and comfortable. Kennedy, for instance, personally authored a final copy of his inaugural address in 1960 and added some offensive motive illustrations to Theodore Sorenson's concluding typed edition[3], [4].

While many "spontaneous" interviews are well planned, even scripted, using more spontaneous interview material might help to solve this issue. Yet in a broader sense, worries about the speechwriter's impact may not matter. Prepared texts, regardless of their position, do exist as the leader's words, are understood to be the leader's words, and have effects as the leader's words. We may infer from scores based on these words that they provide a reliable indicator of the leader's personality and that they can be used to forecast or understand the author's actions. But, the same condition also holds true for any other strategy for drawing conclusions about a leader's or, really, anybody else's, personality.

There is evidence that although audience, campaign concerns, public mood, cultural values, and political stereotypes do have an impact on speech content, they do not entirely account for motivation imagery ratings. So, from nearly any clear policy position, a political leader may discuss topics like the economy, national heritage, and even war and peace while using or refraining from using imagery of success, affiliation, or power. In other words, rather than just reflecting the common currency of cultural symbols or ideological views, the motive imagery scoring systems seem to pick up on the subtle shades of image or accent that represent personal elements.

Reliability

Many readers may be skeptical about the dependability of this at-a-distance approach since the motive imagery content analysis system was evolved from TAT scoring systems, which are known to have poor test-retest reliability. Actually, according to a number of studies, the perception of poor TAT dependability is untrue. Winter further claims that these scoring systems' at-a-distance adaptations provide split-half over-time dependability values in the range of .62 to .77, which shows a high degree of temporal stability. Translation If a translation was done carefully, it seems that translated materials provide about the same scores as originals. This is in line with previous studies on the impact of translation on motive imagery ratings.

Last Warnings

Despite the fact that the motivation imagery scoring system has provided insightful generalizations in research on groups and beneficial case studies, some last precautions about the method are necessary. Keep in mind that all content analyses rely on the written record. Yet, not all records are available to researchers or even known to them. For instance, it took 25 years for the public to learn that President Kennedy and his advisors during the Cuban Missile Crisis had audio recordings of their discussions. Some of the Presidents Johnson and Nixon's recorded talks and discussions have just lately been made accessible to academics. Moreover, many significant "messages" should not be sent in a fashion that will result in their inclusion in a public archive. For instance, Sir William Tyrrell had dinner with Richard von Kuhlmann, the German charge d'affaires, just after the start of the first Balkan War. Tyrrell conveyed Grey's "serious and decisive proposal" for "heartfelt and durable conciliation" at that dinner, according to Kuhlmann's later telegram to German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, whereby Germany and Britain would walk "hand in hand" in resolving not only the Balkan crisis but also all other potential conflict zones. Actually, there is no written record of these events in any official British archive and no written record of the final outcome of the conversation in German or British archives. In response, the German foreign secretary questioned whether Grey would communicate such a significant proposal in a "dinner conversation." So, a content analysis of what happened during that supper specifically is not possible.

Similar to this, many of the most crucial elements of the Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly from the Soviet perspective, are either undocumented, unavailable in official records, or have not yet been declassified. For instance, various people's memories of numerous crucial interactions between American news reporters and Soviet officials at the height of the crisis vary. The conversations between Robert Kennedy and the Soviet envoy Dobrynin are also only known to us via reports and memoirs. Recollected texts are referred to be "unspoken assumptions" since they are open to alteration. Due to all of these factors, we must employ content analysis of the written record with care and humility since it may not always be isomorphic with the psychological states of political leaders, organizations, and peoples.

Leadership Style Evaluation: A Trait Analysis

When the topic of politics and politicians is brought up, debate often centers on individuals. A certain fascination exists with political leader analysis. As a consequence, biographies of current political figures become best-sellers, and both their victories and failures become news headlines. Our interest in the personal traits of such leaders is largely a result of the knowledge that their preferences, the causes they support, and the methods by which they arrive at decisions may have an impact on our lives.

So how can we get a deeper understanding of the personalities and, in particular, the leadership trajectories of political leaders? Giving someone like Tony Blair, Saddam Hussein, or Boris Yeltsin a battery of psychiatric exams or requiring them to participate in a series of clinical interviews is difficult to imagine. They wouldn't just find such processes tedious or intolerable, but they also could be concerned that if the findings were made public, it might hurt their political standing.

Examining what political leaders say is one approach to find out more about them without needing their assistance. Politicians are arguably the only group of people that leave more

evidence of their actions in the public eye than movie stars, popular music bands, and athletics. The media often covers the actions and remarks of US presidents, for instance, so very little of what they do goes unnoticed. These resources serve as a foundation for evaluation. Even when these persons are unavailable for the more common assessment approaches, we may start to understand something about the public personas they project by examining the substance of what political leaders say. The remainder of this article will provide a method for evaluating leadership style using remarks made by political leaders as an example of how their words may be researched to understand more about them.

Concentrating on Spontaneous Content.

For the majority of political leaders in the latter half of the 20th century, speeches and media interviews were the two main sorts of remarks that were easily accessible. Examining speeches to gauge a leader's personality requires some care since these materials are often created for the leader by speech writers or staff members. Yet typically, consideration and care have gone into what is said and how it is stated. Yet, media interviews are a more impromptu sort of content. Leaders must reply rapidly throughout the back-and-forth of a question-and-answer session without the use of aids or props. The kind of answer and the language used may be influenced by how they are. Political leaders often prepare for press interviews, but when they are alone and speaking on their own during the interview, their comments are frequently more impromptu [5]–[7].

Interviews are the preferred source of information since there is a need to evaluate the political leader's personality traits and, therefore, his or her leadership style. Political leaders are more likely to reveal aspects of their personalities in an interview than they are in a speech because they are less in control of what they say while being in a public environment. The following trait analysis employs the interview answer as its analytical unit. Individual comments from interviews are separated from the question that prompted them.

There are several places where you may find media interviews with leaders. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, which is released via World News Connection, compiles interviews with political figures from other nations' governments. These interviews are also carried on other nations' information agency' websites. In newspapers like the New York Times and Washington Post, as well as in weekly news magazines and as recorded from weekly television news shows, you may often find interviews with American political leaders. The Presidential Papers of each president provide information on presidential news conferences and other interviews with the presidents.

Finding verbatim responses—that is, the whole language as uttered by the leader—is very crucial when gathering interview materials. Sometimes, leaders are surveyed or edited out of interviews by newspapers and magazines, making it impossible to determine how accurate the published content is. We are more interested in how the leaders conducted themselves in that environment than in what the individual media organization feels would sell newspapers or magazines.

It has become clear as I've finished profiles of the leadership philosophies of around 122 political leaders that the analyst can create a reliable judgment of leadership style based on fifty interview replies that are at least 100 words long. Yet, any profile will suffer if it is based on less than fifty replies. Of course, having confidence in one's profile improves the number of interview responses the analyst can evaluate. The fifty interview replies that are studied should cover the

leader's term in office, have taken place in various sorts of interview settings, and concentrate on a range of issues in order to guarantee that the definition of leadership style is not context-specific. To determine how prevalent the characteristics that make up a leadership style are, interview answers may be gathered and categorized according to time, audience, and subject. Such information reveals a leader's relative context sensitivity or insensitivity.

Also, it is feasible to categorize interviews based on how spontaneous they were, which can help the analyst better understand the differences between a leader's public and private personalities. The least spontaneous interviews are those in which the political leader invites reporters into his or her office to present a strategy or to report on what is occurring, or in which the political leader requests questions in advance and picks which reporters will respond, planning the replies. The most unplanned interviews happen when the leader is seen by the media during an unexpected interaction, such as while leaving a meeting, boarding or deplaning an aircraft, in a building's hallways, or when there is a tape of a discussion between the leader and advisors. One may learn not just about the stability of a leader's profile but also about what he or she is especially sensitive to if there is a lack of stability by separating the interview replies on degree of spontaneity as well as context.

Leadership Approach

Political leaders face a number of challenges in influencing policy as the world becomes more complex and an increasing number of agencies, organizations, and people participate in policy-making, both domestically and internationally. For example, they must figure out how to maintain control over policy while still delegating authority to other government actors and how to shape the policy agenda as situations are defined and opportunities as well as problems are seen. The specific leadership stance a leader takes may have an impact on how they approach these decisions and how they resolve these conflicts. According to Barber, a leader's leadership style often derives from the acts that helped the leader achieve their first political victory. These behaviors are reinforced over time as a consequence of the leader relying on them to secure their second, third, and so forth political victories. The phrase "leadership style" refers to how leaders communicate with people around them, including followers, advisors, and other leaders. It also refers to how interactions are structured and the conventions, rules, and principles that serve as a framework for such relationships.

I have discovered a set of leadership styles that seem to govern how presidents, prime ministers, monarchs, and dictators interact with people they lead or with whom they share power after analyzing the individual distinctions of 122 national leaders over the course of the previous 20 years. These leadership philosophies were developed in response to three questions: How do leaders respond to political restrictions in their environment—do they uphold these restrictions or do they question them? How receptive are leaders to new information? Do they utilize it wisely or are they willing to let it influence how they act?

What are the motivations behind the leaders' pursuit of their positions—are they motivated by an internal focus of attention inside themselves or by the connections that may be made with key stakeholders? The responses to these three questions provide light on the degree to which the leader will desire to exert control over events or act as a spokesperson for opposing ideas, as well as whether they will be generally sensitive or indifferent to the political setting. These responses when taken as a whole point to a certain management approach. Before we analyze the questions in combination, let's take a closer look at each one individually.

We are interested in how important it is for leaders to exert control and influence over the environment in which they find themselves and the constraints that environment poses, as opposed to being adaptable to the situation and remaining open to responding to demands of domestic and international constituencies and circumstances, when considering how responsive leaders are to political constraints. According to research, leaders that are prone to challenge limits are more set on confronting a situation head-on, finding a speedy solution to a problem, making a decision, and tackling the subject at hand decisively. Since limitations are seen as barriers rather than insurmountable ones, their personal characteristics are a strong predictor of how they will react to circumstances. Such leaders attempt to put policy-making under their control in order to make it easier to retain direction over events. More sensitive to their surroundings, interested in how relevant people see events and seeking their support, more open to negotiating, trade-offs, and compromise, and more inclined to concentrate on individual events have all been identified in leaders who are more attentive to the context. Due to the limitations that these leaders must work within, personal traits may be used to predict the level of backing and closure they will need from their surroundings before making a choice, as well as where they will look for it. Consensus building, political timing, and adaptability are seen as crucial leadership skills -

George found that while looking at how American presidents made decisions, whether they had a clearly defined vision or agenda that framed how facts were received and understood or were engaged in researching the issue before making a choice affected the kind of information they sought. Presidents with agendas looked for facts that supported their views and surrounded themselves with allies who shared them. Presidents who were more concerned with the political climate at the time wanted to know what was possible and realistic at the moment and were open to professional advice from people who were well-informed about key constituencies. Less receptive leaders have been shown to operate as advocates, seeking out information that confirms their perception of the problem and ignoring data that contradicts it in order to win over other people to their point of view. According to reports, leaders who are more receptive to information are cue-takers who define the issue and choose a stance by looking at what influential others are saying and doing. Such leaders are looking for political insights into who is now supporting what and how strongly. They are interested in information that is both conflicting and supportive of the alternatives on the table.

The reasons behind a leader's actions determine how they "orient toward life—not for the time, but enduringly." Their motivations—what matters to them and what inspires them to take action—shape their character. According to a review of the literature on political leaders' motivations, people are motivated to assume leadership roles in society for a number of reasons, according to Hermann and Hermann, Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, Hermann and Preston, and Kaarbo and Hermann.

Analyzing Traits to Determine Leadership Style

The need for power and influence, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, the propensity to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something rather than maintaining the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities, general mistrust or suspiciousness of others, and the intensity with which a person holds an opinion are seven characteristics that have been found to be particularly useful in determining leadership style. These seven features provide data relevant to evaluating how political leaders react to environmental restrictions, how they process

information, and what motivates them to act, based on prior studies relating leaders' personal characteristics to their political conduct (Mann 1980, 1984a, 1987). It is possible to predict whether a leader would dispute or respect the constraints they see in each situation by learning how much they feel they can affect what occurs and how powerful they are. We can assess the intellectual depth and self-assurance of leaders to predict how receptive they will be to new ideas. We may also learn more about what drives leaders by measuring their level of in-group bias, overall mistrust of outsiders, and propensity to favor problem-solving tasks to those requiring group maintenance. The following sections will outline how each feature may be identified via content analysis of leaders' interview replies and explain what the results signify for leadership style, both individually and collectively.

In this characteristic analysis, it is presumed that leaders would find specific words and phrases to be more salient to them if they use them more often in their interview replies. The trait analysis really uses frequency counts and is quantitative in nature. What is in dispute is the proportion of times that leaders utilize certain terms and phrases while replying to interviewers' inquiries. Currently, one leader's percentages may be compared to those of 87 heads of state from different parts of the globe or to those of 122 political figures who hold a variety of roles in governments in the Middle East, Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Western industrialized democracies. The researcher or analyst may assess if a certain leader scores well or poorly on a characteristic by making these comparisons. We will discuss how to code for the seven qualities after which this technique will be more obvious. A computer program that will automatically code for the qualities covered in this article is currently being developed. The application, called "Profiler," will provide a researcher or analyst the attribute ratings for a certain leader based on speeches or interviews.

Now let's discuss how each quality may be coded and how it relates to the questions about leadership style that were posed before.

Does the leader uphold or disregard restrictions?

Political leaders that have a strong craving for power and a strong sense of self-control have been seen to challenge social norms and push the boundaries of what is feasible. These people in control are aware of what needs to occur. Also, they are adept at achieving their goals both directly and indirectly. Yet those leaders who score poorly in these two areas seem to respect—or at least acknowledge—the limitations they see in their surroundings and to work within them to achieve their objectives. They consider it crucial for a politician to possess and use the abilities of consensus-building and compromise. Depending on the circumstances, leaders who exhibit both of these features in a moderate way may move either toward challenging or toward respecting restrictions; their decisions will be influenced by their other attributes and what they feel the scenario requires.

But what if a leader scores well on one quality but only scores low to moderately well on another? Leaders who have a high degree of self-belief in their ability to influence events and a low degree of need for power will take charge of events and push limitations, but they will struggle more to read people and operate behind the scenes to exert the required impact. Such leaders won't be as effective at making an impression as those who exhibit both attributes to a great degree. They will abuse their authority in an overt and blatant manner, unintentionally giving people cues on how to respond. What about those leaders who have a low self-confidence in their ability to influence events yet a great hunger for power? These people will also question

limitations, but they will feel more at ease doing so covertly and indirectly than than directly. Such leaders are particularly effective in circumstances when they are the "power behind the throne," where they may exert influence but bear less responsibility for the outcome. As mentioned before, I have gathered information on the personality qualities of 122 political leaders, 87 of whom were heads of government, for prior study. The sample's leaders cover the years 1945 through 1999 and come from every continent. Scores on the craving for power are connected with those on the confidence in one's own capacity to influence events for this group of leaders, with a correlation of 0.21 for the 122 political leaders and 0.17 for the sample of 87 heads of state. These connections show that the two traits stand out from one another and that there will be situations when the subject of the study scores well on one and poorly on the other. Let's explain the two characteristics in more depth so that we can put this topic into context: there is a belief that people and governments have the power to alter the course of events. The emphasis is on verbs or action words when coding for the perception of control over occurrences. We presume that when leaders take charge of organizing or starting a task, they do so because they feel they have some influence over the outcome. Here, the emphasis is on initiatives put forward or acts made by the leader or a group that the leader identifies with. The number of times the verbs in an interview answer suggest that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has accepted responsibility for planning or beginning an activity is calculated to get a score for this attribute. The average of this percentage throughout the whole pool of interview replies under consideration is the overall score for every leader[8].

Leaders who think they can affect international events tend to be more engaged and active in the formulation of policies. High performers will want to keep control over decision-making and execution to make sure that things do in fact happen. After all, anything may go wrong if they are not participating. As a result, these leaders are more likely to check in with subordinates to see how they are doing, to pay unexpected trips to locations where policy is being implemented, and to be interested in having face-to-face meetings with other leaders to gauge their level of commitment. Leaders who hold this concept strongly are less inclined to transfer power for tasks and are more likely to start initiatives than to wait for proposals from others. Often, they are "running concepts up the flagpole to see who salutes them." This characteristic resembles a self-fulfilling prophesy in several ways. Leaders who feel they have some control over occurrences are more inclined to take the lead and monitor operations to ensure that policies are followed. They are more willing to assume responsibility because they feel they have some control over outcomes. Such leaders are also less likely to make concessions or come to an agreement with others since they are so confident in their ability to change the world. Whenever they make a choice, they radiate confidence in it because they are aware of what has to be done.

Low self-confidence leaders are more reactive to circumstances and wait to take action until they have a better idea of how the issue will pan out. They are less inclined to take the initiative, preferring to delegate anything too risky or out of the norm to others. Such leaders like to take part and exercise leadership in situations where there is at least a 50% possibility of success. They are prepared to cede power in the hopes that others will be more successful in influencing results than they do. As a consequence, when anything goes wrong, these leaders may also assign responsibility. Instead of accepting responsibility and moving on, these leaders, unlike their colleagues who believe they can influence their external circumstances, are quick to blame others for making it impossible for them to take action. Politicians who doubt their ability to influence events may let their sense of timing be overridden by their fear of failing.

CONCLUSION

Pairwise comparisons are a straightforward and easy approach to gather judgment data. The judge must choose which of two items (or "stimuli") is "x-er"—that is, which object contains more of a certain property, "x"—than the other. The pairwise comparison technique, sometimes known as the "paired comparison method," is a method for ranking or selecting from a set of options by contrasting them against one another in pairs, or two options at a time. The paired comparison test just provides assessors with two samples and asks them to compare the two samples without requiring them to judge the significance of the difference.

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CHAPTER 13

NEED FOR POWER AND INFLUENCE

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ABSTRACT:

Influence is the capacity to significantly alter actions and beliefs, while power is the capacity to force your will on others. You'll sometimes need to utilize your influence as a leader to direct the ship. Yet, when you utilize influence to lead, your team will gradually come to value and respect you more. In this chapter author is discusses the conceptual complexity.

KEYWORDS:

Influence, Leader, Power, Political, Politics.

INTRODUCTION

The need to control, influence, or have an effect on other people or organizations is indicated by the need for power, which is concerned with building, maintaining, or restoring one's authority. Similar to how the preceding feature was coded, the craving for power is coded mostly via verbs. Is the speaker attempting to gain, hold onto, or reclaim authority with their proposed action? When the speaker suggests or engages in a strong, forceful action, such as an assault or attack, a verbal threat, an accusation, or a demand; provides advice or assistance when it is not requested; attempts to control the behavior of another person or group; attempts to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else as long as the goal is not to come to an understanding or avoid conflict; or endeavors to Once again, the leader's proposals or actions—or those of a group with whom he or she identifies—are the subject of attention. Calculating the proportion of times the verbs in an interview answer indicate that the speaker or a group with which the speaker identifies has participated in one of these actions yields a score on the thirst for power. The average of this % across all of the interview replies that were looked at determines the overall score for every leader[1]–[3].

When the urge for power is great, leaders attempt to control and affect the surroundings while projecting an image of success. They are adept at assessing circumstances and determining the best strategies to use to accomplish their objectives. They do in fact have a strong Machiavellian streak, often working behind the scenes to make sure their viewpoints prevail. Power-hungry leaders are often attractive and daring—the dashing hero. But, they don't really care about their neighbors or people in general. In practice, other individuals and organizations are seen as tools for the leader's purposes; trickery and dishonesty are seen as inherent in the game of politics. Such leaders establish regulations to secure adherence to their ideals, but these regulations are subject to sudden change if the leader's objectives or interests shift. Leaders with high levels of this motivation first seduce followers because they can get results and are charismatic, but with time, as these leaders take advantage of their followers and as their objectives diverge from what the people desire or believe they need, the "bloom frequently leaves the rose."

Power-hungry leaders will test the boundaries before committing to a course of action, haggling and negotiating right up to the last minute to discover what is feasible and what the repercussions of moving farther toward their objectives would be. These leaders are more adept in these

discussions when they can speak face-to-face with the parties; otherwise, they could make assumptions about what the other side is thinking and how far they are ready to go.

Leaders may be one of many influential people when there is no need for them to be in command. They are quite OK with other people getting credit for what occurs. For such a leader, empowering others is crucial. Since they believe that what is best for the collective is ultimately best for them, they are prepared to put aside their personal interests in favor of the group's. By giving their followers the authority to serve as messengers and grow the organization or the group's resources, leaders who have a minimal desire for power make their followers feel powerful and accountable. These leaders develop strong morale, a feeling of teamwork, and clear goals among their followers via this technique. Moreover, they possess a sense of fairness. People know where they stand and what will happen if they breach the standards since they are treated fairly based on the group norms and do not play favorites. Their goal is to establish a relationship of trust with their supporters and foster a feeling of shared accountability for what occurs. The group's demands and interests are effectively represented by these leaders, who act as its agent when formulating policies[4]–[6].

DISCUSSION

Leader Open or Closed to Contextual Information

Based on their degrees of self-assurance and conceptual sophistication, political leaders often vary in their receptivity to difficult information. The self-other orientation of a leader is formed by the interaction of these two attributes, according to Ziller and his colleagues. The self-other orientation reveals how receptive the leader will be to feedback from other stakeholders in the decision-making process and from the broader political landscape. On general, those who score higher on conceptual complexity than self-confidence are more open, pragmatic, and receptive to the wants, needs, ideas, and demands of others. In America, these leaders are often chosen via municipal and state elections. They react depending on what they perceive to be appropriate in the given circumstances and are perceptive to environmental signals. Others see them as being receptive and attentive. Since they seem engaged in what happens to others and concerned about assisting them, these leaders may influence others to take action. Such leaders are more likely to set up collegial decision-making processes that provide unrestricted input and output, maximizing the amount of contextual knowledge they may gather about the needs and views of individuals around them. These leaders approach issues and situations on an individual level[7]–[9].

Leaders who score higher on self-confidence than conceptual complexity are more likely to be closed, ideologues, principled, and motivated by causes. These people take the initiative to convince others that their course of action is the correct one because they are aware of what is right and what ought to be done. Such leaders are often unresponsive to or oblivious to environmental stimuli. Instead, they perceive the surroundings differently to meet their worldview. Moreover, they are not beyond utilizing forceful or cunning methods to force a group to embrace their viewpoints. In fact, they are quite engaged in support of their cause, actively pursuing strategies they feel would be successful. To keep control over the nature of the choice, these leaders are more likely to structure the decision-making process hierarchically. They often do not place first in "most popular leader" competitions, but they are frequently praised for their accomplishments.

The conduct of leaders will depend on whether their scores are high or low in comparison to other leaders when the scores on these two attributes are about similar. If both are high, leaders will be approachable and more strategic, concentrating on what is now attainable and practicable. Their high level of self-assurance makes it easier for them to remain calm under pressure and take their time to determine what would work. These leaders will possess the greatest traits of both of these traits—a sense of what they want to accomplish as well as the capacity to assess the situation and determine what will work. It's noteworthy to note that this kind of leader is less likely to be elected in democratic systems, maybe because of how unpredictable and opportunistic their conduct seems to the outside observer and interested constituent. Such leaders' decisions and behaviors make greater sense when one understands their objectives and political environments. They could come out as chameleon-like and indecisive without this understanding, however.

The person is likely to be closed, reflecting the opinions of people around him or her, and disposed to fairly readily latch onto a stance that will look likely to be successful if the scores on both attributes are low in compared to other leaders. These are the political figures Lass-well saw who turned to politics to make up for their poor self-worth. They make for easy prey for organizations looking for a persistent spokesperson for a certain cause in return for power and influence, no matter how flimsy and temporary the assignment. These leaders could exhibit certain narcissistic traits, such as enjoying the limelight, pushing for actions that the group may not see as important, and harboring delusions of unending success[10], [11].

Self-Confidence

A person's feeling of self-importance and perception of their capacity to deal with people and things in their surroundings are both indicated by their level of confidence. Indeed, self-assurance "is the component of the self-system that controls how well the self-system holds up under stress, such as that experienced while processing new information about the self. An individual's concept of self-mediate environmental stimuli. As individuals often gauge their level of self-assurance by comparing themselves to others and their experiences, this quality frequently serves as the frame of reference for establishing oneself in a given situation.

The pronouns me, myself, I, me, and mine are the main topics in coding for self-assurance. How significant do speakers think they are in relation to what is going on when they use these pronouns in their speech? Does the leader's use of the pronoun indicate that they are initiating an activity, should be viewed as authorities on the subject, or have received favorable feedback from someone or some group? There is an improved feeling of self-worth and a demonstration of self-confidence in each of these situations. Calculating the proportion of times these personal pronouns are used in an interview answer that satisfies the three criteria yields a score for this feature. Any leader's overall score is calculated as a proportion of all the interview replies that were gathered for that specific individual.

High self-confident leaders are less susceptible to environmental information than are those with low self-confidence. They are more typically content with who they are and do not look for further information to judge who they are and how they behave." To keep behavior consistent, new knowledge about the self is either discounted or reshaped. Such leaders are not influenced by the whims of external circumstances. Since consistency in conduct is so vital, they are neither

the victims of events nor forced to change to the circumstances. Based on their strong feeling of self-worth, information is filtered and reinterpreted.

Yet, political leaders who lack confidence are more easily tossed about by "contextual winds." Such leaders often seek information from their surroundings in order to know what to do and how to adapt to the demands of the situations in which they find themselves since they lack a strong sense of who they are. Knowing how to respond in each circumstance depends on getting feedback from others about what they are thinking and feeling. As a result, these people's actions often come across as being quite erratic since they are tailored to the circumstances rather than to the requirements and preferences of the person. Some leaders try to join political organizations whose agents, representatives, or delegates may help them feel more confident in order to make up for their feelings of inadequacy.

Conceptual Difficulty

Conceptual complexity is the level of difference shown by an individual while explaining or debating the ideas, policies, concepts, or objects of other people, places, or things. The conceptually sophisticated person is able to perceive several justifications for a given viewpoint, is open to the thought that the environment could be ambiguous, and is adaptable in how they respond to stimuli. The conceptually simple person, on the other hand, has a tendency to categorize things and thoughts into good-bad, black-white, either-or dimensions; has trouble seeing ambiguity in the environment; and responds very rigidly to stimuli.

Focus is placed on certain terms when coding for conceptual complexity—words that imply the speaker can perceive several dimensions in the world as opposed to phrases that imply the speaker sees just a few categories along which to categorize things and concepts. Terms indicating of low conceptual complexity include absolutely, without a doubt, undoubtedly, and irreversible. Words indicative of high conceptual complexity include approximately, possibility, tendency, and for example. The proportion of high and low complexity terms in each interview answer that imply high complexity, along with the other features previously addressed, determines the conceptual complexity score. Every leader's total rating is the average of all of their interview answers.

Political leaders that have high conceptual complexity pay attention to a broader range of environmental cues than do those with low conceptual complexity. Actually, they are looking for a range of viewpoints through which to organize their current position since they feel that things are more gray than black or white. As they don't always trust their first reaction to an incident, these leaders have a sharp awareness of the context. The conceptually complex leader believes that in order to comprehend a situation and make plans for action, one needs acquire a wide range of facts and ask for advice from others. According to this leader, there is always place for one more piece of information or viewpoint. Such decision-makers often deliberate carefully and consult with a wide range of stakeholders. The secret of behavior is said to be flexibility.

Low conceptual complexity leaders trust their instincts and are often inclined to choose the first alternative that is presented to them. It is better to take action than to ponder, prepare, or look for additional information. The universe is highly organized and structured because contextual information is often categorized using a set of stereotypes, which frequently match well with the political orientation of the conceptually simpler person. As the person's closed conceptual framework analyses and converts information from each scenario into the designated categories,

making decisions is comparatively simple. The two pillars of conduct are consistency and interpretation.

Is the Leader Motivated by Problems or Relationships?

According to the literature, political leaders often take on their positions of power for reasons related to both themselves and the importance of the organizations they associate with. As was previously said, in general, leaders are motivated by either an internal focus—a particular cause, an ideology, or a certain set of interests—or by the need for a particular form of feedback from individuals in their environment—acceptance, power, support, or praise. They also seem to be triggered by a desire to defend those of their own species. Leaders who are more closely associated with particular groups work to protect those organizations and frequently see the political world as being full of potential threats to their groups, whereas leaders who are less closely associated with those groups see the world as offering opportunities to collaborate with others for mutual or individual benefit. As a result, while evaluating a leader's motivation, we are interested in both the reasons they ran for office and their desire to protect and safeguard the group they are heading.

Task focus, in-group bias, and mistrust of others are the three characteristics that are used to gauge these two forms of motivation. Task vs interpersonal emphasis reveals the leaders' motivations for running for office, while in-group prejudice and mistrust of outsiders help determine how much they identify with the group. Let's look more closely at each of these characteristics.

Reasons for Applying for a Job

It has been established that leaders have two separate roles in groups: directing the group toward task completion and maintaining the spirit and morale of the group. These two roles may be represented as a continuum, with one end reflecting a focus on completing the work and the other end showing a focus on maintaining the group. Task focus refers to how much weight a leader gives to solving challenges facing the government in dealings with others as opposed to emphasizing the wants and concerns of relevant and significant constituents. Moving the group closer to a goal is the main reason for leaders who place an emphasis on the issue to assume leadership. Maintaining the loyalty of followers and maintaining a positive work environment are the key responsibilities of leadership for those who place an emphasis on group maintenance and building connections. According to research, charismatic leaders are those who lie somewhere in the center of this continuum, concentrating on the issue at hand when it makes sense to do so and on developing connections when it makes more sense. The charismatic leader recognizes when the situation necessitates each of these actions and concentrates on it. This topic is summarized in 8.4.

Similar to coding for conceptual complexity, counting certain phrases that indicate effort on a task or other instrumental activity as well as words that concentrate on consideration for another's emotions, wishes, and satisfaction are the emphasis of coding for task concentration. Words like accomplishment, achievement), strategy, position, proposal, suggestion, and technique are examples of task-oriented terms. Words like gratitude, amnesty, cooperation, disappointment, forgiving, harm, emancipation, and suffering are examples of the group-maintenance sorts of words. The proportion of task-oriented words in relation to the overall number of task-oriented and group-maintenance words in a certain interview answer is calculated

to determine the task focus score. The average percentage of all the evaluated interview replies makes up the final score.

Task-oriented leaders are often taskmasters who constantly pressure their teams to concentrate on fixing the current issue. They have a propensity to see the world in terms of issues, with the group's function being to address these issues. These authorities see people more as tools than as unique beings. Such leaders often inquire about the status of a project, the status of the execution of a solution to an issue, and potential solutions to problems. The subject of discussion is the content, not the participants. Task-focused leaders are prepared to give up a high degree of group morale in order to complete the mission. These leaders see that it is impossible to please everyone; thus, difficult choices must be made for the welfare of the group, and followers must be willing to accept the consequences. These leaders look for followers who share their enthusiasm for problem-solving and who will put up a lot of effort to put any choices taken into action.

The morale and spirit of their groups should be maintained, according to leaders with a relationship- or group-maintenance emphasis. These leaders often pay attention to what the people want and need and work to fulfill those needs. They can only advance the group's objectives as quickly as its members are willing to do so. For leaders with this focus, comradeship, loyalty, and commitment to the group are essential. The group's members are the center of attention, not the tasks that need to be completed. These executives strive to encourage a feeling of engagement and camaraderie inside their organizations. Members feel involved in what is going on and that their opinions are sought out and taken into consideration. For these leaders, leadership is all about energizing and empowering followers. They are thus more likely to form teams, share leadership, and often ask for input on what is practical among important constituencies at any given moment.

inspiration for We can determine whether a leader is motivated by perceived dangers or issues in the world or by chances to build cooperative connections based on information about a leader's scores on in-group prejudice and mistrust of outsiders. A rising body of research suggests that how leaders see the world might influence how assertive their nation will likely be, whether they will take initiative, and if and when they will use economic sanctions and military actions. As it focuses on how leaders' concerns to defend their own kind, when shared by an administration, may affect how combative or cooperative a government and country will be in the international arena, this work has even been referred to as the "statist approach" to foreign policy decision making. According to the research, the more intent leaders are on defending their own kind, the more threats are likely to be context-specific and addressed on an individual basis. Leaders also acknowledge that their nation, like many others, faces challenges that place restrictions on what they can do and necessitate flexibility in their responses. Finally, there are some international contexts in which cooperation with others is both possible and practical.

High

Even though the international system is essentially a zero-sum game, leaders believe that it is constrained by a specific set of international norms. Despite this, opponents are still seen as inherently threatening, and leaders attempt to reduce the threat while boosting their countries' capabilities and relative status. Although the world is seen as being conflict-prone, leaders can respond with some flexibility because other nations are seen as having limitations on what they

can do. Leaders must, however, vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary's actions while still pursuing their countries' interests.

In order to confront these adversaries, leaders believe they have a moral obligation to do so. As a result, they are more likely to take risks and act in a highly aggressive and assertive manner. International politics is centered on a group of adversaries that are seen as "evil" and determined to advance their ideologies or increase their power at the expense of others.

believe in protecting the environment, the more committed they will be to confronting those in charge. As the world is seen as holding both chances and challenges, leaders who are not so ardent in this ambition are capable of understanding the potential for win-win accords and for developing connections in international politics.

The correlation between the two characteristics—in-group prejudice and mistrust of others—is 0.62 in my sample of 87 heads of state and 0.29 in a larger sample of 122 leaders. The relatively significant correlation in the head of state sample suggests that when such leaders have a strong sense of loyalty to their nation, they also have a strong sense of mistrust, and vice versa. To put it another way, leaders tend to be either hawks or doves, rigid or flexible, more danger and issue focused or more opportunity and connection oriented.

An in-group bias is a way of looking at the world where one's own group dominates. This in-group is highly valued and has deep emotional ties to its members. Also, there is a focus on the need of preserving in-group status and culture. All judgments taken are in the in-favor. group's The term or phrase that refers to the individual leader's own group serves as the unit of analysis when coding for in-group bias. Finding out the following details when the leader makes a reference to their own group is interesting: are the modifiers positive, do they imply strength, or do they reflect a need to uphold the group's honor and identity? When one of these qualifiers is used, in-group bias is implied. The number of times a leader mentions in-groups that fit the aforementioned criteria in an interview answer constitutes the leader's in-group bias score. The leader's total score is calculated as the average of these percentages for each of the questions.

Political figures with a high level of intragroup prejudice are vested in preserving the distinct identities of their groups at any costs. When other groups, organizations, governments, or nations attempt to intervene in what they regard as their group's internal affairs, they get highly alarmed. The leader and group grow increasingly isomorphic with increasing score; if something bad occurs to the group, it also happens to the leader, and vice versa. Leaders who score highly for in-group bias have a tendency to see the world in terms of us and them and are quick to perceive others as being a threat to their group's standing. They have a tendency to see only the positive qualities of their group and to downplay or explain away any flaws. As a result, these leaders often detect issues that might threaten their authority after the fact.

Leaders that have a high level of in-group bias are prone to exploit their perceived opponents as external scapegoats for all of the group's issues in an effort to rally their own population's support. At the extreme, these leaders could continue to keep their group militarily active in order to combat the fictitious external adversary. High scorers are more prone to see politics as a zero-sum game where one group's success is another group's failure. They must thus constantly exercise caution to ensure that their team succeeds rather than fails. Such leaders will wish to surround themselves with devoted, strongly identifiable group members, choosing advisors based on their feeling of dedication to the organization's objectives and interests.

It is crucial to remember that even leaders who exhibit little in-group prejudice are patriotic committed to keeping their groups distinct. However, they are less likely to see things in black-and-white terms and more inclined to classify people as either we or them depending on the circumstances or issue at hand, ensuring that such categories remain fluid and constantly changing depending on what is taking place in the world at the time. As a strategy for quelling internal opposition, these leaders are less inclined to turn to scapegoats; instead, they may engage in exchanges like summit conferences and commendable diplomatic initiatives.

Distrust of others refers to a generalized sense of uncertainty, unease, misgiving, and wariness toward others—a propensity to question the intentions and behavior of others. The emphasis is on nouns and noun phrases relating to people and groups other than the leader and those with whom the leader identifies when coding for mistrust of others. Does the leader have any mistrust, doubt, apprehension, unease, or caution over what these people or organizations are doing? Does the leader express worry about what these individuals or organizations are doing and believe that such behavior is damaging to the leader, an ally, a friend, or a cause that is important to the leader? The term or noun phrase is coded to indicate mistrust if one of these circumstances is true. The amount of times a leader expresses mistrust for other people or groups during an interview determines how well they do on this feature; the total score is the average of these percentages throughout all of the interview replies under consideration.

