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Publics, Politics and Participation in Middle East and North Africa



Dr. Uma Warrier
Dr. Anita Walia

ALEXIS PRESS
JERSEY CITY, USA

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Published by: Alexis Press, LLC, Jersey City, USA
www.alexispress.us

First Published 2022

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Publics, Politics and Participation in Middle East and North Africa by *Dr. Uma Warrier, Dr. Anita Walia*

ISBN 978-1-64532-368-6

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CHAPTER 1

PUBLICS AND POLITICS IN MIDDLE EAST

Dr. Uma Warrier, Professor, Department of OB & HR, CMS Business School,
JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-umawarrier@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

The intricate relationship between publics and politics plays a crucial role in shaping the dynamics and outcomes of modern societies. This abstract provides an overview of the key themes, theories, and implications surrounding the interplay between publics and politics.The concept of publics refers to diverse groups of individuals who come together around shared interests, concerns, or identities, and who engage in collective action to influence the political landscape. Publics are not homogenous; they encompass a wide range of social, cultural, and ideological perspectives. Understanding the composition, formation, and mobilization of publics is essential to comprehending the complex nature of political systems.Politics, on the other hand, encompasses the processes through which power is exercised, decisions are made, and resources are allocated within a society. Political systems can take various forms, including democracies, autocracies, and hybrid regimes, each with its own mechanisms of public engagement and participation. Publics can exert influence on politics through a variety of channels, including voting, protests, advocacy, and social media.

KEYWORDS:

Activism, Authoritarianism, Civil Society, Democracy, Dictatorship, Electoral Politics.

INTRODUCTION

The air and ground Israeli strikes on the Gaza Strip, the Middle East and North Africa area was once again engulfed in a fresh wave of intense violence as 2008 came to a conclusion and this book was nearing completion. While Arab leaders crisscrossed the region in quest of an elusive shared strategy and reaction, Arab people flooded onto the streets in protest, mostly against their own governments but also against Israel and those who support it in the West. The United Nations Security Council met in deadlock after deadlock while pictures of casualties and combatants filled televisions all over the globe[1].The Middle East was once again fixed as a theater of action, whose publics are only seen to the world via bloodshed, misery, and dissatisfaction, thanks to the repetitive media depictions. However, the rehearsed claims made by Western observers about "cycles of violence in the Middle East" covered up significant changes in the balance of power and the public's reaction both inside the area and outside of it. While some Arab nations extended out to Iran and the Muslim nations of South and Southeast Asia, others coordinated their actions and responses with Turkey. The massive public outrage in Turkey over Gaza outweighed that in the Arab world and even Iran. The transnational mobilization of Arab, Middle Eastern, and Muslim populations throughout Europe, North and South America, and Australia was much more apparent than before, and many of them seemed to be more aligned than before with friendly political groups in their home countries[2], [3].

The "Arab Street," whose alleged demise had been greatly exaggerated by the Wall Street Journal in 20011, became a virtual transnational thoroughfare, with the Al Jazeera network playing a crucial role in connecting commentary and responses from all over the world and living up to their claim of being the only international network reporting directly from Gaza.The end of the first decade of the 21st century appears to be heralding a re-regionalization and a shifting landscape of state and society across the Middle East and North Africa, along with the global financial crisis, which particularly affected the oil economy and markets of the Gulf States in ways that have yet to fully manifest themselves. Both the growth and fading of Islamic politics and influence are shown by the spectacular elections in Iran and Lebanon. The media-tion of information and political response, publics made visible through street protests and demonstrations, old and new forums for regional and interregional deliberation and decision-makingall of these point to the increasing relevance of situating the public sphere in this region, not only for understanding the underlying dynamics of public mobilization and the means through which it is achieved, but also for clarifying the implications for state, society, and the economy[4].

Locating the public sphere in the Middle East and North Africa

Given how heavily this concept is influenced by normalized Habermasian principles of critical debate, communicative consensus, deliberative reason, and bourgeois democracy, the Middle East and North Africa region may seem an unlikely candidate for a fruitful investigation of public spheres. The past and present Orientalizes of the Middle East and North Africa have long criticized the area for lacking not just civility but also public-ness and public-ity. In the past, the state was seen as an extension of the ruler's personal domain in this area, and even economic and religious matters were totally subordinate to political power. Orientalists often maintained that the numerous ancient urban settlements of the area were not, sociologically speaking, cities since social and economic groupings were seen as lacking autonomy. As a result, the historical and modern public are only depicted as the submissive and placated mass or the enraged mob in academic and media accounts of the area.

This book begs to be different. It employs the notion to make the Middle East and North Africa, as well as its publics, more visible in ways that do not just center on violence and exceptionalism from democratic principles. It aims to enhance both the literature on public spheres and the literature on the Middle East and North Africa. This collection extends beyond explaining processes that are exclusive to geographically, culturally, or civilization ally defined entities, however. The purpose of this book is not only to show that these countries have public spheres now or in the past, or to compare Muslim public spheres to those in the west. Instead, the articles start the process of carefully conceptualizing the creation and destruction of public spaces and locations in connection to specific political organizations and processes via their many subjects. In these situations, people get together to form publics, participate in public discourse, and political engagement develops the intermediary characteristics that are conducive to the growth of democracies. This viewpoint adheres to the idea that democratization should be viewed and assessed as the improvement of rational collective decision-making via public discourse[1], [5].

The aim of using the public sphere as a conceptual framework for the SSRC project and this volume was not so much to carve out a delimited space of social science inquiry that emphasizes particular and distinct social and political processes, as much as to integrate s from a five-year project organized by the SSRC entitled "Reconceptualizing Public Spheres in the Middle East and North Africa." New views on the area, its cultures, and its politics are made possible by the

integrative potential in the idea of public spheres. According to Hoexter, "The significance of this notion resides primarily in the fact that it addresses the full spheres of societal and cultural life that has relevance to the social and political order, going beyond appeals to the formal institutions of the Western civil society model.

The idea of the public sphere offers perspectives on social change in these works that neither compartmentalize nor homogenize the units of study. It clarifies the meaning of the terms "nation" and "nation-state" and puts the spotlight on transnational, non-national, and online areas and activities. Importantly, the significance of space and location in promoting the establishment of publics and political involvement is underlined and "located" in specific contexts. In doing so, the collection both expands upon and challenges existing theories and frameworks for understanding the public realm. It also offers crucial comparative insights that are generally absent from the body of existing research. However, it must also be acknowledged that, particularly from the viewpoint of the Middle East and North Africa area, the process of "talking back" to the literature on Western liberal democratic public spaces is only getting started. This edition joins a select group of books and edited volumes that have been published in the previous ten years in this attempt.

Even in this little body of literature, a few topics stand out as crucial to comprehending the overlapping areas variably referred to as the Middle East, Arab World, and Islamic World. In order to situate religion in the public realm, account for modern religious political and social movements, and serve as a historical and civilizational framework of research, Islam is clearly the emphasis of this book. Understanding the blurred lines between the private and the public as well as how gender roles and identities act in navigating this difference is a second, related concern. Studies of the media, particularly new media and its function in fostering new publics and the ways in which virtual publics vary from national publics, show how an interest in democracy and participation affects many of the problems highlighted by the literature.

These topics are influenced by a main interest in politics and the manner in which publics congregate around political processes that may be local, national, or international. This collection shares these concerns with the literature that is currently accessible. Political and violent warfare is a constant theme in both the foreground and background of these s. Processes of political mobilization and resistance throughout history and now are also emphasized. It should also be noted that each is structured to lay out the many facets of the four topics of the collection as well as to open up upcoming theoretical debates and research goals.

The first, Philosophical Frames, presents several conceptions of the public domain that are supported by local data. The s emphasizes the importance of group activity, the interplay between nationalism and democracy, and the public-mindedness of socio-religious organizations. Comparatively, historically, and in light of new and altering political configurations of states, citizenship, participation, and discourse, they emphasize various facets of the public sphere.Fawwaz Traboulsi explains in the first of these essays what he values most about the Habermasian concept of the public sphere, notably its connection to democracy and, hence, its motivational rather than instrumental potential. Through a focus on the Arab world, the critique of the propensity to expand language and reinterpret social reality in new and trendy terms rather than to amass social knowledge offers an example of a historical, critical, and comparative approach to the public sphere. A processual concept of the democratizing public sphere swiftly replaces the contrast between non-democratic and democratic public spheres and the "lacks" that define the former. In addition to examining non-Western countries through their unique historical

and social contexts, such an approach calls into question popular conceptions of Western and European history. According to Traboulsi, this entails comprehending the non-bourgeois and non-urban origins of contemporary democracies, differentiating between revolutions for liberty and revolutions for equality, and lastly recognizing the importance of "popular power."

By examining challenges to "the hegemony of liberal norms of the public sphere" in concepts of the public, social justice, and the common good used by socio-religious organizations, particularly in Muslim nations, LeVine and Salvatore also underline the importance of popular power. The authors turn to Gramsci and Foucault to look at the relationship between religion and collective action where the transformation of power relations is simultaneously a transformation of subjectivity, of the self. They remind us that in these cases resistance goes beyond mere challenges to the liberal order to the development of alternative programs and that the public sphere is a "site for solidarities." The conceptual framework provided by the authors enables an analysis of socio-religious movements that integrates previously separately-studied aspects of these movements, such as their politics of resistance, philo- sophical formulations, and functions of welfare and social solidarity, into a single framework. Additionally, their debate lays up the possibility of recognizing these connections beyond the context of the case study, Islam, and East and West.

Zeynep Gambetti offers yet another viewpoint on the kinds of theoretical connections and interpersonal connections that the idea of the public sphere clarifies. She focuses on how small-scale behaviors, regular life, and "spheres of circulation" shape and reshape publics and public spheres. Gambetti wants to "expand the scope of communication" via this, which will help us better understand how publics are formed and the locations in which communication occurs. She places a lot of emphasis on "liminal" situations and locations where conflict and rupture really function as means of communication that enable the reshaping of power dynamics. This perspective highlights "the creative potential built into the structure of crisis," where even armed conflict is a field of interaction, communi- cation, and negotiation over the parameters and substance of political engagement. She gives examples of the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey and the Zapatistas in Mexico, and contends that the public sphere needs to be rethought in terms of "its connection to struggle, collective action, and self-determination." Gambetti is cautious to note that the discovery of a "mid- dle ground" or "common ground" via conflict is not automatic but rather depends on a variety of circumstances. The potential of the idea of the public sphere, for her as much as for the other writers in this, lies in developing a new philosophy of action.

The case studies in the following three s address the challenges raised by these three theoretical treatments in various contexts. Between Private and Public, the second book in this collection, examines the emergence of a variety of sites, social statuses, discourses, and practices that undermine the idea of separate private and public spheres, including memoirs and testimonies, surveillance tactics, the Tehran bazaar, and migrant domestic workers. The literature on gender and sexuality has dealt most thoroughly with the moving, permeable, and yet often ideologically stiff border between the private and the public for the Middle East and North Africa area. But when "public spheres" are mentioned, such concepts often get overlooked or marginalized, which results in the articulation of simplistic and misleading differences. This examines how privacy and publicity are organized and negotiated in the shifting cultural, political, and economic relationships between the state and society, as well as how the construction and representation of the self, the domestic, the communal, and the national intersect in various contexts.

The by Haugbolle examines the line between private and public as well as the line between the individual and society, as well as between biography and history, using the example of Lebanon during the civil war. Memory, as well as the recording of autobiographies and testimonials, serves as a means for communication across different worlds and is crucial for the rebuilding of publics in post-conflict nations. As a consequence of social groupings being pulled apart and pitted against one another, Haugbolle notes that these societies are "packed with voices" and are thus problematic. Such recollections become crucial building elements of new postwar public discourses and worlds due to their publication in books and, more crucially, newspapers, that most public of venues.

The Lebanese instance is unique and fascinating because these "private" voices interact with and infuse a "feeble national history," which has been further torn apart by sectarian bloodshed throughout the civil war. This might potentially revers the normal relationship between the hegemonic country and its counterpublic- lics. Haugbolle focuses on the voices of women, demonstrating how the war allowed women to enter previously male domains and gave rise to a voice that "previously depended on representation by others," even though these voices frequently seem to bemoan the war's destruction of the same "civility" that had previously silenced them. The paradoxes of the attempt to forge a new postwar nationalism are then explored by Haugbolle using the testimonies of former militiamen who emphasize the significance of forging peace with oneself as the first step in forging peace with others, who denounce the sectarian politics of the past, and who engage in "public rituals of catharsis." His account concludes with a warning not to take the apparent emerging public consensus for granted given the fact that there is still ongoing sectarianism

Moors, Jureidini, zbay, and Sabban investigate migrant domestic workers in three areas, which is a totally different issue, but they also raise similar concerns about how to discern between the domestic and the national. Examining how domestic workers, who are supposed to be invisible and encapsulated within the domestic and the private, actually achieve "being present in the public" raises interesting questions: on the one hand, it points to the gendered access to public space operating in many of these settings that apply to all women, whether "migrant" or "national"; on the other hand, it also demonstrates how the invisible existence of migrant women in the home facilitates the participation of "na- tional" women. Finally, domestic workers are made public by being the subject of, if not active participants in, popular culture via soap operas, books, and movies, as well as through discussions in the public and media about motherhood, immigration rules, human rights, and national identity.

This highlights the value of mobility as well as the "politics of presence," or the act of just being visible outside of a domi- stic area as a means of communication in the public realm. According to the authors, comprehending modern migrant domestic work requires a historical context as well as knowledge of the many domestic labor shifts—from slavery through wage labor to the current situation, which may be considered as a return to slave or bonded labor—as well as its varied kinds. Due to its long history of work, the household sphere cannot clearly be considered a private one. The domestic worker must enter public space in order to gain privacy since the domestic/private space serves as her place of employment. The creation of subaltern public spaces specific to such groups, who not only have no justifiable claim to a public presence but also, by virtue of their "foreignness," do not constitute part of the national body, is, on the other hand, "privatizing" or at least challenging their claims to "openness" in public spaces[6], [7].

The Political Body's Structure

A political organization or community's guiding ideals, laws, and institutions are referred to as its "body politic" or "constitution." It lays forth the parameters in which political authority is exercised, the obligations and rights of people and institutions, and the dynamic between the rulers and the ruled. A nation-state, a sovereign entity, or any other kind of political organization may all be referred to as the "body politic." The underlying ideas and concepts upon which the political system is built are laid forth in the constitution, which acts as a social compact. It ensures the separation of powers, provides the foundation for government, and defends peoples' liberties and rights.Various elements may be discussed in relation to the body politic's constitution, such as:

1. Examining the guiding ideals of the political system, such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and equality, are seen as fundamental principles. It involves talking about how the constitution upholds and defends these ideas.

2. Governmental structure has to do with how the political system is set up and how power is distributed. It entails talking about the checks and balances that exist to avoid the concentration of power, as well as the separation of powers among the many institutions of government, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

3. Rights and liberties focus on the defense of personal liberties within the political system. It comprises talking about clauses in the constitution that protect civil rights including the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and privacy.

4. Process of amendment entails determining how the constitution may be modified or updated to accommodate changing social demands and ambitions. It could include topics including how the constitution can be amended, the steps involved, and how to strike a balance between rigidity and adaptability.

5. Constitutional interpretation refers to the function of the court in determining how the constitution should be read and applied. The importance of judicial review in safeguarding constitutional ideals is discussed, along with the concepts and procedures of constitutional interpretation.

6. Examining the rights, responsibilities, and engagement of citizens within the political system is necessary to understand the relationship between the body politic and its constituents. Discussing citizen involvement tools like elections, referendums, and open forums should be part of it.

7. Understanding the fundamental ideas and mechanisms that form a political entity requires a consideration of the constitution of the body politic. It serves as a foundation for assessing and enhancing governance and promotes a common understanding of the rights, obligations, and principles that support the democratic system.

The major subject of the by Karl is the Ottoman Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century. Karl stresses that the public sphere develops at, and through, the intersections of state and society rather than at those intersections or in the gaps between their opposing realms. He contends that rather than being independent of state authority, the public sphere is an arena for political conflict between the ruler and the ruled. Krl sees this as part and parcel of a new relationship between state and society, where each becomes more visible to the other. He demonstrates this by

showing how the strategy of surveillance of conversations in public places, such as coffeehouses, was in fact an outcome of a new interest of the Ottoman state in "public opinion" and was also "the moment when subjects were constituted as political citizens." The sultan's growing accessibility to his people is an indication of the state's greater visibility to what is now known as its public. The sultan became visible and approachable through travels throughout the empire and personal interactions with various groups of the populace. He used his public appearances to try to draw the populace closer to him, link the outlying areas of the empire to the capital, and create a sense of collective identity among his subjects. The first Ottoman newspaper, which is published in Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, and French, is unsurprisingly published at the same moment and announces the new activities and image of the king. Krl contends that one essential element of modernity is surveillance.

In his investigation of the interaction between state and market in the Tehran bazaar in post-revolutionary Iran, Keshavarzian makes similar discoveries. Keshavarzian investigates the relationship between geography and collective identity, that of the bazaaris, widely recognized for their significant contributions to the social and revolutionary movements of contemporary Iran, by examining the widespread belief in Tehran that the bazaar lives "in the shadow" of the state. The bazaar "became a venue to organize and stage dissentto make it public," he adds, and he also highlights the significance of routine forms of human contact in the creation of publics and public spheres. Keshavarzian thus defends including the market in the public sphere, claiming that a "narrow understanding of the public sphere and strict dichotomy between private and public, or personal and political, would preclude a full understanding of Iranian politics and of the bazaaris' political power."

Building on the connections between public spheres and networks, Keshavarzian investigates the interpersonal relationships and widespread trust that have long helped make t In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the bazaar is no longer a site of publicness and political efficacy. A public sphere, and in fact the public associated with it, is no longer. This is the conclusion drawn from his investigation of the relationship between place, networks, and power as well as the changes brought about by state policies and economic globalization. According to this study, the market's proximity to the government which earlier scholars had cited as evidence that Muslim societies lacked publicness and public mobilizationwas actually a crucial factor in enabling the formation of a public and a public sphere in and around the bazaar. The Tehran bazaar and other bazaaris used to play a significant role in democratizing the public sphere, but their influence has been decreased since because the link between merchants and the state is veiled in secrecy and trade occurs in international locations like Dubai.

As was already established, the Middle East and North Africa area has long been seen as being defined by "private politics" as opposed to public engagement, as well as by a rigorous division of the private spheres of family and neighborhood from public places and the state. These chapters, which are centered on various locations and eras, pose a number of questions on the ways in which ties between the state and society might be exploited to foster social mobilization, collective identity, and public agreement. This raises further concerns about the connections between public opinion, public discourse, and public action, which are addressed in the third chapter of the book, Mediated Publics.

The media unquestionably contributes significantly to the development of contemporary public spheres. The media, according to the author, "are situated at the interface between publicity and secrecy, which thereby allows for struggles over the boundary of state openness/secrecy in the

public sphere." It is crucial to consider, though, whether new information technologies and forms of media are fostering new discussion spaces that are empowering and how they might be neutralizing or disempowering public action and debate. What media engender new publics that transgress established social and political boundaries?The authors of this article 8 provide persuasive examples of the many ways that technological communication has significantly broadened the concept of the public in the Middle East and North Africa area. How the country, as well as society and self, are envisioned and reframed via the prism of diverse media, from conventional print to new information and communication technologies, is a key aspect in this case. In this quest, having a historical perspective is crucial in order to evaluate the similarities and variations between various media types and the processes by which they produce their audiences. While Krl in his discussed the significant contribution of the first Ottoman newspaper, published in 1831, in establishing a "public" in the modern sense of the word, Michelle Campos in her examines the press in the final years of Ottoman rule in Palestine as "an emergent revolutionary public sphere" that took upon itself the role of defining the "Ottoman public." The newspapers in this multilingual press aimed at various ethnic, religious, and linguistic readerships while aspiri the newspapers were supposed to be "the voice of the people" while also defining who "the people" were. Campos concluded that the hegemonic public and the counter-publics were being generated via the same medium of the newspaper as a result of the ongoing struggle between "the Ottomanizing impulse of the press and its particularistic thrust." Campos describes how these papers' didacticism, news from across their empire, comparisons of local governance styles, discussions of universal conscription, and reader debates, editorials, and letters that served as a forum for public discourse all contributed to the formation of a national/imperial public in their various languages and target audiences. Targeting distinct linguistic and ethnic groupings as their readership, they also often and sometimes overtly emphasized the unique characteristics and conflicting interests of these communities within the wider imperial body.Campos also examines newspaper reading habits, arguing that the imagined community of print capitalism, which the newspapers established as their audience, was not the only factor in forming the public sphere; social activities that gathered around the newspapers also played a role. This included sharing papers back and forth among friends and neighbors as well as attending organized "reading nights" and public readings. The tales of intercommunal conflict and competing interests in the press itself reflect the "limits of Ottomanism" and its final failure in the face of emerging nationalisms that ultimately tore the Empire apart, despite the press's success in building its readership and public.

DISCUSSION

Satellite television functions across the Middle East and North Africa today, often in surprising ways, to both support and undermine communal identities. On a practical level, as Hadj-Moussa explains in her, getting satellite TV in Algeria requires collaborative effort since satellite dishes are owned and maintained by associations of neighbors, which also entails agreement on which channels to watch. Both the state and Islamists attempt to forbid or restrict the viewing of satellite television, with the latter even turning to armed threats and the forced dismantling of dishes. Collective action is also required to defend the ownership and viewing of satellite television, which "became the technological medium at the center of the struggles between the state and the Islamists, with the viewers in the middle." Satellite television has also contributed to a greater awareness of social rank and economic distinctions, gender differences, and identity politics. For these reasons, Hadj-Moussa contends that "satellite television enabled Algerians to negotiate their modernity" and that in Algeria, viewing television is a daily act of defiance

against both the government and Islamists. The term "satellite television" describes the transmission of television content using communication satellites. It has transformed how we watch television and access it, giving people across the globe access to a huge selection of channels and programming possibilities[8]–[10].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the multidisciplinary discipline of publics and politics research studies the complex interrelationships between collective action, power relations, and decision-making procedures. For encouraging inclusive governance, resolving social issues, and determining the future of democratic societies, it is essential to understand how publics organize, mobilize, and influence politics. However, there are difficulties in the public-politics interaction. Divided society may be brought about through polarization, false information, and a loss of faith in democratic institutions. Addressing these issues requires fostering communication, advancing media literacy, and bolstering democratic institutions. Governance, policy-making, and social cohesion are all significantly impacted by the interaction between publics and politics. To ensure that decision-making processes are open, inclusive, and accountable, politicians must be attentive to the interests and aspirations of various publics. In order to affect policy results and hold political leaders accountable, the public must also actively participate in politics.

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CHAPTER 2

DIFFERENTASPECTS OF SATELLITE TELEVISION

Dr. Dinesh Neelakanta Rao, Assistant Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-dinesh.rao@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

Satellite television has revolutionized the way people consume and access television content, offering a range of benefits and challenges across several aspects. This abstract provides an overview of the key dimensions and implications of satellite television, including technology, programming, global reach, and regulatory considerations.The technology behind satellite television involves the use of satellites in geostationary orbit to transmit and receive television signals. This technology enables broadcasters to deliver high-quality audio and video content to a wide geographic area, overcoming the limitations of terrestrial broadcasting. Satellite television offers viewers a diverse range of channels and programming options, including news, sports, entertainment, and educational content. This wide selection caters to diverse interests and cultural preferences, providing viewers with a rich and varied television experience.

KEYWORDS:

Broadcasting, Cable TV, Channel lineup, Content distribution, Digital broadcasting, satellite.

INTRODUCTION

In order to send television signals from broadcasters to receivers, satellite television depends on the utilization of communication satellites. In order to receive and retransmit signals to large satellite dishes placed at viewers' locations, it uses satellites in geostationary orbit. It is now feasible to reach viewers in far-off places because to technology that permits the transmission of high-quality audio and video information across vast distances[1]–[3].

Scripting and Option

Viewers of satellite television have access to a wide range of channels and programming choices. It offers access to regional, global, and local channels that provide news, sports, entertainment, and specialty programming. Depending on their interests and preferences, viewers may choose from a range of packages and subscription choices.

Global Coverage

Global reach of satellite television enables cross-border transmission and reception of programs. This makes it possible for viewers to access material from other nations and cultures, encouraging cultural interaction and variety in television programming.

Impact on the Media Environment

The media environment has been significantly impacted by satellite television. Because of the growing rivalry among broadcasters, there is now a wider variety of programming available, all

of higher quality. Additionally, it has increased the reach of media organizations by giving them venues for the communication of knowledge, entertainment, and cultural exchange.

Connectivity and Accessibility

Particularly in distant or underserved locations where terrestrial transmission may be constrained, satellite television has played a critical role in enhancing access to television services. By giving individuals who may not have otherwise had access to connection, information, and entertainment, it has helped close the digital divide.

Challenges

Multiple difficulties are faced by satellite television. These include the price of the necessary equipment and subscription costs, the loss of signal due to inclement weather, and competition from other media and content streaming platforms. Additionally, the proliferation of web-based streaming services has changed the tastes and consumption habits of viewers.Additionally, domestic drama on satellite TV creates a new link between the private sphere of the home and the public sphere, or the "outside." One trend is the male retreat inside the home, away from coffee shops and public places, to watch television. The tensions and rivalries over which channels to watch and with whom to watch them, on the other hand, represent generational and gender inequalities. Consequently, men see Arabic channels as appropriate for women and regard them as binding women to Arabness, Islam, and Algerian values, as opposed to French stations, which are for men and may mistakenly serve as a route to democratic modernity. It's interesting to note that access to French television and other satellite channels provides access to both national and local news, as well as coverage on events that are often not covered by national television.

The author of the article on internet use in adjacent Morocco, Bahyyih Maroon, likewise makes new media, engagement, and democracy central issues. Youth at cybercafés use Skype to contact friends inside the city and utilize chat programs to flirt with another person sitting in the same café, demonstrating the interaction between the local and the global. Maroon contends that the sorts of physical spaces generated by the technology and the patterns of interaction within these spaces demonstrate how the introduction of a new technology in Moroccan society is mediated via the mores and morality of the "Muslim public sphere." The technology also opens up new cultural and social spaces and encourages the growth of new aspects of young culture. By establishing areas of desegregated sociability and generally enhancing the sorts of information and communication channels accessible to Moroccans, cybers therefore "gently push the limits of the moral terrain of society."

Maroon describes how state interest in modernization, Islamic values that positively view science and technology, and the social aspirations of youth work together to create change, even if this change is currently contained within "new public spaces" while older spaces like coffee shops, streets, and parks remain governed by ingrained notions of morality and gender identities. Maroon's story amply demonstrates the birth of a new public and a new young culture in Morocco, both of which were mediated and made possible by the Internet and the World Wide Web, however limited in terms of numbers they may be.

The Internet is a tool and a weapon in the hands of a new kind of public in Iran as well. Masserat Amir-Ebrahimi looks at the emergence of "Weblogistan" and the ways that online communities allow for interactions and identities that are tightly limited or forbidden in public settings. In

addition to serving as a platform for "public" criticism of the government and hegemonic moral authority, blogs can serve as a tool for the construction and revision of individual identities. In light of the strong limitations placed on physical bodies in real public space, Amir-Ebrahimi investigates the liberties of the "dis-embodied" virtual places of the Internet. The capacity to communicate globally affects both the local and the national levels, as it does in each of the chapters in this book. Amir-Ebrahimi also discusses the connections between various media, including the press, satellite TV, and the Internet, as well as how one medium of communication helps offset the limitations placed by the government on the others.

It is national and transnational at the same time, and it is first and foremost a site of resistance where bloggers and their readers use every technological and discursive tool at their disposal to increase their autonomy and claim cyberspace as their own. This highly diverse territory is known as "Weblogistan" and is differentiated along gen- der, age, geographical, and ideological lines. The state's ongoing efforts to censor, regulate, and manage this virtual realm serve as a testament to its authority.9 Because "Weblogistan" is also a "communal" environment, it has developed its own social conventions and interactional patterns. It is also a "mirror," a "intimate" area that allows for both self-representation and self-discovery. Once again, inner and outward spaces—public and private—intersect and best actualize themselves when they are in opposition to one another.

The fourth chapter of the collection, Resisting Publics, continues on many of the same topics by demonstrating how conflict and resistance may act as creative forces in the formation of national publics. These pose questions about nationalism, national identity, and the relationship between the state and its constituent communities. Discourses about oneself and others are involved in the development of national publics, as is the nuanced interaction between the many, conflicting public spheres and democratic reform initiatives. Particular historical study in this area focuses on how specific publics and groups are created and changed through time, as well as how the transnational is constantly present in the creation of the national. The influence of religion and the political movements centered around it serve as a reminder to not ignore the interplay between religion and nationalism[4].

In her study, Noor-Aiman Khan looks at the ways that the public sphere in European imperial metropoles offered the setting and tools for the concurrent development of the national, the international, and the transnational. In particular, the friendships and discussions between students and activists from Egypt and India allowed for the creation of other national public spheres, those of the "victims of English domination," thanks to the networks formed between students from the various British Empire colonies. Through the efforts of nationalists at home and in the colonial metropole, as well as internationally through parallel national- isms that worked together in their anti-imperialist struggles, the colonial public sphere was thus created, anticipating third world internationalism and the non-aligned movement.

A political theory and strategy known as internationalism places a strong emphasis on the collaboration, interdependence, and cooperation among states. It is founded on the idea that countries should cooperate in order to accomplish common objectives and solve shared concerns since there are many global challenges and problems that call for collective action.

DISCUSSION

The ideals of internationalism, as well as its background, advantages, and difficulties, may all be covered in a conversation.

The fundamentals of internationalism

Mutual respect, teamwork, diplomacy, and multilateralism are foundational values of internationalism. In settling disputes and fostering peace, it highlights the significance of international law, human rights, and global governance systems.

Historical Background

The origins of internationalism may be traced to the destruction wrought by World Wars I and II, when it became clear that communication and collaboration among nations were essential to averting future disasters. To further global peace and security, organizations like the United Nations (UN) were created.

Benefits of Globalization

Internationalism has several advantages. It helps to encourage peaceful settlements to disputes and fosters communication and discussion between states. Sharing resources, information, and experience enables countries to more successfully solve global concerns. Additionally, internationalism encourages tolerance, respect, and cultural interaction between many peoples and states.

Global Issue Resolution

Internationalism acknowledges that many global concerns, including terrorism, pandemics, climate change, and poverty, call for coordinated response. Together, countries may combine their resources, knowledge, and efforts to discover answers and more effectively tackle these problems.

Issues with Internationalism

National interests that collide with international collaboration, uneven power dynamics among states, and reluctance to cede sovereignty are a few of the obstacles that internationalism must overcome. Geopolitical conflicts, protectionism, and nationalist ideologies may also thwart international collaboration and erode the spirit of internationalism.

In contrast to unilateralism

Multilateralism, in which countries cooperate within international institutions and structures, is often aligned with internationalism. However, there have been instances of unilateral measures when nations put their national interests ahead of group decision-making, which might put international collaboration under pressure.

With many nations and cities offering various freedoms and restrictions, Khan shows how these young nationalists and internationalists navigated the European urban scene. Her attention is also drawn to the areas created by the events, congresses, organizations, cafés, salons, and newspapers that constituted these new public spheres, which were both subaltern and not. Contrarily, "the public sphere cultivated in Europe and safeguarded by its own society's shared assumptions was a direct threat to that society's dominance in politics, economics, and culture throughout the world."

Eric Davis examines the evolution of one such national public sphere by examining the cases of colonial and post-colonial Iraq. He investigates the importance of poetry, short story writing, art, and the press as some of the "means of communication" crucial in developing an Iraqi national consciousness at the start of the 20th century. Clubs, coffee shops, professional associations, and

literary and artistic salons served as the venues for these debates. These venues evolved throughout the course of the century to reflect changes in class structure, political background, and political contestations. Davis pays close attention to the ways in which these communicative and discursive spaces transcended ethnic, sectarian, and regional borders, as did labor organizations and, by the middle of the century, political parties, in light of the difficulties the Iraqi state and society are now facing. Political parties exhibit the institutional foundations of the Iraqi public sphere's transnational, Arab, and/or Islamic character the most explicitly[5]–[7].

Davis then discusses how identifying the perpetrators and targets of intra-Iraqi violence requires an understanding of the origins of Iraqi nationalism as well as the significance of the nationalist public sphere. As with their counterparts across the border in Iran, those Iraqis who have only their ideas and words to use against the violence they witness in their daily lives are using the "blogosphere" as a weapon. It explains the "hostility of sectar- ian groups towards a historical memory based in tolerance, diversity of knowledge, and cultural pluralism."

In their two most recent books, Joseph Alagha and Marie Le Ray explore a particular sort of resistance in which the state and the minority square off over the definitions of identity, memory, and society. In this instance, Le Ray explores the local environment of a Kurdish Alevi region in Turkey. This area has long been characterized as a "overregulated space of surveillance" with stringent security, checkpoints, fences, and curfews that dictated every aspect of life. In the relative peace that prevailed at the time of the research, social practices, pilgrimages, festivals, and commemorations created "breathing spaces" that may have a transformative effect and, over time, contest state definitions of the "public grammar." Le Ray, however, shows how an encounter between passengers on a bus and checkpoint policemen and soldiers turns into a "public grammar" contest. The creation of heterodox religious places highlights both the Kurdish and Alevi identities of the people of Tunceli by complicating their identities. Protests against a governmental plan to build dams in the area engage in environmental discourses even more openly and jointly. Thus, the people of Tunceli multi- ply and complex their identities, which in and of itself challenges governmental categorization of them as "heretics" or "terrorists."The stories of migrant workers from Europe who return home to take part in celebrations, donate money to development initiatives, and take part in collective action are another strand of the Tunceli tale. Once again, local, national, and transnational factors all play a role in the development of the subaltern public sphere.

In the final chapter of the book, Joseph Alagha gives us a very thorough account of how Hizbullah changed over the course of just 30 years from a minor sectarian Shiite protest movement in Lebanon to an organized subaltern social movement to a fully-fledged political party that engages in and tries to control national politics and the public discourse. With reference to a shifting national and regional environment, the author pays close attention to both significant and minute changes in Hizbullah's political speech and methods. These changes have a dramatic impact on the movement's internal and external connections. The key moments that led to Hizbullah's metamorphosisand with it, the alteration of the internal Lebanese landscape—were political assassinations, street protests, and war with Israel.

This volume's case studies, which start in the second and conclude with Alagha's, are appropriate given that they are mostly a product of the SSRC conference that was held in Beirut. Alagha's narrative demonstrates how to use Haugbolle's advice to "read between the lines" and how the "reconstruction" of the national public sphere after a war is really rife with conflict. Despite the latent and overt violence linked to Hizbullah's rise in Lebanese national politics, various parties'

ongoing commitment to forging some semblance of national consensus is all the more impressive given its elusiveness and fragility.

Publics, Politics, and Involvement

The writers base their analyses of the public sphere in the Middle East and North Africa area on a variety of contemporary thinkers, including Habermas, Arendt, Foucault, Gramsci, and many more. As was stressed above, the integrative potential of the idea of public spheres brings many literatures and issues together. This shouldn't, however, come at the price of analytical precision. The literature often jumps between notions, most notably between "public sphere" and "civil society" and "public space" on the one hand, and between these concepts on the other. Furthermore, the phrases "public," "political," "national," and even "urban" are often used interchangeably. The issue with such fuzziness in analysis is that certain crucial characteristics of each kind of institutional form and political activity are lost when they are combined. These examples demonstrate how using public spheres as an analytical framework aid in identifying and examining three societal forms and practices that cut across the volume's sections: the spatial formations of the public, or spaces of publicity; the formation of publics as processes and emergent forms of publicity; and the various institutionalizations of political participation.

The Public's Spatial Forms

The structural and institutional arrangements that result from and embody public discourses, acts, and lives have been highlighted in sociological approaches to the study of public spheres. A spatial theory of the public sphere that is attentive to the complex design of public spaces and the manner in which public life and publicity are performed in various settings might be a beneficial supplement to this emphasis. This would maintain focus on the commonplace constructions of public spaces, emphasize agency and practice in addition to structure, and keep sociological and cultural factors at the forefront of inquiry. To highlight the social arrangements and interactions that are involved in the creation of such spaces, to historically frame the emergence and transformation of different public spheres, and to comprehend the channels by which "public discourses" are made possible and disseminated, the concept of the public sphere needs to be grounded in particular contexts, times, and places. If the analytical attention focuses simply on hegemonic forces and discourses, this bottom-up perspective may help us spot emerging publics and new areas of contestation in specific empirical circumstances.

The Tehran bazaar in Keshavarzian's is a clear example of how spaces can be opened up and closed down, but Moors et al. also highlight the ways in which public spaces emerge and make visible those migrant women wh Maroon's description of the cramped "cybers" in Morocco is a new form of teenage culture and a new style of "being" in public. Le Ray shows how disagreements over the definitions of public areas and public events intersect while identifying the landmarks of a Kurdish town in Turkey.

It is not by chance that every chapter in the collection focuses on cities or urbanizing areas. The Middle East and North Africa area, with its long and rich urban history, is especially pertinent when focusing on the city and its close relationship to the construction of public spaces. The Habermasian concept of public spheres places a premium on places where strangers can engage in conversation, opinion exchange, and consensus building, with coffee shops and salons serving as prime examples of physical spaces and journals serving as examples of mediated spaces. The s explain how public dialogue and engagement are made possible by cafés, marketplaces, plazas, churches, organizations, bookshops, and theaters. They explain how certain spaces can be

commandeered by the state and other hegemonic forces and subsequently controlled or neutralized, but other spaces are able to evade this control, even if only partially or occasionally, and somewhat occlude the manifestations of power and hierarchy that endanger their autonomy. The virtual realms of new media also create consensus or dissent and run their own systems of inclusion and exclusion.A spatial orientation in thinking about public spheres highlights a problem in the conception of public discussion and disputation that is limited to a certain understanding of "rational-critical discourse." Such a conception ignores not only the variety of ways in which public participation, political struggle, and political community are formed, but it also neglects what Göle refers to as the "ocular" dimensions of the construction of the public sphere. In addition to speech, the public sphere serves as "a stage for performance."10 It is crucial to acknowledge the "imagined" nature of "publics" and political communities, but it is also crucial to look at the various ways in which participation in collectivities and constructions of self-vis-à-vis publics manifests itself through bodily practices, visual and symbolic cues, and performative interactions. Thus, the processes of forming oneself and one's public are linked and interdependent.

The Process of Publics

The processual and emergent nature of public spheres is highlighted by thinking of them as "spaces of contestation" and by giving the concept of "space" the full range of its interpretative power of the visual, experiential, and daily experience of constructed surroundings and social interactions. A historical perspective is particularly crucial for understanding the connection between the people and the country. Krl addresses the emergence of an Ottoman populace and contends that the use of surveillance, the idea of popular opinion, and the encroaching relationship between the state and society were all indications of modernity. It's noteworthy to note that Campos refers to a different Ottoman public that never existed due to the Imperial politics of inclusiveness losing out to the national politics of exclusion. Khan also discusses how colonial students helped to establish overlapping publics in the metropolitan capitals that afterwards consolidated and separated to form a variety of states.The dynamic and participatory aspect of public development and interaction is referred to as the "publics as a process." It highlights that the public is not a static thing but rather develops as a result of people actively engaging in conversation, exchanging ideas, and debating various problems or themes.

Development of Publics

Publics are created via social processes rather than being pre-existing entities. They develop when people band together to support a common issue, hobby, or cause. This may occur through a number of venues, such as social movements, internet forums, or grassroots organization.

Interactive Communication

The process of publics emphasizes the value of participatory communication. It involves the public's active participation, conversation, and exchange of ideas. This may occur via a variety of channels, including in-person contacts, social media discussions, open forums, and public gatherings.

Diverse Points of View

The process of publics acknowledges the variety of viewpoints and ideas held by the general public. Different people contribute their own backgrounds, experiences, and points of view to the

conversation, making it richer and livelier. The inclusion and pluralism that this variety promotes in public debate.

Deliberation and the Formation of Opinions

The process of publics emphasizes how debate shape's public opinion. Deliberative procedures include deliberate, reasoned dialogues where people share ideas, take into account opposing points of view, and evaluate arguments. This procedure seeks to promote group understanding and help people make informed judgments.

Nature Is Fluid and Evolving

Publics are a dynamic process that alter and develop over time. Public opinion and involvement may change when new facts or situations arise. New innovations need public adaptation, and people may band together or separate over certain topics or events[8]–[10].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, satellite television has transformed television broadcasting and has several benefits in terms of technology, global reach, and variety of programs. It has widened viewers' choices for entertainment and encouraged cross-cultural interaction by opening up access to television material globally. To ensure that everyone has access to satellite television and that its advantages are maximized, issues like cost, accessibility, and regulatory issues must still be taken into account. Additionally, the dynamics of the media and advertising sectors have changed as a result of the development of satellite television. Through satellite channels, advertisers may target certain geographic regions or demographic groups, allowing more specialized and focused marketing campaigns. As a result, broadcasters and advertisers are now competing more fiercely, and pay-per-view and subscription models have emerged as new sources of income.

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CHAPTER 3

INFLUENCE ON DECISION-MAKING

Dr. Vinayak Anil Bhat, Assistant Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-vinayak_ab@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

Decision-making is a complex cognitive process influenced by a multitude of factors. This abstract provides an overview of the key aspects and sources of influence on decision-making, including cognitive biases, social dynamics, emotions, and external pressures. Understanding the various influences on decision-making is essential for improving the quality of decisions and optimizing outcomes across diverse domains. Cognitive biases are inherent patterns of thinking that can distort decision-making. These biases stem from mental shortcuts and heuristics that simplify complex information processing. While these shortcuts can be efficient, they may lead to systematic errors and suboptimal decisions. Examples of cognitive biases include confirmation bias, where individuals seek information that confirms preexisting beliefs, and anchoring bias, where judgments are influenced by initial reference points. Awareness of these biases can help individuals and decision-makers mitigate their impact and make more rational and objective choices.

KEYWORDS:

Bias, Cognitive Biases, Cultural Influences, Emotional Intelligence, Public.

INTRODUCTION

Publics may form public policies and have an impact on decision-making as a whole. Publics may influence the political and social environment when they participate in meaningful debate, voice their concerns, and organize for action. Policymakers may be held responsible and informed by public opinion.For Habermas, the nation serves as the main center of the public and the analytical unit. However, Calhoun emphasizes that the country should be regarded as a political community built via identity politics and that its existence is a result, not just a prerequisite, of the activities of the public sphere of civil society. A range of interpretative strategies have been used to shatter the naturalized idea of country, from viewing it as imagined to examining national rites and commemorations as inventions of tradition. Consideration of hierarchy, authority, and difference in the context of a country may also be achieved by considering how differences are expressed via various publics. While maintaining the analytical focus on the question of how, and if, these differences produce political communities that participate in imagining and creating the nation through interaction in a variety of public spheres, this acknowledges the social facticity of the ethnicities, races, classes, genders, ages, legal statuses, etc. that make up a national entity. The idea that public and private worlds are dichotomous or restricted is effectively called into question when we look at how various forms of identities are constructed as public processes. This raises the issue of who and what really belongs in public spheres that are considered to be public. This then brings us to democratic

inclusiveness or how the public sphere incorporates and recognizes the diversity of identities people bring to it from their many involvements in civil society.

According to historical study, there have always been many ways of accessing public life and a multiplicity of public arenas, rather than just one public sphere or one way to participate in political life. As a result, analysis increasingly concentrates on the diversity of publics, rival publics, and counter publics. Additionally, Göle emphasizes that public spheres shift. Therefore, we cannot refer to the public sphere as a pre-existing immune arena. It is necessary to redefine that sphere's boundaries and normative principles in order to accommodate new social groupings. The public sphere's boundaries as they are defined and envisioned by society and its lawmakers at a particular period are revealed by newcomers. According to Göle, the question of a social bond with the stigmatized and excluded is the essential problem of democracy," and these "newcomers" can really be a representation of the same populations whose exclusion the country was founded on[1]–[3].

These theoretical developments help us understand that publics historically have been created via difficult, improvised, and unfinished processes of struggle, change, and challenge. Publics aren't s units; they develop. Through and in connection to certain discourses, texts, performances, structures, and institutions, publics and counter publics develop. They may have constituencies that overlap and are always partial, but they often depict themselves as inclusive totalities: the public rather than a public. Publics are developed via both inclusive and exclusive methods. What about counter-publics, then? Hegemonic publics are often undefinable, but it's vital to note that this 'homogeneity' is maintained by legislation, sanctions, and social practices of exclusion. Could it be said that counter publics, which must confront and combat dominant categories, are reflexive while hegemonic publics are characterized by naturalization and silencing of difference, even though they may be equally exclusionary due to a "membership" that is strictly defined and enforced in public?19 Such a conclusion would also be supported by Göle's understanding of the controversy surrounding a headscarf-wearing MP in the Turkish parliament.20 She argues that whereas the Islamists have a disjunctive relationship to both the "modern" and "Muslim" identities and are thus reflective, the authoritarian and secular "dominant" public is characterized by a lack of reflexivity toward both their history and modernity. Which "public" is consequently the more contemporary one, which poses the question?

The problems of characterizing certain publics as hegemonic and national and others as counter-hegemonic and sub-altern are highlighted by Haugbolle's analysis of the complex collection of publics in Lebanon and the ways in which they are differentiated along ideological, gender, and sectarian axes. In the case of war and post-conflict contexts, the fluidity and open-endedness in the narratives about the self and the collective define publics as fragile and disputed but also capable of severe violence. Le Ray's assessment of post-conflict rebuilding characterizes both the Turkish and Kurdish publics as being disputed, and the public sphere as being ephemeral and dynamic, at times manifesting only via brief interactions in buses and checkpoints. The flexible and fluid nature of the Iranian public sphere as well as the intangible aspects of both actual and virtual public spaces are particularly highlighted in Amir-Ebrahimi's study of the "Weblogistan" in Iran. The problem is complicated by the manner in which discourses from both inside and outside of communities and the area often collaborate to categorize speech and action forms. The construction of the country and its publics is influenced by transnational actors such as diaspora

groups, migrant communities, and foreign intervention in addition to the emerging, fluid, and changing realities of public spheres inside countries.

DISCUSSION

Political participation and its institutions

Examining the processes by which public spheres develop citizenship is another approach to frame the issue of the connection between the country and its people. In order to concentrate on the development of subjectivities, the agency of the individuals who make up these publics, and the character and quality of their engagement in public life, it is vital to investigate the sociology of emerging publics. If the central question is how to study public involvement that causes, as well as facilitates, the exercise of citizenship and the creation of imagined political communities, then such participation might be expressed in a variety of ways.

One of the promises of the concept of the public sphere, as Nancy Fraser notes, is its significance for both democratic political practice and critical social theory by identifying a institutionalized arena of discursive interaction is conceptually distinct from the state is a site for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the state. In an essay addressing this topic, Craig Calhoun notes that Habermas's phrase "the public sphere of civil society clarifies the close relationship but also the distinctness of the two domains and processes. Similarly, the term public sphere should only be used to refer to specific types of discourses and political participation. According to Calhoun, the importance of the concept of public sphere is largely to go beyond general appeals to the nature of civil society in attempts to explain the social foundations of democracy and to introduce a discussion of the specific organization within civil society of social and cultural bases for the development of an effective rational-critical discourse aimed at the resolution of political disputes.

Through his analysis of the literature on transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe and China, Calhoun criticizes the blurring of the lines between civil society and the public sphere. The 1990s saw the emergence of civil society associations in many second and third world nations, driven by both internal dynamics and the search for alternatives to ossified political structures as well as by external impetus and funding from international organizations and bilateral aid programs. Even while the development of civil society may have helped accomplish significant domestic goals and forge vital connections with lobbying and global activism organizations, it is crucial to assess the effectiveness of this development in terms of long-term effects. Even if civil society is active, its influence on for- mal democratic processes may be quite limited, and it also poses complex and controversial issues about the correct ratio between nation- and state-building. Examining the public spheres produced by these associations and endeavors provides us with a further criterion by which to assess the relative success of these endeavors: is the expansion of civil society accompanied by the emergence of forums for debate and participation that deepen the sense of citizenship, responsibility, and rights and, as a result, have favorable effects on the emergence of political communities and social mobilization?

Thus, the idea of public spheres has the potential to clarify the diversity of civil society, acts of resistance, and democratic processes. A large portion of the literature on democracy and civil society has been ahistorical, technicality, and prescriptive. As previously mentioned, research on civil society frequently focuses exclusively on particular forms of association, types of mobilization, and actions, omitting social contexts where dynamic change and innovation may be occurring as well as enduring historical forms of association and mobilization that do not fall

under the definition of civil society. The idea of public spheres offers a more comprehensive and all-encompassing examination that can include sectors of social activity that the idea of civil society often leaves out[4]–[6].

The works of Davis on Iraq and Alagha on Lebanon, which address issues of civil society and political movements, provide enough support for this. Both are troubled by the problem of sectarianism and mobilization inside and between ethno-religious boundaries. They demonstrate how political involvement, along with its aims and objectives, evolves with time, despite the persistence and even increased essentialization of such identities. Hadj-Moussa is especially interested in collective action, as well as how identities are formed and altered in relation to, and in defiance of, both the state and strong social movements. Saba Mahmood's claim that "the public sphere is also a space for the creation of particular kinds of subjects and for the cultivation of those capacities and orientations that enable participation within this sphere" is supported by her analysis. "While much of this literature focuses on the technologies of discipline through which public subjects come to be produced, relatively little attention has been paid to the differing conceptions of social authority that undergo.

The authors of this collection join a growing body of work that aims to include religious studies in contemporary public sphere research. Here, study on Middle Eastern and North African civilizations aids in the creation of a transcultural conception of the public realm that may be used to modify and consciously reform religious traditions. Other research on the region examines how rationality and debate may be constructed and oppositional discourses maintained in Muslim societies. These works demonstrate that restricted conceptions of the public sphere cannot adequately account for the emergence of socio-religious movements, especially in the ways that they conflict with and/or challenge nation-state projects on identity, justice, and welfare.

Intellectual Frameworks

My guiding principle is that not all theories, concepts, or notions that emerge in one theoretical fieldin this study, the Westare necessarily endowed with the vocation of universal application without prior testing or critical verification.1 Although many ideals and values have become universal, regardless of their original birthplace, not every theory, concept, or notion produced in one theoretical field is necessarily endowed with the vocation of universal application without prior testing or critical verification. In reality, the idea of the public sphere seems to be closely linked to the experiences of Europe and North America in order to assert a priori universality and applicability.

I rush to separate myself from two of the common meanings of such a remark in order to clear up any misunderstandings. First off, the methodology suggested by this supposition steers us largely toward a historical, analytical, and comparative approach to the issue of the public sphere, far from accepting any type of national or cultural essentialism. Second, ideas, concepts, and thoughts do not automatically become more universal just because they are created, disseminated, and labeled "global" by international agencies. Additionally, the assertion of "globality" does not provide these ideas any pretense of innocence.

I shall build a comparison between the circumstances that gave birth to public spheres in Europe, North America, and the Arab world after making a number of opening statements motivated by the aforementioned supposition. After that, I'll talk about the public sphere's problematic position in the democracy process. The notion of the public sphere is motivating, not just instrumental, as

Habermas has often emphasized. Here, he emphasizes the autonomous influence of the public domain on activity, particularly political action. The goal is the same in both situations, however. It is the contribution of public spheres to the democratic process, whether as a factor in the democratic transition in nations with nondemocratic regimes or as a corrective agent for the distortions and the corruption of democratic institutions and practices in the developed countries of the West.

Introductory Remarks

Many analytical and methodological queries and remarks are raised by the widespread, uncritical adoption of a large portion of the globalized intellectual output in the nations of the South during the post-Cold War period. A tabula rasa approach to the creation of social knowledge has resulted from the constantly changing forms of approach to the regional concerns. As a result, any intellectual fashion that is imposed internationally alters the trajectory of intellectual creation and often prevents any attempts to critically evaluate the previous fashion, which is typically criticized for being outmoded or unsuited to cope with new global developments or the new world order. Due to the ongoing redefinition, rede-signing, and sometimes simple renaming of components of social reality, the outcome is usually repeated beginnings with little to no accumulation of knowledge.Practically all areas of intellectual creation exhibit this trend. The UN-sponsored Human Development Reports on the area are an excellent example of this. The term "development" has been replaced with the phrase "human development," as the concept of development has been removed from the economic sphere in favor of the new trinity of freedom, knowledge, and gender. Instead of incorporating the innovation into the region's actual difficulties or assimilating it into its theoretical concerns, this relocation often only occults them. Studies on income distribution, which are often limited to the global level, are replaced by studies on poverty as

Poverty starts to resemble a disaster or an infectious illness. As a result, we research poverty without researching prosperity. As for the middle classes, they are either seen as being diminished in number and effectiveness and subsequently dying out or are given the position as repositories of the democratic goal. We define the "poor" but not the "rich." Assuming that they would lean toward a homogenous and unidirectional political conduct, relatively little sociopolitical effort is put into analyzing their political behavior in both circumstances. As for the answer to the issue of poverty, it is no less a grandiose UN effort to eradicate poverty on a global scale with set deadlines to accomplish the job which leads in the final elimination of poverty being postponed each year as the campaign's pitiful results are disclosed[7]–[9].

As the state/civil society dichotomy is designated for the same treatment as described above, human rights and civil society take center stage on the political scene. Due to its imposition as a simplistic and reductionist formula over all the theoretical fields in question, the famous "couplet" is turning out to be a factor of theoretical impoverishment rather than a welcome complement and corrective to the rich and complex body of knowledge on state/society relations developed by the social sciences over long decades.

I'll confine my comments to two in this case:

The first is related to the Arab world's intellectual output on democracy. Instead of the most fundamental and urgent duty of explaining, evaluating, and diagnosing the existence of the authoritarian and dictatorial regimes that really exist, this has become more and more dominated by the explanations, and even theorization, of an absencethe absence of democracy. On the other

hand, "filling" that lack often takes the shape of straightforward wish fulfillment or modeling that is centered on the Western democratic paradigm. Though it is unclear how much its proponents have accepted it, there is nothing wrong with wanting that paradigm. Despite the iconographic importance given to "democratization," the problem lies in the fact that very little attention and even less intellectual effort have been devoted to the diagnosis of authoritarianism and the tracing of the ways and means of the transition from authoritarian and despotic regimes to democracy.

The second finding relates to the connection between the dominating state and society. We are confused twice in this situation. One is the conflation of the statethat is, the institutional structures of political societyand the temporary political regime or system in effect at a certain historical juncture. The second misunderstanding is the difference between society and civil society, or, more specifically, between the total number of autonomous collectivities and types of voluntary associations within society that share a common degree of autonomy from the state.Is a robust civil society necessarily a given under a weak state? What impact does a weak state have on the integration and cohesiveness of any society in general? Can we continue to argue that weak states are what set Western democracies apart? Can it be said with confidence that the United States of America is a weak state or government, using the extreme example of liberalism in politics and economics? On the other hand, what exactly does it imply when a state is described as "strong"? Do all dictatorships share this trait? Does the development of the public sphere and civil society, as well as the subsequent advancement of democracy, invariably follow the thinning of the state?

This is not the place to deal with this issue in depth, but such concerns, and others of a similar kind, need to be carefully addressed in the intellectual output addressing democracy in the nations of the "South." However, we may be happy with recognizing that the state plays an importantand sometimes fundamentalrole in the cohesiveness and integration of society as a whole in many South American nations, just as it had done historically in the countries of the North. In such event, rather than the development of a robust civil society or the advancement toward democracy, the weakening of the state or its dissolution may be equivalent to the dissolution of society itself.

A terrible example of this issue is the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Insofar as it has been and continues to be a source of serious worry, the semi-planned, semi-random breakdown of the Iraqi state during that warwhich was by no means a precondition for the collapse of the Ba'th regimedeserves considerable and in-depth reflection. By "semi planned breakup of the Iraqi state" we refer to the process that had "nation building" as its code name rather than "regime change," and which included the U.S.-led occupation forces' refusal to defend any government institution aside from the Interior and Oil Ministries, as well as the post-occupational decisions to disband the entire Iraqi army, government, and Ba'th Party. It had turned out that "state destruction" was somewhat of a prerequisite for "nation building."

The least that can be stated about that procedure, if we are to avoid the issue of intentions, is that it resulted in two very negative outcomes. First, let's talk about the degree of the democratic process. For the purpose of argument, let's say the U.S.-led coalition had major concerns about the democratization process in Iraq. When security concerns and the need to restore the Iraqi state take precedence over everything else, it is acceptable to assume that the process of democracy has been demoted to a subordinate role. Second, the statewhich is not at all identical with Saddam Hussein's Ba'thi regimewas a crucial element in the cohesion of the multiethnic and

multireligious Iraqi population. We cannot only blame Saddam Hussein's actions for the rapidly growing ethnic and sectarian split of Iraq and the Iraqis. The above-mentioned situation is in large part caused by the objective issue of the annihilation of the Iraqi stateas a state. Of course, a dialectical connection may be considered to exist here. One might even dare to suggest that the current crisis in Iraq is partially the result of a state that is increasingly incapable of achieving the bare minimum level of social integration at a time when that society is unable to generate the forces necessary to naturally produce a new state.

Regarding the importance of the public sphere in the European Union's transition to democracy

Is the public sphere a result of, a cause of, or both of the democratic transformation of European societies? In his responses to the question, Habermas seems to be extremely conflicted. First, he claims that the concept of the public sphere originated in eighteenth-century Europe, when "bourgeois" public spheres emerged as autonomous counterweights to the absolutist state, the second of which served as a prerequisite for the first function. This historical allusion specifically prompts a number of questions about the circumstances and forces at play throughout the shift from absolutism to democracy.

I'll keep my inquiries to a maximum of two:

First, are efforts to replicate one of the historical processes that Europe previously underwentnamely, the development and consolidation of industrial capitalismin nations outside of Europe and North Americaproposals for re-creating a civil society? Partha Chatterjee responds to this query by stating that the essential premise of his approach is that only notions from European social philosophy have the potential for universalization. To be fair, Habermas never suggested that his own examination of advanced capitalism and his ideas of civil society and the public sphere had any lessons for the rest of the world. Instead, he called attention to the provincialism of the European experience when it was seen as the universal narrative of development. This acknowledgment serves as more evidencenot that there is nothing to gain from that experience, but that what is needed is a critical historical perspective that takes inspiration and insights from it. He freely acknowledged that his is a Eurocentrically limited view.

Second, was the move to democracy in Britain and subsequently other European nations a necessary and sufficient prerequisite for the bourgeois public spheres, which definitely served as counterweights to the dictatorial state? In response to this query, I would like to make the case that Habermas appears to undervalue the significance of the no bourgeois and anti-bourgeois forces in bringing about the radical revolutionary changes in their societies that ultimately led to the shift to democratic systems. This Habermasian bevue may be traced to a number of various, but connected, converging variables.Perhaps Nancy Fraser's definition of the public spherea theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk, contains the most succinct summary of Habermas's view of public spheres as arenas of peaceful rational-critical debate where language, discourse, deliberations, opinion formation, and education are stressed, all contributing to his famous concept of discursive interaction.

The public sphere cannot be thought of as an institution and most definitely not as an organization, but it is a social phenomenon just as fundamental as action, actor, association, or collectivity. Despite eluding conventional ideas of social order, the public sphere is a social phenomenon. It is not even a set of standards with distinct responsibilities and competencies,

rules for membership, etc. It doesn't really represent a system either; although one may draw internal limits, its external features include open, porous, and dynamic horizons. The public sphere is best understood as a network for information, communication, and points of view. The streams of communication are filtered and synthesized throughout this process, coalescing into collections of broadly held public beliefs.Through communicative activity, which is recreated in the public arena, mastery of a natural language is sufficient.

Further insisting on the bourgeois character of the public sphere, Habermas implies that it is always in danger from the prospect of being accessed by no bourgeois social strata. That starts the conversation regarding the dialectics of inclusion/exclusion in Habermas's view of democracy, namely his exclusion of class and gender, which has been criticized by many. In fact, Habermas' main argument is that such intrusions would obfuscate the crucial distinction between state and civil society. He specifically warns against populist movements that represent the frozen traditions of a lifeworld endangered by capitalist modernization.

At least in Europe and the United States, Habermas denies significant change in modern society and in political authority, and his warnings against social revolutions become more frequent after the fall of the Soviet Union. He gives up on the traditional Marxist aim of worker power since the working class fell short of fulfilling liberalism's promise. It demonstrated that it was unable to make capitalism social and political structures adhere to purported bourgeois ideologies like freedom and democracy. Even more striking is Habermas' assertion that capitalism cannot be replaced. He makes the odd premise that equality is a bourgeois ideal. The misconception that the French movement was a "bourgeois" movement in and of itself is undoubtedly what causes the mistake. The point that has to be stated here is that extreme violent political and social upheavals, in which the common masses played a significant part, were the catalyst for Europe's successful transition to democracy. The ultimate result was a drastic transformation of the state's essence and function, as well as its external appearance. Thus, the historical process of democratization resulted in the structural shift from absolutism to democracy by combining dramatic revolutions and lengthy periods of cumulative change.

In fact, the English and the French revolutionsthe two great upheavals in Europeeach sparked not one, but two revolutions: a revolution for liberty and a revolution for equality. Each one stood for a distinct coalition of powers. The extreme components in the English experience were represented by groups like the Familyists, who demanded the abolishment of private property. The Levellers argued for the equality of all Englishmen and the representative franchise for all males without any property constraints. They opposed both feudalism and capitalism. Both revolutions ended in a forced compromise where inequality persisted in the socioeconomic sphere while the concept of equality was limited to the legal and political spheres. It is well known that the state's brutality and its laws forced that promisewhich in the French experience gave rise to the renowned trinity of Liberté, Egalité, and Fraternitéupon the representatives of the underclasses[10], [11].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, choosing decisions is a difficult process impacted by a variety of variables. The decisions that people and organizations make are influenced by a variety of factors, including cognitive biases, social dynamics, emotions, and outside forces. Decision-makers may improve their decision-making processes, minimize biases, encourage different viewpoints, and maximize results across multiple domains by identifying and addressing these impacts. In terms of

personal, professional, and social settings, improved decision-making has the potential to spur creativity, enhance problem-solving, and support overall success. Decision-making is also influenced by external influences including time restraints, resource limits, and institutional considerations. While resource limitations may necessitate concessions and trade-offs, time pressure might result in rash judgments. Organizational culture, policies, and power dynamics are examples of institutional elements that may influence decision-making and its results. Decision-makers are able to manage restrictions and improve decision quality within the given environment by being aware of these external forces.

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CHAPTER 4

PUBLIC SPHERES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: AN ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT

Dr. Satyajeet Nanda, Associate Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-dr.satyajeetnanda@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

The concept of public spheres, spaces for open deliberation and the exchange of ideas, has evolved over time, shaped by historical contexts and societal dynamics. This abstract explores the historical development of public spheres and argues that despite initial progress, their evolution has been hindered, resulting in an arrested development. Examining key historical periods and factors, the challenges that have impeded the full realization of vibrant public spheres and emphasizes the importance of revitalizing them for a healthy democratic society.The notion of public spheres traces its roots to ancient Greece, where the Agora served as a gathering place for citizens to engage in political discussions. In subsequent centuries, the Enlightenment era fostered the development of public spheres as spaces for critical thinking and the exchange of ideas. Prominent thinkers like Habermas further theorized the concept, envisioning public spheres as arenas where individuals could engage in rational discourse and contribute to the formation of public opinion.

KEYWORDS:

Citizenship, Civil society, Communication, Counter publics, Democracy, Enlightenment.

INTRODUCTION

This is where I'd want to make the case that, at two different historical junctures, the expansion of peripheral capitalism and the rise of the public sphere in the Arab world were primarily halted by the escalation of colonial, national, and identitarian issues.An ambitious program of centralization, secularization, modernization, and political reform, the Ottoman Tanzimat, ran from 1839 until 1856. They were motivated by two opposing forces: first, to submit to European pressures to reform the Empire's structures; and second, to adopt some European values and state institutions in the hopes of establishing the necessary frameworks for competitively competing with the burgeoning economic and military might of the European states.The Ottoman Tanzimat were one of the last efforts to establish an Ottoman person whose loyalty is to the state rather than to his community and military or even to the Sultan, and there doesn't seem to be any debate among historians about this. Because Mohammad 'Ali's modernist and reformist movement had previously been suppressed by the Empire and its British supporters, the effect on the Arab territories of the Empire was immediately apparent[1], [2].

The post-Tanzimat era saw the blossoming of many facets of a newly emergent public sphere across the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire. It is crucial to draw attention to some of that movement's most important features even if this is not the place to examine and study that diverse movement in depth.The most striking feature of the developing public sphere was

perhaps the remarkable contemporary urban development. Cities were experiencing the same phenomenon that Europe had experienced in the eighteenth century: a proliferation of cafés, associations, theaters, scientific, literary, and learned societies, salons, etc. In addition to urban spaces expanding in the form of public squares, gardens, wider roads, promenades, etc., cities were also witnessing this phenomenon. Additionally, independent and independent secret organizations were actively involved in organizing the young and promoting constitutionalism, decentralization, or even straightforward Syrian or Arab independence[3].

The rural areas were not excluded from such developments. A wave of peasant and commoner uprisings swept over Algeria, Tunisia, Palestine, Northern Syria, and Mount Lebanon in the 1860s and 1870s. The demands for land, political and judicial equality, and opposition to excessive taxation were shared characteristics of the rebels. Three significant commoners' uprisings that occurred in Mount Lebanon between 1820 and 1860in 1820, 1840, and 1858led to the establishment of the custom of elected village representativesthe wakilswho were given the authority to guide their fellow villagers as long as they remained "faithful to their own conscience, to the interests of the villagers, and to those of the general good."8 A council of 100 chosen wakils dominated the territory during the Kisrawan insurrection of 1858-1861 under the banner of "the power of the republican government" for around three years. This uprising combined antitax opposition with peasant jacquerie. Tanius Shahin, the group's head, often cited the Ottoman reform decrees of 1839 and 1856 in his demands for "full equality and complete freedom.

The nahdah, the renaissance of Arab culture, in its two major centers of Cairo and Beirut, depended on a quickly growing cultural infrastructure of expanded education networks, private and public schools, increased literacy and mixed education, advancements in the printing press, and the development of "print capitalism," as evidenced by an impressive number of news-papers and magazines. Al-Jawa'ib by Ahmad Faris al-Chiyaq was published in Istanbul and read across the empire, from Yemen to Algeria. It was semiofficial yet fiercely independent of the Ottoman authorities. The rising emergence of the "individual" as opposed to the "subject" and the community member was a common feature of all those changes. Both the secular Lebanese intellectuals and the Islamic reformers Afghani and 'Abdu advocated for reason, education, and individual freedom in both religious and secular matters. For instance, Butrus al-Bustani freely translated Robinson Crusoe by Daniel Defoe in 1861, as if to envision the character's genesis in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmad Faris al-Chiyaq, a colleague, would highlight the value of equality, which includes social equality, the value of hard labor, the emancipation of women, and respect for time[4].

European powers, however, returned to the policy of protecting the religious and ethnic minorities in the Ottoman Empire as the Tanzimat, the imperial constitution, proclaimed political and judicial equality between the subjects of the Empire and imposed measures to implement it, beginning a growing process of secularization of the state. This strategy would serve as the foundation for the post-World War I mandates of Britain and France over the Ottoman Empire's Arab territories.By defending the Christians, Shi'a, Druze, and Alawis, France was able to defend her colonial "rights" over natural Syria. On the other hand, the well-known Balfour proclamation reveals all about how the issue of minorities was used to further colonial goals. The promise of a national home for the Jews in Palestine not only acknowledged the Jewish people's national character throughout the world while denying it to the Arab population of Palestinenegatively

defined as "the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestinebut also viewed the Palestinians as "communities," with rights that were only civil and religious and not political.

Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East was divided using the same principle. Syria was divided into five states along sectarian lines: two states for the Sunnis, a Christian state in Greater Lebanon, one Alawite autonomous region, and one Druze autonomous region. Sunni minority rule was imposed in Iraq where ethnic Kurds were denied their rights to self-rule.I would want to make the case that the evolution of the public sphere was directly influenced by the transition of clans, ethnic groupings, and religious communities into political organizations. In addition to endorsing subnational forms of identification and solidarity as communal repositories of rights and obligations, those political entities also created patronage networks that aided in the growth and development of those who believed that the relationship between the state and society was ambiguous, with communities that were neither fully autonomous nor fully representative of their members. More importantly, people were constantly devalued to the point of dominance[5]–[7].

The second issue is about the interaction between nationalism and democracy in the context of comparative Arab and European experiences. In the case of Europe, nationalism and democracy were mutually supportive because the fall of the absolutist state allowed for the emergence of people whose allegiances to the nationembodied by the nation-statewere gradually shifting away from those to the family, region, religion, and ethnic group. In the second instance, the colonial experience led to a split between the anti-colonial struggle for unity and independence on the one hand, and the call for democracy on the other.Under the Mandates and the first independent regimes, which were typified by the parliamentary governments of the merchant-landowner nos, the two kingdoms weren't all that hostile to one another. The disparity, however, grew throughout the post-1948 era in response to the founding of the state of Israel, as well as with the emergence of new nationalist groups and the installation of radical populist governments.

Colonialism and the opposition to it at the time were important factors in preventing the public sphere from acting as a force for democratization. Authoritarian military regimes were imposed as justification for the 1948 Palestinian catastrophe and the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although there was a great deal of misunderstanding in the public's mind, it was replicated as a contradiction between opposing Western colonialism on the one hand and rejecting democracy and modernity as Western inventions on the other. The current discussion around the occupation of Iraq serves as a striking illustration of this schism's ability to persist and create its own dichotomies. On the one hand, there are some who desire to mythically resolve the dichotomy by dismissing "nationalism" as an outdated concept in the age of globalization, even if the exact things that replicate it, even in its most extreme versions, are growing. On the other hand, there are others who wish democratization away[8].

