PUBLIC POLICY AND DEMOCRACY

Amit Verma
Dr. Amarpal Singh

ALEXIS PRESS
JERSEY CITY, USA

PUBLIC POLICY AND DEMOCRACY

PUBLIC POLICY AND DEMOCRACY

Amit Verma

Dr. Amarpal Singh

ALEXIS PRESS

ALEXIS PRESS

Published by: Alexis Press, LLC, Jersey City, USA
www.alexispress.us

First Published 2022

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Public Policy and Democracy by *Amit Verma, Dr. Amarpal Singh*

ISBN 978-1-64532-453-9

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

DEMOCRACY'S VISION: GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT STRUCTURES

Amit Verma, Associate Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:- amitverma2@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Visions of Democracy in the Global Justice Movement is a thought-provoking exploration of the complex relationship between democracy and social justice in contemporary political activism. The book examines the diverse perspectives and aspirations of the global justice movement, which seeks to challenge the inequalities and injustices of neoliberal capitalism through collective action and grassroots organizing.The author critically engages with debates surrounding the meaning and practice of democracy within this movement, which often prioritizes participatory decision-making and horizontal forms of organization over representative models of democracy. Through in-depth case studies and analysis of key theoretical debates, the book offers a nuanced and multidimensional understanding of the various visions of democracy at play in the global justice movement.

KEYWORDS:

Democracy, Global Justice,Movement,Organizational Structures, Social, Transnational Activism.

INTRODUCTION

Organizational Structures and Visions of Democracy

Social movements shift their focus from politics itself to meta-politics by not only making demands of decision-makers but also by more or less clearly expressing a fundamental criticism of traditional politics. Their ideas are in line with an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organization of collective decision-making against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy. Their criticism has often focused on the democratic principle of representation and called for public involvement.While participatory elements have long been a part of theories about social movements and democracy, some recent developments can be discussed in light of the expanding body of work on deliberative democracy, which places an emphasis on communication and the location of democratic deliberation in arenas of protest, social movements, and more generally, enclaves free from institutional power.

Deliberative participatory democracy refers to decision-making procedures where, in the presence of equality, inclusiveness, and transparency, a communication process grounded in reason may change individual preferences and produce choices that are focused on the welfare of the public. Although there is a growing emphasis on discourse quality, some aspects of this definition are similar to those already present in the participatory models we just described as

typical of social movements. Deliberation occurs among free and equal individuals. nonetheless, deliberative democracy requires some forms of apparent equality among citizens. At the very least, all citizens must be able to develop those capacities that give them effective access to the public sphere, and once in public, they must be given enough respect and recognition so that they can influence decisions that affect them in a favorable manner. Power derived from force as well as an uneven weighting of the participants as representatives of various organizations with varying sizes or as more powerful people must be excluded from the deliberation process.The focus on inclusivity is another element that conventional ideas of participatory democracy share. All citizens who have an interest in the decisions being made must be involved in the process and given the opportunity to voice their opinions. This indicates that the deliberative process occurs in a setting of diversity of values, comprising individuals with various points of view who share a set of issues.

This is a fundamental tenet of deliberative conceptions as well since deliberation is built on the idea that, even if I may not have to give up my perspective, I could learn something if I consider the other person's point of view. Furthermore, direct, participatory democracy and transparency are complementary because meetings are typically public forums that are open to all. A deliberative democracy, according to Joshua Cohen's definition, is an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members.The emphasis on preference creation with a focus on the definition of the public good, however, is particularly novel in the theory of deliberative democracy and in certain current movements' activities. Deliberative democracy really requires the transformation of preferences in interaction. it is a process through which initial preferences are transformed to take into account the points of view of the others. Deliberative democracy varies from ideas of democracy as the accumulation of preferences in this regard. The quest for a shared purpose or good is facilitated in a deliberative environment. According to this democratic paradigm, political discourse is organized around various notions of the common good and, more importantly, it draws identities and citizen interests in ways that contribute to the public building of the common good[1].

Deliberative democracy places a special emphasis on reason, debate, and discussion since the stronger argument will generally persuade listeners. Deliberation is built on horizontal communication flows, many content creators, abundant possibilities for interaction, conflict based on reasoned arguments, and a willingness to listen to others. Participants' perceptions of arguments as reasonable are used to make decisions. Additionally, these conceptions frequently make reference to consensus-based decision-making techniques as opposed to majority rule, which relies on votes to legitimize decisions.The vision of democracy in social movement groups is the main topic of our study. However, instead of quantifying levels of democracy, we aim to conceptualize the various, more or less pure models of democracy that exist. One of the basic premises of our study is that the broad democratic ideals of authority by, from, and for the people may be united in many ways and with various weights, such as representational vs participatory and majority versus deliberative. We presume that the diversity of democratic concepts expressed by current movements reflects the plurality of repertoires we have found in those movements[2].

We examine how democratic ideals are conceived in social movement organizations. The resource mobilization method, whose proponents emphasize both the rational-economic assumptions and formal organizattional thrusts, has placed a focus on social movement groups at its center. Social movement groups must gather resources from the community, whether directly

in the form of money or via volunteer labor performed by their supporters. they also need to defeat opponents and win over more people, both ordinary people and elites, to their cause. A social movement organization is a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals, according to the definition, which emphasizes its instrumental function. SMOs serve as identity markers for the movements' supporters as well as its detractors and the general public. SMOs, which are described as 'associations of individuals making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought to be structured that, at the time of their claim-making, are peripheral to or excluded from mainstream society', really serve an identification role.In this book, we examine organizations as places for discourse and the development of values as well as as agents of mobilization. In writing on social movements, the first strategy has dominated.

As Clemens and Minkoff recently observed, Attention to organization appeared antithetical to analysis of culture and interaction with the growth of the resource mobilization viewpoint. The cultural content of organizing and the meanings signaled by organizational forms were sidelined as a subject for investigation as organizations were considered in an instrumental way. However, in more recent approaches, SMOs are increasingly seen as contexts for political conversation, with particular etiquettes[3].This progression represents shifts in the closed to open system approach, followed by neo-institutionalism, in the sociology of organizations. The proportional weight given to environmental impact and organizational agency helps to identify these approaches. The so-called closed system approach, which was developed along with organizational sociology, identified internal organizational forces as the prime causal agents in accounting for the structure and behavior of organizations.

Rather than emphasizing the technical interdependence of organizations and their environments, an open system approach did so in the 1960s.Later, the metaphor of a garbage can was used to describe decision-making in situations with high preference ambiguity and limited information on environmental constraints and opportunities. In recent years, the emphasis has switched from the technical to the sociocultural environment according to the neo-institutional approach in organizational theory. The new institutionalism in organizational theory and sociology, according to two of its proponents, is characterized by a rejection of the rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as independent variables, a shift towards cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in the characteristics of supra-individual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals' attributes or motives.

In an effort to merge the study of environmental implications with those of organizational decisions, we share some of the problems raised by the neo-institutional approach in our research. First, we look at organizations as socializing agents and norm-producers, which 'do not only confine options: they define the fundamental criteria by which individuals find their preferences'. Therefore, organizations serve as both platforms for experimentation and means of mobilization.Second, we examine both formal and informal practices. The relevance of relationships was no longer defined by the formal organization chart. forms of coordination grounded in personal networks as well as non-authoritative projects of mobilization were made visible, as well as influences that transgressed the official boundaries of an organization, according to the neo-institutional approach. In order to better understand each firm, we will look at its practices and core values rather than just its official organizational charts[4].

Third, we both emphasize on cognitive processes. Organizations do not automatically adjust to their surroundings. instead, organizational actors' perceptions of external influences filter them. This is similar to the neo-institutional approach. Neo-institutionalists shifted the emphasis away from Parsons' internalization theory and toward cognitive processes derived from ethnomethodology and phenomenology. They also placed more emphasis on practical knowledge and everyday action based on the premise that organization members discover their motives by acting. Bourdieu's idea of habitus, which he defined as a system of'regulated improvisation' or generative norms that symbolizes the internalization by actors of previous experiences on the basis of common typifications of social categories, perceived phenomenally as people like us, is crucial to this research. In this study, we want to analyze both official organizational positions and informal behaviors, as well as general ideals and involvement in protest movements. Although we believe that organizations play a significant and active role in influencing their environments, environmental constraints may be important in influencing organizational behavior. Organization serves as both a means and an objective for social movements, just as it does for other social actors.

We will concentrate on the democratic ideals embodied in one specific movement, the Global Justice Movement, which gained prominence following the protest at the World Trade Organization Summit in Seattle. The Global Justice Movement is a loose network of people and organizations working to advance global justice through various forms of collective action. With a focus on both internal and exterior change, democratic conceptions become especially pertinent for this movement. In terms of the external, the movement must adjust to threats to representative democracy, including the transfer of power from the state to the market, the rise of transnational institutions and their lack of democratic accountability, and the demise of mass parties. Regarding internal change, the Global Justice Movement adopts an open and inclusive structure already common to other movements, but with increased reticularity: international counter-summits and campaigns, as well as local-level protests, are typically organized by structures coordinating hundreds, if not thousands, of groups.I'll discuss some of the methodological decisions we made for our study in the sections that follow, deferring until the following section a more detailed understanding of the pertinent democratic characteristics[5].

DISCUSSION

Multi-Method Research

The project Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of the Society, which focuses on the attitudes toward democracy of social movement organizations engaged in the GJM, is the source of the research provided in this book. The study, which examines social movement groups from six European nations as well as transnational ones, acknowledges that it only examines a small portion of the GJM. Many of them took part in the European Social Forums, where tens of thousands of activists and thousands of groups have networked to create another Europe since the first edition in Florence in 2001. However, it also addresses the two main constellations that converged in the GJM: one where unions and social issues appear to be more central, particularly in Central and Northern Europe, and the other where NGOs are more visible.

Surveys of movement activists, an analysis of documents and websites from GJM organizations, semi-structured interviews with movement organizations, and participant observation of movement groups and their experiences with participatory and/or deliberative decision-making make up the research we present here. We wanted to gather data on a reasonably high number of

organizations/groupings per nation and on extremely various organizational forms, in contrast to most previous social movement research. We integrated quantitative study of a large number of examples with qualitative in-depth investigation of a few organizations in different aspects of our research. The heterogeneity of the GJM, especially in terms of organizational designs, served as one of the justifications for increasing the number of chosen examples. We have to choose a lot of different groupings in order to show this variability. This book includes the findings of an investigation of 266 SMOs' websites, 244 SMOs' foundational documents, and interviews with 210 SMO officials.

The first section of our study focuses on e-democracy as it is conceptualized and used on the websites of 266 social movement organizations engaged in global justice protest campaigns. Organizations involved in social movements utilize the Internet to disseminate information, create identities, recruit new members, and mobilize both online and offline. The number of movement groups having an online presence has significantly increased in recent years due to its cheap cost and possibilities for horizontal engagement. Based on prior research, a structured code book was used to analyze the websites of the GJM groups in order to gather data on the factors that could influence how well online organizations use the democratic potential of the Internet. The following dimensions served as the framework for the codebook:

general information provision, including variables aimed at estimating the dissemination of information and analysing how information is organized on the Web site. identity building, focusing on the use of a Web site for internal, multilateral communication. transparency, with a set of variables on the online publication of information on statutes, organizational structure, work agenda, physical existence and reachability, activities, economic situation, number of Web site users, as well as information useful to access- ing members of the organization – often referred to as bilateral interactivity, that is, an organization’s willingness to offer channels of direct communication with citizens, creating more participative organizational structures . mobilization, through variables aimed at measuring the use of Web sites for protest, both offline and online . intervention on the digital divide, based on the presence of opportuni- ties for training and providing a series of resources to socialize their users to the Internet[6].

The Internet is a useful research tool as well as a wealth of information for analyzing the textual output of social movement organizations. A second area of our research, which does not solely rely on the Internet and analyzes the founding documents of 244 social movement organizations, focuses on the general conflicts between deliberative participatory and representative patterns, both in the internal dynamics of social movements and in their interactions with institutions. This portion of the study focuses on organizational ideology rather than how the organizations or groups actually operate. The underlying premise is that strong normative declarations regarding internal democracy are more likely to be found in 'visible' documents like a constitution, mission statement, about us page on an organization's website, and so on. We are aware that in certain situations, constitutions or mission statements may be strategically useful. that is, they can be modified to meet the needs of outside sponsors, government agencies, and other entities in order to gain support and clout. However, formalized decision-making processes have a tendency to limit an organization's institutional framework.The following organizational documents were examined in-depth:

1. The organization's constitution.
2. A statement of core principles and/or intent.

3. A formally adopted program.
4. The mission statement.
5. The about us page on the website.
6. The frequently asked questions page on the website. and
7. Equivalent or similar web content expressing the official position of the organization as a whole such as annual reports, membership application forms, and so on.

These materials were available on the websites, but not all of them. In an attempt to complete our collection as much as feasible, we contacted the organizations after analyzing the Web sites to request any missing papers.We created a codebook for the quantitative portion of the study with the intention of conducting an organized examination of democratic aspirations. In terms of methodology, this section is very fresh. Social movement organization structure documents have been analyzed in a variety of research initiatives, mostly as part of qualitative in-depth assessments of a small number of groups. These analyses had the benefit of thick description but were challenging to summarize in wider comparison[7].

Our codebook was developed using the following groups of variables: basic organizational features. membership policies. organizational structures and decision-making processes. linkages with public institutions. and identity and democratic concepts.This is the first effort that we are aware of to create a systematic content analysis of organizational papers from SMOs that discuss democratic values. As a result, we spent a lot of time and effort creating the codebook, keeping in mind both the features of the resources at our disposal and our primary research concerns. We were able to draw on some prior research-related experiences for the creation of this instrument. In instance, party election manifestos have been analyzed as significant sources of information on party ideology, and the constitutions of political parties have been investigated in studies on party organizational structures.

The existence of many different forms of organizations, including political parties, unions, huge associations, tiny informal groupings, international networks, and local groups, presents a challenge for our study. Of course, we might have restricted our attention to just those organizations that fell under the same category, such as those that had a constitution. This strategy, however, would have left several pertinent alternative organizational forms out of our research. We must therefore accept that the amount and nature of written material greatly varies by group. In fact, substantial written production increases the likelihood of finding statements about democracy while the lack of a formal constitution decreases the likelihood of finding detailed information about the formal rules of decision-making. We take into consideration these variations and their effects when interpreting our findings. Another issue is that although official organizations often make the chosen papers easily accessible, this isn't necessarily the case for less formal groups. Furthermore, informal organizations also showed a greater resistance to offline document provision. As a result, the corpus of documentation on certain groups was diminished, particularly in some nations[8].

The triangulation of the findings with those from a survey of the same organizations examined in the earlier portions is one technique for addressing these limitations. The semi-structured interviews, like the document analysis, centered on notions of democracy but turned the emphasis to how they are handled by representatives of a sample of social movement groups affiliated with the GJM. The semi-structured questionnaire covered 210 SMOs and was given over the phone to key informants. It asked about organizational traits and their connections to the

organizational field. Between January and August of 2006, the interviewing campaign was conducted.Some quick observations on the sample procedures are necessary before going on to the outcomes of our empirical investigation. To ensure variation, particularly on the key concerns addressed, we chose in each nation groups that had been participating in the GJM's core projects.

Since the GJM has been referred to as a movement of movements, we have chosen approximately 35 organizations per nation and on a global scale, including those we thought were most indicative of the different streams that converged in the GJM. Lists of organizations that have signed social forum calls for action and other significant movement events were compiled and utilized to identify the organizations that make up the core of the GJM's networks. In order to acquire comparable data, spanning SMOs concentrating on various concerns, a similar sample technique was decided upon. Additionally, various media Web sites nearby the GJM were also chosen. Local social forums were also sampled where they were present. Finally, organizations that were critical of the social forum process were included when they had a symbolic impact on the activists' discussion of democracy.

Since our sample was not chosen at random, it cannot be said to be an accurate representation of the makeup of the GJM worldwide. Random sampling is only one method of case selection, while it has certain clear benefits and challenging application requirements. According to King et al., among others, Random selection might not be feasible in qualitative research, and indeed in much quantitative research, because the universe of cases is not clearly specified. Given that we didn't know anything about the cosmos, random selection was really impossible in our situation. Additionally, random selection is not necessarily a wise technique to use, even when it is feasible, because there is a chance of missing important cases. This observation also applies to the study methodology we used, which limited the number of groups each team could choose from to 30 to 40. King et al. advise us to proceed cautiously if we have to forgo randomization, which is often the case in political science research[9].

In reality, we aimed to choose the groups in the center of the Global Justice Movement in each nation and at the supranational level rather than using randomness as a factor in our selection strategy. Additionally, we made an effort to reflect the diversity of the movement through the topics we covered and our ideological inclinations. According to the principle that the best intentional design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable without regard to the values of the dependent variables, we took care to avoid sampling on our dependent variables.This sampling methodology prevents us from claiming that our national samples are representative of all GJM organizations in each nation. We are convinced that the selection decisions did not affect the statistical correlations among the coded variables, nevertheless, since our case selection followed the rule that we must not search for those observations that fit our a priori theory. When available, similar organizations were used in place of the lists used for the analysis of the documents in the sampling strategy for the interviews. This occurred in 19.5% of the instances, which were predominant in the Spanish and international groups. They ranged from a substitution rate of 0.0% in the Swiss case to 2.7% in the Italian, 7.7% in the German, 10.7% in the French, and 13.8% in the British cases.

We investigate the effects of several sets of factors on democratic ideals and behaviors in this book. In an effort to develop generalizable assertions that speak to the extensive social science literature on social movement groups, the aforementioned databases, along with qualitative data,

are employed using various statistical approaches.Donatella della Porta supports the selection of the Global Justice Movement as the subject of our investigation in The Organizational Population. She looks at the many ways that the sample organizations describe the GJM and discusses the problem of the movement's diversity as well as its global aspect.For organizations adhering to different facets of the Global Justice Movement, Herbert Reiter discusses the significance of participation as a value and participatory democracy as a principle for the internal life of the group. While the mention of delegation spreads across groups with various structural characteristics, attesting to the presence of various participatory traditions within the GJM, delegation emerges as being correlated with some organizational characteristics. The terms participation are used by the Old Left, New Left, new social movements, and organizations in the New Global Movement regions. However, these terms have diverse connotations and implications for both internal democracy and relations with institutions. The same holds true when considering organizations participating in various organizational domains, including grassroots social movement groupings, contemporary networks, official NGOs, unions, parties, and cooperatives[10].

The goal of Donatella della Porta's essay on consensus in movements is to conceptualize the Global Justice Movement's contribution to discussions of deliberative democracy. It highlights some varied interpretations that comparable ideas acquire in organizations with diverse historical histories and engagement in different arenas by examining normative theory on deliberative democracy and empirical research on deliberation in movements. The structural and cultural characteristics of the organizations that reference consensus are also explored in order to provide reasons for the focus on consensus decision-making. Addresses the movement's thoughts about the establishment of multilevel government, once again by Donatella della Porta. The focuses on social movement groups' responses to current threats to the representational paradigm of democracy in particular. It conceptualizes attitudes about institutions and looks into reasons behind the varied opinions based on organizational records and interviews. Addressed in particular are the influence of organizational qualities that are structural and cultural.

Alessandro Nai and Marco Giugni investigate potential reasons for variations in internal decision-making seen across Global Justice Movement groups. They specifically look at several structural and cultural factors that influence whether or not organizations involved in the movement adopt a deliberative participatory approach. They use many types of triangulation to do this. To determine whether organizational structural and cultural elements have an influence and to determine their relative weight, a logis- tic regression is first conducted. Second, to examine various and conjunctural impacts, qualitative comparative analysis is performed.Clare Saunders explores the major sociological ideas on the organizational structures of social movements in Chapter 6, which focuses on the influence of organizational resources on democratic beliefs.The interview results show that scale does, in fact, result in a more oligarchical organizational structure. However, a qualitative analysis of a few carefully chosen large organizations enables us to move beyond the idea that big is ugly, revealing some organizational decisions that can restrain the oligarchical tendency.

Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune concentrate on the selected organizations' modes of action in chapter seven. Following a mapping of some broad patterns in GJMO repertoires, the authors identify two organizational clusters: one is made up of groups that only use moderate forms, while the other includes groups that also use confrontational ones. The various action alternatives are then discussed using both internal and external considerations based on a variety of sources,

including the organizations' Web sites, important papers, and interviews with group officials.Lorenzo Mosca and Donatella della Porta's book Mediating the Movement focuses on how the Global Justice Movement Organizations utilize the Internet. This explains how organizations and activists use computer-mediated communication both for internal organizational communication and for outward mobilization. The conceptualizes the many attributes of the organizational Web sites by a methodical examination, and it searches for an explanation in both the external opportunities and the internal traits of the organizations[11].The GJM is in fact seen by its participants as a novel kind of engagement, an inventive type of conflict, and hence an unheard-of form of communal involvement. Being a movement of movements, it brings together organizations founded at various times. Indeed, different generations show some traits of the eras in which they were born, with the most recent groups exhibiting more straightforward and consensual conceptions and practices of democracy.

In their investigation of the global justice movement's transnational activism, Mario Pianta, Raffaele Marchetti, and Duccio Zola posit transnational activism as the primary driver of significant innovations in social movement organizations. The shift to transnational activism is viewed as an expansion of knowledge about global concerns as well as a development of political goals and connections to economic and political power, resulting in organizational structures and modes of action that significantly diverge from domestic activism. An index of transnational activism is presented, integrating details on involvement in transnational events and connections to transnational networks and campaigns, based on empirical evidence derived from the interviews. The findings of this analysis indicate that the Global Justice Movement's identity, field of activity, size, network/campaign form of organization, use of demonstrations as a form of action, and national specificities are key factors influencing its level of transnational activism.

CONCLUSION

The last reflections discuss the democratic visions that emerged from the empirical investigation as well as the structural and cultural reasons behind them. The codebook was checked several times by all programmers in order to have a trustworthy tool for Web site development. On two different Web sites, each underwent two reliability tests. After the second test, we specifically intervened with the variables that had performed poorly. Variables that had failed to function because they were read differently by various programmers were removed, and new ones were only added where it was technically feasible. We gave the coders general guidelines to follow in order to increase the reliability of the coding process, such as: a) limiting some searches to particular pages or sections of the website. b) using the internal search engine or a Google search function that is equivalent and allows for the search of specific information while restricting the search to a single Web site. We requested the coders to record certain Web pages and provide a final remark on the website's characteristics with a focus on symbols, dis- courses, actions, and coordination to whom the organizations were tasked in order to supplement the quantitative coding with extra information.

REFERENCES:

[1] N. Bertuzzi, Normalising the 'alter-Europe' or going beyond this Europe? Italian environmental movements' perspectives on Europe, democracy and the ecological crisis, *Eur. J. Cult. Polit. Sociol.*, 2020, doi: 10.1080/23254823.2020.1798262.