Leaders who have a high level of mistrust for others are prone to being suspicious of the motivations and behavior of others, especially those who are seen as rivals for their positions or who are opposed to their cause or philosophy. These other people are incapable of doing anything correctly, and their actions are often seen as having hidden purposes. When taken to its furthest, mistrust of others may turn into paranoia, in which there is a strong justification for being wary of certain people, nations, or organizations. In order to avoid any sabotage of what they want accomplished, leaders who lack faith in others often undertake things on their own instead of relying on others. Working with the leader and taking part in policymaking become impossible without loyalty. And these leaders often move their advisors about to prevent any one of them from amassing a significant enough power base to put the leader's authority in jeopardy. In some ways, a zero-sum worldview—where everyone benefits at the expense of everyone else—may be the root of mistrust of others. The leader analyzes and questions others' motivations out of a desire to avoid losing. Leaders who mistrust others often exhibit hypersensitivity to criticism—often detecting it when others wouldn't—and are cautious, always on the lookout for threats to their position of power or identity. Political leaders may naturally be wary of the intentions of others. Leaders who have a low level of mistrust for others, however, often put things in perspective. It is more probable that trust and mistrust are dependent on prior interactions with the parties and the circumstances at hand. Instead of assuming the worst about someone, suspicion is based on more concrete indicators [12], [13].

CONCLUSION

Workplace politics are a common occurrence. Organizations must, however, foster a climate that prevents politics from degenerating into harmful behavior. This may be accomplished by putting into practice important goals that establish standards inside the company. By defining power as the capacity to influence and influence as the use of power to effect change, it is clear how linked these two concepts are. It is extremely logical and intriguing to remark that managers often have to make judgments for which there is no one proper solution. Political power is legitimated

authority since it signifies acceptance by the state and its consent to rule over them, which is undoubtedly the power that politicians want.

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CHAPTER 14

CONTEXTUALIZING THE PROFILE FOR PERSONALITY

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ABSTRACT:

While culturalist concepts were a part of a larger postcolonial discourse from the beginning of the post-second World War era, quickly shifting circumstances after the conclusion of the Cold War caused cultural politics to assume a more prominent role in many regions of the globe. It was particularly noticeable in the Asia-Pacific, where the region's economic vitality led experts from a variety of fields, including international business and cultural studies, to declare the beginning of a "Pacific century. In this chapter author is discusses the constructing a profile.

KEYWORDS:

Contextualizing, Leader, Politics, Political, Personality.

INTRODUCTION

It is time to put the results into context by comparing them to those of other leaders once a leader's interview replies have been coded and total scores have been computed for each of the seven attributes mentioned below. Without making such a comparison, there is no evidence from which to draw conclusions about whether a certain leader's attributes are exceptionally high, low, or average. Choosing which set of leaders to employ as the comparison—or norming—group is the problem. For the 122 more general political figures mentioned earlier as well as the 87 heads of state, see 8.6 for scores on each of the seven qualities. The shows the mean or average score for each attribute for each of the two samples of leaders, along with the values that are one standard deviation above and below that mean. The trait is high for the leader under research if their score is more than one standard deviation above the mean for the sample of leaders; the trait is low for the leader under study if their score is more than one standard deviation below the mean for the group of leaders. The leader is moderate in the attribute and is similar to the average leader in that comparison group if his or her score is close to the sample mean. The 122 leaders are drawn from forty-eight countries and include, in addition to the 87 heads of state, members of cabinets, revolutionary leaders, legislative leaders, leaders of opposition parties, and terrorist leaders. The 87 heads of state represent roughly forty-six countries from all corners of the world. From 1945 to the present, leaders who held positions of power are included in the sample. The author may provide scores for specific regional, national, or cultural groupings represented by these 122 leaders[1].

It is possible to utilize the information offered earlier on the qualities and leadership styles to create a profile of the leader after the analyst has assessed how a leader's scores compare to those of other leaders. How is the leader likely to react under pressure? How receptive to knowledge is he or she likely to be? What kind of incentive does the leader have for wanting power and influence? The analyst may determine the specific leadership style the leader is likely to use by noting whether they are more likely to respect or dispute constraints, to be more or less receptive to information, or to be more internally or externally motivated.

Now, let's say we were creating a profile on Syria's current president, Hafez al-Assad. Imagine that, when compared to the other 87 heads of state, his scores indicate that he is likely to challenge constraints, has a conceptual complexity score that is higher than his self-confidence score, is open to receiving new information, has a high task focus score that indicates that his attention is more focused on the problem than on relationships, and has an elevated need for power score. According to Assad, his leadership style is aggressively autonomous. He will be very concerned with preserving his own and Syria's flexibility and independence in a society that he believes constantly seeks to restrict both. While Assad believes that the world is prone to violence, he also believes that all nations are partly restricted by international conventions, giving him some latitude in his actions. While still advancing Syria's interests, he must sensibly plan to control an enemy and keep an eye on events in the international arena. We may start creating a profile or picture of the leader in relation to other political leaders by utilizing the characteristic ratings.

Setting the Profile in Context

Several studies on personality contend that some individuals make decisions based on context and that, as a result, their attribute scores may alter depending on the circumstances. The personalities of other individuals are generally consistent across contexts. It is feasible to assess a political leader's leadership qualities by looking at a variety of sources on that person. We may assess the stability of the leadership attributes by looking at content that spans a length of time, various substantive themes, various audiences, and is either within or outside of the leadership group. We can also determine if leaders are responsive to certain environmental signals but not others by looking at several context-specific factors including the issue, audience, and whether the attention is on the local or foreign domains. If there is variation in the scores, we may assess if those variations reveal something about how political leaders vary in their public personas or how they respond to particular circumstances. We gather hints about their anticipated behavioral changes and the environmental factors that cause these changes.

Kind of Subjects Covered

Determining the themes addressed in the analysis's data is required in order to assess if and how a leader's characteristics may vary. The challenge is figuring out what the leader is referring to in each coded interview answer. What subjects are being discussed? It is often easy to arrive at a set of categories by looking at where the themes are similar and which topics are addressed the most after noting the topics that are covered in the interview replies being reviewed. In practice, some themes that have happened throughout the leadership of the subject of the investigation might be integrated into a more general topic. It is feasible to investigate if certain kinds of scenarios have an impact on the leader's scores by recording when these events occurred and selecting interview answers that cover these intervals of time. Such a study might be carried out before and after elections in democratic democracies. One can think about if there have been any changes through time for leaders who have held positions of authority for a long period, or whether they have remained mostly the same.

Whether Changes Are Substantial Must Be Determined

An analysis of variance will offer the information needed to determine statistical significance of variations in scores across time, topics, or audiences for any of the personal characteristics for a leader. A one-way analysis of variance approach is available in the majority of personal computer

statistical software, and it can simply be used to investigate this subject. If the one-way analyses of variance "F-tests" are significant, the leader is acting adaptively in that kind of circumstance since their scores on that characteristic for that context factor vary. The analyst may put the leadership profile into perspective by identifying the areas where a leader's scores vary. One can observe if the leader adopts a different persona when interacting with foreign diplomats than when doing so within his or her own country; if the leader uses different tactics to address various problem types; and if, with experience and a longer time in the position, the leader adjusts to being a political leader in a different way. The more generic profile that was created is given depth and subtlety by this contextual study.

Issues Often Experienced While Building a Profile

What if the results for leaders vary significantly throughout themes, audiences, and time? Significant variations in performance across contextual categories often imply that a leader is well aware of the situation. These leaders often evaluate their alternatives in light of the current situation by evaluating who is supporting what and the nature of the issue. Only when such leaders have had a chance to assess the situation and determine what is vital for others to do is action initiated. For these leaders, analysts will need to have a far better understanding of the circumstances they are in in order to predict their actions. Understanding exactly where the changes took place might reveal which aspect of the setting is crucial for that leader. If audience-related changes are discovered, it is likely that the individuals, groups, and organizations that these leaders contact with have an impact on them. Nevertheless, if the adjustments are topic-specific, the leaders are likely focused on resolving the immediate issue and adapting their behavior to cope with the current situation.

What if a leader's ratings change significantly depending on whether they are speaking to a domestic or an international audience? Due to the frequent discrepancies among third world leaders, this issue is crucial. When dealing with the governments of bigger, more developed nations from whom they may want something, they are far less directive, more endearing, and more diplomatic than when they concentrate on their own country. They may be quite dictatorial and autocratic in household situations, always knowing what has to be done and when. As these differences have ramifications for what leaders are likely to accomplish where and may result in incorrect perceptions of these leaders' leadership styles, it is crucial to draw attention to them in any profile.

Do leaders' evaluations in times of crisis and times of calm vary from one another? Since certain issues have a more crisislike tone than others, knowing your leader's scores by topic may help you determine if there is a difference between his or her public personas in crisis and noncrisis circumstances. Hence, the scores are more likely to represent crisis behavior than when the leader is concentrating on the economy or education if the themes contain "aggression from another nation" or "threats to ethnic group." Since leaders often face stress during crises and have a tendency to emphasize their strongest attributes, it is crucial to distinguish between crises and other situations. Their profiles tend to grow more severe. For instance, if they normally feel they can influence events, they will have even more trust in this view during a crisis. Similarly, if they typically have a strong desire for power, this need will be amplified during a crisis. The leaders who score similarly across time, issue, and audience—those who are generally insensitive to the environment—show the greatest evidence of this accentuation. Leaders whose performance varies significantly according to these context elements seem to become more cautious and

hesitant during crises, responding to rather than initiating action and relying on others' assistance and support more often than normal.

Reliability of the Profiles

There are two kinds of dependability that are often taken into account while creating profiles. The first measures how simple it is for persons who are not acquainted with the content analysis coding system to pick it up and use it with the same proficiency as its inventor on leaders' interview replies. Can others be taught to apply the coding system and reach a high level of agreement with the individual who created the profiling approach, in other words? The second dependability checks the stability of the leader's scores in an effort to determine how politically sensitive the leader is. With the coding scheme outlined in this article, both types of dependability have been determined.

The intercoder agreement between a group of coders and the author has varied across many research from .78 to 1.00 for the seven qualities presented in this. If there were disagreements, the subsequent conversations among the coders allowed the coding system to be improved. Unless a coder achieves intercoder reliability with the author on all qualities that is .90 or better, they are often not allowed to content analyze a leader's interview replies to be included in the bigger data set. Several sorts of reliability coefficients are being determined when the automated coding system is built to assess how precisely it captures the author's original intent. Assessing a person's characteristic reliability skills might provide information about the leader. The analyst may determine how consistent a leader's attributes are through time and problems by comparing the odd and even interview replies. This index offers an additional method for assessing the leader's propensity to be open or closed to contextual information.

The impact of the translation on the final scores is one of the often asked topics concerning content analysis coding systems that employ translated information, which we frequently have to do. In numerous cases, intercoder agreement has been measured between a native speaker coding text in the original language and the author concentrating on the translated text to determine if there were any impacts and the nature of such effects. French and Russian were spoken. In both situations, agreement between the seven traits developed profiles on twenty-one leaders using the procedure outlined here averaged .92. Based on these profiles, it was determined on a series of rating scales what kinds of leadership behaviors a specific head of state should display given a specific leadership style. These assessments were contrasted with those given by reporters and former government employees who had the chance to see or converse with the specific leaders. The average correlation between the two sets of evaluations for the group of leaders was .84, indicating that the profiles created using this at-a-distance approach gave me access to the same kinds of data that the other raters had used to assess the s' conduct.

Identifying the Political Leaders' Operational Codes

After World War II, as a solution to the conundrum of Soviet negotiating conduct and the expansion of U.S.-Soviet ties into a cold war, operational code analysis evolved as a leadership evaluation technique. The Bolshevik ideology, which was motivated by biases in Lenin's personality and Russian political culture, was recognized as the operational code of the Soviet Politburo in the prototype research by Leites at the RAND Corporation. The Soviet Union's negotiation approach and tactics with the West after the conclusion of World War II regarding

topics like German reunification, European economic recovery, and a general peace settlement with Germany, Italy, and Japan, he said, were explained by these views.

This includes methodical techniques created since the RAND study for figuring out a leader's operational code and predicting expected patterns of conduct. It is desirable to understand operational code analysis' history and earlier applications before using it to evaluate leadership conduct. It's also critical to understand how the methods for identifying beliefs and inferring behavior have evolved. Before moving on to the job of predicting behavior given operational code beliefs, these subjects are briefly reviewed. Prior to extracting and evaluating a leader's operational code beliefs, a brief history of operational code analysis and the Verbs in Context System of content analysis is presented. The second set of examples shows how to analyze a leader's operational code and predict probable behavior at various decision levels.

Operational code analysis is a method for studying political leaders that may concentrate either on a group of political views or more generally on a group of ideas ingrained in a leader's personality or emanating from the cultural fabric of a country. Leites used a more comprehensive approach to operational code analysis that took cognition, character, and culture into account, although his method was changed in subsequent applications. George claimed that a leader's operational code should be seen as nothing more than a set of political beliefs, whereby certain components direct the leader's diagnosis of the situation and other components outline the best course of action.

George anticipated studies that would link cognition and character, even though he advised political scientists to focus only on the study of beliefs, which "can be inferred or postulated by the investigator on the basis of the kinds of data, observational opportunities, and methods generally available to political scientists." The operational code construct's ability to operate as a valuable "bridge" or "connection" to psychodynamic interpretations of unconscious elements of belief systems and their impact in action under various circumstances is one of its appealing qualities for behaviorally minded political scientists. Hence, when the researcher has developed an actor's method of political calculation, he may go on to tie some of the in-question beliefs to other motivational elements of a psychodynamic character, if he so chooses and is able to do so.

What Changes Have Been Made to Operational Code Analysis as a Leadership Assessment Tool?

Operational code analysis has now developed in the manner George foresaw, first concentrating on beliefs before shifting its attention to motivating factors. Operational code studies in the year 2005 concentrated on the leaders' philosophical and practical convictions, which were referred to as the "solutions" to the 10 questions George asked. The leader's philosophical convictions are how they see the nature of the political system and other players. The leader's personal choices for political acts in terms of strategy and tactics are informed by their instrumental views. Holsti provided a response to these questions by creating a typology of belief systems, which he said were the optimal kinds of operational codes. Cognitive consistency theory, which presupposed that a leader's operational code beliefs were internally consistent with one another and that a leader's actions were compatible with these beliefs, served as the conceptual framework for both George and Holsti. They contended, specifically, that a leader's philosophical views on the nature of the political world served as a "master belief" that shaped the ideas included in the other philosophical and instrumental beliefs[2].

In developing his operational coding typology, Holsti used this notion of a master belief. He postulated that other philosophical beliefs about the likelihood of achieving fundamental goals, the predictability of the political future, the leader's control over historical development, and the function of chance were based on the leader's beliefs about the nature and source of conflict in the political universe. The leader's instrumental ideas about the best strategy and tactics, the best method for calculating and managing risks, and the usefulness and timeliness of using various tools to defend or accomplish political goals were in turn impacted by these philosophical convictions.

Such a leader is likely to be somewhat pessimistic about the chances of attaining core political values, to regard the political future as less predictable, to feel that control over historical development is relatively low, and to ascribe a greater role to chance in political events. On the other hand, a leader who sees conflict as transient is more likely to be enthusiastic about achieving objectives, more sure of the future's predictability, think they have more influence over the course of history, and to place less weight on chance.

1. The Operational Code's Philosophical Principles
2. George's ten inquiries on the operating code's tenets

The cognitive consistency theory predicts that these variations in the diagnosis of the political universe will result in variations in the recommendations for political action. The first leader's pessimism is likely to be accompanied by the convictions that strategy should be constrained in its objectives, tactics should be adaptable, risk assessment and management should be conservative and cautious, and force should only be used as a last resort to advance political objectives. The optimism of the second leader is more likely to result in beliefs in overarching strategic objectives, more rigid methods, speculative calculations in risk assessment, and the usefulness of the offeree as a statecraft instrument.

This line of thinking is shown by the six operational code belief system types in Figure 9.2, with the pessimists grouped as Types D, E, and F in the bottom left-hand quadrant. Although pessimists disagree on the causes of conflict—individuals, societies, and the international system—they do agree that it will always exist and that this has implications for other philosophical and practical views. The optimism resulting from the overarching concept that conflict is transient is shared by the other categories of belief systems. They disagree, nevertheless, on what causes conflict: personal misconceptions, dysfunctional social structures, or the anarchic structure of the international system. They are more likely to disagree on some of the remaining philosophical and practical ideas as a result of these later differences.

According to Holsti's theory, these internally consistent belief systems stay true for the leaders who hold them across time and across different policy domains. The Bolshevik ideology and the Holsti typology did not, however, cover the wide range and cognitive complexity of political leaders, as both George and Holsti acknowledged. They could have master ideas about the political universe's stability and the causes of conflict that vary in sort and degree. However, not every leader has a consistent, clearly defined set of values that make up their operational code, and some leaders may modify these views over time.

This prediction has been confirmed by research into the operating codes of numerous leaders from the 1980s and 1990s. According to the findings of multiple studies, a leader's operational code beliefs are likely to have components of at least two different Holsti kinds.

TYPE A

Conflict is transient and is brought on by miscommunication and misunderstanding between people. The main risk of war is a "conflict spiral," which is based on false perception and rash actions. While opponents are often swayed by irrational factors, they typically react favorably to compromise and resolve. Based on a leader's capacity and desire to influence historical evolution, optimism is reasonable. The future is mostly predictable, and it is possible to influence it. Set objectives within a structure that emphasizes common interests. Using adaptable strategies that manage risks by preventing escalation and moving promptly when conciliation opportunities present themselves, pursue large international objectives progressively. Avoid using force too soon and place an emphasis on tools that foster an environment conducive to discussion and compromise.

Atomic Self

Permanent conflict results from human nature, nationalism, or global anarchy. Major risks associated with conflict include power imbalances. Opponents may differ, and it is unclear how they will react to compromise or toughness. Long-term optimism fades, while short-term optimism relies on the effectiveness of leadership and the balance of power. Both predictability and historical development control are constrained. Strive towards constrained objectives flexibly using modest means. If the opponent and the situation call for it, use military force, but only as a last resort.

Dee Typec

Conflict is transient, and the political system may be changed to reflect the underlying harmony of interests. The anarchical state structure, which allows for a range of circumstances to result in war, is the root of conflict. The character, objectives, and reactions of opponents to compromise and firmness differ. Until the state system is reformed, one should be pessimistic about objectives since anarchy makes it difficult to forecast the future and exert control over the course of history. Set aggressively ideal objectives inside a thorough framework. In pursuing common objectives, manage risks by focusing on methods rather than ends. When there is a chance for negotiation, move fast, and avoid resorting to more drastic measures whenever you can. Resources other than military might are helpful.

NACH High

The main causes of war are miscalculation and appeasement; conflict is transient and brought on by warlike powers. The opposition is logical and defeatable. Regarding goal achievement, optimism is reasonable. Political future is somewhat predictable, and historical evolution may be controlled. Under a thorough framework, one should fiercely pursue optimum aims. Limiting methods rather than aims will help you reduce hazards. Any strategy or tool, including the use of force, may be suitable when it provides the chance of substantial profits with little risk.

TYPE B Contents of the updated Holsti operational code, measured over time and for various political issue domains. Philosophical beliefs are more subject to change over time and across domains as representations of reality as a result of context-dependent context changes. As a leader's instrumental views are less prone to change, it is challenging to keep their internal coherence with their philosophical convictions.

What is the relationship between motivations and beliefs?

The fact that instrumental beliefs are partially representations of the leader's personality in the form of motivational biases rather than only the results of lessons drawn from changing experiences in the political sphere may help to explain why instrumental beliefs are relatively stable. This justification is in line with Leites's more general definition of operational code analysis. In his examination of the connection between ideas and behavior in the Bolshevik operational code, George made explicit reference to this connection.

The political strategy maxims that make up the "operational code" have the appearance of moral guidelines set forth for good Bolsheviks and behavioral standards that, in theory, are internalized by the person in question, who thereby gains a new and distinct character type—that of the dependable, "hard-core" Bolshevik. The individual who is successful in internalizing this desired character structure so completes a "identity change," in the terms of current ego psychology.

The relationship between beliefs and behavior was also noted by Holsti, who was undecided as to whether people picked up their operational code beliefs through socialization into a particular political role or through a subtle process of self-selection based on how well their personality traits and the operational code beliefs associated with the role mesh.

Walker reanalyzed the Holsti typology and discovered that the motivating imagery associated with the four categories varied. Whereas the beliefs of type DBF exhibited pictures of power, those of type A featured images of affiliation. The other two categories varied in their perceptions of power and allegiance but shared a sense of accomplishment. The four quadrants in 9.2 are a two-dimensional simplification of what is actually a three-dimensional personality structure, in which the beliefs are embedded in a motivational foundation created by the needs for power, affiliation, and achievement emanating from the nuclear self. They also represent the ideal types of belief systems in the Holsti typology. Walker and Falkowski applied these belief systems to actual leaders[3]. These findings supported the Leites theory, as George subsequently remarked, that character and intellect were intertwined. The operational code beliefs of the leader may also include character prescriptions that convey the leader's identity as an actor in the political universe in addition to cognitive scripts for political action. If this is the case, political leaders' operational code ideas go beyond serving as simple diagnostic tools for analyzing data from the social environment. Also, internalized prescriptions that have the normative ability to articulate wants for power, affiliation, and success are included. These prescriptions serve as causal mechanisms for political behavior.

Motivations and Beliefs Help to Create a Coherent Personality

The cognitive and motivational components of a leader's operational code nonetheless constitute a cohesive personality when seen from these two angles and without the premise of internal cognitive consistency. Yet, as George and Holsti hypothesized and as the aforementioned investigations have shown, this personality may be fairly complex and may use several "states of mind" in various spheres of the political universe. Hence, depending on the domain in which he or she is involved and the signals from that environment, the typology of operational codes in may coexist in the same leader and get awakened variably. This viewpoint contends that rather than deducing from an idealized typology of operational code belief systems, the empirical task of mapping a leader's operational code beliefs should proceed from the bottom up by aggregating targeted beliefs about specific issues in various domains of political action. Whether and to what

degree a leader's ideas about himself or herself and others are constant across domains and over time, any generalizations about that leader's general operating code will rely on that. In turn, paying close attention to the scope constraints that define the degree of generalization on which the prediction is based will be necessary in order to forecast a leader's conduct from operational code beliefs. In order to determine a leader's operational code beliefs and to construct contingent predictions of his or her future plans, tactics, and actions, the VICS technique of content analysis was created [4], [5].

CONCLUSION

I have suggested that it is feasible for a researcher or analyst to create a profile of the leadership style a certain political leader is likely to show by doing a trait analysis of seven dimensions of personality. The seven personal qualities reveal whether a leader will uphold authority or question it, whether they will be receptive to environmental information or not, whether they will prioritize community building over issue solutions, and whether they will be more rigid or more flexible.

The characteristics also interact to provide a prediction about which leadership style, out of a large range, is most likely to predominate in any leader. With the development of computer tools that can evaluate leaders' interview replies and the gathering of characteristic data on 122 political leaders from across the globe that serve as a norming group with which to compare any one leader's scores, creating such a profile has become more viable. Not only is it now possible to create a basic profile of a specific leader, but it is also possible to put such a profile into perspective by looking at a variety of contextual aspects that show how the traits vary as the circumstance changes.

By learning more about the leader's personality as a whole, we can determine the kind of political material that will most likely pique his or her interest. The contextualized profile illustrates how that leader has individualized his or her reactions to display more distinctive qualities. As a result, the general profile indicates where a particular leader sits in a larger discussion of leadership style. The researcher and analyst get a more thorough understanding of the leader's profile after they are familiar with both the general and the more individualized profiles. Not only does the individual come to symbolize a certain kind of leader, but we also know when and to what extent they have altered their conduct in light of the situation.

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CHAPTER 15

AN OVERVIEW ON THE VICS METHOD

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ABSTRACT:

The VICS method of content analysis is a collection of methods for identifying belief patterns in a leader's public utterances and making deductions about public conduct that is consistent with those beliefs. In this chapter author is discusses the steering and learning effects.

KEYWORDS:

Consistency, Leader, Political, Policy, Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

Inferences regarding a leader's operating code are drawn by the VICS approach from public sources, such as speeches, interviews, or other public statements made by the person. Public discourse is perhaps the most relevant source for the systematic prediction of governmental conduct. A leader's public conduct is bound by his public image, and over time, his public actions will consistently reflect his public views. This is a theoretical presumption of operational code analysis. This presumption looks contradictory since it seems to rule out the possibility of the leader using deceit and impression management techniques in public statements. While it is conceivable for a leader's views and actions to diverge for a brief period of time, the contrary is more common. This cognitive consistency theory tenet is founded on the general bounded rationality axiom, which holds that people behave rationally in accordance with the beliefs they hold, and its corollary, which holds that other people expect them to act rationally in social situations[1]–[3].

THE VICS METHOD:

The VICS method of content analysis is a collection of approaches for identifying belief patterns in a leader's public pronouncements and making deductions about public conduct that is consistent with these beliefs. These inferences turn into predictions about a state's conduct to the degree that a specific leader is in charge of the behavior of the state or to the extent that a leader's ideas are shared by those who have the authority to act on behalf of the state. The recording unit is the "utterance," which consists of each verb in the statement and the relevant components of speech associated with each verb—the subject and object or the subject and predicate nominative or adjective. The public statement serves as the retrieval unit. For each recording unit and its context, the VICS approach pulls data for six attributes: subject, verb category, political domain, verb tense, intended target, and context.

Whether the speaker or another actor is the verb's subject is indicated by the word "self" or "other." The verb is classified as either a positive or negative transitive verb or a positive or negative intransitive verb depending on the tense. If the verb is transitive, it is further divided

into two categories: cooperative or antagonistic action that manifests in either words or deeds. Whereas negative transitive acts are recorded as Punishments, positive transitive deeds are coded as Rewards. Negative transitive words are marked as Threat? or Oppose/Resist, whereas positive transitive words are either Promises or Appeal/Support.

Verbs are categorized as Neutral and eliminated if they don't fall into one of these categories or don't have a political context. The following passages discuss the leader's opinions on how he or she sees others and themselves using their authority to influence the political concerns brought up in the statement. They serve as the foundation for inferring the leader's government's future actions. Depending on the range of policy domains and problem areas and the quantity of characteristics available to be coded from the universe of public remarks, predictions based on these inferences might be highly generic or rather particular.

DISCUSSION

How Are VICS Indices Calculated and Interpreted?

These assessments are inferred from four kinds of indices constructed from the balance, central tendency, proportion, and dispersion of verb attributions in these sources. For example, the balance between the frequencies of positive and negative verbs attributed to others in public statements indicates the leader's beliefs about the friendly or hostile nature of politics and image of others in the political universe. The same calculation for verbs attributed to self indicates the strategic orientation of the speaker toward others in the political universe.

Assigning weights to the same verb categories and multiplying them by their frequencies measures the intensity of positive and negative attributions by self and others. The central tendencies of these weighted self and other attributions, respectively, are indicators of the leader's beliefs about effective tactics and the prospects for realizing political values. These four indices summarize at the most general level of aggregation the leader's diagnostic propensities regarding the nature of the political universe and the prospects for success, plus the leader's choice propensities for effective strategies and tactics. The calculation and interpretation of these indices are fairly straightforward and are summarized as follows[4]–[6].

The balance indices for the nature of the political universe and strategic direction vary between -1.0 and $+1.0$, calculated by subtracting the number of negative verbs from the number of positive verbs and dividing the result by the total number of negative and positive verbs. The scale illustrates the range of values associated with each index and the remaining descriptors used to anchor and interpret the scores. A particular score is anchored to an inter-prestation based on the distance between the score and the nearest descriptor.

For example, a score of -0.21 is anchored to the descriptor "Somewhat Hostile" on the nature of the political universe scale for P-r, because it is closest to -0.25 on the continuum of possible balance scores. A score of $+0.41$ is anchored to the descriptor "Definitely Cooperative" on the direction of strategy scale for I-i, because it is closest to $+0.50$ on the continuum of possible scores. The interpretation of these two scores for a leader takes the following form: "He or she believes that the political universe is somewhat hostile, and he or she also believes that a definitely cooperation-oriented direction is the best strategy in this universe."

The central tendency indices for the leader's beliefs about the prospects for realizing political values and his or her beliefs about the intensity of tactics also vary between -1.0 and $+1.0$.

The indices are calculated by multiplying each verb by the scale values associated with its coding category, summing the results, then calculating the average score and dividing it by three. The following scale shows the range of values and descriptors for these two indices, which anchor the scores with an interpretation. The interpretation rule for the and indices is the same as for the and indices: assign the descriptor that is closest to the score. For example, if a leader's P-2 score is $-.31$, then he or she is "Somewhat Pessimistic" about the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals. An 1-2 score of $+.27$ would indicate that he or she believes in "Somewhat Cooperative" tactics. The interpretation of these two scores for a leader takes the following form: "He or she believes that the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals are somewhat pessimistic, and he or she also believes that somewhat cooperative tactics are best under this condition."

A series of proportion indices measure the leader's beliefs regarding control over historical development and the relative utility of different ways of exercising political power. The number of self or other attributions as a percentage of the total number of self and other attributions varies between 0.0 and 1.0. This index measures the locus of control attributed to self over historical development while the number of other attributions as a percentage of the total number of self and other attributions is the locus of control attributed to others. As in the case of the balance and central tendency indices, the actual scores for a leader are anchored with a descriptor that is closest to its value. So, a leader with a P^a score of $.53$ believes that he or she has a medium degree of control over historical development while also attributing a medium level of control to others in the political universe.

The same basic logic applies for calculating and interpreting the utility of means indices. With six categories for the exercise of political power rather than two categories for the locus of historical control, however, the medium proportion of equal utility for each one is reaching that level are assigned higher or lower descriptors of utility. Although this index can vary between 0.0 and 1.0, it is relatively unlikely with six categories that the upper boundary will be reached, and so $.32$ is denoted as the descriptor in the following scale for a Very High proportion—twice the expected proportion when each category is equally useful. The interpretation of the utility of means scores can take two forms. They can be analyzed proportionately or simply by their descriptors.

So, for example, a leader with percentage scores of Rewards + Promise + Appeal/Support + Oppose/Resist + Threat + Punish = 1.0 believes the following about the utility of means in his or her political universe. Appeals and expressions of support are about twice as useful as statements of opposition/resistance or promises, which are over twice as useful as threats or punishments, and, finally, rewards are approximately three times as useful as threats or punishments. It is also possible to make inferences from the descriptors rather than from the scores. A leader with these scores believes that the comparative utility of appeal/support statements is very high, the comparative utility of rewards is high, the comparative utility of promises and expressions of opposition/resistance is medium, and the comparative utility of threats and punishments is low.

There are four indices that take into account the dispersion of verbs across the six categories for the exercise of political power. Two are the predictability of the political future and risk orientation. Both of them employ a measure of dispersion, the Index of Qualitative Variation, which assesses the variation in the distribution of observations among the six categories for self and others. Calculated separately for self and other attributions, the IQV score is subtracted from

i.o to estimate the predictability of the political future and one's own risk orientation. The higher the estimates from these calculations, respectively, the more predict are the political future and one's own risk orientation. For example, a leader's beliefs with scores of .08 for P-j and .03 for I-3 attribute very low predictability to others and to self.

Interpretation of these scores is enhanced by the indices for two related indices of the importance of timing: flexibility in shifting between different kinds of tactics as a risk management technique. These indices are calculated by subtracting the absolute value of the balance index for cooperation/conflict and words/deeds from one. For example, a leader's beliefs with scores of and for shifts between cooperation/conflict and words/deeds, respectively, manage the very low predictability of the political future by attributing a risk orientation of medium flexibility in both cooperation/conflict and words/deeds to himself or herself.

Finally, there is an index for the role of chance, which takes into account the predictability of the political future and the degree of control over historical development. It is calculated by multiplying the leader's scores for the latter two beliefs and subtracting the product from one. The logic of the index is that the higher the predictability of the political future and the greater the leader's belief in his or her ability to control historical development, the less the role of chance. It is interpreted the same way as the other indices that incorporate measures of dispersion into their formulae. For example, a leader with an index of .96 attributes a very high role to chance.

Collectively, the VICS indices provide information about a leader's diagnostic, choice, and shift propensities regarding the exercise of power in different political contexts. Operational code analysis defines politics as the exercise of power between actors, in which the beliefs of each actor about the nature of the political universe and the most effective strategies and tactics in this universe influence the choices of means, tactics, and strategies and the ensuing outcomes of interaction episodes between them.

Assessing Leaders' Beliefs: Steering and Learning Effects

The belief template for mapping the interface among beliefs, behavior, and interaction is an expanded version of the Holsti typology of belief systems. Where Holsti assumed consistency between philosophical and instrumental beliefs, the present analysis allows for instrumental beliefs to be independent from philosophical beliefs. Taking each set of instrumental beliefs and pairing them not only with the corresponding philosophical beliefs in the Holsti typology but with the others as well, there are a total of sixteen types of belief systems possible.

Holsti's four pairs are as follows: A with A, B with B, C with C, and DEF with DEF. The twelve additional hybrids are A with DEF, A with B, A with C, DEF with B, DEF with C, DEF with A, B with C, B, with A, B with DEF, C with A, C with DEF, and C with B. Collectively, these combinations of beliefs map different definitions of the "self-in-situation" in which different levels of decision are made.

Key VICS indices locate the "self-in-situation" coordinates of a leader's operational code within the template. Two indices are used to place Self in one of the four quadrants associated with Holsti's four types of belief systems. They are the strategic index plus Self's locus of historical control index. They are mapped to parallel the axes formed by the power, affiliation and achievement axes in the Holsti typology of belief systems. The VICS strategic index scores are

plotted on the vertical axis, and the VICS scores for the locus of control index are plotted along the horizontal axis.

The association of nPow with conflict, nAff with cooperation, and nAch with greater control over outcomes is consistent with previous research on the cognitive and behavioral correlates of these motivations. The intersection of the locus of control index for Self with the strategic index determines the leader's location in one of the four quadrants in . The verbal interpretation of the leader's scores should resemble more closely the instrumental beliefs for the Holsti ideal type located in this quadrant than the instrumental beliefs for the other types. The indices for the philosophical beliefs of this leader may or may not be located in the same quadrant as the indices for his or her instrumental beliefs. The indices for the nature of the political universe are plotted on the vertical axis, and Other's locus of control index is plotted on the horizontal axis. They locate Other in the political universe. Once a leader's self-image is located in one of the four quadrants:

Type B Quadrant

Key indices of beliefs in the operational code typology are scaled along the vertical and horizontal axes to locate a leader's generalized images of self and other in a quadrant. Reward, Deter, Punish, and Compel tactics are variants of a general strategy of reciprocity in which Self initiates either an escalatory move or de-escalatory move and then responds in kind to whether Other escalates or de-escalates in response to Self's initial move. Appease, Bluff, Exploit, and Bully tactics are variants of a general strategy of cooperation or conflict in which Self initiates either an escalatory move or de-escalatory move and then violates the norm of reciprocity after Other escalates or de-escalates in response to Self's initial move with these scores, it is possible to make some behavioral predictions with different degrees of confidence about tactics and strategies shared with other leaders whose self-images fall into the same quadrant. The following predictions are based on their shared preferences for cooperation or conflict as the dominant strategy and a shared sense of the degree of control over historical development [7]–[9].

Leaders in the type A quadrant with a relatively cooperative strategic orientation and a relatively low sense of historical control are more likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favor the tactics of Appease and Bluff within a general strategy of cooperation. The more cooperative the tactical intensity index and the lower the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction as a deviation from the norm of reciprocity.

Leaders in the type C quadrant with a relatively cooperative strategic orientation and a relatively high sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favor the tactics of Exploit and Compel within a general strategy of cooperation. The more intense the tactical cooperation index and the higher the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction as a deviation from the reciprocity norm.

Leaders in the type DBF quadrant with a relatively conflictual strategic orientation and a relatively low sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favor the tactics of Bluff and Bully within a general strategy of conflict. The more intense the tactical conflict index and the lower the locus of historical control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction as a deviation from the reciprocity norm.

Leaders in the type B quadrant with a relatively conflictual strategic orientation and a relatively high sense of historical control are likely to exhibit choice and shift propensities that favor the tactics of Exploit and Bully within a general strategy of conflict. The more intense the tactical conflict index and the higher the locus of control index, the higher the confidence level for this prediction as a deviation from the norm of reciprocity.

These predictions are forecasts of likely deviations from the norm of reciprocity expected as a response to a stimulus, based on an assessment of the leader's operational code. It refers to the mix of other behavior that accompanies the elements of the response that match the stimulus and represents movement along a continuum of escalation and de-escalation anchored by an actor's own previous move. Leaders with a locus of historical control index that attributes roughly equal control to Self and Other are most likely to follow a general strategy of reciprocity normed by the Reward, Deter, Punish, and Compel tactics.