DISCUSSION

City and Countryside

The urban environment has long been linked to ideas like civic society, the Enlightenment, and public spaces. Here, I want to provide a case for the relative nature of this presumption. Let's start with the experience in Europe. Can we reasonably conclude that the countryside had a reactionary, or in this instance antidemocratic, role in the democratic transitions in Europe? Is the French Vendée the sole example of a rural community participating in the democratic process in a European society? I believe the answer is no. The ultimate sociological foundation of the

French Republic was the independent peasant and farmer, not only because of the Jacobin feat of connecting the peasant masses to the Revolution by incorporating the land question into the revolutionary program, but also because revisionist histories of the French Revolution have come to question many aspects of the traditional, primarily Marxist interpretation of the revolutionary process. For instance, François Furet emphasizes the part played by middle class professionals and clubs in the revolutionary process while maintaining that a tiny militant elite really wielded revolutionary power; despite this, he nevertheless holds that the French Revolution was a "popular revolution."

Similar to how they did in the English experience, rural social groupings were quite important. The Levellers, who opposed both feudalism and capitalism, promoted equality of all Englishmen and the representative franchise to all males without property restrictions and not the city's merchants. The Familyists, as stated above, agitated for the eradication of private property. Similar to this, although on a much smaller scale, the influence of the countryside cannot be understated in the history of the elective systems throughout the Arab world. The above-discussed Kisrawan commoners' revolution was successful in forcing the first election system onto the mutas. The first instance of electoralism in the Ottoman Empire was Mount Lebanon's arrifiyya.

Can we state with certainty that "civility" is an urban exclusivity, even if the two registers are not directly related? Between industrial and nonindustrial cities, Gramsci makes a distinction. Although Gramsci discusses the issue in terms of progressive/reactionary, this couplet can easily be translated into the pair democratic/anti-democratic. Only the first is endowed with the quality of being more advanced than the countryside, whereas in the second, the urban nuclei are drowned in a sea of nonurban inhabitants. In a more direct statement, Fredric Jameson writes: "Perhaps the most crucial specification of this antithesis between the country and the city. ..Jameson is alluding to the discussions surrounding the French Revolution, in which it was argued for the first time in history that "the primacy of the human will over social institutions and the power of humans" ..to alter and fashion society in accordance with a strategy, fantasy, or ideal.

This divergence raises the issue of the contribution of administrative, rentier, and mercantile towns to the creation of the public sphere. Another way to frame the topic is: Are all public areas required to be public spheres and necessary contributors to the democratic process?While a public sphere is a place for inclusion, it is also a place for exclusion. Can we confidently assume that a public space restricted to a portion of a communityor hypothetically to the entire communityconstitutes a component of the public sphere and is conducive to democratization in societies where tribes, regions, religious sects, and ethnic groups are organized as political institutions and representative bodies? Because it brings together members of ordinarily closed and exclusive families, clans, regions, and other groups, is Hizbullah's creation of an urban area in the southern Beirut suburb a closed space or a public sphere?

Are structured family groupings, political religious sects, and ethnic groups a part of civil society or its antithesis? The debate over civil society in Lebanon was limited by the establishment of two "societies," if you will: first, a communal society to include the aforementioned, and second, a civil society that includes voluntary organizations like trade unions, political parties, NGOs, and the like. The same issue might affect Yemen, the Gulf nations, Jordan, etc. However, that difference is still insufficient since more study and definition are needed to determine how much the former influences the latter and how independent civil society is from the state. According to

research conducted in Egypt, the majority of current NGOs were either founded by the state or are reliant on it. Therefore, inasmuch as the city may contain social factors that serve as barriers to democracy, the rural has the potential to release social forces that promote it.

The Evolution of Society toward Democracy

Many detractors have argued that Habermas approaches the issue of public spaces as though the capitalist state and market are immutable and unchangeable. The most that can be done is to combat their worst consequences on democracy, namely the inequalities in income and access to public services, as well as the drawbacks of bureaucracy. Habermas has suggested three approaches for achieving that goal. First, the siege model, in which the public sphere besieges the state in an effort to balance the influence of money and bureaucracy. The more subdued and docile model is this one. Second, the sluice model, according to which the administrative center is affected by public opinion through the inner periphery of power universities, chari organizations, foundations, etc. Third, and in the worst scenarios, Habermas acknowledges civil disobedience as the last resort for the opposition by popular forces.

We may ignore the discussion about the "End of History" and the future of capitalism and the market for the sake of expediency. However, we should at least point out that several opponents of the concepts of civil society and the public domain have emphasized how capitalism and democracy are fundamentally incompatible. Of course, what is meant is that the former maintains the latter's incompleteness and partiality. Following Deleuze, Michael Hardt foresees the "Withering of Civil Society" as late capitalism transitions from the disciplinary mode to the control mode, where power relations now occupy all social space. Slavoj iek's critique expands on a more structural causality: he claims that the discrepancy and no contemporaneity are to be seen as structural necessities of capitalism. The criticism is leveled at Habermas' idea of "modernity as an unfinished revolution," which also relies on the assumption that capitalism and democracy are in conflict. In order to complete that revolutionwhich is also the duty of democracyits two facetsinstrumental reason on the one hand, and unrestricted intersubjective communication on the other—must be brought together. According to iek, it is impossible to complete the modernity project by realizing the potential of the second aspect, as Habermas suggests, due to capitalism's inherent character. He queries:

What if we can't just add communicational Reason to instrumental Reason since the supremacy of instrumental Reason is essential to contemporary Reason as such?The problem, however, continues to be the democracy process in and of itself. The methods outlined above, according to Habermas, are intended to recognize the corruption of the public sphere in postmodern advanced industrial societiesand, eventually, to address the democratic crisis. The major misunderstanding that is likely to result from this is treating these strategies as if they were essential and sufficient steps toward democratization in non-Western nations, i.e., the change from despotic and authoritarian rule to democratic elective rule under the rule of law.

What are the best methods for overthrowing authoritarian governments?

Is the public sphere's political influence, as envisioned in the three models above, sufficient to topple authoritarian governments in the South? First off, it's important to note the connection between the social uprisings taking place in all of these nations and the reluctance and partial democratization steps implemented in a number of Arab countries. The 1988 youth rebellion in Algerian cities was the key factor that brought about the collapse of the FLN's one-party rule, imposed the recognition of the media and political groups, and led to the organization of free

elections, which were later interrupted by the army as they gave a significant lead to the Ismaili movement. The urban unrest of January 1977 in Egypt was greatly instrumental in the political liberalization measures, including the recognition of political forums. The "bread riots" that shook the country's major cities in the second half of the 1990s forced King Hassan II of Morocco to take liberalization measures, including the drafting of a new Constitution, acceptance of the principle of the alternation of power, which led to the formation of a government by the main opposition party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, and the release of political prisoners. The same might be said of Jordan, where King Hussein's liberalization policies during his last years were greatly influenced by the Salt and Ma'an revolts. Contrary to popular belief, such contestation movements were largely driven by social concerns. But their greatest successes were in the political sphere. Here is another instance of the socioeconomic and political being linked for your consideration.

Those movements resemble the civil disobedience Habermas advises as a last option quite a bit. Of course, as a result of the responses from the in-place regimes, these escalated into more violent clashes.It is important to contrast these social movements with the fleeting public sphere of the Damascus Spring of 2000–2001, which was primarily characterized by the rapid growth of autonomous associations and cultural clubs throughout the nation and the intense activity of human rights organizations driven primarily by businesspeople and ex-Leftist intellectuals. That movement, which regrettably has not yet been the focus of in-depth scholarly investigation, was easily put down and was readily revived by the dictatorship because it lacked a popular component.

Finally, study into the specifics of the Arab world's transition to democracy must include the instance of the toppling of the Iraqi dictatorship. The tragic popular insurrections of March 1991, which marked the pinnacle of the Iraqi people's two-decade-long opposition to the Ba'th regime, raised concerns about the relative vulnerability of large-scale armed popular insurrections even when facing an army that had recently lost a war on the outside. This issue raises serious concerns about the issue of toppling authoritarian governments in the Arab World, even if it in no way justifies the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. The very minimum that can be stated is that it calls for the use of greater popular power, which regrettably does not preclude the use of violence. Or, to put it in Habermas' own words, "popular power intervention" is necessary to transfer the democratic process from the "discursive" level to the "strategic" one.

Reflections on Alternative Genealogies in Relation to Religious Mobilization in the Public Sphere

This article does not aim to present a modelized framework for a comparative investigation or provide a case study of any specific socioreligious movement. Instead, it makes an effort to comprehend how religious mobilization relates to contemporary public realms, which is complex and fraught with conflict. By relating to the frequently discussed idea of "religious tradition," we first attempt to delineate the philosophical underpinnings of the various notions of the "public" utilizedexplicitly and implicitlyby socioreligious movements to define their ideologies and actions to achieve social power. Next, we critically explore the contribution of some writings by Gramsci and Foucault in terms of their rooting in "common sense" and their potentially eruptive "political" implications Our combined interpretation of these two ideas should make it clearer how socio-religious movements might advance practical common sense in order to establish a politics of the common good and challenge the dominance of liberal norms in the public arena.

Socioreligious movements work to create and implement programs for the common good that seek to validate certain political groupings. These civilizations are based on public reasoning methods that are in opposition to modern liberal concepts of the public sphere. They remain unaffected, in particular, by the rigidities of liberal norms of publicness that are based on contractually based notions of trust and atomistic views of social agents, by a strict interpretation of the distinction between the private and public spheres, and by the fact that the basis of public reason ultimately lies in private interest. Although the interpretations of these traditions might differ, the public justification for socioreligious movements is typically based on a practical rationale that is sanctified by religious traditions. This viewpoint offers these discourses a flexibility that significantly enhances their capacity to inspire vast numbers of people to support their cause.

To understand how the common good notion adopted by many socioreligious organizations relates to ideas of practice and common sense, we must take into consideration the most recent studies on civil society, the public sphere, and the role of religion within. More precisely, we argue that the work done by socioreligious groups may be compared to Gramsci's concept of good sense as a strategy for uniting social groups who are excluded from politics. Such movements contribute to establishing and challenging the social norms of public life by giving back to their communities and advocating for social justice in ways that are at odds with the daily rights-based discourse of wealthy elites. Socioreligious movements question the legitimacy of government and non-governmental organization elites and, via them, the allocation of monies for welfare, education, and development. They do this by using a specific set of resistance and project identities. This process involves the creation of historically novel strands of solidarity that, without being utopianally horizontal, engage in social criticism of state-centric, vertically constrained academic discourses[9], [10].

Habermas's well-known definition of the public sphere is that it is "above all the sphere of private people come together as a public; however, this definition is too limited to explain how public spheres emerge and how people gain access to them globally, not just in non-Western societies. The actions made by socioreligious groups to reclaim the common good are ineligible because they oppose the secularity promoted by the modern state and any iteration of liberal, republican, or socialist ideology. But we do build on Habermas's recognition of the possibility for plebeian, alternative, or counter publics, which, in his words, are essentially the periodically recurring violent revolt or a counterproject to the hierarchical world of domination with its official celebrations and everyday disciplines.

Plebeian, subaltern, and marginalized popular movements can avoid liberal conceptions and publicness norms and can display a level of complexity and rationality that deviates from their potential classification as simple resistance movements, that is, movements that challenge bourgeois hegemony but lack a constructive, alternative sociopolitical program. This is because, historically, public spheres have been established in non-Western and premodern contexts through a mix of partial consensus and a shared hierarchical structure, which are mediated by informal and pervasive patterns of influence, responsibility, and shared expectations. These agreements offered a structure for conversation and practice that went beyond local settings, enabling debates of the general good and redefining behavioral patterns. When it is not limited to modern secular contexts, the public sphere may be understood as the environment for discussions about the definition of the obligations, privileges, and particularly conceptions of justice that members of society require for the common good to be realized.

The idea of the public sphere is both wider and more narrowly focused than civil society. Eisenstadt succinctly said, "Civil society entails a public sphere, but not every public sphere entails a civil society, since not every public sphere has the economic component that is based on the market and trust and is essential to the operation of civil society. Habermasian definitions of the public sphere are too rigidly based on the idea of a civil society of private citizens, a limitation that becomes a particular hindrance to contemporary theorization when we confront two other issues with the way the public sphere is frequently described: first, such definitions do not sufficiently consider the modalities through which modern states introduce disciplining and legitimizing projects into public sphere dynamics.

The public sphere and the opposing cultures that underpin it provide a platform for a variety of actors, including those inspired by religious discourses and symbols, to engage in conflict or negotiations with elites who have different degrees of access to state authority. One practiced and theoretical strategy for the proper operation of the public sphere is to base it on the interests, rights, and obligations of the private citizendespite being historically influential and mainly dominant. However, in modern Muslim majority societies, this approachand the historical experience on which it is based: those of former colonial powers, not of colonized peoplesclearly falls short of capturing the variety of expressions and activities involved in the public sphere, as well as failing to account for the growing fragility of some state structures, with Iraq and Palestine being two of the most notable examples[11].

CONCLUSION

There have always been both advancements and challenges throughout the history of public spaces. The dominance of certain voices, echo chambers, and the decline in trust represent a stalled development in the public spheres at the moment. Societies may create a revived public sphere that promotes free discussion, diversity, and the interchange of different viewpoints by acknowledging these issues and taking action to remedy them. Such initiatives are essential to the operation of strong democracies and the pursuit of group decision-making for the common benefit. It is essential to confront these issues and regain the founding principles in order to rejuvenate public spaces. Promoting media plurality, openness, and different ownership arrangements requires effort. Prioritizing media literacy education will help people analyze information critically and participate in productive debate. To establish responsibility, safeguard freedom of speech, and stop the spread of misinformation, regulatory frameworks should be developed. Platforms must make active efforts to lessen the effects of algorithmic biases and provide open content moderation guidelines.

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CHAPTER 5

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE INSTITUTION AND INTEREST OF GRASSROOT COMMUNITIES

Dr. Neena P.C, Associate Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-dr.neenapc@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

The relationship between state institutions and grassroot communities is a crucial aspect of governance, as it directly impacts the well-being and development of local populations. This abstract explores the dynamics and complexities of this relationship, examining the role of state institutions in addressing the interests and needs of grassroot communities. By understanding this relationship, policymakers can foster inclusive governance, empower communities, and promote sustainable development.State institutions encompass government bodies, bureaucracies, and public agencies responsible for policy formulation, implementation, and service delivery. Grassroot communities, on the other hand, represent the diverse groups of individuals living at the local level, often characterized by shared geographical, cultural, or socioeconomic characteristics. These communities are often the most affected by policy decisions and development initiatives.

KEYWORDS:

Advocacy, Civil Society, Community Empowerment, Decentralization, Grassroots Movements.

INTRODUCTION

Several socioreligious organizations, particularly those that focus on education and welfare, provide alternative models of the interaction between governmental institutions and the interests of local communities in Muslim majority cultures. These programs, which are supported by social justice discourses, have a significant influence on their communities' perceptions of political community, citizenship, and legitimate authority. This dynamic may be seen in organizations as disparate as Hizbullah in Lebanon or Hamas in Palestine, where the establishment of a Islamic state entails a just social order just as much as, if not more so than, a state that is religious,that is, founded on the Shari'a. A paradigm like this is one that articulates a parallel or alternative civil society and public sphere with its own unique social control, political discussion, and power and governance mechanisms[1], [2].

Such strategies place a greater emphasis on the rhetoric of justice than on the desire and action to seize, acquiesce in, and change governmental authority. Socio-religious movements in Islamic contexts map their social environment through active social knowledge, produced through the creation and mobilization of dense social networks and communal frameworks that heavily rely on voluntary action. This knowledge is used to provide social services or to plan insurrections. Socioreligious movements relate to societies as an extension of their own discourses of justice, something they are intimately part of and equal to in a web of relationships that are partly horizontal and partly vertical since they are based on ties of authority. This contrasts with the

secular abstractions of NGOs that target a society that is fundamentally different from the way the actors see themselves as agents of change[3].

Islamist charities are often successful and sometimes dominant because to the primarily egalitarian and voluntaristic styles of cooperation. The resistance by these same groups to the military occupations of Palestinian, Lebanese, Afghani, or Iraqi territories has been supported by a variety of organized uses of violence. At the same time, these strategies are woven into larger, global financial and moral economy networks that have become inseparable from resistance. It is exceedingly difficult for such groups to avoid taking an ambivalent, often skeptical, and hostile position toward individuals they see as outside of and intruding upon their communities once they participate in or support violent resistance operations[4].

Even when supporting bigger nationalist initiatives in theory, these groups have the potential to cast doubt on the viability of such programs by alternate social and educational systems, political rhetoric, and most notably, violent actions. Examples include Hamas and the insurgency in Iraq. This has been the overarching theme in the relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority, but it also applies, mutatis mutandis, to Shas' stance toward the Israeli government. In light of this knowledge, we suggest investigating socioreligious movements and the public spaces they produce as logical reactions to inadequate provision of essential services by either "public" or other "private" organizations. The integration of Hizbullah into Lebanese political culture and system appeared to offer a counterfactual example to this general assessment prior to the war of July 2006; however, the current situation now represents yet another instance of ambivalence between the communitarian power and the hegemonic challenge launched by socioreligious movements. The endeavor to reorganize the national community in a more democratic manner than permitted by the sectarian bias of the Lebanese political system continues to be the latter component.

It is important to consider premodern developments when evaluating modern conceptions and practices of the common good that open up new avenues for the construction and challenging of national public spheres. The concept of a common and highest good of all mankind, from a decent existence in this world to redemption in the next, was traditionally specified by the term of "public" as strongly tied to specificmostly spiritually higherforms of values. Premodern conceptions of the public were not founded on a stark separation of the private and public realms, but rather on a more nuanced and condensed understanding of the socio-legal-political order that allowed for the blending of layers and value hierarchies. The concept of what over time became known as the res publica in Roman law and government arises within such grids as good sui generis, non-negotiable, and for many writers, the prerequisite for the pursuit of all other social goods[5].

The idea of the common good serving as the core of publicness has a lengthy history that extends beyond the traditional limits of Europe or the West to include the cultural legacy of Muslim countries. The concept of community in faith, which leads to collective action for the common good, has its roots in traditional conceptions of the social and political aspects of human agency that contemporary theories of civil society find difficult to define. Islam, on the other hand, offered a more complex interpretation of the aforementioned schematized Abrahamic heritage, combining aspects of both Roman law and Platonic and Greek thought on the origins of social goods. The Islamic jurisprudential conceptbased on the root s-l-h, which implies being and becoming good, conveys the complete range of positive qualities from uncorrupted up to right, honest, virtuous, and just. This concept is crucial to our goals. The basic meaning of mas. lah. an

is more clearly cause or source of something good or beneficial. Rashid Rida, a public intellectual who lived in the early twentieth century, and the modern global 'lim Yusuf al-Qaradawi were two modern reformers who helped to resurrect the conceptual network surrounding the concept of maslah[6], [7].

The transition from a model of social relationships between the ego and alter that is mediated by a shared belief in God to an ego-alter dyad without any transcendent third instance constitutes a drastic rupture in the history of the emergence of the concept of the social bond, incorporated in programmatic visions of a civil societya transformation that corresponds to a shift from faith to trust as the primary glue of society. Trust implies a reciprocal recognition of the other's dignity and capacity to act, irrespective of the outcome of the interaction, or at least without having any guarantee about the outcome, which is no longer covered by strong role expectations. In faith-based relationships, transcendent otherhood is what helps the human self to know himself/herself and connect to terrestrial otherhood.

Giambattista Vico, a thinker from Naples in the eighteenth century, argued that the development of ever-more complex constructions of symbolic mediation between ego and alter was the key to humanity's historical emergence into "the human age" of poli- ties and civility. He concentrated on the communal force of senso commune, or common sense, in this context. Senso commune is supposed to be a store of common knowledge that is present in poetic discourse and comes before revelation enters history. The senso commune anchored myth firmly in the foundations of the civitas, which, crucially, might refer to the state, citizenship, a city-state, or a city; in other words, to diverse spheres of political and social interaction and power.

Vico's interpretation of common sense, however, did not gain traction in the majority of civil society discussions. Hume, Smith, and other pro-liberal theorists based the rising sociological facets of the contemporary understanding of civil society not on a historicized common sense but rather on a transhistorical idea of a moral sense. In doing so, liberal thinking created a much-condensed understanding of the human and social actor. Several writers, building on the Scottish Enlightenment and connecting it to other Enlightenment thinking streams as well as its criticism via Romanticism, undertook the complexification of civic society. In this line of thought, the very original and, in fact, towering personalities of Kant, Hegel, Marx, and later Nietzsche, stand out. If measured by the standards of social and economic "progress" set in England, Scotland, the Low Countries, France, and New England, it is telling that these thinkers were situated in a region of Europe that underwent a particularly conflicted historical experience during the Protestant Reformation, the commercial revolution, and the industrial revolution.Indeed, the best way to understand Habermas' well-known concept of the public sphere is to situate it in the logical intersection of the mostly Anglo-American liberal tradition and the German critical voices. However, continental Europe offered additional opportunities for critical inquiry, which sadly Habermas himself mostly disregarded. We provide a combined interpretation of Gramsci.

DISCUSSION

Gramsci's movement: From common sense to alternative hegemonies

Antonio Gramsci, a twentieth-century Marxist theorist, was moved by a mixture of respect and aversion in his approach to religion, seeing in it a token of antimodernist but also the possible key to an alternative modernityto the extent that it could be seen to possess a kernel of immunity from modern forms of socioeconomic and cultural domination. He began to examine religion in terms of its ability to ensure some level of opposition to and criticism of dominant discourses

without alienating the cultural worlds of the rural masses as a result of his ambivalence. In light of this, some aspects of religion could make it possible to reassemble a hegemony based on ideas of the common good that are freed from ideologies that cover up class dominance, especially the dominance of the Catholic church's high hierarchies.

According to Gramsci's theory, religion could not be destroyed in a nation like Italy in the 1920s and 1930s that was still essentially pre-capitalist. The establishment of a new popular belief, that is, a new common sense and thus a new culture and a new philosophy that is rooted in the popular conscience with the same solidity and imperative- ness as traditional belief was what could be accomplished. Given the influence of religion, Gramsci thought that the proletariat could succeed in overthrowing other classes, especially the peasants, by forming a network of alliances with them. The Catholic question was ultimately a peasant or rural or farmer question in Italy since the church, which had historically claimed sovereignty over the peasants, was the only way to connect with them[8].This alliance was made possible by the fact that the church as a community of believers had evolved over the centuries in almost constant political-moral opposition to the church as a clerical organization. Most importantly, religion to Gramsci was the creative spirit of the people and the source of this oppositional, though largely amorphous politics. In other words, the merit of Gramsci's approach basically comes down to whether it can help us understand Foucault's political spirituality.

Every religion, according to Gramsci, is in reality a multiplicity of distinct and often contradictory religions. His analyses of religion also show a wealth of themes and a complexity and multiplication of levels at the epistemological, ideological, historical, social, and political levels. Gramsci also displayed some ambivalence towards Islam, which he discussed in his Prison Notebook. Gramsci felt that it was absurd to assume that Islam was not evolving, despite the fact that it was torpid from centuries of isolation and a putrefied feudal regime, according to the question of why Islam did not follow in the modernizing footsteps of Christianity. From these passages, we can infer that he believed that Islam could only be compared to Christianity if one had the courage to question the universal association of Christianity with modern civilization. Lack of a sizable church organization that might serve as a collective intellectual and aid in "adaptation" to modernity was a significant barrier.

It's also crucial to remember that Gramsci thought Muslims were less motivated to modernize themselves because they saw the great hypocrisy of the church's embrace of modernity in Europe. Even while Islam was forced to run dizzily toward modernity, in reality it is the same with Christianity, with both involving grand heresies that supported national sentiments connected to a purported restoration to an original state. For example, Wahhabism and Ataturkism or Turkish republicanism, which together form a record of modern expression as developed as that of Catholicism, are common to widely diverging, if not opposite discourses that Gramsci explained as being common to the current focus on origins by many in the Muslim world. In fact, if religion was politically crucial to the creation of the historical bloc that could challenge bourgeois hegemony, Gramsci belied as a result, the "fanaticism" of certain Muslim nations was really very comparable to that of Christians throughout history and in the years leading up to World War I.

It is hardly surprising that Gramsci encouraged careful examination of the theological role of both the clerical structure and that of Islamic high education in these processes given his concentration on the creation of knowledge by intellectuals. We can extrapolate Gramscian elements for approaching the question of the public sphere in Muslim majority societies through

his strategy vis-à-vis the church, which was the subject of the vast majority of his writings, given the similarities Gramsci believed existed between Islam and Christianity in spite of all obvious differences. It's crucial to note that Gramsci believed that a mass cultural revolution was feasible in the Muslim world and that it had precedents in the history of Christianity, particularly the early church and the Protestant Reformation[9].

In this context, it is important to remember Gramsci's contention that the local dynamics of capitalist growth have an effect on intellectuals in every nation, including those in the Middle East. Gramsci's analysis urges us to investigate the precise connection between the region's emerging ruling classes and the "organic" intellectuals they interacted with. These individuals themselves led various types of reform movements that were crucial players in both the political and larger public spheres. In light of this, we may comprehend his viewpoint:

Why couldn't Islam accomplish what Christianity has implicitly been said to be a part of contemporary civilization? We believe that this adaption should be simpler since there isn't a significant Christian-Catholic ecclesiastical body. Why not draw the conclusion that Islam will inevitably change if it is acknowledged that modern civilization will ultimately prevail in the East as a result of its industrial, economic, and political manifestation? Will Islam be able to survive in its current form? No, it has already changed from how it was before to the conflict. Is it conceivable that it will collapse suddenly? The greatest painful challenge for Islam is really brought about by the fact that a torpid culture has been thrust into a frenzied civilization that is already in the process of disintegrating.Gramsci reads folklore, popular religion, intellectual religion, and, most importantly, Vichian common sense in an effort to understand the power relationships between historical religions and social structures. For Gramsci, the key dynamics that would determine the success of the socialist project would be determined by how dialectically exalted the common sense incorporated in everyday religious practice could be.

A key idea in Gramsci's study of religion is common sense. Gramsci sees a basic ambiguity in the historical and contemporary forms of Christianity because of the interaction between religion and common sense. By common sense, we mean a shared perception, experience, or awareness. It will always be fragmented and not uniform. It is chaotic, contradictory, superstitious and realistic all at once. As a result, religion serves as the "principal element" of a wider body of unorganized common knowledge. However, religion cannot be reduced to common sense since it has the capacity to be a complete social praxis[10].

Here, we see a sophisticated vision of a living tradition in which fragmentation predominates but is ultimately recondensed and merged by the underlying practice-driven need for coherence. In addition,and going beyond VicoGramsci thought that people share in the common sense, which gives them the capacity to critically elaborate the cultural foundation to achieve transformative social praxis and thus transcend its initial reality as common sense turned good.Good sense is what allows common sense to transform into the pursuit of common good. We should conclude that in Gramsci's view, a pursuit of common good can only succeed if a po Without taking this action, common sense will serve the ruling classes' hegemonic culture.

A back-and-forth pendulum between universality and local, common knowledge, common sense facilitates the connection between the two extremes of high culture and popular culture and, being mobile and flexible, continually transforms and enriches itself with new ideas to shape the range of maxims through which principles are translated into moral guidelines for everyday life. However, neither religion nor the larger body of common sense supports this.In the end,

Gramsci's assessment of the situation facing the vast majority of southern Italian peasants was rather bleak. The sole source of hope for Gramsci was personal initiative that eventually led to organized, revolutionary political activity. When we approach to Foucault's study of the Iranian Revolution, a situation where religion did succeed in transforming into good sense, exactly because of what Foucault regarded as the unity of will of the people, this understanding of the relationship between common and good sense will become crucial. As we will see, Foucault believed that for a little period of time in Iran, religion ceased to be common sense.

However, in saying that religion is a need of the spirit and even a key to the needed public spirit, Gramsci was echoing Marx and anticipating Foucault in saying that religion is the spirit of a spiritless age. A metamorphosed religion has the power to unite the will of the people, and as such is essential to carrying out the philosophy of praxis. The "intellectual and moral reformation" that must come before any revolution depends on it. By reinterpreting Gramscian concepts, one may venture to claim that religion is a philosophy and can serve as the foundation for a philosophy of praxis, not as a theoretical endeavor but rather as a catalyst for action and a source of mobilization. Indeed, one of the ideas that separated Gramsci's thinking from Marx's was the idea that religion served as the people's opiate. That is to say, even if religion might convey a disenfranchised and delusional ideology, it can also function as a catalyst for revolution, or at the very least, a "passive revolution," when the hegemonic force oppressing the people is too large to allow for active opposition.

Beyond the postcolonial paradigm: Foucault's "political spirituality"

According to Gramsci, political dependency is always a sign of cultural dependence. Leading Muslim opponents of the West and of capitalist modernity have recognized this fact for two centuries, including Iranian philosophers like Shariati and Jalal Al-e Ahmad. Foucault used a method that was fundamentally different from that of his larger body of work in order to make sense of the revolutionary events in Iran. In that work, he prioritized the agential motivational prism above the development of an alternative hegemony founded on ethical-political claims to the common good. During his time in Iran, he identified with the phrase people that they are much freer than they feel when referring to those who accept contemporary conditions and realities as permanent and unchanging.

It is a true act of emancipation in the proper meaning of the term when a colonial people attempt to rid themselves of their colonizer. However, we also understand that this act of emancipation falls short of establishing the freedoms that will eventually be required for this people, this society, and each person to choose acceptable and acquiescent forms of their life or political society.Scholars have criticized Foucault for paying insufficient attention to the colonial condition, particularly from a postcolonial viewpoint. The colonial was not a prominent issue in Foucault's work, but he did frame it in certain instances, as the aforementioned quotation and his direct involvement with the early Iranian revolution demonstrate. Nevertheless, we would not support Foucault on this point. One of his most important discoveries was that "liberation" cannot provide true liberty without a certain amount of what can be called "discursive control" by the populace over the regimes of governmentality that such liberation produces.

In this context, the enigma of revolt in the Iranian revolutionary events of late 1978 was an important finding for someone examining how the revolt was being lived: was dreamt of as being as much religious as politicalclose to those old dreams which the West had known at another time, when it wanted to inscribe the figures of spirituality on the ground of politics.The

active function that Foucault attributes to religion stems from his observations of how discourses about the development of modern subjects use religion as a background to compel potentially impermissible aspects of the individual into contemporary disciplinary grids. A new manner of creating an ethical way of being a self will be the main campaign in that conflict, according to Foucault, if the fight for our identities is a politics of our identities.

If Foucault's well-known work on early Christianity seeks to disclose how the religious subject is produced, his works on the Iranian Revolution prompt us to consider how the new Iranian religious subject managed to terminate the shahs' millennia-long rule. The Iranian Revolution particularly piqued his attention because of the changes in subjectivity it brought about. His main goal was to explore how religion generates forms of subjection by creating new power relations. Because of this, he sought to investigate alternative methods of managing oneself via a new manner of splitting up true and falsethat is what I would term political spirituality.

Foucault's research on early Christianity taught him that religion has always been a political force; a superb instrument of power for itself; entirely woven through with elements that are imaginary, erotic, effective, corporal, sensual, and so on. The Iranian revolution fascinated him because it seemed to plot a escape from history and was "irreducible" in scope. Even more so when the individual rebelling is Muslim since "the issue of Islam is basically a problem of our era and for the years to come. His conduct is a ripping that breaks the thread of history and its endless chains of reason. The Iranian philosopher Ali Shariati, in Foucault's opinion, was a prime example of the potential for such spiritual politics and enlightened mysticism enshrined in religious activism. Shariati's early political and religious experiences as a member of the movement of God-worshipping socialists reveal precisely the kind of revolutionary sociopolitical program, rooted in Islamic Iranian intellectual culture, that would appeal to Foucault. This is hardly surprising given that, in Shariati's opinion, the penetration of European values into Iran aggravated the country's already-existing lack of faith and ignorance of the Qur'an. According to the group's platform, Shariati belonged to, its philosophy includes the need for religious belief, defending the genuine rights of workers and peasants, and opposing tyranny, exploitation, and colonialism.

Shariati was particularly fond of Frantz Fanon, who believed that the colonized must return to their true selves in order to defeat colonialism. Of course, for Foucault, there was no such thing as a "true self"; rather, one could return to a focus on the self as a project, a complex microsocial structure, replete with foreign relations, and not the dis-engaged autonomous self of the modern self-imagination. We can comprehend the connections that this ethical sensibility could forge with religiously driven movements of resistance throughout the globe if we think about it in a political context. However, although the Iranian Revolution shows the value of power technologies in the face of hegemonic systems of dominance, it is evident that Foucault's revolt with bare hands" lacked defined long-term objectives. Unfortunately, the lack of a strategyespecially by the leftist-student-intellectual coalition that spearheaded the early stages of the revolutionproved to be its downfall in the face of Khomeini's ruthlessly well-thought-out strategy. By fusing a naive assessment of the forces at work in Iran with his yearning for a "political spirituality" that he perceived to be exhausted in the West, Foucault saw

To use Gramsci's categories, it means that they realized they had to become their own organic intellectuals, to forge the ideology for their own appropriation of the Iranian state based on a hegemonic reformulate. This has important implications for our discussion, as Georg Stauth argues. Foucault understood the situation as one in which the people on the street had become

increasingly conscious of the fact that the system had come to depend on their own active ideas for its sustenance. This discourse's organic nature would have to be precisely linked to the wider social class and network of economic ties from which it originated, defining and complicating the idea of common good.It is obviously very difficult to interpret the Iranian Revolution in Foucauldian and Gramscian terms together. However, there is another level to Foucault's analysis that is integral to his whole strategy. Even though it is obviously naive, it is especially intriguing for our case. It is the view that the history of the widespread Islamic uprising cannot be understood via prisms of motive based on Western ideas of power. Most importantly, Foucault grasped that the people's yearning to change themselves, to make a difference, was what drove the revolution.

significant transformation in their perception. Here is where I believe Islam enters the picture... Religion was the promise and guarantee of discovering a dramatic transformation in their subjectivity. This was consistent with traditional Islamic practice, which already safeguarded their identity, and it was in this way that Islam had come to life as a revolutionary force.And here, crucially, he reminds the reader that, prior to Marx's famous line about religion being the opium of the people, Marx argues that religion is "the spirit of a world without spiritLet us say, then, that in 1978 Islam was not the opium of the people precisely because it was the spirit of a world without spirit, i.e., a form of affirmation of will unrelated to the way technologies of power worked within modern politics. It was practically a non-biopolitical kind of power, but one that legitimately aspired to contemporary credentials and was thus suited to unpredictable outcomes. The difficulties and discursive failures of Islamic reformers and revolutionaries in the modern era, whether in Iran, the Ottoman Empire, or elsewhere, could then simply be seen as a variation in an effort to transform traditionsand thus the authentic selfunder the structural conditions of modernity, an effort that is perpetually painful and never fully successful[11].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, a key component of governance and development is the interaction between state institutions and grassroots communities. State institutions may encourage inclusive governance, give communities more power, and advance sustainable development by acknowledging and addressing the concerns and interests of local communities. In order for state institutions to successfully serve the many and distinctive interests of grassroots communities and eventually create more just and affluent societies, effective communication, engagement, and empowerment are essential components. The interaction between governmental institutions and grassroots communities is centered on sustainable development. In order to promote social welfare, environmental stewardship, and fair economic development, state institutions are essential. To fulfill the unique needs and ambitions of grassroots communities, advance social inclusion, lessen inequality, and save the environment for future generations, policies and actions must be developed.

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CHAPTER 6

CONFLICT, COMMUNICATION AND ROLE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN FORMATION OF PUBLIC SPHERES

Dr. Urmila Itam, Assistant Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-dr.urmilaitam@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

The formation of public spheres is a dynamic process influenced by conflict, communication, and collective action. This abstract explores the interplay between these factors and their role in shaping the emergence and transformation of public spheres. By examining the relationship between conflict, communication, and collective action, the significance of these dynamics in fostering inclusive and participatory public spheres.Conflict serves as a catalyst for the formation of public spheres. Conflicting interests, values, and perspectives often lead to debates and contestation, prompting individuals and groups to engage in discourse and negotiation. Conflict can arise from various sources, including social, cultural, political, and economic disparities. These conflicts create opportunities for communication and provide a platform for diverse voices to be heard and considered.

KEYWORDS:

Activism, Civil society, Collective identity, Conflict resolution, Cultural diversity, Deliberation.

INTRODUCTION

Even though the concept of the public sphere has been criticized by Marxists, feminists, and postmodernists, social theory and everyday language have stubbornly allowed it to endure. In fact, rather than political theorists, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians appear to be the ones who have recently rekindled interest in the idea. By all means, the idea's productiveness is shown by the many, contradicting, and astonishingly creative uses outside of political science[1]. The term public sphere now refers to a wide range of phenomena, from the production of cultural modes of stranger-relationality to the institutionalization of debate, from the site of resistance to the medium of opinion formation and circulation. However, this is due to the proliferation of approaches and inter- predations. This idea could be too much to handle, particularly as it hasn't yet shed its legal, Hegelian meaning of state-connected territory or action tied to the common good. The state, society, and a body that sits in between them cannot all be simultaneously represented by the public realm. Additionally, it cannot be used to denote both ordinary interactions with strangers and rational activity at the same time[2], [3].

The proliferation of anthropological research on stranger relationships and publics has eloquently shown how the dissemination of diverse discursive practices and narratives creates the contextual conditions necessary for discussing publics.1 Microprocesses that build and recreate a variety of overlapping publics help social imaginaries and representations of collective selves to develop, alter, change, and reestablish themselves. Publics are created as performative outcomes or results of regular social engagement, but this interaction also serves as a foundation for resistance to

dominance. These more recent research has been helpful in spotting subtle kinds of subversion when political or economic scholars had missed them. Anthropologists have surpassed political theorists in conceptualizing hitherto unknown mechanisms of change, resistance, and insurgence in addition to exposing the complex relationship between social practice and publicity. There has been a great deal of discussion on how unexpected and uncontrollable counternarratives might destabilize dominant discourses via performative means. Anthropological studies demonstrate how spaces of communication progressively arise or vanish in the cracks between routine social activity by elaborating on the plural nature of textualization processes. The state also becomes entangled in the small-scale activities of daily life. What political scientists refer to as the state is really a collection of multilayered discourses and institutions that define social norms and subjectivity people by dictating how they should behave. But at the same time, the state's inherent ambiguity and illegibility simultaneously facilitates the negotiation and ultimate subversion of these same standards. Anthropologists emphasize the intricate connection between state and society rather than dividing them into clearly defined entities[4].

Therefore, the public sphere may and does include a variety of interconnected levels of activity, ranging from routine interpersonal interactions to state-related activity, passing via logical argument and communication, all of which open up circles of circulation amongst strangers. Public spheres are those settings where previously unconnected strangers engage into nonintimate relationships that either build or shatter social structures and norms. Subversion, after all, is a danger inherent in stranger-relationality. However, a significant question still arises in the anthropological context: Is there any distinction between the public and public sphere? Is simple stranger-relationships a sufficient foundation for the concept of the public sphere? In fact, don't the various ways that the public and private are distinguished from one anotherbased either on the classical Greek distinction on the more recent distinction between the private and public realmssufficiently distinguish the two without the need for the additional qualifier "sphere"? One might assume that the spatial and relational nuances associated with the public/private distinction, which have been brought to light through rich and varied anthropological studies, would make the concept of a public sphere superfluous or, at the very least, allow it to be used interchangeably with related concepts like "public," "space," "publicity," and "culture." The fundamental categorical argument of this article is that it would be both a significant theoretical and political error to believe that this is the case[5].

At the beginning, it should be acknowledged that the many opponents of the normative Habermasian conception of the public sphere as a civic forum for debate and reasoned opinion formation are all very persuasive. Since Habermas's model is not the focus of this article, there is no need to elaborate on their perspective. In a nutshell, the deliberative model lacks gendering, heavily emphasizes a masculine and bourgeois use of reason and persuasion, fails to conceptualize social identities as constitutive of individuals' public stances, is extremely rigid in its separation of the public from the private, of the state from society, and of the public sphere from everyday life, and glosses over the constitutive role that collaboration plays. Taking these ideas to a further level, new research argues that we should maintain the normative model's intrinsic communicative feature of publicness while persuasively broadening the scope of communication, refusing to be constrained by the Kantian ideal of the public application of reason. This exercise broadens the places in and through which publicness operates in addition to the ways in which publics are produced[6]. The favored venues for critical publicity, such as salons, reading groups, and informed publications, indicated in Habermas' historical account of the creation of the bourgeois public sphere, then, are no longer the case.8 Anthropological terms

like representational spaces, symbolic spaces, spaces for movement and performance, margins, and in-betweens are used with justification.

But it should also be noted that anthropologists' overzealous antimodernist enthusiasm weakens their conception of the public realm. The normative potential inherent in the liminal moment is eliminated when the primary and most distinctive characteristics of the theoretical framework in which the idea of the public sphere was defined are rejected. The term "liminality," which was first used by anthropologist Victor Turner, refers to an antistructure or a threshold on the edge of daily existence. In addition to spheres or areas where structural and norm-bound restraints are loosened to allow for a creative estrangement from social life, Turner also speaks of liminal moments or episodes. Liminality is what separates familial relationships from public relations. In liminal public areas marked by contacts with strangers, Sirman writes, each exchange marks a performative moment when the subject has to find the proper code to behave according to. A refunding of relational patterns on fresh, perhaps equitable foundations is made possible by the temporary suspension of structures and norms. The public realm so stands out by providing spaces for group activity and ultimately self-determination[7].

Analytically speaking, the distinction between a community that is actively molded by communicative agents and a community that is passively created inside a communication framework must be preserved. Such an obliteration has serious repercussions. Let me use Benedict Anderson's description of the country as a fictive joining together of otherwise unconnected people via contemporary vernaculars, particularly capitalism and the development of print, to show what I believe to be a mere public. The country is a classic example of a communal organization that people are exposed to without really being its subjects in the constitutive sense. It is imagined but not actively constructed. From this perspective, it is clear that such a community cannot be claimed to have developed as a result of collective self-determination. Instead, it is believed that common forms of communication and interaction, like Adam Smith's invisible hand, combine to create a structure that is both distinct from what the acts were meant to accomplish and goes beyond the creation of particular agents. Such structures are overshadowed by the ghostly shadow of Marx's idea of alienation, which has long been criticized for its essentialism. Specifically, "Powers, born of the action of men on one another, have up until now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them[8].

The difficulty confronted by all democratic politics: how to organize communal life according to standards that we ourselves have setis what is lacking from the new anthropological shift in studies on publicity. Norm-bound behaviors offer the prerequisite for the creation of anthropological public spaces, which are often associated with power systems or viewed as the result of dominating discourses. Curiously, the subject of emphasis is how these standards are subverted and challenged inside via a slow, anonymous process. In the structured setting of daily actions, norms are understood to both reproduce and be perverted. Then, social movements are seen as just the latter's larger-scale replication. Even while it may be alluring, a purely textual interpretation of the "fruitful perversity" of public discourse ignores the topic of political action, which is undoubtedly one of the most important issues in social and political philosophy at the start of the twenty-first century.

The Kurdish revolt in Turkey informs my criticisms of both Enlightenment and anthropological views of the public space. I have previously discussed what I referred to as the "conflictual formation" of the public sphere in Diyarbakir, the biggest city in the mostly Kurdish southeast of Turkey. Here, I'll use the theoretical knowledge gained from that investigation to reconsider the

public sphere in terms of its event-character, its relationship to conflict and political struggle, and, subsequently, its distinctive quality of self-determination via collective action. In doing so, I'll interact with a conversation between Dana Villa and Craig Calhoun on political action and resistance that is sure to get you thinking. This exchange, in which the question is not whether the public sphere is a theoretically valuable concept or not, but rather whether political action is even possible in the modern era, captures the essence of the otherwise scholarly exercise of trying to rethink the public sphere in its connection to struggle, collective action, and self-determination.

DISCUSSION

Diyarbakir: An agonistic public space

Since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the nonrecognition of Kurdish nationality has been a complicated issue that has continued in a more or less deceptive way. When the illegal Kurdistan Workers' Party assaulted two army installations in southeast Turkey in 1984, it quickly escalated into a serious situation. The situation quickly devolved into a brutal conflict that split the majority of Turkey's social and political groupings into two distinctly opposing factions. Speaking from a "middle ground" was almost impossible by the early 1990s because anyone who refused to use the language of separation faced persecution from both sides. The civil war was made up of opposing publics that took positions about a problem that had many labels depending on where one stood: terrorism/separatism or the Kurdish crisis/Eastern problem[9], [10].

Even while this alignment forbade discussion or communication between the camps, it still forced a single eventwarupon what eventually expanded to include a national audience of watchers. Furthermore, it made any attempt to deny the existence of an issue, regardless of its name, impossible. Everyone, including the mainstream media, was aware that the PKK enjoyed widespread popular support in the provinces with a significant Kurdish population, and that categorizing the situation as the result of a few isolated acts of terrorism or as the folie des grandes of radical Kurdish leftists would not be sufficient. The actuality of conflict simultaneously divided and united the two publics, notwithstanding the complete absence of true discussion and debate among the Turkish population. Kurds and Turks were now living in the same physical place in addition to having competing claims to the same land. Regardless of what one may think about the merits of national political spaces, the case in question demonstrates the extent to which the formation of single spaces depends on antagonistic division rather than consensus. The situation closely resembled a paradox developed by Laclau and Mouffe, according to which hegemonic struggles construct a single space in the very process of partitioning available discursive elements into two opposing fields.

Political and social actors, notably in the southeastern provinces, found themselves creating new practices or reacting to new demands when tensions subsided in the second half of the 1990s. Between state and non-state players in the area, argument or negotiation became inevitible regardless of the reasoning behind it; however, this did not hold true on a national level. Through communication between state institutions and municipalities that were run, starting in 1999, by Kurdish parties, new channels of cooperation were made possible. The latter, imitating Islamic parties in other parts of Turkey, established and improved regional democratic governance procedures that included constituents, associations, and party members in collaborative decision-making. The main city in southeast Turkey, Diyarbakir, developed into a hub connecting the area and the rest of Turkey as Turkish intellectuals and activists flocked there to conduct research,

host conferences, and carry out social work. Local cultural components re-appropriated and reinvested in an urban area that had been destroyed by conflict and ideological colonization19, and where none had previously been, a public space of activity and interaction amongst a variety of actors was formed. Up until relatively recently, local politics developed a significant degree of independence from the military forces of both factions, generating its own dynamics.

Similarly, innovative issues like whether to permit minority language broadcasting or redefine citizenship so that the name "Turk" would be substituted with the more inclusive "Türkiyeli" grew to preoccupy the majority public. The latter was compelled to discuss each unconventional demand brought about by the new solidarity practices. In the time that roughly started in the middle of the 1990s and continued until 2006, a public sphere in which the norms and structures of communal life were subject to critical examination and ultimately reshaped via discussion or real practice was seen to be evolving.

The Diyarbakir case, which is currently in limbo because of a resurgence of Turkish nationalism, had parallels to other instances of mobilization where conflict, rupture, and struggle also became "communicative": the Zapatista case in Mexico's Chiapas, the anti-globalization movement that carved out a space for itself in Porto Allegre and the World Social Forums, and the peace movement that arose in response to the 2003 Iraq War. These recent examples of collective action amply indicate that conflict is not necessarily harmful, together with feminist movements and the rise of the working classes during the previous century. But the second point that has to be addressed is how much staying power public spaces thus constructed gain.

On risky territory: revisiting conflict

Dana Villa makes a terrible claim: in a world where the space of politics has been stolen by contemporary subjectification of the real and by the automatism of natural and mechanical processes, resistance is the only ethical course of action. Villa argues that attempts to "resurrect the agora or some approximation thereof by appealing to deliberation, intersubjectivity, or "acting in concert" are frustrated by the lack of a genuine public sphere. We have no choice but to resist falling into the trap of norm-bound functional behavior and must preserve "as far as possible, our capacity for initiatory, agonistic action and spontaneous action." The only things that are "seen and heard by all" in the public realm Villa describes, however, are "the false appearances... offered up under the single aspect of mass culture. Resistance is a "reaction," but it is the only method of acting available to dissidents, the only defense against the complete withdrawal of politics. Even while there are still opportunities to start something fresh in the contemporary world, giving new areas of freedom any permanency has become quite rare indeed due to the public sphere. Power systems that operate in the aftermath of the twenty-first century are too robust to acts of subversion on a microscale, as the recent deterioration of the "communication" formed between the Kurdish and Turkish publics appears to illustrate.

Despite how scary this warning may be, the conceptual framework seems to have a flaw. The question of whether action requires the prior existence of a public sphere where it can establish freedom rather than wreak havoc or whether public spheres are themselves results or effects of collective action is left unanswered, in large part due to the ambiguity of Arendt's own postulates. If it were agreed that a common world is the prerequisite of action and politics, then adopting a Foucauldian mode of local/everyday resistance or taking a negative-critical stance similar to what Adorno, in his desperation, proposed as the only way to avoid the trap of ideology, would in fact be the only alternatives left. Villa's assertion that the potential of political

action per se has all but vanished from today's environment makes it clear that the issue is not purely academic.

Contrarily, Calhoun argues that political activity creates public space and that failing to take political action would actually result in calamity in the shape of the return of the totalitarian reflex ingrained in modernity as a period. In fact, Calhoun correctly argues that no institutional arrangement can be seen as its prerequisite if action is to be considered as a fresh beginning in the Arendtian sense. Action is what produces public spheres or new meanings, connections, and identities. Whether or if we can establish new circumstances of publicness is the issue confronting us in late modernity, not whether or not we should reconstruct some historical model of the public sphere, such as the agora or the salon. According to Calhoun, the search for a single, retrievable model of the public domain is in reality problematic. The problem is linked to that of pragmatic democratic politics rather than with any ontological understanding of genuine political activity, according to one possibility, which is to think of the public sphere not as the realm of a single public but as a sphere of publics.

The major dilemma of modernity and of politics after Auschwitz cannot, of course, be taken lightly. In order to introduce a theoretical perspective that is more likely to take into account the various instances of collective action and self-determination that still continue to undermine power structures, cause gaps in ideological boundaries, or disturb the functionalist universe of consumer capitalist society, I will confine myself to the following modest remarks.

Despite Arendt, modern theories of power provide a little less dismal image of dominance and subordination than older critical theorists' totalizing perceptions. They often highlight the ambiguity of dominating systems and the constant potential of opposition. The concept of liminality is one specific topic in the already extensive literature on power systems, as was previously mentioned. According to Turner, liminality is a state of being in between successive participations in social milieux dominated by social considerations, whether formal or unformalized. This condition of being unqualified, undetermined, and unbound unquestionably carries a Heideggerian underpinning of groundlessness. However, Turner's interpretation of Heidegger differs in that liminality is treated as a domain of action rather than an ontological archsodality. Rather, liminal situations or periods are nothing more than undifferentiated, equalitarian, direct, and nonrational relationships that do not easily fit into preexisting behavioral patterns. Turner's commentary on society in general may be found in part in the microlevel interaction with a stranger that designates a relationship as public rather than personal or private.

As a result, liminality lends itself to the analysis of relationships that fall outside the kinship-based realm of the private or the rule-governed field of institutions because it is well supplied with some of the conceptual components of the public sphere, particularly with what John Austin calls the performative. This is an egalitarian time because, in contrast to the domestic sphere, where kinship is governed by hierarchical institutions, interaction in the public sphere is unclear and unpredictable. By examining the case of Merve Kavakç, a fashionable headscarf-wearing American-educated woman who was elected to the Turkish Parliament, Göle, for example, uses the concept of liminality to highlight the fractured identity of Muslim women in cosmopolitan Turkey. Göle claims that these veiled women's transcultural and crossover performances in settings where they were previously prohibited by both secularists and Islamic tradition enact a liminal way of being public. They are in-between established social identities and codesneither Islamic nor contemporary, neither private nor republican. In a sequence of micro practices that performatively alter the current republican space of appearances, the mode of publicness that

results is negotiated and renegotiated. As a result, rather than being seen as a structure or institution, publicness is seen as a field of potential.

If the aforementioned were to be translated into the language of political philosophy, liminality would then have something to do with groundlessness, understood as the potential to alter the current state of affairs and essentially create a new world. Because it is the time when the unexpected may happen, the unexpected may show up, and a new style of relationality may arise, the performative as opposed to the normative is the liminal. Therefore, it seems that the liminal both relocates freedom in the ambiguity of public relations and attests to the contingent nature of all human form and speech.

People who find themselves in liminal circumstances are no longer able to rely on the previous meaning and behavioral patterns that existed inside the normalcy field. Instead, liminality forces one to employ creativity and imagination to find a route out. This aspect of liminality explains how it contributes to societal transformation. The most authentic liminal circumstances are those that arise during times of crisis when normative frameworks fall apart and new ones are yet undeveloped. These situations fit the definition of "social drama" according to Turner. These are public episodes of tensional irruption or units of aharmonic or disharmonic process, arising in conflict situations. While gradual processes may over time lead to significant changes in social structures, dramatic events or conflict seem to "bring fundamental aspects of society, normally overlaid by the customs and habits of daily intercourse, into frightening prominence." The self-reflexivity that distinguishes liminal circumstances suggests that dramatic and gradual transition processes vary qualitatively. The liberation of human capacities for cognition, affect, volition, creativity, etc., from the normative constraints incumbent upon occupying a sequence of social statuses is what Turner refers to as "communitas," while daily interaction remains within the bounds of norm-governed behavior and is unquestioned. This results in what Villa would describe as the kind of positive alienation that permits the de-naturalization of the norms of mass communication.

For ears trained to the language of rational deliberation, this creative potential inherent into the structure of crises emerges as a misconstruction. One of the key principles of Marxist theory, from Marx to Gramsci and beyond, has been the notion that crisis may not only be awakening but also liberating. The ambiguity that characterizes the liminal moment is what makes Turner's anthropological description of crisis especially suitable for understanding public spaces in the postmodern period. Crisis frees from all belief and structure without exposing any objective structure underneath subjective belief. As a result, neither the liminal moment itself nor what Turner refers to as the redress and reintegration moments that occur after a crisis take on a predictable feature or direction. While the time of redress may pave the way for a "distanced replica- tion and critique of the events leading up to and composing the 'crisis,'"34 the phase of reintegration may see the reinstatement of previous structures or the formation of completely new ones.

The connection between Turner's talk of crisis and liminality and my initial query about the specific conditions of action and politics in the current age is made by the latter of these two possibilities. One may nevertheless argue for a beneficial "disruption of reference" in the Heideggerian sense even if the austere foreboding that today's world is defined by the complete absorption of subjectivating rules is left uncontested. This would clearly necessitate considering politics and the development of the public sphere in terms of both breaches and crises in addition

to discourse and cooperation. The idea that this could be today's sole other option to inactivity or simple opposition gives the mission its significance and importance.

Resistance should not be seen as a simple stand-in for action in the true meaning of the word. Strangely enough, Arendt makes a connection between acting and resisting that resembles Turner's reasoning in certain ways. As a member of the French Resistance, René Char and others discover that they are stripped of all the masks that society assigns to them; they go naked, as it were, caught between the past and the future, and Arendt opens her essay, "The Gap between Past and Future," with one of Char's aphorisms: Our inheritance was left to us by no testament. Their joint resistance as resisters creates a space of relationality where the apparition of freedom appears to them. They are guided in their future action only by their shared imagination and resistance. They become challengers and take the initiative to fight "things worse than tyranny." Resistance to dominanceand restitution in emergency situationsmight really be how we carry out initiatory, agonistic action and spontaneous, independent judgment in the modern world, as opposed to serving as stand-ins for action.

Arendt calls it the "revolutionary tradition," which may refer to both resistance and a fresh start. However, the ability of any collective attempt to create new worlds is what gives freedom zones that may arise from the path of action permanency. A slightly different way to put this is to say that not all forms of resistance are political and that resistance itself is, at best, a kind of displaced or second-best form of political action. As Villa rightly notes, Arendt is acutely aware of the modern de-worlding of the public world to subscribe to the belief that a politics of everyday life con- fined to 'local' struggle and resistance can effectively prevent the further withdrawal of the political.

The explanation of conflict's creativity that was just given has to be carefully qualified since it is both provocative and dangerous. The hubris-producing abilities of political activity that fall short of creating a common world or public sphere may in reality be the root cause of liminal circumstances. Fanatical fervor or mob outbursts do not produce liminality since they highlight rather than blur normative or ideological-structural divisions, yet the emergence of the Nazi movement unquestionably had liminal aspects. Additionally, liminality may lead to many results. The period of reintegration after a catastrophe may reinstate previous behavioral patterns or result in more subordination and dominance rather than allowing anything new to develop.

The Kurdish movement in Turkey seems to be experiencing this. Methods were developed to get the dominant public to close in on itself in order to become resistant to opposing viewpoints in the wake of a succession of upsetting and provocative events of national importance. Therefore, the new public places for action and interaction that appeared in Diyarbakir and elsewhere in Turkey during the previous ten years have largely lost their potential revolutionary implications. Mainstream public opinion and political players have skillfully used the liminal position to their advantage, becoming more homogenous and dictatorial than they have in more over twenty years. It is sufficient to note here that a passive public, like that in Anderson's Imagined Communities, is potentially vulnerable to ideological manipulation and discipline, even if much has been written about how this came about. What I shall say next is correct, as shown by the fact that only a small section of the Turkish populace was really able to participate in the remaking of cultural and political norms prior to the planned blocking of alternatives. A public sphereor a sphere of publicsseems to only have stayed power when the publicness forged during social dramas ultimately serves as the foundation for effective self-determination, understood as the collective restructuring of the social space open to the communicating publics. Without

claiming to be thorough, I will discuss visibility and world-making, two conceptual components that seem essential for reconsidering the public realm today[11], [12].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, public spheres are formed by a combination of conflict, communication, and collective action. Discussion is sparked by conflict, exchange of ideas is made possible through communication, and varied voices and demands are amplified by collective action. Fostering open and participatory public spheres that promote social cohesion, democratic governance, and social justice requires an understanding of the role played by these dynamics. In order to foster dynamic and inclusive public spheres in modern countries, actions must be taken to remove power disparities and provide fair access to communication outlets. Society is significantly impacted by the creation of public spheres via conflict, communication, and group action. Public spheres that are inclusive promote social cohesiveness and democratic participation by recognizing and incorporating different points of view. They provide platforms where perspectives from underrepresented groups may be heard, advancing social justice and equality. The inspection and accountability of those in positions of authority is also made possible by public spheres, ensuring that governments are open and responsiveness.

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CHAPTER 7

CROSSING THE THRESHOLD BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND TRANSFORMATIVE ACTION

Dr. Gayathri. R, Assistant Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-dr.gayathri_r@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

The threshold between resistance and transformative action represents a critical juncture in social movements and activism. This abstract explores the dynamics of this threshold and its significance in bringing about meaningful social change. By examining the processes of resistance, collective mobilization, and transformative action, the importance of crossing this threshold to foster sustainable and impactful transformations in society.Resistance, in the context of social movements, refers to acts of dissent and opposition against perceived injustices, inequalities, or oppressive systems. Resistance often emerges in response to grievances and seeks to challenge existing power structures, norms, and practices. It can take various forms, including protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience, and grassroots organizing. Resistance serves as an initial catalyst for raising awareness, mobilizing individuals, and drawing attention to issues of concern.

KEYWORDS:

Agency, Consciousness, Empowerment, Liberation,Unlearning, Visionary, Leadership.

INTRODUCTION

Reformulating Simmel, allusions to stranger-relationality are now widely used in the literature on public spaces. Public discourse is viewed as constructing the audience to whom it is addressed performatively, in contrast to personal or kinship-based modes of communication. Thus, circulation seems to be the mechanism by which strangers exchange public speech, thus building bigger social units or even whole countries as imagined communities. Public spaces in contemporary cultures with print and visual media become "metatopical,"40 that is, they are nonlocal places that forge many linkages amongst the audience members of public discourses. This seems to be the definition of "public" as used generally in anthropology[1], [2].

Although an original theory of the public realm would seem to be unneeded with the anthropological method, it also leaves us without a conceptual framework to comprehend the fully self-reflexive liminality Turner's notion of social drama implies. Anthropology combines spectacular media coverage with the routine operation of discursive circulation. The indiscriminate use of the idea of visibility seems to be the root cause of the misunderstanding between public and public sphere.

It may be claimed that the opening of a space of appearance turns previously unconnected persons into a community, pushing the topic beyond the narrow scope of visual performance and

approaching it in a larger ontological context. It is impossible to identify an issue as a shared problem that motivates action or to engage in effective communication without the appearance of conflicts and identities, differences, commonalities, and power structures to diverse publics. Subjects can only fully act as change agents in this environment and via the interactions that create it. However, although visibility undoubtedly refers to appearance in political parlance, it may also indicate mere appearance. In technologically sophisticated societies, a wide variety of concerns may have ocular exposure without ever triggering a reflexive-critical public. It is important to differentiate between the more active appropriation of space within a certain social fantasy and the passive acceptance of such apparent items. Being seen as a subject of action has nothing to do with being an object of spectacle. Because it doesn't interfere with any established patterns of conduct, plain coexistence or copresence does not provide a place for action per se. In contrast to mere appearance, the kind of presence that has the ability to create new places for community or spaces for action might be conceptually referred to as making an appearance or gaining publicity. Instead of being only a form of cohabitation, this kind of exposure is a need for action. It tends to be a willed and purposeful activity of articulation rather than being defined by the more passive and progressive process of circulation.

In a social play, the performer is undoubtedly a novelty agent, but she is not the only one. The meaning that an action has in its context is distinct from the meaning that the performer herself gives the action. Action is enshrined into the spatiotemporal reality of any particular society by the manner in which an event is told by others. The dependency of the activity on a spectator and narrator public suggests the tremendously complicated and fruitful ways in which a web of relationships and meanings is constructed in social settings. However, the spectator's judgment not only gives an action its significance, but also decides whether it will be carried out or not. Particularly significant in this context is the contrast Arendt draws between the two phases of actionto begin and to carry through. A single person or group may start something new, but no change can last for very long without support from others.

The point that has to be addressed here is that, in contrast to other periods in human history, the visibility of various types of relationality may actually rely much more on the efficiency of dramatic staging now given the relative closeness of the area of action. It is also accurate to say that this capability only applies to what Warner refers to as counter-publics. They provide many means of performing stranger-relationality, rely more on performance venues than print media, and are even built on the circulation of strangers. Contrarily to dominant publics, which are "those that can take their discourse pragmatics and their lifeworld’s for granted, misrecognizing the indefinite scope of their expansive address as universality or normalcy, counter publics do not take these traits for granted. Counter publics are places for exchange where it is believed that scene-making poetry would be transformational rather than just replicative. However, just being "counter" does not ensure that a space for collective action would be created. A counter public that has not established the ideal circumstances for appealing to other publics throughout the self-reflexive process is unlikely to succeed in sufficiently altering the power structures it is opposing.

According to Turner's theory, a breach is not one until it is evident to the public and interferes with the normal operation of social interactions. Every public crisis, according to Turner, has liminal characteristics, since it is a threshold between more or less s phases of the social process, but it is not a sacred limn, hedged around by taboos and thrust away from the centers of public life." Instead, it adopts a frightening posture inside the forum itself and, in a sense, challenges the

stewards of order to engage in combat with it. It cannot be wished away or ignored. Here, visibility assumes a meaning beyond the more innocent notion of connection. It turns into a challenge that the previous power structures must accept if they are to continue operating. I think this was the result of the Zapatistas in Mexico or the Kurdish uprising in Turkey[3]–[5].Therefore, conflicts and dramas might be argued to establish such a space as opposed to simple visibility which presumes the preexistence of a space of appearance. The other may become more accessible during conflict. In spite of the fact that verpoliticized definitions of identity and arguments of conspiracy exclude the possibility of finding resemblance and reinforce the demoniacal definitions of the adversary as Turner also indicates, excessive polarization may be seen as the shock required to induce self-reflection in a dominant public. In the most severe situations, the disruption of normalcy caused by conflict may determine how effective communication is.

This does not, however, imply that a public sphere or a group of individuals will inescapably emerge from disputes or crises. For a mobilizing relationship that changes or reshapes power systems, publicity is a necessary but not sufficient requirement. If a public sphere of equals is to arise at all, world-making must come after this first stage. The development of a world between performers and viewers is the second stage in Arendt's play, but in Turner's social drama, redress and reintegration are phases that come after breach and crisis.Despite the fact that there is no question about the ontological priority that action has in regard to the public sphere, the ability of a social or political movement to become a conditioning force, or to leave its mark on the world, really relies on the appropriation of space. A political community receives a concrete actuality when a place of existence is taken or made available. This also stabilizes the power created by collective action and establishes the circumstances for memory. Lefebvre had the epiphany that any "'social existence' aspiring or claiming to be'real,' but failing to produce its own space, would be a strange entity, a very peculiar kind of abstraction unable to escape from the ideological or even the 'cultural' realm. Part of the argument that any imagining that gives people agency is ideological comes from a misunderstanding of the materiality of discursive practices. In addition to verbal performativity, material and practical performativity also contributes to the formation of a public.

According to Calhoun, this might serve as the cornerstone for the creation of a philosophy of social solidarity and commitment as a setting for the development of social solidarity as a matter of choice, rather than necessity. Such a decision may be somewhat explicit and based on reason, but it also involves world-making in the meaning of Hannah Arendt new conceptualizations of solidarity, identity, and shared interests enable new physical forms of social interaction. These in turn support agreements between parties.48 In terms of relationality, the world that has been created between the performers and the audience becomes their shared "interest" that ties them together and the interesse that defines their togetherness.For instance, the city of Diyarbakir had become a shared concern for its citizens, refocusing attention away from who the Kurds were and onto how the city might be improved. At that time, Kurds as well as other local minorities and Turks made commitments that went beyond an imagined Kurdish unity. To address challenges with women, forced migrants, children, or the infrastructure, new material practices and social policies were implemented. The initiative made by locally elected mayors to deal with Ankara about both local and national problems, short-circuiting the official leaders of the Kurdish party, was one especially creative technique. However, the larger Kurdish movement was unable to capitalize on the synergistic forces created in Diyarbakir, or, to put it another way, it was unable to convert this communication into transformational activity elsewhere in Turkey.

A community that does not reinforce or reinstall the power structures it originally set out to oppose and overthrow must be built on the principle of solidarity. Breaking out from the constrictive politics of resistance is necessary in order to appropriate the "political universality"49 made available by the rupturing of previous norms and build new kinds of commitment. Remaining within the options set out by power does in fact leave one vulnerable to being overpowered through the phases of redress and reintegration.

Therefore, it is important to emphasize that in order to develop new relationships on more microlevels, forms of political organization also need the use of creativity and resourcefulness. The council system, which began with the Paris Commune, is Arendt's political form, at last found; this is the "amazing formation of a new power structure which owed its existence to nothing but the organizational impulses of the people themselves. This is similar to Marx and for many of the same reasons.50 The specific structure of the councilsthe rejection of representative democracy or party politics, the expansion of participation spaces, and the professionalization of administrative dutiesoffers an alternative to the political structures that are currently regarded as natural and inevit-ablethe state, party politics, and bureaucracy. The council system fosters diversity and spontaneity while narrowing the gap between the powerful and the powerless. However, alternatives do not always have to be confined to what was previously accessible, particularly when creative local experiences like those in Porto Alegre or Chiapas serve as sources of inspiration.

The difference between a public and a public sphere, in my opinion, requires consideration of the likelihood that the normative components found in the latter conceptself-determination, critical distance from power structures, communication between divergent viewpoints, and participation in decision-makingwill become enduring features of society as opposed to being localized, transient, and ultimately manipulable. The connection between action and the public realm subsequently takes on more relevance since it is no longer sufficient to presume that any intentional community building is truly happening. Instead, then focusing on agency, which is today's dominant trend, we may need a new theory of action.

DISCUSSION

Between Private and Public

The social scientist's conception of the era he lives in represents the pinnacle of his interest in history. The theory he develops about man's fundamental character and the potential boundaries it may place on the change of man during the course of history is the pinnacle of his preoccupation with biography. C. Memory may function as a space of counterhegemonic discourse where defeated and excluded components speak against the grain in the reconstituting publics of postconflict societies. This article examines the negotiation of Lebanese identity in counter publics of memory, which refers to discourses about the past, and particularly the civil war, that Lebanese groups and individuals use to mark off their social identities vis-à-vis one another. Lebanon after the Civil War from 1975 to 1990 is used as a case study. The analysis focuses on the interaction between "common sense" national history narratives and personal accounts of violence and suffering, and what this interaction meant for the prospects for national reconciliation in the postwar period, which is defined as the time frame ruled by Syria from November 1990 to May 20053. More broadly, postwar Lebanon offers a chance to examine consensus and deliberation in the context of identity politics and social memory in a stratified society[6]–[8].

Several Voices of Wartime Recollections

You know, Lina, we'll be nostalgically remembering all of this in the future. After giving up on "survival in Beirut," the title of her war memoirs from 1977, Lina Tabbara's companion tells her this as she is leaving Beirut at the conclusion of the "two-year war" in 1975–1976. It may seem strange that someone would have sentimental thoughts about a terrible civil war. However, in post-war Lebanon, nostalgia for the conflict was a popular emotion. A prolonged social, political, and economic crisis during the postwar era, which caused some individuals to focus on the past rather than the future, was one factor in this. Different reasons for the seeming lack of historical knowledge have been put up by intellectuals, artists, academics, activists, and politicians in Lebanon. While some search for an answer in the war's ambiguous ending, others focus on the state's inability to promote remembering and educate the next generation what occurred during the conflict. Whatever the reason, the idea that a "collective amnesia" was afflicting society gradually became a common-sense notion in itself, with the result that the majority of attempts to bring the memory of the war to the public in post-war Lebanon, and particularly after 1998, were formed in response to this so-called "collective amnesia." Silence was seen as hegemonic, and remembering and commemorating as "truth telling."

The struggle to reconcile the complex relationship between one's own memories and national history is a recurring issue in Lebanese writing about the war and the postwar period as well as in cinema. Elias Khoury, a well-known author, and many others like him express reality as it looks when seen through the hazy lens of recollection. Memoirs, as opposed to novels, take a more formally historical approach to personal history, staying closer to an ostensibly objective concept of "what happened," and filtering out the shifting between multiple voicesinternal, external, and logicalthat are typical of the Lebanese war-novel to make room for more straightforward war stories. This is not to argue that a more straightforward narrative results in a more accurate portrayal of the past. Instead, multiple viewpoints in a single discourse are frequently the rule rather than the exception in both oral and written accounts of the past. Using Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia, or "differentiated speech," anthropologists have explained how internally contradictory historical narratives are formulated differently depending on context and audiencein both social interaction and in a literary context, which is where Bakhtin's ideas were first introduced.