[2] W. D. Greason, A More Beautiful and Terrible History: The Uses and Misuses of Civil Rights History, *J. Am. Hist.*, 2019, doi: 10.1093/jahist/jaz137.

[3] D. Della Porta, Organizational Structures and visions of democracy in the global justice movement: An introduction, in *Democracy in Social Movements*, 2009. doi: 10.1057/9780230240865.

[4] C. Hinrichs, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty, *Contemp. Sociol. A J. Rev.*, 2005, doi: 10.1177/009430610503400642.

[5] C. Corazza, By no other means than peace: W.E.B. Du Bois on nonviolence, world peace, and justice, *Peace Chang.*, 2021, doi: 10.1111/pech.12490.

[6] J. U. Loh, Transgender identity, sexual versus gender 'rights' and the tools of the Indian state, *Feminist Review*. 2018. doi: 10.1057/s41305-018-0124-9.

[7] N. McKeon and G. Berron, Introduction to 'Reclaiming democracy from below: from the contemporary state capitalist system to peoples' sovereignty', *Globalizations*, 2020, doi: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1783813.

[8] D. della Porta, Organizational Structures and Visions of Democracy in the Global Justice Movement: An Introduction, in *Democracy in Social Movements*, 2009. doi: 10.1057/9780230240865_1.

[9] M. Giugni and A. Nai, Paths towards consensus: Explaining decision making within the Swiss global justice movement, *Swiss Polit. Sci. Rev.*, 2013, doi: 10.1111/spsr.12016.

[10] Review Index, *Perspect. Polit.*, 2017, doi: 10.1017/s1537592716005314.

[11] C. Pring, *People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015 – Global Corruption Barometer*. 2015.

CHAPTER 2

GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL POPULATION

Sourabh Batar, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:- battarsourabh@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Global Justice Movement Organizations is a comprehensive study of the organizational structures, strategies, and tactics of the diverse array of social justice organizations that make up the global justice movement. Drawing on extensive empirical research and case studies from around the world, the book offers a detailed analysis of the ways in which these organizations work to challenge the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism and promote more equitable and sustainable forms of economic and social development. It explores the wide range of organizational forms and tactics utilized by these organizations, from transnational networks and coalitions to local grassroots movements and direct-action campaigns. The book also examines the challenges faced by these organizations in their efforts to mobilize and sustain popular support, including issues of resource mobilization, leadership, and internal democracy.

KEYWORDS:

Civil Society, Global Justice Movement, Organizational, Resource Mobilization, Social.

INTRODUCTION

The Global Justice Movement is the subject of our study. Social movements often cannot be described as united actors since they are made up of loose networks, have a diverse range of actions, and their collective identity is not organized along clear organizational lines. This is especially true for the actor we are looking at since it has been said that it is organizationally flexible, strategically wide, and tolerant of variety.As a consequence, there has been discussion over whether there really is a global justice movement. Activists and academics both debate whether to use the single or plural form of the word movement to describe the networks and organizations mobilizing for global justice, with viewpoints reflecting in part the degree of agreement or disagreement in mobilization at the national level. A sign that the mobilizations on global issues do not share enough common meaning to allow us to speak of a social movement, the heterogeneity of the movement has been viewed by some scholars as a sign that. while others have argued that it resonates with internalized values of tolerance and inclusiveness. The degree to which activists identify with the movement, the uniformity of diagnostic and prognostic frameworks, the density of mobilizing networks, and the consistency of activity have all been taken into consideration when addressing the issue of the presence of a movement.

The usage of the single or the plural differs among campaigners. The Italian protest organizers who planned the Genoa 2001 G8 summit protest identified as members of A movement of movements. We, women and men from social movements across Europe, came to Athens after years of common experiences, fighting against war, neoliberalism, all forms of imperialism,

colonialism, racism, discrimination, and exploitation, against all the risks of an ecological catastrophe, the Assembly of the Movements said at the conclusion of the 4th edition of the European Social Forum.Beyond the mere presence of a movement, the topic of the phenomenon's worldwide scope is also addressed. Some academics emphasize that social movements continue to organize and develop around national issues, while transnational groups are typically ad hoc coalitions with limited autonomy and personal commitment. It is often observed that protest activity, which primarily depends on national political possibilities and attempts to specifically target national administrations, only very seldom occurs outside of national boundaries. Along with the rarity of transnational protest events, it has been suggested that the short lifespan of transnational networks and campaigns indicates a lack of strength in other fundamental components of social movements, like action and networking.

The degree to which we can identify innovations in organizational methods, problem framing, and action repertoires in the recent mobilizations on global justice is also up for debate. Cycles of protest have historically served as testing grounds for novel concepts and burgeoning social movements that carry new norms and standards. The definition of new social movements, however, was already under dispute by the 1980s, and the propensity to find novelty in each new wave of protest was viewed with distrust. This was especially true for the global justice mobilizations, which were hailed or derided as a rebirth of the Left due to their interest in 'materialist' themes as well as the organizational support from left-wing parties and unions.The information we have gathered enables some clarification of these difficulties. As I present some descriptive data on the organizational population studied in this volume in terms of cultural frames, forms of action, and organizational models, I will discuss the existence of a movement, the strength of its transnational dimension as well as its innovative versus traditional elements. Finally, I'll outline the organizational conceptions of democracy that will be substantially discussed throughout the rest of this book[1].

DISCUSSION

Framing Global Issues

The development of a discourse that highlights a shared identity and the object of the protest on a worldwide scale is a prerequisite for the emergence of a global movement. Organizations involved in movements should conceptualize their initiatives in terms of global identities and issues, referring to themselves as members of a global movement and focusing on global enemies within a worldwide context.The existence of strong levels of identification with a worldwide movement is the first conclusion drawn from our study. We questioned participants in our interviews with representatives of social movement groups how connected they felt to the Global Justice Movement. Up to 80% of respondents said that they completely identified, and only a very small number of groups indicated that they did not see themselves as being a member of the movement or that they did not share the same opinion on the topic. The articulation of a sense of membership in the movement is all the more important given the wide variety of organizations that expressed a desire to be a part of it, from NGOs to political parties, from unions to more traditional new social movement organizations. The media, which we tested as being supportive of the social forum process, as well as more radical formations, often stated a lack of identification. Furthermore, the data show that organizations that existed before the GJM's emergence have a high level of identification with it.

In order to determine how much different actors and campaigns adhere to an analytical definition of social movements that emphasizes the requirement to subscribe to a shared belief, it may not be sufficient to look at actors' self-definitions of the movement in terms of its existence and sentiments of membership. As previously stated, the question of whether a movement of movements really has enough basic agreement to be considered such is still up for dispute in both politics and the social sciences. The replies to an open question on the key goals of the GJM in our surveys of SMOs provide intriguing information to address these challenges[2].The representatives that were questioned expressed a variety of perspectives on the Global Justice Movement. Reagglomerating the responses to an open question reveals that more than one-third of groups consider the movement's primary goals as worldwide, while more than two-thirds define them as social. More than half of our groups highlight themes related to the new social movement, and around a quarter highlight the topic of democracy. In a cross-national comparison, transnational groups emphasize global goals more than national groups, which emphasize social issues.

Swiss and Spanish groups focus more on the issues of the new social movements, while a sizable number of British, French, and Italian organizations see democracy as the movement's central tenet. With 85% of respondents endorsing proactive assertions and just 40% mentioning negative ones, our respondents tended to highlight the movement's positive characteristics. The majority of organizations make generic declarations, while one-third bring up particular concerns or policy proposals.Looking at the whole responses, we can see that organizations often see the movement as a place where their own unique issues may reach a wider audience. Our responses do concentrate on a few key concerns that have come together in global justice mobilizations. Organizations engaged in the South of the globe make up a significant portion of our mobilizations. They view the GJM as an opportunity to develop alternative mechanisms to control markets, trade, and development. They advocate for a vision of the world based upon the dignity of the persons and the respect for human rights, ask for worldwide legislation for protection of labor rights according to ILO norm, work to end the global inequalities that drive migration, and oppose the idea of a fortified Europe.

In actuality, the Jubilee Debt Campaign places reducing poverty and promoting economic fairness at the forefront of its priorities. According to Medico International, the movement's key goals are to give permanently disadvantaged people access to resources like education and health care. to combat the logic of evaluating people according to their potential for economic profit. The 'developmental paradigms influenced by the neoliberal orthodoxy' are criticized by the Italian Consortium of Solidarity. War and peace-related issues are also crucial. The GJM prioritizes human security and peace as its core ideals. In order to achieve peace through justice, it is thought that poverty and hunger must be eradicated, since the GJM's primary goals are to prevent wars, achieve disarmament, and implement inter-national standards. Environmental concerns are emphasized by ecological organizations, who see the movement as looking for alternatives to the capitalist system that widens the gap between the rich and the poor and depletes natural resources[3].

The unions and left-wing parties depict traditional social justice issues as being of utmost importance. By fighting for a different model of globalization that places decent work at the center of development and trade, the GJM seeks to uphold basic human rights, democracy, and social justice, according to the International Metalworkers' Federation, and, according to the Parti socialiste suisse - section genevoise, it seeks to provide global solutions that are not only

based on profit. The connotations of the have nots place a strong emphasis on equality and, conversely, the fight against inequality. The GJM is seen as supporting the battle against inequality, providing visibility to the excluded, and advocating for a guaranteed income that does not impoverish people. In parallel, the Coordi- nation des intermittents d'Ile de France fights against precarious work, the French association for the rights of migrants strives to make the struggles of undocumented migrants known, the Italian Comitato Immigrati emphasizes the fight against the western model conceiving other peoples as colonies, and the Muslim Association of Britain advocates for equal rights.

These are not'single issue' concerns. rather, it is clear that each organization views them as important issues to include on the agenda of a multifaceted movement. Furthermore, the language is frequently in tune with the various traditions. Unions and conventional left groups place an emphasis on equality, whereas religious organizations emphasize the dignity of the person. According to Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica, the movement is a move- ment of universal brotherhood that strives to spread social justice and economic development in the whole planet. The movement supports critical libertarian thought, according to the Sexual Freedom Coalition. As for the Confederazione Unitaria di Base, the rank-and-file union, it emphasizes unionism, workers' rights, fair pay, and freedom of association[4].Despite these distinct languages and focuses, there is ground in common. Beyond the various accents, respondents' common concerns are highlighted by bridging themes. The respondents consistently identify four key issues as the GJM's underlying drivers: demands for rights, social fairness, democracy from within, and the action's universal scope.

First of all, almost all organizations speak in terms of rights, with varying degrees of emphasis on particular rights. This is characteristic of groups associated with the New Social Movement and unions. The groups active in the campaigns in the South of the globe disseminated a language of human rights, which in the GJM quickly evolved into global rights. The GJM is focused on the promotion of human rights and of social sustainable development through strate- gies against poverty, illiteracy and exploitation, according to the spokesman of the European Global March against Child Labor. However, the movement's foundation is rarely limited to particular racial or ethnic groups, but rather is defined by broad categories like citizens of the humanity. People from democratic nations are not the only ones who speak about human rights. Although it is mentioned, citizenship applies to all residents and beyond. The GJM is a movement that starts from the citizens and a world citizens' movement, and its mission is to confront neo-liberal globalization and propose an alternative globalization based upon the respect of human rights for all. Gay organisations also emphasise the importance of civil rights. According to a spokeswoman of the biggest Italian homosexual rights organization, Arcigay follows the GJM because we believe that in addition to economic globalization, civic and social rights should also be globally standardized.

Second, most responders bring up social concerns in one form or another. The goal most often mentioned is social justice. The GJM seeks to engage on concrete issues: stating equality among human beings, emphasizing human rights and reduction of differences, as emphasized by the Italian Emergency. The phrase social justice may be used to sum up these objectives. Social justice is defined differently depending on the tradition. Social concerns may be discussed in terms of poverty in the language of NGOs or religion. In order to expose the scandal of poverty, to help in practical ways to root it out of the world, and to challenge and change the systems which favor the rich and powerful over the poor and marginalized, Christian Aid works as part of

the GJM. for the Catholic Pax Christi, the movement seeks to change the laws of economics. The GJM challenges capitalism and all of the negative effects that it has on people, according to the Trotskyite Socialist Workers' Party, since social concerns are traditionally couched in terms of exploitation. A distinct anticapitalist identity that rejects a society centered on products, profit, and war is described as the driving force behind the mobilization, which is primarily against neoliberal policies[5], [6].

In contrast, social justice is seen as the broker frame that links all others. According to a representative of Espacio Alternativo, there is a great diversity, but there is also a trend to unify them in a general, pluridimensional idea of social justice: social, ecological, between genders, between peoples and cultures, democratic-participative, and for the defense of the common good. According to official statements, the GJM seeks to seek economic, political, and social alternatives to the prevailing model, in a decentralized and non-hierarchical way and to promote social justice in all the world, give priority to human beings over profit, reduce or redistribute economic, financial, cultural, and military power. The movement, in the words of Friends of the Earth International, bridges environmental and social issues. it challenges the current model of economic and corporate globalization, promotes the creation of solutions for environmentally sustainable and socially just societies. The mission of Greenpeace is to found a globalization based on social and environmental rights, human rights, environmental respect, cultural diversity, and pacifism. Social justice is often at the head of lengthy lists of objectives, especially by more political parties but not solely.The preservation of the environment and biodiversity, new economic models, the globalization of human rights, and media democratization.

Redistribution of wealth, international peace, worldwide gender equality, and opposition to all types of intellectual propertyInternational institution reform, a social constitution for europe, the fight against precarity, increased investments in cooperative development, the strategic role of politics in promoting sustainable development, and the right to housing, culture, and education. Trade justice, debt cancellation, more and better aid, human and workers' rights, social, cultural, economic, and political rights, eradication of poverty, economic, social, and environmental justice with a special focus on the economic, but not excluding other issues, political, social, economic, and environmental justice. No war, social rights, ecology, end poverty, women's rights, migrants...A third bridging element is the search for a different democracy that is developed from, and it is always related to social justice. The movement's key concerns are democracy, social justice, environmental justice, and equality. It also calls for another economy and a new democracy that go beyond national and delegated institutions. Its goal is to rebuild a public space and democracy.

Attention to democracy is articulated, particularly by multinational organizations, in terms of the reform of global governing institutions. The movement aims to challenge and alter the predominate economic policies and the international decision-making architecture in addition to strengthening international law and institutions, democratizing the international system, and achieving democ- ratization and accountability of international institutions. The more conventionally political groups place emphasis on the need to change current institutions, establish democratic institutions without mercantilist aims, increase globalization's participatory governance, fight against economic hegemony and multinational companies, and reform the UN.However, democracy is also seen as the creation of spaces for participation and deliberation. Democracy is about two thingsdemocratic involvement at all levels, and productive activity transparency. to increase awareness of all players, as well as promoting a good politics coming

from a vibrant and reactive civil society and innovation of the culture of traditional parties. The movement's mission is to promote direct participation and citizenship to defend common goods from private economic aggression and to re-establish the priority of politics over economics. The movement calls for a transformation of society so that it is more just, egalitarian, solidarist, and in which all citizens have to decide on what concerns them, not only vote every four years and presents citizen engagement as a need for social equality. According to London Rising Tide, the movement's goal is to change the current system of power so that people can reclaim control over their own lives, while democracy and participation are fundamental elements of the Welt-friedensdienst's definition of a good life.

It is usual to call for a restoration of politics pitted against the market. The movement is often characterized as being focused on recovering and expanding the spaces that were lost for the community to the advantage of the financial power. To oppose all state renunciations of competitiveness that tend to privilege the rights of investors and traders. Additionally, Euromovement emphasizes the organization of politics under principles of participation and self-government in order to achieve global common goods. The British journal Red Pepper describes the movement as aiming at the creation of effective means of democratic control at all levels - local to global. Rete Noglobal, a network connecting squatted social centers and similar collectives, defines the solution as a radical change in the forms of political decision and conditions of economic democracy. The solutions range from the regulation of international financial markets to more co-management rights for the civil society.

The usage of terms like global, international, or world is a typical expression of this reference to a global dimension, which is the fourth shared element. The GJM pursues a change in the existing global structures that are based upon a neoliberal economic model that privileges that maximization of profits over distribution, equality, and justice of human rights, according to one interviewee.Different frames also apply to the international sphere, the global perspective, and the world's attention. By using Swiss organizations as examples, we can see that the GJM's objectives include: 'Balancing the power struggle between the North and the South, i.e. democratic consultation for international market regulationsSeeking a fairer international economic order and give a human face to international relations. Changing the world to allow for more equality and freedom'. And 'Offering social, political and economic alternatives, implementing international trade agreements'. Seeking a more equitable society. This movement, which seeks to stop welfare cuts on the national, European, and international level, to the realization of social justice through reallocation of wealth from top to bottom, is essentially one for the redistribution of global wealth.

Our data from the document analysis on the fundamental themes and values contained in organizational papers really validates the bridging effect of concepts like alternative globalization, democracy, social justice, global justice, and workers' rights. Environmental principles also seem to be quite significant. About half of the organizations urging solidarity with developing nations mention the Global South, but equally as many emphasize the value of human rights, and one-third make reference to fair trade. Women's rights, peace, and migrant rights are all often mentioned topics as well. However, the major ideologies of the past are less frequently brought up by our groups.We recoded these variables based on bivariate correlations across all the topics, grouping references to another globalization, democracy, and social justice under the heading new globalism. These key concepts are mentioned by almost all groupings. Values associated with the new social movements include anti-racism, women's rights, animal

rights, and the environment. The same amount of people concentrate on topics of nonviolence and peace. Solidarity values include allusions to sustainability, support for the developing countries, critical consumerism, and ethical finance, which were cited by 58.6% of our sample. Anti-capitalism also contains allusions to anarchist, autonomy, and socialism and communism from conventional leftist movements. The fact that our businesses cite several of the aforementioned topics as their top priorities is very pertinent, indicating a strong propensity to find solutions to problems that go beyond the initial issue.

In conclusion, it is challenging to determine if this movement of movements is more diverse than earlier ones due to a lack of comparison data and a lack of agreed-upon criteria, as well as whether it has reached the level of shared belief indicated by social science definitions. The many ways in which our respondents described the movement's primary goal show numerous specifics, but they also share certain overarching concerns, such those about rights, social justice, and democracy. The identification of issues and solutions, identities, and targets as supranational - as seen in the frequent use of terms like world, planet, and globe, as well as the reference to the Global South - is another trait shared by our organizations and supports the definition of a global justice movement. The majority of the aforementioned themes have strong cultural roots in the organizations and participants in the mobilizations. A communal iden- tification in the GJM is resonant with the bridging of the numerous themes. The degree to which topics and languages that were formerly thought to be quite distinct, if not at odds with one another, are now being bridged with greater intensity feels novel. Additionally, in order to make up for the organizations included in the document analysis that we were unable to interview for a variety of reasons, we had to modify the sampling in the portion of the research based on interviews.

Multifaceted and Varied Protest

A movement must use transnational modes of activity in order to be considered global. Economic globalization and multilayer governance may be predicted to shift protest to the transnational level, against foreign players, just as protest activities tended to concentrate at the national level with the establishment of the nation-state. Some of the new protest movements that have emerged since Seattle are in fact transnational in nature, despite the fact that research on protest events has emphasized that the nation-state continues to be the focus of most claims-making. Counter-summits take advantage of the media coverage and windows of opportunity provided by summits of international organizations to highlight critiques of global policies on problems like the depletion of natural resources, the infringement of human rights, the promotion of communication rights, or the fight against copyrights on seeds. Global days of action draw attention to global concerns, while global or macroregional social platforms encourage conversation across boundaries.

Transnational protest events, such as campaigns against poverty in the South, capital gains taxation, debt relief, fair trade, global rights, and the reform of international intergovernmental organizations, are particularly relevant due to their capacity to foster networking and their symbolic value even though they may be uncommon in absolute terms. Even before reaching the national level, contacts between various groups often began at the global level. Campaigns like the Euromayday against precarious work, the global day of action against the war in Iraq, and the European Marches on unemployment and exclusion have created opportunities for 'in action' encounters between activists from various national and social backgrounds. As opposed to at the national level, where divisions within and between social movements have consolidated along

traditional fractures and personal enmities, representatives of local groups or activists from various countries frequently came together at the transnational level.

Our respondents stated that the global level was more important than the national and local levels when questioned about involvement in events put on by the GJM, and the regularity of this engagement attests to a continuity that goes beyond ad hoc mobilization. In actuality, almost 80% of the groups had attended a transnational event like a World Social Forum and/or European Social Forum. a similar high percentage had taken part in Global Days of Action. and nearly 75% had attended counter-summits held in conjunction with meetings of international governmental organizations. Fewer than 60% of the groups had attended local or national social forums. The groups in the French and Italian samples seem to be the most involved in the GJM events we described, in terms of national specificities. This is a reflection of how significant movement events were planned in various nations during the previous ten years. The third European Social Forum in London was especially crucial for the British organizations, although national and local social forums were also key occasions for German, Swiss, and transnational organisations. For the French, Italian, and Spanish factions, international days of action were significant. Moving from local to national and international activities boosts GJM protest participation in every other country, with the notable exception of the German and Swiss samples.

The responses to the question concerning the five organizations, initiatives, and networks dealing with problems of global justice with which the groups most often contact support the significance of the transnational component for our groups. The problem and the geographic scope of these campaigns/networks are presented in 1.5. More than two-fifths of them deal with international concerns, around half with social ones, and between 10 and 20 percent with national, democratic, or issues related to emerging social movements. German and Italian campaigns/networks focus particularly on national concerns, Spanish organizations are mostly concerned with democratic issues, while British and international campaigns/networks are predominately concerned with new social movement issues. While most of our groups participate in transnational action, their strategies do vary because there are many different concerns and values, which are reflected in many different forms of action. The data on the territorial level of the campaign confirms that most groups network transnationally, with less emphasis on the national level campaigns and very low participation in local campaigns. The portions of the research based on documents and interviews helped to confirm the presence of a broad and varied repertoire, ranging from lobbying to direct action, from educational campaigns to public protest. This is important to note before moving on to a more in-depth analysis of the groups' repertoires. The movement's orientation toward the adoption of various methods is supported by a plural repertoire, which also supports the movement's pluralistic character[7].

While a significant portion of the sampled organizations mention protesting in their documents, a sizable portion also list influencing the media, disseminating alternative information, and raising awareness as core objectives of their groups. Additionally, nearly half of the organizations mention citizens' political education. Despite being fewer, the significant number of groups that mention political representation, the defense of particular interests, advocacy, service provision, and self-help suggests that the majority of organizations engage in a variety of activities. Additionally, much higher percentages mention lobbying. The majority of our organizations combine many techniques instead of sticking to just one.Almost 90% of the groups value cognitive activities like disseminating information, planning conferences, seminars, and

workshops, publishing research reports, and so on, according to similar results from the interviews. About 75 percent of the groups say they participate in protests, and a similar number say they build concrete substitutes.