The following example is based on the earlier illustrations for the calculation and interpretation of VICS indices in the previous section of this. Those scores are from a speech by U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk and are reproduced along with their interpretations. According to the data, the leader's instrumental beliefs indicate the following choice and shift propensities. Rusk believes in a definitely friendly strategy in his approach to political goals and believes in somewhat cooperative tactics to pursue them. He has an approach to the calculation and control of risk characterized overall by a very low score. This risk-averse orientation is marked by a propensity at a medium level to shift flexibly both between conflict and cooperation and between words and deeds. When this leader's score for I-1 is plotted against the score for Self's control over historical development, the coordinates indicate that Rusk locates Self in the type C quadrant of the template.

The secretary of state's scores for philosophical beliefs show a leader with the following diagnostic propensities: the political universe is somewhat hostile, and he is somewhat pessimistic about the prospects for realizing fundamental political values. He views the political future as very low in predictability, believes that he has a medium level of control over historical development, and attributes a very high role to chance. When this leader's scores for the nature of the political universe is plotted against the score for Other's locus of control, the coordinates indicate that Rusk's view of other falls close to the center of the template in the type DEF quadrant. Depending on the amount of information available from public statements, it is possible to refine these predictions and raise further the confidence level for a particular leader in two ways.

First, it is desirable to use the additional information about risk orientation and shift propensities from Rusk's profile to qualify or strengthen the confidence level of the predictions. In the example, the predictions for a leader in the type C quadrant are choice propensities to use Reward and Deter tactics as part of a general cooperative strategy. However, the leader's medium level of control over historical development, very low orientation toward taking risks, and medium propensities to shift tactics make it relatively likely that he or she will use other tactics, too.

Second, if there is sufficient available information, these refinements are subject to further qualifications. It is possible to partition the observations by time, domain, issue area, and target and then recalculate the VICS indices. The effects of disaggregating beliefs are to narrow the scope of their steering effects to apply only for a particular issue toward a specific target and to

detect learning effects on the leader's beliefs over time. As the following example reveals, this effort may or may not significantly refine the predictions.

In a study of President Jimmy Carter's operational code, the results indicate that the elements of Carter's belief system remained relatively stable over time for much of his administration. No statistically significant changes in the VICS indices occurred for his general operational code until after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even then, the key VICS indices that locate Carter in the type C quadrant did not change enough to move him unequivocally to a different quadrant; however, the key indices that summarize the nature of the political universe did clearly move from type A in the direction of the type DBF quadrant.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a more significant impact on Carter's operational code toward the Soviet Union, moving his views on Soviet-American ties into other quadrants of the operational code template. Soviet-American relations were shifted as a result of changes in the balance of control over historical development and shifts in the major VICS indices for Carter's diagnostic propensities from cooperation to conflict. The information in 9.3 demonstrates that Carter's attitude toward the Soviet Union changed from being quite favorable to being relatively antagonistic. His strategic and tactical decision-making propensities toward the USSR decreased along with this transition, and his propensities to switch between confrontation and collaboration as well as between words and acts significantly increased.

Determine the behavioral variations between leaders

The VICS indices for two separate leaders may be compared to identify areas of agreement and disagreement on the nature of the political world and the best course of action, tactics, and strategies for achieving political objectives. These comparisons may show the potential outcomes of a change in state leadership, either within a state or across states. Let's look at the findings of a comparative study of two Israeli presidents, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, throughout two distinct decades, 1974–77 and 1992–95, to highlight these possibilities. In the previous decade, the two Labor party leaders in Israel displayed opposing operating codes, and in the next decade, they converged.

Rabin and Peres had varied levels of pessimism about politics in the early 1970s, but both saw it as undoubtedly hostile. Peres was much less optimistic than Rabin regarding his potential to influence historical evolution, but not being significantly gloomier. The two leaders were placed in distinct quadrants of the political universe during this time period due to the difference in diagnostic propensities. The two leaders' dissimilar expectations for actions, tactics, and strategies throughout the 1970s are further supported by a statistically significant individual difference in strategic decision propensities in the preceding decade. These variations are enumerated.

The remaining data, however, show that the two leaders' diagnostic propensities converged in the early 1990s. They shared a combination of optimism and pessimism about the achievement of political objectives, and they were quite confident in their power to influence historical evolution. They also believed that the political universe was made up of both friendly and enemy forces. Also, they had a clear cooperative orientation in their strategic and tactical decision-making propensities. Both presidents changed their perspectives on politics, but Peres changed his strategic and tactical inclinations to align with Rabin, who underwent very little change over the years [10], [11].

These Behavior Assessments to Interpret

The work of applying evaluations from an operational code profile is both quite easy and somewhat difficult. No matter which of the following complexity levels is chosen for applying assessments, the leadership analyst must provide the subsequent behavioral observations and make the determination as to whether the observed behavior corresponds to the behavior predicted in the assessment. Although the applications that follow concentrate on how leaders engage in foreign policy matters, it is also feasible to examine international interactions between leaders at various decision-making levels. To explain the results of interactions between states rather than evaluating a state's leaders and choices, which is not the emphasis of the current book, is the new purpose of operational code analysis.

Straightforward Assessments of Single Cases at Level I

It is simple to determine a leader's VICS indices, for instance, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and infer a narrative operational code profile in the future tense that converts his VICS indices into a prediction of his overall diagnostic, choice, and shift propensities. The text that follows, which is based on the VICS and arranged as "solutions" in the future tense to George's 10 questions, serves as an example of this kind of prediction. Dean Rusk will typically diagnose the political universe as somewhat hostile, be somewhat pessimistic regarding the realization of political values, view the predictability of the political future as very low, believe he has a medium level of control over historical development, and attribute a very high role to chance based on his philosophical beliefs.

Dean Rusk will likely have an inclination to choose a decidedly cooperative approach in the political world and carry it out with relatively cooperative techniques based on his instrumental values. He will have a very low risk-acceptance attitude and manage risk by having a somewhat flexible tendency to switch between conflict and collaboration as well as between words and acts while putting his plan and tactics into action. He has a very high preference for requests and affirmations, a high preference for prizes, a medium preference for assurances or declarations of opposition or resistance, and a low preference for threats and penalties.

Complicated Case Comparison Assessments Level 2

It is feasible to forecast behavioral similarities or differences by comparing the operational codes of one or more leaders across time. Through the comparative examination of President Jimmy Carter's overall operating code profile, we have first shown these possibilities. Analyzing this makes it simple to spot statistically significant variations in the philosophical and instrumental components of his operational code that foretell adjustments in his propensities for diagnosis, decision, and shift. Then, as previously shown in the instance of Dean Rusk, these modifications may be formatted as a narrative text in the future tense to make predictions about changes in his conduct. Rather, they may use the structure of statistical comparisons, as in Carter's 9.2. The same reasoning may be used to compare two leaders at the same time as well as each one individually throughout time.

General Typological Comparisons, Level 3

The summary indices of a leader's philosophical and instrumental beliefs may be determined using the VICS scores, and judgments can be based on the leader's attributions of strategic and locus of control beliefs to Self and Other. In order to define the "self-in-situation," the essential

VICS indices collectively consider both the leader's dispositions and significant elements of the context for choice. According to the main categories of instrumental beliefs connected with the placements of Self and Other in the quadrants of the Holsti typology, this characterization of the scenario represents the choice and shift propensities assigned to Self and anticipated of Other. The generic self and additional pictures of Carter, Rabin, and Peres are moved about the template's quadrants.

Last but not least, over the past two years, a number of leader profiles have been created using an automated version of the VICS content analysis procedures, and as a result, the raw VICS scores for leaders have been transformed into normed scores, which are calculated as the number of standard deviations from the mean score for each component of the operational code construct. For a set of twenty global leaders from various geographical areas and historical times, the anchor descriptors on the continuum for the raw scores are now applied to these standardized scores at intervals of one-half standard deviation above and below their respective averages.

The standardized scores show a leader's performance for each indicator in comparison to the reference group's average. Standardized scores will be used in this volume's operational code profiles of Saddam Hussein and William Jefferson Clinton to understand each leader's diagnostic, choice, and shift propensities in the context of this sample of global leaders. These will enable us to establish whether or not and how their results differ from the normal scores for the reference group[12].

CONCLUSION

Whichever method of evaluation is used, it's necessary to keep a few warnings in mind about the reliability of the findings. When it is possible to do so, these directives may be expressed as a number of comparisons. Although some of these may be accomplished by operational code analysis, others need for additional resources. Comparing a leader's VICS indices based on public utterances with VICS indices from private sources and judgments of the leader from other sources, such as predictions from other personality profiling methods or qualitative interpretations based on biographical analysis, is a good idea. To determine if there is agreement, compare the VICS indices for the leader with the corresponding indices for advisors and other members of the government. This stage is especially crucial if there is uncertainty as to whether the initial analysis's sources reflect the opinions of several leaders or the dominant viewpoint within a government. To improve the evaluations, compare the VICS indices from public and commercial sources for various policy domains, problem areas, and goals. Employ statistical significance tests as a criterion to assess the likelihood that differences in VICS indices were from chance. Analyze the results of an operational code analysis in comparison to competing predictive models, such as models of foreign policy decision-making that place more emphasis on internal or external factors than those that are included in the VICS indices. These can be predictions made by local specialists or by scholars in various branches of international relations theory. Any of these comparisons might be helpful in determining if operational code evaluations are in line with other pieces of evidence and the accepted knowledge. The operational code predictions should only be taken seriously when they fall outside of an existing consensus or when there is no agreement after using several forecasting algorithms. Nonetheless, it is under these circumstances that operational code predictions may also prove to be most helpful in avoiding unpleasant shocks and in seizing unforeseen possibilities brought about by the leader or state under study's otherwise unpredictable actions.

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CHAPTER 16

ASSESSING INTEGRATIVE COMPLEXITY AT A DISTANCE: ARCHIVAL ANALYSES OF THINKING AND DECISION MAKING

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ABSTRACT:

The same goes for encountering any collection of texts as well as doing archival study. Although while finding and description are a part of archive analysis, it doesn't end there. The archive is a sparse and incomplete collection of historical documents, not history itself. In this chapter author discusses the structure versus content.

KEYWORDS:

Archival, Complexity, Content, Cognitive, Structure.

INTRODUCTION

Some psychologists believe that since cognitive functioning is internal and hence not susceptible to direct observation, it cannot be thoroughly examined. Nonetheless, via the use of both experimental and observational methods, research has shown the worth of indirect measurements. It is evident that mental processes underpin spoken or written communication; maybe this is most seen when individuals are making decisions, solving problems, disseminating information, or persuading others. As with motivations and other intrapsychic processes, we may logically assume that the process and the result are connected and that the result reflects some significant characteristics of the process. The majority of integrative complexity research is founded on this premise, and many, diverse research efforts have shown its validity [1], [2].

Integrative complexity is one of several "cognitive style" factors that have been employed in the research on information processing, along with authoritarianism, dogmatism, field independence, personal constructions, explanatory style, and many more. There are two key ways that it varies from the others. Integrative complexity theory and research are primarily focused on the internal and external factors that govern the degree of complexity at which a person is functioning at a specific time and in a specific situation, in contrast to related theories that emphasize individual differences in cognitive processes. The focus of the study is on state features rather than trait traits, in part to balance out the more prevalent tendency toward the former, as will be detailed in more detail later.

Integrative or conceptual complexity ratings evaluate how well information processing is differentiated and integrated. The method for assessing these two factors has been modified for use with nearly any related verbal content, including as speeches and interviews, in contrast to most methods in this field. The technique may be used for "measuring personality at a distance" because of this. Differentiation is the awareness of various views, traits, or dimensions of stimuli by an individual or group; integration is the sense of links between these diverse perspectives,

traits, or dimensions. When a text alludes to several traits or points of view, at least two of which are considered valid, differentiation is implied. When the section discusses trade-offs between options, creates a synthesis that merges them, or places them in a broad contextual framework, integration is implied. Most related verbal materials may be used to evaluate both of these criteria.

History and Current Status of the Building

Personal construct theory and conceptual systems theory were the seeds from which the notion of conceptual complexity as a personality characteristic was born. Cognitive complexity, interactive complexity, and integrative complexity are recent variations. All of them clearly highlight structure, and more recent iterations have focused on either increases in complexity caused by circumstance and context, or the interaction of these factors.

DISCUSSION

Structure versus Content

The focus placed mostly on structure rather than content, or how a person thinks as opposed to what a person believes, distinguishes cognitive style variables from many personality factors with cognitive components. Several cognitive style theories place an emphasis on structure, taking into account things like how rigidly plans are carried out and how receptive people are to new knowledge. Structure, as in the conceptual principles used in reasoning, making decisions, and connecting to others, is a fundamental issue of the conceptual/integrative complexity construct as opposed to content. Contrarily, personality constructions that take information processing theories into account tend to highlight content characteristics, as shown in the authoritarianism theory's emphasis on moralistic punishment and animosity toward minority groups.

Integrative complexity grading cannot be based on the presence or frequency of certain words or phrases since it is not based on content analysis. Such occurrences may be employed as signals to inform the scorer of potential structural traits, at least at lower complexity levels. The scoring manual states, for instance, that phrases like absolutely and everyone agrees are "content flags" that suggest the possibility of an undifferentiated thought structure, which would require a score of I for the passage; however, phrases like on the other hand and nevertheless may be conflict flags for a differentiation score. The handbook also cautions that these flags may occur in sections that are genuinely higher or lower than the flag would indicate, and that they are neither required nor sufficient reason for a certain score.

State vs. Trait Attributes

The chronic or typical level at which a person functions is recognized by current complexity theories as having a trait component, as does the situation-specific state component. Integrative complexity theory stresses that differentiation and integration varies from circumstance to scenario for each person, in contrast to conceptual complexity theory, which examines constant degrees of complexity that define a specific individual's functioning. When Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait initially succeeded, then was endangered by Desert Shield, and was ultimately stopped by Desert Storm, for instance, his complexity rose and diminished. The fundamental issues in the state-trait dispute are how much a psychological predisposition determines behavior and what role environmental conditions play.

Complex traits

The dual trait and state character of information processing complexity is successfully confirmed by a longitudinal analysis of Robert E. Lee's integrative complexity. Lee's complexity was typically high throughout the most of his adult life, but it began to drop as the challenges of a protracted conflict with a stronger adversary became more intense. It returned to its usual high level when the Civil War ended.

According to Suedfeld, persons are predisposed to respond to environmental variables with varying degrees of state complexity due to the trait component of complexity. The qualities of the problem scenario and trait complexity work together to define the next degree of state complexity. The cognitive manager model contends that complexity is altered depending on the significance and urgency of the issue, other issues that must be resolved concurrently, the person's intellectual capacity and other relevant resources, and the environmental and social factors that will be covered later in this.

An alternate argument is that state complexity acts as a moderator variable in the relationship between trait complexity and behavior. Research that replicates and broadens the results on General Lee's pattern on how these elements interact in other circumstances is obviously needed. Different people have distinct personality qualities for their information processing styles, which are referred to as differentiation and integration in formulations of conceptual complexity. Measuring is based on answers to broad questions in basic situations like relationships with authority and responses to ambiguity, and these predefined questions are given in a classroom or laboratory environment free of emotional significance or conflict. Early research on the links between personality traits like trait complexity and other factors like authoritarianism, dogmatism, and field independence showed very small correlations. Depending on the sample and the IQ test employed, there is a modest correlation between intelligence and complexity. At least in restricted-range university student groups, conceptual complexity has been shown to have only a moderate correlation with mental talents such as linguistic ability, crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, and divergent thinking[3], [4].

Along with openness and creativity, low social compliance and conscientiousness, narcissism and antagonism, high initiative, power motivation, and self-objectivity, as well as social adeptness, gregariousness, extroversion, warmth and nurturance, and nonconformity, moderate correlations have also been found between trait complexity and a long list of general personality traits. Conceptual complexity may actually be linked to certain undesirable personality qualities, such as being easily bored, self-centered, and narcissistic. Nevertheless, such assessments may have been made as a result of how more complex individuals reacted to the demanding weekend of rigorous testing.

The intricacy of a trait may have a role in effective leadership. For instance, during times of crisis when their colleagues and peers displayed disruptive stress that lowered complexity, leaders maintained relatively high levels of complexity notwithstanding their length of service in high office. During his military career, General Lee continuously performed at a very high level of complexity. Despite having a vastly higher number of soldiers, Union commanders that fought Lee were unable to achieve a conclusive victory. As the Confederate deteriorated, Lee's army lost men, energy, and supplies, and his strategy became less difficult. He ultimately ran against opponents that were operating at complexity levels that were at least as high as his, and he wasn't nearly as effective with them. One intriguing observation is that Lee's complexity level instantly

increased and stayed there for the rest of his life after he made the decision to surrender at Appomattox.

There is another alternative, even if these statistics could indicate the presence of a degree of complexity whose expression might vary depending on the situation. Instead of being a major impact characteristic, conceptual complexity may be an interaction feature. The most crucial element in this situation could be the capacity to identify and adjust to circumstances that call for various degrees of complexity. While this concept has not yet been verified using archival data, it has been confirmed by the findings of a wide range of simulation studies of company executives' decision-making. State Complexity Scholars have looked at a variety of factors that could have an impact on how complex a scenario would be. The environment, social or political variables, and the nature of the activity are a few examples of situational influences in addition to intrapsychic ones.

Intrapsychic Elements

Between the more dynamic and responsive state complexity dimension and the pervasive and symbiotic trait complexity, a variety of intrapsychic elements may be seen as intervening. Despite the fact that content and structure are often independent, such intrinsic qualities could potentially serve to strengthen their association. The desire to reconcile a conflict or contradiction among objectives, assumptions, or ideals has been the main focus of the majority of intrapsychic factor study. Tetlock and his coworkers have discovered, for instance, that political liberals tend to produce policy proposals that are more complicated than more radical supporters of either the left or the right side. Tetlock has published consistent data from politicians in both the United States and the United Kingdom that demonstrate the same trend, which was also confirmed in a sample of Canadian members of Parliament. Tetlock contends that liberals or liberalism are not inherently complicated, despite the fact that many other theories have been put forward. Rather, value conflict or value pluralism is at its maximum intensity at this juncture of the left-right political spectrum. When two significant goals cannot be fully realized, there is a value conflict; in politics, liberals see this as the desire to promote both equality and individual freedom. Conservatives tend to value freedom more than socialists do when the two are at odds, as they often are when policy options are decided in Western democratic governments. So, compared to liberals, both of these groups encounter less disagreement and need fewer extremely complicated solutions. Experimental research have also supported the curved association between complexity and ideological orientation on the left-right axis.

At various locations along the ideological spectrum, the ability of value conflict to inspire integrative complexity has also been studied. For instance, Tetlock discovered in a laboratory experiment that moderate liberals who gave equality and their personal economic success high marks on the Rokeach Value Survey achieved their peak level of complexity when asked whether they would be prepared to pay more taxes to aid the poor. When asked if they would be prepared to pay additional taxes in order to improve national defense, moderate conservatives who gave both their personal prosperity and national defense high ratings reach their greatest degree of complexity. So, one important lesson of the value pluralism model is not to count on ideologies having consistent major impacts. Instead, the model anticipates interactions between ideologies and issues in which the point of maximum complexity of reasoning changes depending on both the respondents' value priorities and the perceived relevance of "issue framing" to highly valued values.

Differential value conflict is not just based on the left-right spectrum. In contrast to either extreme abolitionists or proponents of slavery, pre-Civil War moderates who opposed slavery but wished to maintain the Union were obviously in more struggle and had higher integrative complexity. In a different archival study, the British Columbian provincial government and a group of scientists it had selected to develop forest management policy in a sensitive old-growth area were caught in a dispute between factions hoping to maintain the financial advantages of logging and those hoping to ensure the protection of forested wildness. The government and its scientists demonstrated more complexity than did environmentalists and wood industry representatives, as Tetlock's model anticipated. Students in an experimental environment also produce essays that are much more complex when addressing the relationship between two values that they classified as having a high degree of conflict than when discussing two values that have a low degree of conflict.

So, value plurality will result in more difficult situations where there are two or more values that are about equally important, necessitating the acceptance of both in any conclusion. The circumstance must be such that the maximizing of each would result in the violation of the other; the only solution is to attempt to link them and determine what type of compromise or trade-off may acquire at least some degree of both that is at least somewhat acceptable. Of fact, this is the precise definition of a sophisticated problem-solving strategy. In contrast, people who simply seek to promote one essential principle do not need to adopt such accommodationist stances. According to Lavalley and Suedfeld, events that inspire motive pluralism are affected by a comparable mechanism in terms of complexity levels. This happens when people or organizations may simultaneously have at least partially conflicting motivations, such as the need to be liked by the person or group being tried to influence while also wanting to assert authority over them.

Situational Characteristics

The degree of environmental stressors, social elements, and the type of the activity are situational aspects whose effects on complexity have been studied. The integrative complexity index captures contextual factors like task and domain complexity. On the basis of this study, cognitive management and metacomplexity theorists need to further investigate how people might use psychological tendencies like compartmentalization and attribution to specific issue circumstances.

Workplace Environment

According to the integrative complexity theory, it is important to investigate how environmental factors affect how complexly an individual processes information and the behavioral consequences that follow, as the complexity level of the individual influences how they react to specific environmental circumstances. Environmental elements that impact integrative complexity include information load, time constraints, perceived danger, perceived serious repercussions, weariness, ambiguity, intragroup conflict, and challenge to or loss of control.

Planning and decision-making in simulation trials become less integrated when there is a lack of time, an insufficient amount of available information, and/or unfavorable results. Participants who write a paragraph based on a predetermined subject have lower complexity ratings because they eliminate qualifiers and consider alternatives in favor of answers that are at the top of the respondent's hierarchy.

Like in studies of executive decision makers in foreign policy crises, severe and sustained stress is predicted to account for an inverse relationship between the beginning of violent conflict and the degree of complexity. At times of crisis, particularly when armed conflict is likely to result, outside observers often conclude that the situation necessitates high levels of complexity among national decision-makers. Decision-makers face threats to crucial national interests that are characterized by the risk of war, uncertainty about the intentions of adversaries, allies, and neutrals, a steady stream of potentially perplexing intelligence data, the need to maintain effective control over one's own bureaucratic and military infrastructure, as well as the need to engage in drawn-out and exhausting deliberations[5]–[7].

In connection to leadership decision-making during global crises, the effect of environmental variables on complexity has been repeatedly examined. International crises are stressful almost by definition, and several studies have examined the connection between complexity and crisis outcome. While Neville Chamberlain alternated between cooperative and competing methods throughout the series of incidents that made up the Anglo-German crisis of 1938–1939, the complexity of the situation changed with time. Prior to the failure of diplomatic efforts in crises that turn into conflict, the complexity levels of leaders exhibit predictable declines. According to Suedfeld and Tetlock, Israeli and Arab speeches in the UN General Assembly showed noticeable declines in the months leading up to the start of major Middle East wars. They also discovered that leader complexity declined between the preliminary and climax phases in two crises that ended in war.

On the other side, ongoing high complexity is often linked to peaceful, negotiated solutions. In other crises that featured the same countries and some of the same leaders but were handled without going to war, complexity remained the same or increased across the two periods of the Suedfeld and Tetlock research. The fact that surprise strategic strikes are constantly preceded by a decline in the complexity of the eventual attacker but not the victim is particularly notable. Conflict spirals cause the leaders of all the countries involved to become less complicated.

Not all crises involving conflict are important to complexity. When complexity is restored, a conflict may end amicably. For example, American and Soviet leaders' complexity decreased in the months immediately before to the start of the two main Berlin crises but increased during the course of the crises. Disruptive stress isn't always linked to military conflict though; it may also occur when a balanced, compromise- or consensus-oriented policy is abandoned. According to a study of Canadian prime ministers, important internal political problems that have clear-cut, one-dimensional answers are also followed by a reduction in complexity. These results suggest a possible use for the integrative complexity approach: real-time monitoring of the complexity of utterances might alert observers to impending changes in a protagonist's strategy.

Satterfield examined the linguistic output of Churchill, Hitler, Stalin, and Roosevelt before and after personal and political crises to provide another viewpoint on the connection between crises and decision-maker complexity. Satterfield discovered that leaders who displayed higher integrative complexity prior to a crisis showed higher resilience—that is, fewer negative effects of stress—afterward. This was determined by using change scores on the Global Assessment of Functioning Scale to measure the person's psychological functioning. In a different recent research, Kowert discovered that "open" U.S. presidents had reduced integrative complexity loss during crises.

This may be a good time to underline how complexity is a normatively neutral structural characteristic. It has nothing to do with morality, appropriateness, or accuracy of the ultimate action. In addition to the fact that there is no theoretical or historical evidence to support the notion that complicated judgments are always bad ones, a newly created computer-based decision assistance system also failed to uncover such a connection. In order to make the best decisions, it may be necessary to allocate resources based on a cost-benefit analysis since sophisticated tactics need more time, effort, and resources to handle other issues and may draw attention away from important information in favor of unimportant details. According to theory and evidence, it may be advisable to respond unequivocally to an obstinate, aggressive, or simple-minded advertiser rather than delaying, obscuring, or diluting your message. Hence, depending on the context and the adversary, either low or high degrees of complexity may lead to effective settlement of issues or conflicts. But the capacity to retain complexity in the midst of crisis may be connected with personal career success among politicians. The conclusion of history is that, despite Hitler's relative lack of sophistication during the Munich Conference, Chamberlain was outmanoeuvred by him. We would also disagree with the conclusion reached by many colleagues that a declaration of war always indicates poor decision-making. In certain cases, giving up on talks and engaging in military confrontation may be the morally right option, as well as the pragmatically wise choice—or both[8].

Scholars who are convinced that complex results are superior often neglect the morally irrelevant nature of complexity. Yet when we examine particular, the abstract value disintegrates, as it so frequently does. The intricate connection between complexity, morality, and achievement is best shown by three historical instances. Ronald Reagan's straightforward and comprehensive description of the Soviet Union as an evil empire has drawn criticism from a number of intellectual and media pundits. Yet, given the history of Soviet tyranny and the chronological—and possibly causal—association between American policies based on Reagan's point of view and the fall of Communist control in Eastern Europe, President Reagan's depiction had both moral and practical merit.

However, most modern observers commend the integratively simple abolitionists of 1850 who demanded the abolition of slavery despite the fact that doing so would result in a civil war and/or the dissolution of the Union, as integratively complex moderates in both the Democratic and Republican parties accurately predicted at the time. The majority of modern experts also praise Winston Churchill's totally straightforward strategy, which he used to describe Nazi Germany as a gangster state that spoke only the language of power and deterrent in 1930. Churchill thus urged an end to Chamberlain's intricately nuanced strategy, which was based on striking a balance between deterrence and assurances that the British were aware of Germany's valid security concerns[9], [10].

CONCLUSION

Archival research offers a thorough comprehension and examination of the topic. By using the archives as your main source of information, you can be certain that nothing is being left out. There are several resources available to you for collecting and validating data for your study. Archives can provide teachers the primary sources they need to give pupils hands-on experience with the topic. The pupils will remember these experiences for a very long time and may utilize them in other real-world situations. They are only kept if they are thought to have lasting historical importance. They weren't intentionally made as a historical record.

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CHAPTER 17

SOCIAL FACTORS FOR POLITICAL LEADER

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ABSTRACT:

The intention to project a specific image, the nature and perceived attitudes of the audience in a persuasive scenario, the source's position, which also impacts responsibility, and intragroup cohesion and diversity are only a few social aspects that are crucial to complexity. In this chapter author is discusses the technical aspects of leader.

KEYWORDS:

Beliefs, Leader, Management, Politics, Political.

INTRODUCTION

Impression Management

The majority of the integrative complexity research examined in this article is based on the premise that complexity reveals intrapsychic processes, i.e., that individuals who express themselves orally or in writing in integratively simple or complex ways are similarly inclined to think similarly simple or complex thoughts about the subject at hand. A different view, known as impression management, contends that people's speech and writing are influenced by the political objectives they have in the social or professional contexts in which they live. According to this perspective, a topic may be addressed at a level that the source feels will make the intended impact on the target audience rather than the degree of complexity at which the source truly considers it. Tetlock, as an illustration.

The differences between these interpretations may not matter for certain applications. Regardless of whether simplification reveals changes in underlying thought or influence strategies that have been more or less deliberately chosen, decreasing complexity in international crises may indicate the imminence of war. Likewise, increasing complexity may indicate an impending compromise, again regardless of the "true nature" of the construct that determines the complexity of the text. Nonetheless, the difference may be quite important for other reasons. Whether leaders intentionally fake nonrecognition or really fail to perceive legitimately opposing viewpoints on a topic does matter, both psychologically and politically[1], [2].

The impression management hypothesis is untestable in one sense since it is hard to tell what impression a message's originator wants to convey. There is no clear benefit to either picture since viewers may judge both high and low complexity images favorably or negatively. In certain situations, leaders often fail to communicate well enough to control impressions. For instance, putting on a show of complexity would have seemed like a wise move for national leaders preparing a strategic surprise attack, for Saddam Hussein as the UN Security Council's deadline for enforcing sanctions drew near, and for Mikhail Gorbachev as his domestic political

and economic problems grew increasingly dangerous; in reality, all of these leaders displayed lower complexity. It may be argued to save the image management theory that in dire situations, leaders would have anticipated that the presentation of a resolute "I will not be swayed" posture would dissuade opponents or encourage them to make greater compromises. This is a question that cannot be answered without having access to the leader's thoughts[3], [4].

Tetlock and Manstead discuss two study techniques that might separate intrapsychic from impression management hypotheses. The disruptive stress concept would expect simplicity in both private and public documentation, with impression management occurring only in the second, prior to war or other uncompromising confrontation. Two research confirmed the public-private divide anticipated by impression management, whereas three others did not.

Studying situations when image control is unlikely to be useful is another strategy. In both a field study of students as they got closer to a difficult test and an experiment utilizing a noise stressor with university students, there were significant stress-related declines in complexity. Non-specific archival materials, such as those dealing with subjects other than the crisis and those created by social elites who were not involved in crisis resolution, like novelists, scientists, and American Psychological Association presidents, have also shown marked reductions in complexity during times of acute societal stress. Low complexity, however, can also be explained by the disruptive stress of a draining election campaign, which is followed by recovery, or by successful candidates for high office who gain immediate access to information that broadens their perspective and makes them aware of new points of view and problem-solving options.

In other words, the borders of the intrapsychic and impression management explanations are hazy sets. Both parties may interact, or one of them may take control in specific circumstances. While some predictions—such as those relating to disruptive stress, value conflict, and correlations with personality traits like dogmatism—flow more naturally from intrapsychic perspectives, others—such as those relating to the influence of the target audience or the relationship between power and political influence—are more obviously derived from an impression management model. Both may be included in more general explanations like the cognitive management model. At this point, it seems acceptable to conclude that integrative complexity has characteristics of both cognitive processes and social influence strategies in addition to those of a state and a trait.

The position and status of the source of the utterance is another element that affects complexity and is sometimes connected to impression management objectives. The amount of intricacy with which individuals and organizations express themselves varies depending on whether they are criticizing an already-enacted policy or attacking their opponents who are in positions of authority. Election campaigns and environmental crises have both shown this tendency. The fact that liberal parties have dominated the legislatures of the nations included in these studies—Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom—for the majority of the past five decades may have had an impact on previously mentioned complexity differences between liberal and conservative politicians.

According to a Canadian research, members of the ruling party made statements that were more nuanced than those of the opposition. MPs from both parties shown more complexity when a minority administration was in existence, which indicated a greater urgency to find mutually accepted policy solutions. Contrary to Tetlock's results in US presidential elections, complexity grew within the ruling party as the next election neared but before it was called and reduced

among the opposition. Election campaigns in Canada are significantly more different from elected lawmakers' "business as usual" operations once they get going than they are in the US; in fact, Parliament is disbanded when an election is called. Nonetheless, compared to legislative speeches, speeches made during Canadian election campaigns tend to be more simpler[5], [6].

Success and long-term regard accrue to individuals who go from relatively low to greater degrees of complexity as a person's standing moves from being in opposition to being in power, while those who fail to make this transformation are more likely to lose their position or the respect of future generations. Both elected and revolutionary leaders have this trait. No research that examines a similar trend when individuals leave power and enter opposition has yet to be published.

Other Elements

The nature and perceived views of the audience in a persuasive scenario are another important social aspect. When students were told they would later have to discuss their thoughts with another student or with an expert who would evaluate the quality of their comments, integrative complexity was shown to rise in numerous trials. In addition, responsibility strengthens other cognitive strategies including delegating blame, putting off making decisions, and focusing more on unimportant details. The eventual audience's opinion was kept a secret from the subjects in these studies, but it's interesting to note that the first condition evoked higher complexity, possibly due to disruptive stress in the second, when students were made to speak in front of an audience that either agreed with them or disagreed.

There hasn't been much study of how groupthink affects integrative complexity. Group-focus thinks on intragroup unity, illusions of invulnerability, conformity police, and connection with an idolized leader should be expected to result in simplification. Tetlock found that the latter had resulted in substantially more complicated public remarks from the U.S. president and secretary of state when comparing international situations in which Janis had labeled American decision-making as either groupthink or nongroupthink. More investigation of this association is warranted, however, given recent criticisms of the groupthink model and the reclassification of some of the crises previously investigated. Walker and Watson discovered an intriguing variation in which complexity increased as British leaders moved away from group-think and toward multiple advocacy while deciding on a continental strategy against Nazi Germany.

The issue of individual disparities within leadership groups is an additional social element that warrants more investigation. Tetlock claimed that Dean Rusk maintained his degree of complexity during both groupthink and nongroupthink crises; however, this research did not look at the leaders' continuing interactions. In a thorough examination of the papers from the Kennedy inner circle, Guttieri, Suedfeld, and Wallace tracked variations in complexity during the duration of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Janis had praised this decision-making procedure as the pinnacle of non-groupthink methods. However, Guttieri, Suedfeld, and Wallace discovered evidence of cognitive management and disruptive stress: complexity first increased as the importance of the issue was fully recognized and solutions were weighed, and then decreased as no resolution appeared and options were closed off. There were no complexity differences between so-called hawks and doves in either public or private communications. It is noteworthy that the Kennedy brothers did not exhibit the diminished complexity of depleted cognitive resources. The Kennedy brothers were the only members of the group to be aware of a covert agreement to swap the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba for the later removal of American

missiles from Turkey. Personality differences were also seen in British cabinet debates in the late 1930s, but sadly, little is known about this fascinating topic.

Problem Specifications

It's crucial to consider the nature of the issues being addressed or the choices that need to be taken. Tasks that are both significant and challenging are subjected to higher complexity, as the cognitive manager model predicts. For instance, Maoz and Shayer demonstrated how Israeli prime ministers employed more sophisticated arguments to persuade the Knesset to take a conciliationist approach rather than a belligerent one against their Arab enemies. This might be seen as both a rhetorical move on the part of the prime minister and an indication that he views the conciliatory persuasion effort as "more tough and demanding." Tasks that are not highly compelling cause people to underestimate their capacity for complexity, as Ceci and Ruiz have shown.

Various issues being handled at the same time may have varying degrees of complexity. Tetlock discovered that the degree of complexity with which Soviet leaders treated various internal and international problems changed, the amount fluctuating with the severity of challenges at a particular period. Particularly when it came to foreign policy, Mikhail Gorbachev was constantly more sophisticated than when it came to domestic economics and politics.

Personal disasters, including a divorce, a loved one's passing, professional losses, and sickness, tend to elicit a different pattern than societal dangers, like an ongoing war. The latter may be seen as being less susceptible to the person's control or coping mechanisms. Personal crises are associated with increases in complexity, at least among males, which go away after the crisis is over. The intricacy of women's responses to personal issues is less variable.

Regarding publications that discuss either past or future occurrences, some intriguing facts have been gathered. One case study demonstrated that retrospective accounts of stressful life events that were intense, unpleasant, undesirable, and neither controlled nor predicted by the person are more complex than the accounts of events that had the opposite characteristics. Retrospective accounts of stressful life events that met these criteria revealed higher complexity than material produced at the time of the event. There are no sex-related differences in this pattern. As they gradually approach their last and most intense crisis—death—both men and women often exhibit a large decline in complexity, however in a study context, contemplating death itself—especially one's own death—produces more complexity than contemplating the process of dying.

DISCUSSION

Technical Aspects

Technical disputes that were brought up in detractors of the integrative complexity approach have not yet been entirely resolved.

The source's name

It might be challenging to determine how closely the item being evaluated resembles the purported source. The two most frequently asked questions are whether the content was created by an assistant, such as a ghostwriter, speechwriter, or public relations specialist, and whether it can be assumed that content that was translated into English from a different language accurately reflects that source's complexity rather than that of the translator.

The first query can only have a provisional response. No significant complexity differences have been identified in studies that rated both private letters and public remarks made by the same political leader within the same time period. The conclusion has generally been that, at least in the case of important statements, leaders either write much of the material themselves, set firm guidelines for the writer that embody their own cognitive approach, modify the final product to be compatible with how they think about the issue, or select writers whose theorizing aligns with their own. Many of the documents scored for complexity either have been holographs or showed extensive editing and annotation in the hand of the named source. Last but not least, no significant differences have been discovered depending on whether the content occurs in personal or public messages, the latter of which includes both those meant for broad distribution and those dedicated to a specific group of colleagues. On the other hand, as previously mentioned, it has been stated that the line between public and private remarks is blurred among notable individuals as a result of the understanding that even diaries and personal letters may one day be revealed. The end outcome of these parameters should be a good match between the identified source's information-processing complexity and the product's integrative complexity. Yet, it's necessary to be mindful of individual and cultural distinctions. For instance, some notable politicians still always create their own content, while in certain societies, someone in a high position just reads out statements that officials have prepared.