The negotiation of several voices and facts is a key to comprehending how social memory is formed. According to Bakhtin, each person's speech and thought is a response to earlier statements, recycling little fragments of the present worldview. He held that the common sense of social groupings consists mostly of several voices, including other voices of often dominating discourses like that of the nation-state. People are able to interact with one another because they are able to recognize and comprehend the many points of view or voices that are always present in conversation.

Lebanon, a small nation with a very diversified and volatile population, is so to say crowded with voices. This calls for particularly adaptable code-switching techniques. Existing themes and previous points of view mix with politically and emotionally charged personal experience and interpretation in the public discussion of the American Civil War. For instance, the majority of Lebanese juggle narratives of communal solidarity with narratives of ant sectarianism and all-inclusive nationalism, simply because they felt both of these emotions during the war and are conflicted between the various voices and the narratives, they offer about oneself and society.

The following analysis of war memoirs and testimony will be focused on determining why certain voices were favored in public and others were muted.

In tales that are mostly made up of pieces of recollection, one shouldn't put too much structure into them. The past typically seems fractured in public depictions because people who have experienced violent conflict prefer to recall the past in pieces. The nation-state will often try to straighten the bended shards and make national history out of their perplexing differences. Since there was little to no state-orchestrated attempt to create a homogeneous history out of the disparate parts of war-memory in postwar Lebanon, the debate was shaped in a way that reflected the elements of society and their power relations. In fact, many studies of social memory highlight how hegemonic state-sanctioned discourses of the past are received, reformulated, and countered by civil society. Instead of quiet or forgetfulness, as some Lebanese claimed, there was a disjointed conversation about the Lebanese Civil War in numerous tempi and realms, each with their own villains and heroes and their own conclusions.

Literary critics have primarily studied autobiographiesself-life storiesand related genres, demonstrating how structured narratives help people make sense of existence on a personal level by telling their lives to themselves. Bourdieu has argued that the creation of self through the re-creation of the past is nothing more than an autobiographical illusion. He contends that at best, this is a case of ex post facto justifications and, at worst, self-delusion or even a calculated cover-up. Other writers have observed that autobiographical writing has a tendency to replace historical time with a subjective concept of time, in which the writer's circumstances overshadow objective criteria for what is important to tell and are constrained by the finiteness of his or her lifetime. A linearity that may not have been apparent in the experienced moment is often constructed inside this private time. In retrospect, life seems to have been lived in pursuit of a telos, giving rise to a narrative infused with retrospective teleology.

The personal level of self-creation is involved in the rewriting of the country's flimsy national history both during and after the conflict in autobiographical narratives of the Lebanese Civil conflict. These books include a lot of truth, but they also contain a good deal of retroactive teleology on behalf of the country. Memoirs and testimonies, like all public statements, involve and engage the public eye and are thus related to typical or common-sense conceptions of the world that the mass of people in a political community share. This examination of biographical accounts of civil war thus pays attention to the effect that the writer's situation, whether conscious or unconscious, has on the writing. What impact do preconceived views about the conflict have on how personal experiences are expressed in public? How can memory slivers fit within historical national discourses?

Early Wartime Diaries

Although they have been in Lebanon since the beginning of the civil war, war memoirs have never been a genre that is extremely popularly read. Some of the earliest biographies to be published were written by some of the early conflict's commanders. Nawaf Salam has examined three of these books, by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, the Palestinian leader Abu Iyad and the Maronite leader Camille Chamoun. All three writers present themselves and their people as victims of the circumstances and their actions as purely defensive, rational and of course completely necessary. More than anything, these early autobiographies are telling documents of the sectarian-ideological vigor driving the war in its early stages. They are distorted reflections of the "realities" of the war as they were experienced by some of the individuals who led it.

Jumblatt and Chamoun, two historical figures, are exempt from having to explain why they are writing and why we should read about their lives. They represent the common sense of their own communities, not that of the Lebanese. Their recollections and broad knowledge of the conflict so serve to support each political perspective. Consider this crude summary of Lebanese history from Chamoun's book as an illustration: "The Lebanese has often been prosecuted through his history, because he is of the Christian religion and represents a civilization which makes him closer to the West. So much for the two million or so Druze and Muslim Lebanese!These kinds of sentiments were still spoken in private throughout the postwar era, but they were strongly restrained in any national forum. The national public sphere was torn apart by the conflict, and in policed communal areas, particularistic notions of Lebanese identity were allowed to run amok. The leaders spoke on behalf of "their people," which was often just another way of saying their fraction or their sect, even when that fraction or sect was disguising itself as the Lebanese, as in the case of the Chamoun remark. A particular ideological perspective was translated into a particular collective memory, which was then translated into the ethos, or common sense, of the concerned sub-national group. Such was the prevailing reasoning throughout the most acrimonious period of the conflict. After all, it was at this time that Kamal Jumblatt, who spearheaded an effort to dissolve sectarian barriers and bring the Lebanese people together in a popular revolution, is said to have said that in the event of a war in the Shuf-mountains, "one-third of the Christians would be killed, one-third forced to emigrate, and one-third subjugated."18 Daily reprisals, intimidation, and small-scale violence as well as actual massacres in People primarily rejected these particularistic images later in the conflict as the militias grew entrenched and more mafia-like, but to little avail since the war lasted until 1990.

Political leaders' memoirs, which are rigorously con- strained by their duty as spokesmen, provide a less nuanced and often less humane view on the past than those of civilians. One of the many transforming impacts of the civil war was that it changed public representation in Lebanon and opened doors for the subaltern voices of Shi'a, Palestinians, and women to speak out and represent themselves in the political and cultural spheres without the assistance of interlocutors. Women's war memoirs are examined in the following section of the article as examples of civilian voices and new counterpublics that emerged as a result of the war. While the militias gave this released energy a military expression, Palestinian writers, the poets of the South, and female novelists gave new voices to parts of the Lebanese who had previously relied on representation by others, the others primarily being zu'am, bourgeois cultural elites, husbands, and fathers.

Three Lebanese women's autobiographies

As early as 1977, when many people believed that the civil war had ended, Lina Tabbara began writing her autobiography. The political events of the two-year conflict are vividly described in Tabbara's novel through the perspective of a young, prosperous lady from West Beirut's liberal neighborhood. She begins her story, like most other civil war narratives, with a "flashbulb memory" of April 13, 197520. As ordinary citizens like her and her husband find themselves encroached upon by a conflict they do not support and whose murky sociocultural driving forces they fail to understand, her narration picks up the pace in sync with the pace of events. However, as the conflict steadily imposes its own logic on individuals, Lina and her husband observe in confusion and horror as the first passport murders are reported near to their house in 'Ayn al-Muraysa and friendships in their circle splinter along sectarian lines. After the killings on Black

Saturday, the author loses control of her emotions and finds it more impossible to maintain her impartial stance between the pro-Christian and pro-Palestinian viewpoints amid this frenzy:

As of today, December 7, 1975, no one in Lebanon can claim they have not chosen a side. Humanitarian ideals and sanctimonious pacifism have outlived their usefulness. Being Lebanese, Muslim, and a Palestinian, I find it upsetting when Lebanese Muslims are killed. I can feel the seeds of resentment and the need for vengeance growing deep within me. Right now, I demand that the Mourabitoun or anybody else give the Phalangists twice as much as we received in return. I want them to enter buildings and murder the first defenseless Christians they come across.These recollections demonstrate how forced representation by political parties and militias may first appear oddly foreign to those being represented, but when one's own community is attacked, it suddenly makes perfect sense. At the same time, the novel depicts characters who struggled valiantly to reject this rationale. Tabbara doesn't think about these things intentionally. Making sense of the fast-changing circumstances in the heat of battle is quite difficult. Her notes react to the developing tensions. Everything is in flux, nothing is definite, and the author is continuously forced to draw fresh conclusions about the conflict as a result of new fights, agreements, and information. Finally, Tabbara and her husband, who left first, give up and go to Paris, where the novel is later written.

The narrative of Tabbara is similar to that of hundreds of educated, middle-class Lebanese who fled the nation because they felt uncomfortable and excluded by the new, ultra-sectarian environment. Jean Makdisi, the late eminent scholar Edward Said's sister, belonged to the same circle of secular, liberal individuals and survived through the whole war while remaining in the neighborhood near the American University at the point of Beirut. One of the strongest efforts to comprehend what the war caused to individuals on a psychological and social level still comes from her memoirs from 1990. She has the benefit of hindsight since she wrote this in 1990. Although she is likewise motivated by need and the now, she gives herself more reflection than Lina Tabbara. Her story is both personal and societal.

Understanding how the conflict altered people's perceptions of themselves and their role in the world is Makdisi's primary interest. By providing a "Glossary of Terms Used in Times of Crisis" that includes idioms that the conflict developed and made common sense to the Lebanese, she investigates this ontological transformation. For instance, the phrase "msh al-h. l." now signifies that the speaker has narrowly averted death! Such cynical transformations of every day words illustrated the corruption of daily existence. Makdisi admits that she cannot expect to make sense of the overwhelming memories of fifty-three years of struggle, just to try to record it and convey it as best she can. All I can do is describe what I have witnessedmy views into the core of violence and lunacy, into a civilization.

This focus on the outcomes and repercussions of the conflict was characteristic in Lebanon in the early 1990s, before widespread reconstruction began. The devastation of Beirut's urban environment served as astonishing proof that the nation had not yet fully recovered from civil war on all fronts.She laments the decline of prewar Ras Beirut as she thinks back on her Hamra neighborhood. Before the war, the public realm was governed by the ideals of what she terms "bourgeois cosmopolitanism, but today it is a cacophony of undesirable immigrants waving cheap imitations of Western goods. This statement shouldn't be interpreted as a criticism of the presence of socially excluded groups among Beirut's liberals. The true cause of her illness is the sectarian ideals and representation that permeate every aspect of Lebanese culture. She discovers that the only thing that has changed as a result of the conflict is that the little area that she and

her classmates formerly called home beyond divides has been reduced to a patch. She is stigmatized by her religious heritage as a Leftist Christian and in constant danger of being misrepresented by political parties and misunderstood by those who buy into that representation:

Too frequently, people refer to some political parties as Christian parties. I shudder. Political beliefs and religious and cultural heritage are not the same, as you may know. Years ago, foreign journalists began referring to Christian Rightists and Muslim Leftists, and we chastised them for their oversimplified distillation of complex history to these clichés, in which we were ensnared and stigmatized.She also provides gripping accounts of the Israeli invasion in 1982 and the conclusion of the conflict in 1989 in her memoirs. These are potent depictions of civilian suffering, including the erratic pace of daily life during the worst fighting, the constant worry about Al-Hadith, frayed nerves, and damaged interpersonal relationships, but also the coping mechanisms that helped people survive the war, not the least of which was a black, black sense of humor.

Thirteen years after Makdisi's book was written and 25 years after Tabbara's Survival in Beirut, Soha Beshara's Resistance was released. Compared to the two bourgeois Palestinian ladies from liberal West Beirut, Beshara's account of the conflict is told from a more subaltern viewpoint. She also stands out because her story is exceptional, rather than being interesting as a chronicle of the typical. She joined the Communist movement during the conflict as a young Greek Orthodox girl from a town in the South. Later, she was given the risky assignment of killing General Antoine Lahad, the head of the SLA. She made an unsuccessful attempt to murder him in 1988 while posing as an aerobics instructor and was therefore sent to the infamous al-khiyam jail.

Her book gives a straightforward account of how she became involved in the conflict and how, rather than for intellectual reasons, patriotic motivations led her to support the Communist cause. The calmness of her surroundings prompted her to act to free her nation from Israeli occupation. Although her book includes recollections from a participant, it focuses on the general opposition to Israel. In Beshara, the conflict continued beyond 1990. She was incarcerated in al-khiyam for the majority of the 1990s, where she made friends with Hizbullah women despite their opposing ideologies and religions. Her autobiographies tell a nationalist story that triumphantly ends with her release in 1998 and her elevation to the status of a genuine national herothe type of person that people stop to applaud on the street. Beshara did, in fact, come to represent the age of racial harmony brought on by the liberation of Southern Lebanon in May 2000:

With the South's emancipation, life even briefly became lovely. It was a unique instance of Lebanese unification. They had been tearing each other apart with firearms for fifteen years, and despite a ceasefire that failed to address the harm they had done to one another, they were still bitterly separated and unable to mend such excruciating wounds. When compared to the might of our struggle against the Israeli occupation, the liberation revealed how our civil war had been, like every fratricidal conflict, a futile mirage.According to the book, the conflict with Israel constituted the "reality" of the war. All conflict amongst Lebanese may be justified as pure craziness, an aberration of reality, in light of this reality. Co-conspirators and nefarious Falangists are mentioned in passing, but they are never the major topic. The war's remembrance therefore doesn't seem to be a contentious subject. She suggests that the conflict be discussed instead so that people may learn what it's like to live in a checkpoint and curfew-controlled environment while growing up. It is obvious that this is an allusion to the Second Palestinian Intifada. However, the Lebanese and their effort to reclaim their sense of national pride are Beshara's first

and foremost concerns: The fundamental principles I fought fora free Lebanon, a nation at peace but nevertheless firmly rooted in the ideas of justice and democracyremain. This is mostly a memory issue. This hope will be gone and the resistance spirit will disappear if the people allow themselves to forget.Even if Beshara tries to hide her prejudice by saying the war was "madness" and a "mistake," the problem still exists: her discourse reflects what she believes to be the virtuous side in the conflict. These two key new interpretations of Lebanese nationalism sought to identify Israel as the true adversary and link the liberation of the South with the post-war era. Because it provides a nationalist teleology and a happy ending to the battle, the story is appealing. The Christian Right would have to seek for forgiveness for supporting Israel, even if it is never explicitly acknowledged, and the side that won the battle by eliminating the enemy would have to be rewarded. The Lebanese were not equal participants in this new nationalism, just as they were not equal partners in the conflict, despite what the official rhetoric of l'ghlib said. In light of perceived political marginalization, the façade of an inclusive public sphere has a number of negative consequences. As we will see, it exhorted excluded groupssuch as the Left and the Christian Rightto support their wartime memories, but in tactful ways that took into account the complexities and sensitivities of postwar Lebanon.

The three memoirs, which cover the war, the immediate postwar period, and the years after 2000, when the war started to become sufficiently distant from contemporary concerns to be discussed as a historical event rather than a pressing reality, were all inspired by the authors' current concerns. The fact that all three autobiographies were written outside of Lebanon is not a coincidence. Reflections need distance, both in terms of place and often also in terms of time, in order to be properly freed from the ingrained, internalized memory that goes unnoticed but which directs the behavior of both individuals and society. Soha Beshara only began coping with her memories, symptomatically, once she relocated to Paris. Her Proustian madeleine cake was created after a former prisoner in al-khiyam brought her some of her jail documents and clothing in a parcel. This freed the memory that would otherwise still be in chains[9]–[12].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, social movements and activism cross a critical barrier between resistance and transformational action. Individual mobilization and awareness-raising are sparked by resistance, whereas group mobilization fosters cooperation and solidarity. Imagining and putting into practice transformational acts that oppose oppressive institutions and promote sustainable alternatives are necessary to cross this barrier. The successful crossing of this barrier might result in long-lasting social change and help to create a society that is fairer and more equal. For social change, it is crucial to successfully transcend the line between resistance and transformational action. It helps movements to go from being reactive to being proactive, making significant and long-lasting contributions to society. Social movements may address structural injustices, confront power disparities, and promote inclusive and sustainable alternatives by reorienting their efforts toward transformational action. In order to create a more fair and equitable society, reaching this barrier has the ability to transform societal structures, institutions, and narrative.

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CHAPTER 8

TESTIMONIES AND MEMOIRS OF FORMER MILITIAMEN

Ujjal Mukherjee, Associate Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-ujjal.m@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

Testimonies and memoirs of former militiamen provide valuable insights into the complex world of armed conflict and the experiences of those directly involved. This abstract explores the significance of testimonies and memoirs in shedding light on the motivations, actions, and personal narratives of former militiamen. By examining the multifaceted nature of these accounts, their potential contributions to historical understanding, psychological analysis, and reconciliation processes.Testimonies and memoirs offer firsthand accounts of individuals who have participated in armed conflicts as militiamen. They provide personal narratives that shed light on the motivations, experiences, and perspectives of those involved in warfare. These accounts offer a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted factors that drive individuals to take up arms, including political ideologies, social pressures, economic circumstances, or personal grievances.

KEYWORDS:

Autobiography, Confessions, Debriefing, Former Combatants, Personal Narratives, Post-war Reflections.

INTRODUCTION

Lebanese intellectuals and artists have criticized their fellow countrymen's "chained memories" and "traumatic repression" after the war. They maintained that it was past time for the Lebanese to take a bumpy piece out of the metaphorical madeleine cake since the War in its entirety had turned into a "taboo," was "repressed," and had caused "amnesia" in society. They held the opinion that closure" was necessary for Lebanon to "move on. There is reason to suspect that these absolutist views, bolstered by buzzwords borrowed from Western political jargon and advanced by persons who often did not participate in the conflict themselves, masked a far more nuanced scenario after reading the experiences and memoirs of former militants. Some aspects of the war, such as the opposition to Israel and popular coexistence despite militia-imposed restrictions, were able to leave a positive impression and could therefore be discussed in public without fear; however, other aspects, such as the pain, guilt, and responsibility that came with the war, could be seen as being truly divisive issues[1], [2].

The phrase "no victor, no vanquished" and its problematic character are best embodied by perpetrators and victims, who more than anyone else represent the shadow that the conflict continued to throw over postwar Lebanon. Women typically took the brunt of the suffering, even though, as we have just seen, they were seldom passive victims. The majority of the Lebanese people may be called a victim in one way or another. Holding the crumbling Lebanese social

institutions together was one of women's greatest accomplishments. The most extreme example of a woman stepping into a traditionally male position is Soha Beshara, but she is by no means the only one illustrating the war's transformative consequences on gender relations in Lebanon. Lebanese women were compelled to enter the public realm of the job market due to the loss or disappearance of so many men during the conflict[3]. According to several studies, many women valued the social responsibility that came with their new job and felt important to society despite the hardships they endured. If not a revolution, the war at least provided a solid foundation for social change, yet neither Tabbara, Makdisi, nor Beshara take up this issue in a specifically feminist manner. Etel Adnan and Hanan al-Shaykh, among other female authors, contend that sexual oppression and masculine dominance were direct causes of the conflict. However, because it criticizes Lebanese society, or even worse, Lebanese culture, it might be unsettling to reach this conclusion in public. It is more consoling to emphasize that a sizable segment of the public was never represented by the militias and that many men participated in the peace movement in the late 1980s.

According to Charles Corm, the reality of the war is that it was never founded on widespread mobilization or public involvement, but rather on the tyranny of a conscientious minority that was justified by false beliefs that the general populace rejected. This notion of a "war of the others" undoubtedly became one of the "common sense" reasons for the conflict that put the roles of the 10,000–20,000 participants in danger[4].

In 1991, a nationwide amnesty legislation made it possible for ex-militia members to find peaceful employment. While many people were fortunate in landing positions in the security, military, or transportation industries, others had less difficulty finding employment in Lebanon during times of peace. They discovered that they were disliked and, for the most part, chose to remain silent about their prior profession. How can we therefore explain what caused Lebanese to attack Lebanese if the conflict was a war of the others as many Lebanese claim? These people's recollections may have been suppressed, both by themselves and others, since the most perplexing issue of allwhat motivated the warmight be answered by what they went through. Is it accurate to say that foreign forces organized the participation of the Lebanese? Where did the violence originate from, how did regular people turn into hired murderers, and who is accountable for it? How did the "banality of evil," to use Hannah Arendt's famous phrase, permeate not just the daily lives of the perpetrators of the violence but also those of the masses who tolerated it throughout the war?

Even though these ethical issues are troubling, some of them were addressed by the Lebanese media. And who better to ask than the combatants themselves? Several Lebanese news publications began publishing interviews with former militiamen in the middle of the 1990s. A number of them opted to speak out on their own initiative, while others spoke up anonymously. These papers have representation from every side of the conflict, although not equally or in the same manner[5]. Due in part to an ongoing discussion about the recent past among Maronite Christians, a sizable number of former militants from the Christian militias have made their recollections public. The Shi'i parties Amal and Hizbullah have had the least exposure at the opposite end of the spectrum, which may have something to do with their greater cohesion in post-war Lebanon. A number of intellectuals who were active in the Lebanese Left throughout the war have produced novels and memoirs. While these works cannot be considered testimonials, they have nonetheless helped us comprehend the socialist camp's ideological fervor and how it evolved during the conflict. Collectively, these public representations conjure up a

multivocal narrative about the causes of the war's breakout, its many phases, and its aftermath. They also provide flimsy solutions to the challenging issue of blame, punishment, and revenge[6], [7].

DISCUSSION

The Christian Debate

In public accounts of the conflict, former militia members associated with the Christian Right played a significant role. The Maronite Christians in particular, as well as Christians in general in Lebanon, experienced a process of reorientation following the war unlike any other group in the country. Followings or quasiapologists of General Aoun, the Lebanese Forces, or Kata'ib were pitted against those who believed that the Christian Right's demise was a natural and deserving result of the Christian nationalist movement that had developed prior to and during the war. Equally crucial was how individuals chose to take sides in the discussion over Syria's involvement in Lebanon. The division of Kata'ib into a pro- and anti-Syrian strand led by Karim Pakradouni and Amin Jumayil was the most overt manifestation of this struggle. The latter school and the many organizations that were loosely associated with it or agreed with its views perceived a clear connection between the conflict during the conflict and Syria's control over Lebanon after the conflict. For a very long time, the imperative of continuing the fight for independence came before any effort to come to terms with the radicalism of the past. The Christian community refers to this widespread feeling of loss as al-ih. bāt. al-Mas□h, which induced nostalgia for both the period before to and the duration of the Civil War, isolated the Christian Right's viewpoint on a popular and political level and made it even less sensitive to criticism.

In addition to hardening communitarian defensiveness, the political division of the Christian community gave rise to a specific argument about the history of Christianity. The sociologist Nasri Salhab urged the Maronites to accept responsibility for their previous errors in his book al-Mas'ala al-Maruniyya, also known as al-Asbab al-Tarikhiyya li-l-Ihbat al-Maruni, published in 2000. Salhab said that if the Maronites were to critically examine themselves, they would see that their "war of liberation" had resulted in oppression, that they had lost the moral direction provided by Christianity, and that they had become defensive and degenerate sectarians.

Other initiatives to undermine the Christian Right's ideology have originated from beyond Lebanon and the Christian community. Les Secrets de la Guerre du Liban, a book by French journalist Alain Ménargues that depicts the Christian Right from Bashir Jumayil's rise to Sabra and Shatila, was released in 2004 and quickly rose to fame in Lebanon. The report contains information on the leadership's tight ties to the Israeli government and is anything from complimentary. Of course, the Christian Right was not the only group to carry out killings and fall victim to sectarianism. Their collaboration with Israel, however, amounts to anything similar to a sin given the continuous war with Israel and the broad support for the Palestinian Intifada. The Sabra and Shatila massacre in September 1982, in which Christian militiamen slaughtered more than 2000 Palestinian civilians as retaliation for Bashir Jumayil's death a few days earlier, remains the pinnacle of this collaboration and the "main file" against the Christian Right. International outrage at the slaughter led Ariel Sharon, Israel's then-foreign minister, to resign. Elias Khoury has played a special role in the effort to incorporate the Palestinian war experience into Lebanese collective memory through activism43 and his literary work, which includes the novel Bab al-Shams about the Palestinian experience in Lebanon, which was released in a

successful screen version in 2004.44 Sabra and Shatila have received more attention than other massacres in the postwar period[8], [9].

Foot troops recall the conflict

Since the late 1990s, former militiamen from all factionsaside from Hizbullahhave shared their memories and reflections on their acts during the war in a number of interviews that have been published in the major Lebanese newspapers. When asked how they connect to the wrongdoings they did, they merely express an abstract repentance and apology. None of them go as far as Shaftari and none of them confess to having killed anyone during the conflict. Therefore, it is unlikely that these interviews can be seen as complete regrets that would acknowledge the crime, address the victim, and apologize. These former foot troops are very resentful of their past and current superiors and refuse to accept responsibility. First, they accuse them of deceiving and manipulating the Lebanese people in order to gain their support before the war:

The leadership instilled in us a sense of sectarianism and made it clear that Muslims were the enemy. Only the zu'am's benefited. They don't give a damn about what happened to those who perished since they are now MPs and ministers. They perished in vain. And no issues were resolved as the conflict came to a close. We don't know how things transpired. They threatened us with death if we didn't engage in combat. They are making fun of us right now. If only Sayyid Musa Sadr were there to alter the circumstances,

The Scapegoat

Many commentators contend that the Lebanese Civil War produced a new nationalism as a result of the experience of suffering "simultaneously, but not together," as Samir Franjieh put it. The shattered public during the conflict produced an ambiguous foundation for postwar nationalism where memories of "imagined fraternity" and bodily experiences of separation blended, competed, and were manipulated by social and political actors. In contrast to more homogenous forms of nationalism, this article shows how public memories and interactions in the public sphere as a whole were shaped by such ambiguity.55 At the same time, the weak foundations for cross-sectarian nationalism frequently required, and continue to require, strong attachments to the nation in the form of symbols and discourses that are blatantly Lebanessuch as cross-sectarianism and the Lebanese flagbut often en

The difficulties that the Lebanese have faced in building an inclusive public sphere on the ruins of the civil war may not be unique to the postwar era, but rather are byproducts of Lebanon's unique brand of sectarian power-sharing and can be traced back to the founding of modern Lebanon.Before the war, the situation in Lebanon might have been described as a stalemate of competition. This contest evolved into a combative fight throughout the war. Following the conflict, a new consensus emerged in society that emphasized tolerance, cohabitation, andmore subtlySyrian tutelage. This effectively eliminated the extreme ideology from the public dialogue. In a gendered interpretation of the conflict, the males may be at fault, but in an ideological sense, the specific nationalistic ideologies that the men fought forand, therefore, the individuals in charge of the militiasare the real villains. The particularistic ideologies were made to seem bad in national discourse, forcing its former followers to publicly distance themselves from sectarianism and isolationism in order to re-join the national community. They were granted legal amnesty by the amnesty legislation of 1991, but in order to get public forgiveness, they had to publicly confess their previous relationship. Other groups, such as women who emphasized the suffering of civilians, the secular middle class who emphasized that the war was not of their

making, Christian parties who used the memory of the war to cope with their loss of power, and former foot soldiers who blamed their leaders, were politically or socially marginalized and merely sought recognition of their perspective through remembering the war. Diverse actors in Lebanon's confusing civil war strove to incorporate their perspectives into the general understanding. And every single one of them blamed sectarianism in one way or another.

Since the Syrian withdrawal in April 2005, a fresh and possibly constructive account of the conflict has gained traction, emphasizing simultaneous Israeli, American, Iranian, Palestinian, and Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs as the primary causes of the fratricide in Lebanon. Sectarianism still shapes the public realm, to be honest. Talk back and kalm fd. Nevertheless, guardedness and vulnerability continue to influence how Lebanese people behave in public. More importantly, a sectarian power structure still governs politics at all levels, from the national to the local. The fall guy, in other words, was neither dead nor gone, but continued to be present "between the lines" in postwar Lebanon. The post ideological realm created in the name of national reconciliation and "truth telling" is thus largely imagined and depends on a public consensus of civic nationalism or "intellectual patriotism." He grew up in a society that was especially replete with coded messages, masks, and voices in play. The truth is always shaky in such a public setting and is always highly sought.

An emerging public presence in the Middle East: migrant domestic workers?

The rapid growth of paid domestic labor, the feminization of international migration, and the creation of new public spheres are three developments that are brought together in a discussion of migrant domestic labor but have previously remained largely unconnected in academic debate.In the last decades of the twentieth century, paid domestic labor has become a growth sector in many parts of the world, and the number of migrants employed as domestic workers has increased even faster. We have seen the feminization of global migration since women make up the vast majority of these migratory domestic workers. Growing economic inequality on a global scale, changes in family structures and household composition, as well as evolving patterns and perceptions of women's employment and unpaid domestic work, have drawn migrant women into this line of work, not just in Europe and North America but also in East Asia and the Middle East.

This study looks at the public presence of migrant domestic workers in three Middle Eastern citiesDubai, Istanbul, and Beirutas one specific result of the region's sharp growth in the number of such employees. These locations were chosen due to contrasts in their historical paid domestic labor trajectories, state building processes, and transnational migration patterns. We next quickly review common conceptions of "the public," stressing the range of "being present in the public" formsincluding bodies, venues, and associationsand situating these varied modes in areas of power. This article's major focus is a study of migrant domestic workers' presence in public spaces, which involves tracing its historical paths to emphasize the unique aspects of the current situation. Finally, we briefly address the media depiction of migrant domestic workers before turning our attention to public discourse and representation.

Preconditions and Contexts

Mobility is a crucial idea that sheds light on the public presence of migrant domestic workers in the Middle East. Migrant domestic workers in the Middle East must travel across international borders to reach their place of employment, and once there, they must have the freedom to leave the confines of their employer's home. These two actions are necessary for them to be present in

public space.International migration has to be understood in light of the enormous income disparities present on a global scale. The growth of the oil economy in the Middle East after 1973 was a pivotal period. A large demand for migrant workers was created in infrastructure and construction, education and health services, as well as domestic labor, as a result of the very rapid rise in income in oil-exporting nations like the United Arab Emirates. Initially, migrant workersespecially the large numbers employed in education and health servicestended to be mostly from the Arab world. Since the 1980s, Asian workers have steadily replaced Arab immigrants in occupations that do not need fluency in Arabic. Asian labor is less expensive, less politically risky, and simpler to manage, while some of the better jobs are filled by natives. The need for employees in infrastructure and construction decreased during the economic slump of the late 1980s, but the need for domestic workers persisted. As a consequence, feminization of migration from Asia increased. Such an inflow of migrant labor was not exclusive to the Middle Eastern nations that produce oil. Other nations in the Arab Middle East that do not export oil, including Jordan and Lebanon, were also impacted by the growth of the oil economy. The latter saw the emergence of new middle classes, which were often supportedat least in partby remittances sent home from jobs in the Gulf nations. The younger generation has a tendency to leave the extended family early in life, and the rise of women's education and subsequent employment has further increased the need for paid help with housework, childcare, and elderly care. Changing family structures have also encouraged the employment of paid domestic labor. Simultaneously, local women who may have previously performed this task were able to abandon this unappealing line of work as new revenue sources became accessible. Overall, this has led to the majority of migrant women from South and Southeast Asia now working in this field. Even highly educated women who would never contemplate working as a domestic at home travel overseas to obtain job as domestic workers since they could earn 10 times as much as they might if hired locally.

While in some settings hiring a migrant domestic worker was in and of itself an indication of the status and standing of the employer's household, further distinctions also become crucial. The rise in migrant domestic labor not only allows female employers to work in the public sphere, but it also facilitates a particular higher-status lifestyle that could not be sustained without domestic workers. Among migrant domestic workers, nationality is a key sign of stratification. Because of their high level of education, solid command of the English languagean asset particularly valued in households with children of school agetheir "modern" appearance, professionalism, and knowledge of the Middle Eastern culture, Filipina domestic workers, among the first to migrate there as migrant labor, are frequently held in high regard and paid the highest wages. However, the justifications given by employers in favor of or against certain kinds of domestic employees are not persuasive. Due in part to their development in contrast to domestics of other nations, they are often stereotyped and undergo change over time. As Muslims, the Indonesian domestic workers are also perceived as being "cleaner" and "more civilized" than the Sri Lankan women working in the Middle East in large numbers. For example, with the more recent influx of Indonesian domestic workers in the Middle East, Filipinas are becoming increasingly perceived as "too assertive" in comparison to the Indonesian workers' "obedience."

Although there are significant income disparities between Asia and the Middle East, which are often made worse by neo-liberal policies of economic restructuring, migration of labor from Asia to the Middle East has not occurred as an unmediated, natural process. Women have often been aggressively persuaded to serve as domestics overseas. State policies have actively encouraged

international labor migration in certain contexts, such as the Philippines, and the remittances sent home by these workers have become a vital source of revenue for both the government and individual families. Recruitment agentssome licensed, many unlicensedhave also been crucial in persuading women to work abroad, often misleading them with regard to wage levels, working conditions, and even the location of employment, according to the Philippine government, which has given so-called "Overseas Filippino Workers" the honorary status of "the new heroes." Such trickery is seen as falling under the category of human trafficking. This makes migrant domestic work a kind of forced migration, particularly when it involves refugees. It is typically difficult to discern between family and individual plans, according to research on the factors that drive women to move overseas. While many women claim that they leave for the benefit of their families, some also flee abusive situations or specific family demands.8 Others stay away because they find it difficult to "fit in" with their families of origin and see benefits in staying abroad.

Our study sites have their own unique characteristics in terms of the percentage of migrants to the national population, the patterns of migration, and the routes of movement, if this is the larger backdrop of migrant domestic work in the Middle East. The extremely tiny national population and the vast majority of non-national inhabitants in the United Arab Emirates, a significant oil producer, have dramatically different wealth and perks. 90% of the work force and 75% of the population were foreigners by the middle of the 1990s; estimates for Dubai are even higher10. This foreign labor force is engaged in a variety of professions and at various levels of employment. A significant portion of immigrants work in professions other than physical labor. A sizable nonnational middle class has formed as a consequence. Additionally, a sizable number of foreign domestic workers are employed by these Asian, Arab, and Euro-American expats. There are a sizable number of workers from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia in Dubai, while the majority of migrant domestic workers come from nations like India and Indonesia.

Turkey, which has a greater population than the Arab Middle East, provides a contrast. In addition to being significantly less impacted by the Middle Eastern oil economy, it also has a history of exporting workers. It is true that Turkish middle-class and upper-class houses often hire domestic helpers, but the majority of these households hire Turkish women as day employees. Additionally, the majority of migrant domestic workers in Turkey come from the former Soviet republics rather than Asia. The tiny number of Filipinas who live and work in Turkey are mostly hired by foreigners and corporate leaders. The Gagauz, a group of Christian-Turkish origin who are not only seen as well educated, obedient, and professional, but also combine their ability to speak Turkish with an image of Western modernity, are preferred by Turkish upper middle-class households over Moldavian domestics. Turkish domestic workers, on the other hand, are viewed by their employers as being far less "professional": they "do not keep their distance," try to personalize their relationships with employers in order to obtain additional benefits, and have their own families to take care of. Moldavian domestic workers, on the other hand, are preferred over Turkish domestic workers.

The emergence of new middle classes, often influenced by Gulf state lifestyles, has led to a sharp rise in the number of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon and other central Middle Eastern nations like Jordan. It is true that some local women still work as hired domestic helpers, but their numbers are modest and steadily declining. These women are often immigrants, members of ethnic minorities, or residents of underprivileged regions. While some of the wealthiest houses in Jordan and Lebanon also hire Filipinas, some of whom were forced out of nursing when this

field was restricted to foreign labor, the majority of migrant domestic workers are from Sri Lanka. Ethiopians make up a significant portion of the workforce in Lebanon, while the number of Indonesian domestic workers in Jordan is rising quickly.

If being able to enter their nation of work is the first need for migrant women to be seen in public, being able to leave their employer's house is the second. After arriving at their place of employment, migrant domestic employees often experience movement constraints. Migrant domestic workers in the Arab Middle East are often hired on a temporary basis, need a visa sponsor who is accountable for them, are not permitted to change employers or work for anyone else, and must turn up their passports to their employers. Further, since leaving the home is often a site of conflict between employers and domestic employees, the freedom of movement of migrant domestic workers is severely constrained in daily life. Some employers even go as far as to lock the doors when they leave the home and only let their domestic staff to leave the house when they are being closely watched. Furthermore, while though domestic employees technically have a right to one day off each week, this does not imply that they are free to roam about on that day. Some employees just find it difficult to skip one day of work; however, there are other considerations as well.

The restricted freedom of movement of female migrant domestic workers fits within existing patterns of gendered access to public space in various Gulf nations, which must be considered while analyzing the limited freedom of movement of migrant domestic workers. However, more is at risk than only adhering to regional standards of gender segregation. Because employers believe that allowing domestics access to public areas may jeopardize their ability to manage them, this topic is often contentious. Some people are concerned about how "unknown others" could affect their domestic employees. They worry that the latter may be drawn to or become a victim of "the wrong company," exemplified by male conational who may seduce or coerce them into having sexual encounters with them or letting them into the home while their bosses aren't home. Some employers view any relationships domestics have with people outside the family of employment as potentially threatening because these relationships could serve as sources of information and support systems, which could ultimately motivate and enable them to ask for higher pay and other benefits or to quit their jobs altogether. We first quickly describe the idea of the public we are dealing with in this research before proceeding to an exploration of the ways that migrant domestic workers have nevertheless been apparent in the public[10], [11].

CONCLUSION

As a result, former militiamen's testimony and memoirs give insightful perspectives into the realm of armed conflict by providing firsthand descriptions of motives, deeds, and personal experiences. They aid in processes of historical comprehension, psychological research, and peacemaking. Researchers and readers may better comprehend armed conflicts, human experiences, and the complexity of post-conflict communities by critically analyzing and contextualizing these narratives. These testimonials and memoirs are significant sources of knowledge, empathy, and introspection that eventually support our efforts as a group to create a more peaceful and fair society. Reconciliation attempts and peacebuilding initiatives may benefit from the testimonials and memoirs of former militia members. Former militia members may humanize their experiences, encourage empathy, and advance understanding amongst various groups by sharing their story. These narratives have the potential to be very important in recognizing past crimes, promoting truth-telling, and encouraging communication between

former fighters and impacted populations. They may aid in reunification, healing, and the avoidance of future disputes.

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CHAPTER 9

RECONCEPTUALIZING THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Dr. Varalakshmi S, Associate Professor, Department of Management,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id- varalakshmi@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

The concept of the public sphere has been a central topic in political and communication theory for decades. This abstract explores the need for a reconceptualization of the public sphere in light of contemporary societal changes and technological advancements. By examining the limitations of traditional models and proposing alternative perspectives, the importance of rethinking and expanding our understanding of the public sphere in today's complex and interconnected world.The public sphere traditionally refers to a space where individuals come together to engage in rational discourse, deliberation, and the formation of public opinion on matters of common concern. However, this conventional understanding of the public sphere has faced criticism and challenges in recent times. The rise of digital technologies, globalization, and social inequalities has transformed the dynamics of public communication and participation, necessitating a reevaluation of the concept.

KEYWORDS:

Accountability, Civil discourse, Collective deliberation, Communication, Critical engagement, Democracy.

INTRODUCTION

Conventional ideas of the modern public sphere need to be reevaluated in order to discuss the involvement of migrant domestic workers. In particular, the Habermasian idea that those involved in the modern public sphere are seen as equals in public discourse who acknowledge the strength of rational argumentation and are not constrained by attachments to specific interests or identities needs to be reconsidered. Such an explanation of the contemporary public sphere, as Fraser convincingly argues, fails to address questions of voice, authority, and exclusion and fails to acknowledge that the public sphere is in reality a space for the creation and enacting of social identities. She challenges the idea of a single public sphere and asserts that members of inferior groups, like women, may find it useful to create several publics. In order to do this, she suggests the term "sub- altern counter publics": "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups construct and disseminate counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and demands. However, "subaltern publics," like migrants and women, experience different kinds of exclusion. It is not enough to simply acknowledge that gender disparities must be discussed in discussions on the growth of the public sphere; a focus on the issue of migrant domestic workers shows that there are significant disparities and hierarchies between women. This understanding necessitates a criticism of the ways in which the public and private are conceptualized as distinct from one another. Since there are so many domestic workers, whether they are migrants or not, middle-class women have been able to engage in society while adhering to the standards of private domesticity that are prevalent

in their social circles. In truth, middle-class women's ability to reach the pinnacle of domesticity "without becoming dirty" has been made feasible by the hiring of domestics. Contrarily, migrant domestic workers have come under fire for failing to uphold the standards of motherhood and domesticity by leaving their kids in the hands of others. The disparity is comparable at the place of work. The house serves as the employer's place of privacy, but the domestic worker's workplace; in order to get any privacy, domestics must leave the home and go "into the public."

The notion that logical argument is the sole acceptable or practical form of involvement is another issue with a Habermasian conception of the contemporary public sphere. There is a need for a more comprehensive "politics of presence" that allows for the inclusion of other forms of critical expression and nonverbal modes of communication, such as bodily comportment, appearance, dressing styles, and the nature of the language, rather than just its substance, if the public sphere is recognized as a setting where group identities and interests are always at stake. In other words, a politics of presence includes a far wider range of methods in which individuals might "make a statement," as it were, by engaging in the public. This is crucial when talking about the contributions of marginalized groups, who may not have as many opportunities to participate in "rational argumentation" situations and may not be as skilled at articulating their viewpoints there. Therefore, a key area of inquiry in our work is the physical presence of migrant domestic workers in public. subaltern public places

There is no question that migrant domestic workers have steadily increased their presence in public areas, but greater investigation is necessary into how this has happened and what it means. Although they have created some kind of subaltern publicness in many contexts, with the market and the church as important places, their presence is often organized along racial and, to a lesser degree, religious lines[1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

Commercial Spaces, Recognizable Bodies and Ethnic Neighborhoods

Commercial places, such as the stores where migrant domestic workers purchase for clothing and food, the restaurants where they dine, and the entertainment venues they attend, are especially important locations for them to congregate. The public may frequently see and hear how these cater to a specific national or ethnic population by, for example, the kind of items displayed and the language used on storefronts, as well as through the language spoken and the music performed. While these areas are not entirely under the authority of migrant workers since they often cannot own real land, those in charge may nonetheless use a variety of informal techniques to keep away others. Since migrant workersdomestics and others from the same countries of originhave over time gained a steadfast presence in particular areas despite immigration policies strongly discouraging any form of settlement, clustering of such commercial spaces results in a certain density that transforms certain streets or areas into "ethnic neighborhoods." A few people have been able to stay in the nation for an extended amount of time either by signing many contracts back-to-back or by overstaying their visa. Furthermore, a regular intake of immigrants from the same place of origin is sufficient for the development of some type of community and collective presence; it is not required for the same individuals to stay. These places are especially desirable to live-out domestics who are often undocumented and whose homes serve as a hub for live-ins who visit their flats on their days off[4]–[6].

The presence of migrant domestic workers in these communities varies depending on the region. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Laleli neighborhood in Istanbul, for example, has become

the hub of the shuttle or suitcase trade with the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This trade is supported by thousands of small businesses, which has led to an increase in the demand for immigrants who speak Russian. While Laleli is the area where many Moldavian migrant domestic workers arrive and find their way to employment, the popular perception of these Moldavian women is different: they are neither associated with prostitution nor branded as "Russians." In Laleli the recent, extremely rapid influx of migrants from the former Soviet Union has led to a significant increase in prostitution by "Russians," who are frequently from other parts of the former Soviet Union such as the Ukraine.

Non-Arabs have often been seen in public places in Dubai. For ages, the port of Dubai has drawn merchants and immigrants from the Indian subcontinent, Baluchistan, and the Iranian coast. In the 1930s, an Indian market area had already started to take shape in Deira. South Asians, mostly Indians, are well recognized in a variety of business sectors, including as retail and wholesale, the gold market, and clothing manufacturing. People from South Asia who work in a wide range of occupations visit certain malls. In a similar vein, the neighborhoods where South Asians dwell range from affluent upper middle-class communities to more vibrant communities. In these areas of the city, migrant domestic workers do not stand out as South Asians but are recognizable as domestic workers to those familiar with internal differentiations and social hierarchies. In the city as a whole, South Asian domestics are first seen as South Asian rather than as domestics. In contrast to several districts in Dubai that may be described as South Asian or Indian public places, this region is segregated within.

Even while they have also steadily established a presence in the public, migrant domestic workers' relationships to "the public" in Beirut are distinct. For instance, a range of tiny stores, services, and restaurants serve diverse immigrant nationalities, mostly from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and India, in the Dowra neighborhood, a lower-class commercial district. Although there are differences among migrant groups in Beirut as well, it is the presence of the vast majority of women who work as domestic helpers that has been crucial to the growth of these migrant spaces. The end result is that South Asian or African women in Beirut are often presumptively seen as domestics. The information above suggests that when talking about migrant domestic workers' public presence, it's vital to consider how they are truly visible or identifiable as such in the public. Moldavian women in Istanbul are in a very different condition than Sri Lankan women in Beirut or South Asian women in Dubai in this regard.

From Places to Advocacy, Churches and NGOs

Churches are a favorite among the semipublic places where domestics congregate in their leisure time. Churches have transformed into gathering places for domestic workers in a number of communities, and it is common to see domestics from various religious backgrounds joining together for a wide range of activities, whether they are religious or not. There are two enormous properties in Dubai, where churches were built with the ruler's approval in the 1970s. Numerous denominations are permitted to use the Church of the Holy Trinity, which belongs to the Anglican Church. Plaques on the wall show that there are over 70 different churches present, including not only the major protestant denominations but also Pentecostals, more intimate organizations like the Seventh-Day Adventists, and local churches like the Church of South India. Numerous migrant domestic workers who frequent the Christian resource center, a tiny coffee shop where books and CDs are sold and where assistance is provided to migrant domestic workers in need, are among the tens of thousands of people that come here on a weekly basis. The adjacent Catholic St. Mary's Church serves as a comparable gathering place and is estimated

to conduct 60,000 communions each week. On Friday, simultaneous Mayalam and Arabic masses are held across this vast property. Domestic servants are not the only non-native population members who attend these churches; their employers also do. This is also true of the Hindu temple in Dubai, a modest structure located in a historic area of the city, where Hindus from all backgrounds go to pray.

While only foreigners visit churches in the United Arab Emirates, there are local Christians in nations like Turkey and Lebanon. However, at least in Lebanon, when migrant domestic workers visit the same churches as the local population, they often do so at different times. Additionally, people who live in other nations, particularly Sri Lankans and Filipinas, sometimes do not attend Mass together due to linguistic barriers. Churches are still quite inclusive as home gathering places. These are also frequented by non-Christians seeking a spiritual encounter. For instance, Buddhist ladies congregate at the al-Wardiyya Church in Beirut, some to touch the sculptures in the little grotto built in the courtyard outside. Filipino women congregate at the considerably bigger St. Frances Church on Hamra Street not just to celebrate Mass but also to barter small goods like handmade food and apparel and to provide services like manicures. Sri Lankan ladies congregate at the front and side of this church, while male photographers from West Africa sell their services. Other churches, like the Ethiopian Orthodox church in Badaro, cater specifically to migrant domestic workers, while Pentecostals, a group that some Ethiopian women appear to be turning toward, congregate in a small church in Naba'a where a Lebanese pastor conducts the service with simultaneous translation into Amharic[7]–[9].

Church-related NGOs, which are active mainly in Lebanon, also support domestic servants from certain national backgrounds. The Pastoral Committee of Asian-African Migrants was officially established in Lebanon in 1997 under the leadership of the Bishop of the Lebanese Ecclesiastic Council. They manage a variety of Catholic facilities that serve the needs of migrant African and Asian domestic workers as well as provide social, legal, and theological help to migrant workers, including free legal representation. Thanks to the efforts of a Filipina nun who also oversees a 30-minute radio show in Tagalog on Sundays on the Voice of Charity channel, the Afro-Asian Migrant Center, which was founded in 1987, has a sizable Filipino worker constituency. Since 1988, a different facility managed by a nun from Sri Lanka has served as the principal resource for Sri Lankan domestic workers of all faiths. In addition, Caritas-Lebanon established its own migrant center in 1994 to assist refugees and female migrant workers from Asia and Africa. The existence of such non-governmental organizations (NGOs) promoting the rights of migrant domestic workers blurs the lines between being present in public space and engaging in public life because they serve as more than just a subaltern public space.

Historical Developments and Changing Interpretations of a Woman's Public Presence

We must look at the historical trajectories of non-kin domestic labor if we are to comprehend if and how the presence of domestic workers in public space is new and what such public presence entails. Investigating not just the forerunners of today's domestic employees but also the labor laws that governed these previous types of workers is necessary. The growth of nation-states and the rising significance of transnational ties overlap with changes in these labor relations.There isn't a long-standing custom of hiring hired domestic employees on a significant scale in the Middle East in general. Particularly in the Middle East's rural regions, where it was ideal for young couples to temporarily reside with the husband's family, daughters-in-law were often in charge of the more demanding domestic chores, while older ladies also looked after the children. However, domestic slaves and "adopted daughters," as well as poor local women, girl children,

and orphans, were also employed as live-in domestics as part of webs of patron-client relations, and these categories of women could be seen as predecessors of modern migrant domestic workers.In Muslim countries like the Ottoman Empire, domestic slavery is one of the oldest types of non-kin domestic work. Slaves of the wealthy and powerful were able to rise to positions of power; in the nineteenth century, the majority of slaves were women, many of whom performed domestic labor. By the end of the nineteenth century, Ottoman antislavery policies had started to reduce the number of slaves available, and in 1926 with the abolishment of Islamic law, the institution was abolished. Slaves of the wealthy and powerful were able to rise to positions of power.

In the Ottoman Empire, the number of paid live-in servants and evlatlks rose as slavery progressively faded. Despite the fact that the name "evlatlk" literally means "adopted daughter," formal adoption is not permitted under Islamic law. At the age of six or seven, these adopted daughters'orphans or young women from impoverished, frequently rural familieswere placed in better-off urban homes. They would work as unpaid domestics for unspecified amounts of timeoften ten to twenty yearsuntil their foster families arranged a marriage for them. Evlatlks replaced domestic slaves in republican Turkey since foster families did not legally adopt them, despite the civil code of 1926 making legal adoption possible. Many evlatlks were war orphans, and impoverished Anatolian villagers also sold their girls as a means of subsistence, sometimes in exchange for little money. These girls, who were often labeled as "backward," were to be transformed into cultured Muslim Turks, according to the state's stated goal. But compared to how they treated their own girls, the adoptive family handled them extremely differently. When compared to almost all biological daughters, who were permitted to finish their education, they were purposefully clothed in an unappealing manner and often did not attend school at all. Instead, the sheer existence of adopted daughters allowed for the early learning of "how to command" in biological daughters, allowing them to forgo household chores. Industrialization and the rise of internal family mobility, however, began to provide other ways for impoverished rural families to earn a livelihood by the 1960s, and by the time slavery and slave-like behaviors were formally outlawed in 1964, this institution had all but vanished. While there were still some live-in young girls from the rural regions, unlike the evlatlks, these girls got a pay and were no longer bound to one household. The middle classes had begun to hire married cleaning women from the squatter settlements around the main towns.

Domestic slavery still exists in the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf republics, while it had already disappeared in the Ottoman Empire by the early 20th century. Slaves from East Africa were brought to Dubai to work as pearl divers, and women were brought in their wake as wives for slaves or for domestic labor. As elsewhere, the status of slaves depended heavily on the status of their owners; female slaves could rise to positions of prominence through close relationships with their owners, especially if these were wealthy. The British effort to end the slave trade in the Emirates coincided with the decline of the pearl diving industry. Housework was mostly carried out by female relatives and daughters-in-law until the 1960s, and in the case of the large tribal families, it was also carried out by the women of the houses that were reliant on them. After emancipation, domestic slaves often stayed associated with the affluent homes in which they had previously lived and worked, while a sizable number of Indian men and impoverished women from Iran and Baluchistan took up paid domestic employment. However, by the 1980s, this had dramatically altered, and migrant womenprimarily from India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Ethiopiahad essentially replaced native women as the primary source of paid domestic work in the Emirates.

The situation of today's migrant domestic employees is substantially different from that of individuals who held previous types of domestic employment. First off, unlike in domestic slavery, when these girls were segregated from their families of origin, they were included in the family of employment, although in a low role. The legal regulation of nationality and residency, based on patrilineal kinship rather than residence, has assumed center stage in permitting and hindering forms of settlement with the emergence of the nation-state. While modern domestics have many more opportunities to stay in touch with their families back home thanks to technologies like email and cell phones, they have almost no opportunities to settle in their country of employment. Such laws have become particularly restrictive in those states where expatriates outnumber the national population, for example in Kuwait and especially the United Arab Emirates. Due to regulatory policies, migrant workers frequently have to navigate at least two legal systems: the legal system of their country of origin and the legal system of the country where they are employed. As a result, even after working there for decades, they remain temporary employees who are dependent upon their visa-sponsor. For instance, some nations only let women to go overseas to work as domestics provided, they meet particular age or income requirements, but many of the nations where they work do not adhere to such regulations.

In connection to the actions and attitudes of their employers, the relationship of migrant domestic workers to public space has also changed. Not only do migrant domestic employees find themselves in a distinct working relationship, but public space presence also has whole new connotations. When women's isolation among the wealthy was still a sign of high rank, the visibility of domestic slaves and other low-status female servants allowed their female employers to maintain their seclusion. In other words, these women's participation in gender-mixed public settings was more of a sign of and contributor to their low status position than it was a chance for mobility. With the rise of nationalism and the modernization of the nation-state, notably in the case of Turkey, which actively promoted women's appearance in public, this started to alter. The adopted girls of republican Turkey, in contrast to domestic slaves in the Ottoman Empire, were more often kept in private houses since their owners believed they needed to be managed and could not be trusted on their own. In fact, the situation that today's migrant domestic workers are in is rather similar to that of the ancients. Their limited access to public areas coincides with local middle-class women's increased involvement in society, whether it be through professional employment, membership in NGOs or women's organizations, or, in the case of gender segregation, participation in female semipublic spaces. The simple fact that migrant domestic workers are in the house allows for their employers to have such a visible presence in society[10], [11].

The Mediated Presence of Domestics

NGOs provide more than just open areas for migrant domestic workers to socialize and enjoy some solitude. Many of them also participate in often mass-mediated discussions concerning migrant domestic workers. These discussions change the position of migrant domestic workers from one of absence to one of presence, however they mostly serve as discussion starters rather than participants.International NGOs and human rights organizations play a significant role in drawing attention to the issues and mistreatment that some migrant domestic workers endure. These organizations often detail individual instances of mistreatment of migrant domestic workers, with the most disturbing ones making their way to the Internet, television, and international media. As a consequence, migrant domestic workers are primarily presented as

victims who have been taken advantage of by employers and agencies. Although media audiences are often drawn to dramatic victimization tales, situations involving migrant domestic workers appear to get far more interest than those involving native domestics.Although traditional print media sometimes covered non-kin domestic labor, the introduction of new technologies has considerably accelerated the spread of information and photographs of migrant domestic workers. For instance, women writers in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century voiced their disapproval of the system of slavery.This wasn't so much because they thought slavery was cruel per se, but more because they thought it was immoral since it made concubinage a legal practice. The experiences of slaves weren't always important to writers; instead, they often utilized slavery allegorically to discuss political concerns, such as when the abolition of slavery was seen as the end of state dictatorship. In addition, the news media didn't seem very worried about young females working in houses. Newspapers did not cover this topic, as Ozbay found in her study on the interactions between adopted girls and the members of the families who had taken them in. Republican writers who were outspoken in their criticism of the practice of exploiting evlatlks as cheap domestic labor did a particularly moving job of addressing their situation.

More recently, the hiring of migrant domestic workers has been the subject of intense discussion, particularly in nations with a relatively tiny native population, like the United Arab Emirates. While Emirati families see the hiring of domestic help as essential, the hiring of foreign women is seen as very troublesome in public discourse. There are several "national disaster scenarios" that are warned of, in which Emirati women are accused of abandoning their children because they aren't well-socialized in the nation-state's language and religion. Such discussions are covered by the media as well. Sabban draws attention to various distinctions between the coverage of this topic in newspapers written in Arabic and English. She came to the conclusion that al-Khalij had twice as many articles critical of migrant domestic workers than the Arabic-language Gulf News, with more than one-fourth of the pieces condemning the country's reliance on migrant domestic workers. Gulf News, on the other hand, tended to characterize migrant domestic workers as victims more often, and it was the only daily to sometimes include success stories. This disparity is between audiences rather than nationals or non-nationals, with the ability to read Arabic or English making a crucial difference. Relevant here is also the fact that Gulf News has emerged as a prominent publication in the region, read by liberal elites of many nationalities, with editorials written by certain intellectuals from the UAE.

Additionally, domestic workers are shown in entertainment media. Modern Turkish television series and movies utilize certain "types" of domestic employees to identify the households that hire them. If domestics are dressed in uniforms, the family is elite; the presence of older black women is a sign of the family's prosperous past and emphasizes family values like loyalty, love, and respect for the elderly; if governesses are employed, the family is Westernizing; and when unpaid peasant children are present, the cruelty of the family is highlighted. Domestic servants are the key characters in other situations. Jureidini focuses on the way Egyptian melodramas highlight the conditions that have led women into this line of labor and the methods by which they are able to leave it, often by getting married to their boss or his son. This is often shown as the domestic's nefarious scheme, while other times it is the romantic joyful conclusion to a difficult existence. Instead of migrant domestic workers, local domestic workers are the main protagonists in these fictitious stories. While this can be because a sizable portion of Egyptian women are working as domestics, migrant domestic workers might also be seen as "too different" for the public to empathize. However, the use of domestics as the main protagonists in

works aimed at an international audience has not been without criticism. Marriage Egyptian Style's creators came under fire for choosing a cleaning lady as the show's primary character rather than a well-educated, contemporary, and cultured middle-class woman. The producers were charged with seriously harming Egypt's image outside of its borders because they picked a person judged unsui "to represent the nation."

Even though these are just a few instances of domestic workers appearing in the media, it is clear that certain media give different domestic worker categories and concerns more attention than others. International NGOs' publications address domestic worker abuse, while local media emphasizes the risks of migrant domestic labor to the nation's ability to reproduce. Local domestic employees rather than migrant domestic workers are the major characters in the entertainment media, whether as victims of an unfair class structure or as a danger to the employer's home due to their sexual orientation.

In conclusion, foreign domestic workers are becoming more visible in the Middle East. It is true that this is very different from the Habermas Ian idea of the modern public sphere in the sense of actively engaging in public discourse and deliberation; in Middle Eastern media discourse, migrant domestic workers are still primarily the subject of discussion rather than active participants. Yet migrant domestic workers are more prevalent in public spaces when we use a wider definition of participation in the public that takes into account their physical, embodied presence. The cityscapes of the Middle East have also altered significantly, at least in part due to the presence of a sizable number of migrant domestic workers, despite a variety of governmental restrictions intended to prevent any kind of settlement or permanent stay.

The significance of such a presence in the public, however, is not immediately apparent; we must confront the problem of agency in order to comprehend and sort out what such a presence in the public means to migrant domestic workers themselves. In addition to demonstrating their capacity to leave the place of work, their appearance in public areas might also be an indication of exploitation, which would emphasize their low status. Less ambiguity surrounds their participation in subaltern public venues including stores, restaurants, churches, and NGOs. These areas are often where migrant workers may find some privacy, independent of their employers, and in a way "among themselves." These locations might thus be seen of as a kind of counter public, one that maintains a sense of its inferior position and sets itself apart from a dominating public, even if not so much via participation in public discourse as through the embodied presence of these employees[12], [13].

CONCLUSION

In light of the potential and difficulties presented by recent social developments and technology breakthroughs, it is imperative to rethink the public sphere. We may create a richer and more current knowledge of the public sphere by reevaluating conventional paradigms, embracing inclusion, taking into account the effects of digital technology, and acknowledging the interconnectivity of the world. We are able to promote democratic participation, solve social injustices, and manage the complexity of our linked world thanks to this reconceptualization. It is necessary to use an interdisciplinary approach when reconceptualizing the public realm, drawing from disciplines including political science, sociology, communication studies, and cultural studies. To create a more thorough and inclusive knowledge of public discourse and involvement, it includes interacting with a variety of theoretical frameworks, empirical research, and critical viewpoints. We can promote more democratic, inclusive, and participatory societies

by rethinking the public realm. It helps us to deal with power disparities, welcome variety of views, and manage the complexity of modern communication environments. A reimagined public sphere encourages people and groups to actively participate in influencing public opinion, policy choices, and social change.

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CHAPTER 10

SURVEILLANCE AND CONSTITUTING THE PUBLIC IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF TRANSGRESSION

Dr. Kiran L Maney, Associate Professor, Department of Management,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id-kiran@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

The intricate relationship between surveillance practices and the formation of the public sphere in the context of the Ottoman Empire. By examining the politics and poetics of transgression within a surveillance framework, the complex dynamics that shaped public discourse, power structures, and resistance in the Ottoman Empire.Surveillance played a crucial role in the construction and control of the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire. The ruling authorities utilized various mechanisms of surveillance, including state agents, informants, and bureaucratic systems, to monitor and regulate public life. These surveillance practices aimed to ensure political stability, enforce social norms, and suppress dissent. However, they also created conditions for resistance, subversion, and the formation of alternative publics.

KEYWORDS:

Empowerment, Governance, Imperial Rule, Modernity, Power Dynamics, Privacy, Public Sphere.

INTRODUCTION

The public sphere is one of the notions that has been used more often and in more disciplines during the last ten years than any other. The word public is now often used to refer to both individuals and society, and the phrase public sphere is also becoming more common. The use of the idea of the public sphere in modern European history has been criticized by Harold Mah in a relevant and insightful study, calling it a phantasy. Mah draws attention to the "inescapable instability" in the representation of Habermas's universal public sphere based on an order of abstract categories, pointing out the conflict between social historians' recent efforts to recognize different identities and represent their differing interests in the public sphere on the one hand, and the fundamental requirement for Habermas's ideal public sphere in which diverse groups set aside their particularities and assume collectivity on the other[1], [2].

I contend that the enthusiastic acceptance of the idea of the public sphere in Middle Eastern history is connected to the political imagination, to a fantasy that the idea promises to provide, for quite different reasons.The new attraction to the idea of the public sphere is largely due to two specific characteristics in Habermas' conception of it. First, it's unclear from Habermas's initial usage of the word whether the public sphere refers to a hypothetical ideal or an actual historical reality. Habermas claimed that the public sphere cannot be "transferred, ideal typically generalized, to any number of historical situations that represent formally similar constellations," by highlighting the historical distinctiveness of the public sphere in Western Europe. But as other

observers have pointed out, the public realm in which sane public debates have arisen is also a normative ideal[3]. In actuality, Habermas' definition of it has never been achieved, and in the nineteenth century, when the circumstances that had allowed for its development a century earlier vanished, it underwent a transformation. In his subsequent writing, Habermas addressed this uncertainty by highlighting the public sphere's normative nature and deploying the concept in relation to citizenship and 'democratic legitimation'. In today's rhetoric, the public sphere according to Geoff Eley, means the general search for democratic agency in an era of declining electoral participation, compromised sovereignties, and frustrated and disappointed citizenship. Despite the fact that a sizable body of work using Habermas's public sphere oscillates between these two points, non-Western historiographies are more motivated to adopt the idea due to its normative appeal. Similar to how the word civil society was seized as the agent for democracy, especially in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, In order to achieve comparable normative goals, the term of public sphere was widely adopted in Middle Eastern and other non-Western historiographies in the 1990s. The notion of a society independent from the stateof state and society as two different realms diametrically opposed to one anotheris the second key component of Habermas' conception of the public sphere. Strict commitment to this binary opposition has helped non-Western historiographies emphasize the public sphere's conception as a normative ideal. The claim is that authoritarian state traditions that kept societies outside of Western Europe under its control prevented the growth of civil societies and public spheres, and/or that societies' submissive political cultures prevented them from resisting those oppressive states and creating a "rational-critical discourse." In essentialist words, Islam in the Middle East is portrayed as the fundamental component of the subservient political culture.

Even the partial fulfillment of the public sphere, which is a fiction in European past, is a fantasy in non-Western present. By highlighting the different temporalities that the so-called East and West occupy, it has recently become clear that the absence of the public sphere is just another example of the history of absences that characterize non-Western historiographies. Terms like "latecomer" and "late-developing," which were employed in the 1950s to emphasize the lack of "the necessary institutions capable of avoiding and breaking the slide into political totalism, trans- muting quantitative temporality into qualitative difference, Byalternative modernity's or retroactive modernity's have more recently been supplanted. With the growing use of rhetoric's like the "emergence" or "development" of the public sphere that emphasize yet another temporality, we are now seeing a similar situation in research on non-Western locations.

Two trends in Middle Eastern historiography have emerged as a result of this fervent normative goal. First, the phrase has been adopted to mean wherever people come together for collective exchange and expression of opinion, which makes analytical and focused discussion difficult, if not impossible. A striking illustration of this ambiguity is the fact that it is now conceivable to compare studies on the Intifada in modern-day Palestine with those on coffeehouses in Istanbul during the sixteenth century using the same conceptual framework of the public sphere. The conceptual ambiguity of the public realm seems quite at home given that area studies has primarily been characterized in reference to a loosely defined geographical orientation rather than a disciplinary concentration.

The claim that the public sphere had already existed in the Middle East, even before its emergence in Europe in the eighteenth century, distinguishes what might be called defensive historiographies, even though a sizable body of scholarship is heralding the "emergence" or "development" of the public sphere in the Middle East. Before comparable public spaces arose in

Europe, coffee shops, mosques, sufi lodges, spas, and other gathering places possessed all the elements of the public sphere, according to some claims. This defensive reaction has been an all-too-familiar part of Middle Eastern history as a variation of "cultural nationalism," of which there are many examples and which far precedes the use of the idea of public sphere. It is an effort to hide blatant absences by interventions in the past, as though motivated by a feeling of guilt toward contemporary Europe.

This essay does not discuss the origin or growth of the oppositional public sphere or make an effort to weigh in on the controversy surrounding the presence or lack of a public sphere in the Ottoman Middle East during the nineteenth century. I will argue that the "public" and "public opinion" have been constituted in a series of governmental practices that redefined politics in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, as opposed to using the conventional antagonistic conceptualization of state and society and understanding the "public" and "public opinion" as merely sociological referents that emerged despite and against the state. Although the phrase "public opinion" was not explicitly used in Ottoman political discourse prior to the 1860s, I will argue that beginning in the 1830s, it became a new component of politics and an implicit source of legitimacy for the Ottoman government. The procedures by which the populace was transformed into the primary target for action were closely related to the growing "governmentality" of the Ottoman state. These processes included constituting the public and seeing its opinion as a source of authority. To achieve this, a variety of political techniques were used, including legislation, taxes, institutional institutions, and ceremonial traditions. These changes in the Ottoman system of government, which marked a split between "the old" and "the new," can be traced back to the second quarter of the nineteenth century thanks to a wealth of evidence. These changes were formally recognized as the Tanzimat reforms, which were started in 1839 and are widely hailed as having revolutionized Ottoman governance[4]–[6].

I contend that the monitoring of the population was the root cause of this breach. The "collection and integration of information used for administrative purposes is a broad definition of surveillance. It is a novel view of society as an entity that can be known, and it makes reference to administrative procedures like polls, registrations, and the mapping of individuals and objects for monetary and political objectives that render society legible. Social control is not the only goal of surveillance, but it is essential to it since it helps to spot opposition. It is also fundamental because monitoring gave the government the tools it needed to control, manage, and act upon the populace. In other words, this paper departs from the literature's emphasis on the "nonpolitical" nature of surveillancean all-encompassing disciplinary power that leaves the governed population with little to no voice, making it unpalatable for studies on the public sphereand emphasizes that surveillance was crucial to a new conception of politics and the redefinition of the public sphere. I'll use two instances to explain how the public and public opinion are formed. First, I'll use a collection of spy reports produced by the Ottoman government in the 1840s to show how the introduction of monitoring changed the position of public opinion. Second, I'll emphasize the symbolic but significant significance of a new courtly custom, namely the Ottoman sultan's public display.

DISCUSSION

Listening to the Public

The Ottoman authorities spent a lot of time in 1840 listening in on people's talks. Informers stationed in public areas, as well as private homes and hotel rooms, in the capital city of Istanbul

overheard and recorded everyday conversations about current events. As a result, a sizable number of reportsmany of which are now kept in the Ottoman archives in Istanbulwere produced. The topics of conversations captured in these reports varied, but the majority focused on political commentary in the broadest sense: remarks on the uprisings in North Africa and the Ba'ath Party. The informers would send their reports to their superiors, who would then send them on to the police chief and ultimately the sultan. Although all of the conversations in the reports were taped in Istanbul, the capital, it is obvious that informers paid particular attention to people who had recently moved there and engaged them in conversation about issues like irregularities in provincial land and income registration or the corruption of tax collectors, governors, and local officials. It follows that listening in was not confined to the capital, however it is hard to say that the whole populace was in fact being watched.

The identities of persons whose talks they overheard and the location where a certain discussion occurred were meticulously documented by informers. The names, professions, and residences of people who arrived from the provinces were scrupulously recorded, as well as their temporary housing arrangements. Their reports were detailed transcriptions of the informers' reconstructions of specific remarks, some of which were recorded in dialogue form, rather than overall assessments of the public moods based on their perceptions. The precise date and time of every recorded remark started to be included by informers from 1843, giving their reports an even higher degree of specificity.

The informants weren't covert security personnel. This strategy ensured that informers could successfully penetrate the webs of society without being detected and listen in on conversations carried out in any of the nearly dozen languages that were widely spoken in the cosmopolitan city of Istanbul.In many cases, the informer was a personal acquaintance of those on whose conversations he eavesdropped.

They were recruited from among the local population, Ottoman subjects and foreign nationals alike. He wasn't only an excellent listener, though. He sometimes participated actively by asking leading questions, much like a contemporary opinion researcher, and he did not think twice to incorporate the answers to such questions in his report.

This monitoring effort was primarily conducted to ascertain public opinion rather than to bring charges against those responsible for the crimes due to their political statements. Therefore, these files were not exactly traditional police reports, which often recorded sedition with an eye toward denunciation and, eventually, punishment. There is no evidence that anybody who made political statements that were included in the reports was ever put on trial. People's voices are tinged with a significant dread of retribution, albeit they may not have been conscious of that.