About half of the organizations use a lobbying strategy that puts direct pressure on elected officials. Contrary to the notion that protest and lobbying are diametrically opposed tactics used by various players, we discovered evidence that a large portion of our organizations did both. This outcome is consistent with the majority of observations made about the demonstrations in Seattle and related events, when many plans were developed and put into action. Organizations from various nations, at least in our samples, favor various techniques. While lobbying is more common among groups affiliated with Northern European nations and the global level, protest is more frequently used by groups associated with Southern European nations. The majority of French, Swiss, and international organisations reported using a strategy targeted at creating tangible alternatives, but almost all German and Swiss groups reported investing in the political education of people. We may see that few organizations concentrate on a single approach when we take the utilization of many strategies into account. While only one-fifth use only two different strategies, more than two-thirds use at least three at once.

Groups that are particularly active in various types of protest are more likely to originate from southern European nations. Most of the groups we studied employ petitioning and protests. Less common are more extreme and/or creative types of protest such blockades, occupations, boycotts, and civil disobedience. Most groups place a high priority on the aesthetic and symbolic aspects of collective activity. over two-thirds of our organizations participate in artistic and cultural performances. While the strike has spread from the trade union sector to the social movement sector in some countries, in others it is still restricted to groups organizing workers[8].The responses to the open question on the movement's primary goals, where respondents also addressed the methods in which the movement may aid in achieving them, indicate the wide character of the repertory of action of our sampled organizations. The perception of the movement's primary methods of action is also influenced by different worldviews. Respondents in fact emphasize alternative discourses, peaceful culture, political pressure, public education, conscientization, democratic citizen control of economic and political growth, social and cultural mobilization, and political pressure.

The movement's primary tactics can be summed up in a variety of ways, including public mobilization and teaching about the issues, raising trade profile as we see it as a key to lifting people out of poverty, or to struggle against the barbarian consequences of the mondialized capitalism and discuss an alternative project.But 'building alternatives' is regarded as being crucial across all of our organizations. The word alternative appears 42 times in the database of string variables used to define the movement. The word revolution is not only completely absent, but even the word protest is only mentioned three times, with qualifiers like protest as the basis for the construction at the political level, not sterile protest. Alternatives are envisioned as tangible, actual solutions: according to Rete Lilliput, creating evident contradictions through alternative practices is necessary for the construction of other possible worlds. In this case, the movement must publicize alternatives already used in the Global South. However, the term alternative is also thought of as being fundamentally different because the movement aims to unveil/make visible/denounce the different forms that the capitalist systems use to legitimize itself and activate proposals or alternatives to this sys- tem. It suggests a radical transformation of society and way of life and offers a viable alternative to the capitalist model.

As a conclusion, document data and interviews attest to the usefulness of transnational protest activities for the organizations taking part in the GJM in terms of networking and symbolic value. At least for our groups, involvement in such events does not seem irregular or infrequent. rather, a sizable portion of them often participate in a wide range of global activities. It seems that in the perspectives of our activists, the Global Justice Movement is primarily about action, not only at the local or national level but also at the transnational level, despite the lack of evidence on the role played by transnational events for other movements. Action repertoires seem to be both multilevel and multiform. Not only are groups using a variety of pre- ferring techniques included in our sample, but most groups also often blend forms that were previously thought to be highly unlike, if not incompatible. The current mobilizations' use of the practice of alternatives as possible utopias is noteworthy as a novelty.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion,the analysis of international justice movement groups provides crucial insights into the complex and ever-changing landscape of modern social justice advocacy. These groups, which range from small grassroots movements to international networks and alliances, are working assiduously to upend the neoliberal capitalist status quo and advance more equitable and long-term models of economic and social development. These organizations continue to show the value of teamwork and strong partnerships in fostering positive social change in the face of substantial setbacks and barriers. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of cooperation and solidarity across various social justice groups and organizations, since only through cooperation can we possibly aspire to create a more fair and equitable society.

REFERENCES:

[1] J. J. Schoenefeld, ‘Interest Groups, NGOs or Civil Society Organisations? The Framing of Non-State Actors in the EU’, *Voluntas*, 2021, doi: 10.1007/s11266-020-00283-w.

[2] F. Colli and J. Adriaensen, ‘Lobbying the state or the market? A framework to study civil society organizations’ strategic behavior’, *Regul. Gov.*, 2020, doi: 10.1111/rego.12227.

[3] M. A. Alves and M. M. da Costa, ‘The collaboration between governments and civil society organizations in response to emergency situations’, *Rev. Adm. Publica*, 2020, doi: 10.1590/0034-761220200168x.

[4] S. Pongutta, K. Kantamaturapoj, K. Phakdeesettakun, and P. Phonsuk, ‘The social impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on urban slums and the response of civil society organisations: A case study in Bangkok, Thailand’, *Heliyon*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e07161.

[5] E. A. Ruvalcaba-Gomez, ‘Open government and citizen participation: Perceptions between civil society organizations and government.’, *eJournal eDemocracy Open Gov.*, 2019, doi: 10.29379/jedem.v11i2.539.

[6] X. Gao and J. Teets, ‘Civil society organizations in China: Navigating the local government for more inclusive environmental governance’, *China Inf.*, 2021, doi: 10.1177/0920203X20908118.

[7] V. Parekh and M. Klintman, 'The practice approach in practice: Lessons for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that Work Towards Sustainable Food Consumption in Sweden', *Sustain. Prod. Consum.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.spc.2020.12.011.

[8] C. Ruzza and R. Sanchez Salgado, 'The populist turn in EU politics and the intermediary role of civil society organisations', *Eur. Polit. Soc.*, 2021, doi: 10.1080/23745118.2020.1801180.

CHAPTER 3

NETWORKING: MOVEMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

Bhirgu Raj Maurya, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Email Id:- brmourya.mourya321@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

A movement of movements is a groundbreaking analysis of the transformative power of networked social movements and their potential to catalyze large-scale social change. The book explores the complex dynamics of these movements, which are characterized by decentralized decision-making structures, fluid boundaries, and a commitment to bottom-up organizing.Drawing on extensive empirical research and case studies from around the world, the author offers a nuanced and multidimensional understanding of the ways in which networked social movements are challenging established power structures and promoting alternative visions of social, economic, and political organization.

KEYWORDS:

Civil, Organization, Movement, Networks, Social.

INTRODUCTION

A global movement should incorporate, on an ongoing basis, organizational networks functioning in multiple nations if social movements are networks of people and groups. Even while new technology like the Internet has made it easier to create worldwide networks, both literal and figurative constraints unavoidably exist. Worldwide gatherings are uncommon and typically attended by a cosmopolitan elite, which has led to the emergence of networks like No Vox to protest the marginalization of the have nots both in society and within the movement. These organizations support the presence of marginalized groups, particularly at transnational gatherings where the effects of the ownership of material and cultural resources are more relevant.Furthermore, even when counter-summits are planned by transnational coalitions, the majority of the attendees are still nationals. There are extremely few independent resources available to international networks, campaigns, and social movement groups. Finally, the convergence of diverse groups, each with their own organizational model, has been observed in the global justice mobilization. This diversity has been cited in some approaches as making the creation of common structures even more challenging.

The GJM is pluralistic and varied, with a wide range of organizational structures existing within the same movement, according to our findings from interviews on the organizational traits of the sampled groups. Resources differ first and foremost. Our organizations' membership sizes, both individually and collectively, differ widely. Approximately half of the population has between 100 and 10,000 members, while the remaining one-third has more than 10,000. Only 21.6% have fewer than 100 members. One-fifth of the almost 65% of our organizations with collective members have ten or less members, whereas one-third have more than one hundred. Regarding their budget, 16.7% say it is variable or limited, and 25% say they have less than €50,000. The

remainder is split evenly between those who say they have between €50,000 and €500,000 and those who say they have more than €500,000. The presence of paid personnel varies similarly, with barely one-third of our organizations stating none, 44.4 percent up to 16, 14.1 percent between 16 and 100, and 11.2 more than 100. The groups are evenly split between those who declare fewer than 16, those who declare between 16 and 100, and those who declare more than 100 volunteers in terms of the number of volunteers.

We have been able to identify a variety of extremely distinct organizational traits on the basis of the organizational papers. A significant portion of our groups scored favorably on an index of structural participation that we created by giving organizations where the assembly meets more frequently than once a year and/or the members of the executive/president/spokesperson are chosen by the general assembly a positive value. On the index of structural inclusivity, which takes into account the absence of prerequisites for membership and mechanisms for member expulsion, a lower 39.3% gets a favorable score. The average for our sample is 0.42 on an additive formalization score, which takes into account the existence of a constitution, a statement of fundamental beliefs, an officially accepted program, formal membership, and membership cards.

Our groups might alternatively be categorized as belonging to several organizational fields: 10% as unions, 10% as political parties, 2.9% as cooperatives, 38.9% as NGOs or official SMOs, 4.9% as grass-roots groups, and 34% as contemporary networks. Our groups are also a part of various social movement generations: 18.6% were started prior to the 1968 uprisings, 19.8% between 1968 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, while almost one-third were started in the 1990s and another third following the Seattle protest. This is related to the fact that our sample includes organizations from several movement fields, echoing the GJM's self-definition as a movement of movements: We recoded 13.1% of organizations as Old Left, 11.5% as New Left/Anarchism/Autonomy, 11.5% as mobilizing on new social movement themes, 28.7% as solidarity/peace and human rights, and 32.8% as new global, having formed around issues of global justice.

Our results indicate to certain common aspects if these variations are significant and support the idea of a coloured, heterogeneous mobilization. First off, the firms in our sample provide services at various levels of territory. As previously indicated, our groups actively participate in international umbrella organizations, forums, campaigns, and days of action. Three-quarters of the organizations in our samplewhich, by necessity, under-represents local groups—consider a local presence to be important. This is evident when we look at the geographical levels covered. However, the national level and the international level are equally significant. about one-third of our groups claim to be organized at those levels. Hierarchical'single' organizations, conventional federations, modern/loose networks, and campaigns may all be found among the organizations having a supranational level.

The high prevalence of network organizations is particularly relevant for the GJM. in our sample, this is shown by the fact that roughly half of our cases represent networks/federations or ad hoc umbrella groups. The fact that approximately half of the organizations in our sample permit collective membership is another sign of the high reticularity of GJM organizations. Additionally, about 80% of our organizations mention networking and collaboration with national SMOs in their documents, and a similar percentage with transnational SMOs. The significance of collaborating with groups working on different topics than they do is mentioned

by around one-third of the organizations that mention collaboration and networking.A theme that keeps coming up in our conversations and unites the many strategic perspectives is the movement's function as a venue for networking. First of all, the movement is seen as a place for interactions, discussions, networking, as well as for mass mobilization.

The GJM aims to connect and empower people, especially those in the Global South, by criticizing capitalist globalization and proposing economic, social, and cultural alternatives, as well as the creation of nets between different movements, in the North as well as in the South. To promote the coordination of movements that resist neoliberal globalization, define and implement alternatives, is the organization's principal goal. Building and strengthening worldwide civic networks, as well as fostering new linkages between social movements and political parties, are its key contributions. A feature of the movement's diversity, according to the spokesman of Indymedia Italia, is that it is pluralistic We feel close to the movement because we think it represents an umbrella of different movements. The establishment of stronger working relationships among NGOs, the strengthening of coordination among national campaigns, and the construction of adequate social coalitions for an emancipatory movement that provides an alternative to neo-liberal capitalism are also emphasized [1].

The dissemination of knowledge via the internet is often seen as crucial. Many interviewees mention the GJM's cognitive depth, which fosters the cross-cutting debate between the different social movements, international networking, and aims to spread, reflect, and debate the different struggles at the local level. Mutual understanding is thus possible thanks to information. The movement's major goal is to enable all forces that oppose the neoliberal mondialization to know each other and converge, as well as to provide a forum for an exchange of struggles and savoir faire. The common struggle is then facilitated by reciprocal knowledge because it federates social struggles, allows the convergence of the struggles against neoliberalism, represents the nets of resistance in all their forms, and permits the com- ing together of the different resistances in a new internationalism. This movement aims at an internationalization of resistances, to unite the local resistances and coordinate

The degree of networking among our groups cannot be measured or compared, and more generally within the GJM, we can determine that the formation of international alliances is in fact seen as a key objective for our organizations. Beyond diversity in size, resources, and age, a variety of organizational models appear to be present in our sample. Beyond this, our organizations appear to share an interest in networking that was less overt in previous waves of protest. The prevalence of groups that permit group membership, or those that are networks of organizations by constitution, seems to be a major advance from an organizational point of view. Additionally, a lot of these organizations emphasize transnational networking as a key organizational strategy and are structured at various territorial levels[2].

DISCUSSION

Visions And Practices of Democracy

The recognition of a variety of similarities and differences, outdated practices and novel innovations, and local and global struggles leaves open some key questions for our research, such as which conceptions of democracy go hand in hand with the variations in issue focus, modes of action, and organizational structures. What democratic ideas and methods evolve in response to the new problems posed by international and diverse actors?The examination of

democratic models as they are developed from is the primary goal of our research. As previously mentioned, although representative models of democracy continue to predominate, they are under threat from a crisis of legitimacy as well as efficiency: a decline in the use of traditional political participation is accompanied by a perception that representative democratic government is performing below par. Other democratic models are emerging as potential remedies for representative democracy's flaws. participatory and deliberative democratic forms are being tested by political actors as well as by institutions of government. Different ideas about democracy coexist in this setting, each emphasizing different aspects of democracy. The idea that the fundamentals of democracy may be mixed in many ways and with various balances is a key tenet of our study. As a result, rather than attempting to quantify the degree of democracy, we sought to identify several kinds of democracy that exist in GJM groups in a more or less pure form. In this regard, we examine in depth the diversity of democratic behaviors and concepts that our selected groups exhibited[3].

We have created a typology of democratic internal decision-making processes with an emphasis on democracy inside movement groups. The first dimension, which deals with delegation and participation levels, sets certain organizations apart from others by giving members of a group a prominent place in the organization's decision-making assembly. A second dimension relates to deliberation/majority vote and examines the relative importance of techniques of decision-making that provide public discourse, the common good, logical reasons, and the transformation of preferences a specific significance. By emphasizing the decision-making process as a whole, the consensus approach especially embeds and valorizes these features. We divided organizations using the consensus technique from all other organizations using other decision-making processes based on this dimension.The two previously mentioned elements of participation and discussion are both included in the typology we established for the Demos project. Although we used the same typology throughout our research, the variables we used are slightly different as a result of the various research tools and sources we used.

We operationalized the two aspects as follows after analyzing the key papers of GJM organizations. Delegates make up either an assembly or another decision-making body in an associational form. The majority vote is used to make decisions. We refer to deliberative representation when, in accordance with the chosen documents, delegates instead decide by consensus. We have either an assembleary model, where decisions are taken by majority, or deliberative participation, where consensus and communicative processes based on reason are mentioned as important values in the documents, when decisions are made by an assembly that includes all members or whoever wants to participate.A model of internal decision-making based on associations is supported by somewhat less than half of the studied firms. This indicates that a paradigm based on delegation and the majority principle is relatively common, at least officially.

Here, the typical method of internal accountability is representative the assembly is made up of delegates and executive committees that play a significant role in organizational decisions, and the system of decision-making emphasizes majority principlespreferences are tallied either by pure majority or through bargaining. This outcome is somewhat predicted given the well-established, sizable, and resourceful organizations like parties, unions, and third-sector organisations that are present in the GJM. Our findings encourage consideration of the causes and effects of the existence of many connections in widespread networks and campaigns.But this is only a portion of the overall picture. Since the documents we examined highlighted the importance of the assembly in a decision-making process that is still reliant on aggregative

techniques like voting or bargaining, we classified 27% of the organizations as assembleary. The importance of the assembly and its inclusivity highlight the participatory aspects, however neither consensus nor it's usage as a decision-making technique are acknowledged. Therefore, efforts to create direct models of democracy are still active.

A further 25 percent of the groups emphasize the deliberative component. Consensus and/or deliberative democracy are specifically listed as organizational values in these organizations, and/or consensus is employed in the assembly or executive committee decision-making process. We can tell the difference between the 15.0% of organizations using consensus inside an assembleary model and the 12.5% using it within an associational kind. This emphasis on discursive quality is an extremely creative addition to social movement concepts of democracy.We have supplemented the data on organizational ideology with interviews on organizational functioning, as perceived and reported by their speakers, in recognition that constitutions and written documents are not always followed in daily activities practices are frequently different from norms and that it can be challenging to find written documents for smaller and grassroots organizations.

In this section, we operationalized the dimension of participation/delegation by separating groups from other organizational kinds based on the importance of the assembly in the organization's decision-making process. On the dimension of deliberation/majority voting, we distinguished between groups using consensus and those using other decision-making processes. Almost one-quarter of organizations fall into the deliberative representative category, where the principles of consensus and delegation are combined, and a similar percentage use an associational model based on majoritarian vote and delegation. 15% of the chosen organizations combine the principles of delegation and majoritarianism, while 39.6% of the groups combine a consensus-based decision-making process with the ideal of participation[4].

When comparing the findings from these two sections of our study, we find that interviewees frequently place a greater emphasis on consensus than do organizational documents. This may be interpreted in a number of ways: either the respondents are more current and accurate in describing the actual decision-making in their groups, or they are attempting to provide a more true picture of the procedure in their companies. Additionally, we had to change the sampling for the interviews to account for the organizations that we were unable to interview due to a variety of factors. Whatever the reason, movement organizations seem to be strongly in favor of consensus rules. This outcome also reaffirms the normative importance that social movement organizations place on internal decision-making as an embodiment of their ideas of democracy and their willingness to engage in model comparisons.

A Worldwide Campaign for Justice

These are all topics that will be covered again in the sections that follow. First, we'll look more closely at the definitions of the various conceptions of participation and consensus as well as another aspect of democracy. Then, we'll look at how values, action repertoires, and organizational structures relate to conceptions of democracy.We may now go back to our original concerns while also summarizing the data on our organizational population that was provided in this article. The first major issue was whether or not we could refer to the global justice movement as a unique entity. The information provided on organizations, ideals, and behaviors seems to support a favorable conclusion, however with significant caveats. First, the organizations in our sample show not only a high level of subjective identification with the

movement but also some agreement on the definition of global justice and democracy from the perspective of broker frames, bridging the particular issues that continue to be at the center of our organizations' concerns. Additionally, it doesn't seem like participation in common campaigns is an irregular, sporadic experience but rather a recurring pattern. Finally, networks and networking take on a positive connotation as they are highlighted as integral components of the corporate identity.

How global is this movement, was the second query. Our findings suggests that the movement is multileveled in this instance, where the global component becomes increasingly significant. First, the definition of issues and the standard for one's own identity are often portrayed as worldwide. Second, in the many transnational networks to which the majority of our organizations are pleased to belong, cosmopolitan identities develop. Third, different geographical levels of governance are targeted by action repertoires that are not just diverse but also regulated[5].What is novel in this movement was the third query. We can first point out the presence of a multi-issue discourse, even if it rejects the big ideologies for a dialogic search for solutions to emerging problems, without wanting to reopen an old debate on the fundamental newness of the social movement and remaining bound to an empirical concern with specific characteristics. The emphasis on knowledge and the use of alternatives resonates with the rejection of taking power at the repertory of action level, beyond the combination of demonstration and lobbying. At the organizational level, experimentation with both participatory and deliberative democratic models is enabled by the flexible networking of many, diverse organizations.The Turin and Abruzzo Social Forums also refer to the public good.

The most crucial decision-making tasks are more often than not given to a monocratic body or a group of people, such as an executive committee. In around 25% of the groups, these decisions are made by the assembly. in 10%, they are given to other bodies or shared among many bodies. in the remaining 4%, theme groups act as significant decision-making bodies. Our organizations do, however, have an executive committee in around two-thirds of them. These committees are often chosen by the general assembly, congress, or meetings of local groupings or affiliates. A little less than half of our organizations disclose utilizing just a consensual technique for making decisions, while the other half employ a majoritarian method that is sometimes combined with consensus.If we simply choose the organizations that were included in both Work Packages, the distribution hardly changes. A slight rise in the associational model and a decline in the deliberative participatory model are noteworthy.

Participatory Customs in the Movement for Global Justice

Social movements more or less clearly articulate a basic criticism of traditional politics, defending the validity of alternatives to representational democratic forms. Their ideas relate to an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organization of collective decision making against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy, according to the authors. Direct engagement is important in this situation, both as a value and as a practice[6].Social movement organizations have attempted to implement these ideals in their organizational structure at least since the 1960s, not just for ideological reasons but also due to the strategic benefits of participatory democratic decision-making. This represented a clear departure from the organizational forms used by institutional political actors, including the Old Left institutional allies of new social movements. The dominant characteristics of the various models advanced included the limitation

of delegation and the direct participation of all members in internal decision-making. The Global Justice Movement, on the other hand, has been referred to as a movement of movements that is characterized by networking between truly new global groupings and organizations that emerged from earlier waves of mobilization, such as new social movement and Old Left organizations. As a result, it may be believed that many participation traditions coexist inside the GJM in terms of both ideals and internal procedures.

I will examine these various traditions and talk about how they affect GJM networking and relationships with governmental entities in the sections that follow. Participation as a value and as an internal practice of GJM organizations will be examined, drawing in particular on a qualitative and quantitative examination of foundational documents of organizations involved in the social forum process. The relationship between participative ideals and the level of delegation in the internal decision-making of the sampled organizations is the focus of the first section of the report. The second section examines the many participation traditions that are present within the GJM while taking organizational and cultural aspects into consideration. The third section focuses on how networking between GJM groups and these organizations' relationships with state institutions are impacted by participatory ideals and the level of delegation in internal decision-making. Our results show that although internal delegation levels are more important in determining relationships with state institutions, participative ideals encourage networking and cooperation across movement groups inside the GJM[7].

Organizational Structure and Participatory Ideals

The information gathered as part of the DEMOS project, specifically the analysis of the founding documents of 244 organizations involved in the social forum process, allows us to examine participation from two perspectives: the explicit mention of participation as an internal principle or as a fundamental democratic value, and the existence of an organizational structure with little delegation of authority in internal decision-making. As a sign of a particular participatory tradition, we look at how participatory principles and delegation are combined. The relationship between the two dimensions is covered in the section that follows.The 244 sampled organizations frequently mention participatory values in the fundamental documents we examined and coded: 27.9% explicitly mention participatory democracy as a general principle of internal debate and decision-making, and 51.2 explicitly refer to participation as a general democratic value1. More than 90% of the organizations mentioning the internal principle also mention the democratic value. For the following, we make a distinction between the 68 organizations that also or exclusively refer to participation as an internal principle and the 63 groups that mention participation only as a general democratic value. There are 113 groups that make no reference to participation as a value in their fundamental documents.