Dealing with the translation issue is simpler. No appreciable difference in the difficulty of the two versions has ever been discovered in studies that rated both the original statement and a "official" English translation. There is no reason to suppose that these discrepancies will materialize if the original was written in a language other than English. We may presume that skilled translators can replicate the original statement's complexity level in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Scorer expertise

How much background knowledge a scorer should possess is a different problem. Particularly when working with historical, biographical, and political content, this might be troublesome. There is no one correct answer to this question since it is fairly possible for scorers to score passages correctly even if they have no knowledge of the context. The issue comes when the scorer's knowledge or lack of knowledge of allusions or implications in the text may affect the score. We have tested both knowledgeable and uninformed scorers, and we have not yet seen any substantial or big discrepancies; nonetheless, the risk of this kind of confusion should be kept in mind. Moreover, it's intriguing to note that even the most gullible individuals in the study—university students—seem to have a decent implicit awareness of integrative complexity and how different endogenous and situational elements impact it.

Measurement

This section's content is an extract from "The Manual for Grading Conceptual and Integrative Complexity. Integrative complexity is scored on a scale from 1 to 7. 1 indicates that neither differentiation nor integration is present. For information processing, the author uses one-dimensional and evaluatively consistent rules. Threes suggest no integration but moderate to high differentiation. While at least two independent aspects of judgment are acknowledged in the sentence, any potential conceptual links between these dimensions are not taken into account. Obtaining a 5 means you have moderate to high distinctiveness and moderate integration. The author draws attention to conceptual linkages between several judgmental dimensions. The

identification of a superordinate category connecting two concepts, insights into the shared characteristics of differentiated dimensions, the recognition of competing goals or value trade-offs, the specification of interactive effects or causes for an event, and the development of potential explanations for why reasonable people may have different perspectives on the same event are just a few examples of integrative cognitions. Scores of 7 indicate strong integration and high differentiation. An overarching principle offers a conceptual foundation for comprehending particular relationships among several aspects. The results of this kind of systemic study lead to second-order integration principles that put integration rules operating at a scale value of 5 in perspective and may even expose their generalizability's boundaries. Scores of 2, 4, and 6 indicate degrees of translational conceptual structure. Here, rather of being obvious and completely defined, the qualities of differentiation or integration that, if expressed properly, would support the next higher score, are implicit and emergent.

A portion of content that is narrowly focused on one concept is the fundamental unit in integrative complexity grading. This scoreable unit often, but not always, consists of a single paragraph. Sometimes the scorer may split a lengthy paragraph into two or more parts, each focusing on a different theme. Nonetheless, a few brief paragraphs from the original text may be combined into a single scoring unit. The scoreable unit is referred to as a paragraph throughout the text.

Finding the whole pool of accessible and scoreable paragraphs is the initial stage in the sampling of paragraphs from historical information. For each input into the data set, at least five paragraphs are randomly selected from this pool. The benchmark commonly employed in subsequent statistical analysis is the mean complexity score of the sections with five or more. There are several methods for creating content that can be programmed for integrated complexity. In essence, these methods vary from high to low on a continuum of experimenter control.

One point

I would just repurpose one of the messages Jesus gave us and convey it at this very moment. I wouldn't even discuss it with anybody. I would inform him that, as the president had said, we would be conducting surveillance, and that he should prepare for it. He may immediately put an end to his firing and sit down to chat if he wishes to do so. Rating of 3 On that, we are working. We don't know the solution. We will need to discuss the provinces' views on the program's scope, associated costs, and hospital savings relative to those incurred elsewhere.

Score of 5 If we take immediate action to stop global warming, we can succeed on both fronts. We can succeed in our efforts to create employment and improve the environment. We can build the foundation for a fresh, vibrant, and cleaner economy if we go forward with this. Rating of 7 The work of our party will greatly benefit from the current debate. By doing so, we will be able to change our condition from one that is passive to one that is active in certain aspects, better grasp the socialist economic rules, repair time-based imbalances, and comprehend what "positive balances" really mean.

In the conceptual complexity study, the PCT was the preferred approach. Participants in the study were required to respond to six sentence stems for the PCT, which addressed key areas of social cognition such as interpersonal conflict, uncertainty, and authority orientation. Each completion, typically one to two minutes were allotted. In order to utilize the PCT as a power test

rather than a speed test, later iterations of these instructions changed the exact themes, the number of paragraphs to be written, and the amount of time permitted each stem to as much as 10 minutes.

Providing participants with a single subject on which to write an essay is a noteworthy variant that was invented by Claunch. De Vries asked participants to answer the question, "Who am I," and Walker had them write an essay about the death penalty. Streufert has more recently based his rating of complexity on a protracted guided interview. This type of task, when content is being generated specifically for the study, needs careful instructions to ensure that respondents evaluate the materials on which they are writing and do not merely provide descriptive accounts, which are unscoring, and to ensure that the format does not bias the responses in the direction of either low or high complexity. Comparing the mean complexity ratings of other data-generating methods, such as the PCT, essays, or guided interviews, reveals relatively slight differences. Higher complexity ratings are often seen in content that has been produced after considerable thinking or preparation and with little to no time pressure. Materials that were created quickly and under strong time constraints tend to have lower complexity ratings. Since oral data is more spontaneous and is susceptible to shorter time schemata, written reports often get better grades.

A correlation of at least $r = 0.85$ with an expert coder is a prerequisite for becoming a trained complexity coder. Without repeated practice and feedback from experienced coders over time, this condition has proved difficult to achieve. Traditionally, learning to score texts for integrative complexity has taken place in multi-day training workshops that included in-depth analysis of challenging instances and group debate of scoring choices. A guidebook was recently created so that anyone may learn how to assess integrative complexity without going to a workshop. Many applicants have successfully utilized it to qualify as independent coders by reaching a level of agreement with the expert scores; however, we have not yet had enough experience to determine if it will typically be sufficient as a replacement for in-person training sessions.

Building Causal Narratives about Political Leaders

To demonstrate the complementing benefits of these approaches to understanding political leaders, each of the earlier personality evaluation techniques is used to Saddam Hussein, a leader from a closed Arab culture, and William Jefferson Clinton, a Western democratic leader. Each leader is the topic of a thorough portrait that focuses on the fundamental structure of his personality before assessments of many aspects of the personality. Stanley Renshon creates and decodes a psychoanalytic image of Clinton based on his Neustadt Award-winning book *High Hopes*. From his evidence before the House Armed Services and House Foreign Affairs Committees, Jerold M. Post updated and improved his psychobiographic/psychodynamic description of Saddam Hussein's political personality. These studies provide an account of the formative events that molded each leader's core personality structure as well as the mechanisms by which private motivations are externalized onto public objects. They also offer a formulation of each leader's core personality structure.

The remaining studies of each leader are grouped based on their emphasis on one of the causative mechanisms—processes of ego defense and externalization, mediation of self and other, and object appraisal—that were earlier discovered. Each leader's own way of handling stress is revealed as a pattern of ego protection by Weintraub's structural analysis of their spontaneous speech patterns. The motivational factors that distinguish between Clinton and Hussein's ego protection tactics and self-other relationship mediation are the main emphasis of

Winter's profiles. According to Hermann's assessments of cognitive, affective, and stylistic personality factors, each man's leadership style for mediating self-other relationships in his particular institutional environment is influenced by the combination of these three personality traits. The investigations by Suedfeld and Tetlock and Walker, Schafer, and Young focus on each leader's cognitive style and beliefs that serve as object evaluation processes.

The authors of these studies also adhere to a loose division of labor, with one providing a more in-depth investigation of individual personality qualities and the other identifying the leader within the framework of a typology or specific arrangement of personality traits. Renshon's dimensional analysis of Clinton's personality and Post's classification of Hussein's clinical type are complemented by Weintraub's discovery of a number of personality qualities for each leader. Hermann's placement of the two leaders under a typology of leadership styles corresponds with Winter's study of their various desires for power, affiliation, and accomplishment. Walker, Schafer, and Young categorize each leader into a set of ideal sorts of operational code belief systems, while Suedfeld analyzes how each leader processes information from the decision-making environment.

Greenstein lists phenomenological, dynamic, and genetic studies as three of these many types of analysis. The previously described cognitive models of object evaluation are used in phenomenological investigations to investigate the relationship between observable behavior and relatively obvious personality characteristics that the leader presents as symptoms of more complex personality dynamics. Models of the mediation of self-other relationships are included in dynamic analyses, which also "cover a host of rather disparate explanatory operations... ranging]... from relativistically atheoretical descriptions of the contingencies under which different aspects of phenomenology are manifested, through explanation in terms of inner events that can only be characterized in terms of the concepts of the various schools of personality theory." The psychobiographical profiles outlined previously include genetic analyses and show "for the characteristics of innate structure, development, applications, and experience that led to the observed presenting features and the inferred underlying processes[7], [8].

In general, a leadership perspective explains social phenomena, such as political choices and consequences, by referring largely to the traits of the leaders as social actors. A prolonged investigation of the evolution of the decision-making environment is excluded as a result of such a focus, and depending on the analytical model, it could not even take into consideration how the leader got to be who he or she is at the time of decision. This line of thinking is congruent with the idea that human events and social institutions are the results of protracted and intricate causal chains involving difficult-to-reconstruct human beings. To put it another way, "fronted with a universe consisting of causal histories of virtually limitless duration, in practice we can only expect to offer information on their most recent past."

The profiles that follow together depict each leader in two causal narratives. The emergence of Clinton and Hussein's personalities is described by Renshon and Post. The other writers pinpoint specific causal processes and speculate on the possible outcomes of choices and actions made in response to outside factors that are either assumed to exist or are provided by others. The user must thus provide information on the macrolevel environment in which the specific leader works in addition to data about the leader in order to apply these personality profiles to specific decision-making circumstances. At the end, we will discuss this knowledge gap as well as other problems with profiling political figures. This profile emphasizes the three main components of

ambition, character integrity, and relatedness while also emphasizing the organizational notion of character as it is presented. The psychology of William Jefferson Clinton and his performance in the leadership and decision-making categories—first as governor, then as president—are linked[9].

CONCLUSION

Leaders inspire followers to be committed and enthusiastic about achieving objectives. The interplay of the leader, the follower, and the environment results in leadership. Ineffective management may cause a number of issues, such as a drop in staff morale, a downturn in productivity, and a general deterioration in business performance. In severe circumstances, it may even result in the company failing. Leaders must thus make sure they are effective in their positions. A leader is a person who skillfully organizes his human colleagues to accomplish certain goals. A great leader is someone who can do it every day, every year, in a variety of situations.

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CHAPTER 18

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PSYCHOLOGY

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ABSTRACT:

Presidential researchers who are interested in the connections between personality and public opinion surveys, decision-making, and performance in office often discuss the subject of presidential personality. Because of the relevance of their advice for governing and being elected in contemporary America, as well as the trend toward perpetual campaigning, the work of political scientists from the middle of the 20th century is still studied. In this chapter author is discusses the Virginia Kelley in psychological perspective.

KEYWORDS:

Leader, Political, Politics, President, Psychology.

INTRODUCTION

The psychology of every individual consists of both dynamic and developmental components. In other words, many aspects of a person's psyche are interconnected and have come together as a result of their particular developmental experiences. Next, a characterisation of the dynamic aspects of President Clinton's psychology is offered after a short account of the formative events that appear to have been most important in the formation of Clinton's character traits[1]–[3].

An Overview of the Clinton Family's Timeline

William Jefferson Blythe was given the name William Jefferson Clinton on August 19, 1946 in Hope, Arkansas. Three months before his son was born, his traveling salesman father William Blythe was killed in a car accident.

Virginia Kelley, his mother, was a nurse until the spring of 1947. She was twenty-three years old when he was born, widowed, and a single mother. She lived with her parents in Hope. Two significant occurrences for both her and the young Bill Clinton happened at that time. She first met and started seeing Roger Clinton, a guy who seemed to be well-off and whose family ran a Buick dealership in Hot Springs. Then, in the autumn of 1947, Mrs. Kelley moved from Hope to New Orleans to pursue her nurse-anesthesia training. The young Bill Clinton was left in the care of his grandparents, Edith and Eldridge Cassidy, while she was away from Hope for around two years. So, the infant Bill Clinton was not only mentally abandoned by his mother between the ages of one and three, but also lost his father before he was even born.

After finishing her training, Mrs. Kelley went back to Hope and her family's house, where she settled into a professional and social life that increasingly focused on Roger Clinton. On June 9, 1950, when Bill was only a few months away from turning four, his mother was twenty-seven, and Roger was forty, they were married. The union was turbulent. Roger Clinton's alcoholism was a significant contributing factor, but there were other issues as well.

A narrative with a psychological frame: The Clinton Family

In his early years, Bill Clinton lived with his grandmother and grandfather, who introduced him to reading and writing for the first time. One journey to New Orleans to see his mother had a deep influence on him. The family relocated to a farm outside of Hot Springs in 1953 when Bill was six years old, but they struggled to make a living there. The family relocated to Hot Springs proper after the first winter, and Roger accepted a position at his brother's successful Buick dealership. Bill's half-brother Roger Cassidy Clinton was born on July 25, 1956, shortly before William turned 10.

Bill spent two years at a Catholic school in Hot Springs where he started to stand out academically. He raised his hand so often in class that one of his professors gave him a failing mark for conduct. In the fourth grade, he began to a new school and "seemed to be ruling the place within days." While Bill was a student at the school, Ronnie Cecil stated that "I just took over the institution. While he didn't plan to, he just took up the space".

Bill had already earned the title of "golden boy" at Little Rock High School by the time he graduated. Bill Clinton had an adolescent that was, on the surface, a developmental success due to his academic talent, ability to excel in extracurricular activities like music and student politics, and the support of a broad group of adoring friends.

Yet, outer looks concealed a turbulent family life that would cause long-lasting traumas. The confrontations between Bill's mother and stepfather became more frequent as their marriage broke down. Roger Clinton was abusive verbally and even physically. Virginia Kelley sought a divorce in 1962. Bill was sixteen years old at the time, his brother was six, and Mrs. Kelley was 39. Like the marriage, the divorce was messy. To prevent Roger from entering the family home, Mrs. Kelley asked the court for an injunction. The Clintons then got back together three months after divorcing and were wedded on August 6, 1962. The union lasted until Roger's death in 1967 from cancer, which was discovered just before his second marriage[4]–[6].

George J. "Jeff" Dwire, Mrs. Kelley's former hairstylist, called her around six months after Roger passed away, and they started dating. Dwire spent nine months in jail after being charged with 25 charges of stock fraud in 1961. They were wed in 1969. Dwire passed away in 1974, five years later. Virginia Kelley married Richard W. Kelley, a retired food dealer, in January 1982. They stayed together until her death in January 1994.

The characteristics of Bill Clinton's personality that are so obvious as an adult—his ambition, his aspirations and sense of self, and the nature of his relationships with others—are explained and explained by developmental events. This necessitates that we place a lot of our attention on his mother, Virginia, since character and psychological development start in the family.

It is obvious that Virginia Kelley had a crucial role in Bill Clinton's emotional development both as a youngster and as an adult. Such emotional prominence continued far into adulthood and even after she passed away. In 1992, as Clinton was running for president and campaigning in New Hampshire, the news of Gennifer Flowers surfaced, sending his campaign into a tailspin "In order to leave a crucial strategy session, Mr. Clinton just vanished. His assistants later discovered him leaning over a pay phone in the lobby and talking to his mother".

It's obvious that Clinton had a strong emotional bond with his mother. What about Virginia Kelley's mother and her kid, though? She was Bill's mother in what way? How did it seem that

their connection affected him? Writing her autobiographical biography, Mrs. Kelley noted how her life was always in a state of crisis.

Why there are so many hills has always puzzled me. Is there anything about our family that makes us feel that we must live as if we were on a StairMaster? According to Hillary, her family didn't have problems every four minutes. So what accounts for our turbulence?

One cannot help but notice how much Mrs. Kelley's perception of her own life as being driven by crises resembles that of her son, whose private and notably public life and presidency have likewise been significantly driven by crises. Their crisis-driven lives are explained and accounted for by different individual dynamics, but the overall dynamic process seems very comparable. His character was directly impacted by hers since she contributed to establish the conditions that shaped his own character throughout his youth and adolescence. What principles and ideals did Mrs. Kelley hold? What was significant to her? What served as her compass as she made the choices that would affect both her and her boys' lives? She provides a lot of hints throughout her autobiography, but they may be categorized under the twin themes of standing out and prioritizing fun above duty. Enchanted by looks, particularly in the men she was attracted to, she disregarded actions that would eventually be harmful to her and her kid. She gave Bill Clinton a model of relationships that looked like this.

DISCUSSION

Virginia Kelley in Psychological Perspective

One person called Virginia Kelley "an American original." I'm a character, a cut up, a lunatic, she says of herself, adding that "Long before Bill became a public figure, I had what may be considered a "public persona"." The portrayal of her as a lady who worked hard and played hard, with a penchant for nightclubs and thoroughbred horse-racing grounds, may serve as the finest succinct summation of her life and demeanor. As firmly as her protruding jaw, spidery fake eyelashes, and quarter-moon smile gave her an eerie likeness to Bette Midler, her flightiness and loud laughter, together with her love of dazzling and various pieces of jewelry and colorful accessories, gave her an Auntie Mame character in later years[7]–[9].

Mrs. Kelley had desire, the capacity to carry out her plans, and the will to do so. Finding a way out of her mother's house and the tensions that pervaded it were an early goal. She seems to have fought against any resemblance to a mother she saw as harsh and vengeful and strongly associated with her kind, people-loving father. Her narcissism was a key aspect of her psyche. She had a strong care about looks, both her own and other people. Appearance, not substance, seemed to play a significant role in everything from her vision of how she would look in the crisp white uniform of the profession she chose in part due to this image, to her concern with the outward appearance of the men she married, and the woman her son brought home from Yale.

Her want to be noticed—indeed, to be the center of attention—and her willingness to go to any lengths to secure that position were further manifestations of her narcissism. Mrs. Kelley enjoyed being in the limelight, and she worked hard to create her Auntie Mame image. I was obviously born with a showy streak inside of me, just aching to explode out, and Hot Springs allowed me to be myself with a fury, she recalls of her partying in Hot Springs.

Her narcissism also showed in the men she picked, individuals whose own narcissistic attractiveness concealed dubious morals and conduct.

The enormous vanity of Roger Clinton appealed to Mrs. Kelley. I like a guy who enjoys himself, and Roger Clinton unmistakably seemed to like himself. He was always attempting to see his image in a window or a mirror. You've never seen such strutting as you did while he was acting as host. She was attracted to guys who eschewed tradition, ethics, and the law. Her previous spouse had several women and numerous children whom she was unaware of. Roger, her second husband, was an often aggressive guy whose actions landed him in conflict with the law. He was also a gambler, a bookie, and a bootlegger. Her third spouse had been found guilty of fraud. When doing research for her memoirs, she discovered that even her adored father had a drinking problem³ and that her mother had a home business selling illegal whiskey[10], [11].

Mrs. Kelley described her strong feeling of self-worth as absolute self-confidence. Nonetheless, her narcissism and desire for her personal pleasure significantly influenced her ambition. What role did these traits have in the early years of Bill Clinton's life?

Motherhood of Virginia Kelley: A Psychological View

In a conversation with Charles Allen, Clinton described his mother as

She was a terrific role model in three respects, in my opinion. I believe mom gave me a high pain tolerance, which is something I believe is crucial to have in public life. She always worked and did a fantastic job as a parent, and we had enough of adversity in our lives while I was growing up. You must be able to withstand harsh criticism, endure setbacks, and get up to battle once again.

The data suggests that Mrs. Kelley prioritized her own emotional needs above those of her children in numerous ways. It is possible to argue that she believed the short-term sacrifices for her and her kid were worth the long-term rewards connected with advancing her profession when she made the decision to move to New Orleans for many years, but the same cannot be said about her absorption in partying and nightlife. The humanitarian rationale she provides for leaving Hope is called into doubt by her unwillingness or incapacity to control her partying. Most importantly, her excessive partying served as a continual reminder to her kid of her priorities after she returned.

While she didn't necessarily place more value on her partying and nightlife than her kids, they were unquestionably fierce competitors for her attention. In light of the passing of Clinton's father, it is also important to take into account the impact of her commitment to partying. Mrs. Kelley needed to be more accessible to her son since one impact of losing a parent at a younger age is a propensity to turn more aggressively to the surviving parent. She ignored him nonetheless in favor of her own goals.

According to Mrs. Kelley, her son "just simply walked quietly in the other way" when it came to his disapproval of her gambling or our social drinking. She makes no mention of the obvious attempt she made to ease the tension between her mothering duties and her partying by taking her kid along with her on her nighttime rounds. Nightclubs were among the most well-liked drinking establishments in the area, and Bill Clinton's mother, Virginia, frequented them whenever she could, sometimes bringing her son Billy along for the fun. He was upset by the smoking and the drinking, according to Mrs. Kelley, who said she only brought her son to nightclubs to listen to jazz.

She had a similar tension between her obligations and her own desires in her work life. Mrs. Kelley recollects visiting the track each day it was open. She was drawn to the spectacle and the gaming. The issue was that she was regularly on call since she was a nurse. This issue was resolved by her scheduling her cases for the mornings during the racing season, allowing her to visit the track in the afternoons. This is unquestionably a striking representation of the relative importance Mrs. Kelley accorded to her career and her leisure.

The narcissism of Mrs. Kelley makes it difficult to determine how much she loves her son: How much of it was motivated by her personal demands and how much was a genuine admiration for his achievements? Parents of neurotic individuals often see their offspring as reflections of their own admirable traits and extensions of themselves. The success of the kid highlights the parent's uniqueness in a favorable way. Mrs. Kelley's statements imply more than simply pride when she says, "I'm a shameless reveler in my son's jobs and triumphs."

The Issue of Loyalty in The Primacy of Others

Both Virginia Kelley and her son Bill exhibit a move toward people in their interpersonal approach. Mrs. Kelley has described herself as someone who was, if anything, excessively trusting of people. She described Clinton in the same terms as other people.

Clinton's early experiences taught him, however, that it was foolish to put too much of oneself into a single connection and to resort to a wide spectrum of people for personal validation. As seen by his unpleasant recollections of their occasional encounters, Clinton's attitude toward others may be related to the loss of both his biological father and mother when she moved to New Orleans for two years to pursue her education.

When a parent is lost, a kid may develop object hunger and crave for them. In other words, they look for people who can fill the gap left by the missing parent. Clinton was strongly motivated to look for other individuals as he came to terms with the fact that he didn't have a father and that his mother was also absent. Even if they were very effective, these early teachings do not adequately explain Clinton's interpersonal connections or the lack of trust that lies at their core. We must look at Clinton's connection with his mother, stepfather, and stepfather in order to achieve this.

A kid may see parental irregularity, unreliability, and concern for pleasures at the price of a commitment to a solidly established family life as betrayal. No more trustworthy than his mother was Clinton's stepfather. He often left his stepson home alone in the evening or entire night while he went out. Clinton could not rely on either parent, either alone or together. When Bill Clinton was a teenager in the middle of the 1950s, Mrs. Kelley's husband was intoxicated "almost daily. They began fighting more often, with verbal abuse sometimes becoming violent. Mrs. Kelley started stashing cash away covertly. The dramatic accounts of Clinton defying his stepfather to defend his mother and small brother stem from this time period. One evening, even Clinton's four-year-old brother attempted to defend his mother by bringing a heavy wood into the home that he could not lift.

The children and Mrs. Kelley left the home, and she also requested a divorce. Once again stepping in to help her, Clinton provided his mother's lawyer with a deposition in support of her claim. His stepfather "honestly did love me, and I genuinely did love him," he has remarked in other places. Through it all, according to Mrs. Kelley, "Bill never stopped loving Roger Clinton."

Considering his affection for his stepfather, it must have been very emotional challenging for Clinton to testify against him.

The divorce was finally formalized in May, but Mrs. Kelley immediately started to compromise. She claims that she did so because her ex-husband, who was at the time, returned, seemed so sad, and pledged that this time, he would really change. Naturally, Clinton opposed his mother's remarriage; according to her, he told her, "That would be a mistake." She did change her mind after a short while, and three months after the divorce was official, they were remarried.

Consider the impact these experiences and his mother's actions must have had on Clinton's trustworthiness. Roger Clinton had often beaten his wife and made threats against her children. In order to finally leave this violent relationship, she asked her kid to fill up an affidavit against the only father he had ever known. So she hurriedly put herself and her kids back in the same risky and uncomfortable scenario. She compromised the mental health and feeling of physical security of herself, her children, and her family by bringing them back to a situation where everyone had suffered emotionally. She expressly broke the promises her son had made to support her and his family by accusing her stepfather in an affidavit and frequently standing up to him at his stepfather's expense. Her remarriage forced them all back into the predicament they had managed to escape and made Clinton's legal and domestic arguments against his father invalid. Clinton made a significant, honest, and challenging emotional commitment to his mother, who then used it before disowning it as a response.

Clinton's early experiences taught him the fundamental lesson that even those you should be able to depend on are often untrustworthy. These incidents are consistent with Clinton's conduct as an adult, particularly with regard to his lack of loyalty to his promises to friends, colleagues, and voters, as well as his admission that he "created sorrow in his marriage." Early experiences of Clinton support his tendency to encourage people to walk the political plank with him and then turn around when it is in his best interest, following his mother's example.

The Draft Controversy

In a lengthy piece that appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* on February 6, 1992, it was claimed that Bill Clinton had promised to enroll in the University of Arkansas' Reserve Officer Training Corps program in order to get a draft deferment during the Vietnam War, but had later broken his word. In response to the accusation, Clinton said that while he was qualified for induction as a Rhodes Scholar in England, he was lucky enough never to have gotten the call since he had been granted a student deferment as an undergraduate. He said that "I absolutely had no leverage to acquire it" and that he had never requested or gotten preferential treatment from his selection board. When Clinton was reclassified as i-A in 1968, Raymond Clinton, Clinton's late uncle, spearheaded an effort to secure special protection for Clinton from being inducted. Later reports revealed that Clinton himself had requested assistance from Senator J. W. Fulbright's office in order to enroll in the ROTC program. In all instances, Clinton first denied any knowledge of the incidents, but later acknowledged he met the requirements for the draft by claiming he had never received preferential treatment.

Ambition, ideals, and Clinton's approach to solving problems

The components chosen for public display gave Clinton the opportunity to portray or interpret his actions in the most favorable light. The story's details that would have challenged this rather

romanticized interpretation of his actions were either left out or else presented in a manner that further pushed the boundaries of popular understanding. One instance of such strategy was when Clinton was compelled to acknowledge that strong individuals, such as Senator Fulbright, had pleaded his case. When questioned about receiving preferential treatment, Clinton said, "the answer is no. They mean did you use influence or money or anything to acquire something that other people wouldn't have received."

A DECISION FOR YOUR LIFE: HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Unless she gets actively politically engaged or if she pioneers new public activities, a president's spouse often merely attracts passing interest. But the Clintons are special. For many years, they have been loyal yet problematic political allies.

Marriage is the endeavour to meld together two distinct but ideally compatible psychologies on a fundamental psychological level. In ideal conditions, each partner's character domains— aspiration, ideals and character integrity, and relatedness—complement and balance the other on a fundamental psychological level. Marriage development is also essential. People don't just merge into one another with two distinct psychologies that stay separate and stagnant. Instead, in every long-term partnership, the two psychologies grow in tandem with one another and with experiences in the outside world.

The other spouse's actions has the potential to strengthen or weaken the idealism that one person may bring to a marriage. Ambitions might be stifled or broadened by a spouse. However, how spouses grow to regard themselves, their partner, and their marriage is also influenced by the chances that marriage gives to accomplish one's aspirations. The Clintons' compatibility has been the subject of several studies, but none have looked at how their psychological bond has changed over time.

Given their fundamental psychologies, dispositions, and broad interests, Bill and Hillary Clinton began their marriage with a remarkable excellent match, according to all reports to date. They had "a fair fight and a fairly balanced courtship[12], [13].

CONCLUSION

Using a variety of techniques is the best approach to get the information required to evaluate a president's personality. In order to reach scientific norms, researchers should first work to apply increasingly stringent criteria. Second, researchers can make an effort to provide a variety of perspectives on a person's life.

Conclusions regarding a president's personality may become more valid and dependable by increasing the number of descriptions of that person's life history. It's critical to keep in mind that personality is more than a collection of components, such as intentions, beliefs, and values, or features, held together by an independent self-schema. Personality has meaning outside of oneself. It is necessary to take into account the broader unit, such as the family, kin group, tribe, neighborhood, country, etc., in order to understand how a person's personality develops. Since it views an individual's personality as the result of the accumulation of multiple events in their life, this theory is known as the social context viewpoint.

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CHAPTER 19

THE ULTIMATE ELUSIVENESS OF CERTAINTY

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ABSTRACT:

When accurate statistical data is unavailable or the independence of the evidence cannot be assumed, the certainty factors theory offers an alternative to Bayesian reasoning and adds a certainty factors calculus based on human expert judgments, in this chapter author is discusses the general personality traits.

KEYWORDS:

Certainty, Economic, government, Leader, President.

INTRODUCTION

The Clintons are two very smart individuals who want to leave their mark and who agree on certain specific strategies for doing so. Each person has a unique mentality. Bill Clinton is intelligent, endearing, and disorganized. Smart and laser-focused, Hillary Rodham Clinton is less able and eager to approach people than her husband. Each offers more of what the other could find useful in various ways [1], [2]. In addition to having high intellect in common, both also exhibit high degrees of ambivalence and confidence in both their own abilities as well as the ideas and strategies they advocate. But what matters most is how these similarities and contrasts influenced the Clinton administration, not how they are similar and different from one another.

In terms of ambition, Hillary Rodham Clinton surpasses her husband. Top presidential aides have said that Hillary Clinton was the one who arrived in Washington with a highly ambitious idea of what she wanted the administration to accomplish. On January 30 and 31, 1993, during a meeting of the whole cabinet and senior White House officials at Camp David, the topic of the president's agenda items came up. Due to the complexity of many of the subjects on the lengthy agenda, several cabinet members recommended decreasing it. Hillary Clinton, nevertheless "then made a persuasive argument for doing exactly the exact opposite. She concluded by asking, "Why are we here if we don't go for it?"

Hillary Clinton was the leading proponent of the enormous, poorly run, and, in the opinion of many, unneeded, government program to buy immunizations for kids. Hillary Clinton served as the administration's principal architect and strategist for their intricate health care package, which was humiliatingly defeated. Who can say no to the president's wife adds to the difficulty of saying no to the president. With her capacity for sarcasm, her propensity to hold onto her rage, and her clear position of authority within the administration, her opinions and suggestions are seldom challenged. Her employees, according to a congressional source who has interacted with her, "They are fiercely devoted but they are afraid of her because they know that if they tell her the truth, she would dismiss them.

Increasing Similarity

Hillary Clinton has started to resemble her husband in some ways, such as their shared perception of the fundamental goodness of their motivations and their somewhat idealized view of their own behavior, as well as their conviction that they are the only ones with the best interests of others at heart and that those who disagree with them are, at the very least, misguided or, more likely, outright evil. Also, they have come to agree that no matter how noble their intentions or skillful their policies, they cannot prevail. Clinton has been the major fuel for the notion that others are "out to get them," including special interests, Republicans, the extreme right, journalists, pundits, and certain sections of the public.

Since she has such a different personality than Clinton, Hillary's contribution was the way she praised become agitated I'm an impatient person by nature, and I want to accomplish things. Having known Clinton for more than 20 years, David Mathews said of his first term as governor, "Bill started his government in 1979 and was like a guy in a rush to get everything done quickly. I believe Bill believed he could alter our state overnight with only his sheer enthusiasm. He set several needless and self-imposed public deadlines throughout his leadership. For instance, Clinton's pledge to choose his whole cabinet before Christmas sparked a "mad rush." On June 4, 1992, Clinton remarked, "I believe I can enact a comprehensive package of legislation within the first hundred days of my presidency," when appearing on Larry King Live. Clinton is described as claiming he would "assemble a transition team to 'hit the ground running,'" which will "result in one of those spectacular 100 days in which Congress would approve my health care and education ideas, my energy and economic initiatives" in a Fortune magazine story from May 1992.

The purpose of this is not to blame Clinton for delays or slippages in the timelines he established, but to emphasize that he created the time constraints that were put on him and that they were not absolutely essential. Given the difficulty of the task the president was undertaking, it is obvious that his timeframe was unreasonable. Moreover, publicly and prematurely making such pledges was needless and unhelpful. There is no proof that the people requested or anticipated him to develop comprehensive legislation on a range of topics, some of which would be complicated and divisive, and that it be enacted or delivered to Congress during his first 100 days in office.

The Want to Stand Out

Bill Clinton was a highly visible president who will likely remain so as an ex-president. Others, particularly the general public, must be aware of what he is doing for him to be respected. Clinton wants the people to understand that he is a guy with excellent analytical skills and a knowledge of facts derived from decades of absorption in policy. Think about the economic conference that the newly elected president and his administration hosted in Little Rock in December 1992 during the transition. Several advisors opposed it, claiming that it would divert attention from more crucial planning and execution tasks. But, the soon-to-be president Clinton wanted to establish himself as a person who understood the intricacies of the American economy. "Professor" Clinton gave a thorough explanation of his understanding of policy specifics, showcasing his erudition in an environment designed to be supportive of the views he had advanced throughout the campaign. Clinton was able to indulge his passion for discussing politics and showcasing his knowledge.

It is hardly unexpected that Clinton came to see himself as somewhat unique and extraordinary given his enormous and successful objectives, which were occasionally accomplished against tremendous difficulties. And I think he really did think of himself as particularly experienced and capable of leading this nation. Naturally, Clinton's early experiences with his mother's perception of him served as the foundation for both viewpoints.

The belief that one has been picked out and treated differently, whether for good or ill, may also be a reflection of one's feeling of specialness. For Clinton, this often manifests as highlighting the absurd standards to which he is held. For instance, when the subject of his marital faithfulness came up during the campaign, Clinton felt like a victim and that he was being singled out for martyrdom. No one has ever gone through what I've gone through in this thing, he groused aloud to his traveling companions. He complained of being subjected to "an unattainable standard" and of "never" receiving credit for his successes in the infamous Rolling Stone interview, despite having "worked my guts out." Because of his unique abilities, he gives off the impression that he is beyond the law[3], [4]. A sensation of being singled out or the realization that what one is attempting to do is significant, uncommon, or vital draws attention to one's efforts and the heroism with which one is putting up a fight. It has the effect of highlighting how special and unselfish one's efforts are. Both of these opinions are in line with Clinton's idealized perception of his own actions, intentions, and political objectives.

The desire for flexibility and a dislike of boundaries

Clinton often seems unconscious of the contradictions between what he says and what he does, which is likely due in large part to his idealized vision of himself. Clinton has a tendency to not want to, or maybe believe that she is not required to, make the formal decisions that people and presidents do in both big and little affairs. His leadership style unmistakably conveys the picture of a president who struggles to fulfill his stated promises. Additionally, his actions imply a president who wants to seem to keep his word while really operating in a way that is not entirely compatible with doing so. The desire to not be politically or individually constrained in any manner, as well as the belief that one is unique and hence entitled to separate treatment, are the sources of this behavioral inclination. But, as a person matures, their grandiose desire to "have it all" is moderated by their understanding and respect of reality limitations.

Taking Chances

Like his character, Clinton's willingness to take risks has conflicting components. He is not careless in certain situations, and many of his risks are hedged. One tactic for controlling these bigger risks is his repeated efforts to be right and wrong at the same time. On the other hand, he regularly takes significant risks and is frequently self-absorbed due to his mix of great ambition, high self-confidence, and thoughts that he is exceptional and above the laws that control others. Sometimes, Clinton takes significant risks and tries to hide them rather than hedge them because he believes he can do what others have failed to do. The president's ambitious and intricate health care proposal is one such example. Remember that this proposal poses a danger to the public as well as to President Clinton. He was prepared to take a significant policy risk in the hopes that his novel proposal would deliver on its promises, have no unfavorable effects, and operate fairly.

Many of the president's advisers and friends lacked his level of assurance. He and his wife nonetheless disregarded some of his advisors' reservations and carried out the plan. Why? Their

belief that they were wiser than everyone else offered one solution. Those with tremendous political aptitude and those who thought themselves to be masterful politicians sometimes miscalculated the likely public response. In other words, having a lot of confidence and tremendous ambition might make you make bad decisions. In addition to underestimating the public's reaction to their health care proposal, President Clinton and his wife also overestimated their capacity to deal with it. In addition, the strategy President Clinton used to secure support for the plan—emphasizing security rather than directly addressing the many complicated and challenging issues it raised—made the problems worse.