We now need to investigate the reasons for the Ottoman government's extensive monitoring, as well as what motivated it to produce these reports. The use of contradictory strategies to deal with public political discourse is one of the ambivalences of the history of early modern and modern states. On the one hand, there is a manifest desire to know what kinds of political issues people talked about and thought affected their lives, and on the other hand, there are various attempts to impose restrictions on people's expression of their political opinions. This apparent contradiction is frequently brought up in historical scholarship in relation to the policies of early modern forms of government, particularly those of eighteenth-century France, and those of the supposedly totalitarian and authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century, such as the Soviet Union under Stalin and Nazi Germany.

Early modern governments were founded on the fundamental idea that politics was the ruler's domain and governed how the ruling class interacted with its citizens. To the degree that this was the case and that it was acknowledged as the embodiment of the state, it was illegal for anyone to publicly express their opinions on political, governmental, or administrative issues. Numerous historical records demonstrate that, previous to the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had vigilantly monitored public areas for "seditious" political talks and punished subversive gossip-mongers, particularly during political crises. The sultan wrote in 1798 to his grand vizier:

It has been claimed that malicious and devilish individuals who seek to stir up conflict and mayhem create and spread lies and fabrications, and that some dimwitted individuals who lack the ability to distinguish between what is good and what is bad, as well as benefit from harm, dare to speak negatively about the government and impertinently spread these fabrications among themselves in coffee shops and barbershops. Closing these coffeehouses and barbershops, where these dissolute congregate and dare talk about the state, and arresting, punishing, and expelling both the proprietors of these coffeehouses and barbershops as well as those who dare utter frivolous and nonsensical words are necessary[7].

Here, it's crucial to highlight two things. First, the government saw public opinion as noise that needed to be watched over, suppressed, stopped, and, if it became too upsetting, silenced. The state's goal to stifle "seditious" political debates is seen in the sheer brutality used against coffeehouses in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the most infamous public spaces in major centers across the Ottoman Middle East. Istanbul's coffee shops were shut down wholesale many times during this time. Second, before the 1840s, spies were often stationed in the hubs of the city, in addition to the time-honored tradition of tebdil-i kyafet. Spies extensively watched coffee shops and other public locations in the late eighteenth and early early nineteenth centuries to stop impolite conversation and punish seditious gossipers. The scope of surveillance was not restricted to males or to public spaces with a masculine predominance. In 1809, a woman informant had a group of ladies discussing state politics in a bathhouse arrested and imprisoned. Authorities also used women informers to target women who were supposedly having seditious chats[8], [9].

As the aforementioned example illustrates, monitoring was vast and all-encompassing, yet it was also unpredictable. It was hardly a daily occurrence for Ottoman people. Additionally, the administration failed to pierce the social fabric, if that was indeed their intention. The effectiveness of social control hinged equally on the good fortune of the informers' stalking as it did on the carelessness and indifference of the populace. Typically, gossipers were aware of any strangers who seemed eager to overhear their chats and used their ingenuity to convert the situation into a platform to air their expectations and woes to imperial ears.

In conclusion, while population snooping was undoubtedly done in the years before the 1840s, it drastically changed in the middle of the nineteenth century. Three variablesthe manner of execution, the agents, and the objectivescan be used to distinguish the differences. Second, while social control through monitoring had previously been accomplished by military-administrative officials, the higher bureaucracy, and even the sultan himself, after the 1840s it became increasingly impersonal and unofficial, as local people were incorporated into the surveillance system. First, spying had previously been sporadic and intermittent before the 1840s, but it was implemented in a continuous manner after this date. Thirdly, and most crucially, surveillance's new goal after the 1840s was to study public moods and attitudes via a covert and sophisticated

system of gathering and recording conversations and exchanges. Previously, surveillance sought to control the populous by punishing seditious utterances. As a result, starting in the 1840s, the Ottoman state was no longer restricted to its traditional political realm, sometimes intervening with the regular operation of public spaces to maintain population control. Instead, its authority started to seep into the ruled population's every day behavior.

It is not sufficient to see the modifications to the monitoring systems as just technical issues related to Ottoman administrative procedures. While the state's growing concern for public opinion was reflected in this comprehensive monitoring, it also revealed a corresponding change in the role of the ruling class. With this new type of political authority, the people were no longer being dictated to by the state but were instead being consulted. The process of listening to conversations and relaying them to the ruling elite without fear of punishment leads, first and foremost, to the erasure of the distinction between official truth and popular lies. In this form of government, popular lies that had previously been suppressed are now given a legal standing. In the lengthy and uneven process of historical development, this was the discovery of public opinion. It was also the time when people were constituted as political citizens as opposed to subversive rumor-mongers, when word-of-mouth became important, and when political power implicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of public opinion rather than denouncing it.

The new approaches to governmental participation with the population that evolved at the same time as the concept of the public via surveillance reports was fundamentally connected. The increased public exposure of the sultan in the second quarter of the nineteenth century signified a new notion of the body politic, just like listening in transformed the populace into an observed body.

Being Both Seen and Seen

Before Mahmud II's rule, it was uncommon, if not totally unique, for Ottoman sultans to be in the public eye. The idea of the ruler's invisibility had been fundamental to courtly etiquette and was institutionalized in Mehmed II's Code of Law shortly after his conquest of Istanbul in 1453. It remained largely unchallenged until the beginning of the eighteenth century, but its most dramatic development occurred in the 1830s. The sultans had mostly used elaborately orchestrated military battles to gain popular attention up until the late sixteenth century. Various sultans turned to various methods of appearing in front of the public in the centuries that followed, when the likelihood of defeat increased and commanding a military campaign became a riskier endeavor. Mehmed IV's infamous hunting trips between Istanbul and Edirne are one well-known example. Along with these occasions, when imperial pageantry was performed outside of Istanbul, monarchs also participated in a few public ceremonial events in the city. In the Sublime Porte, extraordinary imperial spectacles included procession to and from Friday prayers, during which people could approach him to make requests, pilgrimages to the Prophet's mantle during the holy month of Ramadan, and succession rituals that culminated in the sword-girding ceremony in the town of Eyüp.

The idea of the ruler's invisibility was not questioned by these planned and symbolically charged imperial exhibitions. They were carefully controlled events that took place inside a thoroughly scrutinized political system that was based on the isolation of power. The sultan made several notable public appearances, which Habermas described as representative publicity; yet, the ruler's presence was intended more for a performance "before" the people rather than "for" it. The sultan was given a symbolic but essential weapon by this body political to carry out his duty

as ruler in the intricate labyrinth of absolutist politics. The ruler's unseen body stood stand for the stability of the political system, just as politics was, in theory, the ruler's prerogative. Politics were, in principle, otherworldly for the populace and mysterious for the king. This explains the governed population's unlawful political speech and the sultan's lack of visibility.

Mahmud II's rule in the first part of the nineteenth century saw a dramatic change in the sultan's public demeanor. His "country trips" were quite important in this respect. Mahmud II traveled to the countryside no less than five times between 1830 and 1837. In truth, he was more interested in being seen by his people than in seeing them, despite the fact that this was the declared official goal of his excursions, according to several government sources. Mahmud II did in fact usher in a new period in which "westernizing" imperial kings began to leave their cities for the outlying regions of their empires in order to become more accessible to their subjects. Beginning in the late 1830s, Alexander II, Crown Prince of Russia, made large trips around the nation, as did the Japanese emperors in different regions of their empire in the 1870s.

Mahmud II expanded the empire both literally and figuratively with each journey. During his protracted journeys, he made every effort to show his compassion for his people by providing significant sums of money for the upkeep of churches, synagogues, and important and sacred sites as well as by visiting small towns and giving gifts. In an effort to appeal to his people's emotions, he continually minimized his position as supreme leader and projected the image of an unbeatable, but mortal and earthly, monarch. In an unprecedented and calculated move to create his new persona, he spent the night on a battleship and preferred a simple dinner with sailors to elaborate banquets hosted in his honor. He also spoke in front of large crowds of people who came to see him and frequently interacted with his subjects to make himself both visible and approachable. When giving presents, he gave the impression of being a father figure. When ordering the restoration of holy structures, he gave the impression of being a devoted believer. When listening to people's problems, he gave the impression of being a compassionate administrator. In other words, he did not portray a king who was secluded in the comfort of his castle, abdicating his power, but rather one who was devoted to his people.

Regaining the allegiance of his non-Muslim people was one of the sultan's top priorities on his journeys to the problematic provinces. This may be seen in the places he chose to go to. He traveled extensively throughout the regions of the Balkans, which are mostly Christian, but he only made it as far as Izmit in Anatolia, which is predominately Muslim. Sultan Mahmud II's trips were rather appropriate given that nationalist movements were picking up steam throughout the Balkans at the time. By implementing the new dress rule that did away with the headpiece as the primary indicator of rank and confessional identification, he had already officially "offered non-Muslims and Muslims a common subjecthood/citizenry" in 1829. He now personally assured his citizens that both Muslims and non-Muslims would be treated equally in his imperial gaze:

Greeks, you Armenians, you! Those Jews! You guys are God's slaves and my subjects, just like Muslims. You disagree on religious issues. But the law and my imperial will be there to keep you all safe. Make tax payments. They'll be put to use to make sure you're safe and secure.Mahmud II made a commitment to his people that he would keep making excursions to see them. He promised more reasonable taxes, an end to the provinces' secondary status, and the observance of justice regardless of his subjects' faith. His goal was to displace the public's widely held perception of government misconduct with that of law and order. He said: "Law and order will be placed in motion not only in the capital but in the rest of the empire as well." He often left a

sizable quantity of money to cover the town's cost of throwing his own celebration as a deliberate act to demonstrate his sense of fairness.

Mahmud II sought personal popularity with his new image while on the road, and the reception he got from his people was just what he had hoped it would be. As he passed by them with his entourage, they enthusiastically greeted him and prayed for him. As ethnonationalist movements in the Balkans and the demoralizing revolt of Mehmed Ali Pasha in Egypt gained momentum, his presence in the far-flung provinces was an attempt to show the territorial unity of an empire on the verge of disintegrating. He tried to connect the remote regions of the empire to the capital Istanbul and to bring the people closer to him both by seeing them and by giving them the opportunity to see him, thus eliminating the distance between them and him. His goals were "to take symbolic possession" of his domain and to define his people as a group.

Mahmud II used every chance to promote himself to the people in the capital as well, particularly in the final ten years of his rule. He often evaluated his soldiers and took part in the dedication ceremonies for new public and educational facilities. During the reigns of Mahmud II's two successive successors, Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz, this recently formed custom of imperial public appearance persisted.The official journal Takvim-i Vekayi reported on Mahmud II's everyday activities as he started to become more visible to the people in order to promote his new persona as an earthly sultan. Vakayi-i Msriyye, a newspaper founded in 1828 by Mehmed Ali Pasha, was essentially the source of the concept for an Ottoman publication. Mehmed Ali Pasha, who had previously served as the obedient governor of the prosperous province of Egypt, revolted and presented the biggest threat to the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s, when his soldiers repeatedly beat the Ottomans at a distance of about a day's march from Istanbul. The ongoing conflict between the sultan and his dissident governor found a new front in Takvim-i Vekayi, which also served as the new battleground for the conflict over public opinion.

The journal tried to portray the sultan, who was now actively engaged in government activities, as a kind and nurturing figure. Different editions in Arabic, Persian, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, and French were also printed and disseminated in addition to the Ottoman Turkish original. This indicated Mahmud II's steadfast desire to get his point over to his followers, which was also apparent in his attempts to make the newspaper's original language understandable to the people. Mahmud II believed it was too difficult when Takvim-i Vekayi chief editor Mehmed Esad sent him a draft of his florid account of the sultan's tour to the Balkans in 1837. His reply exemplifies his efforts to bridge the verbal and physical distance between himself and his subjects:Despite the fact that your essay is well written and well-crafted, the terminology should be clear enough for everyone to grasp when such issues are given to the public.

In addition to the novelty of Mahmud II's choice to leave the capital and go around the empire to see his subjects he also made history by being the first sultan to open up access to his private photographs. Sultans of the Ottoman Empire since Mehmed II had their portraits painted against the Islamic prohibition on the reproduction of human pictures. These pictures, however, have never left the seclusion of the Topkapi Palace. Mahmud II departed with tradition in an effort to make his reign more widely known. The people of the empire got a chance to witness the sultan's appearance for the first time. Mahmud II began sending his portraits to ambassadors, high-ranking bureaucrats, and most importantly, to the echoism, the chief religious' authoritymuch to the latter's displeasure.52 The British ambassador Stratford Caning remarked that the sultan appeared at all times as though he were posing for an artist. By 1835, the monarch had become increasingly self-conscious of his public image.

It is crucial to note that these portraits differed noticeably from those that had previously been painted in a similar style to his predecessors' but had not been meant for public display. Mahmud II is seen in one of his early pictures, painted between 1808 and 1829, with a long beard, wearing a customary loose caftan, a big turban on his head, and sitting on his diamond throne. His physique seems immobile and lifeless, and despite his youth, he has an elderly appearance with a pale face. He is sitting on a western-style chair in a later artwork that was created between 1829 and 1839. He dons a military outfit inspired by European garb, which consists of fitted pants and a shirt that is covered by a cloak. His beard is substantially shorter, giving him a grave air of authority and a more youthful appearance. He dons a fes, which he ordered all officials to wear as a matter of course in 1829, in place of the customary turban. His physical demeanor is vivacious and active. By pointing, he communicates that he is the subject's leader and guide. A ferman, the sultanic decree, on his left hand bears his imperial seal, and a stack of books next to his chair denotes the authority of established writings. These are now used as the new symbols of his authority as the righteous and law-abiding ruler, not his image on the throne.

Mahmud II didn't only want to emphasize the communal identity and unity of his kingdom by making himself visible to his people. Additionally, he desired the "capacity to gaze back at the people. He sought maps of the locations he visited and comprehensive topography and demographic information from his superiors, only to learn that no such maps existed. On his command, cartographers started charting the empire's territory. This was followed by two efforts at thorough censuses, one in 1831 and the other in 1844. A new tax system was also built on the foundation of land and income surveys of the popula- tion carried out in the Anatolian and Balkan provinces in 1840 and 1844, notwithstanding their incompleteness. These statistics operations also need to include quarantine reports. These monthly reports, which included epidemics and significant ailments and were submitted to Istanbul from every region of the empire, were created by centrally appointed officials as part of the state's developing concern for public health in the 1840s.60 So, throughout the same ten-year period, censuses and maps were used to map the empire's area and populace, while quarantine reports and income registers documented the people's health and riches. Spy reports recorded their moods. Additionally, the monarch was making himself visible to his people while these maps and statistics made the populace "legible." In other words, the subjects became "objects of observation" as the emblem of authority was made apparent.

The endeavor to make the population readable must be seen in the context of all these new surveillance techniques, which are best shown by the land, health, and opinion surveys. These practices together represent a new governmentality founded on the idea that the people are not an aggregate body but a knowable individual. Making the population legible was simultaneously a process of inscription that called for a reorganization of power dynamics and, perhaps more significantly, inexorably created a new channel of communication between the ruler and the ruled. Even social control, which expressly assigns society a passive function and makes the state the lone actor in an unequal but reciprocal process, is placed within this area as a result of this new governmentality. Politics are reinterpreted in this setting. It is "emancipatory" in that it gives individuals under control a legitimate voice in governmental affairs, and it is "disciplinary" in that it organizes, forms, and governs[10].

The public realm was also redefined in this way: It was now a real political sphere where the public and public opinion emerged as a legitimate force in the business of governance and people were constituted as political subjects, rather than merely a moral sphere where the populace was

to be kept out of politics and submit its loyalty to the ruler. In actuality, monitoring led to the state actively meddling in every aspect of citizens' life. The public sphere was therefore encircled by the state's overt and covert activities and turned into a zone of control. This procedure became formalized with the founding of the first Ottoman police force in 1844 as a body distinct from the military. Public policing naturally intersected with the study of public opinion. The political sphere was designated as the public sphere, but it also developed into a zone of control. The state's ability to impose sanctions eventually expanded as a result of this widespread monitoring, and the desire to show off in front of the public lessened. European tourists note the rarity of the death penalty in the 1840s and attribute it, with the usual credulity, to the youthful monarch Abdülmecid, son of Mahmud II, who was lenient[11], [12].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the interaction between transgression, surveillance techniques, and public sphere formation in the Ottoman Empire reveals the complex dynamics of power, resistance, and cultural creation. Within a system of surveillance, the politics and poetics of transgression provide light on the methods used by people and groups to resist hegemonic rule, sway public opinion, and claim agency. Understanding these interactions helps us better comprehend past public formations, illuminates the intricacies of power relations, and provides new perspectives on the potentially transformational nature of transgression in surveillance societies. Understanding the processes of surveillance and transgression in the Ottoman Empire may help us better understand the intricate interactions between the construction of publics, power, and resistance. It demonstrates the subtle ways in which monitoring methods affect social norms, public discourse, and the creation of spaces for alternative kinds of civic involvement.

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CHAPTER 11

PLACES IN SHADOWS, NETWORKS IN TRANSFORMATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TEHRAN BAZAAR'S PUBLICNESS

Dr. Seema Sambargi, Professor, Department of Management,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id-dr.seema_sambargi@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

Analysis of the Tehran Bazaar, one of the oldest and most significant marketplaces in the Middle East, to explore the dynamics of publicness within its complex network of spaces. By examining the interplay between physical spaces, social interactions, and economic networks, this the multifaceted nature of publicness within the Tehran Bazaar and its transformation over time.The Tehran Bazaar serves as a vibrant economic and social hub, fostering interactions among a diverse range of actors, including merchants, customers, artisans, and local residents. It comprises a labyrinthine network of interconnected spaces, both indoors and outdoors, where economic transactions, cultural exchanges, and social encounters take place. These physical spaces, such as market stalls, alleyways, and caravanserais, form the backdrop for the negotiation of publicness within the Bazaar.

KEYWORDS:

Authenticity, Bazaar economy, Commercial networks, Cultural heritage, Interconnectedness, Marketplace.

INTRODUCTION

The market in Tehran is referred to as "that which is in the shadow of the Shams al. Amareh."When I asked a bazaar to explain the business venture where he had spent many years working, he responded as follows:He was making reference to the proximity of Tehran's major market to the grounds of Golestan Palace, which also houses the elaborate clock tower known as Shams al-'Amareh, or Sun of the Architecture. It is not at all unexpected that the main market in Tehran, like many others around Iran, the Middle East, and North Africa, is closely linked to a certain geographic area, or locale. Bazaars or asways are distinguishably marked by ostentatious structures and morphologies that physically separate these business environments from the rest of the city in many of the region's cities, albeit not all.

However, this rather poetic metaphor, which was used by other older merchants, also implies that the Tehran bazaar is a place, one that implies a number of social and relational dimensions that in turn create a collective identity, rather than just an empty point or a two-dimensional space on the map. The sheer fact that business owners and traders refer to themselves as people of the bazaar illustrates the feeling of community that is shared to some extent by individuals of various social classes, religious beliefs, levels of wealth, and sectoral connections. In the past, the multipurpose bazaar fostered intricate and lasting social, familial, financial, and informal interactions that led to shared experiences in the bazaar's shops, offices, corridors, and

caravanserai. As a result, a second quality of place is that it fosters the development of a sense of place or identity that is exclusive to that location[1]–[3].

Last but not least, the idea of being in the shadow of another object serves as a reminder that locations are located, or situated in relation to other places and in accordance with relationships with other hierarchies and processes, like the division of labor, global systems of production and distribution, and capitalist competition. In this instance, the remark alludes to the relationship between the market and the state since the Golestan Palace served as the traditional seat of administration. It brings to mind the politics that developed behind the scenes of the government and in the back alleys and caravansaries of Iran's bazaars, notably for the student of Iranian history. The Tehran bazaar served as a hub for political rumor and planning, demonstrations and leafleting, funding strikes, and organizing dissent. Bazaaris were infamously and frequently involved in the social movements that marked modern Iranian history, including the 1890 movement against tobacco concessions, the 1905–11 Constitutional Revolution, support for the Mosaddeq government in 1951–53, and the 1963 Khom revolution. I'll come back to this idea in a moment, but the bazaar in Tehran and other cities became a place to organize and stage dissentto make it public.

How was it possible that a location that was mainly meant for personal use and was connected to instrumental logic was also a location where people could communicate with one another, get access to public life, and engage in political activity? This makes the case that it is crucial to investigate the interactions between location and networks in order to comprehend how the many characteristics of place are created and modified. It does this by providing data from field research and reinterpreting previous literature. I envision bazaars as confined places with a number of ongoing, socially embedded networks that serve as the trading mechanism for certain goods in order to explore my thesis. The bazaar's morphology allowed bazaaris to create independent commercial networks that were crucial for economic trade as well as well-established avenues for communication, resource mobilization, and the development of collective action repertoires that are important for social mobilization. As I'll argue, the bazaar's physical dimensions served as the organizing principles for its interpersonal relationships and are crucial to comprehending how much of a public realm it has become over the last 50 years.

If the political positioning of the bazaar is accurate, we might anticipate that with the Islamic Revolution, its social space was altered as the government's shadow defined new boundaries between light and dark. I provide evidence to support the claim that new state policies have really changed the Tehran bazaar's location and network in ways that simultaneously changed the areas and sites where trade takes place and, as a result, diminished the bazaar's visibility and political impact. As a result, the way politics are expressed in bazaars is more fluid than the idea of physical space, which tends to be quite static, or the idea of social groupings and classes, which tends to be extremely structured, may imply.

DISCUSSION

Degrees and Contingencies of Publicness

The consideration of geography, human relationships, and politics is reminiscent of Arendt and Habermas' now-classic works on the public realm. The term "public sphere" refers to the discursive arena where knowledgeable private citizens congregate to have rational, critical debate regarding the common good. The public sphere is an empirical heuristic and normative ideal for these writers and others who have interacted with them over the years, according to

which political activity and participatory democracy are made possible and meaningful. Despite the fact that Iran lacks the constitutional and legal frameworks that certain regions of Europe have had since the nineteenth century to enable the development, vitality, and effectiveness of public spheres, the concept of public sphere does highlight the contingent interplay of socioeconomic and political registers in the case of the bazaar. Bazaars and public spaces are outcomes of regular human interactions[2]–[4].

It is in keeping with Arendt's concept of the public sphere to see the bazaar's collective identity and functioning as a consequence of prolonged, polycentric, and complex contacts. Conceptually, the creation of the public is connected to the interactions and exchanges that shape ordinary persons and their political potential. Actions would be meaningless without the presence of others to witness, assess, and give meaning to them, as Arendt notes, the public is something that is experienced via social activity and contact with others in a web of human relationships. Habermas makes the relationship between the ideas of the public sphere and networks further clearer in his later publications. The public sphere, according to Habermas, can best be described as a network for communicating information and points of view; the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized, in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions. However, in order to apply Habermas's fundamentally normative concept of the public sphere to empirical studies, it is crucial not to treat the channels of communication and dissemination of discuss Consequences for accessibility, responsibility, secrecy, and exclusioni.e., publicnessare inherent in the structure of human contacts, the way that they unite and divide individuals. The public aspect of the bazaar is automatically addressed more heterogeneously and dynamically by treating it as both an analytical unit and as the reality created via networks. In other words, patterns of networks or human relationships may provide a wealth of information regarding the emergence, evolution, and waning of publics.

Second, it should be noted that Habermas believed that the mercantile and bourgeois classes, as well as the growth of capitalist market economies, were closely tied to the birth and evolution of the public sphere. In order to evaluate the unique characteristics of the public sphere in Iran and the Middle East more broadly, examining merchants and commercial institutions might be beneficial. This agenda also assists in connecting political, economic, and cultural concerns to one another rather than regarding them as distinct and independent domains.

The public sphere is separate from the market and the private sphere, or more correctly, becomes distinct from both, according to Habermas and Arendt before him. Consequently, normative political theorists may not recognize the bazaar as a public sphere, especially since many of the issues discussed and debated within the bazaar's physical space or through its channels of communication can hardly be construed as constituting the common interest. However, this limited understanding of the public sphere and strict dichotomy between private and public, or personal and political, would preclude a full understanding of Iranian politics. Instead of approaching "the public" in harsh binary terms contrasted against "the private," as current academic work tends to do, it is important to conceive about degrees of publicness. Publicness has "the quality of wholeness, openness, and availability, notes Setrag Manoukian. Public refers to anything that is complete, shared, and all-inclusive, or has the potential to become so. In the sense of being 'in view' and at someone's disposal, it is open and accessible.

Georg Simmel's work, which presents a broader sociological theory of the public and secret as inversely associated and as an essential aspect of social development, is sadly overlooked in debates of public/private and secrecy. Simmel wrote, "The historical development of society is in

many respects characterized by the fact that what at an earlier time was manifest, enters the protection of secrecy; and that, conversely, what once was secret, no longer needs such protection but reveals itself." Simmel believed that society was made up of people who were connected to one another through interaction, with lies and secrecy being one such interaction that necessitates social distance[5]. A top-notch component of individualization is the secret. It has a typical dual role: concealment is highly permitted and necessary in social contexts with substantial personal distinction, but conversely, the secret represents and strengthens such divergence. Simmel continues, in a small and narrow circle, the formation and preservation of secrets is made difficult for technical reasons: everybody is too close to everybody else and his circumstances, and frequency and intimacy of contact involve too much temptation of revelation. Simmel goes on to argue that as groups get bigger and when the money economy rules, people withdraw from social circles leading to secrecy and individualization. The insights of Manoukian, Ayubi, and Simmel are valuable because they consider how interpersonal relationships can develop the more closed, opaque, or hidden qualities associated with secrecy. They also relate publicness to openness and reveal the nature of relationships and interactions between people[6]–[8].

Therefore, the goal of this is not to determine whether or not the bazaar is a public arena, but rather to evaluate the many vectors that make up and produce different levels of publicness or secrecy. Publicness depends on historically unique political and geographical circumstances, which I break down in terms of location and networks. To demonstrate how and why publicness must be spatialized and temporalized, I will now explore the Tehran market.

Publicity Under the Pahlavi State's Shadow

The bazaar has a historical place in the urban structure of Tehran as one of the city's five sectors in the nineteenth century. Early in the 20th century, the partially covered commercial "pulse of the city"distinguished from three ostensibly residential quarters and located next to the government quarter of the Arggrew in significance as the capital outpaced historically bigger and politically and economically more important cities like Tabriz, Isfahan, or Shiraz. As a result of the Constitutional Revolution, Reza Shah's policies of centralization and state-building, and other factors, the Tehran bazaar swiftly rose to prominence as the main hub for both domestic and foreign commerce. A grid system that completely encircled the one square kilometer area known as the bazaar with the street system that surrounds it was introduced by the modernist Pahlavi regime in the 1930s at around the same time as the city's limits were expanded. The Tehran Bazaar has therefore been distinguished from the rest of the city rather literally by its constructed environment, which includes surrounding streets, small alleys, vaulted ceilings, gates, and old buildings. As a result, the Persian word for "bazaar" still refers to a specific location in addition to its more recent philosophical meaning of "the market."

However, the bazaar is more than just a location; it has long been a bustling commercial hub that unites importers, exporters, wholesalers, brokers, and retailers. These businesses have long controlled significant amounts of credit, employed tens of thousands of people, and distributed raw, intermediate, and finished consumer goods throughout the city, the country, and to markets abroad. While it is difficult to determine the precise number of employees and business establishments in the Tehran bazaar, the majority of sources estimate that there were between 20,000 and 30,000 such establishments in the 1970s20. These sizable populations were divided into sectors and lanes, such as the coppersmiths' bazaar or the shoemakers' bazaar. Additionally, traders were situated according to their place in the value chain or distribution network. For

instance, import-export businesses were often found in the tributaries, caravansaries, and side-alleys. The location served as a defining characteristic between economic activity inside the bazaar, i.e., between business sectors and hierarchical ranks. This kind of localization lowers the expenses associated with looking for sellers and makes it easier to communicate information about the pricing, quality, and supply of items as well as the reputations and histories of possible trading partners. As a result, communication was made easier by the spatial arrangement, which included the architecture's human size.

Before discussing the "sense of place" and "location" of the Tehran bazaar, allow me to briefly touch on the fairly complex subject of property ownership. The issue is complicated because the bazaar has historically consisted of a patchwork of structures and land owned by different groups of people, including private individuals, religious trusts, members of the royal family, and more recently, economic foundations that manage property with the express purpose of distributing earnings and profits to the underprivileged. Plans to participate in building inside the bazaar zone have always been hampered by this fragmented structure, the practice of "key money," and confusion around property rights. The bazaar's principal thoroughfares, however, were always de facto public property that was open to everyone and managed by the town. Islamic legal scholars have long regarded the market as a public area that has to be watched over by an inspector to guarantee that Islamic law and local custom are upheld. These scholars have a relational concept of public and private in general.

But as Asef Bayat points out in his essay on the urban poor and political activity, just staying in the same place or nearby is insufficient to turn a dormant group into an active one. Bazaari ties are reproduced by and within the bazaar's stores, alleyways, warehouses, coffee shops, restaurants, and mosques. Spatial concentration matters to the extent that it generates long-term, cross-cutting, and multifaceted interpersonal relations, or the characteristics of what may be described as community or what Arendt would recognize as "a web of human connectedness." Physical space must transform into a social space through activities, rituals, and interdependencies where individuals identify themselves as part of a group and as distinct from others and develop a semblance of generalized trust in order to move from being a passive network of actors sharing a common space to an active one where actors consciously participate in group activities and mobilization.

Up until the 1970s, the bazaar was a functionally diverse setting that aided in the development of interpersonal relationships among bazaaris that overcame any potential sectoral, hierarchical, ethnic, and political divides that might have rendered the commercial concentration politically and socially irrelevant. There were public baths, coffee shops, restaurants, zrkhnehs, schools, mosques, and shrines inside and around the Tehran market. Bazaaris would assemble in their warehouses and at the entry gates to their alleyways to have meetings, eat meals together, and congregate in coffee shops on a regular, if not daily, basis. Mosques and shrines, often established and supported by guilds and bazaaris, served as regular gathering places for religious businessmen or those who want to at least show a modicum of public devotion. Therefore, the bazaar had a variety of applications, including commercial, manufacturing, religious, sanitary, leisurely, and gastronomic. Although the mixed-use aspect of the bazaar brought merchants into touch with society at large and other publics, in especially the clergy, many of these institutions catered to the bazaari community.

The bazaar's small-scale workplace contributed to the creation of a social atmosphere where individuals from all walks of life interacted with one another rather than just being present in the

same space. Customers and coworkers might stop by the open businesses bordering the alleyways to compare products and prices, swap economic news, look up possible trading and credit partners, or discuss political intrigue and forecasts. They were able to see and evaluate the actions of others, whether they were strangers, relatives, neighbors, guild elders, rivals, or partners, thanks to this open quality, which encouraged and even required individuals to recognize one other's presence. In fact, before getting down to business, personal contacts virtually required ritualistic small chat about families, the weather, and politics. Bazaaris often congregated together to eat, drink tea, worship, or just hang around at one other's stores. Casual social interactions that did not entirely map onto social segmentation also averted potential cleavages along class, sectoral, and ethnic lines. The compact shape strengthened the perception that the bazaar was a transparent and open world in plain view of all of its participants and enabled eyes to be upon the streets.

The strong feeling of bazaari individuality and a number of exclusions, which were defined through geographical categories and networks, were present alongside this openness and accessibility, however. Researchers studying the bazaar in the pre-revolutionary period often noted that there was a strong feeling among bazaaris. This was made possible by the morphology of the bazaar and the strongly integrated structure of the economy. Participation in the many dimensions of bazaar life helped inculcate in its people the values of unity and collaboration. As a result, space is productive in that it and networks mutually structure one another, bringing together different bazaari groups to influence how people felt of themselves and those who were "of the bazaar." Businesspeople and bazaari formed, and in some cases still make, a clear distinction between the bazaar and the khiybn, or the streets outside of the region connected with the covered market. One effect for those denied membership in the bazaar was their inability to access affordable credit, as interest rates were based on "being known" and/or having high status co-sponsors. In practice, this distinction, recognized by khiybn as well as bazaaris, was that those located outside the bazaar did not work in the same guilds or participate in the commercial and social relations of the bazaar, and ostensibly lacked membership in the bazaar. They often didn't engage in lengthy and intricate business dealings with bazaaris, so they weren't well known to them and were unable to locate guild leaders and high-status members who may serve as references and doors into the bazaar's realm. Due to their exclusion from the bazaar's space and networksessential elements of being visible and active participants of its publicnesskhiybn was therefore characterized by bazaaris as "inexperienced," which was apparently a byproduct of their absence.

The Bazaar's Location in The Pahlavi Political Economy

Place also refers to how a specific geography is situated in relation to other locations and socio-economic and political processes. Up to this point, the study of the bazaar has concentrated on its constructed environment and how it created a feeling of place. The state's policies and the Pahlavi monarchy's modernist gaze subordinated the bazaar and its residents to the modern economy while making it a central node in Iran's petroleum-fueled consumerism, just as physical boundaries generated a place-based bazaari identity by facilitating a web-like set of relations and effected categorical separation between the bazaar and the rest of the urban society.

The othering of khiybn by bazaaris is a clear example of the Pahlavi state's high modernism, which attempted to destroy the bazaar by swapping out its economic and commercial structure with a purportedly better and distinct modern economy. The commercial and credit activities of the bazaar were planned to be replaced by state-sponsored and -owned chain shops, department

stores, and banks. A number of laws were passed that targeted the bazaaris. The Shah's rhetoric characterized the bazaar as "traditional" in contrast to "modern," the idea of public investment and political outreach, which was applied arbitrarily in ways that did not favor the bazaar community. State banks, for example, directed credit to allies of the Pahlavi family and away from smaller commercial figures. The state practiced systematic discrimination against people connected to the old, conventional economic sphere and in favor of those who shared the kinship and ideologies of the royal family. The Shah only took ad hoc and reactive measures that occasionally chastised a group that was nonetheless seen as being antiquated to modernization. This naturally helped bazaaris to unite and define a group boundary. The Shah did not attempt to co-opt bazaar organizations like the Chamber of Guilds and Chamber of Commerce in order to mobilize bazaaris on behalf of the regime.

The Tehran bazaar continued to play a crucial role in commerce despite the Shah's apparent enmity towards the bazaari elite and their restricted direct access to oil revenues. The Tehran bazaar translated its historical location in the economy to become the commercial hub of an unevenly growing oil economy thanks to rapid urbanization and related capital accumulation and monetization of wage labor, trade policies that encouraged consumption and imports, and the bazaar's ability to continue to dominate wholesaling and private credit markets.

In contrast to democratic theory's presumption, a public may develop independently of and even in opposition to the public authority, or state. This finding resonates with more recent criticisms of this liberal historical narrative of Europe that suggest that the emergence of public spheres is full of exclusions based on gender, class, and race. In this case, the bazaar experience of exclusion was based on modernist principles that defined it as traditional, to be left behind in the modern world[8]–[10].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the study of the publicness of the Tehran Bazaar demonstrates the intricate networks and public places that make up this famous bazaar. Insights about the intricacies of publicness in urban settings may be gained from the mixing of official and informal behaviors, the historical and cultural backdrop, and the ongoing changes within the Bazaar. Understanding the Tehran Bazaar's dynamics of publicness adds to larger conversations on the influence of markets, networks, and public spaces on social, economic, and cultural life in modern cities. Insights into the dynamics of public places and networks in modern urban environments may be gained through comprehending the Tehran Bazaar's publicness. It emphasizes the value of hybrid environments, which include formal and informal structures, as well as the influence of social networks on everyday interactions and economic activity. The complicated interactions between tradition and modernity, globalization and local dynamics, and governmental control and informal activities are further illuminated by examining the Tehran Bazaar's publicness.

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CHAPTER 12

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MOBILIZATION OF BAZAARIS

Dr. Anita Walia, Assistant Professor, Department of Management,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id- anita@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

This abstract explores the mobilization of Bazaaris, a prominent merchant class in the Middle East, and examines the strategies, motivations, and impacts of their collective action. By analyzing the mobilization efforts of Bazaaris, light on the socio-political significance of their collective activism and its implications for broader social movements and political change.Bazaaris, as a merchant class, have historically played a pivotal role in the economic life of Middle Eastern societies. They occupy a unique position within the socio-economic landscape, possessing significant economic resources, networks, and influence. However, their role extends beyond economic activities, as they have frequently been engaged in political and social mobilization.

KEYWORDS:

Activism, Bazaar associations, Demonstrations, Economic boycotts, Labor strikes, Leadership, Political influence.

INTRODUCTION

There are "many ways of accessing public life and a multiplicity of public arenas," Fraser notes. Controversial politics are a key route into public life in authoritarian regimes that prohibit the expression of political dissent and aspiration. How should we evaluate the bazaar's political influence and capacity to sway public opinion in light of these factors? I have argued previously that the reorganization of the bazaar's networks has caused a reduction in the ability of bazaaris to organize against the state in recent decades[1].Here, I want to talk about how different facets of space, networks, and publicness interacted during the Pahlavi era to enable collective action by offering a venue for social mobilization repertoires and by facilitating engagement with other publics through various strategies for copresence, trust-building, and sanctioning.Throughout most of the 20th century, the Tehran market served as a crucial location from which to advertise dissension and confront the government. It was a location where meetings occurred, political speeches were made, opposition material was distributed, and political rallies got underway during the tobacco movement, Constitutional Revolution, pro-Mosaddeq movement, and oil nationalization campaign. The market was the focal point of demonstrations in the summer of 1963 against the Shah's White Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini's detention, and conflicts with the military. Additionally, some areas of the bazaar, including the Shaykh Abdol-Hossain Mosque and Chahr Suq-e Bozorg, were the sites of political events in the past and as a result, had symbolic significance[1], [2].

More dramatically, a number of significant spatial routines served as the fuel for these social movements. The Qajar dynasty was successfully overthrown by market closures and strikes in

Tehran, Tabriz, and other towns in the late nineteenth century and during the Constitutional revolution. Tehran bazaaris coordinated over fifty market closures in 1952 and 1953 as a protest against the Shah's policies. In fact, the bazaar's support for Mosaddeq was so strong that bazaaris formed committees to oppose the coup and continued to organize marketplace closures to draw attention to their opposition to the Shah, despite several clerics defecting to the pro-Shah camp, the overthrow of Mosaddeq and his subsequent military trial, as well as the harsh restrictions placed on student activists by the post-coup government[3]. Three months after the coup, the Shah retaliated by banishing a number of the bazaar's organizers, tearing off a portion of the dome's roof, and vandalizing the building's entrances. National bazaar closures to commemorate the 1963 revolt, which was in part sparked by bazaar closures, were organized by activists using nationwide inter- bazaar business networks during the Islamic Revolution. As a consequence, the bazaars in Isfahan, Mashhad, and Tabriz were shut down, while 70% of the shops and offices in the Tehran bazaar remained closed. Closure is effective, particularly at the national level, since it affects the lives of a significant number of Iranians who work in or use the markets and causes economic disruption. Even if one was uninformed of the political commotion in the making, the deserted market delivered a powerful political statement to potential customers, employees, and bystanders.

Closures were often accompanied by bast, or the taking of refuge, another kind of spatial protest. For instance, in 1905, when the governor of Tehran bastioned two important merchants for defying instructions to cut the price of imported sugar, economic disputes between the Qajar dynasty and the merchants reached a boiling point. Hundreds of bazaaris of all ranks, clerics, seminary students, and Western-educated intellectuals sought refuge at a shrine in southern Tehran where they demanded the creation of a House of Justice in response to the Tehran bazaar shutting its shops. In actuality, this incident ignited the Constitutional Revolution[4].

The utilization of the bazaar as the starting place for marches is a last spatial repertoire. This was especially true during the uprisings of 1953 and the revolution of 1979. Bazaari groups backed Mosaddeq in 1952 and 1953 by planning rallies and protests, the majority of which started in the Tehran bazaar and concluded at Baharestan Square in front of the Parliament. Similar to how many protests during the 1978–1979 revolution started near the Tehran market, but often concluded at Tehran University rather than in front of the Majles. The move from the Parliament to the university, which was surrounded by well-known high schools and technical colleges, was a result of the decline of public deliberative institutions during the final two decades of the Pahlavi era, the emergence of a politicized middle class that was largely based in contemporary institutions of higher education, and a northward shift in the city center. These demonstrations made direct linkages between the bazaar and other iconic locations and their burgeoning populations.Political entrepreneurs among the bazaaris were able to aggregate and distribute financial resources by drawing on pre-existing skills in group activities including commercial and religious events. The flawless coordination of the protests, which attracted tens of thousands or perhaps hundreds of thousands of people, depended heavily on mosque organizations and religious circles[5].

Social mobilization was made possible by the bazaar's multidimensional structure, its intersecting networks, and the population density it created. They took this action in part because to the bazaar's placement within the greater economy. Multiple locations around the nation were connected by the bazaar's business linkages to a vast network of relationships involving importers, exporters, wholesalers, brokers, and retailers. Bazaaris and their families had

connections to many different social groups, and because of their socioeconomic status and middle-class values, they were exposed to a wide range of urban publics and ideas, including nationalism, republicanism, Marxist, and Islamist politics[6]. This led to their mobilization or that of others. Additionally, the bazaar's setting encouraged collective activity via copresence. The Tehran bazaar served as a convenient location for public gatherings and political protests since it was a pedestrian area dotted with public meeting spots close to government buildings. The market was a good place for political problems and actions to swiftly spread[7].

It was crucial for two reasons that there was a strong feeling of community and social control over the line between bazaaris and non-bazaaris. First, since bazaaris were quick to spot outside agents and suspicious activity, it helped restrict the capacity of the Shah's secret police to penetrate the bazaar. Second, those members who were reluctant to take part in group action were successfully sanctioned by the bazaaris. For instance, closures often included peer pressure. Store owners who didn't shut in the morning on the day the Society of Merchants, Guilds, and Artisans called for strikes did so in the afternoon. In Amiriyeh, a neighborhood close to the market, a shop owner explained why he hung a portrait of Khomeini in his window to deter shoplifters: "Most people desire an Islamic republic and I want anything that the majority of people desire. Space and active networks during the demonstrations allowed bazaaris to identify, humiliate, and compel non-participants[8]. They also assisted dedicated rebels in reducing free-riding by pleading with and intimidating unenthusiastic store owners.

DISCUSSION

The Withering of Publicness Under the Islamic Republic

The covered marketplace and its immediate surroundings served as the primary physical space and social environment for the maintenance of networks throughout the pre-revolutionary period. The current situation is much different. Commercial networks and many interpersonal relationships increasingly cross-national boundaries and center-periphery linkages in addition to the distinction between the state and the bazaar. Since the revolution, the Islamic Republic has established trade networks that are controlled by and reliant on state institutions and quasi-state entities for financing, trade permits, and subsidized hard currency. Although this kind of clientelism is similar to that of the Pahlavi government in form, it is far more widespread and has a direct influence on the marketplace. Merchants have maneuvered and skirted the bazaar's boundaries in the shadows of this bureaucracy and crony capitalism by taking use of international smuggling networks and moving their assets and affiliations to other locations. The networks of the bazaar have been replaced by the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of commerce[9].

The set of commercial and social relations required to participate in the import, export, and distribution of commercial goods and services have been extended and reconfigured over the past 25 years as a result of a combination of trade regulations, technological advancements, and new national and regional trade entrepôts. Bazaaris now communicate and travel to sites all throughout Tehran, as well as to far-off places in the border areas of Iran and Dubai, a new commercial hub. When discussing the new geographical coherence of the commercial network, my interviews showed a clear age divide. The Shams al-'Amareh and other historical sites in the bazaar region are irrelevant in debates concerning domestic, much alone global, commerce for the generation of merchants who began their trade in the last 20 years. Even from the perspective of the younger bazaaris, the commercial world is divided into "inside" and "outside" the bazaar,

with the difference now being those commercial interactions and relations, or at least the significant ones, span across "the bazaar's borders" and must engage with the world beyond. Younger bazaaris adamantly and correctly insisted that by studying "only the bazaar, one would miss out on the main commerce that was outside the bazaar area."

There are various causes for this decentralization. The communication and spatial organization of the city and the bazaar, and consequently the flow of goods and information through them, as well as its position in the larger economy, have changed as a result of urbanization and the accompanying sprawl and congestion, advancements in communications and transportation, increased levels of industrialization and consumerism, and a rise in literacy and nuclear families. However, these socioeconomic changes are decades old and do not account for the particular development of the bazaar in the 1980s and 1990s. We must investigate post-revolutionary urban and commercial policies and how they have guided and expedited the relocation of the bazaar in the urban environment and economy if we are to have a clearer grasp of the change from concentrated to dispersed value chains. In particular, zoning law modifications and the establishment of free trade zones drew business to areas that were further away from the city's historic center[10]. A new legislation to reduce traffic was passed by the government during the first year after the revolution. In downtown Tehran, encompassing the Tehran Bazaar and its surrounds, a 22-square-kilometer zone was established that needed special licenses for cars and set hours during which vehicles may lawfully drive. Unintentionally, this new method increased the difficulty and cost of both wholesale and retail commerce. As a consequence, a lot of wholesalers opened new locations outside the bazaar area or even migrated to other regions away from the center core. For instance, numerous car-pet exporters recently relocated their warehouses and carpet cleaning facilities to the outside of the city to assure faster transit of products, access to the airport, and routes to the provinces. The Tehran bazaar's locational exclusivity has been broken up in recent years by the emergence of other commercial areas, such as the Shoush Square cluster of new china and glassware stores. Despite concerns from guildsmen, other urban policies, such as the municipality's construction of shopping malls and the funding of different fruit and vegetable markets and chain businesses as a way to raise money for the cash-strapped local government, have only served to strengthen these tendencies.

Another significant governmental effort from the 1990sthe establishment of several free trade zones, special economic zones, and bazaars in Iran's outlying regionshas shifted the role of the Tehran bazaar in the country's economy. As wealth is drawn to these new enclaves, the historical importance of Tehran and the bazaar in trade flows has been diminished. Transnational circuits that operate via three free trade zones in the Persian Gulf, which comprise around fifty border marketplaces, several border cooperatives, and specifically protected areas, are becoming the basis of commercial activity. The prevalence of offshore import-export businesses, both legitimate and illicit, has also changed the function of the bazaar. Many consumer goods enter the country via speed boats that crisscross the Persian Gulf and dock at improvised jetties and unregistered ports, as opposed to coming in through the air and sea ports56; instead of using letters of credit, traders started using import allowances given to Iranians working abroad and tourists returning to the mainland from these zones. Trading firms in Dubai have been the main importers since the start of the revolution and the Iran-Iraq conflict, with merchants in Tehran relegated to dependent customers. Thus, Iran's main business hub is no longer Tehran and its market. Therefore, state policies have aided in and moderated the process of regionalization and globalization.

Entrepreneurial capital has moved to new and unrestricted locationson the outskirts of the city, in Iran's border region, and internationallyin the context of these and other government policies aimed at extending state control over resources for the war effort, securing the postrevolutionary regime, and redistributing wealth. The bazaar's new place in the commercial sector was modest but profoundly significant. A retailer in the china and glassware industry once said, "The distribution of products is like a funnel. Instead of flowing, imports skip and hop via a value chain that starts with importers in Dubai and leads to wholesalers in border markets and free trade zones, arriving at the warehouses and stores of wholesalers and retailers in Tehran, with the bazaar ho-hum. Whereas the narrow stem of the cone used to be in the Tehran bazaar and the funnel distributed goods out to the rest of the country, there are now a whole series of channels and none of them begin in the Tehran bazaar. The shifting of the networks has undermined the Tehran bazaar's dominant position at the level of national commerce. The Tehran-based commercial network no longer includes many merchants in southern Iran. Instead, they directly buy their products from these new international business networks. Shiraz businesses have relocated their trade routes to the Persian Gulf ports in the south and west, Kerman businesses are now focusing on the Pakistani border area in the east and south, and Tabriz merchants are now focusing on the country's northern and western borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. These kinds of socioeconomic ties, which precede the contemporary establishment of a centralized nation-state in Tehran, are in a way being revived.

There are rifts within the bazaari community as a result of the bazaar's decline in the postrevolutionary political economy's hierarchy. Prior to the Islamic Revolution, one's position in the hierarchy, reputation, and connections within the networks of the bazaar contributed to one's economic dominance. This is no longer the case, as has previously been stated. Beyond relationships in Dubai, the key source of business opportunity and prestige is access to governmental resources and elites. As a result, over time, a distinction has been made between those who have remained in the bazaar and have been able to carry on their business in one way or another, and those who have benefited from their kinship and political ties to the postrevolutionary state elite, who enjoy rents in the form of exclusive importing licenses, tax exemptions, subsidized hard currency, and control over procurement boards and industrial establishments. The bazaaris who formed patronage channels utilized them for their own, exclusive purposes rather than as a tool to further the interests of the bazaar as a whole. Despite their ancestry in the bazaar, the merchants who from the beginning had close ties with state institutions and even held posts in ministries and parastatal organizations are no longer referred to as bazaari but rather as dowlat, or citizens of the state. Even elite families that are active in both politics and business, such as the Asgarowladis, Khamoushis, Rafiqdousts, and Hajj-Tarkhanis, fall out of favor with bazaaris because their influence and capacity for conducting business is derived from their privileged standing in the new political system rather than from their roots in the bazaar's system.

It is not unexpected that the physical environment and social dynamics of the Tehran Bazaar have evolved as a result of the bazaar's connections to the commercial sector, the post-revolutionary state, and the urbanization process. While still founded on personal relationships, commercial operations and exchanges happen just as often outside of Tehran as they do within the bazaar, and they spread over many areas that ordinarily don't encourage cross-cutting links or complex relationships. Additionally, meetings and chats with smugglers, heads of ministries, and merchants in Dubai often take place in secret, rather than in public settings, due to the unlawful or exclusive nature of the arrangements. In the process, economic interactions have grown less

in-person and less ingrained in the Tehran bazaar's many social and physical registers. It is now impossible for bazaaris to tell the difference between trustworthy and dishonest people, despite the fact that they formerly maintained strong and weak relationships to identify trustworthy merchants and social outcasts58. At the moment, bazaaris worry that the dishonest are concealed by secrecy while the trustworthy remain private knowledge.

In addition, many of the gathering places for social interaction that allowed bazaaris to share ideas and perspectives have vanished. While there were 3500 coffee shops in Tehran at the beginning of 1979, there were only 900 by 1990. Another aspect of society that has changed is religion. Previously, the coffee shops and restaurants in and around the bazaar were known as places for discussion, rumors, and evaluation. It is challenging to determine whether Iranians are less religious than they were thirty years ago, but evidence suggests that attendance at public religious events and prayers in mosques have decreased.60 This dynamic appears to be present even among bazaaris, who are typically thought to be more devout than other Iranians. Some business owners and their families informed me that they now often take part in neighborhood religious gatherings and organizations rather as those focused on bazaars and guilds. Others, who are aware of how the pulpit is used for political purposes, choose to pray privately at their workplaces and homes and stay away from activities sponsored by Islamic organizations in the market. As a result, the Islamic Republic has lost yet another public area for engaging in social contact and establishing and sustaining relationships. The increased usage of doors and display cases in shops and workplaces reflects the shift away from openness and availability to spatial proximity and unavailability. Many of the bazaar's areas had welcoming storefronts when I started my research on it in 1999, but in recent years, an increasing number of shops have put up doors, glass cases, and other barriers that prevent shoppers from interacting with shopkeepers and peering inside stores. By using this approach, bazaaris have divided the bazaar's open layout and separated their retail areas from the more public passages. The economic and recreational lifestyles of bazaaris do not map onto or reinforce one another as effortlessly as they did in past decades as a consequence of this loss in social and informal intermixing.

As a result, the bazaar's capacity to create a feeling of place for everyone has decreased. In general, the new system's fractured and vertical hierarchies encourage covert relationships and secrets. The perception that the bazaaris' destiny is inextricably linked to the bazaar has been undermined by the more unrestricted competition among them and by new partnerships with other players. The Tehran bazaar's transformation of its relational elements reflects the new logic of state power that has reconfigured the capillaries of power and publicity in the bazaar, according to Foucault, who said that space is a mirror of the process of power.

Under the Islamic Republic, Mobilization is not Permitted

It should come as no surprise that the bazaar's spatial changes have reduced bazaaris' ability to maintain social mobilization. Bazari antistate mobilization has been unusual since the beginning of the revolution, and when it has happened, it hasn't been widespread or long-lasting. In Isfahan, for instance, the bazaar was shut down for a day to protest "unfair" and rising taxes. Protests have also occasionally been brought on by local political disputes. However, these and other instances of public dissent were brief, confined to a single city, and extremely infrequent. Additionally, the activity was limited to a small number of guilds on the few instances when closures and protests occurred in the last several years. Notably, it appears that protests are common in industries like the carpet and jewelry bazaars, which trade in goods that are typical of nonstandard commodities and have relatively close-knit communities. For example, in October

1994, more than 300 jewelers in the Tehran bazaar went on strike for two days to protest the 100-fold increase in taxes on gold. Hand-woven carpet and pet sellers in the Tehran market went on strike in July 1996 and assembled in the Azari mosque, which is formally known as the Shaykh Abd al-Hosayn mosque.

Mosque is notable because it is situated in the center of Tehran's carpet market and because, as its name suggests, the majority of its congregation is Turkish-speaking Azeris, who make up a sizable section of the city's carpet dealers.The bazaar's seeming calm is not the consequence of any concessions made to the government. Contrarily, bazaris have regularly expressed their displeasure with governmental actions. The official guild publication, Asnf, devoted a special issue to a list of the difficulties that the service and commercial sectors are currently facing as a result of recent government policies. Bazaaris have also grown increasingly aloof from the demands of the hardline Islamic associations, neither attending their events nor casting votes for conservative candidates. In fact, during the 2001 presidential elections, many individuals publicly declared their support for the reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami while refraining from casting votes for the conservative candidate. Large images of the current president, who is often linked to the urban middle class, young people, women, and pro-democracy societies, were hung in many caravanserai. One well-known tea trader posted a huge handwritten declaration on his desk stating that he would vote for Khatami on election day. Some business owners displayed placards with the slogans of the reformist party. As a result, the bazaar's public and private areas were used to display political sensibility related to change.

It is hardly unexpected that collective action and mobilization against the state has been fleeting and disorganized, leading to isolated and often ineffective acts, given the reduction in common social space and an increasingly heterogeneous and delocalized set of commercial networks. The fact that demonstrations have only taken place in certain places is indicative of how disjointed value chains are. A broad loss in the bazaaris' sense of place and the capacity of location to foster the kind of collective trust necessary for social mobilization has resulted from such delocalization.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the Bazaaris' mobilization is a powerful force for social and political transformation in the Middle East. Their coordinated activity, motivated by political ambitions and economic resentments, has the ability to impact governmental decisions, undermine established hierarchies, and strengthen larger social movements. Understanding the tactics, causes, and results of the Bazaaris' mobilization offers important new perspectives on the dynamics of group action and the function of the merchant classes in the formation of socio-political environments. The Bazaaris' movement puts conventional political and power systems under pressure. They have negotiating power with state authorities and the ability to demand policy changes thanks to the economic clout and social networks of the bazaaris. As seen by historical examples when Bazaaris were essential in political transitions and revolutions, their action may result in concessions, reforms, or even changes in the balance of governmental power. The mobilization of Bazaaris is not without difficulties, however. The efficacy and longevity of their collective activity might be hampered by repressive governmental reactions, conflicts within the merchant class, and the appropriation of their leadership by political elites. Resilience, strategic relationships, and adaptable strategies are often necessary to overcome these obstacles.

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CHAPTER 13

AN ELABORATION OF THE MEDIATED PUBLICS

Dr. Anita Walia, Assistant Professor, Department of Management,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id- anita@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

Mediated publics refer to the social spaces and interactions that occur through various forms of media and communication technologies. In today's digital age, these mediated publics have become essential channels for information sharing, opinion formation, and collective action.The concept of mediated publics by examining their characteristics, dynamics, and implications. It highlights the transformative role of digital platforms, such as social media, in enabling individuals to engage in public discourse and participate in virtual communities. These platforms provide opportunities for people to express their views, mobilize support for causes, and engage in public debates.

KEYWORDS:

Communication, Digital media, Engagement, Globalization, Information dissemination, Mass media.

INTRODUCTION

The Press and the Public Sphere in Revolutionary Palestine: The "Voice of the People every free Ottoman has a responsibility to educate his uninformed brother about the advantages of the constitution, as we said in our previous essay, and this can only be done via speech and meetings. The newspapers are today's most effective speakers, and following the constitution, they serve as the ears of wants and requirements.It's true that starting newspapers was among the most significant tasks we had to do following the constitution, but which newspapers do I want? Free newspapers with self-improvement as their primary goal the news media serves as the people's voice; it publishes their rights, obligations, demands, aspirations, happiness, and rage. The newspaper educates and elevates the countries by the information it publishes in its articles and through the changes it suggests for the economy, politics, sciences, business, industry, agriculture, and culture. Additionally, it educates the populace about the political climate in other countries, as well as their connections to and relationships with the state and government[1].

Interacting with Various Public Realms

Some academics have come to the conclusion that Ottoman society was characterized by separate and distinct publics divided along confessional or ethnic lines. This conclusion has been influenced by the difficulty of studying an empire that spanned multiple regions, religions, and languages as well as the dominance of regional nationalisms. Indeed, older interpretations of the Ottoman millet system assumed that religious groups' autonomy was a given. Scholars also have a propensity to accept a static view of ethnicity, where "ethnic groups" are not only seen as stable and unchanging but also as having political significance.4 Studies of the former provinces of the

Ottoman Empire have been produced in this style throughout the twentieth century, influenced by Turkish, Balkan, and Arab nationalisms.

Due in large part to the influence of postcolonial studies, which forced academics in the field to reexamine the dynamic relationship between metropole and periphery as well as the state or society nexus in general, Ottoman studies have recently advanced beyond this essentialist interpretation. Particularly, while nationalisms based on ethnolinguistic concerns emerged in both Turkey and the Arab world during the last decade of Ottoman rule and underwent some institutionalization, none had a significant following, appeal, or audience prior to the collapse of the empire. Even the most significant groups in the Arab provinces, like the Decentralization Party and the Beirut Reform Committee, did not strive for total independence from the Ottoman Empire but rather for expanded cultural rights and privileges within the imperial framework[2].

And yet, academic consideration of Ottoman society as a whole remains fairly undeveloped, primarily due to the different languages in use, despite acknowledgement of the limited popularity of local ethnic nationalisms. Newspapers were published, among others, in Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Greek, Armenian, Ladino, Bulgarian, and Hebrew. The broad ties that connect each of these publics have been investigated to varying degrees, but this is mainly unexplored territory. What were the consequences of multilingualism for creating public-ness? For example, a Syrian Christian may have read the Ottoman Turkish, Greek, and Arabic press, or a Sephardi Jew in Palestine might have read the Ladino, Arabic, and Hebrew press. How were these articles positioned in relation to their intended audiences? How did their readers see themselves as imperial, but also confessional, regional, or ethnic members of society?

The interaction between these multiple publics is crucial to comprehending the public sphere as a whole, not only for the Ottoman Empire. Geoff Eley, among other scholars, has maintained that fragmentation is real and, in fact, essential, describing the public sphere as a "field of conflict, contested meanings, and exclusion. While Nancy Fraser distinguished between two types of public spheresstratified and egalitarianfor Fraser, the latter remained the preferred paradigm.The fragmentism camp, according to Harold Mah, ignores "how the public sphere constructs itself as a unitary entity and in doing so mysteriously changes forms." Other people have fought to preserve the Habermasian ideal of a neutral, unitary public sphere. That is to say, the public sphere's status as a place for unrestricted debate serves solely as a necessary precondition for the creation of a collective subject. Mah argues that "abstract individualism," or the removal of all social features from individuals as the price of admission into the contemporary public sphere, is necessary for the universality of the public sphere. According to Mah, the preservation of corporate identities of difference is proof that premodern forms of publicness existed independently of the contemporary public[3].

Mah is right to point out the need to further explore how groups and groupness function in the public realm, but I believe his advocacy of a pure Habermasian interpretation is unduly pessimistic. Instead of just reifying hegemonic universality, we must take into account that the formation and expression of particularistic groupings occurs in opposition to and in conjunction with more universalizing discourses, making the very public nature of this process crucial. The relationship between different clusters and the larger public sphere, according to Craig Calhoun, is not prescriptive but rather variable, specifically in "how it is internally organized, how it maintains its boundaries and relatively greater internal cohesion in relation to the larger public, and whether its separate existence reflects merely all interests, some functional division of labor,

or a felt need for bulwarks against the hegemony of a dominant ideology." This form of study may provide light on the nature, dimensions, dynamics, and interactions of various publics[4].

Late Ottoman Palestine's press serves as a microcosm for examining the creative and contentious process of constructing numerous complementary and rival public selves, including Ottoman, Palestinian, Arab, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim selves. Because of this, the press was important not just for the information contained inside its pages but also for the way it emerged as a key player in the public sphere at a time when the first-person plural"we"was going through a dramatic manifestation and metamorphosis[5].

The civic and communal axes formed the foundation of the post-revolutionary Ottoman public sphere, and their relationship was fundamentally one of "overlapping and interweaving. In some ways, the conflict between the two was creative in nature, a dialectic that is unarticulated and unexplored in Fraser and Eley's conflictual paradigm and is, in Mah's opinion, rendered transitory. On one level, the late Ottoman public sphere aimed to be an Ottomanist and Ottomanizing public sphere that allowed for overlap in membership based on religious, racial, and regional diversity. As they constructed themselves, these particularistic publics then acknowledged the predominance of the civic Ottomanist public sphere.Due in part to the fact that "communal" delineations in the late Ottoman Empire were themselves heterogenous, porous, contextual creations, this process of creating the "we" was dynamic. People might be members of many publics and their participation in these memberships could overlap, which brings to mind Partha Chatterjee's concept of "fuzzy communities. According to Chatterjee, the ambiguity was a sign that one could, obviously and without any contradiction, belong to several not simultaneously but contextually and that a community did not claim to represent or exhaust all the layers of selfhood of its members[6].

The Jerusalem-based Sephardi Hebrew daily ha-Herut utilized the Hebrew term umah to interchangeably refer to a variety of overlapping groups, including the ethno-linguistic, ethno-religious, civic or regional, and civic/imperial. This is only one example of how groupness and we-ness are contextually identified. Similarly, in Arabic, umma and wat. a were at different periods local and imperial, confessional or communal. In Ladino, the terms nacion and pueblo modified numerous communities.In actuality, the "voice of the people" represented a variety of voices. Even while the Ottomanist public sphere depended on the submission of the numerous publics of the empire to its existence and dominion, there was no intrinsic contradiction between the press's Ottomanizing drive and its particularistic push. My intention is to emphasize the process rather than the result in order to highlight the significance of the coexistence and coproduction of both Ottomanist and particularist public spheres to the dynamic process of publicness on the eve of the end of empire. It would be tempting to simplify the late Ottoman situation by arguing that the multiple publics succeeded in drowning out the Ottomanist one, indicating its failure.

DISCUSSION

The Press and Its Public

Due in large part to the rise in education, the independent press, and the role of the city in forming an urban citizenry, the Ottoman Empire experienced the emergence of a public sphere in a number of its centers in the late nineteenth century. However, even prior to the 1908 Revolution, Palestinians had a space for public discourse: official information and public discourse were disseminated via mosque, synagogue, and church, postings on the city walls,

public crier, and Al-Quds al-Sharif/Kudüs erif, the official monthly publication of the Jerusalem province administration, was the sole newspaper published in Palestine at the beginning of the 20th century to serve its mostly Arabic-speaking populace. As a consequence, the Arab literate classes in Palestine depended on either the tightly controlled journals from Damascus, Beirut, and Istanbul, or the uncensored Egyptian press that they obtained through international mail. Despite the government's benign indifference of the non-Muslim printing problem, the situation for Jews living in Palestine was not much better. Judeo-Spanish, Hebrew, Arabic, and other publications were imported from the surrounding area or elsewhere, but only a small number of Hebrew newspapers were published in Palestine. The local press in Palestine, like elsewhere in the empire, exploded with the revolution of 1908 and the subsequent announcement of the restoration of the constitution and repeal of the strict censorship laws[7].

These new publications had an amazing effect. By enlarging both the "public" and its "sphere" of activity, it assisted in the occurrence of an unparalleled change of the Palestinian public sphere during the late Ottoman Empire. First off, the new local press emerged from and addressed itself to the new effendiyya stratathose Muslims, Christians, and Jews who had been educated in the preceding decades under new conditions, were aware of the changes taking place throughout the empire, and were hung up on the changes taking place in Palestine. Before 1908, the "literate consumers" of Palestine were numbered and fairly homogeneous. The media's yearly membership costs were unquestionably affordable for the middle class' independent and salaried members[8].

Furthermore, newspapers were often read aloud and transmitted from hand to hand, as historians Ami Ayalon and Rashid Khalidi have noted. In Palestine, there is evidence of this, most visibly in the form of editorials criticizing the local custom of recycling newspapers among friends, depriving the press of valuable revenue, if not readers. One educated person equipped with a single newspaper copy could transmit its contents to many others, amplifying its impact manifold says. Other measures were implemented in an attempt to include low-income persons as well as rural and illiterate communities. For the benefit of the masses who were illiterate, a proposal was made in the fall of 1908 to establish regular institutionalized reading nights in which a "educated Arab" would read the newspaper in a public space. Additionally, the newspaper Falastin distributed copies of its publication to every village in the area with a population of more than 100 people in an effort to open the paper before the fellahin first of all to provide information about what was happening.

Becoming Citizens of Turkey

Thus, these pioneering journals set about forming Ottoman citizens with a deliberate understanding that their audience was changing and increasing. The Ottoman citizenship effort had two goals: establishing the term "Ottoman" and informing these newly arrived Ottomans of their rights and obligations as citizens. The bilingual Palestinian press discussed the revolution, its immediate effects, as well as the long-term implications and effects of Ottoman citizenship: equality between the empire's religious and ethnic groups, relations between the ruling class and the governed, changes like universal military conscription, and the role of a reformed Ottoman Empire in the international arena. Additionally, as we will see, news articles often detailed good citizenship behaviors.

By consciously adopting pro-Ottomanism, the young publications recognized that the majority of them owed their birth to the favorable political circumstances created by the Young Turk revolt.

The titles of several of the new periodicals, such as Progress, Equity, Liberty, Constitution, The Voice of Ottomanism, and Freedom, deliberately signaled their support for the revolution and its principles. Other publications began with a statement of the editor's intentions, telling their readers that they were committed to helping the empire develop a civic identity that would embrace the revolution's principles on the one hand and move the empire forward toward a glorious future on the other. By doing so, they simultaneously positioned themselves at the vanguard of the Ottomanist and Ottomanizing agenda while reflecting the enthusiasm of the general public in the wake of the revolution. In fact, the press played a significant role in defining and promoting a nascent Ottoman nationalism based on equality among religious and ethnic groups, which was seen as vital at the time. One contemporary observer, the Jewish journalist Nissim Malul, noted that in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the Arab press expressed the belief that the revolution brought "redemption to the Ottoman people in the Ottoman lands, without dif- ference to religion and nationality." Al-Quds editor and publisher Jurji Habib Hanania placed the Ottomanist project at the forefront of his newspaper's goals: "Circumstances require the establishment of a press that will sow the seeds of brotherhood and work together for equality with goals that are service to the homeland, not to take advantage of one another's differences[9].

Other publications that were founded just after the revolution likewise devoted themselves to this endeavor. When Al-Taraqqi was founded in Jaffa in September 1908, it told its readers that its goals were to serve the nation and humanity, enlighten minds, get people ready for economic change while minimizing its negative effects, and support the concepts of equality, justice, and brotherhood.The Palestinian press made a persistent effort to establish and support the "Ottoman nation/people" in order to remove any uncertainty over who the public was and, more significantly, what its relationship was to both itself and the state. The Ottoman country was a completely new creation, shaped by the new age and the constitution, and it was much more than the sum of its components. According to Jerusalem-based lawyer Ragheb al-Imam:

The Ottoman components, who were drawn from many ethnic groups, entered the constitution via its melting pot and emerged as Ottomanism, which connects the hearts and spirits of the country.The newspapers faithfully reported the various protests, speeches, and celebrations that took place in their province as well as in other significant capitals of the empire during the initial chaotic months of the revolution. The revolutionary calendar offered a chance to restate the revolution's goals, accomplishments, and failures when things started to settle into a new political order. Regular chances for the press's educational voice included occasions like the revolution's anniversary celebrations in July, send-offs for departing local legislators, send-offs for conscripted troops from the area, and the inauguration of new province governors.

For instance, a "Ottoman Hebrew" urged his readers to enthusiastically take part in the approaching public festivities on the first anniversary of the revolution. Come one and all for a wide brotherly gathering and enjoy yourself at this time, in these moments, as brothers. This Ottoman anniversary is not a private party celebration, not Christian, not Jewish, and also not Muslim. Brothers from birth and belly, unite yourselves on this holy day in a brotherly connection, clean and pure, and swear vows of faith to the constitution. Shortly after the celebrations, the newspaper al-Quds conveyed the universalizing message of the events to its readers, attempting to reinforce their sentiments with the following image: "Oh what a happy hour if you had seen the youth of the one homeland who are in the different schools standing side by side next to each other. The press routinely released articles, reports, and special booklets with

this objective in mind, focusing in especially on the revolution, the history of the Hamidian era, and the history of the Osman dynasty. One Judeo-Spanish publication, El Liberal, for instance, provided definitions, synonyms, and straightforward explanations of the changes and the constitution while outlining the history of the Ottoman reform movement.

Other initiatives included translating the constitution and significant new laws, reporting on parliamentary proceedings and political developments in the capital, transmitting directives from the central and local governments, instructing citizens on how to conduct routine business with government offices, and covering the operation of various regional and local councils. In addition to building and deepening horizontal linkages across city, homeland, and empire, the press's function as a source of numerous new sorts of information also served as a bridge across languages, communities, and reading publics. The media enabled readers to transcend physical and intellectual barriers that separated cities, villages, and national and international boundaries.