Most of the time, the papers under analysis offered sufficient material about the selected organizations' organizational structures to permit a differentiation between four levels of delegation for internal decision-making. High delegation is defined by a conventional organizational structure with an executive committee with significant decision-making authority and an assembly of delegates that meets fewer than once per year. The latter approach is differentiated from medium-high delegation by more novel elements like required delegation or frequent assembly sessions. A powerful executive committee is present while there is also a general meeting of all members or anybody who wishes to attend. Low delegation was

characterized as organizations with an assembly of all members or anybody who wishes to participate and a feeble executive committee with just co-ordinating authority.

There are no consistent findings for elements that social movement studies have connected to organizational values, such as political opportunities or a group's size or age, when participative values and degree of internal delegation are considered independently. There is no discernible relationship between the values of participation or the level of internal delegation and the features of political possibilities with regard to the place of origin of the sampled organizations.

However, the impact of organizational age and size on the level of internal delegation and participatory values varies. Our results appear to support the 'iron rule of oligarchy' in terms of the latter. Larger movement groups may find it more difficult than smaller ones to guarantee that all members have the chance for full engagement, as it is covered elsewhere in this book. Effective decision-making in particular may not seem conceivable without a certain amount of delegating. Delegation in internal decision-making is really substantially and linearly connected with the number of individual members in the studied organizations: the more members an organization has, the more likely it is to exhibit greater degrees of internal delegation. However, the results for participatory values are not statistically significant, but they do provide a preliminary indication of the existence of various participatory traditions within the GJM. The greatest rates of reference of participatory ideals are actually seen in both extremely big organizations and very small groupings[8].

In movement groups, oligarchy has also been linked to an organization's age in addition to its size. In reality, among the studied organizations that were established between 1968 and 1989 and between the years 2000 and later, respectively, high levels of movement mobilization, a low degree of internal delegation is important. A strong executive committee and an assembly of all members are combined in 45% of organizations founded between 1969 and 1989, while an executive committee with only co-ordinating responsibilities is featured in 43% of organizations founded in 2000 and later. These two periods, however, had different dominant models. Organizational structures with significant internal delegation predominated before 1968 and between 1990 and 1999. Similar conclusions are drawn from the data on participatory values. There are two noticeable rises in the mention of participation as an internal principle, first for the years 1969 to 1989 and subsequently for the years 2000 and after. In contrast, from 1990 to 1999, there is a steep decline in the mention of involvement as a general democratic ideal until it reaches its peak in 2000 and later.

CONCLUSION

An examination of the transformational power of networked social movements and their potential to spark significant social change is provided in the book A movement of movements. In addition to highlighting the ways in which these movements are opposing traditional power structures and advancing other visions of social, economic, and political organization, the book offers a thorough survey of the vast and dynamic world of networked social movements. It highlights the significance of creating inclusive, democratic, and accountable networks that are responsive to the communities they serve and offers doable tactics for encouraging successful network creation and organization. The book examines the difficulties and possibilities posed by networked social movements, including concerns with accountability, sustainability, and leadership, using in-depth empirical research and case studies from across the globe.

REFERENCES:

[1] W. K. Carroll and R. S. Ratner, 'Master framing and cross-movement networking in contemporary social movements', *Sociol. Q.*, 1996, doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1996.tb01755.x.

[2] P. S. Pratiwi, M. P. Seytawati, A. F. Hidayatullah, I. Ismail, and T. Tafsir, 'Moderasi Beragama dan Media Sosial (Studi Analisis Konten Instagram & Tik-Tok)', *J. Dakwah dan Komun.*, 2021, doi: 10.29240/jdk.v6i1.2959.

[3] C. Z. Levkoe, 'Strategies for forging and sustaining social movement networks: A case study of provincial food networking organizations in Canada', *Geoforum*, 2015, doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.11.013.

[4] I. Muhsin, N. Rochmawati, and M. C. Huda, 'Revolution of Islamic proselytizing organization: From islamism to moderate', *Qudus Int. J. Islam. Stud.*, 2019, doi: 10.21043/qijis.v7i1.5076.

[5] J. S. Lake, A. T. Alston, and K. B. Kahn, 'How Social Networking Use and Beliefs About Inequality Affect Engagement With Racial Justice Movements', *Race Justice*, 2021, doi: 10.1177/2153368718809833.

[6] P. M. Rosset and M. E. Martínez-Torres, 'Rural social movements and agroecology: Context, theory, and process', *Ecol. Soc.*, 2012, doi: 10.5751/ES-05000-170317.

[7] K. wa Fu and M. Chau, 'Use of Microblogs in Grassroots Movements in China: Exploring the Role of Online Networking in Agenda Setting', *J. Inf. Technol. Polit.*, 2014, doi: 10.1080/19331681.2014.909344.

[8] T. L. Petray, 'Protest 2.0: Online interactions and aboriginal activists', *Media, Cult. Soc.*, 2011, doi: 10.1177/0163443711411009.

CHAPTER 4

PARTICIPATORY VALUES AND INTERNAL DELEGATION

Aruno Raj Singh, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Email Id:- arunorajsingh@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The relationship between participatory values and the degree of internal delegation within organizations. Drawing on both theoretical insights and empirical evidence, the paper argues that participatory values are closely linked to the degree of internal delegation within organizations.Specifically, the paper argues that organizations that prioritize participatory values, such as transparency, inclusivity, and democratic decision-making, are more likely to delegate decision-making authority to lower levels of the organization. This is because participatory values promote a culture of trust and empowerment, where individuals are encouraged to take ownership of their work and contribute to the collective goals of the organization.

KEYWORDS:

Democratic values, Delegation, Decision-making, Internal democracy, Power dynamics.

INTRODUCTION

However, rather than addressing both topics separately in the following, we are more interested in examining the relationship between participatory values and level of internal delegation. There is a statistically significant correlation between the mention of participative ideals and the level of delegation in internal decision-making. From high delegation to intermediate categories to low delegation, the mention of involvement rises. Above all, twice as many organizations with a low level of delegation as compared to the other categories mention participation as an internal principle. As a result, an organizational structure with little internal delegation of authority might be considered as a manifestation of participation principles, or at the very least as being closely connected to them. However, only about half of the organizations with low internal delegation and about two-thirds of those with medium-low internal delegation refer to participatory democracy as a core value. However, explicit references to participatory values as internal principles are not excluded by a traditional organizational structure[1].

The propensity of more informal groupings to not develop the kinds of papers including references to organizational ideals cannot adequately explain these findings. The results, on the other hand, seem to indicate the existence of several participatory traditions within the GJM, with participation ideals associated with both low and high levels of internal delegation. In reality, organizational characteristics like the existence of a constitution or the formalization of membership are very weakly or never associated with participation as an internal principle or a general democratic ideal. The powers given to the assembly are an exception, demonstrating a significant association between participation as an internal principle and the assembly's designation as the principal decision-making body. Furthermore, this correlation virtually vanishes for organizations with medium-low and low levels of internal delegation, but it is

particularly strong for those with medium-high and high levels. Different participatory traditions are present within the GJM, as further confirmed by some contradictory results for other organizational features. For instance, organizations that express participatory ideals get better ratings than the average for both having an executive committee and explicitly rejecting it.

It's hardly surprising that businesses with high levels of delegation also explicitly mention participative ideals. Regardless of the level of decision-making delegation, member participation is crucial if not essential for every social movement organization. Numerous documents from the sampled organizations make mention of this importance. Amnesty International France, for instance, states that the members are the heart of the movement's life and participate in all its instances and decision-making under the portion of the about us section of its website devoted to internal democracy. The international level also contains similar claims. According to the about us section of the website for Our World is Not for Sale, the active participation of OWINFS members is what drives our collective work forward.Some organizations' bylaws explicitly state that members have an obligation to participate, while Indymedia requires labor contributions from each local group as a condition for participation in local group decision-making. The obligation to aggressively encourage the participation of members, regardless of their level of delegationhigh, medium-high, medium-low, or lowis explicitly included in the founding documents of numerous organizations.However, there are significant discrepancies between the importance that groups place on the individual and the organization when implementing participatory democracy.

Through membership in the group, an individual can realize their desire to be a protagonist and to participate, according to the traditional left-wing trade union confederation of Italy (CGIL). Some groups explicitly state that they are not membership organizations, such as the British autonomous group Wombles. No one needs to be loyal to the Wombles, however participation is welcomed on a non-hierarchical basis, per the Background statement on their website. Religiously motivated organizations see participation as a calling that extends beyond of the organization. The influence of Pax Christi is largely dependent on how its members carry out these beliefs, according to Pax Christi UK's about us section.In conclusion, different participatory traditions exist in the context of GJMOs, with some groups associating high and others with low levels of delegation with participation as an individual value. The next section is devoted to an investigation of these various participation traditions, taking into consideration both organizational and cultural variables[2].

DISCUSSION

Investigate the variations in participatory traditions by examining both cultural and organizational factors, focusing on the first on the field of movement and the second on the field of organization to which the sampled groups can be attributed. We differentiate between Old Left organizations, New Left/anarchist/autonomous groups, groups working on new social movement themes, solidarity/human rights/peace organizations, and groups focusing on particular new global topics when it comes to movement areas. In terms of organizational fields, we make a distinction between labor unions, parties/party youth organizations/party foundations, NGOs/formal SMOs, co-operatives, grass-roots SMOs, and'modern' networks. According to statistics, levels of participation are much less connected with movement domain and organizational domain than is the level of delegation. The findings of this study reflect the existence of several participatory traditions within the GJM, with the value of participation

associated with both low and high degrees of internal delegation, as shown by a qualitative interpretation of the foundational documents of the sampled organizations[3].

The three movement sectors to which the selected organizations might be assigned are distinguished by major disparities in terms of organizational age and size.7 Old Left groups were typically created before 1968 and typically have more than 100 000 individual members. The majority of autonomous, New Left, or anarchist organisations were established between 1969 and 1989, and they are more likely to have betweenBoth 100 and 1000 people. Despite having a larger membership, most new social movement groups were founded during the same time period. Organizations dedicated to solidarity, peace, or human rights were mostly created between 1990 and 1999 and typically have between 1000 and 10,000 members. The majority of the new, modest worldwide groupings were started in the years 2000 and beyond.Crossing the movement domain with the statement of participatory values has no discernible consequences, although there is a substantial association with the level of delegation in internal decision making.

For organizations that promote solidarity, peace, or human rights, there is a strong correlation between the values that are expressed and the actions that are taken these organizations cite participatory principles less than any other organizations and clearly favor organizational structures with high levels of internal delegation. However, when it comes to the level of internal delegation, the two movement areas' groups that most frequently mention participation exhibit very different preferences: 52% of the new social movement groups follow an organizational model with medium-low or low degrees of delegation, compared to 86% of Old Left groups, who are characterized by high or medium levels of delegation. In contrast to solidarity, peace, or human rights organizations, new Left, anarchist, or autonomous organizations, as well as new global groupings, only get above-average mentions for participation as an internal value. The groups from both movement areas translate their participatory values into low levels of internal delegation, with one exception: while new global groups favor low delegation, the New Left, anarchist, or autonomous groups favor a model with medium-low delegation[4].

The diverse participation traditions that these findings suggest for the various movement areas may be discussed in further detail via a qualitative study of the core texts of the sampled organizations. Organizations of the Old Left frequently combine participatory ideas with a conventional organizational structure. In fact, historically, left-wing groups placed a premium on member mobilization and donations. The Old Left groups involved in the social forum process did not give up on participatory principles in response to the recent increasing decline in membership engagement. The Italian left-wing trade union confederation CGIL, for example, highlights the guarantee of the highest participation of all members, personally or through delegates as one of the cardinal aspects on which the democratic life of the organization depends in Article 6 of its constitution.

There appears to be a deliberate reappropriation of the original participatory values among the Old Left organizations participating in the social forum process, spurred not only by moments of crisis but also by contact with new social movements.8 Such processes appear especially likely for the one-third of Old Left organizations founded between 1990 and 1999, among which we find many instances of traditional organizations refounded in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Italian ARCI, for example, specifically calls for a reappropriation of values. The

organization's Web site's history describes a recovery of the original values, one of which is people' active and aware engagement in democratic life.

However, we can also speculate that there may be some incongruence between the organizational model and the aforementioned values in the case of Old Left organizations. Contrary to new social movements and notably new global groupings, Old Left organizations with high delegation actually emphasize participatory ideals more often than Old Left organizations with medium-high or medium-low delegation. According to a study done by the DEMOS team during the European Social Forum in Athens in May 2006, Old Left activists' perceptions of democracy inside their organizations and their normative notions about democracy, which largely favor direct democracy, are inconsistent. The same activists had the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy inside their own organizations.Old Left organizations tend to make more references to participatory values in their documents than New Left, autonomous, and anarchist organizations do. These organizations have a dominant organizational model that combines an assembly of all members with the presence of an executive committee. However, as was already mentioned, they do receive an above-average rating for mentioning participation as an internal principle. Additionally, we must take into account the fact that a lot of autonomous or anarchist organizations use terminology that does not include the word participation, instead using words like direct democracy, horizontality, or self-organization.

The grass-roots labor union COBAS in Italy specifically opposes a derogatory view of participant with conflict and self-organization from. As for New Left militants, our Athens survey found high levels of satisfaction with democracy in their groups and low levels of incongruence with their normative notions on democracy. In addition, many Trotskyite organizations adhere to a form of democratic centralism.The less participative mindset and the correlation between specialization, professionalization, and centralization in decision-making highlighted for single issue movements may be anticipated for solidarity groups. In fact, solidarity organizations do the worst for mentions of participation, both as an internal principle and as a generic democratic ideal. This is similar to Old Left groups with a predominance of a conventional organizational structure. Participation is specifically mentioned in the founding documents of these groups, whether they are laic or have religious inspiration, as a general democratic principle that should be achieved for their point of reference. The German organization Brot für die Welt's Justice for the Poor proclamation advocates for the creation of a fair, democratic, and future-proof society in its section on Realizing human rights, fostering democracy, and political participation. Similarly, Christian Aid lists to empower people to reform the systems that keep them poor as one of its visions and values, while the British Catholic Agency for Overseas Development emphasizes its goals of eliminating poverty, promoting dignity, and expanding participation.

The Italian Consortium of Solidarity states in the section of its website dedicated to humanitarian aid that it tries to root itself and to sustain the local democratic civil society and an idea of development and cooperation founded upon human rights, substantive democracy, and active participation in the areas where it intervenes.These allusions often transcend beyond a limited understanding of advocacy and/or solidarity. Many solidarity organizations involved in the social forum process regard their work as making a vital contribution to democracy, much as volunteer and community groups do. The promotion of volunteer labor, considered as democratic participation in actions of solidarity and of citizenship, is highlighted as one of the Italian ARCI's goals in Article 3 of its constitution. The Comité catholique contre la faim in France declares its

commitment to pursuing an education to development policy in France that incites everyone to acquire a spirit of citizen participation. Additionally, similar to what was seen for Old Left groups, some solidarity organizations explicitly point to a reappropriation of original values, sparked by the GJM. References to internal participatory values can also be found in both more formal and more informal solidarity organizations. The importance of the social base, internal democracy, openness in management, project quality, and the quest for consistency of behavior are only a few of the values and principles that the Italian Consortium of Solidarity mentions as needing to be put back at the center values and principles partly lost.

Those focusing on new social movement themes, along with groups from the Old Left, most commonly make reference to participatory ideals, with the former emphasizing participation as a generic democratic value and the latter emphasizing participation as an internal principle. New social movement groups make a strong link between participation and their central issues, much like solidarity organizations do. For instance, the French women's organization Les Pénélopes emphasizes that these methods open the door for participation to the weakest groups, namely women, in a contribution on the Porto Alegre participatory budgeting on their website. The Italian environmentalist group Legambiente lists the promotion of citizens' participation in the defense of the environment and in the definition of their own quality of life as one of its goals in Article 2 of its constitution.New social movement organizations often pay special attention to internal engagement at the same time. Friends of the Earth, a British organization, emphasizes the use of participatory procedures for group facilitation as well as public planning.

A special guidance on participation inside the organization that was issued as an internal document emphasizes the value of debate above positional authority and emphasizes the need for everyone who will be impacted by a decision to have a chance to participate in decision-making.Surprisingly, organizations focused on particular new global issues allude to participatory ideals less often than either Old Left or new social movement organizations do. The fact that we are dealing with often informal groupings that are very new may help to explain this. In contrast to the conventional idea of Old Left organizations, references to participation as an internal principle, when found, indicate a definition of participation that goes beyond the conception of new social movement groupings. The Italian Rete Lilliput emphasizes in point 7 of its document of core principles that it refuse[s] the personalization and professionalization of political commitment and wants to avoid being associated with one or more individuals. Priority is given to the members' direct involvement, with delegation and representation formulae being strictly limited.

The quest for consistency between internal practices and external statements is a defining characteristic of these organisations' founding papers. According to the Spanish collective Otra Democracia Es Posible, it seeks to apply the same democratic processes that it expects of society for internal functioning. The relevance of the approach is notably emphasized by the Italian network Rete Lilliput: Why this concentration on a process from? The Rete Lilliput has been distinguished throughout the years by its efforts to test out various organizational and actional modalities, beginning with the understanding that one's actions have an impact on the outcome. According to the London Social Forum, Democratic ferments generate organizational forms that are based on solidarity, not competition, inclusion, not exclusion, horizontality, not hierarchy, participation, not marginalization, conviviality, not protocol[5].

Additionally, the issue of coherence between group practices and claims frequently comes up in internal debates, with voices asking whether this coherence is successfully realized and whether a fully participatory model can be sustained over time. One attendee lamented: For now I cannot see the translation of the ideal into practice, for example concerning horizontality and the possibility for all to participate during an Indymedia Italy gathering in Genoa. One intervention was made in a regional meeting of the Emilia-Romagna ATTAC-Italia committees to note:How can we not make our organization the testing ground for these activities if direct democracy and active participation are among our political goals? We cannot believe that Attac can start and finish in the form that its founders abstractly intended two years ago, just as democracy is not something one obtains once and for all but a difficult daily exercise.

The burden that such participatory methods create for the organization and its members was a common complaint in internal talks of the Italian Rete Lilliput. According to a network participant at a regional meeting in 2003, the network has emptied itself, the remaining people are tired, worn out by the rhythms of participation, and the rules we gave ourselves. the organization that we gave ourselves to experiment with a model from revealed itself to be too much of a strain.New global groups continued to affirm and reaffirm their participation activities as prefigurative politics despite comparable and persistently raised reservations. We tried to practice the method of consensus, which despite its complexity allowed us to experiment with horizontality, diffuse leadership, and participatory methods. This was stated in the final document of the 2006 national assembly of the Italian Rete Lilliput. We have worked to ensure that the methods and the aims, as well as the form and the substance, are coherent[6].

A utopian aspect that is notably lacking from the writings of groups relating to other movement regions is also included into new global organizations' intricate counter-models to current democratic processes. The Spanish organization Otra democracia Es Posible advocated for the adoption of referendums, popular legislative initiatives, and electoral recall in its published recommendations for a revision of the national and provincial constitutions on its website. The Italian Rete Lilliput imagined Omnicrazia, which is defined as power of everyone or dispersed power, as a potential utopia of politics outside to evolve alongside politics inside during its national congress in 2007. The development of organizations with high levels of internal democracy and the creation of a network of networks are tools for politics outside. As tools for 'inside' politics, Lilliput mentions a number of models, including Agenda 21, community contracts, participatory urban planning, participatory budgeting, civic lists, referenda, popular legislative initiatives, and the expansion of local autonomies, but also criticizes 'empty' forms of participation.Finally, different participatory traditions are present in the GJM movement areas, fusing references to participatory values with varying degrees of internal delegation. The investigation of how organizational fields affect participative attitudes and practices is covered in the section that follows.

Movement space and organizational domains are strongly related. In our sample, the Old Left makes up around 60% of the trade unions, while the New Left makes up roughly 30%. The Old Left dominates political parties, party youth groups, and party foundations in a similar fashion. By contrast, 16% of people identify as New Left/anarchist/autonomous and 25% as ecologists. About three-fifths of NGOs and formal SMOs are solidarity, peace, or human rights organizations, while the majority of cooperatives have New Left, anarchist, or autonomous roots. 'Modern' networks and grassroots SMOs are both primarily new international organizations.The particular effects of organizational restrictions are shown by examining the relationship between

organizational fields, on the one hand, and the mention of participation ideals, and the level of internal delegation, on the other. In fact, participative ideals are specifically mentioned in several organizational sectors. The organizations in the different sectors all share varied participatory traditions and blend differing levels of internal delegation with participatory principles.

Political parties, party youth groups, and party foundations stand out for their frequent mentions of involvement, both as an external principle and as a generic democratic ideal (31.8%) and internal principle (59.1%), respectively. The unique nature of politicalThe fact that trade unions, which are also controlled by institutionalized groups with an Old Left past, mention participatory principles far less than political parties emphasizes this point. However, compared to parties, union organizations are typically bigger. They were also mostly started before 1968 or between 1969 and 1989, as opposed to political parties, which were primarily launched between 1990 and 1999.It is due to the nature of these organizations and the particular kinds of papers they create that 90% of political parties, party youth organizations, and party foundations emphasize participation as a general democratic ideal. One of the main goals of party foundations is to encourage political engagement.

Regardless of whether they are more moderate or more radical, or whether they have an Old Left or an ecologist background, the majority of parties and party youth organizations involved in the social forum process have policies that call for the strengthening of participatory processes in political decision-making. While the communist Madrid chapter of Izquierda Unida Jovenes calls for a revolution in participation, the moderate left youth organization Sinistra Giovanile in Italy emphasizes the need to move from representative to participatory democracy. Fausto Bertinotti, secretary general of the Italian communist party Rifondazione comunista, pitched the creation of participatory democracy as a key goal to be achieved by joining a center-left governing coalition at the party's 2005 convention. The French Green Party calls for the introduction of participatory democracy at all levels of public decision-making in its 2007 program in order to provide everyone the opportunity to participate in the formulation of the choices that affect them. We can assume that party organizations, at least in part, respond to demands made by civil society in general and the GJM in particular through these programmatic positions[7].

Political parties, party youth groups, and party foundations highlight participation as an internal concept more often than other organizational disciplines. The Italian Rifondazione comunista says in Article 7 of its constitution that one of its major duties is to encourage all members to engage in political and democratic action and to organize political activity in a manner that encourages the widest possible involvement. Izquierda Unida, the Spanish sister party of Rifondazione, sees its internal operations as a new way of making politics in Article 8 of its constitution, where the involvement of all of its constituents is the defining practice of its organization. However, in the majority of political parties, references to participatory democracy as a core value go hand in hand with organizational traits that anticipate conventional forms of delegation. In reality, none of the examined party organizations had low degrees of delegation, and more than 60% of them exhibit high or medium-high degrees.

The democratic and participatory operation of Izquierda Unida is founded on the primacy of the assemblies, which is guaranteed by Article 8 of the party's constitution. This ensures that the ensemble of choices is made from top to bottom. Political parties have the distinct quality of combining internal delegation with high levels of internal engagement as a value. In fact, parties with an assembly of delegates mention participation as an internal ideal significantly more often

than parties with an assembly of all members. In contrast, this tendency is reversible in NGOs, formal SMOs, and particularly in modern networks. Political parties, particularly those of the Old Left, seem to stay committed to and defend a specific tradition of political participation and the organizational form in which it historically found its expression. We can hypothesize the same incongruence between organizational values and practices discussed above for Old Left organizations in general for political party organizations. This is clearly stated in a paper from the Rifondazione comunista.