Another area of risk-taking that has to be mentioned is the indulgent and careless people in his personal life. This willingness to take risks has come to light in respect to his extramarital relationships, his involvement in the Whitewater real estate project, and—most notably—his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. In each of these situations, it is obvious that Clinton acted in a way that was very dangerous for his personal and professional goals. In these situations, Clinton struggles to control his impulses because he seems to think that even if he gets caught, he can always find a way to diffuse the issue. These actions are all elements that come from character. The belief that one will succeed in achieving their goals arises from ambition. The highly idealized picture of oneself, which he thinks he can persuade others to embrace, emerges from the area of character integrity. The impression that he can and will take whatever steps are necessary to persuade others to view things his way also comes from the relatedness domain.

Exercise of Responsibility

Clinton struggles with self-admittance. Even while he may sometimes only blame himself when anything goes wrong, this is by much the exception to a more typical tendency. This pattern, which was seen throughout the 1992 campaign in the marijuana, draft, and fidelity scandals, consists of rejecting, dodging, blaming others, and distorting or not fully revealing facts that, if released, would give his actions a different and less benign tone.

He was initially questioned about marijuana usage during the 1992 campaign, and his evasive response that he hadn't violated any laws was that he hadn't. Afterwards it came out that he had used marijuana while in England, thus his response was true while also being evasive and unresponsive. He then made the assertion that although he had tried marijuana, he had not inhaled in an effort to minimize what he believed would be a devastating admission. If this endeavor had been a unique episode, it may have been more humorous than disturbing, but it wasn't; during his administration, this pattern reappeared again. A president who views his own actions as somewhat idealized, who feels unjustly held to high or inconsistent standards, and who seeks public validation for his successes might find it difficult to admit his shortcomings in a plain and honest manner.

"I had nothing to do with any decision, except to try to save the tax payers and the press money, that's all I knew about it," Clinton stated in response to the improper handling of the White House travel office inquiry. In this remark, President Clinton simultaneously claims credit for the inquiry and rejects blame for the incident itself. Later, he said, "The President is ultimately responsible for everything that occurs in the White House." The proverb, intended to honor Harry Truman's political fortitude in the lack of a more explicit remark, serves as both an acknowledgement and a disclaimer. Even when somebody seems to accept complete and unqualified responsibility for a situation, new information sometimes becomes available that paints a different picture of his actions. While explaining his contentious decision to withdraw

Lani Guinier's candidacy, for instance, President Clinton seemed to be unambiguous when he said, "I want to again stress that I accept full responsibility for what has transpired here." What was he accepting blame for? He was admitting responsibility for a number of things, including the fact that he hadn't read Guinier and, thus, wasn't aware of his contentious racial views[5], [6].

Competition

Clinton's psychology mixes a fierce drive to succeed with a fierce sense of competition. This characteristic has been present in Clinton's conduct from infancy and has been noted throughout many years and in many circumstances. The degree to which different people feel satisfied by outperforming rivals, winning, or achieving the objective itself varies greatly. For some individuals, the gratification they get from winning or defeating others is subordinate to the delight they derive from what they do. Some experience the opposite. The three sorts of enjoyment are interconnected in Clinton's psychology. His eagerness to win suggests that his image as a guy who is too willing to compromise is not always well-deserved. He wants everything done exactly the way he wants it.

Achievement

On a variety of metrics, Hillary is very driven to succeed. While ambition is the basis for success, the two are not interchangeable. The degree of one's aim and the degree and applicability of the abilities one has to achieve it must coincide. Typically, a president should possess a strong drive for success. A president who lacks ambition will also lack a clear sense of what he wants to do and the conviction to carry it out, which will cause him to veer off course and cause presidential drift. But, having an excessive amount of accomplishment drive has drawbacks. Clinton is highly focused on success, but it is a certain kind of success as a result of a mix of fierce ambition, high self-confidence, and strong self-regard. Little victories are insufficient since they aren't what he has in mind. His success is characterized by himself as very lofty, if not grandiose, levels of intended accomplishment. The approval of certain significant policy proposals is insufficient, too. Under Clinton's concept of success, a few or even a lot could be insufficient.

Personality traits and motivational biases of Bill Clinton

The studies of William Jefferson Clinton that follow successfully concentrate on both his motivational biases and his general personality features. In the sections that follow, the authors use their individual content analysis techniques to build a profile of the causal mechanisms related to the processes of ego defense and the mediation of self-other connections.

Characteristics of the Whole and Self-Defense

Theodore Weintraub, 5,759 words from Bill Clinton's responses to inquiries from reporters at impromptu news conferences were included in our vocal study of his overall personality. Clinton's usage of our categories in 12.1 is contrasted with presidents' post-World War Two speech patterns. Of post-World War II presidents, Clinton uses the pronoun *we* the least and *I* the most frequently. The president portrayed himself as a successful politician with a track record of getting things done, not as the champion of a cause. Clinton also had the greatest passivity rating

among post–World War II presidents. We'll notice that Clinton often uses the pronoun I, which suggests that he often acts as the victim when he is assaulted[7], [8].

Clinton's minimal usage of qualifiers and retractors reveals his spontaneity and ease with reporters at news briefings. As he doesn't feel the need to micromanage interviews, the president is presumably not overbearing in other interpersonal relationships. Hillary can make judgments and change them as needed, according on her ratings on qualifiers and retractors, which are moderate. He speaks with the demeanor of a flexible leader. Clinton gets a mediocre explainers score, indicating that he does not communicate his viewpoint in a too didactic manner. In fact, he expresses his viewpoint more often than he does its justification.

Clinton ranks among the post-World War II presidents who expressed their emotions the most, according to both his nonpersonal references and manifestations of feeling ratings. His relatively low direct references score suggests a propensity to shy away from direct conflict. It comes as a bit of a surprise to hear that Clinton seldom greets reporters by name, which was Ronald Reagan's favorite rhetorical tactic. At his press appearances, Clinton often restricts himself to a discussion of topics and steers clear of becoming personal with the reporters. Hillary scored well on the adverbial intensifies test. The president has been referred to as a "preacher" and "actor." His performance in a category that rates histrionic conduct seems to support the notion that he is an actor-politician. Only Eisenhower earned a higher score for adverbial intensifiers than the other post-World War II presidents. Clinton's negatives score is rather high. A close examination of Clinton's use of negatives reveals a propensity to defend herself when criticized.

Compared to previous leaders, Clinton's address contains very few original or eye-catching statements. He makes little efforts at comedy, uses practically no metaphors, and doesn't put words together in an innovative way in his replies to inquiries from reporters. He is not John Kennedy, despite his publicly shown wit. If Clinton's inability to express himself creatively mirrors his inability to think creatively, his efficacy as a leader may rely on his capacity to communicate others' ideas. As a candidate and elected politician, Clinton's biggest concern has been the alleged character flaw. He has been unable to dispel claims that he was a womanizer and a draft evader. The president's response to the allegations—a mix of denial, admission, and profane crying—has harmed him more than the possibility that he was at fault for the charges. One issue that continues to haunt Clinton is that after listening, listeners have doubts about his trustworthiness.

Similar assaults have been handled more well by other presidents. Personal assaults might be dismissed by Franklin Roosevelt or made fun of, as he did in the infamous "Fala" speech. Former Louisiana governor Edwin Edwards may have created the most effective approach to countering personal assaults. He has handled accusations of gambling and womanizing by making no admissions, making no denials, and rapidly shifting the topic. Reporters questioned Edwards about his involvement in gambling and his connections with women during the campaign to unseat David Duke. Edwards said that sure, he had had issues, and that everyone was aware of them, but that it was now time to start working on Louisiana's problems. Edwards never explicitly indicated what infraction he was accountable for. He failed to pique the public's interest. He avoided the possibility of being charged with lying if any ethical questions later on arose by making no denials.

Let's now examine Clinton's response to accusations of unethical conduct. How did his grammar choices correspond with his replies to the reporters' questions? The following passage from

Clinton's response to David Frost's inquiry on her decision to forgo military duty demonstrates her extreme denial and propensity to victimize herself. I didn't intentionally exclude any information from the draft document. Really, I didn't. Since then, I've / haven't. I probably should have done this before I began running for president, but I didn't since nobody had ever condemned me, even the authorities. I've written to everyone who could be in possession of any of these documents worldwide. I responded, "Send the recordings my way. Please give me the whole story. Let me look, please." Clinton's reaction probably failed to persuade many people because they thought he "protested too much" and sought to place the blame elsewhere.

In conclusion, Clinton's high IIwe ratio indicates that he is more interested in becoming president than in directing a campaign to achieve certain objectives. His passiveness score suggests that when strongly questioned about unethical actions, he plays the victim. His negatives score is rather high, indicating that he may feel the need to conceal unpleasant truths about his actions. The president's moderate qualifiers and retractor scores show that he is moderately impulsive and at ease among reporters; he can make choices and then change his mind without getting immobilized. The feature of impulsivity, which is often associated by a high retractors score, is not present. Clinton doesn't seem to feel the need to dominate interview settings. A moderate explainer's score indicates that Clinton presents his ideas on topics in a categorical rather than didactic manner. Instead of elaborating, he just declares his position. This quality, together with a high score for adverbial intensifiers, characterizes the communication style of a preacher. Clinton's penchant for using adverbial intensifiers, personal allusions, and expressions of sentiment establishes him as one of the presidents with the most expressive style. His sparse use of direct allusions implies a propensity to shy away from conflict. Clinton's lack of linguistic imagination shows a potential reliance on outside sources for original ideas [9], [10].

CONCLUSION

The psychological analysis of leaders may offer significant measures of validity with training, attention with the facts, and theoretical caution. Yet, given the limitations of our theories, the complexity of what we are undertaking, and the limitations of our evidence, measured caution appears to be a more constructive posture than theoretical exuberance. It is important to be aware of the limitations of what can be achieved, regardless of the amount of ground that can be covered by a combination of particular psychological theories, typological generalizations, and absorption in the biographical details of a leader's personal and political life. It is a very difficult undertaking to comprehend and forecast the actions of intelligent, highly functional people who are well aware of their circumstances and what may be required to overcome them. It is feasible that such individuals would conquer their impulses despite their psychological inclinations, if not on their own, then most definitely with the assistance of several advisors, whose only job it is to assist the leaders in pursuing their own personal and political self-interest.

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CHAPTER 20

MOTIVATIONS AND MEDIATION OF SELF-OTHER RELATIONSHIPS

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ABSTRACT:

The self-concept is a source of work motivation since it drives people to maintain and improve their internalized self-perception. Particularly, people's interpretations of facts are often influenced by the intensity of their own views and their drive to validate their sense of self. In this chapter author is discusses the Clinton's leadership style.

KEYWORDS:

Leader, Leadership Style, Politics, Political, Power.

INTRODUCTION

There is a vast quantity of information of every sort available for evaluating Clinton's influence, accomplishments, and affiliation motivations, including speeches, press conference comments and reactions, and informational remarks. In truth, since his 1993 inauguration, Bill Clinton has documented every "official" word he has spoken or written in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents series, which will ultimately be published in the Public Papers of the Presidents volumes. The majority of presidential addresses are now accessible online. The challenge for the researcher is to choose from this plethora a suitable and manageable quantity of information to score [1], [2]. The plethora of verbatim material for analyzing Clinton is swiftly reduced to two evident and significant standard speeches by the requirement to choose a comparative group or groups.

Comparing Clinton's formal announcement speech from October 3, 1991 to those of the other eight leading contenders in the 1992 primary race will help profile Clinton as the presidential candidate for that year. In the same manner that Winter and Carlson evaluated Richard Nixon's motivational profile based on his first inaugural speech in 1969, Clinton's first inaugural address on January 20, 1993, may be compared to the first inaugural addresses of past presidents from George Washington to George Bush.

Also, one may compare Clinton's presidential addresses to one another to see whether and how his motivations have evolved over time. One example of an intrapersonal comparison would be the president's annual State of the Union address. The address is often an overview of the state of the nation with an emphasis on the president's preferred topics and objectives, delivered annually at the same time to the same audience under same conditions. So, a time-series of Clinton's motivational levels throughout his first term might be derived from his State of the Union addresses from 1993 to 1996.

As a candidate, Hillary

Clinton scored slightly over average in accomplishment and affiliation and slightly below average in power in his 1992 campaign launch speech, coming in at 12.2. The following phrase from Clinton's speech serving as her announcement exemplifies how these two goals are combined: "I really think that by working together, we can achieve this. A new period of advancement, wealth, and rejuvenation is within our grasp." Several of Clinton's statements and actions before to, during, and after the campaign were high-minded and aspirational, but also matched the high achievement/high affiliation pattern. Although his experience as governor of Arkansas, Clinton's comparatively low power motive score raises the possibility that he could not be comfortable or successful in the political swamp of Washington, D.C.

Similarly to his announcement speech, President Clinton's inauguration address displays a motivation profile with all three scores high, particularly those of success and power. Nonetheless, as shown in the far right column, accomplishment still prevailed over power. What do these results indicate about Clinton's performance as president and how can they be predicted? Making forecasts using the data gathered and Clinton's standardized test results is one method. For instance, Clinton's strong accomplishment motivation ratings in 1992 and 1993 were undoubtedly congruent with his many improvement-focused initiatives and first-term initiatives, as well as his vivacious personal manner. Even his "Slick Willie" persona might be seen as reflecting the propensity of achievement-motivated persons to alter their performance in light of past outcomes. His backtracking on the health care issue, withdrawal of controversial appointments, adoption of the Republican welfare reform plan, and centrist strategy in 1995–1996 all show the avoidance of excessive risks and the utilization of feedback, which are attributes of success motivation.

Although while Clinton's affiliation motivation score in his inaugural was rather high, it was still much lower than his accomplishment motive score. This shows that his views and policy adjustments were more driven by risk and outcome assessments than by the influence of others. Mean and SD of the comparative sample are both 50. Compared to other significant 1992 candidates' campaign launch speeches, standard. close friends or the purported "seeking to be liked by everyone," which is a mainstay of media depictions of Clinton, are standardized in contrast to first inaugurals of previous U.S. presidents. The fact that Clinton avoided conflict and worked for peace in places like Haiti, Bosnia, and the Middle East, as well as the many scandals and allegations of scandals that rocked his administration, all support such a score. Comparing Clinton to prior American presidents is another method to understand his motivations. Clinton's 1992 announcement speech may be used to determine how similar he is to Lyndon Johnson. He was beginning to resemble President Carter more after his 1993 inauguration[3], [4].

What does it mean to claim that Carter or Johnson "resembled" Clinton? It is obvious that this does not indicate that he is the same person, that he would behave in the same ways, or that his actions or results would be the same. Instead, it raises the possibility that objectives and goal-setting approaches, political responses, and individual strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and vulnerabilities may be comparable. Both Johnson and Carter scored well on their accomplishment motive and scored higher on their power motivation. Similar to one other, both came into office full of hopes and dreams only to leave a few years later, bogged down in disappointment and loss. Carter came to Washington as an outsider in 1977, just as Clinton did in

1993, and he was brimming with suggestions for improvement. But by the summer of 1979, his administration had been destroyed by the economy and the gloom of the political system, and he had retired to Camp David.

Clinton's inaugural power motive score, on the other hand, significantly outperformed that of his announcement address and even came close to matching his accomplishment motivation. The most important concern about Clinton's first term from a motivational standpoint was whether his power motive would be strong enough to counterbalance his achievement drive. Would Clinton's ability to "enjoy power"—to relish the political games of the presidency—be sufficient to enable him to maneuver through the political minefield of compromise, annoyance, stalemate, autonomous power centers, challenges in enforcing policies, etc.?

It seemed as if Bill Clinton's administration might end in a single-term disappointment of Carteresque proportions after the 1994 midterm elections. Journalists and political commentators who were certain that the Republican juggernaut had permanently impaired his capacity to rule, much alone his prospects of reelection, were preparing his political obituaries. The Republican forces were in disarray for the 1996 campaign, which took place eighteen months later. The Clinton administration skillfully turned the Gingrich "revolutionfront"'s line against itself during the 1995–96 budget fights and government shutdowns. The Republicans, however, came out of the 1996 primary season with an older, unimpressive candidate who could struggle to unify his party with his message. Clinton was thus reelected with a wide margin.

DISCUSSION

We may argue, using tired political clichés, that Bill Clinton succeeded in 1992 in the role of the "Comeback Kid." Yet, this doesn't explain the nature of his return or how it happened. Yet, Alison Mitchell's study in the *New York Times* offers a hint. Mitchell's analysis of four significant Clinton speeches from 1995–1996 revealed that Clinton underwent a transformation from a policy wonk "bogged down in particulars" to the "man in the bully pulpit," ready and eager to use the full rhetorical capabilities of the office. Such a shift reflects, in terms of motivation, a rise in the power motive in relation to accomplishment. I graded Clinton's four State of the Union addresses and four "landmark" speeches Mitchell identified as being characteristic of the "new Clinton" in order to keep track of changes in his motivational profile. There is no requirement for an external control or comparison sample in this research since it simply looks at one leader across time and compares several speeches by that leader. Such an intrapersonal investigation, however, cannot reveal much about the leader's position in relation to others on its own [5], [6].

In contrast to Carter's "frustration" pattern, Clinton's four State of the Union addresses during his first term reveal a continuously growing tendency away from it and toward the "joy of politics" pattern that typified Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and John F. Kennedy. In 1993, Clinton's inaugural speech had 0.64 more accomplishment imagery per 1,000 words than power images. A few weeks later, his first State of the Union address somewhat bucked the trend: there were 1.23 times as many power imagery as accomplishment images. As the 1996 presidential campaign was well underway in January 1996, there were 7.02 more power pictures than accomplishment images, up from 5.84 in 1995. Each of the four speeches Mitchell highlighted included a motivation profile that emphasized power above success. A detailed examination of Clinton's historic speeches reveals that there was more to the resemblance to Harry Truman than just psychological cues. For instance, seven times in his first famous address

in Dallas, he said, "I will veto." Moreover, at his State of the Union address in January 1996, Clinton made fifteen additional direct challenges to other groups in addition to thirteen direct challenges to the House. Even yet, Clinton persisted in waving a peace sign encased in the symbols of affinity and success that marked his earlier motivational profile: "But if Congress would simply sit down with me and work out a sensible solution... we can produce a historic achievement."

Of course, there were many other elements at play during the 1995–1996 political shift in Clinton's favor, including smart strategy and technique guidance, openings created by Republican errors, and just plain good fortune. Yet, excellent counsel, chances, and luck may not always materialize. My thesis is that Clinton was more prepared to take advantage of these chances, to apply the sound advice, and to feel comfortable with the new paths as a result of the changes in his motivation profile. Another president with the same high achievement/low power profile may have disregarded the counsel and continued on a self-defeating path. The two analyses of Bill Clinton demonstrate how motive profiles can be used in various contexts to understand political leaders. They can be used to both predict the broad contours of a leader's performance—particularly their strengths and weaknesses—while in office and to comprehend the psychological underpinnings of changes in a leader's behavior over time.

Clinton's Management Approach

This leadership profile of Bill Clinton, the 42nd president of the United States, is based on an examination of his comments to domestic and foreign media in 54 interviews conducted between 1992 and 1998. The description that follows is based on an evaluation of around 36,750 words done from a distance. Seven distinct qualities that affect how political leaders would act, the sorts of measures they are likely to advocate on their parties and governments, and the form and interaction of their advisory groups were looked for in the words. By comparing a leader's characteristics to the scores of other political leaders in their area and throughout the world, one may put their own features into context. By examining how they vary among topics, target audiences, and times, the traits are placed in a wider perspective. The characteristics that make up the profile are those that historians, journalists, political scientists, and other leadership scholars have discovered to be significant in determining what political actions leaders will take. The characteristics that are looked at include the need for power and influence, the belief that one can control or influence events, conceptual complexity, self-confidence or self-esteem, in-group bias, general mistrust of others, and the propensity to prioritize problem-solving and getting things done over maintaining the group and dealing with other people's ideas and sensitivities. Further specifics on the at-a-distance method are provided [7], [8].

There were many other vocal sources of information about Clinton, including speeches, remarks made in public, memos, communications, and press interviews. A certain amount of care must be used while evaluating such comments to learn more about the leader since the first four sorts of content may be created or produced for the leader by others. What has been said and how it has been stated have often been well considered. Yet, media interviews are often more impromptu. The leader must reply promptly and unaided throughout the exchange of questions and answers; the kind and wording of the response may depend on the leader's personality. While leaders may have some preparation before a press interview, they are on their own to answer during the interview. For these reasons, the ensuing profile is solely based on Clinton's replies to inquiries from the media during an interview.

The Leadership Profile in General lists Clinton's typical characteristic ratings based on 105 interview answers. The results show the % of the time Clinton used terms that were indicative of a certain feature when the traits' coding conditions were met. The percentages might be between 0 and 100. provides what would be deemed low and high scores on a certain trait based on the ratings of 18 North American political leaders as well as those of 122 political leaders from 46 other nations. Low and high scores are defined as being one standard deviation below and above the mean score for a given feature for the group of leaders with whom Clinton is being compared. These scores set Clinton apart from the rest. If Clinton's score for the characteristic is not one standard deviation above or below the mean for the specific group of leaders, or if he resembles the comparative group of leaders on that feature, then he is said to be moderate in that characteristic. As the reader will see, I have noticed that Clinton tends to be one of the two when his scores are on the cusp of being either low or high. On four of the seven attributes, Bill Clinton differs from the two samples of leaders. In terms of mental sophistication, self-assurance, in-group bias, and mistrust of outsiders, he varies from the other leaders. His leadership style is affected by the parallels and divergences between Clinton and these previous leaders. These consequences are covered in the debate that comes next. It is based on significant social science research that explains how these traits impact leadership.

Leaders may either uphold political environment restrictions or challenge them. We are interested in how important it is for leaders to exert control and influence over the environment in which they find themselves rather than adapting to the circumstance and remaining open to responding to the needs of domestic and international constituencies and circumstances when we think about leaders' responsiveness to political constraints. We can determine whether a leader will challenge or respect restrictions based on scores on the craving for power and the conviction that one can control events. Leaders with high levels of both traits strive to take charge of any circumstance and push the boundaries of what is possible; those with low levels of both traits understand the value of working within the constraints of their environments to forge consensus and take into account constituents' interests.

Clinton is moderate compared to other leaders, according on his rankings on these attributes. He shares these leaders' traits; he does not distinguish himself from other leaders in his area or throughout the world on either count. Such middling ratings imply that the leader will typically accept restrictions but may, in some instances, dispute those that seem inappropriate or arbitrary. Leaders with middling ratings, like Clinton, will often operate within the constraints they perceive to govern their political environment. Consensus-building and attaining commitment are crucial talents for a politician to possess and employ because of the constraints they think they must operate within. Some leaders like to wait to act until they have a better idea of how things will turn out rather than taking the initiative. They like to let others take the initiative and responsibility for anything too risky and unusual; they prefer to take the lead when there is at least a 50% probability of success or a higher, or when compromise is feasible. Before making judgments, leaders like Clinton will want to put their theories to the test—to "run ideas up the flagpole and see who salutes them." The foundation for determining what would work is provided by polling data, specific constituents' perspectives, and talks with impacted groups. Such cautionary conduct limits the possibility of action unless it will already have support, but it also makes it easy to blame others if anything goes wrong.

As we contextualize Clinton's profile, it will become clear that there are occasions when leaders with scores like his would push back against the limitations imposed on them. Leaders who

scored moderately on the need for power and the belief that they can control what happens will be more likely to take charge and become highly manipulative in order to achieve their objectives when faced with threats to the policies that support their leadership positions, unfair accusations, and national crises. The circumstances demand action, and if no action is taken, the individual will be seen as lacking leadership.

Is the Leader Receptive to Contextual Information or Closed to It?

Based on their degrees of self-confidence and conceptual complexity, political leaders have been shown to vary in their receptivity to contextual information. A leader's self-other orientation—how receptive they are to information from others in the decision-making process and from the political environment in general—is formed by the interaction of these two attributes. Leaders like Clinton who score more highly than other leaders on these two characteristics tend to be more receptive to new ideas. They may even be highly strategic in their actions, concentrating on what is practical and attainable at any given moment. Although their high conceptual complexity forces them to look for knowledge from a range of components and viewpoints, their strong self-confidence encourages them to have patience in the circumstance and take their time to see what will succeed. These leaders have a clear idea of what they want to accomplish but also have the capacity to assess the situation and determine what will work. They blend the greatest aspects of both of these attributes.

To determine what is doable, these leaders look for both confirmatory and disconfirmatory information in the context. Any information network that can provide them a sense of what is going on and who is in favor of or opposed to certain alternatives and activities will be at the center of their attention. Information is power in their eyes. They possess more knowledge than any other member if they can continue to serve as the centers of such networks. They are able to influence all choices in such a position. One problem these leaders have is that to an outsider, their actions may seem chaotic and opportunistic. They may seem chameleonlike and uncertain as they strive to determine what is feasible at any given moment if one is unaware of the objectives or how such leaders are seeing the circumstance. These leaders may mislead certain constituencies and groups into thinking that their stance is supported when, in reality, all they were doing was weighing their alternatives and gathering feedback.

Political figures with high conceptual complexity, like Clinton, are more attentive to a broader range of environmental cues than are those with low conceptual complexity. They search for a range of bits of knowledge to organize the circumstance in which they find themselves because they have a feeling that things are grayer than they are black or white. As they don't always trust their immediate reaction to an incident, these leaders have a keen awareness of the context. Such people believe that there is always space for one more fact or angle to help them comprehend a problem and formulate a plan of action. As a result, these leaders often consult with a wide number of participants in the decision-making process and take their time when making judgments. Being effective in politics is seen as requiring a degree of flexibility.

Is the Leader Motivated by Problem or Relationship?

According to the literature, political leaders often take on their positions of power for reasons related to both themselves and the importance of the organizations they associate with. Leaders are often motivated by one of two things: either an internal focus—a problem, a cause, or a particular set of interests—or the need for a certain form of input from others around them—a

connection, whether it be acceptance, power, support, or praise. They also seem to be triggered by a desire to defend those of their own species. Although leaders who are more closely associated with certain groups try to maintain their organizations, those who are less closely associated with a particular group see the world as offering possibilities to collaborate with others for either their personal or joint advantage. Task-focused motivation as opposed to interpersonal motivation is indicative of the former, whereas a mix of in-group bias and mistrust of outsiders is indicative of the latter.

Leaders like Clinton who score in the middle on task versus interpersonal concentration are able to concentrate on the issue at hand when it is appropriate or on developing connections when it makes more sense. Such leaders are aware of when each of these tasks is necessary given the situation and concentrate on it at that moment. Depending on the situation, they might work to achieve their objectives or concentrate on retaining the support and morale of key constituencies. They can effectively do the two tasks that are fundamental to governance: completing a task and preserving coalitions. These leaders are likely to watch the surroundings for clues that suggest the desire for a certain focus of attention because they have the flexibility to switch between a concern for fixing an issue and a sensitivity to what it will take to retain people aligned to a cause. Such a capacity would increase Clinton's overall openness to information and would emphasize the strategic nature of his plans and actions. Depending on what he has to do to maintain his position and advance his objectives, such as becoming a taskmaster or rallying the men behind the flag, situations are assessed and actions are taken.

In-group prejudice and mistrust of others, which Clinton scored quite low on, suggest that he tends to see politics as more cooperative than combative. It's true that there are circumstances in which working with others is both possible and suitable. Threats, opportunities, and the potential for win-win agreements all exist in the political climate. In reality, Hillary sees politics as a big game board where everyone has to make certain trade-offs to get closer to the overarching objective. The ideal outcome is a compromise that allows everyone to get part of what they want while only requiring a little amount of sacrifice. Such strategies make Clinton seem as if he has no values or, at the very least, is weak and wishy-washy, in contrast to leaders who have an adversarial or zero-sum vision of politics, where there should always be a clear victor and loser. Politics, in Clinton's view, is the art of the conceivable. Usually, there will be another opportunity and time to attempt to obtain more. There is, in fact, always next year. Clinton has been compared by some commentators to a kid's "Bobo clown" because no matter how many times it is knocked down, the clown always rises back up. Like Clinton, the toy seems to be saying, "You didn't like that; well let's try another way to do it." Opportunities can always be taken advantage of, and relationships can always be formed.

One drawback of this more upbeat outlook on politics and life is that dangers may have to be really serious before they are recognized as a threat. Since he is focusing on the good aspects of the scenario rather than the bad, Clinton can overlook what would seem to others to be evident signals of a developing clash. As a result, he may sometimes act as if he is interested in discussing a resolution while failing to see that the other side is not prepared to engage in negotiations. Others have compared Clinton's conduct to an "artichoke" response to stress, when layers come off gradually and in bits and pieces. Yet, his results on the ingroup bias and mistrust of others imply that it can take a few occasions for the situation's danger level to be recognized[9].

CONCLUSION

Since it prevents you from relying on others and encourages you to utilize your skills to achieve your objectives, self-motivation is crucial. Also, it enables you to focus on your areas of weakness and prevent them from impeding your objectives. Motivation is based on the individual's desire to achieve goals, while self-efficacy is based on the individual's conviction in their own ability to accomplish goals. High self-efficacy is often accompanied with strong motivation, and vice versa, although this is not always the case. Many strategies to maintain workers' motivation in their work are suggested by motivation theories. While a manager is not obliged to grasp all of these theories of motivation, having a general understanding of certain ideas may be useful for day-to-day tasks.

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CHAPTER 21

AN OVERVIEW ON LEADERSHIP STYLE

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ABSTRACT:

A leader's approach of encouraging team members to strive toward the same purpose while putting an emphasis on their welfare is referred to as their leadership style. A team must comprehend the leadership style in order to function as a unit, evolve, and accept change. In this chapter author is discusses the effects of time period.

KEYWORDS:

Belief, Leader, Profile, Politics, Political.

INTRODUCTION

We can predict the sort of leadership style Clinton would adopt based on his pattern of scores across the seven criteria. We know from extensive research that Clinton will demonstrate a collegial leadership style by determining that he is likely to generally respect the boundaries in his political environment, be open to, and to seek out, information in the situation, be motivated by both solving the problem and maintaining morale, and view politics as the art of the possible and mutually beneficial. His attention is directed at bridging gaps and forging agreement, maintaining authority and influence via interpersonal connections, and seizing opportunities to collaborate with others in order to achieve certain goals. Clinton tends to approach politics with a team-building strategy because of his leadership nature. Similar to the captain of a basketball or football team, the leader depends on others to cooperate with him to accomplish his goals. These leaders put themselves in the spotlight as the source of all knowledge. Working as a team gives advisors in the advising process the chance to take part in all facets of policymaking while also sharing responsibility for the results. Team members are required to be considerate of and supportive of the leader's opinions and ideals[1]–[3].

Considering his ability to switch between developing connections and resolving issues, Clinton may sometimes display a more opportunistic leadership style when he seizes an opportunity to further his objectives. Clinton tends toward a collegial style of leadership, but when the situation demands it, he can sharpen his attention on the work at hand and what has to be done, exploiting the occasion to further his agenda. Clinton's pattern of scores is similar to those of Mikhail Gorbachev and Chou En-Lai among the 122 international leaders that made up the reference group for this profile. Both of these leaders kept their jobs because they were aware of the limitations they had to work within but also attentive to what was practical and possible given the circumstances. Everyone believed that knowledge equaled power and aspired to be at the core of any information network. Both saw politics as needing agreement and commitment, and they both took advantage of what they saw to be chances to forge connections in their respective political settings. The correct circumstances and bargaining partners made it feasible to reach

mutually beneficial agreements. They thought that adaptability and transparency were essential for successful political action.

Contextual Leadership Profile

In any leadership profile, the stability of the features is a key consideration. Do Clinton's ratings essentially stay the same during the course of his term in office, while he is speaking to both domestic and international media, and when he is talking various substantive issues? If there is minimal change in the scores when the context changes, we can be certain that we are evaluating the leader's personality; at the very least, we know that the leader does not seem to be reacting to the circumstance. When the characteristic scores are higher, it is simpler to predict what a leader will do politically; when the scores are lower, the researcher or analyst must take into account contextual elements when determining how to influence the leader and what he or she is likely to do. To determine if Clinton's ratings are consistent over time, audience, and issue, a statistical approach might be utilized. presents the findings of this research and the attributes for which there were statistically significant variations in the scores across different context types. Six were statistically significant changes out of the twenty-one potential modifications. In other words, Clinton fits the prior description of the leadership profile for leaders in most situations. But, the statistically significant differences do highlight Clinton's leadership style and will thus be covered in more length.

DISCUSSION

Effects of Time Period

The results of interviews conducted during Clinton's first administration and those conducted during his second administration might be compared to show whether or not he has altered his approach after being reelected. Clinton is more ready to fight the limitations in his surroundings during the second administration and to work both directly and indirectly to achieve his objectives. During the second administration, his ratings for the craving for power and the conviction that he can influence events rise. He shows greater interest than he did under the last administration in controlling and directing what is happening. At times, consensus and commitment need to be forced into place. The leader has the authority to push the issue if other parties refuse to cooperate [4], [5].

Clinton also has a greater propensity in his second term to concentrate on finding solutions than paying attention to the needs and wishes of people. He takes the initiative to forward his goal and turns into more of a taskmaster. Consequently, the second administration makes his surroundings more suspect and dangerous. He must now be cautious to deal with any opponents and challenges to his position in addition to seizing chances. In comparison to the first administration, the world is a bit less bright now. Although still highly sensitive and receptive to political stimuli, Clinton's leadership style in the second administration is more actively independent; he starts to play the role of the "new Democrat." Clinton is now ready to challenge what he perceives as growing constraints on his role and activities; to push his agenda, albeit in subtle and strategic ways; and to be prepared to contain an adversary if he is threatened himself or if his programs are under attack. Maintaining his adaptability and maneuverability is important to him. There is a notion that these two crucial aspects of the political game are being taken away from him during the second administration. He and his administration turn their attention to how to win them back and be able to demonstrate some progress on his objectives.

Impact of the Audience

According to the research, Hillary is significantly more likely to fight restrictions at home than abroad. While speaking to the home press, his scores on the craving for power and the conviction that he can influence events lean high; for interactions with the foreign press, these two scores are moderate. Considering Clinton's lack of prior foreign policy expertise, these discrepancies may be a reflection of his own level of comfort with domestic rather than international concerns. Even when Clinton has been engaged in international affairs, it has been with a domestic focus, as analysts have noted. Clinton, however, has been learning foreign policy on the job and has only been as effective at it as the sources and information at his disposal due to the domestic focus of his attention. On the internal front, he has recognized where to go for information and individuals who may assist him; yet, in the international sphere, he has shown less proficiency. His test results point to a propensity to be more proactive and to defer to others when it comes to making decisions on foreign affairs. As a consequence, it is feasible for him to place blame for mistakes or accuse others of making it challenging for him to take action[6], [7].

The descriptions of Bill Clinton in this concentrate on his views and thought processes while in office. His cognitions' substance and organization are two components of the process of object assessment that both reflect reality and showcase the leader's character. The authors analyze the integrative complexity of Clinton's mental processes in the sections that follow to find diagnostic and choice propensities in his operational code beliefs and determine how probable it is that they will affect his conduct as president of the United States.

Beliefs in the operational code and object evaluation

Based on a sample of sixteen speeches from publicly available sources over the course of three months of President Clinton's first term, the analysis that follows of his operational code. Each utterance was machine-coded using Profiler+, a program for automated content analysis, according to the VICS coding guidelines. The following examination of Clinton's beliefs is in terms of their direction and intensity compared to the average VICS scores for a norming group of twenty global leaders from diverse areas and periods. As a consequence, the findings have a very high degree of reliability.

The degree of generalizability from the sample to the population of President Clinton's speeches and other public pronouncements will determine how reliable the findings are. As the sample does not span a significant amount of time, its generalizability is constrained unless it is assumed that operational code beliefs are character characteristics rather than mental states. The amount of variety in the research on this subject has caused researchers to warn that the following profile may only be accurate for the time period in which the data were collected.

The discovered index scores for each VICS index are shown as standard deviations from the scores for the norming group for Bill Clinton's general operating code. They interpret it in terms of how many standard deviations there are for each operational code construct element above and below the average VICS score. The anchoring points for each VICS index, which are applied at half-standard-deviation intervals above and below the mean score of the norming group for each VICS index, are represented as "Somewhat, Certainly, Very, and Very."

The VICS scores for Clinton's philosophical viewpoints reveal that he has more than two standard deviations more favorable views on the political world than the typical leader. He is also

quite upbeat about the chances of achieving important political objectives. Clinton sees very little predictability in the political future, but he thinks he has far more power over the course of history than most people do. Clinton's evaluation of the significance of chance in politics is also average.