The press took it upon itself to report news from other cities in Palestine, surrounding provinces in the empire, the capital in Istanbul, and even from distant parts of the globe, often via regular columns. Regular columns like "From the Capital" were a mainstay of regional newspapers' coverage, and noteworthy Ottoman cities as well as happenings in remote regions of the empire deserved to be covered often. For instance, major reports on starvation in Anatolia, Bedouin uprisings in Kerak, information on secret organizations in Crete, Albania, the Hawran, and Yemen, the genocide of Armenians, and of course the conflicts in Tripoli and the Balkans were all covered. The Palestinian press and public were able to virtually follow key events taking place throughout the globe as a result of contemporary wire services, which allowed Palestinians to see their future in the empire in "real time" in tandem with the empire's shifting boundaries. Additionally, practically all of the publications employed correspondents in different Palestinian cities, from Acre in the north to Gaza in the south. For instance, the Hebrew publications ha-Herut and Falastin both had a regular segment on local news from Palestine. The Jerusalem-based Al-Munadi journal often published news from southern Palestinian cities including Lydda, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Gaza.

Importantly, local newspapers broadcast news that they believed was essential to the new citizen's exercise of his rights in addition to material they believed would be of interest or benefit to their readers. While feature articles on other Palestinian cities or villages sought to inform readers about a little-known region of the nation, they also hoped to ensure that readers had a common understanding of the subject matter and that they started to "imagine" a common set of spaces and identify with common issues. Lessons were learned from others, comparisons were formed, and discrepancies were noted. The unfamiliar was made familiar and feasible, and people were empowered by knowing that there had been precedent elsewhere. As an example, readers in Jaffa and Jerusalem turned their attention to the other provincial capitals in the empire and demanded a local health council "like in other cities."

The citizenship initiative in late Ottoman Palestine was driven by this feeling of empowermentof the press, though not often of its real audience. The Open Letter as a means of speaking to local officials as well as one's fellow citizens was one of the most significant tools that the press used to "practice citizenship" as a result. These open letters appealed to their readers' sense of reform and critique, and in this way became significant political actors in their own right. The Jerusalem City Council, in particular, received a lot of press scrutiny, criticism, and recommendations.39 Additionally, it also received recommendations from the press.

The press as a gauge of Ottomanism's Bounds

Before 1908 and the emergence of a somewhat open and active public sphere, this role of the press as the "eyes and ears" as well as the interlocutor of different governmental organizations and officials had not been feasible. However, the same principles of cooperation, openness, advocacy, and active citizenry that were essential to "making Ottomans" would also be crucial to highlighting their differences. Newspapers used this to keep tabs on the activities of other groups and communities, to promote and debate a certain image of Ottomanness, and to lawfully enforce those limits. They also translated news articles and editorials from other languages.

The press gives us a window into the emergence and expression of escalating inter-communal antagonism since the Jewish community was not the only one that lamented the flaws of the new age. The inter-communal rivalry of the constitutional era was seen through an Ottomanist prism as opposed to expressing ahistorical religious animosity or economic struggle. In their publications, tensions between the groups could be seen, especially in relation to the new citizenship rights and obligations and the enduring advantages of non-Ottoman people or communities. The rhetoric of a common citizenship and nationhood was contrasted with the far more convoluted reality, as Muslims and non-Muslims both hated their own required contribution to altering the status quo while doubting their neighbor's refusal to do so.

Universal military enlistment serves as the ideal example of this. The Ottoman parliament reversed the previous exemption of non-Muslims from the Ottoman military in 1909 by establishing universal conscription for all Ottomans. The Ottoman military was hailed for its involvement in the revolution and for bringing about change during the surrounding enthusiasm. urriyya, whereas the Ottoman populace was ready to take part in both the rights and obligations of citizenship. In order to Ottomanize the empire's multilingual populations, universal conscription was proposed as a technique of social engineering. Universal conscription was supported in public discourse as a means of distributing the costs of protecting the empire from internal and foreign dangers andmore importantlyputting a stop to the many benefits enjoyed by the non-Muslim groups of the empire.

Support for universal conscription came to be seen as a sign of support for Ottomanism, the empire, and the inclusion of non-Muslims in the new Ottoman body politic in a responsible manner. This was especially true for the Ottoman Jewish communities. It was seen as an honorable service to the Ottoman country and was both a responsibility and a privilege for all people. However, military service quickly became a new metric by which to assess each ethnoreligious community's respective contribution to Ottomanism; in many ways, military conscription was less of a tool for integration than it was a new source of intercommunal conflict.

The conscription problem was a major source of misunderstanding and disinformation, in part because to the ambiguous policy in Istanbul44, and as a consequence, the local press developed as a crucial communication tool for the populace. Numerous articles and announcements about the new legislation, exemption rules, dates for medical tests, call-up notices, and processes were published in the Jewish press. The government established local induction and appeals committees made up of the governor, the local military commander, the head of military conscription, census takers, religious leaders, and lay leaders, placed there "so that no injustice is done and all is carried out according to law" in order to prevent any intercommunal conflicts. Nevertheless, the conscription procedure was cumbersome and ineffective, and it often drew

criticism from the general population for being unjust, ineffective, and exploitative. Many non-Muslim youth were reluctant to join an institution that posed certain health and financial risks, whether through being sent off to quell domestic unrest in Adana, the Hawran, or the Arabian Peninsula, or to defend the empire from foreign attackers in 1911–1913, despite the initial loud declarations of Jewish excitement at serving the homeland. In this case, the press used a dual approach, appealing with Jewish youth not to flee or avoid military service while simultaneously providing a forum for advocating military service as a civic obligation and highlighting the community's allegiance to the Empire[3], [10].

In the words of one Judeo-Spanish newspaper all Ottomans, Muslims and non-Muslims, should enter under the Ottoman flag. The Jewish organization ha-Herut said in May 1909 that "we the Jews were always loyal to our homeland and to our enlightened government, and it is incumbent upon us to fulfill our holy duty especially according to the laws. The publication went on to say that while fresh beginnings are challenging, especially given that the majority of Jewish young men could not speak Arabic or Turkish, Jews must give the last drop of their blood for the good of the homeland. The need to serve in the military was clearly linked to the Ottoman citizenship goal by the Jewish media. Jewish soldiers who volunteered for the Ottoman army were lauded, as were Jewish combatants from the spring 1909 countercoup and even Jews who had been deployed globally.

But as time went on, the Jewish press was forced to acknowledge the Jewish youth's rising resistance throughout Palestine. Even as the initial call-ups and inspections were taking place, a notice published in a neighborhood newspaper urged all young Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Maghrebi, and Yemeni men who were eligible for the draft to visit one Shlomo Eliach's home for guidance on how to improve "their depressing situation." In reality, hundreds of Greater Syrian young and tens of Jewish and Christian youth were fleeing Palestine each week. There were 53 names on the September 1909 lists of eligible non-Muslim males in the Jerusalem region, including over 600 Jews. However, based on recurring news accounts, we are aware that a sizable portion of the called adolescents never turned up when it came time for the actual call-ups.

When the first non-Muslims were ultimately drafted into the army in Istanbul in February 1910, the Palestinian Jewish press got the chance to use the "Jewish pioneers" as role models for the neighborhood's youngsters. One publication observed that the "capital was full of emotion" as individuals from all walks of life flocked to see the over 1,000 non-Muslim conscripts doing their "duty for the homeland." The Jewish and Christian adolescents also demonstrated "equality" in actions, not just words, via their indoctrination. The revolution's promises of equality, fraternity, and a unified Ottoman country were realized that Friday evening as Christian, Jewish, and Muslim troops sat and ate together for the first time.

The Jerusalem-based Christian weekly al-Insaf, however, published an article in the same issue that was translated by ha-Herut, accusing the Jewish community of lying to the local medical inspection committee in order to get exemptions from military duty. The Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire expressed fury in response, pointing to the Jews' profound allegiance to the empire and, more importantly, depending on the newly established rules and rights of the constitutionalist administration to defend them. In a reply piece, "'Otomani" encouraged the Jewish community to sue the daily in accordance with articles 17 and 19 of the new press legislation. As he said in his letter, "I call on every Jew who in his heart has feelings of nationalism and honor that it is a holy duty laid down upon them to prosecute the editor of this paper to either show the truth of his words or to punish according to the law for the honor of the

Jews. The editor of Ha-Herut agreed with him and fired the Arab editor who, in his judgment, was envious of the advancements made by the Jewish community in business, industry, and education. Because they are as devoted to the government as Christians are, if not more so, the government is fully aware of its relationship with Jews.

The chairman of the military inspection committee apparently refuted the claim made by the Christian press that Jews were shirkling when Mendel Kremer, the mukhtee of the Ashkenazi community in Jerusalem, went to him to explain. Ha-Herut's editor urged that formal action be taken to file a libel lawsuit against him via the Society of Ottoman Jews. The editor responded by apologizing and pledging to remove his words in the next edition provided the Jewish community did not bring legal action against him. The newspaper, which had been somewhat appeased, stated that if the editor kept his word, they would forgive him; otherwise, they would demand a lawsuit so that all our haters and enemies will hear, and know that there is an eye that sees, and an ear that hears, and the Jews will go to court over everything.A few days later, ha-Herut stated that al-Insaf had withdrawn its previous charges, stating only that "the notification we issued claiming certain Jewish teenagers placed tobacco in their eyes to trick the physicians is a deception. The Jewish newspaper editors responded by writing that they were delighted that the editor had given their request for a retraction some thought, even if they weren't sure whether he had "seen the truth" or was just afraid of the consequences.

Al-Insaf released a prominent article extolling the Jewish community of the empire in addition to its official retraction, which was translated for its readers by ha-Herut. All the peoples in the vast Ottoman Empire welcomed the constitution with the pleasure, fraternity, and equality that we see on everyone's faces today. If the piece struck the Jewish editors as being disingenuous or sardonic, they kept it a secret. But more than any other group in Turkey, the Israelite umma was known for its spectacular celebrations. On numerous occasions, we saw our Jewish brothers carrying the flag of freedom in the markets and on the streets, and their homes were beautifully decorated with lights and lamps. The joy on their faces urged equality and brotherhood. The constitution that made them equal to the rest of their brothers in the empire, however, was not enough for them, and when the non-Muslim youth were summoned to inspection before the military committee, they marched young and old to the military fortress with joy and excitement to the tents. And it is a miracle that all of the Jewish kids who claimed to be ill at the initial inspection were in fact shown to be ill in front of the physicians and exempted. And the Jews begged to God to make them Ottomans, just like the rest of their brethren.

The conflicts between Jewish and Christian youth in Jerusalem had been temporarily resolved by the time the first ones were drafted in the autumn of 1910. Three thousand Jerusalemites went to the train station for their departure, the military commander spoke about their "duty to the homeland," the military band played patriotic songs, and the cries of the parents, brothers, and children of the departing soldiers rose to the heavens as one. This was depicted as the ideal Ottomanist moment for the induction of the seventeen Christian and eleven Jewish youth. Dear troops, you too! Bring your abilities for the welfare of the state in peace since her tranquility is also your peace. Be brave and powerful, and be as devoted as the sons of warriors to our country and our beloved motherland. In order for your names to be sanctified and for Jerusalem to brag about you, be true to our religion and to our holy Torah, and be with your Ottoman brothers in fraternity and friendship.

Soon after, however, a Christian newspaper that shall remain nameless defamed a Jewish doctor in Jaffa who had volunteered to serve as a military doctor, alleging that he had done so purely for

personal financial gain, against the backdrop of the broader imperial tensions among the empire's constituent groups and the very real strains under which the Ottomanist project was suffering. The "Ottoman Jew" from Jaffa defended himself by blaming "the usual Christian jealousy," saying that the Christians committed this at a time when their physicians were emigrating to Egypt.In the four years between 1910 and 1914, dozens of accusations of mutual recrimination between Jewish, Christian, and Muslim writers, editors, and citizens accused the press of libel or defamation on an individual, communal, and religious level repeated the uneasy hybridity of the Ottomanizing public sphere illustrated in the conscription case. By using the Ottoman judicial system and censor as an arbitrator, Jews, Muslims, and Christians were able to convince the government that their actions were, in contrast to those of their rivals, consistent with Ottomanism. The legal actions against the Palestinian press often focused on this argument for the common good and national unity. Numerous times, Falastin was shut down, once as a result of the governor's belief that it sows discord among the elements of the country. The authorities shut down the publication once again in April 1913 for dividing between the races.

Such a charge was made against the Haifa-based daily al-Karmil by a Jewish publication in Palestine, but al-Karmil responded by making its own claim of anti-Ottomanism. Al-Karmil claims that the purpose of their newspaper's founding was to safeguard human rights, preserve Ottoman unity, prevent assimilation of its peoples, and alert the authorities to the desires of foreign inhabitants. Al-Karmil asserts that the goals of the Jews can only work against the expansion and prosperity of the Ottoman Empire. Ha-Herut was enraged by this portrayal and said, "Enough! Enough of your spreading such news that brings ill tidings to the umah and the state.

The rise of sectarian violence in Palestine during the late Ottoman era was the result of new power dynamics and a shifting imperial terrain rather than reflecting routine intercommunal tensions that may manifest as readily as class conflicts. Jews and Christians both utilized the media to some extent to alienate one another from their Muslim neighbors. Ha-Herut expressed dissatisfaction that Falastin had spread another lie that local Jews were stirring up trouble for the Muslim Rumelian refugees in the wake of the Balkan conflicts. The newspaper said, "Our Muslims here should think about the purpose of these lies." Numerous examples from the late Ottoman Empire demonstrate this contradiction between the process of changing communal borders and imperial ones. Elections to parliament, conflicts with Christian Greece and Italy, and the expansion of the Zionist movement inside Palestine itself all revealed the limitations of Ottomanism as well as the ill-advised juxtaposition of universal and local commitments.

However, there had been a significant revolution in the press's influence, the breadth of its coverage, and its own stated objectives. A civic Ottomanism was promoted, defined, and put into practice through the press. However, it also served as a platform for religious, linguistic, and ethnic groups to advance their own ideas while projecting themselves onto the imperial civic arena. In the end, the press provided a strong voice and platform for the many intellectual, social, and political challenges that civic Ottomanism confronted[4], [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, mediated publics have become potent platforms for dialogue and public participation. They have the potential to promote democratic engagement, provide voice to underrepresented groups, and encourage group action. To guarantee the inclusiveness, dependability, and positive influence on society of these mediated publics, it is important to pay

close attention to the difficulties and inequities that occur within them. Moreover, the impact of mediated publics on the development of social and political environments. It looks at how social movements and online activism have made use of these venues to spread awareness, plan demonstrations, and promote change. Additionally, it looks at how mediated publics affect political processes including election campaigns, policy discussions, and public opinion polling ion.

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CHAPTER 14

SEEKING LIBERTY AND CONSTRUCTING IDENTITIES: ALGERIAN PUBLICS AND SATELLITE TELEVISION

Dr. Urmila Itam, Assistant Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-dr.urmilaitam@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

It examines the role of satellite television in the formation of Algerian publics and the construction of identities within the country. It explores how the advent of satellite television has revolutionized the media landscape and provided a platform for alternative narratives and diverse voices.The historical context of Algeria, including its struggle for independence and the subsequent challenges faced in constructing a national identity. It discusses how satellite television has played a significant role in this process by providing a space for the expression of cultural, linguistic, and political diversity. Through the proliferation of satellite channels, Algerian publics have gained access to a wide range of programming, including news, entertainment, and religious content, allowing for the exploration of different identities and perspectives.

KEYWORDS:

Algerian diaspora, Cultural identity, Diasporic communities, Emancipation, Freedom, Hybridity, Identity politics.

INTRODUCTION

After three decades of monumental history in Algeria, during which disagreement was masked and suppressed by the symbols of the unifying republican brotherhood of specific socialism,Algerians are now aware of class divides and the incapacity of the rentier state. They no longer have a father orientation and are unsure of whether to lament or welcome the passing of a state with a paternalistic outlook. Television has a long history of supporting an ideological discourse that placed a strong emphasis on unity. As long as there were no competing structures, it was a simple process. State television, meanwhile, is becoming worse and worse at maintaining hegemony. Prior to the major budget cutbacks imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund during the 1990s, satellite television first became widely available in the 1980s amid a wave of economic liberalization initiatives. In order to comprehend how satellite television was used as a form of resistance against both the demands of the Islamists and the authoritarianism of the state, I started my study project in Algeria in the middle of the 1990s. Algeria was engulfed in a brutal civil war. The calm bravery of those who knew they may die at any time, who were afraid yet persisted in living, and who continued to watch satellite television, astounded me. This act appeared to embody the concept that life goes on regardless of the circumstances, however naive it may seem to you. Other inquiries into the nature of the connection between the state and society, which at the time I felt was misunderstood, swiftly

followed this notion.4 It was hard to understand how something so socially and politically important could result from regular individuals carrying out regular activities[1]–[3].

The interviews for this study were conducted between 1994 and 2001 in Algeria, mostly in the country's northeastern and central areas. I conducted interviews with 69 participants where is men-37 men and 32 womenfrom varied socio-professional backgrounds. For participants who wanted them or when it was impossible to meet with them one-on-one, I also held three focus groups. After doing fieldwork in Morocco and Tunisia between 2003 and 2006, I have recently extended my study to these countries. These three Maghrib nations are close geographically, historically, and anthropologically despite the distinctions that separate them at the level of political control. Middle Eastern nations should not be confused with the Maghrib. The area is different on several dimensions, including the physical and sociological makeup, colonial past, sizeable Berber community, and most notably, its crucial distance from the Middle East. As a result, even if many Maghribians identify as "Arab" or "Muslim," it is challenging to speak to the Maghrib as a socio-geographic unit or as a region of the Middle East. It is still true that Moroccans will feel they have more in common with Tunisians than with Egyptians despite the displacement of identifications and definitions over the past ten years, during which new forms of "Arabness" and "Muslimness" have developed as a result of the emergence of a politicized movement and new communication technologies.

There are many paradoxes in the broadcasting industry in the three Maghrib nations of North Africa. Despite the existence of a governmental monopoly being claimed in the official records, commercial television networks exist in Tunisia and Morocco. In Algeria, however, private ownership is de facto absent despite de jure acknowledgment. Among other people, Mostefaoui mentions a demonopolization process. Each circumstance affects how the process plays out. The broadcaster was disconnected when the French television station Antenne in Tunisia started to annoy the ruling elite with its prime-time terrestrial trans- missions. On the other hand, the introduction of mini-cable networks in Algeria gave the populace access to satellite channels and the freedom to flout the law. A laissez-faire attitude has contributed to a variety of political considerations, most notably a favorable confluence of forces for "democratic openness," which has been advantageous for viewers. I will only focus on the Algerian experience in this article, despite the fact that the three nations that make up the Maghrib provide a very excellent common site to appreciate the political stakes produced by the introduction of satellite television. This is an illustration of how a new medium has evolved into the focal point around which Algerian society's political and moral perspectives coalesce. Contrarily, the country's civil war has increased the visibility of stakeholder conflict. The political processes at play have not been made simpler by the civil war, but they have most definitely become more obvious as a result.

De facto satellite television access in Algeria was originally orchestrated by the military nomenclatura in the middle of the 1980s, when they built the commercial complex Ryad el Feth in an area of eastern Algiers. The Moudjahid Museum and the Maqam al-Shahid, or Monument to the Martyrs, which were both built in 1984, helped to preserve the history of the Algerian revolution. Satellite dishes were introduced together with the commercial complex since it was built during the period of regime liberalization that was started by President Chadli, even though it was meant to serve the wealthy but was located next to a lower-class area. Later, the middle class living in towns and semi-rural areas began to use satellite dishes. The earliest satellite dishes, or "parabolas," as Algerians refer to them, were so expensive that installing them became a cooperative effort amongst interested parties. Even though individual satellite dishes were

being bought more often by the 1990s' end, the group viewing was an essential one that has to be recorded. There were a lot of "subscribers," and the ownership and administration of the dishes as a whole was revolutionary and enormous[4]–[6].

Let's halt and argue that looking to the past is insufficient to understand how political regimes utilized or responded to satellite television. Instead, we should think about this from an anthropological perspective, concentrating on what people see as meaningful in order to make Algerian satellite TV viewers sensitive and enable them to see themselves as they are. To accomplish this, we must be conscious of the complexity of articulations, including conflicting ones that illuminate the paradoxical practices of actors and those that cast doubt on our guiding theoretical assumptions. This method aids in the rethinking of theory by explaining how public space is changed and remade phenomenologically.

The introduction of satellite television in Algeria prompts the following inquiries: What kind of modernity is produced by it? What impact does it have on public areas? What links does it make between inside and outside spaces? What impact does it have on gender relations? And how does it record the identities and viewer identifications? In order to understand the impact of viewing behaviors on the meaning of the political in a society without a history of democracy, I plan to examine how satellite television affects communal spaces like the neighborhood and take into account its various impacts on gendered actors. An encouraging example is the work of Hann and Dunn on civil society in nonoccidental settings; they demonstrate the necessity to rethink the idea of civil society in light of local realities, such as religion, that challenge conventional ideas of the political. Buchowski claims that anthropologists have helped to broaden the concept of civil society, which now takes into account issues of organizations that are not "necessarily overtly political. Research on the concept of citizenship from, as described by Lucas, is another intriguing current. Democratic societies served as the setting for the investigation. On the other hand, it focused on the behaviors of disadvantaged actors including employees, the jobless, and immigrants. How is politics communicated in situations when there is a lack of voice? "When it is used outside of the moments, instances, and modalities that are thought of as political." Furthering this line of reasoning, Lucas asserts that "there is no longer any civil society, there are civil stakes" and that stakeholders serve as a bridge between civil society and political society. These fields of study and paths of inquiry contribute to a different viewpoint that challenges the vertical nature of structures that are often attributed to the political. Even while the state plays a significant role in politics, it is neither the sole one or the "only source of rights."

These instances are pertinent in this context because the Algerian political system is frequently portrayed as an authoritarian patrimonial system that has enmeshed its tentacles so deeply into society that one is left to wonder if Algerian society even exists or if all that is left is the state, which serves as both the benefactor and the destroyer of a society that no longer exists. The case may be developed further. Separating the two would imply that they have no impact on one another if the state and society are in opposition to one another. We may think about politics in new ways by removing the weight of the "ghost of the state" from our analysis. Daily routines might be thought of as stepping stones to the political.

For quite some time, feminist theory has examined the distinctions between public and private space critically and shown that these distinctions are the products of bourgeois regimes and have been replicated in conceptions of public space, such as those of Habermas and others. These feminist theories emphasize the exclusion of women from public places as a component of bourgeois public space, even while they acknowledge the validity of the idea of a normative

dimension in relation to public space, as Habermas argued. This indicates that the room for intellectual discussion and debate is created by the absence of a place, yet it is clearly not created to vanish.

DISCUSSION

What should one do about the private world that television creates or the potential public places it may create? Because television has been at the vanguard of fostering a feeling of belonging and national cohesion, as well as because the introduction of television has reconstructed the private sphere, many scholars discuss the challenge of sustaining these separations. Does this imply that "home" isn't a private place anymore? Does the home sphere now inhabit a space that is not parallel to the "outside" but rather one that is articulated in relation to it and related to it in many ways as a result of the introduction of a public instrument? Does "mediated publicness" in the setting of non-democratic conditions, in particular, produce publics that are more likely to take action rather than the almost publicsof television audiences? These questions can only have a partial and open-ended response. The first is that there are other media outside television where publicness manifests, and the second is that actors' responses are not political in the sense of a considered set of demands intended to change institutions.

Querrien observes in Un art des centres et des banlieues what Lucas and Neveu note in the case of citizenship: that public space is not a given and that "community does not prefigure public space and does not presuppose agreement as implied by theories of representation, community proposes such an agreement public space is a practice carefully selected, a matter of options. It is a practice of self-recognition and affirmation in the context of a field of possibilities where the guiding principles have not yet been established but will soon be marked. According to Querrien, because of the various actions that develop from the Soviet queue lines over time, they serve as a "minimal public space." We might see the launch of satellite television in Algeria as the creation of a very limited public space from which arise formative moments thanks to an approach that roots public space less in thought and more in action.

In other words, even though everyone can get satellite television, it is structured differently for each person. Viewing habits are influenced by social standing and are used to separate viewers of television shows from one another. Without a predetermined political will to organize themselves collectively, viewers who are intent on expanding their options and finding entertainment focus their organizing efforts on the purchase and management of a satellite dish, opening up new avenues for interpretation and political system critique. The rejection of national television, which was considered obsolete and was seen as the house organ of the ruling class, formed the foundation for satellite television's first success in the middle of the 1980s. All of the Maghrib is true of this. Viewers organize themselves into a tiny public area that becomes an important project for exposing social dynamics and for the documentation of physical places.

Thus, Algerians in the middle of the 1980s were able to see leaders of the Front Islamique du Salut as well as members of the political opposition who were residing in Europe owing to satellite television. After October, the FIS, which already had a strong support base, was denied access to national television, which led to a push for the usage of satellite television. However, if other forms of communication did not support and reinforce these actions, the airing of these opposing voices would be politically meaningless in and of itself. I will keep my comments to the FIS here. At the time, there was scarcely any grassroots backing for other opposition groups. The FIS did not have access to either radio or television throughout this conflict for public space.

It directed some of its efforts toward schools and others toward mosques. The FIS exploited measures that were already in existence, such as the amplified loudspeakers erected in the mosques during the time of "specific socialism." These devices had already changed the physical borders of communities and diverted attention to other locations, such as houses. Preaching by the government imams was increasingly associated with FIS viewpoints. They were sometimes even hijacked by imams whose ideology was similar to the FIS. Sermons spoken at Friday afternoon prayer services may be heard in every nook and cranny of towns and cities, as well as within individual homes. Additionally, audio cassettes were crucial in the spread of FIS doctrine. On market days, authorized sellers sold these cassette cassettes, which were filled with mostly Egyptian prayers and lectures. The chari work, which sometimes conducted from of mosques, was another significant source of funding for the FIS. When it was granted legal party status, the FIS was critical of what it deemed the "unaccep" imitations of French society offered by Radio Chaîne III and cast doubt on the Algerian heritage of its leaders. This appropriation of the technical apparatus of communication, which, in the past, had been the prerogative of the governing powers and which constituted a means of "effecting the materialization of the power of the mosques on the population," became a key tactic of the FIS[7], [8].

Between the time satellite television was in use and the point when it began to symbolize nothing but the Other, the indescribably different, there was a certain qualitative development. This shift from the "justification of ends" to the "justification of values" was particularly evident in February 1992, following the suspension of elections that were expected to produce a FIS victory. As the Islamist movement's ranks were decimated, their ideological position was undermined by speech restrictions, speech restrictions, and a shift in the tone of the international media. As a result, Islamist groups and their supporters became fervent defenders of morality, taking on the establishment. T. Ght is an Arabic word that has just entered the conversation and refers to the idols that, in accordance with conventional Qur'anic readings, must be destroyed. The most vociferous demonstrators made an effort to persuade the populace that satellite dishes were a demonic invention because they caused divisions within the Algerian family. It was believed that young corruption and immorality were spread via satellite dishes. Youth gangs that claimed to be affiliated with the FIS intimidated "subscribers" in an effort to get them to give up their dishes. Slim, a father of four, told me about his encounter. He and his family reside in a housing development outside of a small city that suffered severe civil war destruction. The seeming calm and normalcy of the day in his city is exchanged for terror prompted by the unknowns of the night and its darkness, the time when everyone must return home to abide by the curfew imposed by the state of siege:

The viewers were placed in the heart of the technical conflict between the state and the Islamists as soon as satellite television was given the go-ahead. The bulk of Algerian viewers, however, regarded it as a method of escaping both the authoritarianism of the Islamists and the regime's "la langue de bois." Algerians were able to navigate their modernity thanks to satellite television. In addition to opening up the possibility of redefining the public sphere, this fait accomplithe de facto availability of international television programmingand Algerians' increased ability to disassociate themselves from the prevailing discourses also call into question the idea of the political fact.

Rebukes and Opposition

Algerian audiences migrated in masse to satellite television after realizing they were often misinformed and brainwashed. This is a dual-purpose action, effectively a boycott of Algerian

television, turning away from both national television and Islamist bans. They remark, "It belongs to four or five people," and by that they imply that it is in the hands of a clique, and they do so not just because it is less intriguing, but also because they do not see it to be a "public good." In other words, neither does Algerian television provide people with depictions of who they are nor does it consider their "culture."

This wiping out of the everyday is also felt as a forgetfulness. It seems as though governmental securityor just the long-standing Algerian custom of maintaining secretsmakes people's lives less important than nothing. In 1996, a bomb went off in the middle of my investigation in a little village. Several people were killed and wounded in the blast. Everyone was waiting for a story to air on the nearby television news station. There was general displeasure when TF1, Antenne, Canal Plus, and MBC each gave the story coverage despite the fact that the item was not covered by national television. A few days after the attack, I encountered Adel, a young jobless guy who was still in disbelief over the national news and still shocked:A newscast is often utilized in other nations to show what is occurring there. Algeria, however, is not. Think about the bomb. If only to soothe the families, there need to have been human interest tales about the losses, and a piece shouldn't have taken two days to publish.

Satellite television becomes essential in the face of such a blockage of information, particularly when the official television network attempts to protect the public from the Islamist influence by appropriating it for itself. The Algerian national song and a Qur'anic text are read at the start and the conclusion of each programming day, respectively. The discourses related to midday prayers are televised on national television on Fridays. Youcef, a laboratory worker who I met in one of the eastern Algiers suburbs at the age of 26, commented that while this does not offend viewer sensibilities, it is nevertheless seen as the state using Islam as a political tool:

Prior to now, the religious show on ENTV was broadcast at a set hour, namely 2 p.m. They now change to the call to prayer in the midst of a presentation. Even when a sports broadcast is in the middle and a team is scoring!As previously mentioned, the FIS forbade satellite dishes in a number of areas in a number of cities, and the forbiddance was often enforced with physical force. Certain subscribers had to often disassemble the dishes at the height of the ban between 1993 and 1995 since there was no counter-force, such as the police, army, or gendarmerie, whose presence would have deterred invasions by armed groups. The satellite collectives first complied with orders to destroy the technology, but as time went on, they developed resistance strategies. The answer was less straightforward for those who had a personal satellite dish, as in the example of Hammoud, a professional who resided in a village where armed groups were pervasive:

Already, A of the FIS had threatened us. The dishes had to be taken out. I kept mine hidden. I transferred it to the lower terrace from the top terrace. They are deceitful. They either wait till you are leaving work to murder you or they kill you as you are entering it. The game must be played. They are unable to enact the restriction unless this nation establishes a totalitarian government similar to that of Iran. There are methods even then.The strategies differ for people who jointly own and manage a dish. Young jobless guy Bakir describes the "waves" satellite television brought:

This rather protracted detour prepares the ground for a discussion of the potential factors that may have encouraged the adoption of satellite television by the Smith family. The retreat of males into the home has been one of the most significant transformations, as we have witnessed.

It is important to note that this return is influenced by tactics that, to a foreign spectator, may seem to be highly unsettling in all meanings of the word. The gendered divide of space is so strong that at first glance it seems like the men's withdrawal is against tradition. There are several plans in place to make this seeming violation of tradition palatable. Sometimes agreement is needed for these arrangements between the gendered parties, and other times one or both sides must submit. The parties' own "custom and tradition" which dictates a particular prominence in what is and is viewed for mixed-sex groups, cross-generational groupings, including groupings of the same sex, codifies the shared vision and family viewpoint. The answer seems to be the purchase of several television sets, one for watching national programs and the other for satellite broadcasts, for those who are wealthy and have the appropriate room. Men and women may sometimes watch the same thing separately in order to prevent an embarrassing moment or a nude body from suddenly appearing on TV. Another option is frenetic zapping. Other makeshift arrangements include "turnovers," when one group monitors while the other sleeps. In questionable situations, ladies may also be expelled from the space where others watch television.

Languages or Gender

Many point to the polarization of Algerian citizens into two camps as an explanation for the civil war and the political system's predicament: those who favor Arabic acculturation, who have been neglected by a system that has failed to integrate them, and those who favor French acculturation, whom the system has continued to serve and benefit. The standard explanation for the polarization of the two camps is the language of schooling, which has been Arabic since the 1970s. In reality, Algerian notions of gender inequalities are the true cause of the problem. The way Algerians watch satellite television demonstrates this.

Most of the males interviewed34 made it apparent that they preferred that woman, particularly their sisters, watch national television or other Arab networks when questioned about the watching patterns of men and women on satellite television. The major justification stated for restricting female sex to these options is that, in contrast to Western networks, Arab networks uphold decorum and decency. Few males, particularly those with Arabic educational backgrounds, seem to be drawn to MBC. In addition to providing news and sports coverage, MBC is rated alongside the national network:

Yes, I am aware that Algerian ladies really like Egyptian films, but I myself do not. Rich businessmen and their loves are the subject of the same stories every time. On MBC, that is all there is.

What is it worth? Nothing. Women like it because it has Egyptian movies and fashion news. The remaining entertainment includes Syrian music and two to three movies every day. The only difference between it and our television is that the newscasts are better.

The endless Middle Eastern soap operas that MBC broadcasts undoubtedly contribute to the appeal of the channel for Algerian women, but it also exemplifies what Bourdieu refers to as the "paradox of the doxa," which is the act of neither challenging nor accepting the status quo. This "paradoxical submission" is not always expressed in ways that are amenable to objectification. It is implemented in a way that both men and women find it to be natural. It eventually becomes a part of the natural order. I have cited Bourdieu not because I completely concur with the framework of his analysis of masculine dominance, which seems to me to be entirely situated in the realm of substantial and formal domination and leaves no room for opposition, subterfuge,

and novel practices, but rather because his framework helps us understand how micro practices originating from daily life can be read in the larger context of social structure and how actors justify what is imposed on them.

Let's start by emphasizing that it is not only acceptable but also expected that ladies watch MBC. In light of the actual and potential "danger" offered by the visuals aired by Western networks, female viewers claim to prefer this network. Alongside these regulations, there is another form of universal appropriation by the males of the television sets connected to satellite dishes. After all, and despite all, my female respondents remark "we are Arab" or "we are Muslim" and cannot be subjected to scenarios that may "corrupt our soul." As was said above, as soon as the males get home, either a mixed group watches national television or the ladies are asked to leave. "I have an uncle. Twenty is his age. He settles down and wants us to depart at nine o'clock. This selective appropriation of the object is not only intended to keep women from witnessing the forbidden, but also to shield them from the conductors of knowledgesuch as games and documentariesthat employ the French language. As Hafid, a twenty-year-old student of computer programming, puts it: "All things considered, satellite television has filled the vacuum left by the shortcomings and deficiencies of the school system."

Regarding satellite television, you were posing me questions. Well. It instructs us in French. We study French. I swear, on occasion I sit next to a dictionary when I watch a movie. If a term is used, let's say avare, I check it up right away to find out what it means and discover that it is a mismr or, in traditional Arabic, al-bakhl. The language is being learned by us! The other day, a language-focused program called La route de la fortune aired. It helps us learn a lot. And even when the program is dull or uninteresting, we continue to study French!

Although Hafid was schooled in Arabic, he would never allow his sisters to watch satellite television. Satellite television is not a chance for women to improve their French but rather a threat to social norms. Hijabs should be worn by devout Muslim women, and they should abstain from watching immoral satellite television.

As a result, many people think of satellite television as primarily being for guys, particularly when it comes to European programs. It openly welcomes the foreign and the Other. Women are mostly restricted to the déjà-vu of the Arab networks, which is undoubtedly a conduit for pictures of nude bodies but also for discussion, polemic, criticism, or, to put it simply, "democratic moder- nity." The "umbilical cord" that connects Algerian ideals, Islam, and Arab culture is maintained by women. In this first reading, satellite television's arrival exposes an openly dominating configuration in political discourse where women in Algeria are the exact embodiment of Arab and Muslim ideals.

Similar to the factory's arrival in Algerian space in the 1970s, the arrival of the satellite dish in the home is received with a feeling that it shouldn't change the existing orderby which is understood the ban on women speaking up in public and occupying spaces of power. This ban enables male viewers, whether they speak French or Arabic, to put themselves somewhat at the center of Islamist discourse. Thus, the behaviors associated with watching satellite television engage in a sequential connection with behaviors originating from other public forums for expression and contribute to the development of a discourse that views women as having very little to offer. The creation of a hegemonic and uniform discourse in public space is more important than language itself. Let's look at the instance of al-Jazeera to illustrate the stakes. Al-Jazeera, which has been broadcasting from Qatar since 1996, has distinguished itself via its

coverage of political events, which has angered a number of Arab regimes. Since the second Palestinian uprising in October 2000, al-Jazeera has seen an increase in viewers across the Arab world. Its news bulletins have particularly won over a large number of Algerian men. Al-Jazeera fans often watch in public, unlike viewers of Western networks. For instance, I was at a home appliance shop in Algeria in the summer of 2001. A television set tuned to an al-Jazeera program displayed an interview with a former agent of the Algerian secret service who was now residing in Europe. The tendency has only intensified after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September. Therefore, the gap between men and women is built along political lines.

I admit that in order to properly develop this interpretation, the dynamic character of these practices has to be emphasized in order to demonstrate the complex dominational structure and allow for the analysis to take the singularity of a rising voice into consideration. Have women, particularly those in the Arabic-educated cohorts, once again been disregarded? Will women be able to reject the "symbolic violence" the brotherhood imposes upon them and assert their own voices? In order to demonstrate the intricacy of the differences used to categorize men and women, my answer to these issues will consider two different sorts of arguments. The first is concerned with the "modernity" debate around watching habits, while the second is with television genres. Both arguments are interdependent.

Television is a contemporary technology that women may readily subscribe to, according to a number of female researchers in the area. Thus, Abu-Lughod accuses Egyptian author N. Mahfouz for being sentimental when he sees café meetings dwindling as television takes their place. She specifically points out that he "for-gets that this older form of entertainment, with the imaginary non-local worlds it conjured, was only available to men. Television gives women, the young, and the rural as much access as urban men to stories of other worlds. Television gives women a connection to the public sphere and expands their perspectives. "We have witnessed," claims Hakima, a brave medical professional who works in a modest public clinic 85 miles from Algiers, people who sell their jewels in order to buy a satellite dish. They had prepared. Since watching television allows one to escape the melancholy of the daily, when one turns it on, they see objects and people in action. Examples from satellite television "force national television to broach taboo questions like AIDS" and women are denying the existence of a self, or at the very least, daring to identify the presence of such a self, like this young lady. She remarked: "You know, there was a lady psychologist on MBC who claimed that we Arabs do not feel it when our psyche, al-nafs, is not good. This comment was apparently meant to show a wish for individuation. We solely give thought to our bodily organs. Incest, romantic liaisons, love marriages, and "strong women that prod men into conformance" are just a few of the hidden truths that Brazilian, Mexican, and even Arab soap operas that are aired on satellite and national television disclose.

We need to take into account the word "diversion" in both the sense of amusing distraction and in the sense of detour, deviation, and variation in order to gauge the severity of these disruptions. In fact, people of both genders seek amusement and take up positions of criticism against national television. In reality, if ladies prefer Egyptian films over Algerian ones, it's not because of the plot, but rather the locale, attire, and speech patterns. Egypt is open to women travel without restriction. They are conversant in it. You know that ladies like the bizarre. Foreign soap operas provide women with access to the unusual, which they will manage, adorn, and incorporate into their everyday lives.

Unquestionably, political reporting takes up a significant portion of watching habits, particularly those of males. However, pure amusement is also highly regarded, especially given that, practically speaking, television is the only accessible cultural arena. This vacuum has other causes outside the civil conflict. It started when laws were put into place favoring the business motive at the expense of social and cultural riches. But should entertainment be seen as a singular outlet for the many frustrations brought on by everyday life? Recent research questions the under-theorized distinction between information and entertainment, particularly when looking at how viewers build meaning and how established genres are combined to create what is commonly referred to as infotainment. Talk shows, for example, were long seen as minor genres, but they are now the subject of passionate debate. Many scholars see the talk show as a specific kind of counter-discourse that exists in public life. According to Morley, the emergence of talk shows and dialogic qualities, in which a variety of voices clamor for expression, should instead be viewed as a long-term process that allows those whose voices have historically been silenced by patriarchal and imperialist meta-narratives of modernism to speak out in public[9], [10].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, satellite television has had a profound influence on Algerian society and the creation of national identities. It has given people a place to explore other viewpoints, negotiate group identities, and democratize public debate. To create a balanced and inclusive mediated public sphere in Algeria, consideration must be paid to the difficulties presented by global media influences and the need for inclusive representation. In addition, there are conflicts and tensions that develop inside the mediated publics that satellite television creates. It recognizes the problems of media regulation and control, the impact of multinational media corporations, the possibility for the domination of certain viewpoints, and more. Additionally, it explores how satellite television affects conventional media outlets and regional content generation, emphasizing the necessity to achieve a balance between international influences and regional cultural manifestations.

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CHAPTER 15

MORAL CITIZENSHIP IN MOROCCO'S TECHNOGENIC PUBLIC SPHERE

Dr. Satyajeet Nanda, Associate Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-dr.satyajeetnanda@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

The abstract begins by discussing the notion of moral citizenship, which refers to the ethical dimensions of civic engagement and the responsibilities individuals have towards their community and society as a whole. It highlights the importance of moral values such as integrity, empathy, and social justice in fostering a sense of citizenship and collective responsibility. Furthermore, the concept of the technogenic public sphere, which represents the intersection of technology and public discourse. It explores how digital platforms, social media, and online communities have transformed the way information is disseminated, opinions are expressed, and social interactions occur. These technological advancements have provided new avenues for public engagement and have influenced the construction of moral norms and values in Moroccan society.

KEYWORDS:

Activism, Citizenship, Digital media, Ethics, Internet activism, Moral agency, Participation.

INTRODUCTION

Identity, which shows the status of the public space in issue, is without a doubt one of the clearest lenses through which to see the intricacy of changing alliances created by satellite television. What does the topic of identity gain from satellite television? It is definitely not a totalizing mechanism that immediately wins over people's support on its own. As we have seen, different individuals and political parties manipulate and relocate satellite television. In the case of Algeria, it is difficult to get around the problem of how its history has been colonized by a single, powerful memorythe historical significance of the FLNthrough a process of mythologizing that borders on fossilization. National television has played a significant part in this process. Viewers look for distraction because of that past[1]. Both "the truth" and what the participants refer to as "Algerian culture" are represented by that history, and they wish to move away from it:

Previously, it served as the official newspaper of the government and the El Moudjahid regime. From sunrise to sunset, FLN television was used to indoctrinate people. They were unsuccessful! On our television, which is also very supportive of the FLN, there is too much censorship. I'll be honest with you; I don't watch it myself, not even for newscasts. Enough is enough. We anticipate that they will start with the president and his small group of aides[2].

Monumental history and ossified history don't appear to have the same hold on the public's attention as they formerly did. Everybody now has the right to investigate history thanks to emerging and parallel histories. A nationalist feeling exists. It's inborn. It was not encouraged by the FLN. Every Algerian has this attitude instilled in them. When summer arrives, they realize that France is their country, no matter how incredibly happy they are there[3].

The "Algerian culture" is provided in the examples national television gives of the "daily life of the people," with "their dress, their songs, their art"; this identification is with a reality that is tied to a given territory in a country where the history of the everyday does not weigh as heavily as the grandiose past and present of the FLN. There is a link to location and region, which is not to suggest that it is no longer a "kaleidoscope of uns identities and transpositions". However, as other academics have pointed out, this association should not be essentialized. If, as Massey claims, "the definition of the specificity of the local place cannot be made through counter position against what lies outside; rather it must be precisely made through the particularity of the interrelations with the outside," then it is appropriate to think of the relationship between identity and territory through "an extroverted notion of identity of place."48 The Other, or the outside world, has an impact on the identification processes as well. It is obvious that language is like this. The Arab language was adopted as the nation's "against others" language as a means of coping with colonialism; the French, Algerian, Arabic, and Berber languages were once again exiled[4].

The study's participants do not dispute the status of Arabic as a language. They assert that "We need a language" and "We cannot enable television speakers to substitute "el vilou" for "bicycle," "el automobile," or "l'icoole." However, they do believe that there shouldn't just be one language dominating the radio. Ironically, they are more interested in promoting educational change than they are in promoting the vernacular. They hold the opinion that the Arabic language is not "a scientific language" nor "a technological language," nor is it a language that is accessible to the rest of the world. The satellite dish makes up for this deficiency and draws Algerians closer to France, their "neighbor." Regarding France, the Other par excellencethe Other who is not just an insurmountable difference but also an alter egoan inherent ambiguity, even a "kaleidoscope of uns identities" develops. This is not an instance of the "partial identities" that emerge when a framework for social organization, such as the state, the family, or the clan, is either missing or insufficient.51 Instead, it is an ambivalence that is built in a strong and twofold feeling of belonging, despite the fact that Algeria has confined the French language to the periphery via its direct-action initiatives. France has also contributed significantly to Algeria's move toward Arabicization and Islamist ideologies[5].

For Algerians, the visa's imposition by France forced them to leave the country, where the Europeans were forced to set out new ways. Youth turned their attention away from the Middle East, Syria, Egypt, and the Sudan. They introduced Sudanese and Afghani traditions to us. We weren't used to these traditions.As a result, France serves as Algerians' alter ego and mirror as they almost compulsively wonder "how is speaking about us, how it sees us," even if "we know about every political event that takes place in France." This mirror function is concerned with the worldwide exposure of the Algerian drama as well as parallels between France and Algeria. Algeria only becomes visible thanks to the pictures that are broadcast from France. However, it is a troublesome visibility since the French gaze is seen unfavorably. France's accusations that it "knows nothing about Algeria" are false[6].

They sometimes propagate false information, as I already said to you. We have 130 years of hostility between us. That cannot just be forgotten in a week or a few years. Time must pass naturally. It's typical! They won't go to the voting place with 10,000 voters, but they will go to one with only two men.Viewers of satellite television have the chance to take a critical step back, compare their own lived experiences to those of other communities, and rewrite other histories. The discussion refers to "that other great repressed thought of the 20th century in France, which is that of colonialism and particularly the war in Algeria. Grand Guillaume contends that the deep connection between Algeria and France relates to a long-buried memory and a long-suppressed view of how events unfolded. The long and challenging process of giving material traces meaning, however, has started with the growing debate about torture in France. It has been discussed in the Algerian press, and it has received extensive coverage on French networks. By discussing the subject openly, Algerians who were tortured by Le Pen during the conflict were able to come forward and provide testimony as well as provide responses to the photographs being circulated elsewhere. This has also helped the French to avoid buying the FLN's narrative[7].

France, sometimes known as our saboteur, is an example. France is the example through which a political affiliation is conceivable, despite the gaps in its memory, its unhealthy connection to the zones of its past and despite the presenters of its past. Political affiliation is most often selected, although cultural identification is uncertain and swings between poles of attraction and repulsion. The prospects for political education that satellite television offers, as well as the openings it generates in the national public space by connecting this space with other secure public spaces, are topics I have covered in other places. When someone watches satellite television, their personal experiences are projected onto those of other individuals. France provides the potential for conceiving a democratic future, a future that Algerians briefly saw between 1988 and 1992. France is like the thread emerging from the labyrinth[8].

I can see France. It is a model nation in my opinion. It is a nation that has grown stronger as a result of its democratic traditions. It is a nation where laws are in place and no one is exempt from them, not even generals or presidents. We saw the arrest of a CEO by the police and the imprisonment of ministers. That doesn't take place in our nation. It may be just over here. France is a role model in this area. The law is equal for all people. The president's adviser at the moment is a flan’s son. The moment such boys graduate from the ENA, they are immediately sent overseas as ambassadors, in contrast to the sons of losers who must first compete to enter the ENA and who end up working as paper pushers in a daira or wilya. And Ali Kafi's son works as a government counselor!58 What a miserable person, fresh out of college, first degree in hand, all new and shining, with no history or experience, and voila, he gets a job as the prime minister's adviser. The story was covered by the media. We learned owing to the media, particularly Liberté.

DISCUSSION

Technology is a gift from Allah to the people. God offers another item to benefit others if you create anything with what He has given you. This process continues until technology matures into the state it is in today. Before, people found it hard to believe that an aircraft was in the air; today, just look. What have you got? Every day, there are individuals flying constantly. similar to vehicles and other items. People are now becoming used to technological advancements.In order to take advantage of the many opportunities for success that new technologies provide, we must equip our nation with the ability to use them. This would provide our magnificent people the

assurance they need to grow and integrate with the global economy, giving Morocco the ability to take its position in a world being revolutionized by the digital revolution[9].

Morocco's government has been working diligently over the last fifteen years to transform the Muslim African country into a information society akin to a contemporary state in the twenty-first century. Morocco's information society has undergone extensive bureaucratic reforms as a national initiative and received a modest amount of new financial investment. The initiative has also accelerated the development of the nation's satellite-connected public sphere. This investigates how such a major project's consequences are felt locally, in the everyday places of living. I contend that although emerging technologies have an influence on how social space is produced, Muslim Morocco's situated moral understandings also have an effect on how new technologies are perceived. We'll look at how moral presumptionswhich set the standards and expectations for social behavior in the public sphereare both influenced by and affected by the institutionalization of new information and communication technologies. This article covers what I refer to as the "technogenic" trend in Morocco based on interviews, participant observation, and document study. In the paragraphs that follow, I assess Moroccans' attitudes about emerging technologies and outline the government's initiatives to foster the growth of the ICT sector. I first contextualize the context in which the ICT industry is expanding before providing a detailed account of how communication tools like the World Wide Web, instant messaging, and chat rooms are used in local social practices by focusing on the proliferation of cybercafés in Casablanca, Morocco's commercial hub. The next section compares social customs at cybercafés to those prevalent in traditional Moroccan cafés. The contrasts between the more traditional and modern forms of public space express the technological character of contemporary public life in metropolitan Morocco. As we will demonstrate, the ways in which social actors in the public domain perceive and locate new technological instruments are influenced by contemporary attitudes on technology[10].

Aiming to comprehend the public domain from a placed perspective

Although universal in principle, the public realm is entangled with the routine activities of communal life. Individual subjects are a necessary mediator between the experiences of cultural identification at work and the construction and reification of particularized societal values. The work of develops the Habermasian paradigm but makes a critical intervention by promoting a "historically situated morality against an abstract universal morality. This viewpoint is cited by Habermas as an interpretative mistake. However, Benhabib's conviction that public spheres are located offers us the analytical compass we need to effectively interact with the present realities of modern Muslim publics. By concentrating on the situated character of daily life, we must be able to comprehend the subtleties, justifications, and understandings that define the diverse identities of people who inhabit the public sphere. Benhabib emphasizes the civic body's moral conscience and contends that the public sphere's negotiated sociality is located in political and hence inevitably historic space, the shape of which is defined by practices and actions:

The civic practices and associations of a society, in which people face one another as public agents in a political space, lie between the basic institutions of a polity, embodying principles of the morally right, and the domain of moral interactions in the real world, in which virtue frequently comes to the fore.The multidisciplinary work of researchers interested in modernization programs whose realizations public spheres arise reflects the focus in feminist critical theory on historically situated publics whose moral ideas adhere differently in certain cultural and political circumstances. According to academics, modernization is best understood

as localized processes that are influenced by power discourses. This chapter builds on such studies and contributes to a corpus of work that is increasingly concerned with the moral terrains' experiential nature and how it affects and shapes national and local social change projects including Muslim social actors.

Within the public domain, citizens exist as distinct identities distinguished by categories like status, gender, and class. We must consider how the right to speak and participate in public is conferred or denied to such marked bodies. The creation of the public sphere requires both the direct pursuit of institutional democracy and the growth of an approachable and participatory ethos; thus, it is imperative that we comprehend the extent to which ordinary activities may be political actions. This combination creates the framework for the development of an equitable social body. Along with the freedom to vote, citizens must also be able to engage in conversations that foster public discourse and create an informed public. Even though there aren't many cybercafés compared to other kinds of public spaces, they provide a vital new route for equitable access to emerging forms of communication and open information flows.

In Morocco, public opinion and moral evaluation of technology

A guy called Hajj 'Abd el- Khabir is the first epigraph's speaker. Hajj, a revered landowner and patriarch, was born in Agadir, in the south of Morocco, but has spent the last forty of his sixty-seven years in Casablanca. Other males and the right family members refer to him as Hajj or Hajji since he performed the hajj to Mecca. Just two weeks before the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, we first met in a French-style salon de thé that Hajj runs in the Maarif neighborhood of the city. The next year, Hajj and I became close, and I was often asked to his house for tea or supper while being surrounded by his wife, kids, and grandkids. Hajj, like many other Moroccans I met with in the first year of what Americans now refer to as the "War on Terror," was very worried about how Morocco would be seen as an African-Arab Muslim country in a post-9/11 world. It was crucial to figure out how to successfully compete in a global market when an American- and British-led war on Arab terrorists was taking place. The question of how to preserve strong indications of a "Muslim Moroccan" identity while welcoming modernization and economic prosperity, however, was inexorably framed by another urgent worry[11].

Hajj's viewpoint on technology is a concise reflection of a Moroccan stance I regularly overheard. I was surprised by their shared perception of technical instruments as moralized objects during conversations with underemployed college graduates, stay-at-home moms, renowned professionals, and ignorant members of the working poor. According to them, technology is a means through which Allah imparts knowledge to humanity. In the summer of 2007, I visited Morocco once again, and I heard the same things. For instance, three seniors in their 60s chatted at long about the advantages of technology at a rural wedding in the north of Morocco. Technology aids in the expansion of Islam, and the more we use it to do so, the more innovations we will have in the future, as one individual put it. This emotion is supported by a moral framework for technology. A gift of insight to create anything is given to a good and considerate person; if this innovation is employed wisely and intelligently, it will result in the creation of new inventions. Technology, when seen as the result of reason, is a powerful tool for any thinking individual who also happens to be moral. This is significant because it allows for the assertion that inventions are authentic to Muslim Moroccan culture rather than being alien or foreign. Immoral actions are seen as exotic habits in Morocco. People who use modern technology are not seen as cultural traitors in the contemporary Moroccan environment. It is not

considered acting French or imitating Americans to use a mobile phone or a computer in the same way that coq au vin and blue jeans are.

It became clear to me while doing research in Casablanca that the public in Morocco views technology as a means of achieving social and economic advancement. Technology had a significant role in how people saw the future of their country. We welcome modernization in Morocco, as one interviewee expressed it. This is a result of our lack of fear of unconventional thinking. We encourage innovation. Technology is a good thing. We recognize the value of this kind of change, but we also recognize its limitations. According to the individuals I spoke with, the technology sector offers Morocco the opportunity to compete economically on a global scale while preserving its own cultural identity. This viewpoint emphasizes the progress the monarchy has made in its initiative to enhance ICT's social and economic significance in Morocco. The drive to promote technology has encountered no discernible opposition, in contrast to previous reform initiatives that the Royaume has supported that have run into popular opposition. Public opposition has in the past significantly reduced or effectively stopped previous national initiatives.

Zone of construction constructing a country-wide ICT infrastructure

The transition of Morocco to an information society is anticipated to be completed in the year 2010 according to official publications and speeches. Morocco's goal of ten million "Internauts" by 2010 may or may not be achieved. However, it is evident that the government has actively sought the creation of a robust ICT infrastructure using a variety of platforms. The creation of a regulatory body and legislative changes have been important facets of the overall national agenda. The historic Post Office and telecoms Act was finally approved in 1997 after years of discussion, essentially establishing a legislative foundation for the liberalization and commercial expansion of the telecoms industry. The outstanding 100 percent digital network of the country would be enhanced under the Act. The Regermination des Telecommunications, which began operations in March 1998, was also required to be established under the Act. The Secretariat de la Poste des Telecommunications et des Technologies de information was established when the Post and Telecommunications ministry was reorganized.

The vigorous drive by the Moroccan government to liberalize the telecommunications industry has resulted in the transformation of the once-state-run monopoly on communication utilities into a privatized competitive market. Hard labor and contentious discussion resulted in a legislative reform that gave Morocco its first successful license tender in the middle of the summer of 1999. The private partnership Medi Telecom purchased a GSM operating license for $1.1 billion16, making it the most valuable GSM license ever granted in a poor country. The final offer price was only one indicator of the tender's success; another was how transparent the selection procedure was. Meditel's acceptance of the license as a transnational corporation was also a significant indicator to Moroccans of the nation-state's ambitions to take part in a global economic framework on the path to privatization.

By selling 35% of the privately owned phone utility firm in 2000, Morocco's telecommunications sector moved even farther into the realm of privatization. The government received about $2.3 billion from the sale of its shares to Vivendi Universal. In spite of disagreements about Vivendi's role in influencing the national market, the operator, now known as Maroc Telecom, has emerged as a powerful symbol in the country's discourse about successful market liberalization. The expansion of international ICT firms operating in Morocco, such as

Siemens, Hewlett Packard, Oracle, Dell, and Microsoft, has contributed to the sector's process of privatization. Beyond the signing of lucrative financial agreements, effective and open supervision was also necessary for the sector's successful privatization. In this regard, the ANRT has proved essential to maintaining the dependability of the licensing and sales processes.

Overall, four key factorsdemocracy, market liberalization, strategic government planning, and pro-development public opinionare responsible for Morocco's ICT advances. ICT in Morocco has mostly only been examined so far in terms of its contribution to improving the nation's political and economic standing. Despite the fact that prognosticators and optimistic observers have sought to highlight ICT in Morocco as a tool for electoral democracy or as a catalyst for economic progress, the reality is that for the time being, its power lies elsewhere, on the moral ground of everyday life.

The government has made some effort to offer residents with access to daily bureaucratic operations online and to provide national agencies a presence on the web. However, it will undoubtedly be a while before Moroccans utilize the Internet to complete government paperwork or to find out more than just who to contact at the many bureaucratic entities. People certainly use the Internet to collect political information, but its application to actual, legal political activity is yet unexplored. Few political parties maintain active websites, and neither independent party-political speeches nor party information updates are easily available online. Even if these things were easily available online, just little more than four million individuals out of a population of about thirty-three million actually utilize the internet[5], [6].

Given the average annual family income of $1,300, the biggest barrier to the adoption of new computer technology in Morocco continues to be the high cost of computer ownership and Internet connectivity. The target of 10 million Internet users has still not been reached, despite the fact that the number of Internet users increased from four hundred thousand in 2001 to over four million in 2007. The number of individuals using mobile phones has increased to over twelve million. Due to the comparatively inexpensive cost of buying a cellphone and phone minutes on paper or plastic cards with scratch-offs for access numbers, mobile phones are now a very familiar sight in Moroccan cities. However, the nation's technology industry has generally done badly, suffering from severe losses after the dot-com crash of 2001. As of this writing in 2007, the entire market is still growing slowly, which also reflects the industry's general downturn on a worldwide scale. Gains from the technology industry in Morocco continue to account for less than 4% of the country's yearly GDP, making them a minuscule part of the country's overall financial stability. However, the monarchy's focus on the growth of the technological industry has had a considerable impact. Additionally, they are far more obvious than can be determined just by business margins and strictly numerical measures of political engagement.

Les cybers, Café Casablanca

Franz Fanon contends that the ways in which people occupy space in the public sphere are early indicators of broader social change in his ground-breaking analysis of colonial North Africa.24 Fanon's work gives us a history of the role played by cafés as meeting places and locations of cultural and political information exchange in colonial Algeria. Habermas's depiction of the historical function of public cafés and salons as incubators of the eighteenth-century European bourgeois public sphere chimes with Fanon's definition of cafés as important nodes of public social life:

New institutions that, despite their diversity, assumed the same social roles as old ones strengthened the dominance of the "town": the salons between the regency and revolution and the coffeehouses in their heyday between 1680 and 1730 served as hubs of criticism, initially literary and then political.Another instance of cafés serving as hubs for social reconfiguration can be found in the Moroccan Muslim population of the twenty-first century. The high cost of dial-up connections combined with the high cost of personal computers has prevented the development of a home-based information nation. Les cybers, as the Moroccan cybercafés are known, are places for public recreation and are comparable to the conventional cafés that came before them on the cityscape. However, their clientele is quite different from that of their forebears. During the day, there are about an equal number of men and women at cybercafés. Women account for fewer than 10% of customers in traditional cafés, and they are completely absent from the hundreds of establishments that are classified as les cafés populaires. It's vital to provide a brief outline of the activities happening in these Net-connected areas before discussing the ramifications of such a dramatic differentiation. The placement of cybercafés within the wider network of Casablanca's older cafés and tea salons will next be discussed. This is necessary in order to properly comprehend the importance of activities like chatting, browsing, and emailing.

The tourist regions close to the old medina and the business sectors of Maarif and Gauthier in Casablanca have the largest concentration of cybercafés. The city's poorest neighborhoods, the quartiers populaires, also have cybercafés beside markets and residential enclaves. In contrast, one probably has to travel to locate an internet site in exclusive residential areas like Polo and L'Oasis. This is caused, in my opinion, by two things. One reason is that people in the top stratum can afford both home computers and dial-up Internet connection, which reduces the demand for cybercafés. The second factor might be that public interest locations are more likely to be dispersed across longer distances in these places since urban planning methods there presume residents possess cars.

The fact that cybercafés can be found all across Casablanca is an indication of their growing popularity with the general people. Cybers are seen in a range of building styles since they are a part of the city's rich architectural past. The refurbished old shops are where one may find the most noticeable cybercafé spaces to passersby. However, the majority of the city's cybercafés are found on the second or third floors of buildings with a mix of business and residential uses. These websites provide an intriguing kind of virtual home experience since the setting is reminiscent of an apartment's interior design. Tourists may find a few sites to connect in guidebooks, but locals are aware of the locations of many additional cybers hidden in mixed-use buildings around the city's districts thanks to word-of-mouth.

There are several interior characteristics that all cybercafés in Casablanca have in common, although each one's design is unique to the sort of location it is in. Bright fluorescent lighting that evokes a sterile setting similar to what one would find in a university computer lab is often used in storefront cybers and those in recently refurbished residential buildings. Other cybers, located in renovated subterranean garages or separate structures, often include mood lighting, which creates a lounge atmosphere more analogous to the relaxed ambiance of conventional coffeehouses. Nearly all cybercafés have signage displaying their operating hours and the cost of services. An Internaut may discover the price per half hour or per hour 31 and the price penalty for going five minutes beyond a half or full hour of usage by glancing at a sign on the wall, which is different from the usual in conventional coffeehouses where hours of operation are seldom specified.

The furnishings in cybers are often evocative of professional school computer facilities or office buildings with little cubicle dividers installed on desks. Chairs are famously uncomfortable since they sometimes have no padding at all. There isn't much else furniture than computers, desks, and chairs. The majority of cybers feature soda machines, and some also have vending machines that pour hot beverages like Nescafé cappuccinos and lattes into Styrofoam cups, despite the fact that cybers lack staffed coffee shops. None of the cybers I visited offered any of the drinks or snacks that are available in regular cafés.

The Internauts, who interact with one another as much as they do the computers in front of them, buoy the mood of the cybers despite its appearance of sterility. Despite spending at least half of their café time looking ahead at computer displays, cybercafé patrons engage in a lot of socializing. Cybercafé patrons often arrive in couples or groups. It is not unusual to see two or three individuals using the same station to access different internet experiences and activities. Users engage in extensive user interaction in these situations. There is a little less engagement when friends are seated at different terminals, but regular, unofficial conversations still happen. On-site users converse while playing online games and exchanging knowledge on how to utilize applications and tools. Cyberspace is alive with the sounds of communication as lively people speak with their nearby neighbors or with distant pals they are digitally connected to, as opposed to rooms full of Internauts gazing at screens in silence.

I performed a public opinion poll in addition to documenting user behaviors and interviewing Casablanca-based Internauts. The study was conducted over the course of four months in 2001 with the kind assistance of Casablancan research assistants. People were given survey sheets at twelve predetermined spots across the city. Cybercafés in various socioeconomic areas made up six of the sites. The other six locations were public locations without computers, including tele-boutiques, hair salons, and conventional cafés, chosen by my study assistant Mohammad Iggouch. By collecting poll data from both "wired" and "unwired" sites, it was possible to keep the "public" definition of Moroccan citizens rather than Moroccan Internet users. Two hundred and ten survey forms were completed in total. The surveys provide us a thorough picture of the activities taking place in cyberspace when combined with other types of field data.

The majority of survey participants who use the Internet while online do so for a variety of activities, including online chatting, email, dating, reading the news, browsing the web, and connected gaming. The average Moroccan Internet user has learnt to take advantage of the protracted downtime brought on by very poor network connections. The user will go to one of the many open sites on the desktop while a page loads its content, whether they be other Internet pages or desktop applications like Microsoft Word and Excel. By multitasking, Internet users may get the most of the connection minutes they pay for. Students might be seen working on their coursework in one window while conversing in another.

Moroccan Internet users participate in social interactions on a local, regional, and international scale when they connect to the online world. One sign of ICT's capacity to rearrange the communicative flow of regional, national, and global information into and out of a localized public sphere is the popularity of reading open-access news stories online. 64 percent of individuals asked said they regularly communicate with friends and family who reside overseas. The amount of Internet users connecting with persons in Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, France, and the United States online is reflected in national data on the countries that Moroccan immigrants choose as their destinations. This is a technique to start or continue ties for business, friendship, and romance in addition to keeping in contact with Moroccans who have emigrated.

In the same way that the virtual world encourages communication among social actors situated all over the world, it also supports novel kinds of interactions amongst those same social actors. Cybercafés in Casablanca have evolved into places where individuals may mingle with other city residents in a variety of ways. As previously indicated, Internet users often bring friends when they visit cybercafés. For younger cyber users in particular, cybers serve as a gathering place. Students at the city's colleges and upper-level elementary schools meet for study sessions in cybercafés more often. In addition to interacting with one another, students often share talents during visits, assisting one another with anything from software programs to language translations.

Dating and gaming are two additional significant socializing activities that arise from onsite meet-ups and deserve a quick look. I had been in the field for a little over a month when I started to pay attention to this phenomenon. A growing number of cybers offer dedicated stations for action games, and during my field research, it was becoming quite popular among young men to rendezvous in cybercafés for the purpose of competing in networked gaming. A few days after September 11, 2001, I was sending email to friends and relatives in New York City while seated at a personal terminal on a Casablanca cyber network called Twin's Net. Someone shouted, "Osama!" out of nowhere. Osama!!!" and made machine gun-firing noises in imitation. In a military-style online "shooter" game where players start with machine guns and receive extra weapons by killing terrorists in the open, the person shouting has just shot the terrorist. Players use these points to buy more ammunition and weaponry and to win the game. Osama bin Laden had a big bounty set on his head after the 9/11 attacks, so Moroccan gamers made the joke that they had slain the online "Osama" and were thus entitled to the reward money right away. A surprising scenario of dissonance is created when real-world events and virtual games collide, with young Muslim guys having fun pretending to be American soldiers and executing fictitious Arab terrorists.

The only section of cybercafés with gender segregation is the gaming room. Men and women may be seen sitting side by side in sections with the traditional cubicles, however the gaming area is completely male. However, during the hours of mid-morning and late-afternoon, when many of the young men who make up the gaming groups are at school, both men and women utilize the gaming groups for a different activity: making Internet calls. Calling friends via the Internet at cybercafés is now feasible thanks to the development of programs like Skype. Only a few cybers had Skype installed when I did research there in 2001–2002. However, by the time I returned in the summer of 2007, almost every website I visited had installed Skype on its computer desktops and offered headsets for multimedia usage. Since Skype is far less costly than using a mobile or fixed line, several individuals use it to call friends inside the same city instead of long distance.

The term "onsite cyberdating" refers to a common method of public dating in Casablanca when two individuals get together at a cybercafé for the goal of seeing one other even if they are not seated next to each other. Instead, they are spread out throughout the room's terminal points. During these in-person encounters, a couple is free to communicate in private chat rooms with computers. Over 65 percent of the population in Morocco is under the age of as a result of the country's fast population increase. This reality, in addition to the widespread unemployment and underemployment, has given rise to a new generation of men and women who are unable to afford buying or renting a house together, which is a need for marriage, especially in urban Morocco. For women, the average age of marriage has increased from 17 to 24 since 1980, while

bachelors are often seen well into their thirties among males. As a consequence, an unprecedented number of adult men and women are single in a society that only accepts virginity and marriage as legitimate sexual circumstances. Dating continues to be an illegal form of sociality for both men and women. Online dating practices in cyberspace provide a vital space of privacy that is performed in a public environment in a society where the sight of "boyfriends and girlfriends" holding hands while out on a date is contrary to conventional norms of social practice.

This short examination of social activities at cybercafés, from games and informal talks among patrons at terminals to on-site cyberdating, shows that they provide the general public hitherto unimagined opportunities for socializing and information collecting. In such practices, bodily disembodiment is only one aspect of the newly created social experience taking place at the time of technological advancement. Digital channels are used by online users to grow their social networks and take part in information flows on a worldwide scale. At the same time, sociality in cyberspace is fundamentally characterized by rich kinds of social interchange between physically present individuals. The types of localized social interactions that occur at ICT access points imply that the concept of an "information society" as a whole is manifested in placed social behaviors.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Morocco's technological public realm has significantly influenced moral citizenship. It has fostered moral reflection, opened up new avenues for civic action, and given people the power to tackle social issues. To guarantee the development of moral values, social solidarity, and a responsible digital citizenship in Morocco, attention must be paid to the ethical implications of digital engagement recognizes, the difficulties and moral conundrums that come up in the technogenic public realm. It examines topics including the dissemination of false information, the proliferating of extreme ideas, and the eroding of ethical and private boundaries. It highlights the need of critical digital literacy and moral principles to deal with these issues and promote ethically upright online citizenship.

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CHAPTER 16

COMPARING SOCIAL SPACES IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Dr. Urmila Itam, Assistant Professor, Department of OB & HR,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email id-dr.urmilaitam@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

By highlighting the diverse nature of social spaces in the public sphere. It explores traditional physical spaces such as town halls, public squares, and community centers, where face-to-face interactions shape public discourse. It also explores digital spaces, including social media platforms, online forums, and virtual communities, where individuals engage in public discussions and share information in a digital environment.The dynamics of these social spaces. It discusses the advantages of physical spaces, such as the potential for direct engagement, nonverbal cues, and a sense of community. It also examines the benefits of digital spaces, including the ability to reach broader audiences, facilitate anonymity, and enable asynchronous communication. It compares the dynamics of deliberation, participation, and the formation of social networks within these different spaces.

KEYWORDS:

Civic engagement, Deliberation, Diversity, Equality, Media representation, Online communities.