We believe that the party, which is a permanent organization of women and men who choose to join a political community in order to work together to realize a social project, is essential for bridging and penetrating with a unitary project of struggle the society, the economy, and the state organization, whether it be national or international. In addition, we believe that in the face of the crisis of democracy and the nation state, the party continues to do more than just survive. just'modern' networks, an organizational structure that has just recently emerged, are an organizational area that mentions participatory ideals more often than the norm apart from political parties. One of these modern networks, Our World Is Not For Sale, characterizes itself as a loose association of groups, activists, and social movements in the about us section of its website. In actuality, we might characterize such groupings as loose networks of already-existing organizations that often establish with the intention of pursuing certain objectives or carrying out particular campaigns[8].

'Modern' networks feature a few unique traits. Similar to grass-roots SMOs, around one-third of the sampled networks are neither official membership organizations nor informal membership organizations. Of those with membership, roughly a third only have collective members, which naturally results in significant levels of delegation. in fact, more than 50% of modern networks have high levels of internal delegation, though this is paired with member organizations' autonomy. Additionally,'modern' networks are mostly extremely young: 58% were established in or after the year 2000, compared to a sample average of 20%. They are also quite prevalent in the domain of new global movement.Networks with an assembly of all members highlight participatory ideals far more often than networks with an assembly of delegates, in contrast to political parties. This is especially true for the internal concept of involvement. We are obviously dealing with a different kind of participation than political parties, one that translates democratic principles into modest levels of delegation. Ad hoc groups with a flexible structure, like campaigns, exhibit this as well. For instance, the British Stop the War Coalition emphasizes the need of holding frequent, inclusive meetings for local organizations.

'Modern' networks are especially prevalent as an organizational structure at the international level, where they make up 60% of the transnational organizations in the sample, compared to an average of 33%. References often allude to a more comprehensive commitment, including internal procedures, even if participation is frequently mentioned as a general democratic ideal at the international level. The World Social Forum expresses its commitment to upholding respect for the principles of genuine participatory democracy in Point 10 of its Charter of Principles. Reclaim Our UN characterizes its work as an inclusive and transparent approach. Additionally, there are some specific references to internal participation. Peoples' Global Action stresses the need of creating a variety of direct democracy-based organizational structures at various levels.

Two categories were kept in the categorization of organizational fields despite having relatively little representation in the studied organizations. This choice was made based on the assumption

that grouping them alongside others would skew the findings. This conclusion was formed, in large part, from a qualitative reading of the relevant core texts. The groups in both categories allude to participatory ideals very seldom, for various reasons. The foundational documents of cooperatives reflect the reality that they are primarily economic enterprises. There aren't many papers of the kind we examined produced by grass-roots SMOs, which makes it impossible to categorize these organizations according to how much internal decision-making is delegated to them.12 Both groups favor minimal levels of internal delegation, or organizational models that include an assembly of all members. However, co-operatives have strong executive committees, which are typically lacking in grassroots SMOs, in part due to clear legislative provisions.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, political party organizations and modern networks both exhibit the distinctive influence of organizational field on participatory traditions. The former is linked to a historic method of making politics, while the latter emerged with the GJM. Internal delegation inside companies and its possible advantages and disadvantages. Delegation may promote productivity, adaptability, and creativity, but it can also result in problems with responsibility and coordination. Overall, the paper emphasizes the benefits of integrating participatory principles into organizational practices and structures and provides actionable advice for businesses looking to encourage more internal delegation and participation in decision-making. Researchers, practitioners, and politicians who are interested in the dynamics of organizational behavior and how participatory principles may affect organizational culture and practice might find it useful.

REFERENCES:

[1] J. Grobovšek, ‘Managerial delegation, law enforcement, and aggregate productivity’, *Review of Economic Studies*. 2020. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdaa025.

[2] N. Mouter, P. Koster, and T. Dekker, ‘Contrasting the recommendations of participatory value evaluation and cost-benefit analysis in the context of urban mobility investments’, *Transp. Res. Part A Policy Pract.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.tra.2020.12.008.

[3] N. Mouter, P. Koster, and T. Dekker, ‘Participatory value evaluation for the evaluation of flood protection schemes’, *Water Resour. Econ.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.wre.2021.100188.

[4] N. Mouter, R. M. Shortall, S. L. Spruit, and A. V. Itten, ‘Including young people, cutting time and producing useful outcomes: Participatory value evaluation as a new practice of public participation in the Dutch energy transition’, *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2021.101965.

[5] N. Mouter, P. Koster, and T. Dekker, ‘An Introduction to Participatory Value Evaluation’, *SSRN Electron. J.*, 2019, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3358814.

[6] H. Jiang, Z. Wang, L. Yang, J. Shen, and J. Hahn, ‘How Rewarding Are Your Rewards? A Value-Based View of Crowdfunding Rewards and Crowdfunding Performance’, *Entrep. Theory Pract.*, 2021, doi: 10.1177/1042258720928922.

[7] N. Mouter, 'Willingness to allocate public budget and Participatory Value Evaluation', in *Advances in Transport Policy and Planning*, 2021. doi: 10.1016/bs.atpp.2021.01.001.

[8] A. Roos, D. Mutta, M. Larwanou, C. Wekesa, and G. Kowero, 'Operations and Improvement Needs in the Informal Charcoal Sector: A Participatory Value Stream Analysis', *Int. For. Rev.*, 2021, doi: 10.1505/146554821833992802.

CHAPTER 5

PARTICIPATORY TRADITIONS AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Yogesh Chandra Gupta, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Email Id:- cognitor.yogesh@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The role of participatory traditions in shaping the external relations of organizations. Drawing on theoretical insights and empirical evidence from a range of organizational contexts, the paper argues that participatory traditions are closely linked to more collaborative and inclusive forms of external relations.Specifically, the paper argues that organizations that prioritize participatory values and practices, such as transparency, accountability, and democratic decision-making, are more likely to engage in partnerships and collaborations with external stakeholders. This is because participatory traditions promote a culture of trust, reciprocity, and mutual benefit, where organizations are seen as partners rather than competitors.

KEYWORDS:

Civil Society, Democratic, Internal Level, International Delegation, Social Movements.

INTRODUCTION

The influence of diverse participation traditions and their elements on the external relationships of the sampled organizations is the focus of the section that follows. In reality, depending on whether we consider relationships with other movement actors or with state institutions, the value of participation and the level of internal delegation operate differently. Participatory ideals, regardless of the level of internal delegation, serve as a unifying factor inside the GJM and serve as a foundation for networking and cooperation across tolerant identities in terms of relationships with other movement players. The most important component for interactions with regional, governmental organizations on a national and worldwide scale seems to be the level of delegation in internal decision-making.

Within the GJM, Participatory Customs and Relationships

The relationship that participatory values have with other democratic values observed in GJM-active organizations provides a preliminary hint as to the bridging role of these values. The measure utilized up to this point, participation, has a significant connection with the dummy variables, Consensual Method, Internal Inclusiveness, Equality, General Inclusiveness, Dialogue/Communication, Difference/Plurality/Heterogeneity, and Transparency. In contrast, the degree of delegation only strongly correlates with the consensual approach and difference/plurality/heterogeneity. It is also unconnected to the other characteristics, although somewhat linked to internal inclusivity and transparency.Regardless of the level of internal delegation, the value of participation has a strong correlation with the fundamental tenets on which the sampled organizations focus, which emphasizes the particular significance of participatory values as a bridging element within the GJM and as a foundation for collaboration

and networking. As stated in Chapter 1 of this book, we constructed normalized additive indices by agglutinating the single themes mentioned in the analyzed texts based on their bivariate correlations. Participatory values are closely tied to new globalism, which refers to another globalization, democracy, and social justice. ecominority, which refers to ecology, women's rights, and antiracism. and peace and nonviolence[1].

Above all, a correlation between participatory values and an additive index of all fundamental themes is even stronger, supporting their function as a unifying factor within the GJM. On the other hand, none of these indices are connected with the level of internal delegation.If networking with other social movement organizations is mentioned at the national and international levels, only participation as a value emerges as being significant. However, the ways in which networking takes place are related to both the mention of participation as a value and the level of internal delegation. On a national scale, organizations that do not specifically express participatory ideals tend to network more with organizations working on related issues, while those that only specifically mention participation as a generic value tend to network more broadly. Additionally, organizations that mention participation as an internal principle perform relatively well when it comes to networking with other organizations working on related topics.

No matter how much internal delegation there is, these networking patterns continue. Regarding the latter, there are some definite preferences that stand out: organizations with a high level of delegation network primarily with groups working in the same area of specialization. Medium-high and medium-low delegation groups state networking in general, whereas low delegation groups additionally claim connections with organizations working on unrelated topics to their own. Similar trends may be seen in the international networking findings.In conclusion, collaborative and networking inside the GJM seem to be particularly dependent on participation principles, independent of the level of internal delegation. This is further supported by data gathered as part of the DEMOS project, which was based on interviews with influential figures from groups involved in the social forum process. The interviewees were also questioned about their organization's feelings toward the GJM. The degree of delegation in internal decision-making is not substantially connected with this variable, but it is highly correlated with the mention of participation as a value.

Participatory Customs and Connections to Government Institutions

We may get an initial impression of an organization's relationship with state institutions by looking at the tactics and action repertoires that they claim to use. The majority of goals and duties listed in organizational documents, such as lobbying, representing particular interests, self-awareness and self-help, advocacy, offering and providing services to the constituency, spreading information through the media and raising awareness, political education of the populace, and legal protection and denunciation of repression specifically, are unrelated to participatory values. The exceptions are political representation and protest/mobilization, both of which are specifically linked to the statement of participation as an internal concept. In this case, it appears that different participatory traditionsmore conventional forms of political participation used, in particular by political parties of the Old Leftas well as newer or more recent social movement organizations and the New Left are associated with internal participation[2].

Regarding internal delegation, there is a correlation for a number of goals and duties mentioned in organizational documents, all of which are prioritized by high and medium-high delegation organizations, including representation of particular interests, advocacy, lobbying, and service

provision. Both political representation and protest/mobilization are insignificant, yet all groups with low levels of delegation engage in the former while none do the latter. According to a neo-institutional perspective, as may be assumed, organizations with more centralized decision-making structures pursue the majority of the strategies and action reper- toires that result in a collaborative relationship with state institutions.These findings seem to show that, in contrast to relationships inside the GJM, relationships with state institutions are more impacted by organizational traits than by the principles indicated. In actuality, involvement as a value is very weakly connected with cooperation with state institutions, as shown by interviews with representatives of the sampled institutions.15 Less cooperation is shown toward national and international institutions by the organizations that emphasize participation as an internal ideal, and a greater proportion of these organizations reject collaboration or stay uninterested. They merely have a more cooperative attitude toward regional institutions. The majority of the organizations that just identify participation as a broad democratic objective, however, have a restrictive attitude toward cooperation.

In contrast to these findings, it is clear that internal delegation levels have a stronger influence, particularly on international and national organizations. The influence of internal delegation lowers considerably with regard to local institutions. In actuality, small groups with low levels of delegation also interact with local institutions, even if collaboration with national and international institutions is mostly practiced by hierarchical organizations[3].These tendencies are supported by an examination of allusions to collaboration, democratic control, or resistance as characteristics of interactions with local, national, and international governmental entities in organizational papers. Uncritical collaborators were defined as organizations that just mentioned partnership. Critical or selective collaborators were characterized as groups that combine cooperation with either democratic control or rejection. While reluctant controllers or objectors either combine democratic control with refusal or blatantly reject collaboration with state institutions, democratic controllers make no mention of unconditional collaboration or refusal.There is no statistically significant association between relationships with local, national, or international governmental agencies and the inclusion of participation as a value in core organizational documents.

But the groups that only mention participation as a fundamental democratic principle are more likely to seek out the position of critical or selective collaborator. The organizations that cite participation as an internal concept, on the other hand, seem more like reluctance controllers or objectors, albeit they do not disparage unquestioning cooperation or democratic control. These findings further demonstrate that stating a specific internal valueparticipationdoes not produce definite preferences in one's interactions with state entities.In actuality, the existence of participatory principles seems to have less of an impact on relationships with state institutions than the manner in which these values are paired with various levels of internal delegation. High or medium-high delegation groups have a tendency to collaborate critically or selectively, as well as uncritically. Uncritical cooperation loses value while democratic control gains it in organizations with medium-low delegation levels. Low delegation organizations make fewer allusions to cooperation with state institutions than do other organizations, but when they do, the denial of cooperation is conspicuously more prominent.

The many participation traditions found within the GJM may be linked to both the organizational field that an organization can be accredited to and the movement region. Regarding the movement space, Old Left groups involved in social forum processes have a propensity to

strongly emphasize participation as an internal value, but they primarily adhere to an organizational model with high levels of delegation. There seems to be a deliberate appropriation of original principles by these businesses, but there may also be a misalignment between stated beliefs and corporate behavior. Although they employ a similar organizational structure, solidarity, peace, and human rights organizations mention participatory values much less frequently. New social movement groups emphasize participation as a general and internal value, much like the Old Left, although they often convert these principles into lower levels of internal delegation. A higher than normal number of references are made to participation as an internal value by both New Left and New Global groupings. The former combine a meeting of all members with a powerful executive, while the latter often forgo any internal delegation. The domain of the new global movement stands out for having a strong utopian component and confirming participatory methods as prefigurative politics.

Political party organizations and'modern' networks have a special influence on participative traditions when it comes to organizational sectors. The nature of these organizations and the particular kinds of papers they create must be blamed for the very high number of references political party organizations make to participation as a broad democratic ideal. In general, appeals for the improvement of participatory processes in political decision-making can be seen in the programs of party organizations involved in the social forum process, at least in part in response to demands put out by civil society in general and the GJM in particular. Political parties often emphasize the importance of internal involvement, albeit they typically pair it with high levels of internal delegation, in order to support a particular history of political engagement and the organizational structure in which it has manifested itself. On the other hand, modern networks represent a distinct understanding of involvement, transforming participatory values into modest levels of delegation.

Modern networks are especially prevalent at the international level since the GJM. Even though internal processes are mentioned as part of a more general commitment, participation is specifically mentioned as a democratic value at this level[4].Different effects for participation values and internal delegation levels are shown in GJMOs' external interactions. Participatory ideals serve as a connecting thread within the GJM in terms of interactions with other movement players. Participation as a value serves as a foundation for cooperation and networking across 'tolerant identities' since it is strongly related to a group of other democratic values and to the fundamental ideas that the sampled organizations are based on. On the other hand, the level of delegation in internal decision-making takes a higher relevance in terms of contacts with local, national, and international governmental entities. firms with high internal delegation levels often engage in critical or selective engagement with state institutions, while firms with low internal delegation levels frequently adopt a defiant approach.

DISCUSSION

Consensus in Movements

Many other groups affiliated with the Global Justice Movement also list consensus as a core organizational value, similar to these social movement organizations. Consensus has not always been a key buzzword for social movement groups or for political organizations in general, despite its current cross-national popularity. Similar to social movement studies, which have emphasized conflict as the dynamic element of contemporary society, consensus as a notion has not been significant. New social movements have been seen by the European tradition in social

movement studies as possible bearers of a fresh primary conflict in our post-industrial societies, or at the very least of a developing constellation of conflicts. The resource mobilization strategy responded to the then-dominant view of disputes as disorders in the American tradition. Anthony Oberschall identified social movements as the primary disseminators of societal conflicts in his seminal work Social Conflicts and Social Movements. Sidney Tarrow made a strong case for the usefulness and benefit of unorthodox forms of political engagement in democratic processes in his book Democracy and Disorder[5].

It's no accident that the notions of social movements and conflict were related in the first book series to focus on social movements, Social Movements, Conflicts and Change. The earliest systematic studies of social movements, from Michael Lipsky through Charles Tilly, sprang from study traditions that emphasized power struggles in politics and society. Conflict is indeed a key component of social movements' conception, according to a commonly recognized definition of the term: Social movement participants are involved in political and/or cultural conflicts that either support or oppose social change. Conflict is defined as an adversarial interaction between players who are vying for the same share of power, whether it be political, economic, or cultural, and who make demands of one another that, if met, would be detrimental to the interests of the other actors.

Conflict is referenced 59 times in the introduction of the same book, compared to consensus, which I shall explore in this article five times.While the existence of conflicts cannot be denied, particularly since the 1990s, a growing focus on the development of political arenas as spaces for consensus building has challenged the notion of politics as a forum for the expression of conflicts. A emphasis on consensus evolved in political theory during the discussion of deliberative democracy, highlighting in particular how crucial excellent communication is to defining the public good in democratic processes. Social movements and similar organizations have been identified by some proponents of the normative deliberative view of democracy as key spaces for the growth of these consensual processes.

Again, attention to consensus evolved particularly within the study of civil society, as shown in normative theory, but also in the empirical research on institutional engagement of non-institutional actors in democratic decision-making. In reality, governing governed communities based upon the agreement of individuals rather than compulsion is one of the primary meanings of civil society. According to this interpretation, being civil is showing people respect, being courteous, and accepting of others. Civil society is often cited as having the ability to resolve conflicts between particularism and universalism, plurality and connectivity, variety and togetherness. A certain kind of universalizing community comes gradually to be defined and to some extent enforced, according to the definition of civil society. Concepts like free spaces in social movement studies highlight the role movements play in creating public forums for addressing social concerns[6].

Deliberative approaches have, in fact, drawn more or less explicit attention in the GJM. This idea holds that politics is a place where shared identities may be created to resolve conflicts of interest, and dialogue is a means of resolving even the most contentious topics by fostering understanding among participants about the common good.The tension between conflict and consensus can be addressed by conceptualizing different political arenas: conflictual ones, where conventional and unconventional forms of political participation are used in a power struggle, and consensual ones, where relatively minor conflicts among potentially compatible actors are

addressed through discourse and the search for consensus. Two of the leading proponents of the idea of civil society seem to share this opinion, since they said that social movements construe the cultural models, norms, and institutions of civil society as the main stakes of social conflicts.

But this is not a simple fix. In general, the idea of politics as a place for mutual understanding is in fundamental contrast with the notion of politics as fight for power, even while it is in some ways common to have conflicting views for internal and exterior democracy. Second, it might be difficult to define the boundaries between the two arenas of politics. This is especially true for movements of movements when organizational loyalty still exists despite networking and communication being expressed normatively among varied and multiple participants. Large, ancient, formal, well-structured organizations are also a member of the movement because of their prominent reputation and historical legacies. As we will see, several concepts do exist within the Global Justice Movement Organizations, connecting the 'consensus' with various organizational ideals and practices.

The contradiction between conflict and consensus concepts will be implicitly addressed in the sections that follow by examining how GJMOs define and approach consensus. I depend on qualitative and quantitative datasets created from the foundational records of 244 social movement groups for this endeavor. I'll start by outlining some fundamental democratic principles that are often cited in the writings of those organizations. In the parts that follow, I'll attempt to explain the common concepts of democracy in terms of both epistemological and social scientific terminology. I use three different ways to analyze the quantitative data, looking for statistical correlations between the mentions of certain democratic principles by GJMOs and the independent variables pertaining to organizational resources and cultural norms. I also emphasize the various interpretations of consensus for various sorts of actors from an interpretive approach[7].

Consensus as a Multifaceted Idea

References to consensus have been seen in the Global Justice Movement as being part of a quest for new methods of decision-making intended at getting above the limitations of delegation and assemblearism. Emerging approaches for the social forum process 'combine restricted and regulated resort to delegation with consensus-based instruments appealing to debate, to the transparency of the communicative process, and to obtaining the widest possible agreement'. According to our study, several and varied groups active in the GJM cite consensus. Consensual approaches have been seen as ineffective, dragging down decision-making to the point that action is jeopardized. They were first advocated within the student movement and then adopted more vehemently by the feminist movement. The consensus model was resurrected by several global justice organizations, but these organizations also devised new, more or less defined norms to aid in overcoming the obstacles to decision-making caused by disagreements or the manipulation of the process by a few people.

Our qualitative and quantitative research of the organizational principles on democratic concerns reveals a strong emphasis on consensus and certain bridged ideas. In order to distinguish between democratic principles indicated while discussing the internal operations of our organizations and generic democratic values, we have coded allusions to democratic values in our study of organizational documents. Additionally, the symbolic contexts in which these values were mentioned have been thoroughly examined.In general, the topic of democracy stands out as being quite important for our GJMOs since the majority of the organizations we studied include

democratic principles in their founding papers. Our quantitative data shows that three sets of values are often referenced in the democratic conceptions of the organizations we have studied for the Global Justice Movement. As we'll see in this section, normative theorists and empirical researchers alike share many of these principles in the definitions of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and civil society that were described before[8].

A first set of values highlights some of the GJM's deliberative characteristics as open spaces. Consensus is important in normative models of deliberative democracy since choices are made through persuading others of one's own position. choices must be acceptable to all participants, as opposed to majoritarian democracy, where choices are justified by the results of voting. Norms of equality, inclusiveness, multiplicity of values, high-quality dialogue, and transparency are all part of the deliberative vision of democracy, as was already noted. The idea of civil society also includes a discursive component, according to which, to the extent that this solidarity community exists, it is exhibited by public opinion, has its own cultural codes and narratives in a democratic idiom, is patterned by a number of peculiar institutions, most notably legal and journalistic ones, and is visible in historically distinctive sets of interactional practices like civility, equality, criticism, and respect. The consensual approach is cited by 17% of our groups as an internal value, and deliberative democracy by 7%. With a value extremely close to that of the reference to participation, references to plurality, diversity, and heterogeneity have been emphasized as crucial democratic aspects in the papers of as much as half of our sample.

Specific guidelines are developed in horizontal communication and conflict management among the groups most dedicated to experimenting with consensual methods: consensus tools include good facilitation, various hand signals, go-rounds, and the breaking up into small and larger sized groups. At the beginning of each session, the facilitator should clarify these techniques. but, if you have any questions about how we are using them, feel free to speak with a member of the process group present. With the goal of incorporating all points of view in the conversation and enforcing standards for effective discussion, from the time allotted to each speaker to the maintenance of a constructive atmosphere, facilitators or moderators are utilized. The consensus approach requires that during a conversation, the level of agreement among the group's different members on a particular subject, which must be given plainly and unambiguously, must be evaluated. On the basis of an incremental approach, wherein a choice may always be brought back into debate in order to please the greatest number of people, the argument is maintained in an attempt to reconcile divergent opinions. The consensus technique encourages everyone to discuss their points of difference in order to determine whether they are willing to support the final decision without leaving the group. Since any specific disagreement is always set within a framework of more general agreement, based on respect and reciprocal trust, the consensus method thus creates agreement within disagreement[9].