According to the VICS ratings for Clinton's instrumental views, a highly cooperative strategy combined with very cooperative tactics is the optimal course of action in politics. He is neither more risk accepting nor less risk adverse than other leaders, which indicates that his overall risk orientation is average. Clinton has an average tendency to switch between word and deed tactics, and he has a very low propensity to switch between cooperative and combative strategies. The utility of means indices demonstrate that his dependence on appeal/support, incentive, and promise tactics is exceptionally high. In comparison to previous leaders, he obviously has a lower tendency to punish and relies far less on oppose/resist and threaten techniques.

Overall, Clinton believes in an exceedingly cooperative approach to strategy, and he assigns himself a very high amount of power in the political sphere, according to the crucial VICS scores for Self and Other. He places a very low amount of control on other people in the political realm and views it as being highly cooperative. Due to his dual Self and Other perceptions and his minimal inclination to switch between conflict and cooperation, his plans and tactics are likely to be quite stable.

We may also locate Clinton in Holsti's updated typology of operational codes using the standard deviation scores for the major indices in and infer some conclusions about his probable strategic and tactical interaction patterns. In the updated Holsti typology of belief systems under discussion, the strategies and tactics in the four quadrants depict the expected interaction patterns with Others that we predict are related to the four kinds of operational codes. The continuum of standard deviations for a leader's perception of the political landscape and approach to political strategy is represented by the vertical axis in. The continuum of standard deviations for a leader's attribution of historical control to Self and Other is shown by the horizontal axis. The coordinates on these axes indicate where a leader is located inside each quadrant.

Clinton's generalized image of Self is positioned in the type C quadrant by his I-i score for approach to objectives and his P-4a score for self's control over historical development. His generalized picture of Others is located in the type A quadrant according to his P-i score for the political universe's nature and P-4b score for other people's influence on his or her political growth. The strategic and tactical ramifications for Bill Clinton's general operational code as a type C leader are that his extremely cooperative strategic orientation and high sense of historical control are likely to cause him to initiate the reciprocity tactics of reward and punishment and to tempt him to use exploit and coerce tactics if he runs into resistance.

Yet until Other shows animosity against him, the American leader's diagnostic inclination to see Other as a friendly type A is likely to lead to a cooperative conclusion. President Clinton is more likely to diagnose a hostile Other as a type DBF than as a type B opponent due to his very high sense of historical control. Clinton is more likely to utilize reciprocity, persuade and exploit, and less likely to use bluff or appease techniques when he takes the strategic initiative against a hostile Other. Peter Suedfeld and Philip E. Tetlock, "Cognitive Manager in Trouble: President Clinton," it appears logical to speculate that a president's cognitive style in decision making and decision implementation has a significant impact on the success of his ideas, even while the substance of a leader's views may affect how he makes choices. The examination of President

Clinton's leadership that follows is based on a model that is relatively frugal and, to an extent, even basic. The president's performance as a cognitive manager is evaluated in this way. According to the cognitive manager model, a smart decision maker would invest psychological resources into solving a given issue that are proportionate to its significance. When the potential benefit outweighs the cost, these methods will be used. Vigilance, information search and processing, reexamination of options, and the other elements of perfect decision making exact a cost.

Also, it's critical to remember that neither issues nor their solutions are provided by flawless computers. Resource allocation is determined by the relative relevance of an issue to others and the problem solver's current resource repertoire. In turn, the resource repertoire fluctuates with time, personality, health, circumstance, and other factors. Consequently, for instance, leaders under extreme prolonged stress would have less cognitive capacity to devote to the solution of even significant issues. Our study focuses on how the available resources are distributed within that constrained pool.

An effective cognitive manager will save high levels of cognitive effort for more significant tasks and use shortcuts to address less significant ones. Also, after all of the requirements for cognitive preparation have been satisfied, the choice may be made in a straightforward or complicated manner, for instance, as a definitive, unchangeable solution to the issue or as a suggestion open to further alteration, depending on the circumstance. In other words, we may anticipate flexibility in response to the task at hand and the availability of resources, on the one hand. To gauge these traits, we use integrative complexity score.

It's crucial to keep in mind that integrative complexity score evaluates thinking structure rather than substance. Every particular policy or point of view from the source may be picked, justified, attacked, or explained at any degree of complexity. Hence, there is no justification for anticipating broad complexity distinctions between pro- and anti-abortion, pro- and anti-immigration, liberal, and conservative policies, etc. In the case of President Clinton, the distinction between substance and structure could be especially significant. Several journalists and political scientists who saw him deal with political problems have characterized him as flexible, information-oriented, and attentive to others, or what we would consider high complexity. This is exactly what we anticipated to discover when assessing Clinton's utterances based on such judgments.

In two separate studies, we evaluated several of Clinton's remarks from the beginning of his first presidential campaign until the conclusion of his first year in office. We began with the supposition that Clinton's issues resulted from an extremely high degree of complexity and an inability or unwillingness to take a basic, forceful, and uncompromising posture when such a stand was necessary, which was based on the media's general agreement. We were shocked to see that President Clinton's mean complexity score was rather low. It only reached the level of moderate divergence both during the election campaign and the first year of the government. While this level was not out of the ordinary for presidential campaign speeches during the previous 80 years or so, it was lower than that of every president who was in office except for Ronald Reagan and was about on par with the second-lowest president, George H. W. Bush[8], [9].

Another notable fact was a slight but steady decline in complexity from the time of the election to the time after the inauguration and throughout the duration of Clinton's first year in office.

While there was a little more complexity in his campaign speeches on economic policy and in his presidential addresses on health care and the environment, there was not much diversity between issues. According to this pattern, regions of particular concern and those where success is seen as potential may be identified. When one presidential plan advanced toward legislative approval or rejection, nothing changed.

As the president got more experience in office and realized the difficulties of formulating and then selling his policies, we had anticipated seeing a continuous rise in complexity. All of the American presidents of the 20th century who are now regarded as having done a decent job at their jobs and the majority of them shared this pattern. We also believed that the complexity of important topics like the national health care policy would be significantly more complex than less important issues like homosexuals in the military as Clinton's proposals faced opposition and he mustered his cognitive resources to win, with a potential decrease as their future was resolved. None of these theories were shown to be true.

The president's remarks during and after his second election campaign were the subject of our most recent analysis. While this time there was a pre- to postelection rise, the absolute level of his complexity had not altered greatly, and even with the increase, it was still among the lowest of all presidents of the 20th century. Another researcher has published findings that are quite similar to ours: In the 1992 and 1996 presidential campaign debates, Panos determined that Clinton's complexity was 1.5 and 1.9, respectively, and that the yearly mean score of his presidential speeches from 1993 to 1997 varied from 1.8 to 2.6. His talks had a mean rating of 2.0 in 1998, the first two months after the Lewinsky crisis.

Contrary to several other analyses' conclusions, it seems that President Clinton routinely deals with policy challenges at a low degree of integrative complexity. So what, we could ponder. After all, the cognitive management model contends that less complicated decision-making techniques need not always be preferable to simpler ones. As we've already said, many issues lend themselves more to complicated or simple decision-making than others. Most people think that basic techniques work best in situations when a choice has to be made quickly, someone must face an opponent who is unrelentingly hostile, key values are at danger, and it's necessary to present a strong, resolute image. These circumstances are not typical of those that President Clinton has encountered.

According to conceptual complexity theorists, Clinton may be functioning at a low level of trait complexity rather than just state complexity. His very stable ratings across time periods and problem domains would be explained by this. Low conceptual complexity subjects have been shown to perform poorly in a variety of circumstances requiring the processing of large quantities of shifting information, a circumstance that must be the model for the majority of presidential decision-making. According to the cognitive manager model, persons vary in their capacity to grasp the need of altering their degree of complexity in response to external demands and/or in their capacity to carry out the alteration after the necessity has been grasped. Regardless of audience, subject, closeness to a decision, etc., President Clinton's relatively narrow range of complexity scores suggests that his cognitive methods are insensitive to the environment.

Clinton could not be able to predict when going to greater degrees of complexity is necessary—possibly his well-known optimism prevents him from seeing the prospect of failure—or, even if he can, he might not be able to formulate a more sophisticated strategy. His frequent adjustments

to policy or image in reaction to poll results and other factors have been noted by certain observers. The number of undifferentiated inclusions and exclusions used to assess the sequential abandonment and replacement.

We haven't yet discussed the nuanced facets of Clinton's propensity to speak in a way that is "technically correct, yet unresponsive and evasive" when under duress. This propensity has often shown itself, both before and after he rose to national notoriety. During his first presidential campaign up to his handling of the Lewinsky crisis, it emerges in the later time. The deliberate use of words that first seem to categorically respond to a question but, upon closer inspection, do not fulfill some technical criteria required for a complete response may be an example of impression management in that content is successfully and discreetly modified. Therefore, the selection of one word over another does not impact structural complexity since it is not a differentiation criterion. Prior research has shown that when presented with major but not overwhelming obstacles, highly effective leaders are more likely to exhibit considerable complexity increases. President Clinton exhibits virtually little context-specific flexibility of any kind. It is unsettling that they are so unresponsive to their surroundings.

An analysis of Saddam Hussein's political psychology

Saddam Hussein's regime was labeled as a part of the "axis of evil" by President George W. Bush. The region and Western civilization continue to be seriously threatened by Iraq. 1 Notwithstanding UN sanctions placed after the resolution of the Gulf Crisis, Saddam has obstinately continued the development of weapons of mass devastation. Understanding Saddam Hussein's motives, perspectives, and decision-making processes is essential for dealing with him successfully. A thorough political psychology profile has been created to give a framework for this complicated political leader, and his activities since the crisis have been examined in the light of this political psychology evaluation. The president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, has been referred to as "the crazy of the Middle East." Not only is this derogatory diagnosis incorrect, but it's also risky. Decision-makers may be misled into thinking Saddam is unpredictable when, in reality, he is not by relegating him to the realm of insanity. A review of Saddam Hussein's thirty-four-year record as the leader of Iraq shows a shrewd political analyst who is not only very dangerous but also far from illogical.

The extreme measures taken by Saddam Hussein as president of Iraq were justified by him, "the great struggler," as being required to obtain "subjective immunity" against foreign schemes and influences. The "exceptionalism of revolutionary necessities" serves as the justification for all revolutionary activities. In actuality, a study of Saddam Hussein's life and career shows that this is only the intellectual justification for a lifetime pattern in which any deeds are acceptable as long as they serve to fulfill Saddam Hussein's demands and messianic goals.

Painful Starts: Saddam Hussein, often known as the "Wounded Self," was born in 1937 to a low-income peasant family close to Tikrit, about a hundred miles north of Baghdad. The main tenets of Saddam Hussein's political personality, however, were already established before he was even born. His father passed away from a "internal disease" while Saddam's mother, Sabha, was pregnant with him, and his 12-year-old brother passed away a few months later, when Sabha was in her eighth month of pregnancy. Saddam's mother attempted suicide because of her poverty. A family of Jews rescued her. She then attempted to abort Saddam herself but was once again stopped from doing so by her Jewish backers. Saddam's mother refused to visit him after he was born on April 28, 1937, which clearly shows that she was experiencing a significant depression

at the time. At Tikrit, where Saddam spent a large portion of his early years, Sabha's brother Khayrallah Talfah Msallat was given responsibility for his care. At the age of three, Saddam was reunited with his mother, who had in the meanwhile wed Hajj Ibrahim Hasan, a distant cousin. His stepfather, Hajj Ibrahim, allegedly mistreated the young Saddam physically and mentally.

Healthy self-esteem must be developed throughout the first few years of life. Saddam's developing self-esteem would have been severely damaged, impeding his ability to feel empathy for others, as a result of the mother's inability to care for and connect with her young son and the following abuse at the hands of his stepfather, leading to what has been called "the wounded self." One option after such traumatic events is to give into pessimism, passivity, and despair. A different strategy is to create a psychological template of compensating grandiosity and promise, "Never again, never again will I succumb to greater power." This was Saddam's psychologically developed course.

Saddam, whose name means "the one who faces," forged his own path and refused to be constrained from an early age. When Saddam was just ten years old, his semi-official biography claims that he was impressed by a visit from his cousin who could read and write. As there was no school in his parents' hamlet, he approached his family about his desire to get an education. When they rejected him, he left his home in the middle of the night to go to his maternal uncle Khayrallah's house in Tikrit to pursue his education there. It's also conceivable that Saddam somewhat inflated his account in the official biography, but it's clear from it that he has grudges towards his mother and stepfather.

Visions of Glory are Inspired by Khayrallah

Not only was Khayrallah to become Saddam's father, but also his political adviser. In the 1941 Iraqi rebellion, Khayrallah fought against Great British and was imprisoned for five years due to his nationalist agitation. He told the impressionable little child stories of his brave family, including his great-grandfather and two great-uncles, who sacrificed their lives in the struggle against foreign invaders for Iraqi nationalism. He told his little pupil that he will achieve greatness, following in the footsteps of his valiant ancestors and the heroes of the radical Arab world. Young Hussein's perspective was influenced by Khayrallah, who would later go on to become the governor of Baghdad, and was instilled with a hate of outsiders. In 1981, Saddam published a booklet titled "Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies" that was authored by his uncle.

Khayrallah educated his young student on his interpretation of Arab history as well as the nationalism and Baath party ideologies. The Baath party was established in 1940 with the goal of establishing an independent, unified, and socialist Arab state that would overthrow colonial and imperialist powers. The central theme of Baath ideology, as conceptualized by its intellectual forefather Michel Aflaq, is the history of Arab oppression and separation, beginning with the Ottomans and continuing with Western mandates, Western-backed monarchs, and eventually the establishment of the "Zionist entity." Saddam has been consumed by dreams of glory since he was a young child, identifying himself with Nebuchadnezzar, the king of Babylonia who conquered Jerusalem in 586 B.C., and Saladin, who reclaimed Jerusalem by defeating the crusaders in 1187. This is because he was inspired by his uncle's tales of heroism in the service of the Arab nation. Yet, since they were developed at such an early age and were supported by a wounded ego and deep self-doubt, these fantasies of fame were compensating.

By the time Saddam accompanied his uncle to Baghdad to finish his secondary school, he had already become well-versed in Baathist philosophy and Arab history. His political inclinations were reinforced by the school, a hotbed of Arab nationalism. Gamal Abdel Nasser led the Free Officers' revolt in Egypt in 1952, when Saddam was fifteen years old, and he rose to fame in the eyes of the boy and his friends. Nasser was Saddam's preferred role model since he was the energetic leader of Pan Arabism. Arab nationalism could only be released from Western constraints by courageously opposing imperialist forces.

Saddam joined the Arab Baath socialist party in Iraq at the age of twenty after being motivated by Nasser, and he rapidly won over party leaders with his commitment. He was a "street thug" who voluntarily utilized violence in the interest of the party and received quick advancement as a result. Two years later, in 1958, Army General Abd Karim Qassem staged a coup that overthrew the monarchy, ostensibly imitating Nasser. Yet in contrast to Nasser, Qassem rejected socialism and turned against the Baath party. The assignment to lead a five-man squad in killing Qassem was assigned to the 22-year-old Saddam at the Baath Party headquarters. According to reports, Saddam made a critical mistake in judgment that contributed to the mission's failure. Yet in Iraqi history, Saddam's escape to Syria—first on horseback through the desert, then by swimming a river—has taken on a mythological aspect. Saddam traveled to Egypt to study law while in exile, where he advanced to the top of the Egyptian Baath party. When Qassem was overthrown by the Baaths in 1963, he returned to Iraq and was elected to the National Command. Young Hussein was revered by Michel Aflaq, the founder of the Baath party, who named Saddam Hussein as his successor and praised the Iraqi Baath party as the best in the world[10].

CONCLUSION

While leading, inspiring, and managing people, a leader's approaches and actions are referred to as their leadership style. The way a person strategizes and executes plans while taking into consideration the expectations of stakeholders and the welfare of their team depends on their leadership style. Leadership is defined as the activity of leading, instructing, encouraging, and inspiring others' actions in order to achieve a goal. It involves the capacity to sway people. It significantly affects the work they do and how they interact. Understanding your personality type may help you improve communication, gauge other people's needs, and establish positive connections.

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CHAPTER 22

INTRODUCTION TO THE REVERSAL OF HOSTAGE POLICY

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ABSTRACT:

Reverse Hostage Syndrome, which occurs when an acquirer wants a transaction so desperately that he makes compromises that are unpleasant at best and damaging at worst, is perhaps the most difficult to see, let alone go through. In this chapter author is discusses the constraint of conscience.

KEYWORDS:

Leader, Intelligence, Political, Policy, War.

INTRODUCTION

Saddam faced the new Syrian Baath leadership at a party conference in Iraq in 1966, despite—or maybe because of—fellow Baathist Hafez al-success Assad's in seizing power in that country. The division and antagonism still exist today because there can only be one great Arab nationalist leader, and fate has chosen Saddam Hussein as that leader[1], [2].Saddam conducted a successful coup in 1968 with the key covert backing of military intelligence head Abdul Razzaz al Nayef. Within two weeks after the coup, Saddam set up Nayef's imprisonment and banishment before ordering his murder in "thanks" for the services he had provided.

This action served as a model for how Saddam has rewarded loyalty and kept his word throughout his career. He has a flexible conscience since obligations and loyalties depend on the situation, and the situation might change. No matter how obedient in the past, if a person or a country is seen as a hindrance or a danger, they will be violently killed without looking back, and the deed will be excused by "the uniqueness of revolutionary necessities." This passage from Saddam Hussein's spectacular "Victory Day" statement on August 8, 1990, serves as an example of how nothing should be allowed to obstruct "the great struggler's" messianic quest for his revolutionary destiny.

The only way to deal with these disgusting Croesuses who cherished possession in order to undermine devotion and who were led by a foreigner rather than by moral ideals, Pan-Arabist tenets, and the ideology of humanitarianism is in this manner. The Kuwaiti people's struggle, patience, and endurance, which was crowned by revolutionary action on that legendary day, gave birth to a genuine new-born child on August 2nd. A legal father and a spotless mother gave birth to the infant. Salutations to the creators of August 2nd, whose labor God has blessed. They have accomplished one of the most brilliant, hopeful, and principled actions in national and Pan-Arab history.

Two August came as a very strong retaliation to the destruction the foreigner had intended to do to Iraq and the country. The Croesus of Kuwait and his allies turn into that foreigner's

subservient, humiliated, and deceitful dependents. What happened on August 2 was inevitable in order to prevent death from triumphing over life, to prevent those who are able to reach the summit from being pushed over the edge, and to prevent corruption and a distance from God from spreading to the majority. Mesopotamia will maintain its honor so that it may serve as the Arabs' guardian, source of pride, and role model for moral excellence.

Enough to Change his Course

Another crucial aspect of Saddam's revolutionary opportunist practice. Similar to how past obligations must not be allowed to obstruct Saddam's quest for the Messiah, he must also abandon any course of action that proves to be unsuccessful for him and his country. As he follows a path of action, he does it wholeheartedly; if he encounters early resistance, he will strive even more, certain in the accuracy of his conclusions. Yet if circumstances show that he made a mistake in his calculations, he is allowed to change his strategy. In these cases, he doesn't admit that he made a mistake; instead, he says that he is adjusting to a changing environment. Throughout his ongoing conflict with his Iranian adversaries, he has shown his revolutionary pragmatism and ideological flexibility three times most dramatically[3]–[5].

In 1970, Saddam had the Kurdish community forcibly relocated. He said in 1973 that the Kurds could not be neutral and that they were either completely with the people or against them. He also claimed that the Baath party represented all Iraqis. One of Saddam's core beliefs is, in fact, that "Anyone who is not completely with me is my adversary." As a result, the Kurds were seen as cunning foes supported by other nations, particularly Iran. The Iranian Shah helped the Kurdish minority revolt in 1973. By 1975, the battle against the Kurds had become very expensive, having claimed 60,000 lives in only one year. Despite his longstanding hatred of the Persians, Saddam prioritized putting down the Kurdish uprising, displaying his revolutionary pragmatism. Saddam and the Shah of Iran made a deal in March 1975 that gave Iran control over the contentious Shatt al Arab canal in exchange for Iran stopping its support of the Kurdish uprising.

Saddam attacked Khuzistan Province in September 1980 after feeling weakness and indecision in the Iranian leadership. At initially, there was only little opposition, but the loss of the Shatt al Arab canal continued to sting. His cancellation of the 1975 agreement that divided the Shatt al Arab canal was one of his first actions. After Iraq's early triumph, Iran hardened and started to seriously harm both Iraqi soldiers and Iraqi cities. Saddam understood that the war was ineffective.

DISCUSSION

Attempts to End the Iran-Iraq War

In June 1982, Saddam sought to end hostilities by unilaterally declaring a cease-fire, reversing his previous militant aggressiveness. Khomeini, who at this point was obsessed with Saddam, was having none of it and said that there would be no peace with Iraq until Saddam was removed from power. As a result, the Iran-Iraq War raged on for another six terrible years and claimed an estimated one million lives. An unresolved cease-fire was reached in 1988, with Iraq maintaining the upper hand by maintaining control of the vital Shatt al Arab canal and around seven hundred square kilometers of Iranian land. Saddam promised that he would "never" grant Iran control over any area of the canal unless Iran decided to renounce its claim to the disputed waterway.

Saddam nonetheless kept 5,000 soldiers in the disputed border. Saddam vowed that he would neither consent to a prisoner swap nor leave Iranian territory. But, revolutionary pragmatism was to surpass this promise since he urgently need the 500,000 men who were involved in the conflict[6]–[8].

Reverses the Waterway's Disputed Policy

On August 15, 1990, Hussein consented to Iranian demands, committing to leave Iranian territory, accepting a prisoner swap, and—most significantly—agreeing to share the contentious Shatt al Arab canal. When revolutionary pragmatism rules, there is never a narrow window of time, which is crucial to keep in mind while analyzing Saddam's 1990 pledge to never cede Kuwait and his ongoing resistance to Western demands.

This trend is followed by the decision to free all foreign captives. Saddam initially pushed his hostage program vigorously, as he had done with other misguided strategies in the past, despite accumulating evidence that it was ineffective. He changed his approach after realizing that it was really uniting the worldwide opposition rather than protecting him from the possibility of armed war as he had first believed. James Baker, the secretary of state, had made a particularly forceful speech on the employment of "decisive force," but the Soviet Union's ire was probably a factor as well. As another example of his deftly manipulative sense of timing, the timing was intended to highlight perceived disparities in the international coalition as well as to capitalize on perceived internal divides inside the United States.

A Calculator who is Reasonable but Often Errs

Saddam is often referred to as the "madman of the Middle East" and a "megalomaniac," however there is no proof that he is suffering from a mental disease. He may be exceedingly patient and only takes action after thoughtful contemplation. In fact, he utilizes time as a tool. He is not impulsive. He is psychologically aware of reality, but his political awareness is often off. Saddam has little experience outside of the Arab world, and his perspective is limited and twisted. His sole long-term interaction with non-Arabs was with his Soviet military advisors, and he is only known to have left the Middle East twice—once for a quick trip to Paris in 1976 and once for a longer tour to Moscow. Also, he is surrounded by sycophants who are hesitant to disagree with him due to Saddam's well-deserved reputation for harshness. He has brutally removed any perceived challenges to his authority and considers criticism to be an act of treason.

One of his first actions after taking complete control of the Iraqi government in 1979 was to meet with the two hundred or more top officials under his command, of whom twenty-one had their loyalty called into doubt. The dramatic meeting of Saddam's top officials, when the twenty-one "traitors" were named as he watched and luxuriantly smoked a cigar from Cuba, was caught on camera. The remaining top officials were thanked by Saddam for their devotion and given the order to organize the death squads after a coerced "confession" by a "plotter" whose family had been detained.

Khomeini, who was personally fascinated on Saddam, said there could be no peace until Saddam was removed from office in 1982, when the conflict with Iran was going extremely poorly for Iraq and Saddam wanted to end hostilities. During a cabinet meeting, Saddam requested open feedback from his ministers. The minister of health made the suggestion that Saddam temporarily relinquish the presidency and take it back after peace had been achieved. He

allegedly complimented Saddam for his openness and received an arrest warrant. His wife begged for his return, demonstrating that he had always been devoted to Saddam. She was given a guarantee by Saddam that her husband would return. The following day, Saddam gave her husband's dismembered corpse back in a black canvas bag. Since it stressed that being seen as being unfaithful to Saddam may result in losing one's life, this episode effectively focused the attention of the other ministers, who were unwavering in their request that he stay in power. Saddam is therefore denied the balance of good advice from his inner group of leaders. He has made mistakes in the past as a result of this constrained foreign vision and a sycophantic leadership circle. The psychological traits of Saddam: Negative narcissism Elevated Self-Concept: Iraq is Saddam and Saddam is Iraq. Saddam is relentless in his quest for power for both Iraq and himself. In reality, he believed that the fates of Saddam and Iraq were one and the same. His lofty self-perception and Baathist political doctrine are intertwined. When the Arab country is united under a single powerful leader, Baathist ambitions will come true. Saddam believes he was born to play that part.

No conscience restraint

There is no proof that he is limited by conscience in the pursuit of his messianic fantasies; his sole devotion is to Saddam Hussein. Saddam eliminates every obstruction in his path of revolution, whether it is a once obedient subordinate or a formerly kind nation.

Unrestrained Aggression to Achieve His Objectives

Saddam utilizes hostility to further his objectives. He employs all necessary force and, if necessary, will resort to extreme violence, including the deployment of weapons of mass devastation. His unrestrained violence helps him achieve his objectives, but it is also protective aggression since his opulent exterior hides underlying insecurity.

Paranoid Attitude

Hussein has a strong paranoid orientation but is not insane. He perceives himself to be encircled by adversaries and is prepared to retaliate. Nonetheless, he disregards his part in creating those adversaries and justifiably threatens his targets. His conspiracy theories not only reflect his paranoid mindset but are also intended for mass consumption in the Arab world. He discovers a convincing chain of evidence that supports his conviction that the US, Israel, and Iran have collaborated to have him removed from office. Latif Jassim, Saddam's minister of information, who was in charge of propaganda and public comments, likely contributed to fostering his paranoid personality and, in a way, carried out his paranoia.

Saddam's harmful psychological traits include a messianic desire for unbridled power, a lack of morality, unrestrained aggression, and a paranoid attitude. This personality type, which may be conceptualized as malignant narcissism, is that of the destructive charismatic who rallies and unites his disgruntled fans by blaming external foes. The Palestinians, who see Saddam as a strongman who shares their fervent anti-Zionism and would support their cause, are particularly drawn to him despite the fact that he lacks charm.

Views Self as a Great Leader in History

Associating himself with his idols Nasser, Castro, Tito, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Zedong, each of whom he admires for customizing socialism to his environment free of foreign hegemony,

Saddam Hussein really believes that he is one of history's greatest leaders. Saddam believes he is changing his society. In his view, children in Iraq must be "fashioned" into a "radiating light that will expel" conventional family backwardness in order to "safeguard the future." Saddam has urged children to report on their parents' antirevolutionary behavior, just as Mao did. Similar to how Mao was given a godlike reputation and had enormous monuments and portraits of him erected all over China, Saddam Hussein has several enormous sculptures and pictures across Iraq. In response to a question on this personality cult, Saddam shrugs and says, "I cannot help it if that is what they want to do."

Most Likely Overestimates Level of Support in the Arab World

Saddam Hussein undoubtedly underestimates the level of support for him in the rest of the Arab world because he is so focused on carrying out his messianic purpose. He makes the assumption that many Arabs, particularly the oppressed, share his views and look up to him as their hero. He most likely experienced real astonishment at how widely his invasion of Kuwait was denounced.

In 1990–1991 Saddam was at a crossroads

In this turbulent region of the globe, Saddam Hussein's longevity as the nation's foremost leader for more than three decades is no coincidence. While he is motivated by fantasies of grandeur and has a limited and skewed political vision, he is a cunning strategist with a strong sense of patience. He is able to defend excessive acts of violence on the grounds of revolutionary requirements, but if the aggressiveness is counterproductive, he has a tendency to backtrack after he has made a mistake and postpone achieving his revolutionary goals until a later time. These reversals merely serve to divert his desire for power rather than to lessen it.

Saddam Hussein is a cunning political strategist who will do whatever it takes to further his objectives. But, he is not a martyr, and maintaining his position of authority while maintaining his honor is his first goal. Yevgeny Primakov, the former foreign minister of the Soviet Union, and others have described Saddam as having a "Masada complex" and choosing to die a martyr rather than give up. This is undoubtedly not the case since Saddam prioritizes his survival above all else and has no desire to become a martyr. He describes himself as a revolutionary pragmatist and does not want a war that would leave Iraq severely damaged and undermine his leadership status[9], [10].

Saddam's advisors are able to significantly contribute to the accuracy of his appraisal of Iraq's political and military situation by offering information and judgments, despite the fact that their unwillingness to disagree with Saddam's actions increases the risk of error. In addition, the leadership's predicament during the invasion of Kuwait was so dire that several officials allegedly voiced their doubts about staying in Kuwait, despite their unwillingness to disagree with him.

In the autumn of 1990, as the situation worsened, Saddam replaced a number of key officials with family members and recognized allies. He appointed his son-in-law Hussein Kamal in lieu of the highly knowledgeable technical specialist and Petroleum Minister Issam Abdulraheem Chalabi. Additionally, he appointed General Hussein Rashid, the Republican Guards' commander and a Tikriti, to succeed Army Chief of Staff General Nizar Khazraji, a career soldier. Rashid is tough, very skilled, deeply dogmatic, and ferociously devoted. It seemed as if Saddam was bringing in the wagons. This indicated that Saddam was under more pressure and that his siege

mentality was becoming worse. The vehemently belligerent language was another sign of Saddam's stress since the more threatened he feels, the more dangerous he gets.

Although Saddam was aware of the risk posed by the Gulf crisis, he also saw it as a chance to rebel against the despised outsiders—a core principle of the Baath philosophy. He persisted in framing the battle as a fight between Iraq and the United States and, more specifically, as a contest between the gladiators George Bush and Saddam Hussein. As the conflict took on a personal tone, Saddam's standing as a strongman eager to challenge the imperialist United States was furthered. President George H. W. Bush struck a sensitive chord when he portrayed the fight as pitting the whole civilized world against Saddam Hussein. Saddam is focused on his position in history and gives the opinion of the world a lot of weight. He would be significantly constrained if he believed that his position as a global leader was under jeopardy. Saddam would thus be extremely concerned about the possibility of being removed from the UN and of being denounced as a renegade country outside the international community. Despite his defiant rhetoric dismissing the UN resolutions as reflecting the United States' control of the international organization, the resounding majority in favor of the Security Council resolution at the time of the conflict must have confronted Saddam with the harm he was doing to his stature as a leader.

The dispute was characterized by defiant speech, which was easy to misread across cultural barriers. The Arab world values expressive language highly. The language of bravery is a hallmark of leadership, and the act of expressing bold determination against the adversary carries a tremendous deal of weight in and of itself. Although though the speech is directed at the United States, Saddam addresses a variety of audiences when he talks. Much of his solipsistic rhetoric is intended to inspire confidence and resolution in the Iraqi people and the Arab world. There is no required link between the act threatened and the daring verbal utterance. Nasser rose to fame thanks to his heated speeches in which he threatened to cover the world with the blood of Israelis. Similarly, Saddam most likely filtered President Bush's Western statements via a Middle Eastern accent. President George H. W. Bush made a public declaration of commitment and purpose, and Saddam may have discounted the stated intention to act. This emphasizes the value of using a private channel to communicate in a straightforward manner. The Secretary of State Baker's trip gave him the chance to clear up any misconceptions with Saddam about the commitment and goals of the US and the multilateral alliance.

Gulf Crisis Promotes Saddam to World-Class Leader

Saddam Hussein was shrouded in obscurity for the whole of his twenty-two years in power over Iraq, eclipsed by the heroism of other Middle Eastern leaders like Anwar Sadat and Ayatollah Khomeini. Yet during the Gulf crisis, for the first time in his career, Saddam was precisely who and where he thought he was meant to be—a renowned political figure in the spotlight, in control of global affairs, and the center of all eyes. The Dow Jones average crashed and the price of oil precipitously increased when he used threatening words. He was proving to the Arab populace that he is a strongman who has the guts to oppose the West and drive out foreign influences.

His need for glory was increased now that he was the focus of attention on a global scale. Saddam Hussein would not readily give up the limelight of global attention. He wanted to stay in the spotlight, but not at the price of his authority and reputation. Saddam would only leave if he believed that doing so would preserve his authority, his dignity, and the continuation of the play in which he was the lead character.

Honor and reputation must be understood in the context of the Arab world. The Arab people had already given Saddam a great deal of respect for his daring in defying the West. Notwithstanding Egypt's military defeat in the conflict with Israel in 1973, Sadat is regarded as a hero in the Arab world for his bravery to fight and initially repel the seemingly unstoppable troops of Israel. As the US crossed the 'line of death,' Muammar Qaddafi launched an air assault. Despite the fact that the subsequent combat resulted in the destruction of his planes, Qaddafi's standing in the Arab region increased. He did express gratitude to the US for elevating him to hero status. As a result, Saddam could look back on the 1990 conflict with dignity. His background demonstrates a remarkable ability to change direction in really difficult situations and yet find a way to save face. Yet, it would be crucial to avoid demanding complete submission and humiliation since doing so may push Saddam into a corner and make it hard for him to change direction. He would—could—only leave Kuwait if he felt he could do so with maintaining his authority and self-respect.

Likewise, he would only change his mind if his authority and reputation were under jeopardy. A united civilized world that is clearly prepared to use force if necessary, would need to assume a position of power, firmness, and clarity of purpose in order to accomplish this. Saddam Hussein solely speaks and understands the language of power. Even if the sanctions are biting hard, Saddam is more than capable of enduring a protracted period of suffering without this clear intent to use force. It was necessary to make it clear to Saddam Hussein that his career as a renowned political actor would be over if he didn't withdraw. It seems likely that the announcement of a significant increase in the force level was made in order to emphasize that point. Due to the overwhelming majority's backing, the UN resolution authorizing the use of force if Iraq did not withdraw by January 15 sent an especially strong message.

There's a good chance the message was heard. With the announcement of the increased use of force, Saddam stepped up his demand for "serious dialogue," looking for a way out that would allow him to maintain his authority and his image. It was a crucial move for President Bush to send Secretary of State Baker to personally speak with Saddam. Saddam's cunning attempts to splinter the international alliance continued in the time running up to the summit.

Saddam, who views himself as a revolutionary realist, is fundamentally a survivor. If he did withdraw and change direction in reaction to the collective display of strength and resolution, this would only be a short diversion of his unbridled desire for power. If serious steps weren't made to confine him, it would be a given that he would come back later and be stronger than before. This emphasizes how crucial strategic planning is, even in the absence of an immediate need, particularly in light of his progress in developing nuclear weapons capacity. He may be anticipated to pursue his objectives discreetly via increased support for terrorism if his overt aggressiveness is resisted. If he has a route out, Saddam won't perish in the final burning bunker, but if he is forced into a corner, he may be very deadly and will stop at nothing. Saddam may react with unbridled violence, using whatever weapons and resources are available, in what would undoubtedly be a sad and violent last act, if he feels that his very existence as a top-tier political player is under danger.

Why Saddam did not leave Kuwait

It was noted in the political psychology profile created for the congressional hearings on the Gulf crisis in December 1990, which was summarized in the previous material, that Saddam was in fact the prototypical survivor and by no means a martyr. His ability to change direction when

circumstances revealed that he had made a mistake was crucial to his ability to maintain power for twenty-two years. We thought he could change his mind again if he decided doing so would prevent his power base and reputation from being damaged and would allow him to maintain both.

Therefore, how is it possible that this self-described revolutionary pragmatic joined and continued in a violent confrontational path in the face of an overwhelming array of military might that would undoubtedly give his country a fatal blow? He presumably calculated and miscalculated as a result of cultural variables. As was previously indicated, Saddam could have seen President Bush's Western declarations of purpose through a Middle Eastern prism and assumed that he was playing a bluff. It's also likely that he downplayed the danger by comparing it to the typical Arab exaggeration. Even though he anticipated a significant airstrike, the extent of the damage done to his soldiers probably caught him off guard.

More significantly, Saddam was impacted by the crises' dynamics. What started out as an outright act of aggression against Kuwait evolved into the climax of his life's story. The cunningly manipulative Saddam had draped himself and his invasion of Kuwait in the Palestinian flag, despite his prior lack of care for the Palestinian people. The Palestinians' reaction was overwhelmingly positive. They saw Saddam as their savior and their hope, stubbornly and valiantly opposing the United States to compel a fair resolution to their dispute. People all around the Arab world were fascinated by this, and their cheers of applause nourished his inflated ego as he went on a rebellious roll.

Saddam may have been high from the elixir of power and exaggerated his prospects of victory since his heroic self-image was more active than ever. He may also have been intoxicated by the praise of the Palestinians and the radical Arab masses. He was accomplishing the messianic mission that had consumed and evaded him his whole life. He was realizing his identity as the genuine successor of Nasser, Saladin, and Nebuchadnezzar as well as the leader of the Arab peoples. His rhetoric held control over his psyche and his available policy alternatives. It would have been incredibly difficult for him to change his mind without being dishonored since he grew so steadfast in his devotion to the Palestinian cause and to refusing to cede Kuwait until there was justice for the Palestinian people and UN Resolutions 242 and 338 had been followed. In the Arab world, losing face equates to losing power. These absolutist declarations, in contrast to earlier reversals, received full worldwide attention. In a sense, Saddam had painted himself into a corner. This conundrum was made more difficult by the Bush administration's emphasis on "no face-saving."