INTRODUCTION

Cybercafés are modern additions to a network of thousands of existing traditional public cafés, which play a significant role in Morocco's history. Shortly after the arrival of Arab and Persian purveyors of Islam in the seventh century, the first primitive cafés appeared in the nation of North Africa. Coffee shops developed as trustworthy places of rest along the road as Islam flourished and trade routes from the Sahara to the center of the Middle East grew. From then, cafes began to appear in settlements and remote areas. Another kind of café was brought to the nation in the late nineteenth century, when European immigration to Morocco started to dramatically grow. Moroccan cafés underwent yet another historic transition in 1912, with the institutionalization of French authority. The proliferation of cybercafés in the twenty-first century, like the expansion of cafés in earlier eras, is indicative of long-term changes taking place in the public realm. When cybers are contrasted with Casablanca's traditional cafés, these shifts become clearer[1], [2].

Les cafés populaires and themed cafés comprise the great bulk of Casablanca's traditional cafés. Glaciers—ice cream cafés—and high-modern espresso salons to French Baroque interiors are just a few examples of thematic cafés. The themed ambiances of thematic cafés are one thing that set them apart from cafés populaires. Populaires are by far the most prevalent kind of coffeehouse in Moroccan cities, outnumbering all other themed café varieties. Thematic cafés look to be nearly all male-dominated from the outside, but if one enters and makes their way to the second floor or the rear, they could find a few young women who are either in groups or with a male friend. Women are actually limited to tiny sections of themed cafés, and as we shall see,

their position is also hotly disputed. There aren't any ladies at the popular cafes. These places enforce gender segregation in order to uphold a "traditional" moral order.35 There is usually a continuous stream of talk going on here, a waiter waiting to take your order, a television playing, and a crowd of patrons, all guys.

In the public world, cafés populaires effectively serve as private spaces for masculinity. They serve as a weird form of living room where the male's ability to associate openly usurps the gender heterogeneity of domestic settings. They are filled with the vernacular comfort of domesticity. Both the men and women I spoke with said that going to coffee shops put women at danger of social stigma. When pushed for an answer, it was often said that males presumed ladies at traditional cafés were prostitutes. Men in particular defended this belief by claiming that because women could not possibly be interested in any of the activities taking place at a café, her motivations could only be speculative. Engineer Abdellah Kacemi, 36, said as follows: "There is no other reason for to be." You can tell when you see them that they are just going to look for a male to give them money. We are here for a cause, guys. We are conversing with our pals and watching sporting events. We often do honest commerce. However, the ladies only come here because they are searching for males to tip them.36

This little explanation is dense with significance. The speaker lists a number of routine tasks, such as engaging in social interactions, closing agreements, and watching sports. Reading the newspaper, viewing the news on satellite-linked televisions, discussing politics, and networking with friends, family members, and colleagues are other key café activities. The spirit of friendship present in Casablanca's classic cafés is the key component that gives these pursuits significance to men. Women who decide to join a male-dominated environment of camaraderie run the danger of permanently harming their reputations. The women in my study minimized the chance of being "caught" or "discovered" partaking in the seemingly shameful act of leisuring in public by either forgoing visits to traditional cafés altogether or restricting themselves to sporadic meetings at themed cafés in neighborhoods other than their own. Numerous legal reforms over the last 20 years have made it possible for Moroccan women to participate in the workforce more often and with equal access to education. However, the place of women in public life is still debatable and subject to moral standards. In actuality, this implies that although women may be seen traveling through Casablanca's streets on their route to or from a destination, they are less common while loitering in the open. The presence of women behind screens or in windows with darkened panes is encouraged in certain public places, such as restaurants and hair salons. Women may be seen strolling through the streets, yet they are unable to halt. The same cannot be true for women, since it is common to encounter a large number of males along pedestrian pathways who have stopped to smoke a cigarette or chat with friends. Women may be seen coming and going from the government offices, companies, schools, and other places around the Parc de la Ligue Arabe, but males are mostly the ones who choose to loiter in the large park itself.

Emerging places of sociability with an alternative logic of access, like cybercafés, assume more significance in a situation where the variety of public spaces is limited and those that do exist are subject to gendered limitations of participation. Cybers provide women unprecedented equal access to cutting-edge, independent communication methods. The gender dynamics of cyberspace, where women make up between 30 and 53 percent of consumers at any one moment, override the mas- culine predominance of Muslim Casablanca's public face, which is so glaringly

apparent in the predominate traditional cafés.38 It is obvious that the moral standard for women's participation in cafés has been suspended.

There are restrictions on this suspension, however. Segregation is strengthened when darkness descends on the city just before the final call to prayer. The male-dominated nature of the conventional cafés is in full effect at cybers by the late-night hours of 9:30–11 p.m. When the threads of the digital age are woven into the public, the moral topography of urban Morocco grows and compresses its normative textures, as seen by the actualization of an egalitarian space during the day and its absence at night. I contend that the availability of technology, which identifies cyberspace as a viable source of information, makes it possible for women to use it without feeling the shame associated with visiting locations seen as just being open for public amusement. While women still face barriers to entrance in public recreational areas, they are about equally represented in educational institutions as men. Then, a place that is seen as a location where one may get new information and skills becomes somewhat accessible to women for employment. This is true even if social leisure predominates in most of what happens online. Cybercafés lose the presence of women at night, just as the streets of Casablanca, which are crowded with women during the day, become completely barren of women after nightfall. The current unwritten ban on the presence of women outdoors in the city after dusk does not outweigh the notion of cybers as centers of information creation.

In this, we have seen how the norms of participation in the public sphere change when an existing place is equipped with modern technological instruments and transformed into a hybrid space. The places that ICT creates on its own do not pose a threat to any values that are generally accepted. Contrarily, the proliferation of cybercafés is correlated with accepted wisdom and moralized views on technology. The very nature of technology's compatibility with pre-existing moral convictions creates a gap through which participation norms are broadened and the moral landscape of public life is subtly but irrevocably changed[3], [4].

DISCUSSION

Afterword

The stakes in Morocco's access to information and communication flows were abruptly and emotionally upsettingly proclaimed on March 11th, 2007. A cybercafé ordered a young Moroccan guy to leave because he was accessing jihd websites on the computer there. In reality, the individual had been trying to utilize the Internet to verify the information required to carry out suicide bombs against targets in Casablanca. The proprietor of the café, the young guy, and the three men who were with him got into a fight. The young guy was killed and four others were injured when the bag exploded.

The topic of democratic participation is brought to light by this incident because it is threatened when "open access" is used for violent subversion. Additionally, it illustrates the many informational and communicational mediums for which technologies are used. As we have seen, online users utilize ICT tools to read news, talk, play games, and develop social networks both locally and worldwide. The majority of men's and women's online actions widen the public realm and improve the circumstances for the development of civil society. By establishing places for desegregated social interaction and generally enhancing the sorts of information and communication channels accessible to Moroccans, cybers typically stretch the boundaries of society's moral landscape. They may serve as venues for socially disruptive kinds of trade at the same time. The cybercafé is exposed to behaviors that not only push limits but also directly go

against the normative fabric of the public sphere, while being a nominally independent area with free access. While jihd actions are not very common among Moroccan Internet users, they do highlight the difficult challenges that must be overcome before a distinctively Moroccan public sphere can be created, one that is characterized by rights of access and participation that are mediated by societal conceptions of a moral public.

Iran's Development of a New Public Sphere

Internet users from all over the globe question, criticize, and sometimes even demolish many forms of authority, institutions, and beliefs every day.1 Thus, virtual acts may have a substantial influence on the real world. This is especially true in nations where individuals are subject to political, religious, or sociocultural restrictions and repression. People in democratic societies have nearly the same freedom of expression online as they do in physical spaces, so filtering and censorship by governments is typically not practiced, though there are always restrictions when it comes to topics that are deemed to be highly controversial and/or illegal, like child pornography, criminality, or terrorism. Cyberspace offers a way to get over the limitations placed on these areas in nations where conservative and restricted cultural and/or political forces regulate and monitor public spaces. As a result, for users, cyberspace may appear more "real" than actual public spaces. Cyberspace becomes in many of these countries an important space for self-expression, communication, and information—three aspects of life that are constrained and regulated under authoritarian states—due to the absence of the body and of face-to-face relationships, as well as the possibility of hiding one's real identity. Of course, governments, as well as customs, traditions, and religion, can impose restrictions on physical space, including cyberspace. However, because of the nature of technology, young people's technological aptitude, and the variety of possibilities unique to the Internet, these censorship and controls are neither absolute nor exhaustive.

People in Iran had to adjust their appearance and public representations in accordance with the "must" and "must not" of the ruling Islamic forces following the Iranian Revolution and the government mission to Islamize society. Intellectuals, writers, and artists were also required to exercise more self-censorship during this period, particularly up until 1997, when reformist president Mohammad Khatami assumed office. The urban middle class could make up for some of their needs, wants, and aspirations in the "free" space of the Internet after its introduction into their lives in the late 1990s, and especially after its growth after 2001 when the Unicode system made typing in Persian possible. The first Iranian news websites were launched in early 2000 in an effort to get around government restrictions on traditional media outlets, making the Internet a crucial source of information in Iran.2 Young people were first drawn to the Internet because it allowed them to circumvent the limitations on inter-gender contact in actual public settings. Through emails, instant messaging, chat rooms, and forums, people could communicate and make new acquaintances and connections online.

The Internet has grown in popularity and accessibility over time among various urban middle-class Iranians strata as it has become less expensive and simpler to use. Iran accounts for 56 percent of all Internet users in the Middle East and has the highest concentration of Internet users in the area, with 32 million users and a penetration rate of 48% as of September 2009.3 Weblogestan, the Iranian blogosphere, is now one of the most significant online spaces in Iran. Salman Jariri started the first weblog in Persian in September 2001. After the Unicode system was introduced two months later, a young Iranian journalist named Hossein Derakhshan produced the first online weblog tutorial in Persian, inspiring more Iranians to start blogs.

Weblog writing blossomed in Iran in less than a year; behind English, French, and Portuguese, Persian was the fourth most popular language in the global blogosphere in 2003.6 Persian no longer has the same position in the global blogosphere due to the globalization of weblog authoring. However, despite the Iranian government's heavy censorship, the Iranian blogosphere continues to be one of the most significant public spaces and well-liked settings in Iranian cyberspace. Here, people can express their opinions, interact with one another, and occasionally even instigate new social movements that may have significant repercussions in the real world[5]–[7].

Young people and women, as well as intellectuals, journalists, artists, former politicians, and other socially excluded groups, have all found empowerment via the internet and weblog writing. Since many young Iranians feel that their "real/true" identities have been "lost/repressed/hidden" in Iran's public places, this empowerment for them starts with a reinvention of the self via the consolidation of new identities and the practice of self-expression. Women utilize weblogs to express their personal and societal concerns, interests, and frustrations. Intellectuals, journalists, and artists see the chance to establish a new public space where they may connect and exchange ideas with their audiences both within and outside of Iran. These new bodiless personas create new groups and help a new public realm that was previously lacking from Iranian physical settings to develop.

In post-revolutionary Iran, presentation and performance

Self-narration in public was unheard of in Iranian society until recently. Reza Barahani, an author and literary critic, expressed concern in 1980 in response to a biography of himself, fearing that its discussion of political concerns in his life may endanger his academic career, if not his political freedom. This is according to Michael Craig Hillman. To put it another way, Iranian worries about how family, friends, neighbors, and society as a whole would respond play a huge part in how authors feel comfortable sharing their personal stories.7 Women are particularly vulnerable to this worry since they have nearly always been the focus of other people's scrutiny and evaluation of their moral character and reputation. According to 'urf and shari'a, women have disguised their inner selves and lives behind walls, veils, appearances, and performances for millennia to keep themselves safe.8 After the Islamic Revolution, it was no longer enough to just conceal one's "inner self"; individuals also needed to learn how to act publicly in a variety of settings in accordance with newly enforced standards. Public places were heavily desexualized, de-Westernized, and governed by revolutionary and religious principles during the first two decades of the Islamic republic, in response to the Western and contemporary culture promoted under the Shah.

The hijab was originally declared mandatory in the summer of 1980, but only in government and public offices. Three years later, in April 1983, all women, including non-Muslims, foreigners, and tourists, were required to wear veils. Along with the hijab requirement, the moral police also enforced a complex set of Islamic performances and new patterns of predetermined social roles based on Islamic and "traditional" values in terms of body language, speech, and interactional codes, particularly in relationships with people of the opposite sex.9 A certain self-presentation paradigm was necessary for interactions with government agencies. Men had to have three days' worth of facial hair and button up their long sleeve shirts. In a black chdor or other dark-colored manteau and a maqna'eh that covers the neck and shoulders, women had to appear without any makeup.10 The newly established moral police seized patriarchal power and took on the role of policing morality in Iranian households, particularly for women and young people.

Despite all of these restrictions, Iranian women and young people have been able to bring about significant and irrevocable changes in their circumstances by making gradual, apparently little adjustments to their look, manner, and social presence. In the end, these modifications altered prevalent patterns of self-presentation and gave rise to new, unplanned forms. After the Iran-Iraq War ended in the early 1990s, many types of hijabs gradually started to emerge, transforming the gloomy perception of urban public places. For the majority of traditional, religious, or government personnel, the chador continues to be the "better hijab," although some women prefer the manteau and brighter, more casual scarves. For Iranian women from various backgrounds, wearing this new kind of hijab alongside the old ones served as a form of social differentiation and public expression.

When examining the recent veils-wearing craze among young Turkish girls, Nilüfer Göle makes notice of how the Islamic clothing code might affect how the body takes up space:

The wearing of a veil signifies more than simply concealing one's head; it also represents a purer, maybe Puritan, form of conduct that limits one's participation in public life. Taking your attitude toward others as an example. You must lower your gaze. how your body uses the space while you're out in public. That implies you shouldn't laugh aloud or otherwise make a lot of noise. So it denotes a more subdued manner of conduct. Its origins are in hija, which means to be more circumspect and humbler. Therefore, I believe that it is more than simply a kind of clothing code, but also a dress code that denotes a set of body manners in respect to the other sex as well as in reference to public conduct.

Youth and women in post-revolutionary Iran have learnt how to negotiate suitable behavior and appearance in a variety of public and private contexts by using a variety of behavioral tactics.

Alongside these techniques of appearance, new kinds of expression have evolved, and women and young people have increased their level of public utterance. Contrarily, the desexualization of public spaces has liberated many women from the restrictions imposed by their families and given them the chance to access public settings, academic institutions, or places of employment. According to Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut, the emergence of a new form of individualization among women and young people, their resistance to forced Islamization, their aspiration for modernity, and their demands for social, political, and cultural rights may indicate the deterioration of patriarchal order in both public and private spheres.

A creeping identity crisis, particularly among Iranian youth, has been brought on by the necessity to utilize a variety of sophisticated and diverse performance methods to move freely in post-revolutionary Iran. Additionally, in the middle of the 1990s, middle class kids gained access to opportunities for greater global engagement, particularly via satellite TV and later the Internet. New patterns of self-presentation were developed via these new technology and wider relationships with the outside world that were in direct opposition to the Islamic and subservient paradigms promoted by the Islamic republic[8]–[10].

CONCLUSION

As a whole, social spaces in the public sphere are dynamic and diversified, spanning both the actual world and the digital domain. Understanding the dynamics and consequences of each form of place is essential for promoting inclusive and effective public conversation. Each type of space has benefits and limits. The connection of physical and digital places enhances citizen participation and highlights the significance of taking these spaces into account as a whole when

examining social interactions and the development of public opinion. the interaction of social places in the real and digital worlds. It looks at how digital technologies have changed physical locations, such as how social media is used to plan demonstrations or spread news during public events. Furthermore, it highlights how real locations continue to be crucial in influencing digital connections, as offline encounters influence online conversations and vice versa.

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CHAPTER 17

THE PERMANENCE OF A TRANSIENT PUBLIC SPACE AND THE EMERGENCE OF IRANIAN CYBERSPACE

Dr. S. Muralidhar, Assistant Professor, Department of Commerce,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id- s.muralidhar@jainuniversity.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

This examines the dynamics of transient public spaces and the emergence of Iranian cyberspace. It explores how public spaces, traditionally considered ephemeral, can attain a sense of permanence through their transformation into online platforms. Focusing specifically on the case of Iranian cyberspace, the study investigates the factors contributing to the emergence and evolution of this digital realm.The research employs a multidisciplinary approach, drawing upon theories from urban studies, sociology, and media studies. It analyzes the historical, social, and political contexts that have shaped Iranian public spaces and their transition to the online realm. By examining the interplay between physical and virtual spaces, this study sheds light on the transformative power of digital technologies in redefining the notion of public space.

KEYWORDS:

Censorship, Connectivity, Cyber-activism, Digital culture, Freedom of expression, Internet infrastructure.

INTRODUCTION

The introduction of the new technology into Iranians' daily life happened practically concurrently with the election of the reformist president Mohammad Khatami. With the emergence of new public places and public spheres after the Iran-Iraq conflict, these events opened up new opportunities for a rising civil society.The Shah's political dictate before the Islamic Revolution and the revolution's controlled public venues prevented Iran from developing a lasting public sphere. Additionally, during both regimes, the state had total control over radio, television, and the major newspapers. Religious and traditional networks as well as small media, including photocopied flyers and audiocassettes of Ayatollah Khomeini's talks, played a part in public mobilization under the Shah's administration. Religious networks lost their democratic traits after the revolution and in particular during the Iran-Iraq war, joining the voice of the revolutionary leadership instead. A large number of public places, including as theaters, cafés, restaurants, and art galleries, were shut down. Activities from public life, leisure, and culture were moved into people's private homes.

The situation has marginally altered after the Iran-Iraq War ended and Ayatollah Khomeini passed away. People were encouraged to come out from behind closed doors by Hashemi-Rafsanjani's ascension to power and, in particular, by the new socio-cultural and urban policies of Tehran's mayor, Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi. Despite growing economic inequality between

the rich and the poor, the new municipal leadership's top priorities were to reduce the socio-cultural and urban divide between the North and South and to get people back into public spaces where they could be seen and controlled. In order to homogenize the city, an aggressive sociocultural and physical strategy was enacted, and large funds were invested in building new motorways, urban infrastructure, cultural institutions, parks, and other public spaces, particularly in southern and central Tehran. New social actors who would eventually function as the primary agents of change in the political realm progressively emerged from these new public spaces or public spheres, igniting the reform movement that resulted in Khatami's election as president in 1997[1].

Additionally, Mohammad Khatami's open stance as Minister of Guidance enabled the publication of a number of alternative and critical publications, including Salam, Hamshahri, Kian, and Gardoon, some of which became the most significant platforms for critics and later engaged in conflict with the government. The number of Iranian newspapers has increased by nearly 50% by 1992.Due to political pressure and restrictions from conservative forces, these new public spheres and spaces continued to evolve, but it appears that the experience of "homeopathic" doses of relative freedom could not be completely eradicated from the daily lives of those who discovered new forms of expression and interactions.

Public areas got more open when Mohammad Khatami was elected president in 1997. The moral police relinquished their vigilance over the streets and public areas as tensions were noticeably reduced. Cultural and artistic hubs were crucial locations for meeting and debating a variety of topics. Hundreds of critical reformist publications appeared, and if conservatives found a reason to outlaw any of them, they were immediately reissued under a new name the next day. During this time, which was characterized by fresh and exciting opportunities for creating a public arena where various groups could voice their thoughts, NGOs also began to arise. All of these locations and organizations were continually challenged and restrained by conservative and Islamist forces, so none of them could last for very long[2]. Despite this, they remained visible in society and often reappeared when there were fresh chances. Iran's history has been marked by recurrent political upheavals, according to Hossein Shahidi, which have prevented the country from building a solid foundation of material and moral resources to ensure the welfare of all of its residents. With two brief periods of rapid growth, in 1979–1980 and 1997–2000, each dubbed a "Spring of Freedom," and each followed by the state closing down a sizable number of newspapers, the past 25 years in journalism could initially be seen as a continuation of the same pattern. Iran has over 1200 publications and over 5000 men and women employed as professional journalists by the end of 2004.

Even the so-called Spring of Freedom under Khatami prevented the establishment of an actual and lasting public sphere in Iran. The Iranian people did, however, have a taste of freedom of speech during this time since certain political boundaries were crossed and taboos against criticizing presidents and other officials were breached. Ahmadinejad is now the most criticized president in recent Iranian history, despite new forms of persecution and the Supreme Leader's backing.The rise of satellite TV and new media technologies has actually meant that, despite tighter control and stronger newspaper censorship, this censorship has not had the same impact as it had during the initial years of the revolution or even during the time when reformists were in power. In actuality, there is considerably more dissent inside the Islamic Republic. For instance, the reformists and supporters of Khatami owned one of Iran's most critical newspapers, Etimd; the Ayatollah Karubi, Ahmadinejad's rival for the presidency in 2005; and Mohsen Rezai,

the former army commander; Etimd-e Mell; and Tbnk, a news website. Additionally, Ahmad Tavakoli, a fundamentalist lawmaker in the Eighth Parliament, is the owner of the news website "Alef," which was the first to expose Interior Minister Ali Kordan's fraudulent academic credentials lately.

The Web site Bztab, which belonged to the former commander of the Guardian Islamic Revolution Army and criticizes Ahmadinejad's policies, was blocked in 2006; however, thanks to Rezai's influence and the support of some Iranian Web sites and weblogs, which never miss an opportunity to denounce state censorship of cyberspace, it was later republished under the new name Tbnk.

Thus, amid a repressive Islamic regime and in both real and virtual areas, Iran's public sphere is growing in a non-Habermasian manner. Iran is a short-term society meaning its public spaces are ephemeral. What Negt and Kluge refer to as new public spheres may be used to characterize the new public sphere in Iran. These spheres are decentralized and many, opening a path of critique and possibly a new politics. Another strategy is provided by Nilüfer Göle's description of the non-Western public sphere. In order to demonstrate the dissemination of both a specific cultural signification and practice as well as a universal code of modernity, Göle proposes that we examine the "public sphere as a social imaginary in order to argue that public spheres are affected by the cultural meanings and social practices in each culture:

The public sphere in a non-Western setting is neither identical to nor completely dissimilar from that in the West, but rather exhibits asymmetrical variances as a result of ongoing cultural meanings and social behaviors. Social imaginations are ingrained in a population's habits or conveyed in implicit notions that support and enable common activities. The public sphere functions in a social setting as a social fantasy, penetrating and blending with cultural significations.

Mark Poster, who claims that "the age of the public sphere as face-to-face talk is clearly over," is referenced. I contend that Weblogistan provides a fresh social fantasy that enables the development of an online public sphere. New networks and communities where individuals with similar socio-cultural interests, hobbies, and backgrounds may come together, interact, and take action are made possible by this virtual connection. These emerging communities have the potential to surpass established ones in power as the next election unfolds. Three decades after the revolution, "small media" like weblogs, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are once again important to middle class Iranians' lives, and there are impending societal changes.

DISCUSSION

Weblogistan: Virtual new networks of Iranian community

A rapidly expanding public realm, the Iranian blogosphere is made up of individuals as well as other networks and groups. Giving precise demographic statistics for Weblogistan or making educated guesses about factors like the proportion of women to men, the average age, or socioeconomic class of bloggers, for example, is almost impossible. Case study questionnaires and recorded observations are the primary sources of information we currently have. Women make up about 47 percent of Internet users in Iran, according to studies presented at the seminar "Internet and Women in the Third Millenium," held in Tehran in 2006; however, according to Jordan Halevi's 2006 study based on a sample of 325 blogs, 33.5 percent of bloggers are women. This data is constantly changing depending on the case study as well as with the entry of new

bloggers into Weblogistan. Many participants in my focus groups said that it is simple to determine the gender of bloggers, particularly if you are used to reading a variety of blogs every day. Generally speaking, women write more about personal and societal concerns whereas males have more specialized blogs about politics, technology, journalism, religion, and other topics[3]–[5].

Like everywhere, the majority of the initial bloggers in Iran were young people. However, the majority of Iranian blogs now are written by middle-aged people. According to Halevi's poll, 90% of Iranian bloggers were between the ages of 20 and 32. However, this number might vary depending on the network, where the average age is sometimes higher. In reality, it didn't take long for a large number of journalists, thinkers, social activists, former politicians, 27 as well as conservative and religious figures, to join Weblogistan and establish their own networks in the blogosphere. Additionally varied are the student demographics, which include a sizable number of both male and female Talabeh bloggers who study religion.

Weblogistan is very diversified in terms of its members' socioeconomic status as well as their geographical distribution, with thousands of Iranian bloggers dispersed throughout several cities in Iran or other nations across the globe. In the United States, Canada, France, England, Japan, Holland, Germany, and Australia, there is a diaspora of Iranian bloggers. Many of these blogs are crucial in helping Iranians within Iran understand the "West" and life outside.

Unity and the beginning of a new social movement

Interconnectedness among bloggers from various socioeconomic backgrounds and regions may have a significant influence on actual occurrences in the real world. Iranian bloggers have worked in unison and cooperatively on various occasions to affect events on the national or international level.Although this togetherness only occurs in a few networks due to Weblogistan's extreme diversity, depending on the topic it may become more pervasive throughout the whole blogosphere. Bloggers have adopted what are perhaps the most pervasive and long-lasting acts against censorship and filtering. Cyberspace censorship in Iran is quite similar to conventional media control in that it is based on anti-revolutionary, moral, and national security concerns as well as religion, morality, and libel.

The Ahmadinejad administration forced bloggers to register their sites in 2006. Only approximately 100 bloggers had signed up by the deadline, two months later. Faced with blatant failure, the government abandoned the project. Bloggers asserted the freedom to write anything they want and claimed cyberspace as their own. Although in Iran this freedom does not really exist and always necessitates some kind of self-censorship, censorship in the online environment is far more challenging. A weblog that is banned is immediately replaced by another with a different address, which with the aid of other bloggers is brought to Weblogistan, following the example of the "Spring of Freedom" and the publishing of newspapers. Another method to get around filtering is to create blog mirrors. Utilizing anonymizers and anti-filtering software, which are traded among Internet users through email or posted on weblogs that focus on Internet software, is a third technique to get around filtering. It appears like there is a never-ending conflict between Internet users and the government, despite the fact that many of these anti-filters are stopped every day.

factors of differentiation are nevertheless powerful in cyberspace despite the lack of economic and social factors like money and social standing, but in a lesser fashion. For instance, conversations are often more courteous when bloggers are recognized by their actual names,

have a high social status, and are acknowledged as authors in Weblogistan, even if there is a greater degree of familiarity than in physical space. However, unlike in physical space, the true power in Weblogistan is exercised using distinct standards. In the world of the internet, the duration of the blog's publication counts more than the blogger's age. The social position of bloggers in cyberspace is defined more by these factors than by their "real" social status. These factors include discipline, content, style, length, originality of writing, regularity of posting, technical knowledge, aesthetics of the website, sincerity and courage toward and respect for other bloggers, and the quantity of links to the site. While a well-known scholar or politician who is haughty, aloof, posts seldom, or is unfamiliar with the weblog writing style may be disregarded, a blogger who writes anonymously and shares nothing about their personal lives may establish themselves as an influential authority. Some teenage bloggers are able to mobilize, plan a demonstration, or collect bloggers for a humanitarian cause in Weblogistan and via the worldwide media to affect events in the real world thanks to this reinterpretation of power.

One illustration is the feminist activists' Web site "Change for Equality," which was introduced in 2006. "Change for Equality" is linked to the effective physical campaign, "One Million Signatures Demanding Changes to Discriminatory Law," where Iranian activists are gathering signatures door to door to later present to Parliament. There is a push to enable women to attend open sports events, and feminist activists have developed another website called "Women's Field" to promote it. All of these websites have gone through several government filters before being republished with a new URL. They also contact interested users about new concerns.

There are additional instances when the activities of activist bloggers significantly influenced actual events. The outcry against women being sentenced to death under Islamic lawoften because they had murdered their attackers or rapistswas perhaps the most significant. Bloggers in Weblogistan coordinated petitions to be sent to foreign organizations and pasted a logo and information about these ladies onto their blogs. The first petition started by Weblogistan that had a positive effect on the real world was for the release of Sina Motalebi, whose weblog was banned in 2002. This widespread action increased public awareness and pressure on a national and international level, enabling some of these women to secure their freedom and avoid the death penalty. He was the first blogger and journalist to be detained33. Several bloggers created a logo for their weblogs pleading for his release and started a petition that garnered the support of several bloggers and Internet users. Sina Motalebi was set free as a result of her acts, and she later immigrated to Europe. Ahmad Batebi became the emblem of imprisoned students under the Islamic Republic after numerous petitions for his release were later signed, and his picture was used as a logo in many weblogs. In February and March 2007, some feminist bloggers and activists were detained by the government due to their activism; many bloggers posted a logo or their picture in their blogs asking for their release, and they regularly updated their blogs with the most recent information about them. Most of these campaigners were freed within a few days; others were released on hefty bail that was covered by their families[6]–[9].

Humanitarian aid is yet another way that bloggers get together to take action. In Iran, charitable societies and activities are an integral aspect of daily life. In Weblogistan, individuals band together to raise funds or locate relief for those in need. On a few instances, bloggers have physically convened to aid one another. For instance, in March 2003, bloggers simultaneously organized a charity in Mashhad, Shiraz, and Tehran to support orphanages by raising money and spending time with the kids. Organizing aid for the earthquake victims in Bam, in southeast Iran, in January 2004 was one of the most outstanding deeds of charity in Weblogistan. Bloggers

organized several networks of aid; some traveled to Bam immediately while others gathered supplies and cash. Numerous bloggers from countries other than Iran took part in this method, and they made a substantial profit.

Bloggers also staged a sizable demonstration against National Geographic magazine. A group of Internet users and bloggers started a protest campaign, creating a petition that was signed by tens of thousands of people, when the magazine released a map in its November 2004 edition that referred to the area as the "Arabian Gulf" rather than the "Persian Gulf." The Iranian Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and official spokesmen were finally compelled to openly protest when this demonstration received wide coverage in Iranian publications. The Iranian blogger and artist Pendar Yousefi developed a "Google bomb" as part of a protest in which entering "Arabian Gulf" into Google's search bar produced the fake message, "The Gulf you are searching for does not exist. Test the Persian Gulf.

Additionally, bloggers express worry and support for Weblogistan members and their individual issues. The Nshi va Jjehsh case is an example of a blogger supporting a non-political cause. In order to draw attention to her issuethat divorced women are not permitted by Islamic law to obtain custody of their childrenNooshi launched her site. One of the earliest baby blogs in Iran, there are now a lot more. Nooshi sometimes blogged about her issues with her ex-husband and the Islamic judicial system while seeking legal counsel and assistance from other bloggers. When her husband abducted her children and did not bring them back, her dilemma took on new meaning. This also coincided with Akbar Ganji, a well-known dissident journalist, going on a hunger strike at the Evin prison. To spare his life, several political bloggers have organized local, state, and worldwide rallies. However, the attention Nooshi attracted in Weblogistan's non-political networks was equally crucial. A few months later, Nooshi discussed this incident and how it affected her life during a phone interview. Nooshi was forced to cease blogging a few months later when her blog was used against her in court. She has said that she would continue it at some point since blogging has transformed her life.

Like in real life, social interactions in Weblogistan sometimes include anger, violence, or the disclosure of sensitive information that might be hurtful and destructive. But after nine years of living and working together, there are new sorts of "red lines" that should not be crossed, as well as increased levels of tolerance and ethical values. Many bloggers believed that when they began writing their blogs, it would be a personal experience, like a journal, according to my interviews and focus groups. However, as soon as they were found, their link was added to other blogs, they started to have their own readers, receive comments and emails, and they started to have their own readers, they could experience a new kind of presence in the virtual world, one that was related to the presence of the "others." For many of them, it was also a process of disclosing the self in front of others. This encounter resulted in a greater awareness of oneself and tolerance for others.

Who is the blog's creator?

A weblog starts out with a name and an address, sometimes using the blogger's own name and other times using a pen name. This name and address often serve as the blogger's primary identifier in the online community to which they are addressed, identified, and linked. Bloggers announce themselves using their actual names on a large number of weblogs that are not Iranian. Their social, cultural, and even economic capital includes their blogging.

Pseudonyms and false identities abound in Iran as a result of the country's political climate as well as specific customs and beliefs, notably among women, young people, and political and social bloggers. Weblog writing is thus not a component of many Iranian bloggers' real-world cultural capital. Despite this, some blogs with fictitious names and pseudonyms become well-known in the blogosphere. For example, bloggers who are just normal workers, students, housewives, artists, or journalists in real life might become "famous" online with a large following and relevant connections. The case of Zeitun is pertinent in this instance. Zeitun, a presumed young lady who lives in a Tehran suburb and has been blogging since 2002, has a distinctive writing style known as the "Zeitun style" on Weblogistan, which consists of multi-part postings written in a friendly yet formal tone. She is one of the most "virtual" people in Weblogistan and has never accepted to take part in a focus group or even a phone interview, despite the fact that her blog has been filtered in Iran and consistently ranks among the top forty Iranian blogs38. I invited participants in one of my own focus groups to share their thoughts on these obscure yet well-known bloggers like Zeitun as we discussed the virtual identities of bloggers. Due to the fact that none of these bloggers had ever spoken to or seen her, the overall vibe was more or less skeptical. She chats and emails, claiming to have attended this or that event, but no one has ever heard her voice or seen her, so you are unable to identify her. Does she exist? Is she a 40-year-old male or a 25- to 26-year-old woman? Nobody is aware of her.

She continues to be one of the most important and well-known "authorities" in Weblogistan despite the suspicions raised about her identity, with more than a thousand readers daily. Due to social, cultural, and political restrictions in the Iranian blogosphere, it is customary for others to withhold the identities of bloggers who use pseudonyms. Thus, as long as there is some degree of consistency between the blog and the fabricated identity, the pseudonym is widely regarded in Weblogistan as an identity. The usage of pseudonyms has been steadily declining throughout the previous seven years of Weblogistan's existence, particularly among certain sociopolitical bloggers who want to have a bigger influence in the real world. However, the use of fictitious names and aliases continues to be popular, particularly among young people and women who write about their personal lives[9], [10].

The development of the self in Iranian blogs

Three elements are crucial to the process of building one's self in Weblogistan: daily writing, the presence of an archive, and ongoing exposure to other people's perspectives via comments. These three elements may help people develop a more expansive sense of who they are while also enabling the formation of whole new self-narratives. The book "Rez-de-Chaussée" by Italian author Erri de Luca offers an intriguing viewpoint on the value of writing in general and the process of self-discovery in particular:Every one of us has hidden multitudes, even if as time goes on, we are tempted to transforming this plurality into a person without a foundation. We are compelled to maintain our individuality and keep just one name on file. As a result, we have trained the many personas inside of us to be silent. We may rediscover them via writing.

The constant availability and access to written records and archives helps bloggers to be conscious that everything they post on their blogs may be cited by others. The whole blog's history, including all posts and comments, is preserved in the archives. For the blogger, this new narrative may provide a social setting that is distinct from "real" life. Bloggers may use this archive to save a history of their appearance on the web and their interactions with other users, which they can then revisit as needed. The opportunity to auto-revise and the potential to have a shared, documented history are provided to the younger generation by this capability.

The blogger might develop a new character with the aid of the archive. In fact, the blogger must exercise more discipline in thinking and articulation than is necessary in actual locations in order to retain consistency and coherence of character. Sometimes the blogger's "virtual persona" in the blogosphere grows to be so well-known, respected, and strong that it progressively influences their "offline" lives. In one of my focus groups, Osyan "Rebellion," a young male blogger who has been writing since 2002, said:

Finally, the blogger's self-conception is greatly influenced by the comments. Readers may enter and engage with the blogger and his or her works in this area of "others," which is where readers can connect with "others." These remarks determine the blogger's place in the blogosphere and illustrate how oneself seems to others in their opinions. It creates a new form of social negotiation that can enable bloggers to see different sides of themselves through the opinions and interactions of others by allowing others to express themselves in a space that is seen as personal and private, reading and refusing to delete their opinions, critiques, and reactions.

I administered a word association exam to my focus groups. The term "mirror" was used most often by bloggers who took part to describe the weblog, since for many of them it was a mirror into their souls, a place where they could represent and define themselves in accordance with their tastes and aspirations. But it also served as a mirror for them to see how others saw them. For bloggers, this mirror has a dual and contradictory effect: it may either boost their confidence or become harsh and upsetting. This virtual self-rep- resentation has more relevance for women since they are required to disguise themselves and assume several identities frequently in Islamic culture. Their weblog turns into a mirror where they may express their "inner selves," the aspects of their personalities that they are compelled to conceal in a moralistic Iranian society:

The term "mirror" has a distinct connotation for males. As was already said, Iranians often keep their personal and private life secret and learnt to play distinct roles after the revolution depending on the circumstance. However, in the Islamic framework of decency, Iranian males generally do not have to perform as much as Iranian women do; they have numerous privileges that women do not. However, they may also uncover hidden aspects in their blogs:The word "mirror" strikes me as the best way to describe the blog. We may imitate or act as we choose there, and we can see aspects of our "self" that we are not accustomed to seeing. This is because we gaze at our "self" there as we would in a mirror, seeing different perspectives.

The primary distinction between Iranian male and female bloggers may be found here. Because they are less constrained to carry out preconceived roles in real life, most male bloggers stated that the self-image shown in their blogs was extremely comparable to that of their true selves. For women, their virtual persona is more in line with their "inner self," which is mostly hidden in public life according to Islamic customs. Women have greater freedom to express themselves in virtual spaces where there isn't a physical presence or face-to-face interaction, particularly if they use a pseudonym to remain unknown and anonymous. Even using a pseudonym while writing does not completely exempt one from moral society's standards of decency. The blogger's identity may sometimes be made known to the public, family, friends, or coworkers. This may result in new forms of self-censorship and restrictions similar to those imposed by actual physical space.

CONCLUSION

Iran's online, on the other hand, presents a singular possibility for the development of a semi-permanent public sphere. Iranians are now able to express themselves, organize their groups, and

subvert social conventions with the help of the internet. People may now interact with like-minded people, participate in political debates, and publish their creative works on social media platforms, blogs, and online forums. These virtual places have shown to have some permanency, allowing for ongoing dialogues and interactions that transcend temporal and spatial boundaries. The advent of Iranian cyberspace has also prompted significant queries about the interaction of the virtual and actual worlds. The internet has evolved into a place of debate and compromise where people balance their right to free speech with government restriction and monitoring. The dynamic interaction between Iran's transitory physical public places and long-lasting online public sphere emphasizes how complicated and dynamic public discourse and civic involvement.

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CHAPTER 18

CENSORSHIP AND SELF-CENSORSHIP IN WEBLOGS: A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Dr. L. Sudershan Reddy, Professor, Department of Decision Sciences,
CMS Business School, JAIN (Deemed to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id- sudershan.reddy@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

This examines the phenomenon of censorship and self-censorship in weblogs from a gender perspective. In the age of digital communication, weblogs have emerged as powerful platforms for individuals to express their opinions, share personal experiences, and engage in public discourse. However, the freedom of expression in weblogs is not without limitations, as individuals often face various forms of censorship, both externally imposed and self-imposed.This study focuses specifically on the gendered dimensions of censorship and self-censorship in weblogs. It explores how gender influences the content creation, dissemination, and reception in online spaces. Women, in particular, may encounter unique challenges and pressures due to societal norms, cultural expectations, and gender inequalities.

KEYWORDS:

Blogging, Digital activism, Freedom, Gender dynamics, Internet censorship, Patriarchy.

INTRODUCTION

Every day, millions of individuals reveal sensitive information about themselves, their personal lives, and their daily activities on YouTube, Facebook, and blogs. This tendency is not exclusive to Iranians. People are now more used to reading about people's lives in online, complete with all of their deviations from traditional pictures in Iran, which has lessened the peculiarity of personal narration in public. This is why many young female bloggers opt to talk about themselves more openly and to tackle taboo subjects like sexism that are still prevalent in Iranian society, despite various attacks and pressure from the government, other bloggers, family, and coworkers in both physical and virtual spaces. Following Weblogistan's years of operation, these disclosures have increased internet acceptance of female bloggers. However, in "offline" culture, this is not the same. Female bloggers must write indirectly and provide little personal information that could be used against them in order to live safely in both physical and virtual spaces in Iran while also being visible and outspoken, daring to speak about their personal experiences, sexual lives, or simply about their everyday lives as women in Iranian society. This enables them to trespass some of Iranian society's moral boundaries [1].

Young feminist activist Emshaspandn has been blogging since 2003 under her own name. She won't write anonymously since she thinks writing under a pseudonym reveals more about her nature. She also thinks Iranian women need to write more about themselves, claiming that the internet is the only place where they can discuss forbidden subjects like their desires, bodies, and

femininity without fear of repercussions. Even while this viewpoint may be regarded as a new social trend in online, it may be very upsetting to an individual:

Farnaz views her connections with her family and coworkers as unilateral because they gather information about her and utilize it in their interactions with her, which she views as an intrusion into her virtual existence. She does not feel this way about other bloggers with whom she discusses her secrets or with online followers who she does not personally know or run into on a regular basis[2]. The lack of a body and an identity in Iran does not guarantee total freedom from self-censorship. In truth, Iranians' lives are significantly impacted by the spirit of gossip. This was acknowledged by several bloggers who took part in the survey as one of the most unsettling problems in cyberspace. Women are prevented from expressing themselves freely because they are always concerned about what other people will think or say about them. They also fear that their writing, appearances, or online habits may damage their reputation as respectable women in real life. This was the reason Sayeh decided to self-censor her blog:

It's okay if you know that other bloggers are reading your blog; but, it's another if you know that other people, like your coworkers or even your employer, are reading it. Because if that happens, everyone in the workplace will know everything about you and will remark on it. It is quite bad that this scenario is unjust. I've discovered that my aunts read my blog to learn more about me and what I'm doing. Then they began to talk negatively about my personal life to others. After some time, I made the decision to write largely on social and public problems instead of significant aspects of my personal life[3].

Even in democracies, according to Danah Boyd, physical reality has an impact on the digital world: "Cyberspace is not our utopian fantasy; many of the social constraints that frame physical reality are quickly permeating into the digital realm."41 Iran's political, cultural, and institutional repression all lead to restrictions on virtual space that are essentially the same. People are compelled to abide by political and conventional conventions online, particularly when they use their own identities. In reality, there is a significant cultural and gender prejudice that affects what people may post on their blogs and largely mirrors the political and traditional redlines. For instance, male bloggers often self-censor their posts on political issues, but female bloggers do the same in regards to sex and sexuality as well as politics. In virtual space, women are more self-conscious about their duties as women than as citizens because they are under greater pressure to perform their social obligations in physical public areas. So that individuals may freely express themselves, they often choose to remain nameless. Those who use their actual identities are forced to take certain risks or deal with constraints and limits that are quite similar to those they experience in their regular lives. In the Iranian diaspora, where female bloggers feel freer to express themselves without censorship and traditional restraints, the situation is considerably different[4].

Many female bloggers value their ability to express themselves freely and will not give it up easy. Even if there is a high cost involved, being honest with oneself is an experience that cannot be undone. Some female bloggers who have had freedom of expression and interaction find it far harder to adjust to the constraints of the real world than it is to accept the results of "being oneself" in a virtual environment. When faced with pressure from their families, coworkers, or the government, some female bloggers are forced to give up their main blog and create a new one under a different name or at a different location. Others, whose experiences in virtual space are too significant to let go of, embrace the situation and effects of their blogging and go on as before[5].

This blog was intended to be a platform for my unsaid thoughts, things I couldn't or wouldn't say, and the words I can't speak in front of "elders" since they would judge me according to their own standards. Everything was great at first, when Carpe Diem's author was simply a name. However, it became harder and harder with time. Ayda's name began to take on a distinct appearance as a consequence of the urge to look at the other names. It took me a bit to get up to this. I didn't want to be forced to self-censor in my own little universe. But I eventually became used to it. No, not to suppress anything. However, when I write, I should be myself and not consider how other people would see me based on my work[6].

Ayda, who took part in my focus groups and is one of the editors of the book Weblogistan: The Crystal City, made this final post. She shut down her blog after this post, which was posted a year after the focus group. I've heard that she now maintains a different blog with new subscribers and a different moniker. She still discusses "freedom" in her writing, but she has decided not to share her identify on her blog in light of her recent experience. Since the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, a temporary public sphere has steadily developed in Iran, ironically becoming permanent in its temporary nature. Due to the ongoing conflict between civil society and the Islamic state, this new public sphere that arose with the new wave of newspaper publishing and the growth of new public venues has continually been subject to cycles of disappearance and reappearance. Iranians have adapted to this temporary state of affairs throughout the years[7]. This ephemeral public realm has been partially transferred to and partially copied by cyberspace since 2001. A middle-class urban populace now has Weblogistan as a new public forum where they can express themselves, talk about problems, and come up with new ideas in a more accepting environment. New identities are created in the virtual world of Weblogistan, sometimes using pseudonyms and other times using actual names, building new and varied networks and communities. Social activities that have affected physical space have resulted from these networks.

DISCUSSION

Resisting Publics

i. Students on Soapboxes: The Metropole in Anticolonial Nationalist Activity

Nearly 30 years after the British took over Egypt, in 1911, the Office of the Secretary of State in London asked the Egyptian Consul-General for a list of Egyptian students who were enrolled at British universities. In actuality, Consul-General Kitchener led the Occupation Government of Egypt and was thus more akin to a viceroy than a diplomat, despite his designation as an ambassador between two sovereign governments. In addition to Scotland Yard, the local police in the university towns where these students lived would also get the information Secretary Grey wanted. The recent assassination of the British-backed Egyptian Prime Minister, Boutros Ghali, by a young man who had studied in Europe was the immediate cause of this sudden need to monitor Egyptian students, but the bigger concern was based on Britons' realization of something that nationalists in Egypt and other colonies already knew: that the most fertile and free arena in which to organize a cadre of strong and committed nationalist activists[8].

These impressionable young colonists learned just as much about themselves and one another as they did about Europe, and they would go on to support nationalist movements throughout all of the British colonies. Many of them were the offspring of the ruling classes of their colonies, but many more were from middle-class families who wanted their boys to serve in the native ranks of the Empire rather than hatching schemes to overthrow it. While the majority did return with

the skills necessary to serve as the colony's physicians, attorneys, engineers, and government employees, they also had the knowledge necessary to set up secret organizations, install printing presses, and create the kinds of publications that may put them in prison. Several of these individuals served as teachers to the subsequent generation of colonial leaders, and several of them would actively question the imperial system during and after the Great War.

We can show that the use of European space, both physically and intellectually, was essential to the political growth of anti-imperial movements by looking at the part that these young expatriates played in supporting the nationalist movements of their original colonies. Nationalists from all around the British Empire came together in Europe to work together in the early decades of the 20th century. Through personal contact or the ongoing network of people and publications that was woven from the geographic foundation of the metropoles, these relationships were maintained long after the people engaged returned to their homes. This network was crucial to the intellectual and numerical expansion of nationalist groups[9].

This network was also used to construct a "imagined community" made up of several nationalisms. Together, the expatriates envisioned a world in which "nations" would serve as the fundamental unit of political organization and empires would not only be obsolete but unacceptable2. As a result, the Habermasian "public space" offered by the metropoles was more than just a forum for non-coercive democratic discourse among individuals; it was also a place where nationalisms could define themselves horizontally among one another rather than vertically against the colonial Great Powers and posit alternative To achieve this vision, however, it was necessary to utilize the public space in ways that challenged the dominance of the societies that were housing it.

ii. Habermas Overseas

The public sphere and civil society that were first created in Europe during the eighteenth century as a consequence of the growth of bourgeois society are the subject of Habermas's own writings. According to Habermas, this group of people was and continues to be essential to the growth and upkeep of contemporary representative democracy. He has never spoken about how much of the rest of the world is affected by such a public realm and the social discourse that results from it. Habermas himself acknowledges this gap in the New Left Review, admitting that he has little to say about “anti-imperialist and anti-capital- ist struggles in the Third World,” although he is “aware of the fact that this is a Eurocentrically limited view. Critics of Habermas such as Edward Said and Jean-François Lyotard point out that this lack of engagement is problematic, not only in terms of recent attempts to apply Habermas’s claims in a cosmopolitan or transnational context, but alsoand especiallywhen juxtaposed with Habermas’s “continuing commitment to what he calls the project of modernity, and thus to the Enlightenment goal of political emancipation upon the basis of knowledge claims that are, in some sense, objectively defensible. Said is perhaps the most directly criti- cal, calling Habermas “today’s leading Frankfurt theorist” and saying that “Frankfurt School critical theory, despite its seminal insights into the relationship between domination, modern society, and the opportunities for redemption through art as critique, is stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire.

This is an attempt to apply some of Habermas's formulations to such an anti-imperialist and cosmopolitan context in order to examine the effects of the still-emerging European public sphere on other societies at the time, as well as to suggest areas for future research, both

historical and modern, in the non-hegemonic contexts where the majority of the world's population lives. The research illustrates the value of Habermas's concept of a public discursive arena in connection to marginalized and expatriate populations as well as some of its limits. It also clarifies how the existence of the European public sphere affected other regions of the world and the threats that such a discursive space posed to European political and cultural dominance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, even as it strengthened representative governance and social cohesion in Europe. Other historical examples can help to further illustrate how applicable Habermas's concept of public spheres is in these situations[10].

iii. Assassination and Nationalism

Despite the living memory of an armed revolution, the murder of Prime Minister Boutros Ghali Pasha in Cairo on February 20, 1910, shocked a nation that had not experienced a political assassination in generations.7 Egyptians had only recently resumed discussing political issues in public after two decades of relative silence due to the exile of many of the country's popular leaders following British occupation in 1882. The first political parties had only just been established in 1907, and public opinion was still split over how to feel about the occupying force, which asserted that its effective and ethical rule had brought widespread economic and social success. The Dinshaway incident of 1906 had validated many nationalist complaints about the British, and many members of the middle and upper classes remembered that Britain had claimed the occupation would be temporary when they marched into the country a generation earlier.8 Additionally, the relatively young khedive was eager to increase his power and autonomy over what was technically his own kingdom. He had a love-hate relationship with the nationalist movement, which demanded a constitution and a system of representative democracy that would lead to a limited monarchy but shared his desire to see British rule over the country end.

Boutros Ghali, an experienced politician who had seen the ups and downs of Egyptian politics for decades, was selected as a promising candidate to act as prime minister and negotiate between the Khedive and the British Consul during this time. By accepting the position of Prime Minister under the strict restrictions placed on Parliament, Ghali had alienated a lot of young nationalists. In addition, he cast one of the three judges' votes in favor of the severe penalties imposed during the Dinshaway trials. The Nationalist Party's journals were quite critical of both the concession and the Prime Minister as he campaigned for the controversial extension of the Suez Canal concession. He being a Copt also contributed to the unrest, since many Muslims believed that Christians were given preference in government positions by the British authority. Despite the utter absence of any proof of religious intolerance, when Ghali was shot by a Muslim Watanist, many believed the motivation to be nationalist fervor as much as religious hate.

Ibrahim Nassif al-Wardani, the 25-year-old gunman in Ghali, was the child of a minor no who had been sent to study abroad in 1908 after the death of his father. While attending school in London, Paris, and Lausanne, the young man devoted himself to the Egyptian nationalist struggle. When he returned to Egypt in 1909, Wardani continued to be involved in the Watani Party and shot the Prime Minister the following year. During his time there, Wardani had become close to Watani Party President Muhammad Farid. Wardani went to the gallows maintaining that he had slain a traitor who worked for the British rather than the Egyptians after declaring during his trial that what he had done was his patriotic duty. The trial and execution were carefully monitored by British officials in Cairo and London, and many people saw that a number of

Egypt's most fanatical young nationalists were really graduates of European colleges. This is what led Secretary of State Edward Grey to ask for a head census in 1911.

The fact that Wardani belonged to a Watani party cell called the Society of Fraternal Solidarity, which communicated using ciphers and seemed to be looking for ways to get weapons or explosives, frightened the government authorities. Although there were a few new graduates working for the government, the majority of the Society's members were students, according to the authorities.10 To their dismay, the police were unable to bring charges against these guys since there was no legislation in Egypt prohibiting such secret societies. The majority of the students were nevertheless expelled from their schools, a strategy that in some cases backfired because it sent the young men abroad to finish their education away from British oversight.11 Between France, Switzerland, and the United States, there were plenty of universities willing to accept tuition-paying students and little desire to police activity that was not intended to harm the host country. In reality, during the years preceding up to the First World War, such students were enlisted and were even financially sponsored in Germany and the Ottoman Empire.

The nationalist activities and overseas education of Wardani were prominently featured in the Egyptian press, which implied that these two factors would help to explain how the murderous tendencies of the son of a respectable family might be explained. Wardani's readiness to use political violence, according to the typically anti-British newspaper al-Mu'ayyid, was a direct outcome of his Western education. Similar to this, the journal al-Muqattam, which supported the Occupation, had reported the year before that far too many students sent to study abroad ended up being engaged in nationalist activities. In response to Sir Edward Grey's request three years later, Lord Kitchener, the British consul general in Egypt, also stated that "all these students... have a tendency to devote themselves to politics, often of a dangerous and subversive character, and they attend meetings where they openly advocate a revolution in this country... Unless some check is put on these proceedings, I greatly fear that... they may easily become a menace to the maintenance of this country."

While we cannot directly link Wardani's actions to Madanlal Dhingra, the Indian assassin, there is a great deal of evidence that Wardani had met and worked with some of Dhingra's "radical nationalist" friends while in Europe. This is because the Egyptian Gazette, the official publication of the British Occupation, implied that Wardani's act was directly inspired by an Indian assassin of a British official in London the previous year15. Even though they were unable to prove that each assassin belonged to it, British Criminal Intelligence late-discovered that there had been a covert Indo-Egyptian Association at the time that both of the assassins were in London. Wardani and Dhingra truly did meet, however, while Wardani was in London in 1908, claims Ahmad Fouad Nassar, a founder member of the Egyptian Society in Lausanne17.

Given that the Watani party had carefully studied Dhingra's case, it is safe to assume that Wardani was well aware of his crime and his stated motivations. In reality, the debate about Madanlal Dhingra's nationalist motivations was far more freely debated in Egyptian publications than it was in Indian ones in the days after Curzon-Wylie's murder. Everyone in Egypt was aware that an Indian teenager had shot a British official in the busy Imperial Institute entryway of London and justified his deed as a patriotic act in defense of his nation. Dhingra maintained that since his victim was a member of a system that "enslaved" millions of Indians, his actions were morally justified. It is difficult to believe that Wardani was unaware of the similarities between Dhingra's actions and those he himself would take a few months later given that the controversial editor of the paper was one of his close friends. Dhingra was hanged on August 17, 1909, and the

Watani Party paper, al-Liwa', came into conflict with the recently reinstated Egyptian Press Law on that day for publishing a poem calling the executed assasin a hero. At the time, Boutros Ghali himself had voiced worry that "some frazzled student, stupid farmer, or puzzled h. The British editors of the Egyptian Gazette may have been more accurate than they anticipated when they referred to the nationalists as "Students of Dhingra" when they said that they were trying to mimic the Indian assassin at the cost of a certain Egyptian official, maybe themselves.

iv. Coordinating European Dissent

In Europe, where organizations of international students were forming in every major city, it was simple for impressionable young men to get involved in nationalist activities. An Egyptian student group, one of several that were formally connected to the Watani Party, was how Wardani became engaged. In fact, the by-laws defining a quorum had to be changed to require that only half of the members be currently present in Egypt because so many of them were abroad, even before the Society of Brotherly Solidarity was found and disbanded in Cairo21. Muhammad Farad's memoirs are replete with references to the various student groups he worked with throughout Europe from the time he became president of the Party in 1908. After 1912, when all of Farid's work had to be carried out from abroad due to his self-imposed exile from Egypt, these pupils became even more crucial.

Additionally, Egyptian nationalists and their equivalents from other colonies were forging strong relationships in Europe. Muhammad Farid's friendship with Madame Bhikaji Cama, an Indian activist also based in Paris whom he warmly mentions in his memoirs, is one of the most obvious examples of this.22 Both Farid and British Criminal Intelligence noted that Cama's home was a gathering place for activists from India, Egypt, Ireland, and Africa in addition to members of the early Socialist movement.23 In addition to Farid, Cama's many regular visitors included the French socialist Jean Longuet,24 Young Egypt, Young Ireland, and Young India were often cited with "Young India" in Lounget's L'Humanité, which regarded all of them as aligned with Socialism against the common enemy, imperialism. This may have been a result of the relationships made in Cama's salon[11].

After the Curzon-Wylie murder, Indian nationalist action shifted to Paris since Krishnavarma's India House, the headquarters of the "extremists" in the Indian expat community, had been shut down by the government. When it became obvious throughout the inquiry that Dhingra had not only resided there while plotting the murder but had also at least gotten moral backing for his scheme there, the majority of its residents departed England entirely. Due to the fact that France had far more Egyptian students than Britain did, this action had brought the Indians and Egyptians even closer together. Ironically, Madame Cama gathered different types of "radicals" who opposed European governments in the same kind of salon that first piqued Habermas' attention in the positive elements of public discourse space[2].

CONCLUSION

The results of this study may guide activities and policies meant to advance gender equality and strengthen the voices of women on weblogs and other digital platforms. It is feasible to build a more inclusive and equitable online environment that empowers women and supports a diversity of voices by removing expression obstacles and promoting varied viewpoints. For one to fully appreciate the complexity of online communication and the power dynamics at work, one must have a thorough understanding of the gendered aspects of censorship and self-censorship in weblogs. It emphasizes the need of developing welcoming and encouraging online communities

that encourage gender equality and the freedom of speech. This research adds to a deeper understanding of the interconnections between gender, technology, and online activism by examining the experiences and difficulties experienced by women bloggers.

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CHAPTER 19

THE ROLE EUROPEAN METROPOLES

Dr. L. Sudershan Reddy, Professor, Department of Decision Sciences,
CMS Business School, JAIN (Deemed to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id- sudershan.reddy@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

This abstract explores the role of European metropoles in the contemporary socio-cultural, economic, and political landscape. European metropoles, such as Paris, London, Berlin, and Madrid, are major urban centers that serve as hubs of activity and influence. They play a pivotal role in shaping regional, national, and global dynamics, contributing to the overall development and cohesion of Europe. It focuses on the socio-cultural significance of European metropoles. These cities are characterized by their diverse populations, multiculturalism, and vibrant cultural scenes. They serve as melting pots of different languages, traditions, and identities, fostering social integration, tolerance, and creativity. Metropoles often become cultural beacons, attracting artists, intellectuals, and tourists, and serving as incubators for innovation and artistic expression.

KEYWORDS:

Architecture, Cultural diversity, Economic hubs, Globalization, Infrastructure, International trade, Modernity.

INTRODUCTION

The organizational skills of Cama helped more than one nationalist periodical. Al-Liwa', the newspaper of the Watani Party in Egypt, and its European-language editions, The Egyptian Standard and L'Étandard Egyptienne, often published pieces from the outlawed Indian nationalist periodicals Bande Mataram and Indian Sociologist, both published by Cama. Additionally, it included remarks from the New York-based Gaelic American and the socialist British newspaper Justice. The editor of Talvar, a second Cama-funded publication with a Berlin headquarters and close ties to Muhammad Farid and Madanlal Dhingra, was Virendranath Chattopadhya. All of these papersincluding Justicewere banned in India, and all had to be produced out of the reach of British authorities in Geneva or other European cities. However, copies were often discovered being smuggled into the colonies, and al-Liwa and her sister journals could be relied upon to frequently quote from them[1].

These papers provide a great illustration of Benedict Anderson's conception of print-based communities since they not only exchanged content but also explicitly articulated objectives. Although each newspaper had a different target audience or focus, they all had a desire to defeat British imperialism and considered themselves as allies with the others. In fact, it might be claimed that one of the purposes of al-Liwa's sister newspapers was to facilitate communication with supporters of other movements. Due to their reliance on volunteers to run, the journals would even share personnel. Thus, Chattopadhya, a friend of Dhingra's, worked with his Egyptian colleagues on editing their English-language articles and speeches while Mansour Rifaat, another Egyptian student studying in Paris, assisted in the editing of Bande Mataram. The

documents would also assist in navigating past censors and colonial conventions. For instance, the Gaelic American was found in French India wrapped with Bande Mataram and an Indian Sociologist. Here, we see a coalition in nationalist printing that represents the common goal, if not print capitalism[2].

Another instance of the expatriate experience in European public spheres was Congresses. For instance, the Egyptian Watanists organized the Egyptian Youth Congress, an annual gathering in Geneva that brought students from all around Europe, including Wardani. The secretary of this congress said that Madame Cama's house served as the venue for its second meeting, which took place in September 1910. The conference was set to take place in Paris, but the French government chose to forbid it, saying that they did it "entirely on their own initiative in order to prevent Paris from becoming the focal point of an anti-British crusade. The location was abruptly relocated to Brussels, where Labour M.P. Keir Hardie spoke and cautioned the attendees about the perils of Britain's strategy of splitting religious and ethnic populations in its colonies, citing both the Indian and Egyptian crises. Lala Har Dayal, the editor of Bande Mataram, also spoke. British Intelligence describes her as causing a stir rising and calling upon all Egyptians to refuse to enter the Egyptian Army. When an Irish delegate proposed the formation of an Egyptian, Indian, and Irish Congress to unite in one gathering the victims of English domination," another offer that was straight out of British nightmares followed. The Criminal Intelligence Reports show the genuine alarm with which the authorities welcomed such notions, since both Egyptian and Indian nationalists at this stage had stockpiled weapons and explosives in their native nations[3].

When he sent a cable to the conference offering a reward in honor of "the martyr Wardani" for an essay on how to best obtain home rule in the colonies, Krishnavarma also caused some controversy. Muhammad Farid was placed in an unpleasant situation since the Ghali killing had already caused the Watani Party in Egypt to become divided. Additionally, the activists present in Brussels had little to no opposition to the proposal. Farid stated the concept was against the values of the Watani Party to alleviate their fears since the "moderate" base in Egypt disapproved of unlawful or violent conduct. Technically, it may have been, but a casual spectator might not have realized that. The Party's vice-president and the former legal partner of the current president Farid represented Wardani in court despite the Party's assurance that it disapproved of his behavior. The Egyptian Gazette reported that the Party had set up a fund to assist Wardani's mother, despite the fact that they failed and he was executed on June 28, 1910. Even while some of the more senior Party officials had voiced alarm about the growing radicalization of the young, Farid didn't appear to be against political violence. In his presence, in paper, or in their gatherings, the young men who were studying overseas were unafraid to bring it up[4], [5].

DISCUSSION

The Metropole

As we can see, students who started or intensified their political involvement there played a crucial part in the nation-alist awakening in the European metropoles. Despite a number of extremely astute studies on the metropole's significance in imperial and colonial identity, this component of the metropole has not been sufficiently explored. Wallerstein's macrosystem approach does notand possibly cannotreflect the very real impacts of people and small groups on civilizations, even if his work has addressed the economic and social function of metropolises. However, Benedict Anderson's seminal work on the topic, Imagined Communities, does discuss

the role of individuals and small groups and is much more sensitive to that ephemeral entityculture. In particular, Anderson's conception of the role of the metropole in the education of upper- and middle-class Creoles and the circular pilgrimages toward the metropole undertaken by the Creole/colonial bureaucrat is similar to the phenomenon being discussed here. In contrast to the anti-colonialism being developed in Africa and Asia, Anderson's discussion of the metropole is mostly limited to its impact on Creole nationalism, a quite different species. Additionally, Anderson discusses the psychological effects of the metropole on nationalism on a far smaller scale than Wallerstein does. The group identity that resulted from this influence is described as one in which the group does share a collection of experiences, but they are not established by discussion of those experiences as a group. In Anderson's work, nationalists unite as a result of their alienation from the metropole; in this novel, nationalists search for one another inside and via the metropole, cutting over ethnic and national lines. For them, seeing the metropole is a multifaceted, often optimistic, and positivist experience[6].

These nascent nationalists found partners and platforms in the metropoles where they could organize and convey their ideas. throughout order to imagine a new global order, activists from different ideologies and even opposing points of view gathered throughout Europe. This collection of people could only come together in a metropole and could only speak the language of the metropolis, which is a feature of transnationalism that merits further research. The laws of Europe also offered a safe refuge for dissidents who could not be persecuted in the same manner in England or France as they might be in the colonies. Not only did the metropoles bring together nationalists across differences that may be insurmountable in their homelands. For instance, take note that British authorities' efforts to forbid the 1910 Egyptian Youth Conference in France were successful but failed in Belgium. British Intelligence was forced to settle with deploying their own informants to watch the activities since Belgian law would not permit the banning of any open assembly that did not promote the overthrow of the Belgian king. The economy in metropoles was far more dispersed than the semi-oligarchical economies of many colonies, and the regulations governing private property and the use of wealth were much stricter, so access to finance could not be restricted in the same way as it did in the colonies[7]–[9].

Finally, when a colonial strolled on the streets of Europe, the freedoms of speech and assembly so dear to the hearts of the civilized races could scarcely be suspended. By getting beyond the censors, the nationalists were able to freely disseminate their message to foreign supporters, other colonial expatriates, and even back to the colony. Even appeals for the abolition of colonial authorities could not be thwarted if published in Berlin or Geneva, thanks to the numerous newspapers established in Europe, which were able to print writings that were hard to disseminate inside the colony. These writings were fiercely circulated and smuggled into the colonies or paraphrased by other journals to the same effect. They were funded by older established individuals but staffed by the young colonists who wrote the pieces in addition to their studies.

at contrast to Ashis Nandy's claim that the colonial encounter was ambivalent, I would contend that a countervailing impact was also at play. This observation does not refute Nandy's assertion that colonialism included the transformation of "the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category... in structures and in minds"41 Rather, the effort of the colonized to define themselves by the internalized values of the colonizer existed along with the process of becoming more native. In other words, even as the Indians we have met here emphasized the martial or virile aspects of classical Hindu mythology against the

British image of their effeminacy they were celebrating their "spirituality" in opposition to Western material- ism. Though the colonials accepted many of the dichotomies defined by their colonial masters, they also questioned the value ascribed to each element of the dichotomies.

Living in the metropole had a far different impact on the colonists than interacting with the colonizer or other colonists did, specifically. These young men were more conscious of their nationality just by leaving home, and their experiences as minorities or even second-class citizens made them more sensitive to injustices that would be acceptable in their home nations. In addition to the colonial being now in the minority, the relationship between colonizer and colonized was also very different in the metropole because the self-definition of the metropolitanthe greengrocer, the bus driver, or the laundresswas hardly the same as that of someone who had chosen to travel to the colony, for whatever reason. While the colonial experience undoubtedly affected the metanarrative that ruled daily life in the metropole, it did not define it as it did in the colony, especially for an educated middle-class colonial[10].

Thus, a feeling of camaraderie was encouraged among students with very diverse colonial backgrounds but very similar political and social concerns as well as students from the same colony. The time period saw both national and personal redefinitions and colonial self-evaluations. It also necessitates, as Dana Villa explainsa specifically political space distinct from the state and the economy, an institutionally bounded discursive arena that is home to citizen debate, deliberation, agreement, and action. Villa's elaboration of Habermas's and Hannah Arendt's public sphere is also a helpful description of what kind of discursive arena is required for such a process, which was welcomed more from sympathizers than from overlord Although the colonizer set the formal limits of this discourse, the otherwise disenfranchised colonials could nonetheless access a realif shiftingspace in the metropole.

This is not to say that Europe offered an ideal speech situation, since there was far from no internal or external pressure. Externally, the coercive restrictions on speech were clear, not only in terms of government policing but also in terms of the strong restrictions on public perception: as second-class visitors in their host countries, the students had to be extremely cautious not to draw undue attention to themselves or incite hostility. Everyone could see, for instance, that the failure of India House was more a result of the media's focus than of any government initiative. Internally, the most glaring barrier to participation was only one of access: only those from certain classes would be permitted to attend courses in the metropoles and participate in the dialogue. There were further restrictions. Ostracism from the organization was a possibility for specific behaviors, including disagreements over tactics, suspicions of government espionage, and personality issues. Another issue was financing; enough nationalists were living off the generosity of others or funds collected by a formal party in the metropolises to potentially allow for the purchase or extortion of consensus. In addition, as Lyotard has noted, the need for consensus reinforces a metanarrative, a way of knowing that is totalizing in scopein this case, not the one of the imperial power but of the nationalist movements. The shared assumptions that Habermas demands for the development of the public sphere are the same shared assumptions that define the boundaries of knowledge and truth in Lyotard's narratives. The Ottoman and Islamic legacies on Egyptian identity were given a prominent position in the Egyptian Watanists' founding narrative; for many of the young men engaged, criticizing this element of the Egyptian Nationalist agenda was equivalent to doubting the anti-imperial movement as a whole. As a result, the debate among Egyptians about the Khedive's position in their movement often caused division among the organization. Many of the relationships formed during this pre-War period

would be destroyed during World War I due to a similar controversy about the influence of Ottomanism in Egyptian nationalism. Additionally, even during the interwar era, when their objectives were similar to the Watanists' on many other fronts, certain rival nationalist movements were sufficiently secularist that the Watani Party kept apart from them. The story of the interwar secularists served as the model for the metanarrative of Egyptian nationalism that continues to this day.

Women were yet another group that was blatantly left out of the expatriate nationalist rhetoric, as well as much of the dominant story. Women from the colonies were mainly missing, although some European women were active in these student-cum-nationalist organizations, often via love relationships. Females from colonial nations weren't often sent overseas to study; instead, those who were typically under severe supervision. As a result, the only "native" women to attend nationalist conferences were sisters, daughters, or spouses of student activists44. Madame Cama bemoaned this reality in her address at the 1910 Egyptian Congress, noting that she had not seen any Egyptian women there. She also bemoaned the fact that many of the bright sons of the colonies were eloping and marrying foreigners, abandoning the ladies of their own countries.