Normal consensus procedures revolve around a proposal, which is, ideally, made in advance so that people have time to think it over. Any reservations are considered once the idea is presented. After then, the proposal is changed until everyone agrees. Trust, respect, the understanding that everyone has the right to be heard and to participate, a sense of togetherness and devotion to that objective, and a commitment to the idea of cooperation are the principles at the core of this process. Although this is not always possible and there is frequently no need to come to one decision at the end of a fruitful discussion, we aim to reach consensus on the majority of issues at these gatherings. In a similar spirit, the Spanish website Espacio Alternativo outlines the following principles for effective communication:The following requirements must be met in

order to move in this directionattempting to foster fruitful discussions regarding what, if any, real differences exist. identifying these differences. understanding the degree to which a particular position is shared by member organizations.Disseminating information about them through the federation's communication tools. and respecting the rights of individuals and collectives to disagree on particular issues, in words as well as in deeds. Our goal is to contribute to the spreading of debates, not by narrowing spaces but by opening them to all those who are critical of this globalization that causes exploitation, repression, and/or exclusion, which is why we pay attention to consensus methods as a way to improve communication. There is no such thing as a true alternative to the existing system. In other words, we aim to provide a place where people may think and engage in civic and social reform.

The idea of the organization as a platform for discussion and consensus-building reflects attention to these aspects as important in and of themselves. A location where political processes of learning and experiences are made possible. in which the various streams of progressive politics discuss with each other, in order to find a common capacity of action together, according to ATTAC Germany's self-presentation. In its self-described role as a permanent space for encounters, debates, and support for collective action, the Foro Social de Palencia claims that decisions are reached through consensus. In reality, the forum's characterization as a meeting place of different visions and positions with some common denominator, not an organization that has to reach a unique position is a favorable assessment of the pluralist nature of the forum. The ideals of consensus decision-making have undoubtedly been propagated thanks to national and international dissemination mechanisms.

It is common to cite the Zapatistas experience as an inspiration. The founding assembly of ATTAC Italy met in Bologna in June 2001 and created a provisional directory but decided on a zapatist consultation with regard to drafting a constitution. Similar to how the World Social Forum's constitution included consensus, most regional and local forums that stressed consensus as a key organizing element echoed it. For instance, all Sicilian Social Forums specify that decisions must be made by massima condivisione. The Genoa Social Forum emphasized the importance of the consensual approach in March 2001, describing it as a way to work on what we have in common and continue discussing what divides us.In order for everyone to feel ownership over the choices made, despite varying levels of happiness. Social forums and international campaigns also supported mutual learning about the methods that promote consensus decision-making. So, for instance, the Italian metalworkers' union FIOM learned about and began to value the use of facilitators in international meetings[10].

At the national level, social movement organizations often make reference to certain papers created by people and groups advocating the consensus approach by outlining particular norms of communication. For instance, Indymedia Italy cites a paper that was created to commemorate the gathering of a fair trade group. The most dedicated groups often also provide training. They include the British Dissent! '3 or 4 days of community labor, construction, community empowerment initiatives, dancing training, and consensus training' are organized locally by the network. The objective is to teach concepts and equip the neighborhood with the knowledge, abilities, and drive to carry out initiatives.The GJM gives new meaning to participation, which is a core component of social movements' conceptions of democracy. This second set of ideals is stated in the founding papers of our organizations.

Beyond the conventional reflections of participatory democracy, some normative conceptions of deliberative democracy are said to support participatory visions because deliberation is said to call for some forms of apparent equality among citizens and must bar power derived from coercion as well as an unequal weighting of participants as representatives of organizations of different sizes or influence. The idea of civil society is connected to the idea of participation in what is referred to as a utopian version: It is a definition that presumes a state or rule of law but insists not only on restraints on state power but on a redistribution of power. It is an expansion of involvement and autonomy as well as a radicalization of democracy.Regarding the GJMOs' values on internal democracy, one-third of the organizations listed participation as an internal value and more than half mentioned it as a general value. Participation is referred to as a fundamental principle by trade unions and left-leaning political parties as well as the more traditional social movement groups. However, new values that define participatory democracy conceptions start to emerge. Although they are not the predominate values of the organization, references to delegation restrictions, the rotation principle, mandated delegation, and criticism of delegation are all present.

Decision-making that is non-hierarchical is often discussed, while inclusivity is mentioned even more frequently. In an index of non-hierarchical decision making, 23.4% of the positive responses on critique of delegation, limitation of delegation, non-hierarchical decision making, and mandated delegation have positive scores. Significantly, just 6% of our organizations cite representational ideals[11], [12].As the idea of civil society links consensus to values of autonomy, a third set of values can be described under the heading of autonomy and are compatible with those advanced in normative theories of civil society. The legitimating principles of democracy and rights are compatible only with a model of civil society that institutionalizes democratic communication in a multiplicity of publics and defends the conditions of individual autonomy by liberating the intimate sphere from all traditional as well as modern forms of inequal- ity and unfreedom, according to Cohen and Arato. The autonomy of member organizations and locals is often cited in our database. When it comes to the overall principles, references to individual autonomy and cultural diversity account for 39.8% of the studied companies.

CONCLUSION

A statistically significant relationship between the mention of participatory principles, in particular as an internal principle, and an organizational structure with low levels of delegation appears for organizations involved in the social forum process. However, a sizable number of organizations with high levels of delegation also refer to participation as an internal value in their founding documents. Additionally, the relationship between participatory values and organizational characteristics is shaky and occasionally contradictory, and there are significant differences among the sampled groups in terms of the importance placed on the organization in achieving participatory values. As a result, several participatory traditions exist in the context of GJMOs, with some groups associating the importance of participation with high delegation levels and others with low delegation levels.

REFERENCES:

[1] E. Kuhn, R. Haselmair, H. Pirker, and C. R. Vogl, The role of ethnic tourism in the food knowledge tradition of Tyrolean migrants in Treze Tílias, SC, Brazil, *J. Ethnobiol. Ethnomed.*, 2018, doi: 10.1186/s13002-018-0224-9.

[2] L. Moraru, Academic Internal Stakeholder Condition: A Comparative Approach, *Procedia - Soc. Behav. Sci.*, 2012, doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.11.383.

[3] C. Schunko, S. Grasser, and C. R. Vogl, Explaining the resurgent popularity of the wild: Motivations for wild plant gathering in the Biosphere Reserve Grosses Walsertal, Austria, *J. Ethnobiol. Ethnomed.*, 2015, doi: 10.1186/s13002-015-0032-4.

[4] S. Jones, Drinking Water Governance: Participation, Citizenship and Paying, *Water Altern.*, 2011.

[5] Human needs and aspirations, in *Real Life Economics*, 2020. doi: 10.4324/9780203012796-15.

[6] N. Lenstra, Social inequalities in the shaping of cultural heritage infrastructure, in *Participatory Heritage*, 2018. doi: 10.29085/9781783301256.011.

[7] T. Freeman, R. Millar, R. Mannion, and H. Davies, Enacting Corporate Governance of Healthcare Safety and Quality: A Dramaturgy of Hospital Boards in England, in *The Sociology of Healthcare Safety and Quality*, 2016. doi: 10.1002/9781119276371.ch4.

[8] G. Lahood, The Participatory Turn and the Transpersonal Movement: A Brief Introduction, *Revis. A J. Conscious. Transform.*, 2007, doi: 10.3200/revn.29.3.2-6.

[9] E. Vizer, Socioanálisis: metodología de investigación, análisis diagnóstico e intervención social, … *Estud. para el Desarro. Soc. la Comun.*, 2012.

[10] Mike Kesby, Retheorising empowerment through participation-performance, *Source SignsSigns J. Women Cult. Soc.*, 2005.

[11] J.-P. Olivier De Sardan, Book Reviews, *Dev. Chang. C Inst. Soc. Stud.*, 2008.

[12] G. Leclerc, Improving poverty-reduction policies, part 2: Contrasting and harmonizing representations, in *Making World Development Work: Scientific Alternatives to Neoclassical Economic Theory*, 2007.

CHAPTER 6

EXPLAINING CONSENSUS: STRUCTURES AND CULTURES

Pradip Kumar Kashyap, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Emai Id:-pradiprgnul@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The relationship between organizational structures and cultures in achieving consensus decision-making. Drawing on both theoretical insights and empirical evidence, the paper argues that organizational structures and cultures are closely intertwined and must be aligned to achieve effective consensus decision-making.Specifically, the paper identifies two key factors that influence consensus decision-making: the structure of decision-making processes and the culture of participation within the organization. The paper argues that decision-making structures must be designed to promote inclusivity, transparency, and accountability, while also providing clear and efficient mechanisms for resolving conflicts and reaching agreement.

KEYWORDS:

Consensus, Culture, Deliberation, Direct Democracy, Structures, Organizational.

INTRODUCTION

Organizational structure and ideals have historically been connected to political potential in social movement research. The spatial distribution of competences and the functional division of power are two institutional factors thought to be important for social movements. The reduction of institutional avenues for challengers brought forth by territorial centralization and functional concentration of power results in increasingly radical conceptions of alternative, participatory forms of democracy. Strong governments often have more bureaucratic movement organizations. in contrast, decentralized states should support decentralized movement organizations, which are also more horizontal.Dieter Rucht found that when France, West Germany, and the United States were compared, the grass-roots level of the movements in the two federal states, the United States and Germany, was significantly stronger than in the more centralized France.

There was also a very strong interest group type of social movement structure in both countries. Parallel to this, inclusive cultural practices need to permeate civil society groups. Relationships might, however, be more challenging. Indeed, according to Rucht, In the long run, this encourages the formalization of centralised and professional interest groups within the movement, while strong executive power structures in a given political system tend to induce a fundamental critique of bureaucratic and hierarchical political forms, which is then reflected in the movements' emphasis on informal and decentralized structures. This indicates that there is greater room for engagement generally and that professional and grassroots organizational structures exist in federal states. Similar to this, more open-minded states that encourage participation have favored the growth of sizable, well-organized, and formalized associations. Smaller groups, however, have experimented with different organizational structures in opposition to the institutionalization and moderation of those associations.

Our cross-national research shows that diverse democratic principles are present in all of the studied nations and at the global level, but there is no obvious relationship between these values and the features of political opportunity. There are more references to internal engagement in the more strongly mobilized Italian and Spanish groups as well as among the Swiss. Consensual Switzerland and majoritarian Great Britain both make frequent references to inclusivity. In centralized France and Great Britain, as well as in decentralized Spain, delegation criticism is more common. Spain and Germany are two countries that often bring up consensual techniques. In Switzerland and internationally, the values of outward inclusion, diversity/plurality /heterogeneity, as well as dialogue/communication and transparency, are much more commonly discussed.

Equality and participation as generic values appear more often in the founding papers of Italian and Swiss organizations.Although some of these findings might be explained by our sampling methodology, our prior knowledge of the GJM in the various countries indicates that it is internally heterogeneous in all of the nation's we chose. In any case, we must look at certain features of the organizations themselves in order to comprehend the differences in focus on various values. I'll examine both organizational and cultural resources while adhering to the key social movement and organizational studies assumptions outlined in this volume's introduction. I will provide some broad assumptions in each of the following two paragraphs and test each one by comparing some chosen values to indicators of organizational structure and standards.

DISCUSSION

In order to build processes based on consensus and give everyone the chance to participate and express both agreement and disagreement, democratic visions, consensus, and organizational structures favor rapid and thorough information flow. These structures also apply criteria for constant verification on the organizational modes, the work completed, and the tasks assigned. If there are speaking, refereeing, coordinating, or other roles, they must be subject to time restrictions that are determined by the length of the initiative or campaign and/or by rotational criteria. The Italian Rete Lilliput establishes a relationship between the consensus method and certain particular organizational traits, particularly a participatory structure, with restrictions on delegation and a focus on full and equal participation of all members. Some organizational structure characteristics have been seen as having an impact on democratic values and consensus decision-making. Organizational structure has been associated with democratic conceptions and practices more generally. Either organizational structures restrict democratic conceptions or, conversely, values guide organizational model selection.

We can discover various explanation hypotheses that detail this link in the social science literature. According to Mansbridge, organizations lacking other effective methods of persuading members to operate as a group benefit most from a consensus-based decision-making approach. Organizations that are less hierarchically structured seem to be better suited to foster effective communication. In terms of the Global Justice Movement, decentralized networks like Rete Lilliput appear to place a larger focus on consensus than more centralized ones like ATTAC-Italia. Additionally, transnational networks appear to be more adept at integrating various organizations through the creation of master frames and particularly sensitive to deliberative values. Negotiations between representatives of social movement groups are often a part of mobilization in particular national or local campaigns[1].

Both organizational model and resource allocation may be used to design organizational structures. Even though associations between organizational characteristics and expressed democratic values frequently tend to confirm our expectations, we observe a low overall impact of organizational structures on democratic values. First off, when examining organizational resources, it is consistent with our expectations that smaller organizations with tighter budgets and no paid staff are more likely to mention consensual methods. Organizations with fewer than 1000 members and a little budget are more likely to emphasize criticisms of delegation and non-hierarchical ideals. However, the same factors have little to no effect on mentions of the other values, which occasionally tend to rise with organizational resources. The magnitude of individual memberships and the geographic scope covered are factors that are mentioned in relation to local and organizational members' autonomy. Similar to this, groups with larger individual membership and multilevel organizations tend to mention autonomy more frequently.

Mentions of ideals like equality, member organization autonomy, and critiques of delegating are all positively correlated with the formalization index. The likelihood that ideals like consensus, internal inclusiveness, equality, and horizontality are articulated rises when the executive is explicitly rejected. In particular, references to horizontality, debate, and consensus are positively correlated with the assembly's importance.In conclusion, even though most relationships follow the predicted paths, it seems that many universal values are only loosely connected to organizational traits. These values are shared among organizations with various organizational structures and resources, despite the fact that they seem to be either highly generic or endowed with several meanings. For smaller and more participative groups, however, the criticism of delegation and the appeal to sensible principles tend to occur more often. The allusions to democratic principles, however, are not particularly well explained by structural organizational features[2].

Agreement, Themes, and Identities

Additionally, inclusiveness implies innovative meeting setup strategies. We all too often fall prey to our own self-imposed schedules, time restrictions, and procedural procedures. This is not to say that agendas or procedures are not significant. Instead, it suggests that we should think of them flexibly, as our creations that we can modify based on our needs, rather than as our gods dictating our life. All too often, in an effort to save time, we respond to the initial problem with clichéd programs or shortcuts. Consensus-seeking procedures improve relationships, trust, communication, and comprehension. Voting-based decision-making, on the other hand, reproduces the social connections we are trying to avoid by establishing power blocs, power games, and hegemonic techniques, including excluded and included hierarchies. Our managers and our bosses share the same productivist mentality. they are all so focused on results, forgetting the life process that goes into producing those results, hiding the voices excluded for the sake of results, and excluding alternative results that would be possible if those voices were included. We have the opportunity to redefine democracy for ourselves and set a positive example for others.

The London Social Forum's adoption of the consensus approach reflects its self-definition, particularly the group's preference for prefigurative politics above effectiveness. Debating various choices in terms of their practical impact is undoubtedly a time- and energy-consuming process, but it also has ethical ramifications. For instance, suggestions were made to offer limited delegation for certain mandates or majority vote on particular matters inside Rete Lilliput, which

publicly supported the consensus approach, restricting consensus to basic choices in the interest of efficiency. The suggestions were, however, rejected on the grounds that the validity of the consensus method which is said to have permitted to experiment with horizontality, diffuse leadership, and participatory methods Rete Lilliput renounced the writing of a document on the world we want, privileging consensus, stating we agree that we all dream of a different world, but it is not at all clear that we all want the same things. we are not able to write a document on which con- sensus can be reached. it does not make sense to freeze in a written document.

It may be assumed that a movement's ideology influences how it views democracy. However, empirical research and theorizing have long ignored the link between internal decision-making and general values. The resource mobilization strategy placed an emphasis on institutionalization's crucial role in achieving movement objectives, while cultural processes' effect on internal organizational structures has received relatively little consideration. The spirit of Michels, it has been remarked, infuses resource mobilization arguments through a sort of syllogism: organizations are resources. effective organizations are hierarchies. consequently, hierarchi- cal organizations are valuable resources for movements. In fact, organizational structures have only lately been examined in connection to the cultural significance that activists give them. In reality, organizational structures have been referred to be a component of a larger social movement repertory. Organizations that are normatively focused may have a prefigurative role, anchoring the social connections that activists want to see in the outer world[3].

The issue of whether values are associated with which democratic vision becomes relevant if organizational values are not just means to a goal but also an aim in and of themselves. The relationships between personal values and organizational values, democratic values and other values at the organizational level, and organizational values and broader culture values have all been examined in past research on this topic. Multi-issue SMOs have been observed to devote more resources to the creation and member involvement in communication channels. Social justice-oriented environmentalists develop a specific understanding of democracy that emphasizes inclusiveness, equality, and fair democratic processes.Consensual decision-making has been seen in the GJM as being consistent with principles like non-violence and respect for minorities.

A master frame connecting the various interpretations of the protest and culturally integrating the various organizations was able to be developed through the use of consensus decision-making, according to research on the decision-making processes of international protest events involving many and different groups. Single-issue movements, on the other hand, seem to be less focused on participation due to varying degrees of specialization, centralization, and professionalization. Prefigurative theories of politics emphasize inclusive organization, consensus decision-making, intergroup ties, and a sense of identity.In our study, we used a variety of indicators to help us account for the cultural influences on the three sets of democratic values previously discussed. First of all, our findings support the idea that multi-issue groups have stronger democratic concerns. We get strong and substantial association coefficients when we combine democratic principles with an additive index of the aforementioned topics.

Additionally, we operationalized the relationship between democratic values and movement areas by separating out the Old Left, New Left, and anarchist/autonomous groups as well as new social movements, solidarity movements, and new global movements. By fusing democratic principles with social movements, the use of consensus emerges as particularly pervasive among

new international organizations. While equality is more frequently mentioned in Old Left, New Left/anarchist/autonomous groups, and new social movement organizations, dialogue is particularly stressed by new social movement and new global organizations. Particularly evident in the writings of New Left/anarchist and autonomous organizations are values of autonomy. Additionally, the new global organizations place a greater emphasis than the others on participation and inclusivity as an external value. In contrast, the new social movements make more frequent mentions of participatory democracy, transparency, as well as internal principles of individual and communal autonomy, equality, and inclusivity. Representative democracy is referred to more often by the Old Left[4].

The organizational population to which a group belongs partially reflects these linkages. Here, we made a distinction between new networks, informal SMOs, formal SMOs, parties, unions, cooperatives, and NGOs. Crossing these with organizational formulae, we found that contemporary networks connected to the GJM more often place an emphasis on values like consensus, transparency, heterogeneity, and horizontal decision-making. Additionally, mentions of multiple themes are connected to references to all previously mentioned themes.If we examine the organizational generations, which are categorized according to the year of foundation, comparable findings become apparent. The propensity of various forms of political organizations to continue to be influenced by the particular circumstances in which they were founded as well as the decisions taken at the very beginning of their existence has been highlighted through research on these organizations.Left-wing parties prefer to replicate the democratic centralism they had chosen when they were created, whereas clientelistic structures tend to persist in political organizations that had to disperse individual incentives when they first appeared.

Similar to this, social movement organizations tend to keep some of the qualities they developed when they were founded, despite having much lower survival rates. Italian women's organizations, for instance, continued to rely on the small size and affinity groups that defined the consciousness-raising groups that had been so crucial in the 1970s phase of high mobilization despite institutionalization processes. Similar to this, autonomous squatted youth centers continued to value their autonomy, which was frequently demonstrated by their refusal to occupy spaces that had been assigned to them and preference for illegally squatted spaces, despite becoming more effective in selling cultural goods and more receptive to collaborative interactions with local institutions.The ability of the GJM to reactivate organizations that had developed during earlier protest cycles is one of its traits. Organizations created after 2000 tend to refer to consensus more often, as well as other related general ideals like difference/plurality/heterogeneity, dialogue/communication. This may be seen by looking at the year of establishment. These more recent groups seem to be more aware of participatory ideals. they mention inclusiveness, internal involvement, participation as a general value, and criticism of delegation more often than the other organizations. In contrast, older organizations tend to make more comments of individual and cultural liberty, and statements about equality and transparency also appear to be more common[4].

Recognizing Ideas about Consensus

Consensus: A large majority that results from a vote or without a vote. In the absence of a clear majority, the discussion goes on. People may reject suggestions or prevent an agreement from being achieved. Major decisions are only taken when there is consensus among all parties. There will be a lot of chatting. When you are not speaking, use hand signals to communicate with the

meeting's facilitator and other attendees.The chosen quotations appropriately capture the rising interest in con- sensus that permeates many GJMOs as well as the many interpretations of the word found throughout various traditions. The qualitative analysis of our documents enables a better understanding of the relationships between democratic values and other organizational characteristics by highlighting the varied meanings that consensus has for various organizations as this emerging value is bridged with previous organizational cultures. This is in contrast to the statistical analysis, which enables us to identify some associations between references to consensus and other characteristics of our organizations. I specifically differentiate between communitarian and multiple notions of consensus, each linked to various traditions.

The first is a multifaceted understanding of agreement reached via excellent conversation. This is a really creative interpretation of the consensus-building process, which often distinguishes network groups. Consensus is seen as functional for safeguarding the unitary-plural nature of the movement as well as members' demands for individual protagonism here, as it is in many social forums. The consensus technique is recommended in networks and campaigns because it enables working on what unifies, despite disagreements. According to Espacio alternativo, in order to achieve unity beyond these divides, the method for clarifying differences has to be consensus and broad agreement. We must continue the discussion until we have come to an understanding of the issues, working to find common ground. Our public communication, if they are not feasible, would guarantee that the public is aware of agreements and disagreements. The international network Our World is Not for Sale also clearly connects the consensus process to networking.

strives to create and connect campaigns all around the globe in an effort to reshape the corporate-dominated trade agenda in favor of supporting democratic ideals, environmental sustainability, and human rights. OWINFS serves as a hub for social movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) interested in exchanging analysis and coordinating international action activities. The advancement of our collaborative work is made possible by the enthusiastic engagement of OWINFS members. On conference calls, we coordinate our efforts and reach consensus on our decisions. There is no official network staff. instead, member groups volunteer to do assigned duties. Individual movements and organizations may collaborate where it is strategic and helps progress their projects, and they are free to invest as much or as little time in the network as is necessary for them to achieve their goals. This flexibility is one of the network's strengths[5].