Saddam had thus come to the conclusion that to change his mind would mean losing his dignity and that his power base would not be protected if he left Kuwait. Saddam questioned if American aggression would end at the border with Iraq. He had believed for years that there was an American, Iranian, and Israeli plot to destabilize Iraq and depose him. Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister, had earlier said that "all was on the," but by late December, any pretense of diplomatic pragmatism had vanished, and Saddam looked determined to defy the coalition's ultimatum. Saddam had likely come to the conclusion that he could not reverse his decision and leave the battle without being dishonored and that he needed to do it in order to show his bravery and assert his claim to pan-Arab leadership.

Saddam prepared to endure a significant air assault and anticipated it. He intended to confront the US "Vietnam complex" in the next combat assault. He felt that his battle-hardened forces

could sustain significant losses, as they had shown during the Iran-Iraq War, but the weak-willed United States would not have the stomach for this, leading to a political-military standoff. Saddam would solidify his position as the leader of the Arabs by proving that he had the guts to take on the world's most powerful country, and he would achieve enormous glory. In the Arab East, having the fortitude to stand up to a stronger opponent might result in political success despite a military setback. By spearheading the assault against the supposedly unbeatable Israel in 1973, for instance, Sadat earned immense credit, even though Egypt was victorious in the military battle. In fact, because of his increased stature, he was able to approach Israel as an equal participant in negotiations, which finally resulted in the Camp David Accords. Nasser, Saddam's political role model and idol, won considerable respect for opposing the imperialists in the 1956 Suez conflict, despite the fact that he lost. Saddam felt that by valiantly opposing the U.S.-led coalition, he would solidify his status as Nasser's successor in Arab history. Latif Jassim, his minister of communication, announced victory on the third day of the air war. He indicated that the coalition anticipated Iraq to fall apart in two days to the shocked journalists. The Iraqis were victorious as a result, having already endured three days of the intense airstrikes, and each additional day would only increase the magnitude of their win. In January, it was made public that a massive bunker, reinforced with steel and prestressed concrete, was located underneath Saddam's magnificent mansion. The design of this structure represents the psychological architecture of Saddam: a magnificent, defiant façade supported by a strong foundation of a siege mentality. Although being surrounded and under attack from all directions, Saddam continues to be stubborn and uses whatever force is required to maintain his power and preserve his existence[11], [12].

CONCLUSION

The abduction of hostages is still often driven by politics, done to demand a ransom, compel an exchange for other hostages, or even convicted criminals. Nonetheless, hostage-taking for financial gain has developed into a "business" in several nations, with ransom being the common demand. A person is taken hostage when they are taken hostage and threatened with being killed, injured, or kept in captivity in order to coerce a third party or governmental body to comply. The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages defines the crime as the seizure or detention of a person (the hostage), combined with threats to kill, harm, or keep the hostage in captivity, in order to compel a third party to do or refrain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit requirement.

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CHAPTER 23

A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON THE CONFLICT OF WAR

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ABSTRACT:

Conflicts are battles between armed forces. War is the formal expression of governments' or states' enmity against other parties. Wars include conflicts, however not all wars involve genuine conflicts, and not all conflicts are related to war. In this chapter author discusses the fractures in tribal loyalty.

KEYWORDS:

Conflict, Military, Security, War, Weapon.

INTRODUCTION

After the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's popularity in his own country suffered greatly. By the end of 1996, he was in a more hazardous home situation than at any point since March 1991 as a result of a string of betrayals, failures, and disappointments. After the fighting, Saddam has changed primarily in three areas:

1. A rise in security flaws
2. enhancing international cooperation
3. growing significance of the initiative to combat WMDs
4. Security Vulnerabilities Have Grown

Assuring his domestic stability and eradicating internal challenges to his government have always been tenets of Saddam's leadership, and these concerns have become more pressing in the years after the war. A severely depleted military, rifts in tribal allegiances, and family conflicts have been the three biggest dangers to Saddam's internal stability.

Unprepared military

The Iraqi army, Saddam's main source of support, was severely weakened as soon as the combat came to an end in March 1991. The Iraqi army, which was once the fourth-largest army in the world, is now a serious danger to Saddam's existence because its once-proud image as the most potent military force in the Gulf has been shattered, its personnel and equipment diminished, and its morale ruined.

1. The Republican Guard and other Iraqi military troops lost faith in Saddam's government.
2. The living conditions for troops have fallen to their lowest point ever.

The no-fly zone over the north and south was seen as a demeaning insult to the once strong military. Kurdish dominance over the north was also a harsh reminder of how helpless and dependent the US was on Iraq.

The UN-sponsored weapons inspections served as a constant reminder of Saddam's humiliation and his inability to exert control over Iraq's sovereignty. A growing wave of discontent, defection, and disillusionment sparked many coup attempts against Saddam by various military groups. Conflicts with the Kurds and the Iraqi National Congress resulted in catastrophic casualties for two regular army brigades in March 1995, severely embarrassing Saddam and the military.

DISCUSSION

Fractures in Tribal Loyalty

There were indications that the greater Sunni tribal system's sense of unity was eroding. Three of the five most significant Sunni tribes, who had served as the backbone of Saddam's support and held military leadership positions, attempted to overthrow him. Republican Guard Jubbur members as well as regular army troops were implicated in a conspiracy in 1990. In 1993–1994, members of the 'Ubayd tribe participated in coup planning. In 1995, Al-Bu Nimr rose up in opposition to Saddam. Conflicts within Saddam's al-Bu Nasir clan exacerbated issues; by the end of the summer of 1996, five of the tribe's "houses" had complaints against Saddam or his family. Dulaymis and 'Ubaydis are still employed by the Republican Guard and in important security roles, but they have been reassigned from the most delicate posts and are under careful observation. Even if Saddam is no longer able to trust his once-faithful tribes, the possibility of a widespread tribal insurrection continues to be distant[1].

Disputes within the Family

Uday. One persistent problem has been Uday, Saddam's oldest son, who is 38 years old and has an erratic disposition. He is widely dreaded by the people of Baghdad and is known as the "bad boy" of Iraq. Saddam has often either ignored Uday's excesses or, if the occurrence was too public to ignore, dealt with it in the mildest of ways despite the fact that he has been engaged in a number of highly publicized instances. There were rumors of violent outbursts involving Uday before the Gulf War. Uday once killed one of his father's helpers with an electric carving knife while intoxicated at a party in 1988. Uday, upset with Saddam's personal valet for his assistance in arranging an affair Saddam was having with a married Iraqi lady, disrupted a banquet being given in honor of Suzanne Mubarak, the wife of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, in a second dramatic public occurrence that year. In front of all the visitors, Uday killed the valet by beating him to death. This led to Saddam putting Uday on trial for murder, but when the victim's family "pleaded for clemency," Saddam banished Uday to Switzerland. Uday returned to Iraq and started reintegrating himself into Iraqi culture a year after being branded *persona non grata* by Swiss authorities.

In 1995, allegedly the night before his brother-in-law Hussein Kamal fled, Uday shot one of his uncles in the leg and murdered six "dancing females" at a party. It is said that Uday was a significant factor in Kamal's decision to defect since he saw Kamal as endangering his connection with his father. Uday's legs were broken in a 1996 assassination attempt, which rendered him bedridden for at least six months. He apparently had a brief paralysis as a result of

the attempted murder. According to some stories, the accident rendered him a paraplegic who is still paralyzed below the waist. There are reports that he was rendered impotent, which might very well be accurate given the kind and location of the paralyzing spinal cord damage. He's still not doing so well, in general.

A Significant Turning Point: The Defection and Murder of Hussein Kamal. Saddam's cousin Hussein Kamal wed Rghad, who was Saddam's favorite child. Kamal advanced in Saddam's inner circle with the meteoric speed that made other insiders and the military core dislike him. Uday's sentiments of competition and jealousy were heightened when Kamal, who had previously held numerous senior security posts, went on to form the Republican Guard and finally became one of the few insiders with access to Saddam Hussein. Hussein Kamal and his brother Saddam Kamal, who had also wed a daughter of Saddam, allegedly fled to Jordan in August 1995 after receiving threats from Uday. There, they were granted refuge. Hussein Kamal divulged a ton of information on the secret weapons program he oversaw in Iraq, which significantly embarrassed Saddam and hampered his attempts to lift the sanctions. After receiving assurances from Saddam that they would be safe and pardoned, the men and their wives returned to Iraq six months later, in February 1996, in what may be described as "assisted suicide, Iraqi style." Both guys were killed forty-eight hours after they returned to Iraq. According to reports, Uday was a significant player in planning Kamal and his brother's murder[2]–[4].

Uday is demoted. As Kamal left, Saddam humiliated Uday in front of everyone, showing that he thought Uday was to blame for the family disputes that resulted in the defection. Uday was relieved of his leading position in the restoration of Iraq's military hardware by Saddam, who also set fire to his collection of classic vehicles. He ordered Uday to relinquish control of the Fidayiin, Saddam's private army dedicated to his security. Most significantly, Saddam promoted Qusay, his younger son, to the most powerful security post inside the government. This proved to everyone that even belonging to the immediate family and even being Saddam's favorite kid would not save one from his wrath if their activities endangered the government.

Qusay is a component of the solution, but Uday is a part of Saddam's issue. Qusay has been getting ready for the role of czar of internal security since 1989 thanks to Saddam. General Abd Hamid Mahmud, the previous chief of internal security, and Qusay had a tight working relationship. They are in charge of security within all security organizations, including the Himaya and the Special Republican Guard, and are in command of the Special Security Organization, the most formidable of all security organizations. They are primarily responsible for the president's security, but they are also in charge of hiding and using Iraq's unconventional weapons.

When it comes to "prison cleaning," or the execution of a large number of political prisoners in order to create way for new ones in Iraq's overcrowded jails, Qusay is the ultimate expert. Also, it is he who approves the death of security and military personnel who are thought to be traitors. Qusay, who is now known as "Warrior Qusay," began getting extensive publicity from the Baath party in 2000. He has been designated Saddam's deputy "in the case of an emergency," replacing Uday in the succession. In addition, Qusay has served as the deputy secretary of the significant Military Bureau of the Baath party in Iraq since 2001. 4 It is believed that Qusay's elevation to the RL is the first step toward his acceptance into the Revolutionary Command Council and, ultimately, his ascension to the RCC chair- manship and president.

Change in strategy: The turmoil within the family, which resulted in Hussein Kamal's defection and murder, as well as Uday's fall and Qusay's appointment to the position of director of security forces, marked a significant shift in tactic. Saddam's family's devotion could no longer be taken for granted. Instead, Saddam had to make the Baath party stronger and depend more heavily on longtime party members.

Morale Uplift and Redemption, Thanks to the Kurdish

Saddam Hussein gave the Republican Guard permission to invade the Kurdish city of Irbil in late August 1996 after the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan obtained military support from Iran. The INC and PUK were "smashed" by the guard. Irbil's capture was a huge victory for Saddam. The Republican Guard's morale was bolstered by this victory after a string of losses and reminders of their diminished position. It proved that the dictatorship was still firmly in charge and a dominant force throughout the whole nation. It was a vivid illustration of the danger of rebelling against Saddam and revealed the fragmentation and helplessness of the opposition groups in Iraq. In terms of regaining control of the situation, this was a crucial turning point for the regime; had the guard not conquered Irbil, it's possible that Saddam's support would have been severely eroded and his position would have been in serious danger.

Unseen Resolution 986

In 1996, with his economy on the verge of collapse, Saddam was compelled to accede to UN Resolution 986, sometimes known as the "oil-for-food bargain." This was a terrible humiliation since it flagrantly violated Iraq's national sovereignty and, inadvertently, Saddam's reputation. As long as the suffering of the Iraqi people could be reduced by the resolution, the embargo could remain in place indefinitely, which was another concern for Saddam that it would weaken international pressure to repeal the sanctions placed on Iraq during the Gulf War. Yet in the end, Saddam was forced to follow the advice of his economic advisors. Iraq declared its endorsement of the resolution on November 25.

It was advantageous to embrace Resolution 986 in a significant way. The selling of oil significantly raised Iraq's prominence on the global and regional stage. It was less significant that the food and medications given to the populace helped them feel less miserable than the fact that Saddam could now stop spending money on feeding his starving people. The drawbacks paled in contrast since the dictatorship, not the UN, received much of the credit for the increase in supply. The regime's capacity to trumpet the agony of the Iraqi people as loudly as previously was lessened by the better circumstances. So, it's possible that the UN-Saddam dispute over UN Special Commission Observation Mission inspections in October and November 1997 was sparked by worries that the embargo would continue even if the humanitarian problem had been resolved.

Renewed international backing

Saddam had been quite isolated in the events leading up to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf Crisis, miscalculating the effect of his actions not just on his Arab neighbors, the so-called near abroad, but also on important international powers, particularly Russia and France. He had often gravely underestimated the hazards of his acts as well as the extent of his support. In the meanwhile, his foreign policy endeavors have shown a far more sure and

intelligent hand. He has diligently tried to improve any weaknesses found as a result of the lessons he has learnt through experience.

Nearby foreign

Saddam has been successful in his diplomatic endeavors toward the "near abroad." Saddam has made a significant effort to mend fences with his neighbors in the area after being shocked by the lack of support for Iraq during the Gulf conflict. Iraq has developed into an essential partner for these countries, depending primarily on the greater economic strength that rising oil sales have given it. Although internal politics and other variables have dominated Iraqi politics, foreign influences have started to provide new opportunities for Iraqi policies and aid in easing Saddam's domestic issues. His closest neighbors have made the most difference.

Syria. Saddam's steadfast determination to patch things up with his longest surviving Middle Eastern opponent, President Hafez al-Assad and his government, serves as the most illustrative illustration of his behavior when he feels vulnerable and seriously threatened. Iraq and Syria started a fresh partnership in the years 1997–1998. Assad responded favorably to Saddam's olive gesture by doing the same. While the partnership was mostly focused on economic and political spheres, it marked Iraq's return to Middle Eastern affairs. A free trade pact was concluded between the two nations. This agreement caused the amount of bilateral commerce to increase from \$500 million in 2000 to around \$1 billion in 2001. Some studies claim that mutual trading really exceeded \$2 billion in 2001. It was predicted that the yearly value of commerce between the two nations would surpass \$3 billion by the middle of 2002. **Iran.** Mohammad Khatami, the president of Iran, tried to strengthen ties with the United States and Saudi Arabia after assuming office in 1997, which greatly alarmed Saddam. But, domestic politics prevented such partnerships from having the desired effect, which created more opportunity for bettering Iraqi-Iranian relations[5], [6].

Turkey. Baghdad is very frustrated by Turkey's close relations to the United States and its insistence on cooperating with the United States on Iraqi issues. Baghdad also harshly condemns Turkish military incursions into the independent Kurdish region of Iraq. Even though Kurdistan is no longer under Saddam's rule, Baghdad views such initiatives as violating the country's sovereignty. Since December 1996, Turkish-Iraqi commercial links have significantly increased. Before to the invasion of Kuwait, Turkey exported to Iraq on average \$400 million a year. Exports have reached a \$375 million yearly pace in 2000, virtually matching the rate from 1990. In 2001, exports almost quadrupled to \$710 million. It was predicted towards the end of 2001 that Turkey will sell goods to Iraq for \$2 billion in 2002.

Jordan. Jordan has constantly distanced itself from Iraq since the early 1990s, despite the fact that it was hesitant to engage Iraq politically and did not join the international anti-Iraq war alliance. Jordan, like Turkey, enjoys the best of both worlds: it upholds excellent ties with the United States and Israel, receiving economic aid from the latter; thwarting Iraqi attempts to smuggle weapons through its territory to the Palestinians as best it can; and continuing to trade with Iraq and receive cheap oil from Saddam. Even though Saddam is well aware of this behavior, he doesn't appear to care since Jordan serves as a key gateway to the outside world. More importantly, his primary objective right now is getting Jordan to protest to a U.S. strike on him. Saddam will be eliminated immediately if Jordan cooperates with an American onslaught because it will provide the Americans the best possible bridgehead from which to start the attack and stop him from firing his own missiles towards Israel.

Up until March 2002, Saudi Arabia remained opposed to the Iraqi government and worked to normalize relations with Iran as a counterbalance to Iraq in the event that the United States could not uphold its security obligations or if the Saudi government was forced to request the withdrawal of U.S. forces. In December 1997, Prince Abd Allah called on the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council to "overcome the past with its events and sufferings," marking the first departure from this attitude. This was seen as a request for reconciliation with Saddam's Iraq. Like other regional powers, Saudi Arabia anticipated an increase in exports to Iraq, from about \$200 million in 2000 to over \$600 million in 2001.

additional Gulf States. A free trade agreement with Iraq was reached in November 2001 and confirmed by the United Arab Emirates in the spring of 2002. The six GCC countries' plans to combine their markets into a customs union in 2003 is the deal's most important aspect. Iraq will now have unrestricted access to the GCC market as a whole. The UAE was one of Iraq's main regional economic partners by the middle of 2002. Kuwait has stubbornly refused to normalize ties with Iraq despite Iraq's intermittent offers of "friendship" and overt threats. Kuwait was the only Gulf state that was still hostile to Saddam's rule by the middle of 1980. Kuwaiti authorities continue to be harshly critical of the Iraqi administration despite having declined an Iraqi invitation to visit Iraqi jails to demonstrate that no Kuwaiti POWs were being kept. It seems that Kuwait shares the US government's support for a bloody regime transition in Baghdad. If that's the case, Kuwait is the only Arab nation to back such a military mission.

The primary Arab partner in the 1990–1991 coalition against Iraq was Egypt. Nonetheless, ties between Iraq and Egypt began to improve dramatically as soon as Iraq's purchasing power increased. Commerce grew significant, and in January 2001, an agreement for a free trade zone was reached between Egypt and Iraq. Iraq's commerce minister, Muhammad Mahdi Salih, said that the two countries' trade in 2000 reached \$1.2 billion, which was quadruple what it was in 1999. The minister expressed optimism that the volume will surpass \$2 billion in 2001. Following France, Russia, and China as Iraq's top commercial partners is Egypt.

Knowing that Russia and France, two permanent Security Council members with veto power, could be relied upon to soften sanctions against Iraq, and that they each have significant economic interests in seeing an Iraq freed from economic restraints and owe them a combined \$11 billion, Saddam has been able to challenge the UNSCOM inspections regime with a fair amount of impunity. China, Kenya, and Egypt have all backed his troubled government in international forums. Several nations adopted the position that relaxing the sanctions was the only way to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people and that the sanctions were harming them more than the government, which gave the impression that Washington, D.C., rather than Iraq, was becoming more and more isolated.

Mass-Destructive Weapons

Nuclear weapons, like with other weapons of mass devastation, are crucial to Saddam. After all, leaders of the globe own weapons of the world. Unconventional weapons have grown in importance, especially in light of the fact that the 1991 battle severely injured the military and significantly reduced its conventional power. A constant reminder to the military of his bravery in confronting the greater foe and that he has not and will not capitulate comes from his defiance of the international community on this issue.

Inspections of weapons

Iraq managed to get significant concessions on the sanctions front pertaining to weapons inspections despite tactical setbacks in October–November 1997 and January–February 1998. This was essential in sustaining Saddam's popularity among the Iraqi people since it was seen as a win. Even if the embargo is progressively lifting, Saddam did not have to give up his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam now has his WMD, his power elite feels more emboldened, the Iraqi people live in better conditions, many components of the embargo are no longer in effect, and as a consequence, Saddam's position in Iraq is strengthened.

In fact, the Iraqi people saw UNSCOM's departure from the country in December 1998 and subsequent ban on their return as a significant win for Saddam. Saddam remained unharmed despite the forced departure of the United Nations from Iraq. Saddam's internal support increased as a result of the UNSCOM inspections regime's challenge, lessening the internal threat as he proved his capacity to undermine and challenge the international coalition while maintaining the coveted weapons of mass destruction program and eroding support for the sanctions regime. Saddam came to the conclusion that he was virtually immune to UN retaliation for pursuing unconventional weapons programs, which have become all the more important to him given the deterioration of his military's personnel, conventional weaponry, and materiel due to the divisions within the UN that he helped promote. There haven't been any significant coup attempts since 1999 because those who would have opposed a leader who was seen as a loser—and who had previously faced up against the UN and the US—were afraid to do so [7], [8].

Change of Image/Return to International Community

Saddam has persisted in trying to improve his position internationally, taking advantage of chances to modify his reputation, including enhancing his reputation among the Arab community:

Saddam started attempting to alter his reputation as a secular leader in the early 1990s. The increased use of Islamic terminology by Saddam, the introduction of the Qur'anic punishment of severing the right hand for theft, the prohibition of alcohol consumption in public places, and the decapitation with a sword for the "crimes" of prostitution, homosexuality, and providing a place for prostitutes to engage in their trade are all examples of this "return to Islam." On a cultural level, a few million Qur'an books were produced in Iraq and given away free of charge. Moreover, Qur'an classes are being mandated for individuals from all walks of life, beginning with students. In a similar spirit, a legislation passed in the late 1990s allowed for the release of Muslim convicts who have studied the Qur'an while incarcerated. The erection of ostentatious mosques is another element of the "Islamization" program. After the mosque in Mecca, the new Saddam Mosque is one of the biggest in the Middle East.

Also positioning himself as the supporter of the Palestinian cause is Saddam. He boosted from \$10,000 to \$25,000 the first "reward" given to families of suicide bombers. Iraq also disclosed to the Palestinian Authority and the general public that it has petitioned the Security Council for authorization to transfer one billion Euros from its New York escrow to the Intifada. Other sources of assistance, albeit less significant, continue to aid Saddam's disinformation campaign. For instance, some of the Intifada-related injuries to Palestinians have been treated at Baghdad hospitals. Moreover, Iraq dispatched a number of trucks loaded with humanitarian aid across Jordan and the Jordan River crossings to the West Bank. These vehicles were permitted to pass across by Israel.

Further Indicators of Iraq's Increasing Acceptance in the Global Community

Hugo Chávez, the president of Venezuela, defied international convention in August 2000 by visiting Iraq to meet with Saddam Hussein. After the Gulf War, he was the first head of state to visit Iraq, an indication of the country's growing international acceptability. Two months later, Iraq received an invitation to the Arab Summit, marking the first time since the Gulf Crisis began that Arab sentiments toward Iraq had thawed. The international airport in Bagdad reopened in the autumn of 2000, which was another indication of normality. There was a lot of international appreciation for Saddam Hussein after a hijacked Saudi airplane landed in Baghdad in October 2000 and all passengers were released unharmed.

Foreign humanitarian planes started arriving regularly in January 2001, and Iraqi carriers started flying. Food rations rose, power outages lessened, and drinking water and sewage systems substantially improved as oil output returned to prewar levels. In an effort to win over Kuwaiti officials, Saddam offered to let them visit Iraqi jails in January 2002, but this request was turned down. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, Saddam's vice chairman of the RCC, was finally embraced and kissed in front of the world's TV cameras in March 2002 during the Beirut Arab Summit by Saudi Crown Prince Abd Allah. This brought an end to more than ten years of fierce animosity and served as a clear indication that Saddam's Iraq had received a warm welcome back into the Arab world. With his showy support for the Palestinian people and his ongoing re-Islamization efforts, Saddam is further winning the hearts of his Arab neighbors. With oil profits, Saddam has promised to give the Palestinians \$881 million.

USING INTERNATIONAL CRISES

International crises have proven to be beneficial to Saddam in his quest to maintain control over his nation, and his record of foreign policy victories have helped him to stifle the emergence of domestic opposition. Success for Saddam does not stop with the eradication of internal opposition; rather, it is only a necessary prerequisite for him to realize his ongoing goal of being acknowledged as the region's premier leader and a fitting successor to Nasser. But before he can become a world-class leader, he must first exert ultimate control over the home situation, which in his eyes entails the utter annihilation of all resistance. Saddam has always been willing to face up against anybody, even superpowers, to accomplish that. Every crises' worst result is one that reveals him to be a lousy leader. As a result, Saddam often encourages foreign crises to support his position at home.

Despite the fact that Saddam's position is unquestionably weaker now than it was prior to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he has demonstrated more sophisticated leadership in terms of both internal security vulnerabilities and diplomacy with both his "near abroad"—his Arab neighbors and Turkey—and his "far abroad." He has diligently and painstakingly worked to lessen his weaknesses and to improve his standing on a national and international level[9], [10].

CONCLUSION

Saddam's overarching objective is to remain in power. He is a cleverly Machiavellian logical calculator who can bob and weave, and he has successfully maintained the allegiance of his soldiers while weakening foreign opposition. Nonetheless, the risk that Saddam may err when forced into a difficult situation remains despite his sophistication and improved awareness of the circumstances around his leadership both domestically and internationally. On these instances, he

may be very dangerous, lash out violently, and use every weapon at his disposal. He may be adopting a risky "back against the wall" stance due to the ongoing demands for regime change. It's possible that he might destroy his own Iraqi oil reserves in a similar manner to how he destroyed Kuwait's oil fields in 1991 when he fled, as if to say, "If I can't have them, no one will." In addition, it is likely that Assad would try to use chemical or biological weapons against Israel and against US soldiers stationed in the area if he had the upper hand. Then, the issue will be whether he can maintain the top military leaders' allegiance to a certain extent or whether they can be persuaded to defy Saddam in the most extreme circumstances in order to protect their own futures. One thing is certain: He is a guy who "will not go gently into that good night, but will rage, rage against the fading of the light," as the song puts it.

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CHAPTER 24

SADDAM HUSSEIN: PERSONALITY TRAITS AND MOTIVATIONAL BIASES

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ABSTRACT:

People's distinctive thinking, emotion, and behavior patterns are reflected in their personality characteristics. A person who scores highly on a certain feature like extraversion is anticipated to be gregarious in many contexts and across time. Personality traits signify consistency and stability. In this chapter, the author discusses the need for power and task focus.

KEYWORDS:

Defense, Leadership Style, Personality, Traits, War.

INTRODUCTION

The studies of Saddam Hussein that follow concentrate first on his motivational biases and then on his general personality features. In each of the next sections, the authors use their unique approaches to comparative analysis to build a profile of the causal factors influencing the processes of ego defense and the mediation of self-other connections[1].

Ego defenses and general personality traits

Theodore Weintraub

The 9,461 words used in the study of Saddam Hussein's overall personality from his speech patterns were chosen at random from his replies to inquiries from international reporters during three interviews in 1990. The usage of several categories by the Iraqi leader is contrasted with that of American presidents since World War II in 16.1. Hussein scored poorly in the following linguistic areas out of twelve: the personal pronouns I, us, and my; qualifiers; displays of emotion; and colorful or imaginative speech. In the areas of explainers, adverbial intensifiers, direct references, and nonpersonal references, he does well. The speech of the Iraqi leader has a chilly, impersonal aspect due to the lack of personal pronouns and poor scores in the categories of displays of sentiment and personal allusions. Hussein's speech has a particular dramatic flair thanks to a relatively high adverbial intensifiers score[2]–[6].

Hussein's speech may be cold, but it still has an interesting character. A high direct references score indicates that his discourse has a confrontational aspect. Hussein often responds to hostile inquiries in a hostile manner. Hussein's active engagement with the interviewer is seen in the following passage from an interview with Dan Rather: "You invaded a weak neighbor who is no danger to you." Hussein: Do you comprehend how evil persons in positions of power in that nation, which you disparage as weak, were? You must be aware of how evil the al-Sabah family was as a citizen of the United States who should uphold his citizenship by speaking the truth.

Hussein must have prepared well for his interviews if his qualifiers score was low. Thorough planning reveals a desire to manage the human environment and apprehension about being thrust into an unknown circumstance. The Iraqi leader's low qualifying score also points to a clear capacity for judgment. His score on retractions is modest, indicating a capacity for decision-making. A score of mild retractions also implies a lack of impulsivity. Hussein's low me score reveals an active temperament and a tendency to take control of things rather than passively respond to occurrences. A modest negative score suggests resistance to pressure without implying crippling stubbornness.

Hussein has an impressive explainers rating. His replies to the queries posed by the reporters have a somewhat didactic tone. A high explainers score also indicates a propensity to rationalize and a reluctance to accept uncomfortable truths. In fact, a lot of Hussein's justifications were used to support Iraq's belligerent actions in the Middle East. Hussein scored poorly in the category of imaginative or colorful speaking. His comments seldom ever include any humor, very few metaphors, and very little in the way of unusual word combinations. The absence of color and the speaker's underwhelming performance in the areas measuring sentiments only serve to confirm this perception. The Iraqi leader may not be capable of inventive thought, if creative speech reflects creative thinking.

How should we interpret Hussein's sparse usage of the pronouns "we" and "our"? Typically, Western leaders use more *Vs*. A Western leader will use the term *us* more often if they are a crusader, or if they depict themselves as the movement's leader. Eastern autocrats often avoid using personal pronouns, especially when they are the heads of political parties. For instance, leaders of communist parties often attempt to position themselves as representatives of a common leadership. An overuse of personal pronouns in these circumstances might be deemed offensive. The fact that Mikhail Gorbachev often used personal pronouns at his press briefings was one clue that he was a new sort of Soviet leader. Hussein probably avoids using personal pronouns because he prefers to communicate in an objective manner and because he wants to seem as the head of a political party.

What effect does a speaking style that combines few emotional expressions with extensive use of adverbial intensifiers and direct allusions have on the listener? Such speech patterns, in our opinion, would have a chilly, hostile intrusiveness as their result. This is a bully's or a scary speaker's way of speaking. In my experience, American political leaders don't often employ the word categories in this way. In a democratic society, listeners do not readily accept such aggressive speaking techniques. Typically, candidates who talk aggressively and intrusively do not prevail in free elections.

Only Pat Buchanan has a bully-like speaking style among all the American political figures I have researched. Yet Buchanan speaks with a language quality that Hussein lacks: creative phrases. Many of Buchanan's original comments are humorous, a linguistic trait that lessens their intrusiveness and adds a disarming sense of amusement to his verbal manner.

In conclusion, Saddam Hussein scored well in explainers, adverbial intensifiers, direct references, and nonpersonal references in his linguistic use. The personal pronouns *I*, *we*, and *me*, qualifiers, emotional expressions, and innovative phrases all received poor marks from him. This kind of verbal behavior analysis reveals Saddam Hussein to be a chilly, indifferent, and invasive speaker. Such speech patterns would make an authoritarian ruler seem scary and dangerous to his subjects—a bully.

In other ways, Hussein still speaks in the manner of an Eastern leader whose official status relies on maintaining control over the dominant political force. His minimal use of personal pronouns is a special example of this. Hussein's use of qualifiers and retractors implies that he has the capacity to make judgments and, when necessary, to reevaluate them. A speaker who uses qualifiers seldom is one who is uncomfortable in situations where surprises may emerge. The Iraqi leader has a propensity for rationalization via his frequent use of justifications. An aggressive leadership style is suggested by a low ME score. Hussein doesn't have much linguistic creativity, as seen by his use of humor, metaphors, and odd word combinations, which are signs of the ability to think and act in a creative or innovative manner.

Relationships between Oneself and Others: Motives and Mediation G. David Winter

There isn't much spoken information accessible for evaluating Saddam Hussein. There has likely been a significant but unknowable amount of selection, editing, and other control over what is accessible. The challenge for the researcher is to locate any kind of relevant data at all. Some speeches are published in books or the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, but these are not very helpful for analyzing the motivations of the majority of world leaders because they are delivered on particular occasions to particular audiences, making it challenging to locate much comparable material from other world leaders.

However because the majority of global leaders do participate in interviews and press conferences, scholars have often graded transcripts to evaluate motivation profiles. As a general comparative sample for evaluating other leaders, I have compiled an interview-based sample of twenty-two global leaders throughout the years, taken from a variety of locations and political responsibilities. Interview-based evaluations of global leaders are less accurate than Bill Clinton's speech-based judgments because there is a lot of variance across leaders and among comparative interviews in terms of the interviewer, the environment, and the target audience. Yet, with the information at hand, this technique does provide a foundation for estimating the purpose profile of any other specific global leader.

Nonetheless, Saddam Hussein was something of a "fugitive" subject for interviewers during the time I evaluated his motivations. There were only eleven English-language texts of interviews that were easily accessible from books, periodicals, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, covering the time span from April 1974 to January 1991. Several of these manuscripts were only available as extracts, and some of them had obvious editing flaws. These interview materials were divided into six that seemed to be more spontaneous and five that appeared to be more edited.

Saddam Hussein's motivation profiles were developed using data from all eleven interviews, as well as from the more and less spontaneous ones. The three profiles have several characteristics: extremely low accomplishment motivation, above average affiliation motivation, and relatively high power motivation. The power motivation score of Saddam Hussein is much greater than the accomplishment score.

It is crucial to concentrate primarily on the standardized scores when comparing the motivation profiles of Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein since the raw results are surely influenced by elements like the format and event, which might mask individual differences. As a result, for instance, practically any leader would be likely to employ more imagery of success and less imagery of power while declaring their campaign for the U.S. president than when being asked

about foreign policy. Such effects are eliminated when the raw motive imagery scores are standardized across similar groups, allowing for the identification of individual variations.

Does the stated motivation profile match what Saddam Hussein did? In Post 3, the author provided an analysis of the man's character and behavior that focused on his general, unrestrained desire for power and prestige, as well as more specific manifestations of extreme narcissism, exalted and extravagant rhetoric, use of aggression as a tool of policy, and paranoid fear of enemies. Each of these traits is linked to power motivation, particularly when there is no feeling of accountability.

We may better comprehend certain facets of Saddam Hussein's conduct by considering his high power motive, such as his recurrent and adamant resistance in the face of evident errors in judgment. In the pursuit of prestige, power-motivated individuals take extraordinary risks, according to laboratory research, but they also have a tendency to confuse their feelings of omnipotence and power with the existence of real social power. As a result, they tend to overestimate their chances of success. As a result, they wind themselves surrounded by sycophants who won't tell them the truth. They are prone to ingratiation. Success promotes future invention and success, whereas failure depletes their creative innovation reserves. When combined, these actions represent the hubris, or overly ambitious, conduct that the ancient Greeks believed existed. How can we interpret Saddam Hussein's superior rating on affiliation motivation? This first seems to be inconsistent with his actions: can anybody name several occasions in which he shown a "desire for warm, pleasant relationships?" Yet, as noted in, laboratory research results imply a more nuanced picture of the affiliation motivation. Affiliation-motivated individuals are driven to pleasant, cooperative interactions, but only when they are with others they see as similar to themselves and when they feel comfortable. They may be rather "prickly" and protective when threatened. Saddam Hussein has behaved like an affiliation-driven individual under threat in the turbulent and dangerous world of Iraqi politics by surrounding himself with his own like-minded people and fusing his affiliative concerns with his power motives in a messianic message of "brotherhood" directed with defiance but also ineffectively to the larger Arab community.

Aspects of Saddam Hussein's Leadership

This examination of Saddam Hussein's replies to the domestic and foreign press in fifteen interviews from 1979 to the present served as the foundation for this leadership profile. The description that follows is based on an evaluation of around 21,000 words from a distance. In order to understand how heads of state will act, what acts they are likely to call on their governments to do, and how they will organize and work with their advisory systems, the words are evaluated for evidence of seven main traits. A leader's characteristics are placed into context by comparing their ratings to those of other heads of state from the same area and more widely. By examining how consistent they are across topics, audiences, and time, the qualities are also placed in context. The characteristics that make up the profile are ones that historians, journalists, political scientists, and other scholars of leadership have discovered to be significant in determining what political actions leaders will take. The characteristics that are looked at include nationalism, the need for power and influence, conceptual complexity, general mistrust or suspicion of others, one's level of self-confidence or self-esteem, and the propensity to prioritize problem-solving and achieving something over maintaining the group and dealing with other people's ideas and sensitivities. Further information on the at-a-distance approach is provided.

There were several vocal resources on Saddam Hussein, including speeches, proclamations, messages, and press interviews. While reviewing such comments to learn more about the leader, care must be taken since the first three sorts of content may be created or produced for the leader by others. What has been said and how it has been stated have often been well considered. Media interviews are often a bit more impromptu. The leader must react swiftly and without assistance during a question-and-answer session; the form and wording of the response may depend on the leader's personality. While leaders may have some preparation before a press interview, they are on their own to answer during the interview. The following profile is solely based on Hussein's replies to media inquiries during an interview for these reasons.