Though the commonality of colonial status outweighed the differences when the expatriates were a small minority in a foreign, dominant, and frequently threatening society, the experience in Europe also provided these students with a chance to forge relationships with other nationalist movements and within their own communities. Many of the above-mentioned partnerships seemed to be built on personal ties, which are undoubtedly easier to form between "fellow colonials" overseas than between a local and a foreigner inside of any colony. Thus, Chattopadhya moved into the same building as Farid in Paris when his own apartment was being renovated, while another Indian activist stopped in Egypt on his way back from earning his degree in order to visit an Egyptian friend who was a well-known extreme Egyptian nationalist. It is hardly noteworthy that these students grew close while studying abroad. One cannot, however, ignore the fact that national activists from many colonies did so concurrently with the organization of their own campaigns against British imperialism. Even now, it might be difficult to distinguish between friendship and conspiracy. Early 1900s young Empire expatriates had the opportunity to grow both throughout their time in Europe.

Enlightenment and Violence

The metropole's explanation of how the two killings listed here are related is instructive. It is also illuminating because political violence and targeted killing seem to be Egypt's first overt contemporary political imports from Europe. The topic of political violence was specifically being discussed in the metropoles' expatriate salons and congresses. Gandhi was a relatively unknown lawyer in South Africa at the time, and the idea of passive resistance had not yet made its way into the political language. The students who convened in the colonial metropoles studied Russian revolutionaries and Mazzini's books. However fervent the nationalist fervor in the homeland, Wardani was acting in character with the milieu to which he had been exposed and the ideals that he had developed through his association with anti-imperialists in Europe when he assassinated Ghali, not Egypt.

The very genuine dedication Wardani showed to the Enlightenment ideas so cherished by his executionersand in fact, ofHabermas himselfhas not received nearly enough attention. By every objective standard, European liberalism produced Wardani's goals and impulses much more than any particular religion or "native" attachment did. It was especially amusing that even the British

Consul claimed that the crime's motivations were merely political, despite the pervasive and persistent perception that Wardani's actions were motivated by religious hate. The murderer had no personal animosity toward the victim and was not acting out of religious fanaticism. In defending his act, he merely repeated the violent and threatening accusations that had been made against Butrous Pasha in the columns of the Nationalist Press. Wardani himself never used religiously derogatory language regarding his victim; throughout his trial, he made only passing references to his nation.

His behavior in jail was likewise consistent with that of a devoted Muslim dedicated to the ideals of liberty and nationalism in the vein of the Enlightenment. He spent a lot of time writing the Constitution for a Muslim republic using his shoelaces since he was not permitted to use a pen. The English Constitution by Walter Bagehot, a French political history of contemporary Europe, Rousseau's Contrat Social, a volume of Arabic poetry, and the Koran were on his reading list in prison. In fact, he had been one of the members of the Egyptian Society in Europe who openly disavowed the Khedive's patronage when Abbas Hilmi refused to honor their 1908 request for a constitution.

Unfortunately for the Watani Party, the nonsectarian nationalist interpretation was quickly eclipsed in the public awareness by the perception that Wardani's motivation was based on Ghali's position as a Copt. Therefore, rather than boosting nationalist sentiment, Wardani's crime instead served to increase intercommunal strife. All Egyptians could now clearly see the difference between the extreme Watanists and the moderates; whereas the moderates opposed all political violence, the debate within the extreme Watani group focused on the Khedive and other power centers rather than the question of violence. Egyptian nationalist media attempted to disassociate themselves from the political ramifications of Wardani's conduct, and there is little doubt that inside Egypt itself, the violence connected with foreign movements, such as the Indian or the Russian, was much more publicly criticized than celebrated. In the meanwhile, he was praised in foreign Indian nationalist publications. According to Krishnavarma, "There is undoubtedly something sublime in the brave Egyptian martyr's lack of concern for the horrors of impending death, which allowed him, like the Indian martyr Dhingra, to focus only on the great destiny of his nation in his final moments on earth.

Historians have often reiterated the assertion of several British officials that colonial nationalist ambitions were only stimulated by Western education or contact with the free air of Europe That most definitely isn't the article's purpose. Neither does it claim that Habermas's public sphere did not or could not serve as the non-coercively unifying, consensus building force of a discourse in which participants overcome they’re at first subjectively biased views in favor of a rationally motivated agreement. Instead, this paper aims to show that Habermas's formulation has both significant benefits and serious drawbacks when applied to a specific nonhegemonic example, and that this information may help.

Due to psychological and practical factors related to the establishment of a public sphere that existed in Europe but not in the colonies, students played a major role in the growth and organization of the embryonic national movements in Europe. The freedom to migrate, socialize, organize, write, and protest that these individuals had in Europe was almost unheard of in their home countries. We've seen how the freedom of the press regulations made it difficult for British customs and censors to prevent subversive material at the point of entrance into the colonies rather than at its source. Similar to how students could work assiduously against the government in plain view in Europe thanks to guarantees of freedom of association and habeas corpus, as

long as they avoided getting caught assisting actual physical revolt, calling for revolt was not against the law in Europe as it was in the colonies. Therefore, the public sphere developed in Europe and safeguarded by its own society's shared assumptions constituted a direct challenge to that society's worldwide domination in politics, economics, and culture.

The Historical Genesis of the Public Sphere in Iraq, 1900–1963, and Its Implications for the Post-Baathist Era's Democratic ConstructionConcern about the Middle East's lack of democracy has recently intensified, which is reflected in the interest in the "public sphere" notion. The idea has had a significant influence in the West, particularly since the release of Jürgen Habermas' The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. It is generally known that Habermas laments in his book the bourgeois public sphere's demise, which he believes has weakened democracy in Europe. The theoretical foundations of the notion seem to have a generality that transcends any specific geographical place, even if Habermas did not intend for his concept to speak to the political traditions of non-Western cultures. Although the public sphere in its most democratic form may have first appeared in early modern Europe, there does not seem to be any logical reason why a forum for reasoned discourse between citizens that is not governed by the state cannot grow and function in a variety of social contexts. What does it mean to apply the idea of the public sphere to Iraqi politics and society, then, are some concerns raised by this? What analytical traction may we expect from such a use? Can the idea aid in our understanding of current initiatives to bring about a democratic transition in Iraq? Or does the concept's importance become tainted by the persistent bloodshed that has defined post-Ba'thist Iraq?

An Arab Public Space as an Idea

We must first acknowledge that the idea of the public sphere is relatively new to Arab analytic and political discourse before talking about Iraq. On the one hand, the idea presents a chance to encourage a deeper understanding of the potential for democratic transformation and more personal liberties throughout the Arab world. It poses significant issues about what influences political engagement, cultural acceptance, individual liberties, and the rule of law. In Iraq and the Arab region, where political unrest, authoritarianism, and a lack of progress toward democratic administration are all too common, these challenges are of special importance.

The matter of the public sphere in Iraq's three northern Kurdish provinces, Iraqi Kurdistan, often brought up when the public sphere in Arab Iraq is discussed. Since Iraqi Kurdistan was able to acquire autonomy from the south during the February–March 1991 Intifada and the subsequent implementation of a "no-fly zone" by the United States following the revolt, much has been made of the growth of civil society building in the region. In addition, the literature on Kurdistan after 1991 suggests a sharp expansion of the Kurdish public sphere.

Although the development of a Kurdish public sphere is not given nearly as much emphasis in this article as it is in the development of an Arab public sphere, many experts today acknowledge that the hope voiced after 1991 that Kurdistan would become a genuinely democratic area of Iraq was mistaken. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdish Democratic Party, the two major political parties in the region, are still tightly controlling the government. Family and interpersonal links to the KDP and PUK leadership continue to be a deciding factor in one's ability to access positions of political influence and economic power. Organizations in civil society that do official business need permits from the government. Threats are routinely made against the independent media, such as the journals Awene and Hawalati, for publishing stories that are critical of the Kurdish Regional Government. For criticizing the Barzani family, which

runs both the KDP and the KRG, critics of the KRG have received prison sentences. In state-run jails, human rights violations have been reported by Human Rights Watch.2 Corruption is pervasive, just as it is in the south. Even though the Kurdish public sphere will be discussed in more detail, the example of Iraqi Kurdistan urges us to carefully consider the connection between civil society and democratization and, by extension, the connection between the concept of the public sphere and its implications for democratization as well.

Due to the issues the KRG has faced since 1991, a new political organization called Gorran was founded in 2009. Gorran ran an aggressive campaign in the KRG Regional Parliament elections in July 2009 despite intense government intimidation and the termination of its candidates from government jobs. In the KRG regional parliament, Gorran nevertheless secured 25 of the 110 seats.

The Reform and Services List, another opposition alliance, also gained 15 members, giving the two movements a total of 40 seats in the legislature. Gorran was successful in winning 8 seats in the national parliament elections held in March 2010. These incidents demonstrate the profound dissatisfaction with the KRG political class and the great yearning for democratic change that a significant portion of Kurds feel.

Since the majority of studies of Iraqi politics have concentrated on the actions of political elites, the idea of the public sphere has not been conceptually apparent. In addition to portraying political processes as venal and corrupt, the absence of attention paid to nonelite aspects of Iraqi politics and society has also obscured the democratic and civil society-building tendencies that characterized much of early and mid-20th century Iraqi politics. Additionally, it has a tendency to obfuscate the efforts made to reestablish a viable civil society after Saddam Husayn's Ba'thist administration fell in 2003[2], [11]–[13].

CONCLUSION

Additionally, European metropolises have an impact on politics, both domestically and internationally. Numerous of these cities act as political and administrative hubs and house national and international institutions as well as diplomatic representations. Global governance frameworks, international relations, and national policies are all impacted by the choices made in these metropoles. Metropolises in Europe also have a significant cultural influence. The inhabitants of these cities come from a variety of racial, religious, and social origins. European metropoles are lively cultural hubs where creative expressions, vogue trends, culinary traditions, and intellectual dialogue thrive because of their multicultural and cosmopolitan makeup. Their cultural impact transcends national boundaries, influencing global trends and promoting intercultural dialogue.

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CHAPTER 20

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

Dr. R. Satish Kumar, Professor, Department of Marketing,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email Id- dr.satishkumar@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

This explores epistemological and methodological concerns in the context of research and knowledge production. Epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge and how knowledge is acquired, justified, and disseminated, while methodology pertains to the methods, approaches, and techniques employed in research and inquiry.Epistemological concerns arise from the diverse ways in which knowledge is constructed and understood. Different epistemological perspectives, such as positivism, constructivism, and postmodernism, shape how researchers perceive reality, interpret data, and establish the validity of their findings. The choice of epistemological stance influences the selection of research methods, data collection techniques, and analytical frameworks used in a study.

KEYWORDS:

Causality, Contextualization, Data validity, Ethical considerations, Generalizability, Hermeneutics.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the concept's conceptual usefulness, applying it to the Arab and Iraqi setting generates two distinct sets of issues: one epistemological, the other theoretical and moral. From an epistemological standpoint, the idea's Western roots expose its use and application to the charge of ethnocentrism. Or, to put it another way, can a theory developed from the historical experience of the West improve our comprehension of Arab politics and society? Is the application of the public sphere to Arab politics and society an instance of using a "imported" idea? Additionally, applying the idea to Arab civilizations presents concerns from the perspective of "ordinary language" philosophy. The idea is not widely accepted in the Arab world, so the absence of socially accepted guidelines or standards for its application by Arab or Western scholars runs the risk of producing an analytical discourse that is only accessible to a select group of academics and intellectuals. How can a notion that has little resonance with Arab intellectuals and the educated Arab publicbe useful in understanding Iraqi and Arab politics, communicating the findings of that analysis, and meaningfully influencing politics?

The second set of worries is theoretical and has to do with the bigger context that is needed to place the idea of the public sphere in Iraq. What kind of environment is the public sphere in Iraq? What shape did it have when it first appeared historically? What historical precedentsmore particularly, whose institutions and procedures allow us to talk about an Iraqi public sphere? What were the causes that aided in its development, especially at a specific period of history? Is Iraqi society's public sphere restricted to certain areas and social classes? What contributions to Iraq's social and political life has the public sphere made? We will be able to define an Iraqi

public sphere more clearly and evaluate its effect with the help of the responses to these questions. As I shall demonstrate, the political economy of Iraqi society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the way that social class, ethnicity, and tribe interacted to create the Iraqi nationalist movement, cannot be separated from the emergence of the public sphere. In order to fully comprehend the processes that shaped the concept's growth, structure, and significance, it must be historically contextualized[1]–[3].What are the normative ramifications of this study if, as I shall argue, there was an Iraqi public sphere in the early half of the 20th century? Does the concept's application to Iraq help us better comprehend the chances of fostering democracy and re-establishing civil society in the post-Ba'thist era? What are the consequences of the idea for those trying to make Iraq more tolerant and participatory? If we are to understand how the idea of the public sphere might enhance our understanding of ways to promote greater political freedom and tolerance in the Arab world, the problem of cross-cultural knowledge and the problem of a private language need to be addressed. While the intention of applying concepts that promote understandings of the development or lack of development of democratization in the Arab world is laudable[4]. Can the notion of the "public sphere" have a substantial political and social influence in the Arab world if it lacks a practical component as a result of a broad variety of intellectual and political players being unable to include it in their political discourse?

In response to these epistemological issues, it might be argued that the difficulties in utilizing Western ideas in non-Western settings are often overstated. According to this argument, ethnocentrism is not always the outcome when Western notions are introduced into non-Western analytical and political discourse. For instance, the term civil society, which is closely related to the public sphere, encountered similar issues when it was first used by Arab scholars like Dr. Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, the founder and former director of the Ibn Khaldun Center in Cairo, who placed emphasis on initiatives centered around this concept.

The idea had a very Western feel to it at first and was not commonly recognized or often employed in Arab political discourse. Nevertheless, the idea of civil society has gained considerable acceptance in Arab academic and political circles and is now central to the intellectual conversation in the area. Al-Sabah and al-Mada are two Iraqi newspapers that came out after the Ba'thist administration fell in 2003 and include sections dedicated to civil society in their regular editions.

Another illustration of the risk of exaggerating the difficulties in implementing Western ideas in non-Western environments comes from the literature on democratic transitions. In the end, it was found that the idea of the "prerequisites of democracy," which dominated most of the modernization literature of the late 1950s and early 1960s, was a poor indicator of how democracies would evolve in non-Western cultures.9 Following the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, democratic governance spread to many non-Western regions of the world, highlighting the problematic nature of much of the earlier theorizing on democratic transitions which maintained that a nation-state must reach a certain level of economic development before democratic governance can take hold. Many less developed nations, including Mali, Benin, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, and Bangladesh, have recently been able to establish and maintain democratic politics, at least in the sense of participatory elections. This suggests that, in some cases, ideas may cross cultural boundaries with fewer difficulties than might initially appear possible[5], [6].

DISCUSSION

Civil Society and The Public Sphere

The public sphere, the cousin of civil society but less developed intellectually, may be better positioned in the Arab and Iraqi setting by taking a closer look at its intellectual history. At least three political changes that occurred in the Arab world in the late 1980s and early 1990s contributed to the region's growing interest in the idea of civil society. The first was the pan-Arabist ideology's fatigue in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Pan-Arabism failed to bring about the unity, freedom, and socialism it had promised. Instead, it increased authoritarianism, heightened rivalry among the most powerful Arab states over who would rule the newly unified "Arab nation," and spread corruption as pan-Arabist political elites took advantage of the public sector for their own nepotistic gain after nationalizing foreign capital[7].

The growth of Islamist political groups in the 1970s and the successful establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran after the fall of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi dynasty in 1978–1979 were the second and third factors that contributed to the notion of civil society's expansion. The idea that revolutionary change would, ipso facto, bring about the hoped-for political, social, and economic reforms sought by many Arab intellectuals was prevalent among pan-Arabists as well as pan-Islamists prior to the Iranian Revolution. However, the intensification of authoritarian rule and violations of human rights under the Khomeini regime undermined this idea.

Third, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its East Block allies in 1991 highlighted the contrast between the new democratic freedoms many former communist states came to enjoy and the absence of such freedoms in the Arab world. This collapse not only deprived many authoritarian pan-Arab regimes of financial and military support. Although the importation of Western parliamentary forms of government under British and French colonial rule between World War I and World War II proved largely to be a failed experiment that discredited Western liberalism, Arab intellectuals began to reexamine Western liberal thought during the 1990s to enhance their understanding of democracy in the Arab world.

The increasing interest in the public sphere in the Arab world is a reflection of the same socio-political dynamics that previously supported the idea of civil society. The public sphere is a space where rational conversation may take place and is accessible to vast numbers of civic-minded persons. In this way, the idea of civil society may be expanded to include the public realm. Interest in these ideas is mostly a reaction to the strong corporatism that underlies pan-Arab and Islamist thought and leaves little place for individual liberties or political or cultural pluralism. The extent to which the corporatist structure inherent in both ideologies has facilitated the suppression of cultural tolerance and political participation as well as the spread of human rights abuses has come to the attention of a growing number of Arab scholars, including a large number of Iraqi intellectuals who were at the forefront of such thinking following the disastrous 1991 Gulf War and subsequent unsuccessful Intifada[8], [9].

What implications does this process have for the potential analytical utility of the concept of the public sphere? Both the concepts of civil society and the public sphere can be seen as parts of a process of reexamination of Western liberal political thought that is being rehabilitated in some Arab intellectual circles. The idea of the public sphere is deeply rooted in Western historical experience, whether it came from Tocqueville, Mill, or Habermas' writings.12 The rise of individual rights and liberal political thought in general have not only given the idea a

distinctively Western flavor, but have also made it into a category that has come under fire for excluding specific groups and the interests they represent. One could argue that notions of economic inequality are also ignored because liberal thought, generally, fails to systematically theorize the concept of social class and distributive justice. This is similar to the way that women, gays, people of color, and religious and ethnic groups are "undertheorized" in the liberal discourse of the public sphere. If historical contextualization is a problem, it begs the question of whether the public sphere idea may be "broadened" to include a wider mental world. This is crucial in the context of Iraq, where the public sphere has historically been associated with popular political and social inclinations as well as issues of social justice. In order to address the historical and social character of the notion, a closer look at Habermas's definition of the public sphere may be helpful.

The idea of the public sphere according to Habermas

In exploring the idea of the public sphere, we see that one issue with Habermas's original formulation is his ambiguity on the mechanisms that led to its emergence. Given this flaw, Habermas' claim that the public sphere is only useful conceptually in relation to a certain social historical experience is debatable. Habermas makes a strong connection between the advent of capitalism and the expansion of markets during the Industrial Revolution and the formation of the public sphere. The rise of a specific social class, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, whose increased political influence was facilitated by the development of the public sphere, per Habermas, was linked to the political changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution, which resulted in the development of representative institutions and the notion of individual rights. The Industrial Revolution's primary processesthe expansion of capitalism and the growth of marketshave not, however, just affected Western cultures. Although the democratic impulses brought about by the expansion of capitalism may not have grown as much in non-Western nations as they did in some of Western Europe, especially England, these impulses are nevertheless there, indicating the emergence of local public spheres beyond the West[10].

The expansion of capitalist production relations and their associated markets on a worldwide scale would seem to show that the prerequisites for the emergence of the public sphere are not unique to the European experience. Contrary to Habermas, I contend that categorizing the public sphere as a "Western" idea is not very helpful. Instead, we should investigate if the prerequisites for its implementation are there in Iraq and, if they are, we must look at the functional counterparts of the public sphere in Iraqi society and how they affect the political process.

The public sphere must be constructed logically and methodically in order to be applied to Iraq. In each location, there must be fundamental shifts in social and political awareness before the public sphere may begin to flourish. It follows logically that in order to create a public space, awareness must first shift. This consciousness must specifically embody unhappiness with the political system in place. Additionally, the concept of the public sphere denotes the growth of a crucial social mass. In other words, there must be an increase in the proportion of members of the dissatisfied social strata who are prepared to channel their feelings of unhappiness into actions that aim to alter perceptions of political authority as well as the structure and procedures of the current political institutions. One can only start to imagine the conditions necessary for the emergence of the public sphere once a specific numerical threshold has been crossed and the unhappiness of particular social strata has crystallized into oppositional ideologies, as it did among Habermas's entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. Other logical precursors to the emergence of the public realm exist in addition to these processes. One of the most crucial factors is the dedication

of those social groups engaged in bringing about political change to the concept of nationhood and an emerging conception of citizenship. Therefore, the concept of the public sphere is closely related to shifts in political identity.

In conclusion, the idea of the public sphere has to be placed within its historical and social context and regarded as a component of a larger process including major economic and social change. The public sphere must be seen as part of a participatory process rather than just as a physical location or area because it necessitates changes in the worldviews of individuals who aspire to create and utilize it. The institutional manifestations of the public sphere and the political discourse forms that have taken place within its structural confines must both be examined if we are to use the concept to better understand efforts, both historical and contemporary, to develop civil society and democracy in Iraq. Furthermore, we must distinguish between this condition and the historical-social processes that shaped its particular manifestations. I would contend that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Iraq, all of the prerequisites for the emergence of the public sphere were satisfied. As I will show, the kind of critical discourse that Habermas associates with the public sphere started to emerge in Iraq in the late 1800s. However, if not for the significant social and economic transformations that took place in Iraqi society in the nineteenth century, this emerging discourse would not have been conceivable. These developments, which were sparked by Iraq's entry into the global economy, led to the country's economy changing from one that was mostly based on subsistence and, to the degree that commerce occurred, was locally centered to one that was connected to European markets, namely the British economy. The rural areas underwent societal development along with this integration process. Many tribesmen became peasants as land prices rose throughout the course of the nineteenth century and the Ottomans made active attempts to sedentize Iraqi tribes. In response to what often devolved into oppressive agricultural circumstances, many peasants fled the countryside for cities. The migration of people from rural to urban regions upended established patterns of ethnic identity and values, which had significant social and cultural ramifications. Urban regions eventually provided the critical mass of intellectuals and political activists necessary for the creation of the Iraqi public sphere as an Arabic education system developed.

Putting Iraq's public realm in its proper context

This is predicated on the idea that the idea of the public sphere has to be reframed in order to reflect the political and social realities of the cultures to which it is applied. If the public sphere exemplifies a discursive space where reasoned discourse can take place and a participatory space open to all facets of society, then it can help us better understand the origins of processes in Arab society that can advance concepts and institutions that emphasize tolerance and dialogue, two fundamental principles that form the basis of all forms of democratic governance. Beyond giving each person a political and social space, the public sphere is significant in that it contributes to the establishment of a strong framework for democratic processes.

Democracies in the Arab world often differ from those in the West. This is particularly evident when contrasting Arab nations with later industrializing nations. In the latter, hegemonic notions of the market, particularly after the fall of communism, have marginalized the idea of social democracy, as demonstrated by the 1930s American New Deal policies, and instead have focused on a limited and formalistic definition of democracy built around the ideas of competitive elections and the movement of elites. Throughout the 20th century, Iraqi notions of democracy consistently placed emphasis on the right to vote and the freedom of the press. The majority of

Iraqis have not viewed political freedoms exercised in an environment devoid of national independence and economic security as meaningful, according to this understanding of democracy, which was prevalent in the modern era. These worries point to a discrepancy between the political discourse of the Iraqi public and the emphasis on laissez-faire economics and state withdrawal from the market that is so crucial to much Western theorizing of democratic processes and transit. Indeed, the shocking failure of American strategy in Iraq during the Bush administration starting in 2003 was evidence of the inflexible market-oriented "neoconservative" concept of democracy and its lack of resonance with Iraqi culture.

Institutional representations of the public sphere in Iraq

In Iraq's past, the public sphere has taken many different forms in various locations. The emergence of poetic expression in the late nineteenth century was the initial place. As European states encroached more and more on the Empire's territory, many Arab residents started to criticize the Ottomans for their inability to fend off European colonialism. Whereas poetry had traditionally been largely expressed in classical genres and in apolitical terms, or had been used to extol the virtues of the Ottoman viceroy in Iraq. One of the most obvious ways that the Arab subjects of the empire expressed their rage was via poetry. The development of an Iraqi press served as a second location for the emergence of an Iraqi public sphere, but this poetry was merely the explicit expression of a process that had started much earlier among Arab citizens of the collapsing Ottoman Empire who were engaged in a complex and extensive discussion over the future course of their society. This growth became particularly obvious during the infamous Young Turk Revolt of 1908. The Committee of Union and development, which spearheaded the insurrection, placed a strong focus on the ideas of development and reform. This helped the tiny and primarily secular Iraqi intelligentsia, which went on to start several publications after 1908. Newspapers often had affiliations with political or reform-minded groups that were a part of the burgeoning Iraqi nationalist movement, indicating that they reflected only the apex of a much larger infrastructure connected to the emerging public sphere. In addition to reporting the news of the day, these newspapers also created a forum in which the idea of Iraq as a unified political and socio-cultural entity could be discussed.

The formation of physical locations where nationalist and oppositional discourse might take place was the third location for the development of the public sphere. The most significant institutional elements of the Iraqi public sphere were coffeehouses, social clubs connected to newly established professional groups, and salons for writers and artists. The coffeehouse was the most well-known and established of these locations, which was discussed in more depth.

Thinking about the public sphere

Here is a conceptual framework for placing the idea of the public sphere in Iraq historically and politically. This framework is based on four empirical traits of the pre-1963 Iraqi nationalist movement that were crucial to the emergence of a public sphere in that country: interethnic cooperation, commitment to associational behavior, national forms of political communication, and artistic innovation that both emphasized local culture and posed a threat to political authority.

Inter-ethnic Harmony

Since the early 20th century, Iraqis have often shown a dedication to interethnic cooperation in their political practice. Iraqi nationalist discourse assumed an inclusive quality from its inception,

from efforts by Sunni and Shi'i no in Baghdad to develop an Arabic language education system after the turn of the twentieth century, to the unifying chorus of Sunni and Shi'i poets in their criticism of the government. The numerous empirical examples of such political and social cooperation refute the essentialist notion of Iraq as a "artificial" nation-state torn by ethnic and confessional divisions.

The majority of the British invasion of Iraq during World War I fell on the Shi'a community, which started in Basra in the south. Shi'i clerics carefully emphasized that they spoke for all of Iraq, not just its Shi'i people, when they issued religious decrees denouncing the British invasion, showing a desire for interethnic collaboration. It is vital to emphasize that the religious directives were designed to safeguard Iraq as a nation-state with well-defined borders, an obviously modern idea, not than some ill-defined Islamic community. The self-rule that the shrine city of al-Najaf experienced between 1916 and 1918 after the Ottomans withdrew was marked by tolerance, which was reflected in the adoption of a proto-constitution that outlined the rights of the residents of the city's many neighborhoods. Similar tolerance might be seen at the nearby shrine city of Karbala.

Self-consciously organizing nationalist demonstrations that included all of Iraq's ethnic groups, the leaders of the June–October 1920 Revolution, also known as "the Great Iraqi Revolution," even went door–to–door asking Jews and Christians to join, claiming they were full Iraqi citizens. In addition to praying in their own mosques and participating in their separate rites and festivals, Sunnis and Shi'a competed to write the best nationalist poetry. In addition to demonstrating the impact of the oral tradition in Arab culture, poetry played a vital role in Iraqi nationalism by mobilizing the most popular form of expression in Iraqi society. Poetry evolved become a crucial medium for connecting urban nationalists with rural tribes and communities. Building on a cultural history shared by all groups in Iraqi culture, cross-regional and cross-ethnic dialogue was fostered in a syncretic manner.

Anis al-Nusuli, a Syrian secondary school teacher, had written a history of the 'Umayyad Empire that some Shi'i clerics considered objectionable. In 1928, the Minister of Education, who had previously held the one Shi'i ministry in the government, attempted to have him fired. As a result of this endeavor, several public protests by Iraqi students of various ethnic backgrounds seeking the reinstatement of al- Nusuli were held. The "al-Nusuli affair" was significant because it revealed how Iraqi sectarianism is artificially created. It also showed how generational factors were involved. Sectarianism was of little interest to people outside of government, such as students, who had little stake in the dominant Iraqi political economy, while Sunni and Shi'i Arabs in Iraq's many ministries had an incentive to emphasize it as a method for increasing their political influence. A political community defined in terms of ethnicity or confession, which they perceived as a component of an antiquated and corrupt political system and a colonial strategy of "divide and conquer" meant to pit one ethnic group against another, was rejected by younger Iraqis who were socialized through the nationalist movement.

All ethnic groups in Iraq participated in the General Strike of 1931 in the 1930s in opposition to British plans to significantly raise municipal power tariffs. The British eventually capitulated and cancelled the intended hikes after encountering widespread public resistance that cut across ethnic lines. The General Strike was notable for the cooperation between the traditional artisan sector of Iraq, which had just formed a national organization called the Association of Artisans, and the emerging labor movement, which had started to form unions in the late 1920s, particularly in the Iraq State Railways, among the Basra port workers, and in the oil industry. In

actuality, the Association of Artisans and the fledgling labor unions were instrumental in organizing the anti-British movement. Again, interethnic harmony was essential to the strike's success.

There are several additional instances of interethnic collaboration that may be cited, such as protests against Iraqi and British-owned businesses that failed to pay their employees fairly or provide safe working conditions. The workers' reluctance to go back to work until imprisoned striking leaders were given their jobs was a common feature of many of these strikes, especially when this resistance persisted in the face of promises of higher pay or better working conditions. The unity shown by employees from a broad range of ethnic origins demonstrated that the lower classes in Iraq as a whole were not much influenced by sectarian awareness. Labor union activity and organization saw a real explosion during the revolution of July 1958. Over 200 labor unions had registered with the Iraqi government by the summer of 1959.

The Wathba of 1948, the Intifada of 1952, and the protests and riots of 1955 and 1956 against the Baghdad Pact and the Tripartite invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel, respectively, were post-World War II nationalist upheavals that exemplified cross-ethnic unity. The June 1954 elections, which were the most democratic in Iraqi history prior to those held in 2005, demonstrated not only the ability of Sunni and Shi'i Arabs to cooperate in order to win seats in the Iraqi parliament, but also the ability of political parties of various ideologies to come together.27 Despite attempts by the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, which had just been founded, to dismantle the National Electoral Front, formed in 1952 between Iraqist, or local nationalists, and moderate Arab[11].

CONCLUSION

Researchers may improve the quality and rigor of their work, advance knowledge, and take on challenging social, scientific, and practical problems by engaging with epistemological and methodological issues. In order to produce meaningful and significant research outputs, this abstract invite researcher and academic to be cognizant of epistemological and methodological factors. Additionally, ethical issues are fundamental to both methodological and epistemological issues. Informed permission, privacy, secrecy, and the appropriate use of data are all challenges that researchers must deal with. Protecting the rights and wellbeing of study participants and fostering the ethical conduct of research depend on ethical concerns. the value of critically analyzing methodological and epistemological issues in research. It emphasizes how crucial it is to match the right methodological techniques with the right epistemological viewpoints in order to improve the validity, reliability, and applicability of research findings. It also underlines the need of ethical behaviors throughout the research process and draws attention to the ethical aspects of research that are inherent.

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CHAPTER 21

COMMITMENT TO ASSOCIATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Dr. Anantha Subramanya Iyer, Associate Professor, Department of Marketing,
CMS Business School, JAIN Deemed to-be University, Bangalore, India,
Email Id- asi@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

This explores the concept of commitment to associational behavior, which refers to an individual's dedication and active participation in various associations, organizations, or groups. Associational behavior encompasses engagement in social, civic, professional, or recreational groups and plays a vital role in fostering community, collective action, and personal development.Commitment to associational behavior is rooted in individuals' motivations, values, and beliefs. It reflects their sense of belonging, identification with a group's mission or goals, and the perceived benefits and rewards of participation. This commitment is driven by a range of factors, including social connections, shared interests, personal growth opportunities, and the desire to contribute to a cause or community.

KEYWORDS:

Activism, Civic engagement, Community involvement, Grassroots movements, Group participation, Organizational commitment.

INTRODUCTION

A person's readiness to participate in and support diverse social, cultural, and political organizations and groups is referred to as commitment to associational conduct. Associational activity might include joining clubs, local organizations, political parties, and advocacy groups. A strong civil society and democracy depend on commitment to associational conduct. It enables people to band together to pursue shared interests, fight for their rights, and take part in politics. Additionally, it offers chances for social and cultural interaction, which may foster understanding and social cohesiveness[1]–[3].

Commitment to associational activity has many advantages, such as:

a) Participating in organizations and groups gives people the chance to become involved in their communities' civic affairs and advance the common good.

b) Social capital is defined as the networks, standards, and trust that promote cooperation and collaboration among people and organizations. Associational behavior may aid in the development of social capital.

c) Political representation: Being a member of political parties and advocacy organizations may assist to guarantee that the political process is inclusive of a variety of views and viewpoints.

d) Participating in organizations and groups may help people develop personally by giving them chances to learn new things, acquire new skills, and advance personally.

A dedication to associational conduct is the second conceptual element that supports the creation of a public sphere in Iraq. Iraqis have been joiners and have been building a network of civic, economic, intellectual, and political groups from the beginning of the nationalist movement. This was particularly true after the Young Turk Revolt, which highlighted the Ottoman Empire's Turkish identity and constitutional government. The Ottoman Empire's inability to defend Iraq and its other Arab provinces from European colonial incursion, the CUP's "Turkification" of the Empire, the growth of Iraqi urban areas, and the parallel expansion of the press and educational systems created the conditions that allowed Iraqis to organize in the context of a developing sense of national identity. Many of the early groups were Arab ones founded in Istanbul or Cairo that had a sizable Iraqi membership rather than being solely Iraqi. The most notable of these early attempts at political organization was perhaps Al-'Ahd, a group of Arab officers in the Ottoman army, particularly Iraqi soldiers. Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society, Literary Assembly, Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Party, Reform Society, National Scientific Society, Mosul Literary Club, Mosul Scientific Club, and Islamic Renaissance Society of al-Najaf are other organizations worth mentioning. These are only a few of the numerous instances of Iraqi political, cultural, and social organizations that were established long before the current state was actually established in 1921 by the Hashimite dynasty.

After the war was over and Iraq was put under a League of Nations mandate granted to Great Britain in 1920, many other organizations, particularly political parties, followed these. An influential and well-respected civic and political group called the Haras al-Istiqlal, which was mostly made up of former Ottoman public officials. Professional groups, such as the Lawyers Association, were established in the late 1920s in addition to political parties and labor unions. These organisations were eventually joined by those for teachers, journalists, and engineers.The many literary and artistic groups that started to emerge throughout the 1930s and particularly after the conclusion of World War II may be added to the list of political organizations, professional societies, and labor unions. The Iraqi Writers Association, the Society for Modern Art, the Pioneers, a sizable group of intellectuals connected to the journal New Culture, which debuted in 1953 and was subsequently shut down by the government, and poets who spearheaded the incredibly avant-garde Free Verse Movement[4]–[6].

DISCUSSION

National forms of political communication

Political communications are disseminated to the general public of a nation or country through national means of political communication. A number of elements, including the nation's political structure, culture, media environment, and historical background, have an impact on these communication channels.

Here are a few examples of national political communication:

i. Speeches during political rallies:

In many nations, political speeches and rallies are typical forms of political communication. They provide politicians a chance to meet with citizens and express their views on public policy and the future of the nation.

ii. Political Advocacy

Another typical method of political communication in many nations is political advertising. This may include billboards, print media, and radio and TV advertisements.

iii. Debates

In many nations, political discussions play a significant role in the electoral process. They provide candidates a chance to interact directly, lay out their policy stances, and describe their vision for the nation.

iv. The Internet

In many nations, social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram have grown in significance as a means of political communication. These platforms are used by politicians and political parties to connect with people, provide news and information, and organize supporters.

v. Official Media

State-owned media organizations have a substantial impact on political communication in various nations. The government often makes use of these platforms to spread its programs and steer the political discourse.Public opinion polling: In many nations, public opinion polling is a significant method of political communication. Polls are used to determine public opinion and to assist politicians and political parties in crafting messages that would appeal to voters.

The proliferation of national forms of political communication that were oriented beyond regions and ethnic groups represented a third aspect of the nationalist movement. The rise of the Iraqi press was aided by the Young Turk Revolt, the British invasion of Iraq, the 1920 Revolution, and the imposition of a League of Nations mandate, which all occurred after 1908. After that, the press in Iraq grew significantly. Iraqi newspapers served as a platform for both criticism of the British colonial presence there and the need for full independence, as well as a venue for the publication of literary works by poets, authors, and critics. Many Iraqi intellectuals played multiple roles, as evidenced by the fact that some of the country's most significant writers and poetsincluding Mahmud Ahmad al-Sayyid, Anwar Shawwal, and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahirialso worked as journalists.30 While the Hashimite monarchy and the British frequently shut down newspapers and publications that were critical of the government, the organizations that published them quickly reopened them under new names. Newspaper publishers' determination to withstand the state's attempts to stifle them was a clear indication of the need for Iraqis to connect with one another and is a crucial component of the public sphere[7], [8].

The expansion and politization of coffee shops in metropolitan areas is a significant sign of the desire to interact across geographic and cultural boundaries. Some of Baghdad's most well-known coffee shops were traditionally linked to powerful merchant families and situated near important marketplaces, or they served as gathering places for traditional intellectuals. This was true, for instance, of the four coffee shops operated by the 'Ukayl tribe, which was well-known for its engagement in international commerce, in the Hamada Market. In the late nineteenth century, as the nationalist movement gained momentum, many coffee shops started to expand beyond their more conventional usage. Coffeehouses started to take on an increasingly political dimension rather than merely serving as a place to unwind and exchange information, whether socially or commercially, or as a gathering place for men of letters.

The coffeehouse's venerable history as a well-known establishment gave it the perfect setting for a developing nationalist political discourse. A new clerical middle class that was connected to jobs in the growing economy and in the governmental bureaucracy evolved with the rise of commerce in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Despite being a relatively tiny

social class, this new middle class utilized the coffee shop as a forum to debate and organize their ideas on societal, cultural, and political issues.

Middle-class individuals lacked the resources necessary to establish private literary salons. These effendiyya increasingly visited the coffee shop instead of having spacious houses where they might gather. The coffeehouse came to be associated with a discourse of political opposition as nationalist sentiment grew, particularly as the Ottoman Empire was unable to stop the spread of European colonialism into its former territories, and especially after the 1908 Young Turk Revolt attempted to impose a more Turkish identity on the Empire's remaining provinces.

Thus, the development of the clerical middle classes and their need for a public setting where they could exchange political, social, and cultural information can be seen in the establishment of the coffeehouse. To put it another way, the coffeehouse showed how conventional forms of discourse, like the literary salon, were unable to meet the requirements and preferences of a new social strata by reflecting an expanding public sphere. Over time, some coffee shops began to be associated with certain political ideologies. The fact that Iraqi nationalists often visited one or more coffee shops after a political demonstration was proof of the importance of these places politically.

The most fascinating aspects of the coffee shop were its internal dynamics. The news could be read and debated here for the poor, who were either illiterate or unable to purchase daily newspapers. Nationalist poets also performed their rhymes for the audience here. Poets were compelled to conceal their ideas through allusion and double-entendre because the government regularly sent informers to coffeehouses with a nationalist bent, teaching the audience how to decode the intricacies of political commentary contained in the poetry being read. In this way, the coffee shop developed into a cultural institution that promoted the emergence of a sophisticated political discourse in which communicational delicacy and subtlety were the watchwords. A "traditional" institution evolved into a place where Iraqis were indoctrinated into the key political inclinations of the time, in addition to being a crucial nationalist movement tool. Some of Iraq's most well-known political activists and intellectuals were drawn to certain coffeehouses as a result of their metamorphosis into a national institution rather than one with a local or urban district emphasis.

Many already-existing coffeehouses gained a more politically-oriented clientele as a new generation of nationalist youth began to mature in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and new politically-oriented coffeehouses continued to appear. The 'Arif Agha cafe developed as a gathering spot for opposition journalists and teachers who had been fired from government employment in the early 1930s. Other coffee shops, including those named for two of Iraq's most well-known poets, al-Rusafi and al-Jawahiri, were also well-known gathering spots for intellectuals and activists.

We can see that Iraqis had established an extensive network of communication by the end of the 1930s, indicating a national consciousness and a desire to cooperate, by taking into account the growth of programmatic political parties, the rise of the press, the expansion of coffeehouses and their restructuring along more explicitly political lines, and the development of a network of social clubs that represented the interests of profession- als, chari and religious groups, and sports groups.

Creative Invention

The process of developing fresh, unique works of art that depart from accepted rules and conventions is referred to as artistic innovation. It entails challenging and thrilling audiences by presenting new thoughts, styles, and methods that go beyond what is conventional or accepted in the realm of art. Since it allows artists to express their creativity in novel and interesting ways, artistic innovation is a crucial part of how art forms evolve. It enables artists to explore various angles and perspectives, as well as try out new materials, methods, and concepts. The use of novel materials, the adoption of novel methods, or the investigation of novel ideas or issues are just a few examples of how the arts may be innovative. For instance, the late 19th-century Impressionist movement was a major breakthrough in the field of painting because it departed from conventional forms and methods and placed an emphasis on the use of light and color. Broader cultural and societal developments might also have an impact on artistic creation. For instance, the development of digital technology has given artists the opportunity to experiment with new mediums, such interactive installations and digital art. The creative activity that was greatly influenced by the nationalist movement supported and contributed to all of the aforementioned processes. Artistic innovation that pushed the limits of political speech was a fourth component in the development of a public sphere. The growth of the Iraqi short story is one of the most significant literary phenomenon. Given the scarcity of printing presses and the expensive expense of publishing a full-length book, the short tale was particularly well suited to being published or serialized in daily newspapers. From the 1930s until the early 1960s, Iraqi short tale authors such Mahmud Ahmad al-Sayyid, 'Abd al-Malik Nuri, Gha'ib Tu'ma Farman, Edmund Sabri, Shakir Khusbak, and others rose to fame not only in Iraq but also across the Arab world. Short story writers were able to effectively convey to the general populace a strong sense of what was wrong with Iraqi society and the need for political action to bring about social justice and democratic rule by chronicling, among other themes, the socio-cultural and psychological disruption caused by the collapse of the rural economy, the migration of large numbers of Iraqis to urban areas, and the political corruption of the Hashimite monarchy under British colonial dominance.

The Free Verse Movement, which led to an original and dramatic revolution in Arab poetry, was perhaps the most stunning of the creative breakthroughs of the time before 1963. Iraqi poetry not only deviated from the traditional qas under the inspiration of Nazik al-Mala'ika, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, and 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Bayati in particular. despite using poetry in daring ways to defy convention, da form in poetic expression. Iraqi poetry from the 1950s made extensive use of symbols from ancient civilizations and its Arabo-Islamic past, reinterpreting the past while pushing the bounds of artistic and political expression in radical new directions. Even though a lot of 1950s art lacked a clear political message and was frequently very pessimistic about the future, the work as a whole was radical in that it urged Iraqis to question political and cultural authority rather than blindly accept the views promoted by the government or other traditional authorities, such as religious authority.

The Baghdad Group for Modern Art, headed by the Iraqi painter and sculptor Jawad Salim, coupled a keen interest in Western sculpture and painting with a passion for the aesthetic achievements of both Islamic and ancient Iraqi civilizations. The Baghdad Group sought to achieve the same revolutionary developments in painting and sculpture that Iraqi poets had accomplished in poetry, as noted by the artist Shakir Hasan at the time.36 What is noteworthy is not only the intellectual symbiosis of the Iraqi intelligentsia of the time, but also the challenging

of hegemonic discourses of authority and tradition in literature and the arts, which implicitly challenged political and traditional authority. The vibrant creative environment of the late 1940s and 1950s had a positive influence on fostering a deeper appreciation for racial and cultural variety as well as providing a foundational element and lasting legacy for civil society and democratic government.

Issues with the Public Sphere

This analysis of the empirical manifestations of the public sphere in the context of the pre-1963 Iraqi nationalist movement shows how the notion must be placed within a wider structural nexus in order to properly comprehend its political influence. Comparing the few nationalist organizations who did adhere to a sectarian definition of Iraqi political community with those that supported a more inclusive concept of political community allows for the easiest demonstration of the political implications of the public sphere. We must distinguish between Iraqist, or local nationalism, and pan-Arab nationalism in Iraq when talking about sectarian identities. Iraqist nation- alists asserted that, while recognizing and honouring Iraq's mostly Arab culture, establishing a democratic state founded on social justice and tolerance for ethnic variety was more important than doing so. In response, pan-Arabists contended that Iraq could only hope to resist Western colonial dominance by joining a pan-Arab state and regaining the historical greatness it had under Arabo-Islamic empires, particularly the "Abbasid Empire," centered in Iraq.37 Sectarian nationalist organizations were invariably pan-Arabist in ideology and heavily rooted in the Sunni Arab community.

The majority of the Sunni Arab political and sectarian organisations were military-based and stressed sectarian identities. As mentioned earlier, one of the first of these organizations, al-'Ahd, was made up mostly of Iraqi Ottoman army personnel. Al-Ahd already developed a dislike for the antisectarian Haras al-Istiqlal, which relied on ex-Ottoman intellectuals and public workers and stressed the openness of its membership. Many of the leaders who ruled the country under the Hashimite dynasty were also Sunni Arabs and former al-'Ahd members. Salih Jabr, the country's first Shi'i prime minister, did not take office until 1947. I contend that the advantages Sunni Arab sectarianism acquired through its links to the state, initially under the Ottomans and subsequently under the Hashimite dynasty, served as its foundation. If Iraq's notion of political community were to include all of the nation's ethnic groups, notably the majority Shi'a, as active participants in politics, members of al-'Ahd perceived a danger to these relationships in the emergence of a multiethnic nationalist movement. In fact, there are similarities in the attitudes of the 'Ahd, ex-Ba'thists, and extreme Islamists from the years following 2003, all of whom support the current insurgency in Iraq because, like their forebears, they too reject an Iraq characterized by political pluralism and cultural toleration.

The group of army commanders that controlled Iraqi politics between 1937 and 1941 is a second illustration of sectarian nationalism. Political activists affiliated with the pro-fascist Nadi al-Muthanna and the so-called "Four Colonels" who supplied the military backing for Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani's pro-Axis administration that overthrew British control in May 1941 made up this group. It must be acknowledged that army officers feared that Iraqi nationalists, who drew a lot of support from non-Sunni Arabs, would strip them of their privileged connections to the state bureaucracy and the military. Ideology undoubtedly played a role in the sectarian outlook of army officers who supported pan-Arabist policies. Sunni Arabs would lose a lot of their political and economic sway if Shi'a, Kurds, and other ethnic groups gained access to government jobs without regard to their ethnic origin.

Social class was crucial in illuminating this sectarian attitude. As a result of the fact that many Sunni Arab army soldiers, intelligence agents, and government officials came from the economically backward river towns of the so-called "Sunni Arab triangle," they saw access to state employment as their primary source of financial security. Strong emotions of animosity against non-Sunni Arabs were sparked by having to compete with Shi'a, Kurds, and other ethnic groups for posts within the state machinery, particularly in light of the dwindling economic possibilities in the Sunni Arab River cities. In summary, the larger Iraqist component of the nationalist movement predominated and offered a "big tent," i.e., a political movement that was open to members of all of Iraq's ethnic groups, and one that stressed the need to link political freedoms to social justice. Pan-Arabists, on the other hand, drew on a relatively small sector of society with privileged access to the state, namely rural and tribally based Sunni Arabs.

Political Unrest, the Public Realm, and Violence in Post-Baathist Iraq

What significance does the idea of the public sphere have for post-Ba'thist Iraq given the violence that has defined Iraqi politics and society since 2003? Can it not be argued that all of the positive remnants of the public sphere were destroyed by Saddam Husayn's Ba'thist regime's total destruction of civil society between 1968 and 2003, two major wars brought on by Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 and its seizure of Kuwait in 1990, the brutal suppression of the 1991 Intifada, and the harsh UN sanctions regime between 1991 and 2003?

The impact of the public sphere can still be seen in some of the dominant forms that Iraqi politics has taken since 2003, aside from the beneficial effects that the historical memory of civil society building and the expansion of the public sphere can have on contemporary Iraqi society, a factor that has been discussed. The simplest way to comprehend this influence may be to consider why sectarian militias and rebel groups have invested so much time and money into trying to destroy Iraq's professional classes. Why are professionals, notably university professors, journalists, doctors, artists, renowned sports people, and entertainers, the target of so much violence, including killings, physical intimidation, and kidnapping? Why are these groups targeted by assaults if the professional classes do not own any militias or significant quantities of economic resources? Why, and by whom, are professionals seen as such a threat.

The answers to these questions are crucial because they demonstrate how ideas, especially those rooted in historical memory, may affect and shape current Iraqi politics. Since 2003, a number of surveys of the general population have shown that Iraqis have continued to identify as Iraqis and have rejected sectarian fragmentation of the nation. Iraq's vulnerable and diminishing professional classes, who represent the most educated segments of society, are the most obvious manifestation of the ant sectarian tradition in Iraqi society. Large swaths of Iraqi society still hold the professional classes in high regard, and as a result, their opinions continue to have significant sway.

The political and economic objectives of sectarian militias, death squads, insurgent groups, and criminal organizations are threatened by concepts of interfaith tolerance and collaboration, however. These organizations progressively filled the political and economic void left by the near collapse of the school system in the 1990s, a weak and faction-ridden central state, a stagnant economy, a shortage of social services, and other factors after 2003. Forcing Iraqis to think in terms of vertically defined political identities, namely according to which ethnic group and religious sect they belong, rather than in terms of national and cross-ethnic terms, these groups intimidated local populations to assert their control over them. This was frequently done

by using physical violence. The educated middle and professional classes in Iraq continue to hold onto the idea that Iraq should be defined in Iraqi terms rather than in terms of sect, hence they are ipso facto seen as a severe danger by the extremist groups that have mushroomed in post-Ba'thist Iraq.

The reason the professional classes in Iraq continue to have significant influence is because they provide a model that is consistent with the views of the Iraqi populace and a counterbalance to attempts by extremist political groups to impose sectarian politics on Iraqi society. Thus, professionals in Iraq stand for an intellectual elite that supports the notion of a tolerant and nonsectarian political system in the country. Their ideals, which are generally ant sectarian and in favor of the history of interethnic collaboration dating back to the nationalist movement of the twentieth century, are the only weapon they have. The fact that these professionals, who reject sectarian beliefs, continue to be prominent targets of Sunni insurgents and Shi'i militias indicates the widespread rejection of a sectarian paradigm by Iraqi society as a whole. In fact, a BBC/ABC public opinion survey from April 2007 found that 94% of participants opposed splitting Iraq along sectarian lines.40 In other words, because of their opposition to sectarianism and their capacity to represent the antisectarian feelings of the general public, professional organizations in Iraq are seen as a danger by sectarian forces. The multi-ethnic makeup of Iraqi sports teams, for example, belies sectarian identities as do their everyday activities. Sports players have been murdered for wearing shorts or participating in activities deemed "anti-Islamic." Attacks have also been made against female performers and public servants who do not dress in a manner deemed proper by extremist elements.

These arguments demonstrate the potency of ideas and the continued relevance of the public sphere in Iraqi society today, even when doing so exposes antisectarian Iraqis to violence and physical danger. It is clear that there is still conflict inside Iraqi society in the framework of what Gramsci would refer to as a "war of position" since university professors continue to educate and journalists continue to publish pieces that subtly and overtly criticize sectarian politics.41 Many professionals make remarks on a regular basis that promote the notion of Iraq as a multiethnic and tolerant country, sometimes in the face of significant personal risk. Another indication of the influence of these ideals is how often sectarian leaders, like Muqtada al-Sadr, mention national unity and anti-sectarianism. Sectarian parties wouldn't have much reason to prioritize Iraqi identity over one based on one's ethnic group or religious sect if sectarian notions did, in fact, predominate among sizable sectors of the Iraqi population.

There is a "path dependency" that suggests the continuation of a historical memory of the pre-Ba'thist era that offers a vision of building an Iraqi civil society based on nonsectarian norms, despite the fact that conditions in Iraq do not point, in the near term, to the revival of the type of public sphere that existed during the late 1940s and 1950s. The assault on Baghdad's al-Mutannabi Street's secondhand book shop and renowned al-Shabandar Coffeehouse in March 2007 was a sign of sectarian groups' ongoing animosity against a historical memory built on tolerance, variety of knowledge, and cultural pluralism.

Iraqis have used the Internet as a means of avoiding physical violence, among other things. The growth and widespread use of blogs after 2003 may be seen as a substantial extension of the public sphere. Of course, the Ba'thist dictatorship heavily limited the use of computers. But as soon as Iraqis, particularly those who resided in cities, had access to the Internet, either via their own computers or the many Internet cafés set up after 2003, they started to produce a broad variety of blogs in both Arabic and English. Iraqi bloggers have developed into a significant

source of information about politics, government corruption, human rights, cultural movements, the American occupation, and the hardline Islamists' mistreatment of Islam. These blogs have sparked ire in sectarian and official circles, but it has been hard to stop them[9]–[11].

CONCLUSION

Strong associational behavior commitment has several advantages. Active participation in organizations offers chances for networking, teamwork, and peer learning. It encourages the sharing of ideas, information, and abilities and promotes both individual and collective development. Additionally, participating in associational activity helps build social capital, which improves community cooperation, trust, and cohesiveness. But maintaining associational behavior might be difficult. Time restraints, conflicting priorities, and shifting circumstances could make it difficult for people to continue participating. Additionally, obstacles linked to inclusion, accessibility, and organizational structures may make it difficult for people to participate, especially if they belong to disadvantaged or underrepresented groups. In order to overcome these obstacles, structural constraints must be removed, inclusive settings must be promoted, and assistance and resources must be made available to encourage and maintain associational behavior.

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CHAPTER 22

THE STATE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Dr. Asha. S, Assistant Professor, Department of Management,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id- asha_s2015@cms.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

This examines the relationship between the state and the public sphere. The public sphere refers to the social realm where individuals come together to engage in open and critical discussions on matters of public interest. It plays a crucial role in democratic societies, fostering informed public opinion, political participation, and the accountability of the state. The state, as a political entity with authority and power, has a significant impact on the functioning and accessibility of the public sphere. Governments have the responsibility to create an enabling environment that upholds freedom of expression, protects civil liberties, and ensures the inclusion and participation of diverse voices within the public sphere.

KEYWORDS:

Citizenship, Democracy, Freedom, Governance, Media regulation, Participation, Pluralism, Political.

INTRODUCTION

The political and social structure of every society is shaped by the interaction between the state and the public sphere. The state is a centralized political entity that has control over a certain geographic region and its inhabitants. The state is in charge of upholding the rule of law, providing public services, and safeguarding the welfare of its people. The state is the only decision-maker in issues of governance and has a monopoly on the use of force. On the other hand, the term "public sphere" describes the area where people gather to talk about and debate matters of public concern. Along with established organizations like the media, governmental agencies, and civil society groups, this may also refer to unofficial networks like social media and neighborhood associations. In democratic countries, the public sphere is crucial because it allows for the expression of many viewpoints and the shaping of public opinion[1]–[3].

The dynamic and complicated interaction between the state and the public sphere. To ensure that people have the freedom to express themselves and take part in political life, the state is obligated to support and safeguard the public sphere in democratic countries. To retain its hold on power, the state may attempt to censor or regulate the public sphere under authoritarian regimes. Although the pre-Ba'athist nationalist movement greatly contributed to the growth of an Iraqi public sphere and a larger civil society, neither of these developments alone can guarantee the emergence of a tolerant, democratic, and participatory society. This emphasizes the issues that arise when a conceptual approach solely considers one aspect of societyin this case, the public sphere and the closely connected idea of civil societywhile ignoring other elements of the political system.

The institutional fragility of the state has been contemporary Iraq's main political issue. As a result, the dynamic civil society and public sphere that emerged from the Iraqi nationalist movement never benefited from an institutional setting that would have allowed them to transform their contributions into long-lasting political practices. The inclusive and tolerant characteristics of Iraqi politics at the mass level have not led to good change at the level of the state due to the absence of institutional development. Instead, the state has been characterized by either corporatist forms of political organization dominated by an authoritarian ruler, such as those that emerged under 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, and subsequent Arab nationalist and Ba'thist regimes, or by weak and venal elite coalitions that Iraqis referred to as the "merchants of politics," such as those under the Hashimite monarchy between 1921 and 1958. In addition to the fact that Iraqis have never been able to agree on a single definition of what constitutes a political community, one of the fundamental issues in Iraqi society has been the ongoing gap between a strong and effective public sphere and a dynamic civil society. After the fall of Saddam Husayn's Ba'thist dictatorship in 2003, the issue of state incapacity and shaky legitimacy came to a climax. Iraq has endured extreme political instability since the Ba'thist administration was overthrown, which has cast major doubt on the viability of establishing a democratic democracy. Since 2003, violence in Iraq has been largely fueled by the fear of various groupsdefined not only by their ethnicity but also by their social class, region, age, and political backgroundthat they will be excluded from political participation and economic opportunity in the "new Iraq." This issue has been made worse by the Ba'thist regime's deliberate destruction of most facets of civil society during its rule from 1968 to 2003 and the absence of any political institutional infrastructure that would serve as the foundation for the establishment of a democratic polity. It is not surprising that democracy has had difficulty if we combine an ineffective central state with a dysfunctional economy with unemployment rates reaching 60 to 70 percent, especially among youth who make up more than 60 percent of the population under the age of 25, extensive corruption in the Iraqi government, particularly in the distribution of Iraq's oil wealth, and the infiltration of government ministries, such as the potent Ministry of Interior, by sectarian forces[4]–[6].

DISCUSSION

The public sphere and Islam as invented tradition

These factors become much more crucial when we take into account the distorted interpretations of Islam that have been propagated in Iraq by Shi'i militias and Sunni insurgent groups. The ideologies being spread by extremist organizations, whether Sunni or Shi'i, in the name of Islam, indicate attempts to not only intimidate and repress antisectarian movements in Iraq but also to establish a sectarian political culture that is the opposite of the public sphere. One example of an attempt by Islamist radicals to skew historical memory is the claim made by the late leader of al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers, Abu al-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, that democracy is a form of political organization that the West is trying to impose on Iraqone that is foreign to Iraqi political culturemuch like how Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party attempted to control perceptions of the past through

Young Iraqis often learn about Islam from organizations that aim to further their own sectarian agendas since the state education system was substantially destroyed by the United Nations sanctions regime between 1991 and 2003 and is currently dysfunctional in many sections of the country. Even so-called religious authorities often just have a cursory knowledge of Islam. Muqtada al-Sadr, who had a subpar education in the 1990s and devoted a large portion of his time to political organization, is an excellent example. The necessity to reconstruct the national

education system and provide a significant number of Iraqi youth access to education is one of the crucial steps towards reconstituting the public sphere in post-Ba'thist Iraq. However, unless the issue of ongoing economic stagnation is solved, there is little chance that the educational system will play a significant part in the socialization of Iraqi youth.

Using historical memory to rebuild the public sphere in post-Baathist Iraq

As previously mentioned, one criticism of many of the claims made in this article is that the violence that has afflicted Iraq since 2003 has tainted the good effects of the public realm. The rest of this chapter will concentrate on how historical memory may be used to revive Iraq's history of a thriving civil society and public sphere.While it is relatively simple to document the emergence of a nascent civil society and public sphere in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the question is whether this rich tradition can be transformed into a political praxis that can help counterbalance the negative effects of Saddam Husayn's Ba'thist regime, the effects of the largely inept American occupation of Iraq, and the rise of sectarian political organizations. His- torical memory is a tool that has neither been fully conceptualized nor used as a kind of public policy. With the resources the dictatorship invested in its Project for the Rewriting of History, of which Saddam served as the nominal chairman, it is clear that Saddam and the Ba'th Party understood the importance of historical memory. Saddam and the Ba'th tried to reorganize how the Iraqi people thought about the past by using historical memory. The Ba'thist regime's efforts had mixed outcomes, but the issue is whether a different kind of historical memory, one that encourages the development of the public sphere, civil society, and the transition to democracy, can be used to achieve these goals.

The key thesis put forward here is that democratic activists, both within and outside of Iraq, should utilize the progressive historical memory of the period before to 1963 in order to achieve democratic reform as part of a process of reinvigorating the public sphere. Another crucial element of political praxis is to connect the evolution of the public sphere throughout the twentieth century to new forms of the public sphere in post-Ba'thist Iraq. This is because the democratic transition should be derived from the Iraqi historical experience rather than one imposed from without. Many radical forces contend that democracy is foreign to Iraq and that the West, particularly the United States, is attempting to impose democracy as a tradition on Iraq because there is no tradition in Iraqi political culture that values democratic practices and, consequently, the ideas of a tolerant civil society and an engaged public sphere.

Media

The use of the media and the Internet to communicate the achievements of the prior is one way that progressive forces within the Iraqi government and those in nonprofit organizations may aid in the promotion of the rebuilding of the public sphere. nationalist Ba'thist movement. When it is often impossible to sell a newspaper in a particular city or town owing to persecution by sectarian organizations, Iraqi newspapers, for instance, have played a significant role since 2003 by using the Internet to disseminate their editions. As was already said, blogs are a crucial source of information for Iraqis regarding every facet of their culture.

The promotion of Iraqi folklore was one of the most effective strategies used by the old Ba'thist administration to curry favor with the urban middle classes. When editions of the Journal of Popular Culture first appeared in Baghdad kiosks, they rapidly sold out due to its enormous popularity. The regime of 'Abd al-Karim Qasim offers a model in which folklore was promoted similarly, but to enhance, rather than divide, the Iraqi populace by stressing its unity in diversity.

The Iraqi government could follow the Qasim regime's lead by promoting folklore not only in the form of state-sponsored publications, but more importantly in the visual media, n. For instance, the television show Baghdadiyyat, which highlighted elements of Baghdad's folklore, including as folk poetry and the artisan manufacturing of special quarters, had a sizable viewership under the Ba'thist rule. The Iraqi government might make better use of the media to spread the historical memory of a tolerant political culture in light of the ongoing violence in Iraq and the restrictions this violence throws on the mobility and activities of many Iraqis. It would be quite effective to promote folklore through government-sponsored publications, the press, television, and movies, since many Iraqis still have origins in rural areas and are connected to rural social structures. Iraqis are very interested in folklore because it highlights their shared cultural heritage. As so, it provides a different way to get past the mistrust brought on by the evil Ba'thist lineage.

Many young Iraqis who don't remember the pre-Ba'thist period might benefit from knowledge about the fundamental social, cultural, and economic prerequisites for developing civil society and democracy via the construction of a large number of Web sites. The message of sectarian groups that seek to use xenophobic and particularistic identities to further their political and economic agendas could be countered by using such Web sites to emphasize not only gender equality but also religious and ethnic tolerance as well as a respect for social difference in general. Moderate clerics might explain Islam and its link to topics that concern young Iraqis in particular, such as moral advice, gender relations, and marriage, through websites and electronic bulletins. This information campaign might benefit from increased usage of radio and television. The national healing effort would be strengthened by such a campaign, and it would also help to broaden the public discourse.

Nationalist Intellectual Conferences

Innovative initiatives can also involve organizing gatherings of senior Iraqi thinkers to highlight the previous achievements. Many of these scholars are still based in Iraq and are old. Iraqi intellectuals could discuss the relevance of their work to the current phase of Iraq's attempt to end sectarian violence and work to create a more tolerant society at the conferences, which could be organized by sympathetic Iraqi government agencies, such as the Ministry of Culture, or NGOs, at relatively little cost. These are necessary conditions for any attempts to begin a meaningful transition to democracy. There may be funding for both reprinting previously published works by nationalist intellectuals with a democratic orientation and for encouraging more recent views from more established intellectuals. Given the current security situation, it might be possible to highlight aspects of the pre-1963 legacy of civil society building and democratic practices by organizing a number of national conferences of historians, secondary school teachers, and interested intellectuals that would be held in the Arab south as well as the Kurdish north, even if held in Iraqi Kurdistan or outside of Iraq. These conferences could serve as the basis for illustrating ideas intended to promote a democratic political culture.

Low-cost loans for the establishment of coffeehouses run by civic, intellectual, and artistic organizations might also be used to advance civil society institutions and attempts to reestablish the public realm. Despite insurgents' attempts to assassinate Iraqi intellectuals, journalists, artists, entertainers, and sports figures in order to reimpose authoritarian rule, there has been a revival of intellectual and artistic life since the fall of the Ba'thist regime. Many of these organizations have limited funding. With minor loans, they might set up coffee shops that they could use to extend their operations or, in risky locations, even set up shop underground and draw in more patrons. In

fact, a number of foreign organizations have been sponsoring the covert operations of Iraqi non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on a range of initiatives, from empowering women to promoting conflict resolution. This suggestion is yet another, reasonably priced tactic that may be used to support the restoration of civil society as a part of a more gradual transition to democracy in Iraq[7], [8].

Rewriting Textbooks for Secondary and Higher Education

Rewriting textbooks at the secondary school and university levels that place the concepts of civil society, tolerance, privacy, human rights, and the rule of law in the historical and cultural experience of Iraq rather than in abstract theoretical paradigms may also be part of these efforts to create a new historical memory. Even while many young people no longer go to school, they do watch state-run television, listen to state-run radio, or use the Internet, where historical information about Iraq may be disseminated. Instead of relying solely on historical examples from non-Iraqi settings, teachers and students would benefit from using the Iraqi experience as the dominant model for explaining concepts intended to foster a greater appreciation for democratic practices.

The degree to which many Arab Iraqis who have fled to Iraqi Kurdistan have been welcomed there is a noteworthy trend that has gotten little notice. This embrace of Arabs by Iraq's Kurds is extremely surprising given the ongoing attempts by successive Arab administrations in Baghdad to violently repress the Kurds, which even included the deployment of chemical weapons in the late 1980s. This welcome has even extended to the Kurdish Regional Government's creation of an Arabic secondary school system for the children of Arab Iraqis who have relocated to the north. The move of many educated Arab Iraqis to Kurdistan offers the chance for democratically inclined Kurds and Arabs to work together to create truly autonomous organizations of civil society and a vibrant public sphere by pressing the KRG to uphold its own democratic discourse because the Kurdish region has yet to develop meaningful democratic governance.

Iraqi Kurdistan has started to experience a process akin to that of the Arab south, namely the rise of political opposition that criticizes the nepotism and corruption of the two main Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, as increasing numbers of Kurdish youth find their ability to participate in politics restricted and their access to economic opportunities unavailable. Here is a chance for Arab and Kurdish Iraqis to work to create a nationalist movement with substantial democratic roots. Resources may be available to finance initiatives intended to broaden civil society and the public domain since many Arab businesspeople from the south have moved their capital to the more developed north. This is not to argue that the KRG would embrace these operations, but it also does not want to jeopardize its standing with Western governments and NGOs or create an unfavorable business environment for Western investors should it decide to drastically scale down attempts to advance democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Renegotiating the Rules of Coexistence in a Postwar Context: Conflict, Space, and the Public Sphere

Beyond the institutions that are often accepted as "legitimate" in democratic nations, such as the legislative, judicial, scientific, and media-related arenas, the examination of public spheres has to be based in particular contexts and settings. However, this is less concerned with locating public spheres in a particular community than it is with examining the prerequisites of their creation via varied everyday social experiences that underlie processes for creating spatial meaning. I will argue that spatial meaning-making, when exposed to others, and specifically to strangers,

constitutes a privileged way to generate both public and private understandings of space. By spatial meaning-making, I mean all the operations through which individuals, collective actors, or institutions ascribe meaning to space: from architecture and city planning to storytelling, poetry, and songs conveying memories and images of surrounding spaces, but also circulation and daily uses of the material setting. This method not only grounds public spheres in actors' actual social experiences, but it also gives us the opportunity to reclaim power in the analysis since the social construction of space is in fact a very contentious process. In order to maintain the sociospatial relations of power that now exist, control over physical space and, more significantly, the meaning of space itself, is necessary. An advantaged way to comprehend the circumstances behind the creation of public spheres in a constrictive political setting is via a geographical and daily-life-oriented prism. In the Turkish political mythology, Tunceli is a subversive zone that has been continuously stigmatized as heretical and a communist or Kurdish nationalist bastion. Tunceli is a hilly Kurdish Alevi province in eastern Turkey. The prov- ince has become an overly regulated space of surveillance as a result of the protracted conflict between the Turkish army and the Kurdish nationalist guerrilla group known as the PKK. Attempts to overthrow the political system are frequently prohibited or suppressed. As we'll see, this situation allows for individuals to literally renegotiate the power dynamic, the ground rules for cohabitation, and societal roles and categories.

"The term 'public sphere' is a spatial metaphor for an only partially spatial phenomenon," claims Craig Calhoun. Indeed, public spaces support and set the stage for public life, from the Greek agora through early modern markets, theaters, and parliaments. But just as parades affect streets, public events also change the places that are often claimed for private transactions. As a result, the public sphere will not be seen here as a realty that can be found, but rather as a realty that manifests via social behaviors. In the words of Louis Quéré, I shall speak to the public sphere as a phenomenon, that is, as a shape and an event. It "structures coexistence, configures social relations, and serves to apprehend events." The public sphere is a principle of social organization that creates behaviors and helps to give form to social interactions or copresence. As an event, it becomes apparent via the practices and connections it shapes and through the same events it serves to understand. A location is not necessarily public since it relies on these same acts and interactions to manifest: "The public sphere is the product of the very practices it calls for, enables and conditions. From this viewpoint. The manner in which certain behaviors or interactions take place, in line with certain standards and rituals, practices, and knowledge, makes it public.

What kind of processes and acts allow the "ordered environment" to arise, directing behaviors, discourses, and actions and giving them a public character? In urban sociology, several schools of thought have previously been examined on this topic. Erving Goffman in particular has observed how "civil inattention" organizes copresence in urban environments, which is an elaborate way of acknowledging the other's presence while establishing some distance, so as not to show too much attention or curiosity. Others have emphasized that urban space is not an empty setting: architectural devices, equipment, and services give city dwellers landmarks to interact with and structure their behaviors. Since the beginning of the 1990s, significant efforts have been made to go beyond the generally established distinction between urban and political publicness. Relieu and Terzi attempt to bridge the most routine activities of city life with political publicness by focusing on the variety of "engagement regimes" and forms of argumentation that actors use to produce and discuss public issues or justify themselves by referring to a "public good." As examples of many ways to "engage" with a public area, they include civic inattention,

taking part in a police inquiry as a witness, and collective action. Each of these actions helps to create an urban publicness. Urban public experiences, they claim, "embody and concretely constitute different modalities of living together," giving them a political dimension. Methodical operations governing activities in urban space are in fact enshrined in a system of normative mutual expectations: while adhering to a procedure or mobilizing specific knowledge in this space, one expects that the other will be able to act in a suitable manner. I anticipate that the drivers of the cars will stop and allow me cross if I am going to cross at a pedestrian crossing. Similarly, if I sprint with my baggage toward the train station, I anticipate that anybody in my path will get out of the way to make room for me to run and catch the train. This practical knowledge enables us to function as regular members of society, assists us in resolving day-to-day problems, and offers guidelines for appropriate behavior. But these systematic procedures and normative expectations also "create and maintain common ways of sensing, acting and judging... They determine, in the same movement, the viewpoint from which a community can consider itself as unified and the relevant categories to behave and circulate within this community.