In this way, consensus norms are pre- sented in organizational networks as resonating with a respect for the autonomy of the many organizations that make up the federation. Recounts how the committee came at its choices as follows. consensus was reached thatNetwork has meetings every two months. Network decisions are solely decided by The Gatherings. they are not made on email lists or on online discussion forums. Local organizations have complete independence from one another and are free to act as they see fit. Local Opposition! Network groupings shouldn't represent the network as a whole. However, local groups should also take into account how their actions will affect the network as a whole. The Discord Thus, the main purpose of a network is as a networking tool. When businesses place a strong emphasis on internal diversity, consensus choices seem to be even more important. For instance, ATTAC Italia, which states in its Charter of Intent that it wants to be a democratic and open association, transversal and as much as possible pluralistic, composed of diverse individuals and social forces, fits this

description. Itwishes to help improve democratic political participation and supports the creation of new civil society organizational structures.

We want to continue to build shared associational forms, based on participation and the consensual method, fit for letting diversities meet and work together and develop democratic decision-making practices, the country's national parliament said. We wish to collectively reclaim democracy because we believe it to be the most essential component of the common good[6].In this sense, participation and the consensus-building process are seen as the two fundamental manifestations of democracy as a common good. Consensus resonates in reality with a focus on the respect for diversity, linked with demands for inclusiveness, inside the notion of the organization as an open spacea metaphor that our organizations often employin particular, but not exclusively, for networks. The Turin Social Forum (TSF), for example, states that: the TSF wants to be an open place in which even the individuals, as well as the organized actors, can meet and work together. a space in which internal differences are accepted and given a positive value, and not thought of as an instrument to be used in order to acquire increased visibility and impose working methods. a space in which there should be no place for hegemony and instead the search for a sufficient degree of cooperation. and a space.

A communitarian idea of consensus as group consensus may be seen as another perspective. Groups having a long history of 'assembleary' behavior express this idea. For instance, the British Wombles said that they had no official membership and that anybody was welcome to join their monthly meetings. Any and all decisions pertaining to the organization are taken during these sessions. The politics we support are the ones we want to practice: direct democracy, self-organization, autonomy, and direct action against coercive and controlling powers. As a result, no one can speak for the Wombles because the group as a whole and all decisions are made jointly based on agreement. Similar to the Italian Disobbedienti, when choices are being discussed in the management council but there is disagreement, the decisions are put on hold and will not be continued until there is agreement. Consensus resonates with anti-authoritarian, horizontal interactions in this context. All IMCs, according to Indymedia Italy, acknowledge the value of the strategies for bringing about social change and are dedicated to the growth of non-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian relationships, in terms of both individual and collective dynamics. Consequently, to organize collectively and adopt the method of consensus, which develops in a participatory, horizontal, and transparent way, in order to make decisions.

This vision depicts agreement as a component of a more intricate, anti-hierarchical system. The Alternativa Antimilitarista-MOC describes consensus decision-making as a process in which we attempt to reach the most satisfactory agreement for all members during general assemblies. Agreement is addressed here as an integral component of a horizontal vision of democracy: in an effort to eliminate all kinds of leadership, we promote horizontal organizational forms by making choices by agreement. This is because our entire operation opposes hierarchical systems. We encourage rotation and the ability of every group member to participate in the tasks they choose to do. There is no 'charge' that increases the power of any person[7]. Consensual approaches should aid in preventing the development of power relationships. Indymedia advertises itself as a source of news and background data on political and social concerns. The members of the moderation committee alternate, and the group makes decisions by agreement to prevent the emergence of power positions.

There is no dominant voice, according to the French Réseau Intergalactique's Charter, which was created around the creation of a self-managed area during the anti-G8 meeting in Evian. It is what we refer to as a horizontal way of working because no small group makes decisions. Thus, there are not small hands and feet on the other side and thinking heads on the other. The objective is to make it easier for each person to be included in the conversation and decision-making.An organizational life prefigurative vision also adopts consensus-based strategies. They share the goal of bringing about social change not just via political choices but also through significant adjustments in daily living and personal attitudes. Because a social transformation cannot be realized through purely political decisions. For anti-militarism to positively affect life options and a fight, the actions must correspond to the needs and wants of the people. Consensus, considered as a process that tries to arrive at the agreement that is most pleasing to everybody, would be used to build this[8].

Growing attention has recently been paid in both fields to consensus, which could be thought of as the antithesis of conflict. Social movements have traditionally been seen as conflictual actors, and social movement studies have historically linked movements and conflict. This focus is in line with ideas like deliberative democracy and civil society, which are becoming more and more important in social and political thought. Even though the terms conflict and consensus are used to describe relationships between social movements and their external adversaries and relationships within the movement, respectively, there is still a tension between the two ideas because they tend to construct contrasting ideas of politics as antagonistic and the domain of power struggles or, alternatively, deliberative and oriented toward dialogue. The political discussion is defined by a battle between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses, and there is no common good in this sense. Conflicts are seen as being intractable in this notion. In the second, disputes may be resolved via discussion. Discourses aid in the creation of a shared understanding of the common good, which is democracy, which is in fact thought of as the most significant common good.

This issue, which is open in both political theory and social theory, has resonance not just in social movement studies but also in actual social movement groups.The findings of our study support the notion that con- sensus was introduced as a new value in the Global Justice Movement, particularly by newly established organizations. Consensus ideals from the Zapatista Sierra Lacandona tended to be connected to other values that resonated with the social movement tradition as they made their way to Europe. Consensus is linked to ideals like pluralism, debate, inclusivity, horizontality, involvement, and openness in the documents of our organizations.However, we also observed that mentions of consensus and other values tended to vary. In terms of structural traits, we discovered that organizations with fewer memberships and resources, no paid staff, and a greater dependence on the assembly made more frequent allusions to consensus. Consensual approaches are stated more often by smaller groups, which is expected and supports the hypothesis that communication is simpler the smaller the company.

The express rejection of an executive and the high significance placed on the assembly both point to some consistency between the pursuit of agreement and horizontal organizational arrangements. The justification of comparable ideals, such as the criticism of delegation, follows similar trajectories[9].The ability of these organizational components to explain the many democratic principles, however, varied, with certain values seeming to be shared by many distinct organizational forms. Instead, the mention of various themes that seem to be pertinent in the GJM has more explanatory power. In fact, social movement groups may be seen of as spaces

for the development of ideals. Notably, references to democratic values are frequently associated with discussions of anti-globalist issues, whereas anti-capitalism and conventional left-wing themes have much less explanatory power. According to the assumption that this kind of structure necessitates greater attention to the formation of agreement among the different nodes of the network, references to consensus are increasingly common in networks.

Consensual values are particularly prevalent in the organizations that were founded during the most recent wave of protest on global issues, that adopted the most recent organizational forms, that praised horizontal linkages, as well as among the more multi-issue organizations, confirming some hypotheses that have emerged in the social science literature. Organizations that have recently emerged from the GJM and show its interest with democracy seem to pay greater attention to democracy in general. In more recent organizations and newer varieties of networks, references to consensus as a democratic value seem to be more common. Transnational social movement groups also give particular attention to inclusivity and place a high value on diversity as a result of their need to build cross-cultural communication[10].But after conducting a more thorough qualitative analysis of our documents, we found that when consensus encountered various organizational cultures, it took on new meanings.

We might point out in particular a view of consensus that emerged primarily in network organizations, which exhibit significant variability. Here, effective communication is seen as being even more necessary to enhance dialogue among various actors. The assembleary tradition is combined with the technique of consensus in a separate, horizontal tradition. Here, assembleary collective decision-making by consensus is a way for the group to develop its collective identity.An emphasis on creating open spaces for excellent dialogue between numerous and diverse actors is shared by all of our organizations. If building public spaces has historically been considered the goal of social movements, the GJM has made some recent innovations that merit attention. Traditional notions of participation are particularly entwined with notions of deliberation, which uphold the principles of inclusivity, discourse, good communication, autonomy, and consensus that are in line with notions of public places. Consensus is particularly significant as a normative foundation for the building of public places, albeit having many meanings. In reality, organizational forms like the social forum offer themselves as places where many actors may interact and appreciate a conversation centered on information sharing and mutual understanding.

CONCLUSION

The interaction of cultural norms and organizational systems in reaching agreement. Effective consensus decision-making, according to this argument, needs both the proper decision-making frameworks and an organizational participation culture. It made clear how crucial it is to have decision-making processes that support diversity, openness, and accountability. These institutions must also provide simple and effective procedures for resolving disputes and coming to agreements. The article has also stressed how important participation culture is for reaching agreement in decision-making. This entails establishing mutual respect and trust among members, promoting active engagement, and appreciating different viewpoints and experiences.

REFERENCES:

[1] S. Big, 'Ina-Cors', *Theor. Appl. Genet.*, 2021.

[2] Erastus Mosha And A. A. B. Ruíz, 'Hubungan Antara Pengetahuan Bahaya Merokok Dengan Perilaku Merokok Pada Mahasiswa Di Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta.', *Theor. Appl. Genet.*, 2015.

[3] Ibid, 'Undang-Undang Nomor 13 Tahun 2003 Tentang Ketenagakerjaan', *Undang. Nomor 13 Tahun 2003 Tentang Ketenagakerjaan*, 2010.

[4] F. K. Campbell, 'Refusing Able(Ness): A Preliminary Conversation About Ableism', *M/C J.*, 2008, Doi: 10.5204/Mcj.46.

[5] N. Hidayah, 'Cluster Regulary Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat – Association 9 (Crispr/Cas9) Teknologi Terbaru Editing Gen Human Pluripotent Stem Cells (Hpscs) Sebagai Terapi Penyakit Diabetes Mellitus Tipe 1', *Theor. Appl. Genet.*, 2020.

[6] I. Republik, 'Grand Design Reformasi Birokrasi', *Reformasi Birokrasi*. 2010.

[7] R. Rahmayanti, 'Analisis Pemilihan Supplier Menggunakan Metode Analytical Hierarchy Process (Ahp) (Studi Kasus Pada Pt Cazikhal)', *Theor. Appl. Genet.*, 2010.

[8] Pemerintahan Republik Indonesia, 'Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 37 Tahun 2010 Tentang Bendungan', *Nefe Quart. Century Proj. Implic. Res. Educ. Policy Makers From A Quart. Century Financ. Educ.*, 2010.

[9] B. Y. Prawoto, 'Hubungan Antara Konsep Diri Dengan Kecemasan Sosial Pada Remaja Kelas Xi Sma Kristen 2 Surakarta', *Theor. Appl. Genet.*, 2010.

[10] O. Dwi Hapsari, 'Pengaruh Pemutaran Video Animasi Terhadap Pengetahuan Dan Sikap Siswa Dalam Pencegahan Demam Berdarah Dengue (Dbd) Di Sekolah Dasar', *Theor. Appl. Genet.*, 2018.

CHAPTER 7

DEMOCRACY'S EXTERNAL DIMENSION: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GOVERNANCE

Dal Chandra, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Email Id:- degautambahjoi@yahoo.co.in

ABSTRACT:

The relationship between social movements and multilevel governance. Drawing on both theoretical insights and empirical evidence, the paper argues that social movements can play an important role in shaping multilevel governance processes and outcomes.Specifically, the paper identifies three key mechanisms through which social movements can influence multilevel governance: agenda-setting, mobilization, and participation. Social movements can bring issues to the attention of policymakers and shape the policy agenda at multiple levels of governance. They can also mobilize support and put pressure on decision-makers to take action on issues of concern. Finally, social movements can participate in governance processes and help to shape the design and implementation of policies.

KEYWORDS:

Activism, Civil society, European Union, Globalization, Multilevel governance, Networks.

INTRODUCTION

Social movement groups have a history of interfering in normal politics, seizing political chances, and fighting for reforms in politics, legislation, and the polity. Political parties have partnered with both old and new social groups, sometimes even supporting the latter or at the very least giving them fresh life.However, there has been a depoliticization of social movements, particularly since the 1990s, and images of anti-political or populist movements, or at least ones focused on a single issue, have emerged. Political discussions and political sciences have condemned social movements in general, and the Global Justice Movement in particular, as anti-political, or at the very least populist, players. Activists often identify as anti-institutional and emphasize a different political from perspective. The most recent movements have been defined as being more interested in changes in daily life than in political transformation, of either a revolutionary or a reformist nature. This is despite the fact that the labor movement has historically had strong ties with party systems and that new social movements led to the creation of new parties.A concern about personal autonomy, self organization, and private space is shown by the revival of the notion of civil society, which was inspired by new social movements and the campaign for democracy in Eastern Europe.

In reality, the literature on civil society has emphasized the separation of the social and political spheres, even while it often includes a discussion of the particular rights required for the complete development of a democratic civil society. A global civil society has been described as the result of the pre-1989 social movements becoming institutionalized, being professionalized, and becoming organized around specific causes. It also refers to the demise of traditional civic

groups and their metamorphosis into NGOs. The 'politicization' of supranational levels of governance, which had previously been thought to be highly technical and justified 'by the output,' has also been interpreted as reflecting recent waves of protest on global issues, as well as a'return to politics' at the national level. In reality, international governmental organizations have offered opportunity for the growth of transnational networks of protest and global frameworks, serving as a coral reef for movements beyond national boundaries, as described by Sidney Tarrow. Others, however contentious, have provided some discursive and political chances for entry by social movement groups. While some have been considered as the primary targets for protest, others.

The EU is a popularly talked and researched example of the latter. European institutions started debating different methods of including individuals in decision-making as a means to address the difficulties of inadequate electoral accountability and the loss of legitimacy by output. One of the basic cornerstones of the White Paper on European Governance is the notion of involvement via open dialogue with individuals and their organizations. This focus on civil society is in line with a broader shift in the EU's legitimation tactics, which are described as a fragmented democracy split between governance for and with the people at the EU level, and governance by and of the people at the national level. Civil society groups have been consulted, and the idea of government with the people has even been promoted via the outsourcing of services and financial assistance for their operations.However, as we will see in this, the GJM organizations in our research did not come across as anti-political. rather, they asserted a political nature and engaged in a variety of intricate relationships with institutions of multilevel governance. Only a small portion of their activities, protest is thought to be important but frequently ineffective without more direct engagement with the government and public administrations. The way social movement organizations deal with representative democracy is by working both with and against representative institutions.

Our GJMOs really use a number of tactics and exhibit a range of views toward institutional politics when attempting to influence institutional choices. Furthermore, as more organizations mention interactions with representative institutions at the local, national, or international level, these interactions appear to be becoming more multilevel. Numerous international institutions appear to not only elicit protest but also to open channels of communication with civil society organizations, despite being formally closed to actors from, not directly accountable to an electorate, and infrequently called to account in public[1].In the paragraphs that follow, I make a first effort to categorize these encounters in light of both the organizational philosophy as it is stated in the core documents and the details on organizational procedures supplied by the organizational leaders and spokespersons who were questioned. After classifying the various attitudes and behaviors of SMOs toward political institutions, I will attempt to explain them by going over some key theories from social movement studies and taking a look at both the internal resources of our groups and their environs.

DISCUSSION

Initially, social movement groups were seen as societal actors with few ties to politics. Since the advent of a political process approach to protest, attention has been drawn to the interactions between social movements and politics and how they shape unconventional political movements' forms, tactics, and results. Social movements have advocated for institutional reforms that would increase grass-roots influence in addition to protesting for changes in policy. Administrative

decentralization has been occurring in several European nations since the 1970s as a result of this pressure, opening up new avenues for communication with local decision-makers. Within the framework of regulatory organizations established to carry out objectives also backed by movement activists, new opportunities for conflictual co-operation emerged. Collaboration took many different forms, including consultation, inclusion in committees, authority transfer, and outsourcing of services. Some regulatory bureaucracies created in response to movement mobilizations view activists as potential allies, as activists are hired as staff members by particular public bodies, or, in the other direction, administrative staff at public agencies assist movements.

First, the groups we looked at support a serious concern with politics. It is common for basic organizational papers to expressly indicate this expressed political interest, which contrasts with perceptions of social movement groups as only participating in street protests or even as being 'anti-political' in character. Although with varying emphasis and meanings, politics is frequently mentioned in the documents of our organizations. in fact, many of our organizations view politics as an integral part of their very self-definition. Since the building of a basis union must start with the material conditions, but at the same time aim at the definition of values and general elements, in short an identity that opposes the social development founded upon neoliberalism, the critical union Confederazione Unitaria di Base CUB believes it essential to give a political breath to our initiatives. Through the activation of peaceful political instruments useful for conditioning, controlling, and verifying the operation of local institutions, ATTAC hopes to contribute to innovate democratic political participation and favor the development of new organizational forms of the civil society. Rete Lilliput mentions being a political subject, having the ability to exert pressure on institutions, and having a disinterest in power as beneficial attributes in the statement summarizing a debate in its General Assembly. that increases our strength, independence, and freedom[2].

Politics, nevertheless, is also seen in a variety of other ways, such as a means of resolving disputes or as a moment of growing. The nonprofit organization Un ponte perpromotes a political commitment focused on having an influence on the causes of conflicteven if it views politics as primarily promoting solidarity by raising public awareness.We discovered that many social movement organizations were amenable to interacting with multilevel governance institutions within the context of this political ideology. Institutional views do, however, differ, just as in politics. We distinguished views toward local, national, and worldwide governmental organizations as well as economic entities by coding references to various attitudes toward institutions, ranging from outright opposition to cooperation. Even though only about half of our groups mentioned links with institutions, our data show that when they did, they were really highly receptive to interacting with them. They weren't only highlighting a bad message, but they often welcomed collaboration on certain issues. Statements of outright rejection of cooperation are uncommon in connection to representative institutions in general, although attitudes of either collaboration or democratic control are more common.

Different people have different perspectives on the various territorial levels of government. Although it appears to occur less frequently than with national institutions, collaboration with IGOs and economic actors is still relevant. Additionally, national institutions are mentioned more frequently than local or supranational ones when it comes to the refusal of collaboration. At the national level as opposed to the international level, statements concerning relationships of partnership are more common. However, there are few differences between attitudes toward

institutions at various territorial levels, suggesting that these attitudes tend to spread from one institution to the next. The changes are less pronounced than one would have anticipated, even if the frequency of encounters rises as one moves from the local to the international and from the state to the market. About one-fifth of our groups, in particular, recognize the transnational level as a crucial institutional level for collaboration. However, our organizations have a tendency to be critical of institutions and see their own work as actively participating in citizens' control of institutional politics through the implementation of discursive accountability channels.Fundamental document statements are a reflection of organizational ideology, and as a result, they provide a clear picture of the disparities in GJM views regarding institutions. However, as previously mentioned, we had to account for the bias brought on by some missing data, particularly in the case of small and grassroots organizations. Additionally, documents describe how groups argue rather than their actual behavior. We may use a triangulation of the assertions in the papers with the attitudes indicated by the GJMO interviewees in order to increase the quantity of information to more groups and increase the degree of practices[3].

The findings from our interviews about proclaimed practices are quite similar to those regarding organizational philosophy. First, please provide your group's relationships with public institutions at various territorial levels.' attest to our organizations' willingness to work with institutions. Refusal to collaborate in any way is still quite uncommon. it ranges from a very low 8.4% for local institutions to 11.8% for the national level and 13.5% for the international level. IGOs have the greatest rejection rates, however they are still just a few percentage points more than national institutions overall and still relatively low. There are more organizations, but they are still confined to between one-fifth and one-third at the local, national, and international levels, either due to disregard for relationships with institutions or rejection by institutions. The remaining organizations in the sample had a propensity for cooperation, particularly with regional and national organizations but also with IGOs. Several groups simultaneously announce collaborations with various territorial levels, demonstrating an adjustment to multilevel governance. However, in this instance as well, our interviewees frequently describe their relationships with institutions as critical or selective, with less critical attitudes toward local governments and rising criticism toward the supranational and national levels.

A qualitative examination of the organizational papers, with a focus on the Italian groups, enables the identification of the numerous distinct methods in which GJMOs engage with institutions. Local governments may work together through holding events, supporting petitions started by social movement groups, or supporting other social movement efforts. To strengthen the sense of responsibility and the effectiveness of civil society, communities, and local institutions, the Tavola della Pace aims to create dense networks of groups and local governments to elaborate political proposals, change politics, and stimulate politics. Rete Lilliput's Tesorerie Disarmate campaign, which aims to deter banks from investing in weaponry by implementing good practices in public administration, specifically targets sympathetic municipal governments. Local city councils are also involved in specific campaigns that call for the rejection of international treaties that are said to undermine local democracy and administrations[4].

Groups that provide different services to the public administration also encourage cooperation with local governments. Projects may be sponsored by local governments, as in the example of Un Ponte per... , whose website states that it depends on its members' volunteer work and local government funding for particular initiatives. Examples abound, even when concentrating just on

Italian organizations. The Peacelink constitution encourages forms of partnership with educational and governmental organizations in order to enhance its cultural activities. Peacelink is a volunteer society for the promotion of internet communication on peace and human rights. Legambiente creates suggestions on sustainable tourism or the public management of water, emphasizing the value of citizen, community, and local government engagement. In order to find organizational headquarters and economic resources to activate help-desks, formation activity, or new social instruments of interventions as, e.g., housing for young gays sent away by their family or lonely old ones, Arcigay works with local institutions on projects and in coordination aimed at popular education against discrimination. Similar to this, the Italian Consortium of Solidarity emphasizes communication with institutions based on particular initiatives, addressing the need for social practices of development from via assistance to the local civil society. In order to increase transparency and provide active citizens control over how banks finance the weapons trade, the Campagna Banche Armate is calling for amendments to the law[5].

Particularly unfavorable is the practice of social movement groups lobbying governments at various levels for certain legislation. The precise definition of the term campaign is given as pressure and sensitization actions that aim to obtain very concrete objectives and last until those objectives are attained. ATTAC, which in reality addresses a wide range of particular demands to both national and EU parliaments, often has a great mobilization and identification potential for proposals for laws implementing a Tobin Tax. Similar to this, the Campaign for the Abolition of the Foreign Debt of Poor Countries supported legislation in that direction. For instance, in Italy, the Law 209/2000 urges the Italian government to promote debt remittance at the international level in addition to imposing debt remittance. A list of demands on specific policies is included in the World March of Women documents, which were organized by 3000 organizations from 140 countries. These demands range from a significant cut in military spending to a social wage for women, as well as criticism of the lack of women in parliament, government, and high positions in the judiciary and central banks. The critical union CUB creates detailed counterproposals against privatization of public services, reduction to social spending, and dismantling of the public health and welfare systems. Social movement groups track the consequences of such legislation, as seen by the campaign Sdebitarsi's documentation, and often bemoan their lack of implementation.

Claims are also focused on procedural matters, such as the confrontation with institutions in order to activate.Given the movements' apparent interest with democracy. Activities that are plural, inclusive, and participatory. The Internet cultural association Isole nella Rete's constitution, which is intended to support the self-organization of grassroots activist organizations, explicitly defends freedom of information. Documents from critical unions often mention workplace democracy and, on occasion, demand for legislation to protect union rights and democracy as well as a universal public service. The Botteghe Del Mondo makes particular demands for legislative standards in favor of alternative trading practices and makes specific objections to reductions in local services. It emphasizes that the forms of democracy and politics as we traditionally knew them, strictly tied to the national state, are largely inadequate and that Rete Lilliput opposes economic choices that jeopardize democracy. In a broader sense, unions' commitment to constructing democracy alongside social rights is described as engagement in the struggle against neoliberal globalization[6].