The Leadership Profile in General summarizes Hussein's average characteristic ratings from his sixty interview answers. The results show what portion of the time Hussein employed phrases that would have shown a certain attribute when the conditions for coding the trait were met. The percentages might range from 0 to 100. based on the scores of eighty-seven heads of state from forty-six nations and twelve Middle Eastern leaders, the report shows what would be deemed a low and high score on a certain attribute. The twelve Middle Eastern leaders are a smaller subset of the 87 with a stronger cultural emphasis. Hussein differs from the other leaders in the comparison group by having low and high scores that are one standard deviation below and above the norm for that trait. In other words, Hussein resembles the comparison group of leaders on that attribute if his score on the trait is not one standard deviation above or below the mean of the group. As the reader will see, Hussein tends to tilt in one direction or the other when his scores are on the borderline of being high or poor.

On more than half of the traits—nationalism, hunger for power, mistrust of others, and self-confidence—Saddam Hussein differs from the two samples of leaders. He is similar to other leaders in that he believes he can influence the outcome of events, has a complicated conceptual framework, and is more concerned with getting things done than with the people involved. Hussein's leadership style is affected by these parallels to and divergences from previous leaders. The discussion that follows is based on in-depth social science research on how these traits impact leadership.

Intolerance of other people and nationalism

The leader and the nation are more identical in the eyes of the leader, who is the country, the higher the leader's nationalism score. If anything bad occurs to the country, it also happens to the leader, and the other way around. Threats to the state are likely to be internalized by such leaders as challenges to their position of authority and prestige. Also, leaders who have a strong sense of nationalism will see their political opponents as either allies or adversaries, and they will be eager to point the finger at them for the nation's issues. They have a tendency to ignore or explain away any shortcomings in their own country and to view only its positive elements. As a consequence, these leaders are more inclined to demonize others or blame outside threats for social issues in order to rally the support of their followers. In the worst case scenario, they may keep their nation militarily active eternally to combat the external* danger. Politics is a zero-sum game where one side's loss is another side's gain; it is a conflict between good and evil, the righteous and the unjust, the noble and the degenerate. To prevent his or her country from losing, a leader must continuously be on guard, or be fast to interpret ambiguous circumstances as victories. Very nationalistic leaders often prefer to surround themselves with advisors who are devoted to their objectives and aims; advisors who take any independent initiative run the danger

of being blamed for any failing initiatives themselves. Politics is often seen by leaders as the art of fending off dangers, especially when they combine a strong feeling of nationalism with a high level of mistrust of outsiders. A profound mistrust of other people emphasizes all that has just been mentioned about leaders who have a strong sense of nationalism. Such leaders will constantly be skeptical of the motivations and deeds of others, seeing hidden agendas and schemes when none may exist. These leaders can only react, therefore they must be very watchful and strive to foresee what will happen if they are to have any impact over events. Moreover, the others—the enemies—are seen as "pulling the strings" and being in command of what occurs. Moreover, they will develop a hypersensitive response to criticism, often believing that they have received it when others would not. These leaders are always on the lookout for threats to their position of power or identity.

Hussein is anticipated to demonstrate this kind of leadership given his strong ratings on nationalism and mistrust of outsiders. As a result, he is likely to take most decisions alone—advisers are people who carry out decisions, not people who make them—act deliberately, but frequently interpret situations as threatening and demanding even when that was not the intention of the people involved, take risky actions in anticipation of what will happen, be extremely sensitive to criticism, and be very controlling of those around him. He aspires to triumph in the chess game of politics; doing so calls for alertness, tact, and a readiness to take chances.

The Requirement for Strength and Task Concentration

Leaders' motivations may be inferred from information about their needs for power and job attention. A high task focus score suggests a strong interest in success; a low task concentration score suggests a concern with other people's emotions and sensibilities and, as a result, a desire for affiliation/approval/support. In the comparative politics literature, charismatic leaders have been identified as those with intermediate task concentration attribute scores. When the circumstance demands it, they may focus on finding solutions, but they can also shift their attention to become interested in the thoughts and emotions of others when the occasion calls for it. The charismatic leader is somewhat adaptable, adjusting motivation to circumstance in an effort to satisfy what he or she believes to be the requirements of the people. The demand for power measures a leader's desire to exert authority and control over individuals and organizations.

Leaders with Hussein's motivation scores often exhibit a certain magnetic appeal, but they employ this charm in a profoundly Machiavellian manner. Depending on the situation and the leader's objectives, they may be considerate of others or put their attention on solving a problem. Such leaders try to control their surroundings in order to hold onto power and project an image of success. They are skilled in assessing circumstances and determining the best strategies to use to accomplish their goals. In practice, other individuals and organizations are seen as tools for the leader's purposes; trickery and dishonesty are seen as inherent in the game of politics. These leaders are more effective when they can communicate with individuals engaged personally as opposed to when they must deal with significant constituencies remotely. They risk misjudging the presumptions the other person is making and how far they are ready to go in the absence of face-to-face engagement.

Leaders with Hussein's kind of motivational style might be excellent to their followers and make it easier for them to hold onto power. But, these leaders are not always motivated by morality or conscience, nor are they necessarily emotionally involved in the people they govern. Their ties

have a function. Advisers must be willing to carry out the leader's orders regardless of the results in order to stay in the leader's inner circle. A perceived challenge to the leader's power might lead to dismissal, exile, or even death, therefore they must be on the lookout for changes in the leader's strategy and go along with him.

Since they constantly seem to be one step ahead and are skilled at gaining what they want—often at the cost of the other party—leaders with this motivation pattern may be extremely tough to influence. It is important to consider how to present ideas and facts so that these leaders seem to have their best interests in mind; otherwise, they may pursue or be drawn to self-serving overtures. Yet given his desire to maintain control and influence over what is occurring, it is crucial to put oneself in the leader's position when phrasing suggestions in this manner and analyze how he is likely to interpret the current conditions. A rival will have to offer something in order to get something in return, according to the language of the bazaar merchant; bartering and negotiating help these leaders understand what is feasible and the effects of moving closer to their objectives. Before sticking to a course of action, leaders with this motivation pattern will push the envelope.

Intellectual complexity and self-assurance

Scores on the traits of conceptual complexity and self-assurance reveal the kind of incentive structures that leaders are likely to utilize with advisors, subordinates, and other leaders as well as how open they will be to input from others and the environment in the decision-making process. In comparison to other heads of state, Hussein scores highly on self-confidence and somewhat on intellectual complexity.

When a leader's trait confidence score is higher than their trait conceptual complexity score, they are more likely to make moral decisions and have more ethical interactions with others. Such leaders spend their time convincing others that their course of action is the right one since they are clear on what they want and what ought to occur. They are not beyond using coercion or cunning strategies to get their way and get their way alone. Threats are really seen as a justifiable motivator for getting others to do something. These leaders look for evidence to support their claims and strengthen their capacity to persuade others of the right course of action. Instead than focusing on what would be the best, most practical, or most cost-effective course of action given the circumstances and context, the emphasis is on creating a compelling case for an already chosen path of action. To convince this kind of leader that a strategy is flawed or unworkable, a string of failures must occur. But, if persuaded, these leaders may demonstrate a marked change in behavior and can make a compelling case for why the change was required given the country's objective. They analyze the world and politics while learning about other people's perspectives. Only becomes crucial when trying to convince someone of anything or when determining who needs to be convinced[7].

To keep control over the outcome, leaders with this pattern of scores often structure the decision-making process in a hierarchical manner. Because of their ability to disclose or withhold information, this sort of organization may act as the center of the informational wheel, making them the exclusive source of all knowledge. Because of their moderate conceptual complexity, they continually scan their surroundings for information that will enable them to keep control over the process and who participates in putting plans into effect. These leaders won't place well in polls to determine the "most popular leader," but they are often revered or feared for their abilities, and they stand out and cannot be ignored.

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS IN GENERAL

Hussein's score distribution implies that he has an expansionist political orientation. It has been shown that leaders that exhibit greater expansionist conduct tend to have higher levels of nationalism, a drive for power, mistrust of others, and self-confidence. Similar to such leaders, Hussein views the political world as highly unstable and full of dangers; the only way for him and Iraq to have any power or influence in this world is for him to maintain control over what he currently has and to work to increase his power and authority in his region through initiatives like building and maintaining a variety of weapons, invading neighbors' territory, influencing world oil prices, and posing challenges to the international community. Hussein's profile is extremely reminiscent of that of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, and Fidel Castro. Each of these leaders aspired to play a more significant role on the global stage than their country's size or resources permitted. Each centralized power in his government, thought of himself as the government, had a deep mistrust of others' motives, expertly used scapegoating to inflame the nationalism of their supporters, dealt with the superpowers of the time in a highly Machiavellian manner, and gave the impression to the rest of the world that he knew where he was going and was in charge of getting there. For these leaders, pressure from the outside world merely heightened the difficulty and the stakes of the game—making politics more exciting and even fatal. Threats did not seem to have been as effective in controlling their conduct as face-to-face negotiation or offering them a temporary position on the big power stage. These leaders, however, always declared themselves the victors to their people whenever they caved in or were compelled to capitulate[8].

CONCLUSION

Together, the stories of Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein provide insight into how the three primary motivations could combine to create two fundamental aspects of political motivation. The connection between the goals and the reasons for power reveals how the leader views politics: as a setting for achieving goals, as a setting for displaying one's own power, or as both. If the accomplishment motivation rules, as it did for Clinton throughout the campaign and the first few years of his first term, the leader is more likely to experience dissatisfaction as the political process eats away their properly formulated and logically articulated aims and ambitions. On the other side, if the desire for power rules, as it did with Saddam Hussein, the leader may see politics as a stage for the merciless and unrestrained expression of his whim and will. A more practical and successful approach to politics is correlated with a balance of these two motivations, as in Clinton's case. Depending on how comfortable and threatened the leader feels, the affiliation motivation may have a variety of political impacts.

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CHAPTER 25

GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

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ABSTRACT:

The theory-practice gap develops when practitioners find it difficult to apply the information, they have learned in a classroom setting to actual clinical practice. There sometimes seems to be a gap between what is seen as best practice and actual practice as standards of care continue to change. In this chapter author is discusses the gap between parts and wholes.

KEYWORDS:

Complexity, Leadership, Nationalism, Profile, Trait.

INTRODUCTION

In any leadership profile, the stability of the features is a key consideration. Do Hussein's ratings essentially stay the same during the course of his term in office, during interviews with both local and international media, and when he speaks about many important subjects? If there is minimal change in the scores when the context changes, we may be certain that we are evaluating the leader's personality; at the very least, we know that he does not seem to be reacting to the circumstance. When the characteristic scores are higher, it is simpler to predict what a leader will do politically; when the scores are lower, the researcher or analyst must take into account contextual elements when determining how to influence the leader and what he or she is likely to do[1], [2].

According to a statistical approach, Hussein's ratings were typically s throughout time, audience, and issue. Among the twenty-one potential modifications, only five were statistically significant. Overall, Hussein fits the previously established leadership profile in the majority of his situations. Yet, the statistically significant variations certainly highlight Hussein's leadership style and will be addressed in more depth. The features that differed significantly across the different kinds of situations are shown in 17.2.

Hussein may come across as more dogmatic and rigid than he really is in the international community and with respect to Iraq's place in the world in the wake of the Gulf War and UN inspections, according to the variations in his conceptual complexity ratings across time and audience. Given his ratings for domestic press interviews from 1979 to 1990, he is significantly more adaptable than these results suggest. When contrasted to the mental complexity of other Middle Eastern leaders and 87 heads of state, these later ratings would be seen to be high. The results suggest that Hussein may be highly complicated and pragmatist when he needs or thinks he needs more information to determine what to do or to keep his power and influence. Yet, when he has made up his mind or feels cornered, his language will turn quite rigid and principled; he will be acting morally. Yet, he might just be posturing, offering the "difficult"

negotiation stance as his first move, and testing the opponent. If the opposition does not respond, Hussein has shown his point; if they do, the negotiation process has started. Hussein's intricacies in thought and some degree of pragmatism will show throughout the negotiation. Given Hussein's Machiavellian tendencies, discussions with him are best conducted in person or via a very reliable intermediary. He is less prone than when the negotiations take place at a distance to misread or misconstrue what is achievable for his own objectives[2]–[5].

Hussein is sensitive to challenges and problems, according to the statistics; three of the seven qualities showed statistically significant variations depending on the subject at hand. It is simpler to comprehend his concentration on issues given his tendency to see the world as full of hazards that must be dealt with. He must confront these dangers head-on in order to keep his influence and authority, which requires continual vigilance. This responsiveness, however, suggests that one method to learn Hussein's viewpoint on a matter is to decipher the language he uses to express it in speeches and interviews.

National-ism was one of the characteristics that varied greatly by issue. Hussein obviously modulated and enhanced his focus on nationalism depending on the aim, even though all the measures for nationalism by issue were high when compared to Middle Eastern leaders and eighty-seven heads of state. His nationalism is still strong, but when discussing relations with other governments and states, both Arabic and non-Arab, it is more moderated and "courting" in tone. In contrast, when he perceives trouble, his nationalism intensifies and his focus shifts to contrasting how good Iraq is with how bad the specific opposition is. He does, in fact, have a tendency to "rage" at individuals who bother him. In certain situations, there are unmistakable adversaries, and they are at fault. When he senses a danger to himself, his nationalistic ratings are higher than his mean score, and when he sees a chance to advance his aims, they are lower than his mean score. This discrepancy in scores might be seen as a possible indicative of what he views as opportunities and risks. Due to his overall strong nationalism and the fact that two-thirds of the six issues constitute dangers, this is likely to be the balance in any analysis of his speech[6]–[8].

The demand for power was another Key quality that differed statistically significantly between themes. According to the literature on this motivation, people express this urge when they are in circumstances where they are seeking power and feel they do not already possess it. This more general conclusion tends to be reflected in Hussein's ratings on several issues. In his comments on domestic politics and the Gulf War, he exhibits less desire for power. In compared to Middle Eastern leaders and the eighty-seven heads of state, both of these need for power ratings are low. In each of these situations, Hussein had authority and was still using it. His replies to interviewers' questions concerning ties with other Arab and non-Arab governments and his comments about the Iran-Iraq War were examples of where he was looking for greater authority and influence. When compared to the leaders in the comparison groups, all three of the need for power ratings are high. This is the point when Hussein's Machiavellianism will be most obvious. He'll probably try a variety of strategies to increase his influence. If such conduct seems to have a good possibility of succeeding, he will be attractive; otherwise, he will come across as a bully. Hussein will push himself to the edge in each situation to see how much power he can hold onto or gain before it begins to work against him. The disparities in the desire for power scores reveal Hussein's level of cunning and likelihood to take risks in order to achieve his goals. The subjects with the highest marks also tend to be those where Hussein wants to exert greater control.

The mistrust of others was the last trait where there were notable variations among themes. Hussein's mistrust of others scores reveal who he holds responsible for his predicament and the problems in Iraq. In compared to the Middle Eastern leaders and the group of eighty-seven heads of state, he scored well for his comments on the Kurds, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Gulf War. Others are at fault for what is occurring, for causing commotion, and for making it difficult for him to succeed. Hussein may dismiss anyone who he believes harm him since he is in charge of determining domestic policy. He has power over what occurs. So, take notice that the score for mistrust of others in relation to domestic political debate is low. Hussein holds himself accountable for Iraq's successes while blaming others for its failures. Unless one does not mind Hussein claiming credit for what an outsider could see as something he or she done to aid Iraq, such a political viewpoint is difficult to challenge.

Beliefs and Integrative Complexity of Saddam Hussein

The biographies of Saddam Hussein in this book concentrate on his integrative complexities and views during several eras of his rule as the president of Iraq. His cognitions' substance and organization are two components of the object assessment process that both reflect reality and reveal the leader's personality. The writers of this article identify diagnostic and choice propensities in Saddam Hussein's operational code and look at the integrative complexity of his cognitive processes to gauge how they could affect the Iraqi leader's conduct in the parts that follow.

Beliefs in the operational code and object evaluation

Based on a limited sample of six speeches from official sources during a period of three years in the late 1990s, the study of Saddam Hussein's operational code that follows is presented below. Each utterance was machine-coded using Profiler+, a program for automated content analysis, according to the VICS coding guidelines. Since the coding procedure was automated and completely repeatable, the findings are quite reliable. The examination of Hussein's views that follows compares their direction and intensity to the mean VICS scores for a typical group of 20 global leaders from various times and places.

The degree of generalizability from the sample to the population of speeches and other public remarks made by the Iraqi leader will determine how reliable the findings are. As the sample does not span a significant amount of time, its generalizability is constrained unless it is assumed that operational code beliefs are character characteristics rather than mental states. The amount of variety in the research on this subject has caused researchers to warn that the following profile may only be accurate for the time period in which the data were collected.

Political Leader Evaluation: A Comparison of Theory and Practice

Academic circles and the policy community continue to have heated discussions on the development of attempts to evaluate how leaders affect the path of events. The end of the cold war period brought to a world without the superpower rivalry's bipolar power structure, which sparked concerns about how predictable the new strategic environment would be. Jervis compared the rigidity of the cold war system with the uncertainty of the post-cold war world, arguing that the latter setting would place a greater emphasis on cognitive and other psychological processes.

This assessment of the potential importance of political leaders is consistent with Greenstein's basic requirements of "action dispensability" and "actor dispensability," which are required for "personality" to be significant in explaining and forecasting political outcomes. By choosing political figures in critical positions in the post-cold war climate, this volume's concentration on a president of the United States and a significant leader in the Middle East as case studies has expanded this reasoning. As the last superpower during its unipolar period following the cold war and the leader of a rogue state situated at the crossroads of the world's primary energy source, respectively, Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein are examples of political leaders whose actions are likely to be indispensable in explaining significant outcomes in world politics. The personalities of both lead actors may also have a significant impact and show each actor's importance in the resolution of conflicts and the coordination of cooperation among states in the Middle East to the extent that the post-cold war environment is weakly structured and highly charged emotionally. The efforts made by Bill Clinton towards the conclusion of his presidency to aid the Arab-Israeli peace process serve as an example of both the potential for a leader to have a big effect and the challenges that face those in positions of strategic influence. Saddam Hussein's sustained resistance to international criticism and sanctions shows the crucial significance that one actor's political image had in determining Iraq's ties with the rest of the world both during and after the Persian Gulf War.

An justification for investing academic talent and government resources in the evaluation of political leadership is made by this kind of examination of the strategic relevance of political leaders and their personalities as significant causal mechanisms for understanding and forecasting global politics. It serves as a brief for two study strands that were first mentioned in i. According to this perspective, it is more crucial than ever to conduct basic research in the academy in the field of political psychology and to implement applied leadership research inside the U.S. government in order to gain perspective on the prospects for peace and progress in the twenty-first century. There are various gaps between and within the academic and policy sectors that must be filled for this information to impact academics' understanding and policymakers' debates.

The phrase "bridging the gap" refers to Alexander George's seminal book of the same name, which was published with funding from the US Institute for Peace. George described the separation between knowledge and action in his writing about the policy and academic sectors. He contends that whereas policymakers require information about individual players and issues in foreign policy in order to take action, academic knowledge is arranged along theoretical and general lines in order to understand international relations. The demand for information that is important to policy and the supply of academic knowledge are separated by these organizational differences, and this gap has to be filled.

A confidence gap between the two cultures of academic theory and governmental practice accompanies this distinction. Each world's inhabitants have misgivings about what the other does. George claims that professionals disagree with academics' attempts to scientifically ground their findings in broad theoretical terms, particularly when given in quantitative form or generated in well-regulated laboratory settings. Such attempts are seen as making flimsy generalizations based on insufficient information, which might result in forecasts that are irrelevant and a delusion of control over foreign policy.

Academics have their own concerns about policy-makers' adoption of an antiquated realism theory of international relations, which emphasizes the use of power and results in oversimplified analyses of policy issues. Worse are theoretic judgments that are based on implicit presumptions or inaccurate historical comparisons, such as the failure of the British to pacify Germany at Munich or the American inability to stop a surprise assault by Japan on Pearl Harbor. Due to the inclusion of political concerns in intelligence estimates, which perpetuate erroneous pictures that suit the interests of the policymaker, other intelligence failures result from representations of the outside world not being submitted to social scientific analysis.

Ironically, there are comparable disparities amongst schools of thought within the academic discipline of international relations, which adds to the comedy of these gaps between academics and practitioners. Realistic is still one of the major paradigms for the organization of knowledge in this subject, despite challenge from liberalism and constructivism. Each of these ideas has a structural bias that holds that the conduct of international relations is not much influenced by the particular leader. Depending on the paradigm in question, leaders are viewed by realists as logical analysts of the connections between national objectives and national power, liberals as conformists to the laws embodied in national or international institutions, and constructivists as constrained by cultural norms produced within and between societies. These schools of thought lack a robust theory of agency, which would allow for the possibility that individual variations among leaders may result in significant systematic changes in international politics.

The decision-making school of foreign policy thought has long maintained that a strong theory of agency is necessary in order to address this issue. These theorists would restrict universal structural propositions to contingent generalizations supported by intervening causal mechanisms connecting structural factors to foreign policy choices and inter-national outcomes. George is another supporter of this viewpoint in the academic community. Yet, structural theorists of international relations did not pay much attention to this idea until quite recently. Neorealist knowledge claims should be restricted to emerging processes and consequences among states at the systemic level of analysis, some realists and their detractors argue. Neoliberal institutionalists are beginning to acknowledge the significance of individual level analytical procedures and situations. The conventional and critical camps of constructivists disagree on whether and how to address the agent-structure dilemma, and this disagreement has caused division within the movement. But, despite all of this focus, there is still a disconnect between academic structural theories and the decision-making process.

In conclusion, it is ironic that structural theorists of decision-making see these theories as underdeveloped models that provide shaky generalizations based on insufficient evidence. This expertise may result in forecasts that are irrelevant and a false feeling of assurance that one can understand and influence foreign policy, which is the same criticism of academic work by practitioners that George previously mentioned. This mutual understanding of the limitations of broad theories of international relations ought to serve as a foundation for a successful discussion between decision-making theorists and real decision-makers concerning particular players in international politics.

Although many government professionals intuitively understand this idea, they often go farther than their academic colleagues and choose to ignore the need for explanation in favor of seeing each leader and circumstance as unique. They are more concerned with the actual instance that a

model is seeking to describe than they are with ideal kinds. By doing thus, they fall victim to "the error of mistaken concreteness." This action is rejected by decision-making theorists who are interested in causal mechanisms as well as proponents of the search for structural-covering rules. They contend that a specific concrete representation of a situation is merely one among an infinite number of feasible models, and that the true nature of the case can only be ascertained by an abstract formulation of the interpretation susceptible to counterfactual reasoning.

What are the consequences of these discussions among academics and practitioners for evaluating the information in this volume, then? The good news is that a focus on leaders as causal actors turns out to be a solid bet for defining robust explanations of social processes and outcomes. This is part of the micro-foundations approach to social science. The bad news is that there isn't much hope for using a universal structural theory to generate accurate general predictions. Instead, fine-grained analyses and succinct causal narratives of political processes and results are based on middle-range theories informed by ideal types and the meticulous empirical analysis of distinctions across examples within each type. Thus, an emphasis on individual distinctions may result in accurate conjectures and predictions about certain players.

The Distance between Components and Wholes

The contributions made by political psychologists in this collection provide examples of a variety of analytical models and empirical approaches for pinpointing personality-based causal processes that influence political outcomes and choices. How these various analyses connect to one another is one subject that instantly arises for investigation. By posing this issue, one is likely to provide light on potential areas for future study as well as the advantages and disadvantages of combining different methodologies. The challenge of connecting parts and wholes is expected to elicit a variety of answers from academics and practitioners in the future.

Using three sources of information is one solution. The same leader is probably the focus of more than one strategy that anticipates a common aspect of a leader's conduct, such as a style of negotiating or a tendency for taking risks. The extent to which the forecasts are similar will depend on how each technique is used. The degrees of fit between the forecast and the result will be determined by comparing the predictions made by each strategy with the subsequent behavior of the leader. Confidence in the forecast of future instances is expected to rise if the findings overlap, or triangulate. Several of the writers to this collection have previously mentioned this solution in their biographies of George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.

A second answer is to integrate the elements of each method to fit them into the lines of a broad "map" of political and psychological activity. The extensive contributions to this book by Post and Renshon, which imply a spatial and temporal hierarchy among the parts of a leader's personality, include varied degrees of this kind of technique. Post and Renshon emphasize that a leader's constellation of personality or characterological features constrains the variety of cognitive states. In turn, formative events in the person's life history are what give rise to these essential personality traits.

A comparative leader approach, which determines scope circumstances under which certain personality traits of the leader are likely to be politically significant, serves as a third response. This methodology is used particularly well in the contributions by Hermann and Weintraub, who stress the necessity to compare a leader to a norming group in order to determine whether or not their standardized score for a certain personality attribute is above or below normal. A leader's

political conduct may be affected more often by deviations from the norm. In Winter's contribution to this volume, he extends this method throughout time by comparing scores for the same leader to a norming group in an attempt to predict changes in his behavior when certain attributes are sparked by shifting circumstances.

A fourth technique, known as a context-contingent reaction, looks at how a leader's personality and the situation in which they are acting interact. The contribution of Suedfeld, Guttieri, and Tetlock underlines the need to take changes in conditions like stress, responsibility, and value conflict into consideration when determining the arousal of various degrees of integrative complexity and its effects on information processing and behavioral choice. Walker, Schafer, and Young's research of beliefs in this book also stresses how a leader's philosophical appraisal of the situation and his or her instrumental propensities for action in selecting strategies, tactics, and movements interact. Another example of this approach of research is Renshon's focus on the dependent nature of the link between a leader's character and various leadership responsibilities.

A typological approach is a fifth reaction in which various personality traits are consolidated or reduced to a number of kinds. The typologies may be inductive and practical reductions based on prior empirical or clinical research. For example, Hermann's leader types were created based on psychological literature, while Post's clinical types were taken from the DSM-IV handbook of personality disorders. A deductive approach to establishing a typology may be seen in the operational code typology of belief systems created by Holsti and conceptually connected with motivations for power, accomplishment, and affiliation by Walker.

The search for conduct that is compatible with the leader's fundamental character, which was developed early in life and shown in a number of circumstances over a lengthy period of time, is the sixth reaction. The analysis of Woodrow Wilson by George and George, which heavily relies on an account of Wilson's early socialization within his family of origin and the consistency in his behavior throughout his terms of office—first as president of Princeton University, then as governor of New Jersey, and finally as president of the United States—is the classic presentation of this approach. These writers continue the emphasis on Bill Clinton's family of origin experiences and Saddam Hussein's early socialization from their separate chapters in this book in order to analyze recurring patterns of conduct in each leader as an adult throughout their respective political careers.

In cases when there are overlapping personality or behavioral qualities, all of these tactics will also result in some evaluation of the degree of conceptual comparability and empirical connection among the different approaches. Is it appropriate for the authors of this book to utilize notions like risk orientation, cognitive style, demands for power, accomplishment, affiliation, control over historical development, and conceptual complexity? Do they convey the same meaning, then? If so, how well correlated are the indicators used to quantify them? The indicators will be able to be utilized interchangeably based on the data that is available for a given leader if the answers to these two questions are "yes."

The validity of the measurements has to be qualified if either one or both of the responses is "no." Maybe they are gauging several features or various aspects of the same characteristic. If the former, then the applications of the fundamental idea are in some ways incommensurable. If it is the latter, then perhaps they may be fruitfully combined into an overall index. The discussion by Suedfeld, Guttieri, and Tetlock in this volume about the initial use of conceptual complexity to refer to a personality trait and the growing realization that it also varies across contexts serves as

an example of these potential difficulties and prior attempts to grapple with them. This empirical finding led to a distinction between conceptual complexity and integrative complexity to distinguish between the default value and the arousal value within the context of cognitive manager theory.

Future Applications

Future applications of these methods of leadership analysis will have a difficult time connecting their individual models to various facets of a leader's political conduct. The establishment of relevant and reliable metrics of such behavior is the largest hurdle. While the authors have spent a lot of time developing personality measurements, they have made very little effort to systematically observe the leaders' decision-making and behavior. For evaluating academic research and practical applications, this gap must be filled. It is challenging to determine the predictive and explanatory capacity of the causal process that is alleged to have produced the result unless the outcome is well defined and quantified. Depending on the breadth of the causal assertions made by the leadership model, the size of this assignment varies.

The explanation and forecast of bargaining and problem-solving techniques with rather basic features are the primary foci of cognitive models of object evaluation systems. Which approach is most likely to be used by the leader: a cooperative or confrontational strategy, reciprocity-based conditional tactics, or appeasement-based unconditional tactics? Will a leader's term in power be brief or lengthy? Is it more probable than not that a job will be successfully performed? These results pose rather straightforward issues as dependent variables, and they are amenable to quantify at a degree of measurement comparable with the independent variables in the causal mechanisms that guide the research.

The Hermann and Winter personality models, which center on the mediation of self and others, have a wider range of applications and can be used to explain a leader's choice of advisors and processing of advice, management style when dealing with subordinates, propensity for taking risks, negotiation style, as well as the behavioral results of decision-making processes. Weintraub sees emotional states like anxiety, moodiness, and wrath as well as even more general personality qualities like inventiveness, impulsivity, and indecisiveness as the roots of prospective political activities in his personality analysis. Developing measurements for new variables, adapting measures created by others, or extrapolating links to behavioral variables from laboratory studies and earlier research are challenges that come with this expansion.

Post and Renshon argue that a leader's fundamental personality constrains and influences other personality traits as well as political action since the analysis's overall focus is on the processes of externalization and ego defense. Instead of using a quantitative study that produces indications of behavior or personality, their technique instead employs an interpretative examination of story evidence. This study either identifies a personality type—narcissistic, obsessive-compulsive, or paranoid—or a group of dimensions—aspiration, integrity, and relatedness—that are hypothesized to produce certain behavioral and personality traits. Without using a quantitative measuring approach, the analyses' heuristic value serves as the foundation for other leaders' observers to understand how personality and conduct are related.

Effective approaches for characterizing political leadership are crucial, regardless of how they are implemented. The post-cold war international environment of the United Nations has made it more acute. The requirement for quick and sophisticated profiling of a new variety of adversaries

grows as attacks from relatively unknown and unfamiliar sources become more frequent. In the twenty-first century, there will likely be a variety of situations for leadership evaluation, including the following circumstances.

The Emergence of Outlaw Nations and Rogue Leaders

The end of the cold war has been unsettling, creating an unpredictable international environment where rogue leaders of lawless countries regularly cause significant political crises rather than a "peace dividend." A number of regional confrontations have taken the role of the formerly well-known and predictable superpower competition, often sparked by the deeds of little-known or poorly understood leaders. Destructive power has multiplied, with more destructive power now in the hands of tiny, autonomous leadership groups with negative political objectives against the United States. The most concerning countries—Iraq, North Korea, and Iran—are governed by unpredictable dictatorships. Names like Saddam Hussein, Kim Jung-Il, Mohammad Farah Aideed, Radovan Karadzic, Slobodan Milosevic, and Osama bin Laden have dominated the headlines during the last several years.

A number of these leaders either already possess WMD or are actively seeking to acquire them. A nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein would have completely altered the course of the Gulf Conflict. William Perry, a former secretary of defense for the United States, described a nuclear-armed North Korea as a "horror scenario." Given Yeltsin's deteriorating health and precarious hold on power, an extreme nationalist winning the presidency of Russia would not have been entirely out of the question. As political and economic unrest increased, the thought of a Vladimir Zhirinovskiy-like figure with his finger on the nuclear button would have been truly terrifying.

Reducing Dangerous Conflict

Alexan- El George emphasized the need of having precise models of the psychology of the enemies while discussing the difficulty of engaging in successful coercive diplomacy. Effective diplomacy in a contentious scenario cannot progress without precise and unambiguous models of leadership psychology, much as with information campaigns. This concept was carried further in the work of the Carnegie Commission on Avoiding Deadly War. They emphasized how important leadership is, both in promoting and averting fatal conflict. Clear actor-specific models of their psychology and decision-making are a bare need to successfully fight leaders that advocate fatal war, such as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and Osama bin Laden.

The Need for Low-Intensity Conflict Resolution

Many political-military experts are convinced that low-intensity conflict—insurgencies and terrorism—will continue to be a prominent feature of the security environment of the twenty-first century and will increasingly demand our attention, despite the military conflicts in the Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While there have been fewer terrorist attacks, they have become more deadly, and effective countering of terrorism has become a top concern due to the destructiveness of terrorist groups and organizations, including the potential use of WMDs. Two striking instances emphasize this idea. The Aum Supreme Truth's poison gas strike on the Tokyo subways turned a dreaded nightmare into a horrific reality. The guru Shoko Asahara's personality and decision-making processes for this apocalyptic millenarian cult had a decisive impact on the choice to launch a large-scale program to create nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

The bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania foretold the horrifying devastation of the World Trade Center in Manhattan, showing the perils of the new form of terrorism. An all-encompassing new kind of terrorism known as transnational terrorism has evolved, with Osama bin Laden at the head of a particularly hazardous organization. In his strikes on US targets, he has repeatedly threatened to use WMDs. The likelihood of terrorists committing nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorism has grown as the obstacles to mass casualty terrorism have lessened. Understanding the motivations of leaders like Osama bin Laden and Shoko Asahara in-depth is necessary to combat this new level of danger. The psychological operations concept, which was created and used in conventional combat, is crucial to the fight against terrorism, but its potent methods have not been modified to fit the evolving nature of low-intensity conflict. The characteristics of the target must be identified in order to successfully use psychological operations against terrorism, notably the target's leadership and decision-making style. Without a thorough grasp of a group's leaders and decision-making processes, which vary greatly from group to group, one cannot successfully target that group.

The revolution in military affairs brought forth by information warfare

While low-intensity combat will continue to be a significant component of the security environment in the twenty-first century, information has been recognized as the key component in light of the evolving nature of warfare. A revolution in military relations has been dubbed the significance of information in offensive and defensive strategy decisions. After the Gulf War, the fight for control of the media landscape was virtually uncontested as Saddam Hussein successfully reframed the war for his radical Arab constituency and improved his image and leadership position. Slobodan Milosevic skillfully fought the NATO air campaign's military advantage in Kosovo by controlling the information environment, redefining the conflict in a way that strengthened the Serbian people's resolve and increased his popularity. By equating himself with Marshall Tito, Clinton with Hitler, and NATO with the Nazis, he achieved this. The skillful and deft manipulation of the media environment by Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein badly impacted the progress of these asymmetric tactics.

And take into account how quickly US public opinion on the Somalia invasion shifted. At first, the broadcast image of malnourished Somali children moved the American people emotionally, and they backed the humanitarian intervention wholeheartedly. The sight of US troops' corpses being dragged behind a Somali warlord's jeeps, however, quickly increased pressure to leave lest more Americans perish. Whether intentional or not, Mohammad Farah Aideed, the warlord of Somalia, executed a very successful psychological operation here. It is also obvious that Saddam Hussein thinks the United States has a "Vietnam Complex" and that the high number of American losses on the battlefield might cause internal unrest and a deadlock.

While significant resources are being allocated to information warfare, it is essential to employ cutting-edge methods for identifying the leadership's behavioral characteristics of the opponent. One cannot influence a foe they do not comprehend. What discourages one adversary could inspire another. The objective is psychological at its core and for maximum efficacy must include both an understanding and major psychological component. To do this, you must be able to quickly and correctly simulate the enemy's leadership mentally. The profiling methods outlined in this book show how to get there. In crisis scenarios, high-level negotiations, estimative intelligence, and summit meetings, they have been used to evaluate the personalities of foreign political and military leaders. These techniques have been used to study changes in their threat

potential as well as the intentions of foreign political and military leaders, as well as the effects of foreign policy events on their psychological well-being and political viewpoints.

Accurate assessments of leader psychology must be created quickly and continuously monitored during crises due to the speed with which international conflicts may "become critical" and the disastrous effects of miscalculation. Several of the writers in this collection are making encouraging strides in using computer-assisted content analysis, and it is believed that in the not-too-distant future, it will be possible to analyze major leaders' psychological states online. Understanding how the leader's mental state changes during a complicated politico-military crisis, like the Gulf War sparked by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, may help crisis managers predict the leader's next action or how they will likely react to others' efforts. Similar to this, in a terrorist hostage or barricade crisis, quick changes in a leader's profile might indicate a significant rise in the risk to the hostages' lives and point to the need for a SWAT team intervention rather than hostage discussions. Real-time measurements might help spot key junctures in international discussions, foretelling the other side's disposition to make concessions.

CONCLUSION

The core of politics, in the eyes of many leaders, is people, and they are keenly interested in the motivations of both their friends and enemies. A more knowledgeable leadership will be able to navigate the perilous shoals of national and international seas more skillfully, and reliable techniques for psychologically assessing political leaders will help with that crucial duty. Such information may assist in the formulation of policies without taking the place of the political acumen required for efficient leadership. George makes the point that even the most knowledgeable leader must be able to weigh the pros and cons of looking for high-quality options, negotiating for agreement on the decision, and devoting time and other resources to looking and negotiating. Knowing the key stakeholders when analyzing a policy issue might at least assist avoid choosing a solution that is so compromised by trade-offs in the decision-making process that it is useless in addressing the issues with the target population of the political process.

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