What if we reintroduce power into the conversation? While controlling social relations, this normative basis and its related practices also help to keep a particular social order stable. People who support the system via their discourses, practices, and actions are seen as deserving members of the affected community and contribute to its perpetuation. Those who don't are branded, disqualified, and are more likely to cause confusion or embarrassment than they are to experience "public" praise or even punishment. Examples could be visitors disrespecting a sacred site, drivers failing to yield the right-of-way, individuals not waiting their turn while in line, as well as audience members talking loudly during a play, people disclosing their sexual orientation through provocative attire or behavior in a conservative environment, or participants unable to reframe their private interests in more universal terms during a debate on the "public good." Specific control mechanisms and tools may even exclude anyone without the necessary practical expertise from entering the public area in question. Each "engagement regime" in a public setting is therefore dependent on adherence to certain guidelines and information, establishing the group's boundaries and offering categories to categorize it, control its behaviors and discourses, and set it apart from the surrounding area. Sharing these protocols allows the "public" to develop inside the same movement. This "grammar of the public life" provides standards to assess the level of validity and visibility of behaviors, discourses, and acts in public. Every social structure, every cultural tradition, and every political system has its own definition of what is and is not acceptable in public, defining "proper" and "improper" conduct within a group. This definition evolves across time and location. According to my claim, public grammars change in accordance with the nature and evolution of power relations. The norms and regulations of social and political organization are enacted via this grammar. As a result, whenever and whenever actors organize to create breathing spaces, contest the prevailing normative framework, and subvert existing categories to construct new ones, public language is continually reassessed, but also renegotiated or contested. Through these renegotiations of the language, what was formerly kept secret, kept quiet, or thought to be illegal in public, may now push its way into the public arena.

Here, I'll take into account the possibility that public spheres may develop anytime social roles, norms controlling interaction and cohabitation, and categories for understanding the environment are renegotiated via spatial meaning-making processes. I concentrate on the contentious renegotiation of these laws between Tunceli residents and the local state officials in charge of security and surveillance, who are the most obvious enforcers. But one shouldn't forget that the

state is not uniform and that people in Tunceli have different perspectives on how to react to the state. This article's first section looks at how conflict has affected how local public life is organized. There seems to be little opportunity for people to create or even negotiate the strict spatial discipline that state agents require in terms of norms of cohabitation and circulation. The second section, which examines a power configuration in change, looks at how Tunceli residents and state agents both work to retake land. A larger conflict over allegiances may be seen in the staging and acting of national and local times and spaces, respectively. However, how does the creation of opposing spatial meanings, which highlights variety, really open the door for the resurgence of shared expectations and the potential formation of discussion and controversy spaces? The final one demonstrates how the people of Tunceli question preexisting categories of identity and interpretation in their surroundings by engaging, more or less purposefully, in fights over "contested spaces," which leads to some preliminary conclusions.

A Room that is Silent?

Residents of Tunceli have long-standing political violence, which has disrupted their everyday life. In 1984, the PKK began engaging in military conflict. This violence peaked in the middle of the 1990s in Tunceli, as well as other eastern Kurdish provinces, with extensive torture, extrajudicial executions, disappearances, forced evictions, and the huge burning of Kurdish communities.18 The PKK's decision to halt its military fight in September of the same year, after the detention of its commander, Abdullah calan, in February 1999, has caused this war's severity to considerably reduce. In July 2002, Tunceli was one of the last Kurdish provinces to have the state of emergency formally abolished. The state of emergency was a unique legislative structure that, starting in July 1987, put 13 provinces under the control of a "super" governor with broad authority and sped up the militarization process. But there hasn't been a consistent progression toward normalcy and peace since 2002. Following the PKK's termination to its unilateral cease-fire in June 2004, setbacks were especially clear. The AK Party administration first adopted a reformist approach toward the Kurds that was geared toward the EU, but it eventually decided to maintain a low profile in the face of growing Turkish nationalism and the military's unwillingness to budge.

The population of Tunceli is now less than 94,000, with 40,000 of them living in villages.19 Since 1990, the Turkish province has had the largest emigration waves. What had functioned as a traditional economy based on small-scale agriculture and stockbreeding has been utterly disordered by war and forced evictions. Tunceli depends heavily on remittances from migrants who live in Turkish cities or other foreign nations to support daily living costs, essential services, and small-scale business projects since the state makes very little economic and social expenditures. The province is still heavily militarized and subject to severe security measures today. For example, in Tunceli, 19,000 of the 23,500 New Turkish Lira given to public employees in January 2006 went to military personnel, while just 1,111 NTL were invested for "economic" objectives[9], [10].

CONCLUSION

The public sphere and the state have an evolving and contentious relationship. A healthy and inclusive public realm has to be maintained via constant discussion, compromise, and watchfulness. Holding the government responsible and promoting an open and democratic public sphere are vital tasks for civil society, independent media, and grassroots movements. One of these foundational elements is to enable politically inclined Iraqis develop a feeling of

confidence in the national political system, especially that Iraqis can cooperate with one another and across ethnic boundaries to advance a democratic political culture. To counteract sectarian groups' attempts to impose a strict and intolerable political culture on post-Ba'athist Iraq, it is essential to cultivate this feeling of confidence, a fundamental type of social capital. As I've said, a number of surveys show that Iraqis reject sectarian division while yet upholding an Iraqi sense of political identity. Thus, Iraq's contemporary historical memory may not only assist Iraqis in reestablishing their faith in interethnic harmony but also foster a feeling of pride and self-assurance that is essential for fending off attempts by authoritarian forces to drag Iraq back into the gloomy days of authoritarian control.

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CHAPTER 23

AN OVER-REGULATED PUBLIC LIFE

Dr. S. Muralidhar, Assistant Professor, Department of Commerce,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id- s.muralidhar@jainuniversity.ac.in

ABSTRACT:

This examines the consequences of an over-regulated public life, wherein excessive regulations and restrictions imposed by authorities and institutions hinder individual freedom, creativity, and social interaction. While regulations are intended to maintain order, protect public safety, and address societal concerns, an over-regulated public life can stifle innovation, limit personal autonomy, and hinder social cohesion.Excessive regulations can manifest in various aspects of public life, including urban planning, public spaces, cultural activities, and personal expression. Stringent zoning laws, bureaucratic red tape, and restrictive permit requirements can impede the development of vibrant and inclusive communities. Excessive regulations on public spaces can curtail spontaneous interactions, hinder the expression of diverse cultures and identities, and restrict the free flow of ideas and public discourse.

KEYWORDS:

Bureaucracy, Compliance, Conformity, Freedom, Government, Legal restrictions, Oppression.

INTRODUCTION

The province has essentially become an overregulated zone of surveillance as a result of the protracted conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK, with many checkpoints, random identification checks, and a harsh curfew impeding everyday movement. Mountains and meadows were off limits. Wherever it was thought that there was a need to control access and circulation within the province, police stations increased and military strongholds were erected, often overhanging major towns but also punctuating highways connecting the several provincial districts and in the highlands. The military operation of forced evictions that took place in 1993-1994 emptied and completely destroyed the majority of the province's villages under the pretense of cutting off the guerrilla forces from local supplies and support. 1994 saw the imposition of a very stringent food embargo as well as widespread forest fire burning. Much of the Kurdish territory, including Tunceli, was cut off from the rest of the nation. Information was strictly under check. No one was allowed to access the area without military permission. The two locally edited newspapers restricted themselves to duplicating news that was taken from large national daily, while the lone local reporter was under intense pressure to "appropriately" choose facts worth reiterating. It was highly punishable to have a subversive publication, magazine, or even a satellite TV antenna.21 In actuality, the Turkish state needed to seize control of all methods of meaning-making in order to maintain its rule, in addition to physically imprisoning the province. Consequently, any resistance via regular spatial practiceswalking, identifying, or narrating the placehad to be destroyed in addition to the material restructuring of space through urban design and particular security measures[1], [2].

According to Appadurai, nation-states must continuously engage in a process of "social and spatial standardization" in order to "incubate and reproduce compliant national citizens."23 However, conflicts and wars give this process a whole new dimension. The Turkish state directly hindered residents of Tunceli from creating their "own contexts of alterity," which paved the way for the "regulated public life" required to strengthen nationalism and silence any other opinions. This was done by preventing residents from walking along their streets, gathering on the front steps of their homes to recall memories, sitting in teahouses to discuss the news, or leading their flocks to the pastures.24 The normal process of creating coexisting rules and norms was impeded by these sociospatial everyday experiences. The markers that locals relied on to act appropriately and create categories to comprehend their surroundings were hushed. Officials of the state clearly aimed to exclude any opportunity for contradictory spatial meaning-making. Anything "in public" that is outside of the national space and time, such as the style of one's hair, the music one listens to while walking down the street, or local or religious celebrations, might be seen as subversive and cause one to be labeled as an enemy. Transgressing the prevailing standards might have harmful repercussions even inside what were formerly more "intimate" groups, like one's neighborhood or home: Denunciations and wiretaps occurred often.

DISCUSSION

A Challengeable Public Grammar

In response, several commemorations and ceremonies were used to widely perform national time and space. The twice-weekly flag ceremony was held at the "Square of the Republic," which is located in the center of the province's largest city. Everybody traveling through the area at that time had to stop, stand, and show respect while sixty or so troops sang the national song. Through tight body control, this power play also served to remind the populace of the "proper" devotion. This theatrical technique may have created its audience, who demanded adherence to the normative standards implied by the ritual itself. It did not accept any discussion or challenge of the methods or the messagethat of Turkish hegemonythat was being transmitted. But on June 30, 1996, a young PKK supporter detonated herself in the midst of the event while disguising the bomb beneath her blouse with maternity apparel. It was the first suicide bombing carried out in the PKK's name. Seven suicide victims and thirty-three other people were wounded in addition to the activist. As a result, the rituals came to a stop, and troops were prohibited from traveling alone through the city for many years after that. This incident signaled a shift in the balance of power and cemented the PKK's capacity to oppose the state's spatial creation in the city's very center. Additionally, it had a significant negative impact on the cohabitation between citizens and government officials, leading to increased order, violence, and segregation. More methodically than ever, the security officers and their families were now living in separate neighborhoods that were surrounded by fences and armed guards. Pregnant women, young girls, and youngsters living in Tunceli were starting to be specifically suspected and were subject to increasingly frequent identification checks and related humiliations. As a result, there were few chances for citizens and government officials to really create and modify coexistence norms throughout this conflict. The grid of "friend" vs "enemy" effectively eliminated all previous categories of identification, which were based on criteria and tests of loyalty that, in addition, never totally guaranteed that a person would not quite randomly change from one group to the other[3]–[6].

Ironically, the provincial governor, the city mayor, and the head of security attended the dedication of a monument honoring human rights in front of the same plaza in December 1996. This 2.5-meter-tall statue depicts a seated lady with her arms and face lifted toward the heavens.

She releases a bird, which flies away. The monument was intended to honor the 48th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its unveiling had been scheduled a year earlier at the request of Mazlum Arslan, the mayor of Tunceli, to the then-President of the High Council for Human Rights. This intention, however, was quickly surpassed since there were several competing theories about what the monument meant. When the monument was unveiled, the government and the head of security intended it to represent the condemnation of "Kurdish terrorism" and, in doing so, the legitimacy of the conflict they were waging and the brutality they were using. Others saw this monument in the form of a lady as a tribute to the young suicide bomber who gave her life to free them from Turkish oppression. As rumors about the monument's celebration of the memory of the suicide bomber grew locally and nationally, there were divergent readings of the situation that were brought to light by these opposing views of what the statue meant. The monument represented a wider conflict over allegiances, albeit it was still mostly confined to the perspectives of the war-makers. The mayor of the city attempted to defy categorization both in the choice to erect this monument and in his subsequent explanation.

Human rights are now our biggest necessity; everyone yearns for them. We are pleased with the statue's construction. The lady represents harmony and tolerance. She carefully chooses her buddies. Violence is abhorrent. Why would we erect a memorial honoring violence? Even marriages were canned. However, it is unknown that we made these victims our martyrs.The mayor also refused to question the official order and its use of violence by using the higher principle of respect for human rights to advance altered circumstances of coexistence between state agents and Tunceli residents. The monument ought to have served as a focal point for the creation of a public area where people wouldn't be labeled as "enemies" or "terrorists" and denied human rights; an area where coexistence would have been feasible.

War robbed the people of Tunceli of the majority of their monuments. Moreover, it rendered real practices of cooperation and contact almost worthless while fostering dread and suspicion among erstwhile friends or neighbors. In terms of the interactions between locals and state security forces, events like identity checks, court proceedings, a guerrilla's funeral, or attempts to secure the release or at least protection from torture of one's son or daughter may have given rise to opportunities to debate moral principles, modify social norms, and alter marginal categories of identification. However, during the height of the fight, they were often muted by non-negotiable protocols and suffocated by the propaganda of the war-makers. The generation of publicness regulations along highly stringent grammars was therefore monopolized by the Turkish state and, to a lesser extent and in a smaller territory, the PKK.

Taking Back Space

The reduction of the persecution of residents from before 2000 was codified with the termination of the emergency rule in July 2002. Military activities in the Tunceli mountains never fully ended, even though the repression did not return to its extreme intensity and scope of the 1990s. After the PKK violated its five-year unilateral cease-fire in June 2004, the tempo of fighting further picked up.As a result, surveillance and control devices changed without going away. One remains out of the six military checkpoints that were originally situated along the route leading from the nearby province of Elaz. However, Tunceli is one of the few Kurdish areas where identification checkpoints are still routinely used. Additionally, checkpoints are maintained between each district. City centers are typically safer than they used to be. Violence and harassment are considerably less indiscriminate, and torture and extralegal deaths have almost

completely disappeared32. The province's major cities have banned arbitrary identification checks, but operatives in plainclothes continue to keep a careful eye on the streets. For meetings or protests, people may now congregate in safety, although police cameras have grown and are always on the lookout for any protest actions within the audience.

The norms of cohabitation between state agents and members of the Tunceli community might have been renegotiated as a result of these changes in the spatial discipline, no matter how weak and reversible they may have been after 2000. Conflicts over spatial arrangements and the rules that govern everyday interactions are favored tools in the reconstruction of publicness after a protracted period of violence that has deprived residents of acquired social norms and principles, but in a political context that is still marked by a significant amount of fluidity and uncertainty.

The Nation-State and The Rebuilding That is Ideologically Favored

At this point, the nation-state had to be exercised locally, serving not just as a policing mechanism but also as an institutional framework that rebuilt, redistributed resources, and offered services. As a result, new landmarks were suggested in order to distinguish the state from its agents. Soldiers planted trees, for instance, in the area bordering the road that was amusingly called the "Forest of Friendship" near the city's entrance. A massive fountain featuring epigraphs from well-known Alevi intellectuals was built in the major city center in 2004 thanks to funding provided by the provincial governor. The biggest tribute is paid to Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic and a hero of the country's War of Liberation. A massive outdoor billboard with one of his quotes from 1923 serves as a visual reminder to onlookers that people living wherever in the newly captured Turkish region are all children of the same race. A more modest fountain, commissioned by the police chief in 2005, is located at the corner of the Square of the Republic and honors the police force's devotion to the people of Tunceli. It bears the inscription "A Warm Friendly Hand" and is a part of the larger campaign Strong like Bronze, Safe like Tunceli, which was launched in 2004. Policewomen were also urged to adopt orphaned children from Tunceli as "voluntary mothers," promising to share their problems and to contribute to their education, their psychological development, and their social growth. These same policewomen gave out roses to female motorists on March 8, 2007 while conducting traffic identification checks. In conclusion, this "postconflict" material creation of space strives to provide citizens new ways to engage with the government, its agents, and its security apparatuses. It is thus an invitation to a new kind of cohabitation, in which people are presumably interpellated via altered categories and are no longer grouped together in the "potential terrorist" category.

However, this state-produced space also serves as a continual reminder of their obligations as "true" Turkish citizens, as well as a way to create categories for reading the surroundings. The way local governments executed the Return to Villages strategy, starting in 2004, is highly instructive on this topic since it distinguishes between trustworthy and untrustworthy community members by explicitly defining responsibilities and proper allegiances. In reality, everyone who is said to have harbored or nourished a member of the guerrillawhich, in concrete terms, includes the majority of the peasants who lived in the area in 1994will not get financial or material compensation.A thorough selection of villages for reconstruction was made, charting the levels of fidelity and commitment shown to the state. One of the first communities to get funding for home restoration was the hamlet of Güneybaş, which also served as a model for how the program of reparations and reconstruction should be carried out. In September 2004, just before the promised twenty-four dwellings were to be built there in July 2005, a water fountain was dedicated there in the presence of the governor, military officials, the head of the police, one

deputy, and a municipal mayor. This fountain honors the martyrs,eight citizens slaughtered by the terrorists of the PKK in the village in August 1993 and July 1997, "just like the Armenians slaughtered our citizens in front of the mosque in 1915. This pilot village became "the best example of the state healing the wounds caused by terror- ism. Once more, the purpose of this fountain and its plaque is to serve as a reminder to the inhabitantsincluding those who are attending the ceremony, learning about it through the media, and those who are simply passing by on their daily commuteof the "proper" behaviors and discourses, the "legitimate" terms, and the pertinent wider context of understanding required to discuss a related issue or to distinguish between the perpetrators of violence and the victims, as well as between the good and deserving citizens, from the bad ones. This fountain, along with official buildings, monuments, newly planted forests, and the engraving of nationalist symbols and slogans on mountains, form the nodes that reorder the environment to produce publicness. They demand a particular regime of discursive and practical engagement to be seen or heard, in accordance with the principles of justice and legitimacy defined by the state agents. However, under post-emergency administration, adherence to this encouraged public language was to be encouraged rather than forced via intimidation or persecution.38 The local state agents have the means thanks to reconstruction policy to both encrypt the environment and distribute these prizes. Thus, the manufacture and transmission of the state-sponsored public language includes the process of spatial meaning-making in full. This process is made even more effective when the state controls the places that are essential to the replication of the dominant grammar and memory. State agents, however, are unable to stifle the opposing tactics or meaning-making activities as they formerly could due to the shifting political landscape[7], [8].

Counter-meaning-making: Challenging the Sociocracies Order of the Nation-state

The people of Tunceli have progressively developed the capacity to interpret their surroundings and to question the interpretations promoted by the government. The most prominent staging of this "production of locality" is arguably the yearly Munzur Cultural Festival. They actively produced a local time and place in order to make sense of this profoundly transformed environment. The mountain range near Tunceli is known as Munzur, and the name of the river that through the area is also Munzur. From 2004 on, the newly elected pro-Kurdish city council of the provincial main city has co-opted, if not hijacked, the festival, which was started in 2000 by associations of Tunceli migrants. Of the tens of thousands of attendees, many are Tunceli émigrés who now reside all over Turkey as well as the rest of the world. During this festive period, security personnel will temporarily retreat, and their control over what constitutes "proper" public conversation and conduct will inevitably wane. The different meaning-making processes that these visitors participate in or just make possible by their presence overwhelm them. Colors, melodies, and readings that are publicly illegitimate or de facto stigmatizing the rest of the year are forced onto the streets, on the festival's booths, and on its musical stages during its four days. While attending packed concerts of Turkish, Kurdish, or Alevi communist performers, young revolutionary supporters often exhibit difficult, sometimes illegal, displays of loyalty. In the meanwhile, delicate topics are addressed in seminars. Emigrants who were able to acquire and develop their home dialect in Europe now speak Zaza in public, strive to recall old terms with locals, and use old place names. The festival has increasingly been used in recent years to organize and expose collective memories of violence, particularly the massacres committed in the region by the Turkish army in 1937-1938, which resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people and the forced displacement of many more. Efforts to gather and disseminate these memories have increased. Bus drivers, in particular, discovered a means to

directly dispute official history, despite the fact that it is still illegal to mention these killings in public or debate them in a classroom. During the festival, as they moved people from one neighborhood to the next, they used the occasion to point out the locations of the massacres: the road, the hills from where the corpses were thrown into the river, and the banks where the survivors were found.

All of these individuals therefore contest the sociocracies standardization process by using localized terminology to practice and describe locations. What tangible steps does this generation of difficult spatial meaning-making take toward the revision of social norms and the emergence of discussion spaces? By narrowing the scope of the analysis, I will here make the more specific claim that this antagonistic production and display of alterity offers opportunities to effectively challenge and transform the existing categories governing identification and interaction while also fostering social experiences that allow the definition of a "public issue" to take on meaningful significance.

Changing the Categories

i. Traditional Public Events

The exhibition of Alevi identity is crucial to Tunceli's reclamation of space. A number of places of worship were constructed beginning in 1999, most of which were situated in significant locations for Alevi cosmology in Tunceli, such as water springs or mountains that symbolize stories, in addition to the resumption of pilgrimages to previously forbidden holy sites. In contrast to Sunni Islam's predominate norms and related rituals, new landmarks' circulation patterns, attitudes, and behaviors have been described in part. State authorities have long attempted to remind Alevis in Tunceli of their "true" Muslim heritage. More precisely, after the military takeover in 1980, the provincial governor encouraged the construction of mosques, one in almost every community, and imams were appointed. The Alevi cemeteries now serve as cultural hubs in the cities, offering semah classes and a place for worship in addition to celebrating Alevi holidays. In addition, the Alevi community has begun to rediscover its sacred Tunceli sites and celebrate Alevi holidays once more. Tensions existed with the revival of this heterodox religious space in front of Sunni state agents. A little girl who was accompanying her mother to the city's largest cemetery recalls one of the police officers at the gate mockingly saying, dirty Christians, go and light some lights for us too while her mother opted to ignore the policeman, the small child gazed at him in disbelief. In this situation, the policeman's disparaging remarks made competing normative systems and commercial moral principles visible. The policeman didn't act with the "civil inattention" that may have been anticipated, but he also didn't stop them from going to the cemetery by using violence or other forms of harassment, for example. As a result, there wasn't a fixed system of expectations between the parties. The mother and daughter made an effort to look unaffected by the verbal abuse, ignore it, and continue on their path with as much pride as they could. It qualifies as a public experience because the policeman called for moral responsibility while employing terminology and allusions from a larger discussion on orthodoxy, and since this had an impact on both the protagonists and bystanders in terms of their views and subsequent dialogues.

The definition of a public problem or a larger discussion might then be fueled by this experience. For instance, the little girl in this narrative used this incident as evidence in a conversation with friends and foreigners about the identity of the people of Tunceli and what made them special. Participants in the seminar on "Alevism: An Identity under Pressure" at the Munzur Festival also

draw on this kind of "ordinary" experience to support their claims and make sense of the presenters' more "general" arguments. These discussions need to be based on real-world experience and usable information in order to resonate. Contrarily, the development in generality within discourse might more quickly follow from this struggle over tools and guidelines for cohabitation and circulation. The rise in generality demands for a concurrent confrontation with particularity. For precisely this reason, checkpoints evolved into privileged locations as the validity of recurrent, systemic identification controls came under greater scrutiny. On one occasion, in the summer of 2006, a bus ride from a district center to the provincial main city center resulted in a discussion on the justification for the surveillance and control policies after passengers refused to show their identity cards for the seventh time that day for both military and police checkpoints. Police officers and military often respond with the same response when asked to defend such repetitious controls: "We are doing our job. But this time, passengers voiced their feeling of unfairness, pointing out that these gadgets presented a terrible picture of Tunceli, with disastrous impacts on tourists and outsiders. This is Tunceli, a zone of horror. The bus passengers challenged the classification of Tunceli and its residents as "terrorists"; or at least, as "suspects," citing a recent official report on urban terrorism which located the threat of terror in large cities and metropolitan centers. At that moment, the checkpoint, a device impeding circulation in the name of security and contributing to the production of an overregulated public life, was turned into a contentious public arena. In fact, a public arena was created when the "engagement regime" of the passengers on the minibus changed from passive identification of the control device to active questioning of the control device itself.

Combined Effort to Address Contentious Spaces

The emergent public sphere in each of the aforementioned situations did not survive the dispersal of its audience after the event. However, these conflicting daily encounters in public become part of a practical knowledge that is utilized to modify ways of circulation and interaction after they are ingrained in memories and sometimes even bodies. They may also be broadcast via media outlets or exposed to and resurrected within wider publics in more or less structured discussion spaces. What occurs today when individuals interact in urban space in a planned manner to act collectively to subvert categorization and undermine the spatial discipline? Does this deliberate and deceptive system of interaction lead to other forms of publicness? Does it allow for other ways of connecting discursive discussion spaces to geographical copresence?

Numerous urban threats and issues have been identified and collectively exposed by organized groups in Tunceli with the lifting of the emergency rule and the relative easing of repres- sion in the province's cities: from the absence of accessible devices for the disabled to a general social degeneration marked by prostitution, alcoholism, and drug addiction; and from the economic dependence of women to the forgetting of native tongues and local history. Each of these inspired particular group movements to recover space. Here, I'll concentrate on one of these concerns: the residents' fight to stop Turkey's dam construction.

In the late 1990s, the Turkish government started building eight dams and hydroelectric power plants in the province, six of which were located inside the national park itself. These dams were intended to supply less than 1% of the country's electricity needs. Although some local construction firms were engaged, the dams do not provide the province with any medium- or long-term development perspectives. Eighty-four communities would need to be evacuated in order to complete this project, while approximately sixty settlements would be submerged. Since

several of the highways between the districts and the provincial cities would likely be covered in water, the isolation of the districts would be further reinforced.

How was the construction of this dam portrayed as a problem requiring collective action? The argument was started in 1999 by Tunceli émigrés residing in significant Turkish cities, and subsequently certain Tunceli organizations participated. They first saw the dam project as the state's fresh, flimsy effort to stifle Tunceli and its defiant personality. The campaign has expanded into a larger environmental movement in recent years, expanding its appeal beyond of Tunceli and far-left groups. Through the immigrant communities' organizations as well as through their participation in various larger environmental platforms, it is both debated in various institutionalized public forums and expressed on various dimensions and locations. In addition, they started to expand their environmental concerns to ore-mining and the use of toxic cyanide that goes along with it, nuclear energy, and genetically modified organisms. The movement has come to refer to the general public as "the people of Munzur," a category that embraces the people of Tunceli as well as any outsider concerned with the issue. At the national level, a broad appeal has been made. However, how does this campaign fit into Tunceli itself and how does it affect the laws governing public life there?

In order to gain "cultural resonance" among the populace, activists notably reinvented the role of nature in Alevi cosmology, appealing to their "innate" respect for and concern for the environment. In urban centers, collective action was performed in this manner to oppose the construction of the dams: marches were organized along portions of the roads and valley to be flooded; trash was collected on the banks of the Munzur river and Alevi reclaimed land; and banners were placed on the banks. The marches were intended to support forms of movement that enhanced community connection while redefining categories of identity. This designation of the Munzur River as a restricted area and venue for protests helped to alter the area's political landscape. It partially questioned the "traditional" protest locations, such the Square of the Republic or the Human Rights monument. Activists typically prioritize inventive repertoire while performing on or beginning their action from these "traditional" places, nevertheless. The "Mads of Munzur" activist group demonstrated against the building of the dam in August 2004 by laying down in the center of the Square of the Republic, each of them representing a globally threatened river. On one hand, this repertory mixing play and seriousness slightly detaches the activity over the dams from venues associated with "traditional" political forces that are already widely demonized. Even police officers were captivated. Even if it lacks any of the markers of the official public grammar, this may make it seem less suspect to residents worried about impending repression, if not to state security personnel. This repertory so potentially helps to extending the public sphere by "conquering" additional arenas for contested politics and linking them with particular behaviors and meanings. Once again, the presence of immigrants and outsiders has a significant impact on how contested performances are shaped and presented. Their approach to engaging in a scenario and their perception of regulating agents may be different from that of occupants as a result of their exposure to other public-ness regulations and the practical knowledge that goes along with them. In reality, they are able to improvise and change their replies thanks to their unique discursive and practical resources, which may have an impact on the behavior of locals and security personnel.

On the other hand, there are certain immediate restrictions to this growth of the public sphere. First, state agents are not going to accept any frame-crossing, such combining environmental concerns with another politically sensitive topic. In July 2004, state security forces heavily

supported and indiscriminately suppressed a march to the Munzur intended to draw attention to Turkish revolution-ary activists dying from hunger strikes in prisons. While they may have permitted more open displays of diversity and alterity, they also emphasized pressure on and stigmatization of specific targets. State forces continued to utilize their authority to impose boundaries on the acceptable use of public space and to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable causes inside that area. For instance, the then-governor of Tunceli hailed the beginning stages of the building of a rehabilitation facility for disabled individuals in his 26 April 2005 address. This center had been supported by residents of Tunceli and other contributors. The governor used the opportunity to criticize the dam campaign in front of the public, saying: "Some civic groups should follow this example and do meaningful action rather than criticizing what they already have. They discuss cyanide and dams, but they lack specific knowledge. They should first understand what is good for our province before criticizing it.This coopting of what reconstruction and modernity ought to be in Tunceli versus alternative viewpoints is, once again, illuminating in terms of the updated state policy to control urban space[9]–[11].

CONCLUSION

This was done with the intention of highlighting the circumstances behind the public sphere's growth in a constrictive political context by taking into account both its urban and territorial aspects. This, in my opinion, is an invitation to scale down the study and pay special attention to visual and performative elements in order to expose the power dynamics underlying the public sphere's governing structure. In order to maintain or undermine the current sociocracies order, political actors do in fact constantly argue over the social norms of cohabitation and the meanings associated with the environment, which are the basic components of urban publicness. A balanced strategy that takes into account the need for safety and order while preserving individual liberties and promoting a feeling of community is necessary to address the issues presented by an overly controlled public life. It calls for a critical assessment of current laws, simplifying of administrative procedures, and giving local communities more authority to influence public policies and places. A culture of trust, communication, and citizen involvement may also assist close the gap between the public and the government, resulting in more responsive and inclusive governance.

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CHAPTER 24

CONTESTATION IN THE LEBANESE PUBLIC SPHERE

Mr. Mithun Kumar S, Assistant Professor, Department of Management,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India

ABSTRACT:

This explores the dynamics of contestation in the Lebanese public sphere. The public sphere is a crucial arena where individuals and groups engage in open discussions, debates, and deliberations on matters of public interest. In Lebanon, a country characterized by its diverse social, religious, and political landscape, contestation within the public sphere reflects the complexities and tensions present in society.Contestation in the Lebanese public sphere manifests in various forms, including political protests, social movements, media debates, and online activism. These expressions of dissent and disagreement reflect the diverse perspectives, grievances, and aspirations of different segments of the population. Contestation serves as a means for marginalized groups, youth, activists, and civil society organizations to challenge existing power structures, demand accountability, and advocate for change.

KEYWORDS:

Activism, Civil society, Cultural diversity, Dissent, Freedom,Identity politics, Media landscape.

INTRODUCTION

The Shi'i movement in Lebanon Since its establishment in 1978, Hizbullah has witnessed extraordinary transformations. With Iranian doctrinal support, it began as a social and political Islamic jihad by diverse Lebanese Shi'i clerics and cadres. But between 1985 and 1991, Hizbullah developed into a full-fledged social movement, with a wide general organization, structure, and philosophy that aimed to bring about social change and social justice for its members. Even later, in the early 1990s, Hizbullah established itself as a major political force that actively participated in all facets of Lebanese national politics[1].

Hizbullah opposed significant changes in Lebanon after the Lebanese Civil War ended in 1990, particularly the creation of a pluralist public sphere and a growing degree of openness between the many communities, political parties, and interest groups that make up Lebanese society and the polity. Hizbullah reacted by altering its aims and ideology, shifting from exclusion to inclusion via an infith strategy. Since then, Hizbullah has grown to be a significant force in Lebanese society and has changed its emphasis from "Islamization" to "Lebanonization" by advocating a local agenda for its political program. Hizbullah has become a "ordinary" political party over time because to its alliances with other parties and wide network of social services that are accessible to both Muslims and Christians. It participates in governmental, municipal, and legislative activities. Hizbullah exhibits more and more traits of a nationalist, patriotic political organization pursuing realpolitik, but still being principally an Islamic movement. Following the killing of Prime Minister Hariri, the evacuation of the Syrian troops, and the war with Israel in the summer of 2006, Hizbullah has really tried to take control of and direct the Lebanese political scene and public sphere in recent years[2].

This looks at Hizbullah's three stages, paying particular focus to the most recent events and the third stage. The highlights the various ways that Hizbullah wields influence through political action, media communications, and a street presence as well as how it accommodates and reconciles national discourses that may not be consistent with its own ideology, although a comprehensive study of Hizbullah's role in the Lebanese public sphere is beyond the scope.

DISCUSSION

Phase I: Beginnings

Hizbullah describes itself as an Islamic movement "whose emergence is based on an ideological, social, political, and economical mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab, and Islamic context."1 The movement's origins can be found in the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr later that same year. Musa al-Sadr was a popular figure who inspired Lebanese Shi'a to become involved in politics throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, "Amal" was founded in 1975 as a secular Shi'i political party with a military component. Al-Sadr's leadership allowed the Amal movement to remain mostly cohesive. His departure caused some party members to become disillusioned with its agenda. This was at the same time when many Shi'i clerics called for "The Hizbullah of Lebanon" and the Islamic Revolution in Iran had been successful in 1979[3], [4].

The second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 served as the impetus for the complete establishment of Hizbullah as an Islamic Jihad organization. The armed branch of Hizbullah, the Islamic Resistance, made some strides as the Israeli army closed in on Beirut and then spearheaded a campaign of resistance after the Israeli army had taken control of the city. Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, two leaders of Hizbullah, were Amal members who had grown tired of the group's compromising nature and participation in the Lebanese cabinet.3 They had left Amal and allied themselves with other Islamic Shi'i organizations, such as Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya and Ittihad al-Lubnani Hizbullah was able to establish a strong base of support among the general Shi'i populace because to later successes in resolving socioeconomic grievances brought on by Israeli occupation[5].

Up until the middle of the 1980s, Hizbullah mostly operated covertly. Hizbullah advocated a radical-militant strategy that viewed the Lebanese political system as an infidel and the Lebanese government as an apostate, to be uprooted through revolution and replaced by the rule of Islam. This political manifesto was first made public by the group on February 16, 1985, in a "Open Letter" that revealed its religio-political ideology. Hizbullah's dedication to an Islamic revolution in Lebanon and the establishment of an Islamic state, as well as its strict adherence to Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of wilyat al-faqh, had a negative domestic impact, alienating Hizbullah from other political and social movements and largely banishing it from the Lebanese political scene.

Despite having a small number of supporters during the 1980s, Hizbullah maintained its status as a sectarian social movement and built up its internal structure and institutional framework. Hizbullah accumulated theological capital, political and symbolic capital, as well as economic and social capital throughout this time.

It should be remembered that at this time, Lebanon was still embroiled in a civil conflict that was characterized by fractured public spheres and "cantons"—mini-states founded on confessionalism. The idea of creating cantons along sectarian lines was high on the agenda of many political parties, including Christian ones, in the middle of the 1980s. Contrary to the

Lebanese Forces and the Progressive Socialist Party, for instance, Hizbullah did not want to create a mini-state with its own ports, airports, taxes, and civil administration. Hizbullah also did not advocate for federalism. Nasrallah emphasized in 1986 that Muslims had absolutely no right to even consider the concept of a Muslim canton, a Shi'i canton, or a Sunni canton. Speaking of cantons, he saidannihilates the Muslims, obliterates their potential, and drives them from one internal war to another.Only the Islamic state upholds their unity[6].

Leading Hizbullah cadres took considerable pains in the 1990s to dispel claims that the party was a state inside the Lebanese state. The leaders of Hizbullah, most notably Nasrallah and Hajj Muhammad Ra'd, the current leader of the party's parliamentary caucus, have often claimed that the group did not take part in the Lebanese Civil War and has never forced its beliefs, ideologies, or political agenda on anyone. According to Nasrallah, the party aims to openness and discussion among all Lebanese and sees the presence of 18 ethno-confessional groupings in Lebanon as a strength[7].

Hizbullah has repeatedly declined to serve as a social, political, judicial, or security alternative to the Lebanese state and its institutions.9 If nothing else, according to Hajj 'Imad Faqih, a member of a mid-ranking cadre, performing state functions would eventually dirty the party's hands, which Hizbullah could ill afford after spending years cultivating a reputation for probity.

Second phase: Infith

Hizbullah continued to advance its Islamic identity and purpose during the 1990s, but did so while adopting a more practical political goal and progressively integrating into society. By building Islamic organizations in civil society and working inside the political and administrative frameworks of the Lebanese state to further Islamization, Hizbullah remained devoted to its Shi'i constituency. When Nasrallah and Muhammad Yazbik were chosen as his waklayn shar'iyyn by Ayatollah Khamina'i, the supreme leader of Iran, religious power among its constituency was solidified. With the inclusion of Sunnis and Christians on Hizbullah's election ballots, more political capital was won. And with more disassociation from Islamic Jihad, symbolic capital advanced. By offering its non-governmental organizations' services to the Sunni and Christian grassroots, Hizbullah gained social and economic capital[8].

The word "infith" was used by Hizbullah. in order to denote its advent into Lebanese national politics. Infitāh. is a strategy of open dialogue in a pluralistic environment that involves contact and collaboration with all the sects and groups that make up the Lebanese polity in order to address political and social issues, promote national unity, and create a stronger and more cohesive Lebanon on shared ground. The Ta'if Agreement of 1989, which put an end to the civil war in Lebanon and created a new constitution, is related to the shift in Hizbullah's policy. In addition to moving the majority of the president's authority to the cabinet, the new constitution stipulated that Christians and Muslims would share political office on a 50-50 basis, particularly in the legislature and the cabinet.

The Ta'if Agreement also mandated that all militias must dissolve and hand up their weapons to the Lebanese government. It demanded that the militia members be integrated into Lebanon's civil society and official institutions, particularly the Lebanese Army. Due to this, the militias were able to become legitimate political organizations. Hizbullah was given permission to keep its weapons and go on with its job of resisting Israeli occupation in the south since the Lebanese government recognized the organization as a resistance movement rather than a militia.As a

consequence of the civil peace, Hizbullah proceeded to progressively ingratiate itself into the new national public arena.

Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi was chosen by Hizbullah to be their secretary general in May 1991. Sayyid Abbas started the infith as part of his political platform. strategy of communication, particularly with Christians, for instance by initiating a visit to the Maronite Patriarch. Sayyid Abbas, his wife, and their kid were killed by an Israeli helicopter on February 16, 1992. Nasrallah and Shaykh Na'im Qasim were chosen as the secretary general and deputy secretary general, respectively, two days later. They have both retained these positions up to this day[9].

Hizbullah consolidated its financial assets after Ayatollah Khamina'i chose Nasrallah and Yazbik as his religious representatives in Lebanon in May 1995. Since then, instead of passing via Iran as it had in the past, the one-fifth tribute mandated on Lebanese Shi'a who follow Khamina'i as their authority of emula- tion, as well as their charity and religious funds, have flooded straight into Hizbullah coffers. Hizbullah had already established an effective network of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social welfare organizations since 1982, including the Martyr's Association, the Association of the Wounded, the Association of Lebanese Prisoners,13 the Islamic Resistance Support Association, the Institution of the Good Loan, the Association of Islamic Health, the Institution of Construction and Development, the Association of the Relief Committees of Imam Khumayni, and the Association of the Relief Committees of Imam Khomeini. Additionally, Hizbullah established its own media and academic centers. In order to promote Islamic culture and principles, it launched the periodical Baqiyyat Allah in 1991. Its weekly mouthpiece al-'Ahd, which was formed in 1984, was renamed al-Intiqad14 in 2001. Both the al-Nour satellite radio station and its think tank, the Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation, were established in 1988. In 2007, 12 million people watched the primary al-Manar15 satellite TV station, the only one run by an Islamist organization in the Middle East.

The pivotal moment in Hizbullah's second phase may be found in the 1992 parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Despite the fact that Hizbullah originally believed the Lebanese political system to be unfair and unjust, the party's absorption via electoral politics gave it more political legitimacy and a larger support base. Hizbullah seems to have learnt that electoral politics is the foundation of democratic practice from both the Iranian experience and the internal dynamics of the Lebanese environment.

One significant milestone in the development of Hizbullah's present character might be its electoral participation. This choice was made after a contentious internal discussion and a formal legal opinion request to Ayatollah Khamina'i over the propriety of such participation. Hizbullah would be practicing wilyat al-faqh in a non-Islamic state as well as in a multi-confessional, multi-religious pluralistic society, therefore this was required. Hizbullah started crafting its electoral agenda and made its intentions known as soon as Khamina'i approved participation.

Shi'i jurisprudential idea of mas served as the foundation for the justification for Hizbullah's 1992 election campaign, which may be characterized as circumstantial and contextual. lah. a . Hizbullah reached out and allied itself with other secular parties and former "enemies" in addition to its strategic alliance with the secular Shi'i party Amal, in this it behaved like any political party that accommodates differences through negotiation with a wide spectrum of groups and compromises on some doctrinal aspects. Now, the party's legislative bloc and the local councils it governs include Christians and Sunnis.

The infith policy of Hizbullah. Additionally, its "Lebanonization" strategy aimed to achieve a balance between its Islamic mission and its Lebanese national allegiance. Hizbullah tried to maintain its Islamic character while operating inside a non-Islamic and a multi-religious, confessional-sectarian state by "opening up" to the many Lebanese polity participants via the support of civil peace, public liberties, and a functioning civil society. Hizbullah changed its stance from one of jihd to one of a more lenient shari'a as a result. The party supported good rules and regulations, and some of its legislators actively participated in their creation.

According to Hizbullah, the shari'a can accommodate all the intricacies of contemporary life since it is a socially produced phenomenon. Thus, by heavily relying on the jurisprudence concepts of necessity, vices, and interests, the party demonstrated a remarkable adaptability in its political program in an effort to reconcile, to the greatest extent possible, its principles, aims, and political ideology with the circumstances and its objective capabilities. Hizbullah's participation in the current Lebanese political system was made possible by this abrupt change. Hizbullah has therefore taken part in each election since the signing of the Ta'if Agreement.

Hizbullah demanded the formation of civil peace, the construction of a state of law and institutions, the promotion of political participation, political, administrative, social, and economic reforms, the preservation of fundamental liberties, and dialogue amongst all Lebanese. Hizbullah emphasized the need of addressing urgent social and developmental challenges, including the environment, health, education, and culture. By striking a suitable balance between material and human resources, the party stressed social justice via constructive measures that may aid in resolving Lebanon's significant socio-economic and financial crises. This might be accomplished not only by standing out for the oppressed and disadvantaged but also by achieving socio-economic development via programs that target underserved and displaced communities.

Even after Lebanon was liberated from Israeli control, Hizbullah's political programs at this time in history all remained committed to supporting the Resistance. With Emile Lahoud, a commander in the Lebanese Army and later president of the Lebanese Republic, Hizbullah had a particular bond. To the delight of Syria and Hizbullah, Lahoud had, in 1993, defied the Lebanese cabinet by refusing to deploy the Army to the south to restore order and put an end to Hizbullah's conflict with Israel. When Lahoud visited Nasrallah in 1997 and "congratulated" him on the "martyr-dom" of his son Hadi, the relationship between Lahoud and Hizbullah was further solidified. Despite Hizbullah's emphasis on resistance, Lahoud pushed Hizbullah to form the secular-patriotic, multi-religious Lebanese Brigades for Fighting the Israeli Occupation in November 1997 as a method to show the party's national identity. Hizbullah formed a strategic partnership with Lahoud when he was president since he was Syria's representative in Lebanon and would not allow the Resistance to be disarmed.

Hizbullah attempted to depict itself as a proponent of Muslim-Christian cohabitation as part of its intifada campaign, highlighting the value of pluralism via multi-confessional representation. It included Christians, including Maronites, on its lists for the parliamentary elections and gave them the opportunity to speak in Hizbullah's name as long as they did not depart from the party's core beliefs. It also distributed Christian seats for local councils. Hizbullah revised its call for the elimination of political sectarianism,21 adopting a position more in line with that of the Maronite Church and papal directives, which emphasize the elimination of political sectarianism in "the mentality" before doing so "in the texts."22 In response, Hizbullah circles responded favorably to the Pope's call for fraternity and the promotion of dialogue and tolerance among Lebanese people

as much of it was reminiscent of Imam Musa al-Sadr's speech on mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and open and ongoing dialogue between Christians and Muslims.Hizbullah took choices that may not have been popular with the party's rank and file or even with some of its leaders as national dynamics altered the party and its policies. Hizbullah's activities during this intifada period were often motivated by realpolitik, political expediency, advantage, and interest. Hizbullah was prepared to assume a more significant national role after finding success in its inaugural journey into politics and administration.

Participation, Dominance, and Contestation in Phase III

In a ferocious speech in 2005, Nasrallah declared Hizbullah's intention to play a pivotal political and developmental role in Lebanon by fully participating in all governmental institutions, including the cabinet and Lebanese political, economic, and administrative life. As previously mentioned, Nasrallah and other Hizbullah founders first broke away from Amal when it made this choice. The assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005, which many believed to be the work of Syrian operatives and divided the nation into two main political parties, resulted in a significant change in relations between Lebanon and Syria, which led to this critical step for Hizbullah. Hizbullah, Amal, and other pro-Syrian organizationsmost of which are Shi'i organizationsthat make up theorganized a protest in favor of Syria. The other group, known as the Cedar Revolution responded with a demonstration in downtown Beirut of an estimated one million people, spearheaded by "Future Trend," the majority of whom are Sunni, to demand the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory and the truth regarding Hariri's assassination. After 29 years of existence, Syria left Lebanon on April 26, 2005, in response to domestic and international pressure in the shape of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559.25 The 14 March movement wanted to see a decline in Syrian dominance in Lebanon, but Hizbullah's strategic-political ties to the Syrian government persisted.

Hizbullah acknowledges that the Syrian pullout expedited the party's decision to enter the government as well as its greater involvement in Lebanese politics and state institutions. It had previously decided not to join the coalition as long as Syrians were present in Lebanon because of the political patronage and indirect influence they gave Hizbullah at the highest levels of government. Hizbullah believed that the Lebanese cabinet would be forced to make political and strategic decisions after the Syrians left that would have serious repercussions for Lebanon's future and that it was necessary to seek representation in the cabinet in order to directly influence its policy statements and implementations.

Hizbullah established a precedent by getting legitimacy from a local Lebanese cleric, Shaykh 'Afif al-Nabulsi, and not Ayatollah Khamina'i, despite the fact that the pivotal choice to join in the Lebanese government should have needed a shari'a ruling and legitimization by the faqih.30 Hizbullah saw its participation in the Lebanese government as an administrative issue on which Hizbullah's leadership was allowed to adopt an autonomous stance, despite the fact that this means the party was now deferring to a Lebanese religious authority in addition to the Iranian one. As a result, Hizbullah was abandoning its 1980s policy of total ideological reliance on Iran in favor of more decision-making independence, not only in terms of actual political difficulties but also, at least in part, in terms of theological ones.

Hizbullah ran for office in the first parliamentary elections held following Syria's disengagement from Lebanon from May 29 to June 19, 2005, on the basis of a transient four-party coalition with Future Trend, Amal, and the Progressive Socialist Party. Out of 128 seats, were won by Future

Trend and its supporters. Hizbullah gained 14 seats, increasing its presence by 2 seats. With the addition of two ministers to the cabinet, Hizbullah's influence on government agencies and the executive branch grew.

A policy declaration that gave Hizbullah permission to continue its resistance in the disputed Sheb'a farms, a tiny patch of still-occupied land by Israel, was drafted with the help of the two Hizbullah cabinet members. Hizbullah recommended a number of changes to the electoral system, including lowering the voting age to 18 and switching to proportional representation, which the party claimed would increase representation for all 18 ethno-confessional groups. Hizbullah had claimed that it would not join the cabinet because it could not assume responsibility for dangerous judgments or unpleasant acts made by a two-thirds majority vote. However, two ministers alone cannot veto cabinet decisions, therefore it seems that Hizbullah gave up that claim.Hizbullah justified this shift in the hopes that cabinet choices would be made in accordance with the idea of "consensual democracy," which would ensure that no legislation that did not adhere to Hizbullah's objectives and beliefs would be enacted. The two-thirds majority vote concept, which is only used when there is a substantial dispute, wasn't something Hizbullah believed would be necessary to use. Practice would nonetheless disprove Hizbullah's claims.

The second stage of this phase for Hizbullah was putting the party's strength and reputation to the test both nationally and within its own constituencies. A sequence of incidents led to the contestations and compromises that came to define Hizbullah's position in the national political arena of Lebanon. MP and former editor and publisher of al-Nahar Gebran Tuéni was killed on December 12, 2005.

The UN panel looking into the Hariri assassination was notified about this case and other politically motivated killing on the same day the Lebanese cabinet convened and requested the creation of an international court to try those responsible. The five Shi'i ministers, including the two from Hizbullah, left the room when the subject was put to a vote, seemingly in protest, suspending their participation in the cabinet for a total of seven weeks. The five ministers didn't resume their responsibilities until Prime Minister Sanyura confirmed Hizbullah's right to oppose Israeli occupation[2], [10].

CONCLUSION

To overcome these obstacles, Lebanon has to work on fostering a more inclusive and active public realm. This entails safeguarding the right to free speech, defending the rights of people and organizations to express their viewpoints, and promoting an atmosphere that values variety, pluralism, and polite discussion. Additionally, enhancing the space for contestation and facilitating the interchange of ideas in the public domain may be accomplished through boosting independent media, empowering civil society, and encouraging digital literacy. Understanding public sphere contestation is essential to understanding Lebanese society's dynamics, its political environment, and its ambitions for change. Lebanon can promote a more inclusive and democratic public sphere that encourages discussion, social cohesion, and the pursuit of shared objectives by embracing contestation and tackling the issues it confronts.

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CHAPTER 25

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND DENMARK A FORMAL APOLOGY

Ms. Anila Bajpai, Program Manager, Department of Management,
JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bangalore, India,
Email Id-anilabajpai@cms.ac.in

Abstract:This abstract examines the concept of a formal apology from the Lebanese government to Denmark. The issue at hand involves a situation or event that has caused harm or damage to Denmark, either directly or indirectly, and prompts the Lebanese government to issue a formal apology as a means of acknowledging responsibility and expressing remorse.A formal apology serves as a significant diplomatic gesture that can help mend strained relations, rebuild trust, and promote reconciliation between nations. It demonstrates a willingness to address past wrongs, take accountability, and work towards rectifying the situation. In the case of the Lebanese government issuing a formal apology to Denmark, it signifies an acknowledgement of any actions, decisions, or policies that have adversely affected Denmark's interests, citizens, or national reputation.

Keywords:Activism, Civil society, Cultural diversity, Freedom, Identity politics, Media landscape.

INTRODUCTION

One day after the Danish Embassy in Damascus was set on fire in protest at the release of cartoons portraying the Prophet Mohammed in a way that many Muslims found objectionable, another event happened on February 5, 2006. Muslims in mobs tried to set fire to the Danish Embassy in a Christian area in East Beirut. Many stores, automobiles, and churches were damaged as a result of the ensuing chaos. The failure of the Lebanese security forces to restore order resulted to the resignation of the interior minister and a formal apology from the Lebanese government to Denmark[1].

The following day, General Michel 'Auon, the head of the Free Patriotic Movement, and Nasrallah met in a church across the old "green line" and signed a historic ten-point "Understanding" addressing political, economic, administrative, and security issues, as well as relations with Syria, in order to contain negative effects and prevent the escalation of Christian-Muslim strife, not to mention civil unrest. Domestic issues including administrative reform, election legislation, corruption, and inquiries into the death of Rafic Hariri were also included in the Understanding. Intriguingly, Article 7 of the Understanding, titled "Lebanese-Syrian Relations," proposed four measures to fend off "foreign tutelage," including defining the borders between Lebanon and Syria, disclosing the fates of Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons, and establishing diplomatic ties between the two nations. It is important to note that the aforementioned demands were in line with those of both the Maronite Church and the now-defunct Christian opposition organization Qrnet Shahwan[2]. They also represented the demands of the 14 March movement, weakening and dividing the ranks of the 14 March as a result of the partnership between Hizbullah and the FPM. The interim four-partite coalition set up for the elections had been broken apart, and after the Understanding, the FPM switched its allegiance to

the 8 March Group even though the bulk of the 14 March Trend members were still Sunnis and the members of the 8 March Group were still Shi'is. Between the 14 March and 8 March blocs, this heightened tensions and led to clashes[3].

The evening of June 1, 2006, LBCI broadcast its weekly political satire program called "Basmat Watan," a pun that might mean either "The Death of a Nation" or "The Smiles of a Nation." One of the performers made fun of the political leadership of the secretary general while costumed as Nasrallah and wearing his turban. "Death to humiliation" was the rallying cry of Hizbullah supporters, who planned to march all the way to Beirut's Christian neighborhood in order to "burn" LBCI. They caused destruction along the route in Christian and Sunni communities and almost got into a fight with the local youngsters. Nasrallah issued an extraordinary request for the masses to disperse after Hizbullah's MPs and mid-rank members were unable to do so. The riots damaged Hizbullah's reputation as an advocate for free speech and expression, even though they promptly complied[4].

These incidents, notably the return of violence to Beirut's streets, were alarming indications that the post-civil war public realm was still under danger. National dialogue sessions between Nasrallah and fourteen other prominent politicians in Lebanon were planned in 2006 in an effort to increase coherence at the national level. These discussions would cover sensitive topics, including previously taboo ones like Hizbullah's right to possess weapons and continue its military strategy. A consensus was reached on two crucial issues during the first session:

a) The Sheb'a farms38 were recognized as Lebanese, allowing Hizbullah to continue its resistance against the occupying Israeli Defense Forces;

b) It was decided that an international tribunal should prosecute those responsible for the Hariri murder. Due to the Israeli invasion on July 12, the last session that was scheduled for July 25 never happened. The conflict with Israel ended public discourse and had significant ramifications for Hizbullah's position in the country.

DISCUSSION

The present: Hizbullah’s contested hegemony in the Lebanese public sphere

When Hizbullah abducted two Israeli soldiers during a cross-border operation, it ignited the conflict between Israel and Hizbullah that lasted from July through August of that year. Although some Lebanese question the wisdom of Hizbullah's action, which was used by Israel as a justification for inflicting so much damage on the country, in many ways Hizbullah emerged from the crisis enjoying- more popularity than before, this was not without risk. Hizbullah's strategic error was not anticipating that such an action would spark a large-scale conflict that would ultimately lead to the destruction of nearly all Lebanon's post-civil-war achievements[5], [6].

The involvement of Hizbullah's media throughout the conflict was one of the elements that boosted its reputation. Al-Manar TV, "the channel of the Arabs and the Muslims," maintained its regional and global outreach to the Muslim world and beyond even if the primary goal of its medium was to rally Hizbullah's audience and boost its morale. Although Israel completely destroyed the al-Manar building and the radio station al-Nour suffered significant damage, neither station went off the air for even a minute because Hizbullah had prepared backup plans and set up secret underground locations to broadcast from.41 Similarly, the newspaper al-Intiqad was published on time every Friday and, unusually, twice in the second week of the war to

promote Hizbullah. On August 5, 2006, in an effort to put an end to the conflict, the Lebanese cabinet unanimously adopted Prime Minister Sanyura's "Seven Points," which included the fourth point, which emphasized that the state had a complete monopoly over the use of force. The Lebanese cabinet unanimously authorized the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese Army troops to the Israeli border after rejecting a UN draft resolution that did not require an Israeli withdrawal and in an effort to influence the language of a new resolution to Lebanon's favor. The cabinet also adopted UNSC Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006, which, like UNSC Resolution 1559 of September 2004, called for the cessation of hostilities and the disarming of Hizbullah among other things. The two ministers of Hizbullah voted "yes" on these resolutions.

Accepting these cabinet decisions seems to be more than just a rhetorical gesture; it appears to be a genuine shift in policy. Until now, Hizbullah had resisted deploying the Army to the south because they believed it was a cover for Israel to be protected from the Lebanese Resistance. Now, however, Nasrallah was claiming that it would be in the country's best interest to accept the deploymentwhich had been a consistent Israeli demandand accede to the conditions of UNSC Resolution 1701.

Hizbullah celebrated the end of the war with a "divine victory" parade on September 22, 2006, after a UN-brokered cease-fire in mid-August 2006 and the lifting of Israel's port blockade of Lebanese ports in September. Nasrallah delivered a speech in front of Lebanese MPs, cabinet members, politicians, and clergy, as well as many Arab dignitaries. A perfect human shield, estimated at around 800,000 spectators, prevented Israel from carrying out its threat to kill Nasrallah as soon as the chance arose.45 On a somewhat amiable note, Nasrallah emphasized that Hizbullah would give up its weapons when Israel gave up the Sheb'a farms, released the Lebanese prisoners of war, and turned over its landmine maps to the UN. While the parade and speech demonstrated Hizbullah's continuedor renewedpower at the national and street levels, many 14 March cadres criticized Nasrallah. In a play on his name, which means "Victory of God," they claimed that there is no such thing as a "divine victory" in the military dictionary. However, Nasrallah also claimed that Hizbullah's rockets had increased, from 20,000 before the war to 33,000.

The rise of Hizbullah as the main opposition force in Lebanon was a significant result of the group's expanding influence at the national level and the many strategic relationships it was forming. Al-Intiqad had a makeover to fit this new image. Al-Nour began to identify itself as "the voice of national unity" and would open its broadcasts with the national anthem, followed by songs by Marcel Khalifé, a well-known Christian nationalist-leftist Lebanese singer. Starting with issue 1192, the left banner of the paper read: "Lebanon 1: The Popular Movement for National Unity."

Hizbullah proposed that the opposition be granted a one-third veto power in the cabinet as a political price for its "victory" in the conflict, in an effort to further entrench its authority over the government and President Lahoud. Hizbullah also demanded the establishment of a representative national unity government and the holding of legislative elections based on a more representative election law that all Lebanese could agree upon, preferably one based on proportional representation and small electoral districts. This could only be accomplished through its alliance with the FPM, which had received the most votes in the 2005 legislative elections.

According to a quota system established by the Ta'if Agreement, Muslims and Christians received an equal share of political power in the cabinet and the parliament. The different Muslim and Christian organizations were then given seats in turn. As a result, the 128 members in the legislature were equally divided between Muslims and Christians, and the 24 seats in the Sanyura cabinetfive of which went to Shi'awere as well. The cabinet could still assemble and make decisions by a two-thirds majority vote even if all five Shi'i ministers quit. Neither the political or demographic might of Hizbullah was evident in this portrayal.

Hizbullah had a 14-member parliamentary bloc in the assembly, and combined with its allies, it could rely on 57 MPs out of a total of 128. Therefore, the opposition headed by Hizbullah was entitled to more than thirteen of the thirty ministers who may possibly serve in a national unity government since the party held 44% of the legislative chamber. The opposition, headed by Hizbullah, requested eleven minutes in an effort to gain veto power. All that was required for the Hizbullah-led opposition to become the most dominant force in the Lebanese political system was to obtain veto power in the cabinet. The president, Emile Lahoud, and the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, were already on their side.

Nasrallah granted the cabinet a week, beginning on Monday, November 6, to establish a national unity government in which Hizbullah and its supporters would have a one-third veto power in an interview on October 31, 2006, on al-Manar TV. He warned that if the government didn't agree to their demands, the Hizbullah-led opposition will move to the streets. Al-Intiqad described the administration of Sanyura as tyrannical, asserting that it only possessed a "artificial" majority and using John Stewart Mill's notion of the "tyranny of the majority." Sanyura responded by stating that giving the Hizbullah-led opposition a veto in the cabinet would amount to "tyranny of the minority." Other political, religious, and media figures also criticized Hizbullah. Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Jusu, the Mufti of Mount Lebanon, accused Nasrallah of inciting Sunni-Shi'i conflict and leveling false allegations against the prime minister that were tantamount to calling him a traitor. In response to Hizbullah's one-week deadline, MP Pierre Gemayyelthe minister of industry, the son of former president Amin Gemayyel, and a member of a prominent Maronite Phalangist cadresaid that he and his countrymen would not permit those who decide on war and peace to have the final say in state development.

The five Shi'i government members resigned on November 11, Hizbullah's "Martyrs' Day," a significant day. Jacob Sarraf, the Greek Orthodox minister of the environment, who was a supporter of President Lahoud, followed suit within a few days. The departure of the six ministers did not result in the fall of the Sanyura government since eight ministers would have had to leave for this to happen. Following these conflicts, Pierre Gemayyel was murdered on November 21, 2006. Tensions then rose to a new all-time high.

Hizbullah, the FPM, and other members of the Lebanese opposition took to the streets in downtown Beirut on December 1, 2006, demanding the creation of a national unity cabinet and a one-third veto power despite earlier53 dangerous precedents showing that no one could guarantee the security of the street. Martyrs' Square and Riyad al-Solh Square were completely filled with these protesters. Nasrallah was warned by Prime Minister Sanyura to refrain from squandering Hizbollah's military successes and wins against Israel in Beirut's back alleys. Nasrallah responded by making the following pledge while speaking to the crowd from a huge screen: "We will defeat the Lebanese government like we defeated Israel in the 34-day war.

Frontline Hizbullah supporters besieged the cabinet's downtown Beirut headquarters in the early stages of the protests and sit-ins. On January 23, 2007, after 53 days of sit-ins, the Hizbullah-led opposition crippled the nation with a general strike coupled with the blocking of major roads, tire burning, and other actions. 150 people were injured, and three individuals killed. A Sunni-Shi'i dispute broke out two days later in a crowded Beirut area. This led to 216 arrests, 300 injuries, including 13 injuries to Lebanese Army personnel, and 4 fatalities. There were tense moments evoking the American Civil War, including snipers, automatic guns, burning automobiles, and property devastation. Following these brutal clashes, Hizbullah referred to the Sanyura cabinet as the government of the armed militias.

Despite the unrest, Hizbullah failed to bring about the rapid government collapse it had promised, and discussions behind closed doors put a stop to the strike. "From the stance of a national, patriotic, ethical, religious, and shari'a duty. I call on you to fully cooperate with all the measures that the Lebanese Army is taking in order to ensure and uphold peace and stability this fatwa is in the interest of our country, its civil peace, and peaceful coexistencewe insist," Nasrallah said in a fatwa he issued in an effort to defuse the situation.

In an effort to break the impasse, Prime Minister Sanyura reached out to the Hizbullah-led opposition. He gave in to the demands of the opposition by giving them two more cabinet seats than they had requested, but only under the conditions that they agree on a shared political platform based on the Seven Points, carry out the decisions made during national dialogue sessions, and most importantly, fully implement UNSC Resolution 1701. Hizbullah rejected the offer since it would ultimately result in its disarmament, even if Berri, the speaker of the parliament and the head of the Amal movement, agreed. Instead of saying so outright, Hizbullah said that it was hesitant to take part in a government led by Sanyura, who the opposition held accountable for Lebanon's socioeconomic issues since he served as the country's minister of finance for 12 years in the preceding Hariri administrations.

A strong polarization between the Hizbullah-led opposition and its supporters and the Lebanese government and its supporters caused Lebanon to enter a political standstill for more than a year, with occasional additional aggravation. For example, on 5 May 2007, Hizbullah revoked its earlier acceptance of the Seven Points, calling them "Condoleezza Rice's orders to Sanyura," as stated by Sayyid Nawwaf al-Musawi, Hizbullah's foreign relations officer and member of its Political Council. On the same day, Nasrallah affirmed the statement, contrary to his earlier public declarations. Two days later Sanyura labeled the Hizbullah establishment as oppressors[7].

The Tug of War

The international tri-bunal, the national unity cabinet, and the president were said to be the three focal areas of the continuing struggle between the Sanyura ministry and the Hizbullah-led opposition, according to Nikolas Nasif, an al-Akhbar writer, in April 2007. Hizbullah had lost the first two battles, according to Nasif, but the third was still up in the air. What seems to confirm Nasif's judgment is that the discourse of all the parties switched to the topic of the president, which thereafter dominated public political conversation. He questioned what would happen to Hizbullah's reputation following these "defeats." In contrast to what 14 March Trend was advocating, Qasim, the deputy secretary general of Hizbullah, warned that the president to be chosen by a two-thirds majority of the parliament. The president should be chosen directly by the people, according to FPM leader 'Auon. The 8 March Group recommended either early

parliamentary elections or a one-third veto power in any future government since it does not accept the legitimacy and legality of the Saynura administration. Before talking about the creation of the national unity cabinet and any agreement on a new electoral legislation to serve as the foundation for the May 2009 parliamentary elections, Trend insisted on choosing the president first.

The tug of war persisted despite the fact that both sides believed that General Michel Sulayman of the Lebanese army would make a sensible candidate for president[8].

While this was going on, new and old disputes in Lebanon were escalating in violence, severely deteriorating the country's security situation. Two members of the 14 March were murdered.69 Armed clashes between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam militants broke out on May 20, 2007, in and around the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli.70 Fatah al-Islam later exacted revenge for Nahr al-Barid by killing Lebanese Army Brigadier General François al-Hajj.

Ayatullah Fadlallah, a prominent Shi'i cleric, said in his Friday sermon on August 17 that the political crisis was so serious that it was more of a threat to Lebanon's survival than its future. The Maronite Patriarch echoed the same concern in his sermon on August 19th. The fear was that if civil war broke out, it would result in the total destruction of Lebanon becauseunlike the 1975-1990 civil war, in which the fighting was primarily between Muslims and Christiansat this point the entire country was polarized and divided. Fadlallah stated that Lebanon had become a battleground for regional and international struggles, struggles that had made the Lebanese pawns.The idea of power fading and growing relates to the cyclical or fluctuating nature of power dynamics across time. It implies that control, influence, and degree of power are not constants but may change throughout time. The reasons, manifestations, effects, and implications of the waxing and waning of power may all be discussed in this topic[9].

Causes

Power fluctuations may result from a variety of causes. The rise or fall of power may be influenced by alterations in the political, economic, or social environment, modifications in alliances and coalitions, developments in technology, and changes in culture or ideologies. War, revolution, and economic crises are only a few historical occurrences that may have a big influence on power relations.

Manifestations

At several levels, including individual, group, organizational, and national levels, the waxing and waning of power may be seen. It may manifest itself via factors like political sway, economic might, military prowess, cultural effect, or technical innovation. As people, organizations, or countries' resources, capacities, or levels of public support vary over time, power may transfer between them.

Consequences

Power fluctuations have profound repercussions for people, communities, and society. Gaining power may open doors to chances for development, influence, and control, but losing power can result in status loss, diminished influence, or even vulnerability. Power changes have the potential to alter social, political, and economic structures and alter global dynamics, policies, and governance.

Implications

Power fluctuations have an impact on societal institutions, international relations, and personal life. Power shifts may cause alliances to realign, geopolitical configurations to alter, and the balance of power in the world to change. Power dynamics have an impact on social hierarchies, resource access, and the distribution of income and opportunity at the society level. Power changes may have an effect on a person's goals, identities, and relationships.

Historical Case Studies

There are many instances from history that show how power waxes and wanes. Political movements or ideologies acquire popularity before fading away, empires endure periods of dominance and decline, and economic powers also go through phases of dominance and decline. Examples include the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, the transfer of economic dominance during the Industrial Revolution from Europe to the United States, and the emergence and collapse of ideologies like communism.

Complexity and Dynamics

Power fluctuation is a complicated, multilayered process that is impacted by many different variables. Interactions among many people, situations, and forces are involved. Power dynamics may be nonlinear, with abrupt shifts or slow changes occurring after periods of stability or fast change.

Inference: The ebb and flow of power

Hizbullah's attempt to seize control of the country had set the stage for a new phase in which it aspired to dominate politics and transform the political system under the banner of openness and cooperation. But ultimately, the government opted to engage Hizbullah for the first time after 18 months of a shaky political impasse. Following a lengthy meeting that lasted until early in the morning on May 6, 2008, the cabinet declared that Hizbullah's telecommunications network was illegal and a "onslaught against the state's sovereignty and its financial resources," and that it would bring to justice anyone involved in its deployment. This announcement amounted to issuing an arrest warrant for Nasrallah because it described the network as a "onslaught against the state's sovereignty and its financial resources."

The Lebanese Army General Wafiq Shuqayr, who had held that position since 2000 and was pro-Hizbullah and pro-Amal, was also fired by the government. In retaliation, on May 8 into 9, Hizbullah used armed force to invade and occupy West Beirut. With the Lebanese Army, the party had been able to reach a "silent consensus" agreement that prohibited intervention in the crisis. The Hizbullah-led opposition engaged in a campaign of civil disobedience, obstructing important thoroughfares and economic arteries for Lebanon, including the Beirut port and the country's airport. More than 65 people were killed and 200 others were injured in turf wars between the rival groups, including at least 16 Hizbullah militants, according to Nasrallah, in scenes reminiscent of the American civil war. In conclusion, the ebb and flow of power emphasizes how dynamic power dynamics are across time. Understanding historical events, global dynamics, and social changes requires an understanding of the origins, manifestations, repercussions, and implications of power swings. Understanding the intricacies of human societies and the dynamic nature of power relations may be gained by studying power dynamics[10], [11].

CONCLUSION

A public apology from Lebanon to Denmark might have advantages beyond just restoring diplomatic relations. It has the ability to advance cultural interchange, provide a better comprehension of one another's viewpoints, and solidify bilateral connections. A formal apology may also act as a starting point for discussions about solving systemic problems and creating plans for future collaboration. The need of an official apology in light of the tense relationship between Lebanon's government and Denmark. It highlights the potential for apologies to promote peace, restore trust, and open the door for fresh diplomatic engagement. The Lebanese government may start a process of reconciliation and contribute to a more positive and cooperative relationship with Denmark by confessing past wrongs and expressing regret.

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