The organizational papers' qualitative examination also identifies some key areas of criticism and, sometimes, suggestions for democratizing public institutions. Our organizations are first

worried about IGO accountability. The quest for a democratic alternative to neoliberal globalization is described as one of the key goals, and international economic organizations are denigrated as being antidemocratic. Even in the Catholic Pax Christi, which criticizes the serious involution of democracy that, from a participatory project of organizing social life according to the parameters of equality, free-dom, justice, international solidarity, and peace, is transforming itself more and more in a mechanism of competitive management of power, dominated by a utilitaristic logic, and subject to the dominion of the m, the critique of an involution of democratic politics is present.In reality, opinions toward the UN or the EU are particularly indicative of the drive toward democratizing while also strengthening the institutions of global governance. The international Reclaim our UN campaign, in particular, advocates reforming that organization based on the principles of multilateralism, international cooperation, strengthening of international law, establishment of democratic international institutions, subordination of IFIs to the UN, expansion of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, creation of an international judiciary police, and promotion of global citizenship with responsible participation of every person. If not all of our groups share this confidence in the reformability of the UN, there is a strong call for transnational economic process governance and a return to politics in opposition to the market's hegemony[7].

Similar to this, macroregional governance organizations, such as the EU, are seen as essential to limiting the harm caused by economic globalization. Due to the significant number of lobbyists working for corporate organizations, the EU is accused of defending the interests of companies. Brussels can vouch to that. Via Campesina suggests a multilayered action to encourage national governments and better IGOs, including the UN and some of its affiliated organizations, to reform their policies. After highlighting the lack of democracy in EU trade policymaking, the Seattle to Brussels Network calls on the EU to promote enhanced transparency and democratic par- ticipation and accountability in EU trade policymaking, including consultations with parliaments and civil society organizations. Additionally, groups criticize the 'democratic deficit' that is attributed to the absence of parliamentary oversight of the executive. ATTAC opposes the European Council, which was appointed by the governments of the Member States, among other things. can make orders that limit Member States. Because neither the national nor the European parliaments have control over the policy of competition in this area, the powerful are able to take advantage of the democratic deficit.

The creation of a democratic constitutive European process that starts from the peoples is one of the five primary goals of the Italian National Council of ATTAC Italia, which rejects the neoliberal process of a Europe of the powerful and the governments.Trade unions, in particular, have been making appeals to defend the European social model as an alternative to the American one. In contrast to a Europe of the market, of commerce, of the elites, of the governments, undemocratic, and subordinate to the US, ATTAC typically favors a social Europe, a Europe of civic and social rights for all inhabitants, a Europe of the people, and a Europe that fosters peace. The creation of a public space in Europe is the tool suggested. The Italian ATTAC declares that In the last two years a new public sphere has emerged in Europe. it has been promoted not by the consensus-catching sent by the commission to look for some dialogue with the civil society, but by the oppositional movements. This statement is made in criticism of the Convention for the Constitutional Treaty's failure to engage the civil society. However, it would be a mistake to look back and perpetuate the delusion that the national states are the stage on which the

movement can play out its democratic instances given the myopia of the European governments and their frequent factual complicity with imperial policies.

Similar to this, the Italian Consortium of Solidarity demands that the EU be democratically empowered and socially conscious through an inclusive and transparent constitutional process. In their demand for a Europe from, the International Consortium for Solidarity Italia emphasizes the centrality of democracy, rights, and social cohesion within the process of European unification. Rete Lilliput declares that the current Europe is not the Europe we want, while enumerating its qualities.

Even the most critical organizations demand for another Europe, showing that not just the more moderate organizations are interested in a European level. A radical, libertarian, transnationalist, antidystopian, open democratic space capable of opposing global bushism and oppressive, exploitative, power-mad, planetwrecking, warmongering neoliberalism in Europe and elsewhere is one of them, declares EuroMayDay. Europe's networkers and flexible employees, unite! There is genuine freedom in the world to be fought for.The lack of accountability for national government is also emphasized. The rising impact of IGOs on national decision-making is perceived as undermining national democracy, as is the lack of transparency and public accountability. For instance, Friends of the Earth stigmatizes the affiliations between businesses and political organizations, charging the latter with supporting and thus exerting influence over the former. The primary demand is for the establishment of a real, or participatory, democracy, including with reference to local and national political arenas.

An open inquiry on the organizations' views toward current trials with participatory public decision making leads to both openness to involvement with institutions and unhappiness with prior experiences. These projects, based on the idea that normal citizens should participate in public forums for discussion, have developed over the last 20 years, particularly at the municipal level, taking the shape of Citizens' Juries, Planungszellen, Consensus Conferences, Conferences de citoyens, and similar events. Social movement actors have been involved in the growth of some of these processes, sometimes as boosters, sometimes as adversaries from outside the movement. The participatory budget has been specifically attributed with creating a favorable environment for associational life, encouraging more activism, improved interconnection, and an orientation of associations toward the city.A significant portion of our sample showed curiosity in this area as well, along with some skepticism and criticism. Over one-third of the groups claimed that these participatory experiments improve the quality of political decisions, while 42.3% of the groups had not discussed this issue or had no clear position on it. the remaining roughly one-fifth were skeptics.

When asked to qualify their opinions of public decision-making experiments, nearly one-fifth of the groups discussed benefits and risks, roughly half highlighted the positive aspects, and nearly one-third highlighted the experiments' negative aspects, which show up on both the input and output sides of the decision-making process. An interest in institutional politics is evident in the replies, even when it is paired with substantial suspicion of the established institutions.Participants are one of the key components of our plan, according to people who support these trials, so they resonate with their own values. Participatory research is promoted as one of our means of action as we push for more civil society dialogues. We advocate for the revitalization of decision-making processes as a method to stimulate civic responsibility and as one of the political ideals we work to advance, we also keep an eye on how well participation is

put into effect. Numerous organizations emphasize their support for democratic participation and greater participation of citizens and their groups in democracy, beyond voting.

Since participation is a fundamental element of democracy, participatory instruments are fundamental even if they are often used to gain consensus, and allow for the full expression of citizenship, more politically inclined organizations especially value the legitimating potential of this type of experiment. Given the crises of representative institutions, participatory experiments are seen as being even more crucial in this regard. The institutional involvement experiments are encouraged since they both signal a crisis of conventional politics and point towards the right route for resolving it. Since the gap between social dynamics and their institutional representation widens as systemic complexity grows, permanent engagement of citizens is fundamental. Participatory democracy brings citizens closer to politics and introduces an element of transparency in the decision-making, which increases institutional accountability[8].

The benefits of participatory choices on the output side are emphasized more by NGOs and nonprofit organizations active in the field. Participation improves choices by making them more equitable, giving decision-makers greater information, and ensuring the involvement of the grassroots, since international cooperation should also actively involve the popula- tion on which it focuses. Participatory decision-making enables better acknowledgment of the field reality, a better understanding of the complex reality, and a bridging of traditional political gaps, while its transparency allows catching ideas and problems of citizens, as If decisions are public and transparent their quality improves. Transparency is often cited as being essential to public control of democracy.The cognitive enrichment that comes from participation is also addressed. Participatory experiments, according to a spokesperson of the network Campagna Banche Armate, which campaigns against the purchase of weapons, help creating a civil society that can pressure politicians toward the public good and produce a better political elite. The importance of local knowledge is emphasized in this passage because decisions improve through proposals and ideas coming from concrete experiences of movements and the civil society.

Some interviewees also emphasize the importance of discussion in general, stating that the contrast of ideas always results in a change, even small, of the initial positions. participatory processes aid in the discovery of solidaristic solutions. Participatory experiments involve the acceptance of each person's dignity, especially but not only for religious organizations. Therefore, the Hermanidad Obrera de Acción Católica representative from Spain supports inclusive public decision-making because we assign a fundamental value to personal dignity, which has to be considered as the beginning and the end of all social, political, and labor action. The process of engaging more responsibility among those who are involved and more sharing of the decisions has a good impact on individuals.Participatory democracy attempts are not only opposed in theory but also critiqued for their shoddy execution. Many respondents clarify their views on participatory experiments by highlighting various institutional models. The truth is that not all public decisional processes promoted by institutions produced a real improvement of the quality of political decisions, and in some cases there is the possibility of institutional changes, in others not. As a result, participation experiments are split into real and fake ones. We support these procedures provided they are genuine and not manufactured, says the Attac Italia official.

Bottom up experiments represent the majority of real experiments. One of the creators of the Rete Nuovo Municipio, which encourages participatory experiments, a representative of the weekly Carta, says they prefer when these initiatives are promoted directly by the citizens. The

Abruzzo Social Forum spokesperson echoed this sentiment, saying, We attempted to participate in them, but they became places for specialists since a task of true marketing is lacking. It is challenging for them to be successful when they don't originate from.In reality, the'real involvement' limitations of these trials are often brought out. Criticism groups highlight the shortcomings of public participation, saying things like, We are very sceptical on participatory budget: in Porto Alegre only 1.5% of the population were involved. Additionally,'real' experiments are ones in which judgments made in interactive venues are implemented, or count, as part of the experiment. Many people worry that the most conventional processes hack at the branches and don't get at the roots of challenging the laws governing property rights, corporate hegemony, and the debt-based interest-bearing monetary system, in the words of the representative of the British organization Global Justice Movement. Even the Rete Noglobal, which organizes groups around the youth centers that have been set up in squats, announces its willingness to participatebut only when it is not a rhetorical artifact and when citizens can make decisions on significant resource. The majority of criticism is related to a perceived lack of tangible results, which characterizes participation as often placebo politics or a smokescreen and a simulacrum of democracy since decisions are taken without taking into consideration the views voiced by these groups. Therefore, street mobilization and these bodies' empowerment are related. Participation in these processes is also accompanied by a concern of co-optation since it is labeled as PR for governments at the cost of the activists or as a co-optation trap that runs the danger of too strong a bond with established structures[9].

CONCLUSION

Furthermore, it has provided useful advice for social movements looking to interact with multilevel governance as well as for policymakers looking to interact with social movements. These suggestions stress the need of clear and open governance procedures, the value of and need for appreciating all viewpoints and experiences, and the necessity of continual communication and cooperation between social movements and decision-makers. The study underlines social movements' ability to support more democratic, inclusive, and successful multilevel government in its entirety. It emphasizes the need of appreciating and acknowledging the influence of social movements on governance procedures and results, as well as the necessity of continual communication and cooperation between social movements and decision-makers. We can build a more fair, egalitarian, and sustainable world.

REFERENCES:

[1] M. Pelling, C. High, J. Dearing, and D. Smith, ‘Shadow spaces for social learning: A relational understanding of adaptive capacity to climate change within organisations’, *Environ. Plan. A*, 2008, doi: 10.1068/a39148.

[2] M. Holden, ‘Sustainability indicator systems within urban governance: Usability analysis of sustainability indicator systems as boundary objects’, *Ecol. Indic.*, 2013, doi: 10.1016/j.ecolind.2013.03.007.

[3] E. U. Petersmann, ‘Methodology problems in international economic law and adjudication’, *Jindal Glob. Law Rev.*, 2016, doi: 10.1007/s41020-016-0033-8.

[4] *Qualities of food*. 2004. doi: 10.9760/mupoa/9780719068546.

[5] T. Aguilera, 'Comment on loris caruso/1: Beyond the emergence of social movements and political opportunity structures. Studying the consequences of protests on public policies', *Sociologica*. 2015. doi: 10.2383/82472.

[6] A. Giorgi and E. Polizzi, 'Communion and Liberation: a Catholic movement in a multilevel governance perspective', *Relig. State Soc.*, 2015, doi: 10.1080/09637494.2015.1062600.

[7] G. Teil and A. Hennion, 'Discovering quality or performing taste?', in *Qualities of food*, 2018. doi: 10.7765/9781526137609.00008.

[8] G. Teil and A. Hennion, 'Discovering quality or performing taste? A sociology of the amateur', in *Qualities of food*, 2004.

[9] U. Carlsson, 'The rise and fall of NWICO: From a vision of international regulation to a reality of multilevel governance', *Nord. Rev.*, 2003.

CHAPTER 8

EXPLAINING ATTITUDES TOWARDS INSTITUTIONS

Bishnanand Dubey, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Emaild Id:- bishu.dubey@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

It aims to explore the factors that shape attitudes towards institutions. Drawing on a range of theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence, the paper argues that attitudes towards institutions are shaped by a complex interplay of individual and structural factors.The identifies a range of individual-level factors that influence attitudes towards institutions, including values, beliefs, interests, and experiences. These factors shape individuals' perceptions of institutions and their role in society, and influence their level of trust, legitimacy, and engagement with institutions.

KEYWORDS:

Attitudes, Democracy, Institutional Trust, Legitimacy, Political Participation, Socialization.

INTRODUCTION

Both datasets revealed a range of attitudes toward collaboration with institutions within the same movement, within the mentioned general openness to interactions with institutions but also mistrust. Even though only a small number of organizations reject interactions with institutions, there are differing views on the value of such a partnership. Some of our organizations encourage participatory democracy initiatives, while others view them with skepticism. What justifies these variations? Following previous research, I first examine environmental factors before concentrating on the structural and cultural internal traits that the literature on Social Movement Organizations has regarded to be pertinent for tactical decisions of this kind.

Environment-Related Factors

Environment has an obvious impact on organizations. Social movements are not created outside of the traditions and institutional bases of the larger society in which they are nested, said Zald and McCarthy. Instead, the cadre and networks of supporters and activists develop from, expand upon, and make use of the action repertoires, institutional structures, and physical infrastructure of the greater society. The environment may impose, approve, encourage, acquire, imprint, integrate, or circumvent organizational structures. Insofar as the greater the extent to which the organizations in a field transact with agencies of the state, the greater the extent of iso- morphism in the field as a whole, dependence on state agencies would increase pressure for isomorphism.The organizational structure of organizations seeking to take advantage of these opportunities is influenced by the rules controlling eligibility for public and private financing, tax exemptions, or preferential postal rates[1]. Even though adherence to such incentives is optional, a tangle of incentives favors some organizational forms over others. This is according to Debra C. Minkoff, who argues that resources and institutional dependencies fundamentally shape

movement development, as do competitive pressures that determine processes of organizational founding, survival, and change.

There is a common belief that social movement groups work more cooperatively the more inclusive the political system. We cannot, however, generalize the claim that formal organizations will automatically be favorably incorporated into an open institutional structure that provides resources to citizens' groups. First of all, formal hierarchical structures have often been constructed to more effectively counter an adversarial governmental apparatus. On the other hand, movement organizations may benefit from comparable tendencies toward decentralization and informality under an open, decentralized political system. It has been acknowledged that several organizational forms may be accommodated within the same system, as opposed to supposing a fixed link between the shape activists give to their groups and the features of the institutional system in which they function. This highlights the flexibility social movement actors have when seeking to creatively adapt to their surroundings rather of having their actions dictated by them, even if these flexibility margins are constrained by historically defined organizational format repertoires[2].

Although not always in the expected ways, our data do indicate country differences. In the Swiss instance, as well as in the French and British samples, organizations more often indicate their rejection of partnerships with institutions in their foundational documents. Attitudes of collaboration are more prevalent at the international level and in Switzerland, where institutional control is also often discussed. In Spain and Italy, the topic of democratic control is less commonly brought up. With the exception of Spain, democratic control and cooperation with local authorities appear to be the most common attitudes toward international organizations. Differences across countries may be seen in the interviews when it comes to relationships with institutions. Collaborations with international governmental agencies are common, although those with Spanish and Swiss organizationsmost of which operate locallyare less common.

For the Spanish and British samples, the refusal to cooperate rises to about one-fourth. While critical/selective collaboration is especially common among French, German, British, and transnational groups, unconditioned collaboration affects up to 39% of Swiss and 52% of transnational organizations. In terms of the interaction with national institutions, we found that the Spanish sample had a lower rate. French, German, and British respondents indicated selective cooperation most often. and Swiss and transnational groups utilized unconditioned collaboration with institutions the most frequently. Regarding local institutions, German, Spanish, and British groups mention refusal of collaboration more frequently. French, German, and Italian groups frequently mention selective collaboration. and Switzerland and Italy, once again, specifically mention unconstrained collaboration.Despite the fact that our sampling strategy makes it impossible for us to assess the representativeness of our groups, we can nonetheless state that across all of our countries, we observe a range of attitudes toward authorities that motivate the search for explanations based on the internal characteristics of our groups.

DISCUSSION

Movement Organizational Structures

Resources in social movement groups come in a variety of sizes and forms. As defined as the organization's financial and human resources as well as the administrative knowledge and capabilities to implement procedures and programs relevant to movement-related goals, various

SMOs have varied organizational capacity. Organizational resources have often been linked to organizational ideas of democracy. The creation of formalized models is supposed to be enabled by the availability of resources. on the other hand, bureaucratization and centralization are predicted to make fundraising easier. On the other hand, informal SMOs are considered to enhance participatory democracy via reasoned arguments followed by group decisions since they are based on face-to-face contact among individuals who know each other intimately. In general, it has been thought that formalization and the availability of resources would make it more likely for SMOs to work with public institutions. The co-optation of economic interest groups in public settings at the national level, when these organizations are more resourceful, well-organized, and professionalized, has already been shown in study on industrial relations. Relations with labor movement groups had a tendency to spread to new movements that were integrated into public decision-making venues, particularly in neocorporatist nations. This incorporation coincided with trends toward professionalization, organizational structuration, and rising resource levels. Our findings supports the idea that certain organizational structure traits have a strong capacity for explaining interactions with institutions[3].

Our study shows a significant correlation between certain organizational traits and the views regarding institutions that emerge from basic texts. The correlation coefficients between a few organizational structure indicators and statements about cooperation, control, or rejection of involvement with any of the indicated institutions. Indicators of organizational structuring, such as the presence of structural accountability and participation, reduce the likelihood of mentioning rejection of relationships with institutions and increase the likelihood of mentioning collaboration with institutions at all levels. At the same time and in a similar manner, organizations that are more structured and have larger geographical levels of contact are more likely to favor collaborative ties and democratic control. Similar to this, the likelihood that a relationship of collaborative control with institutions is mentioned rises with the availability of organizational resources in the form of substantial individual membership.

Although there is some differentiation for the various levels and forms of collaboration, the data from interviews demonstrate similar relationships between organizational structure characteristics and attitudes toward institutions. First off, there is a strong and significant association between organizational resource indicators and relationships with IGOs, national, and local institutions, including membership numbers, volunteerism, and budget size. An sign of professionalization, such as the existence of paid personnel, and the previously described measures of interaction with institutions, show a comparable and equally high link. Correlation coefficients are also higher when dealing with relationships with IGOs than when dealing with local governments, which are more likely to be governed by party friends. Crossing relationships with institutions and organizational forms, at all three levels of governance, collaboration with restrictions emerged more frequently among NGOs and formal SMOs. refusal emerged more frequently among grass-roots SMOs. and collaboration with unions and modern networks.

Some internal decision-making characteristics of the organization have an impact on relationships with institutions. Our internal democracy typology was found to be helpful in describing how the institutions in both datasets related to one another. Organizations belonging to the associational and deliberative representative models tend to more frequently mention collaboration and democratic control, while groups located in either the deliberative representative, deliberative participative, or assemblea tend to more frequently mention refusal. This is based on the organizational ideology as expressed in fundamental documents. When

examining the attitudes toward local, national, and international institutions separately, similar pictures came into focus.

cooperation with international institutions is more likely to happen for less participative organizations, according to our interviews, and this is especially true of cooperation with international and then national institutions. The main body's use of a consensus-based decision-making mechanism also tends to inhibit cooperation at these two levels. More generally, the democratic model, which affects relationships at all three levels, is responsible for this. The same kind of facilitation of cooperation is seen when an executive committee is present.We may draw the conclusion that decisions made on internal organizational structure, or at least structural traits of SMOs, and their attitudes and behaviors toward institutions, are strictly correlated. This is especially true on a global scale, where cooperation is far more probable the more organized, qualified, and resourceful an organization is. Particularly, the decision to cooperate with institutions is discouraged the more organizations adopt participatory and deliberative decision making[4].

Rhythmic Themes

While some approaches have connected decisions about how to interact with institutions to organizational resources, others have looked at cultural factors, suggesting that in social movement organizations, decisions about organizational strategies are made more in light of their symbolic appropriateness than their efficiency or efficacy. In general, decisions on how to interact with institutions are not just strategically motivated but also heavily influenced by identity issues. The labor movement has always been split between reformist and revolutionary factions based on how they feel about the state. In more recent times, it has been said that certain movements have a tendency to concentrate on identity construction while others have a more instrumental orientation towards authority.We categorized democratic ideals on internal decision-making as well as more generally in our collection of organizational papers. First, we compared organizational values regarding democracy with attitudes toward institutions as expressed in fundamental documents. The same connections occur at the expected territorial levels, while they are weaker at the local level.

Values and organizational areas seem to be related. In terms of movement areas with relationships to institutions, cooperative attitudes are more prevalent among the Old Left, new social movements, and solidarity/peace groups, but they are less prevalent among the New Left/anarchists as well as the new global organizations. Parallel to this, the remaining two sectors have greater resistance to cooperation, with democratic power evenly distributed across groups. The interviews reveal similar relationships, with NSM and solidarity organizations more focused on working with both IGOs and national institutions. Groups in the new global region more often show themselves as critical collaborators, whilst the New Left and anarchists more frequently voice rejection. Locally, these disparities are less significant.Parties and NGOs/formal SMOs indicate a larger tendency towards cooperation, however with statistical significance above 0.05, while informal SMOs and contemporary networks are more critical. Over all organizational forms, attitudes toward democratic control are more evenly distributed[5].With a Cramer's V coefficient of 0. 230 for the mention of collaboration, our data on organizational documents show that cooperation tends to rise with the age of the organization. With values of, respectively, 0. 242, 0. 266 and 0. 181 for cooperation with international, national, and local entities, the connections become even stronger in the database of the interviews. These findings seem to

point to some moderation with age, or at the very least, a more critical attitude on the part of younger organizations.

Final Thoughts on Institutions and Movements

Our study does not support the notion that anti-political social movement groups are envious of their independence. First of all, it became clear that our groups were mostly receptive to relationships with institutions, although critically and selectively. They really support another politics and are devoted to politics. Even though our sampling method may have included more organizations with institutional ties, we can still conclude that a sizable portion of the most pertinent and visible organizations in the GJM's primary intervention areas are actually very interested in communicating with policymakers in a variety of ways. The GJM itself symbolizes, to some degree, a time of repoliticization of the civil society groups. Many NGOs, culturally-oriented groups, trade unions, and voluntary associations began to bridge their frames and competences and to target the institutions of multilevel governance after becoming disenchanted with the meager results produced by the type of division of labor between political and social actors that had developed in the 1980s and 1990s.

In addition to interacting with institutions, the vast majority of our organizations also address them at various geographical levels of administration. As with national and transnational SMOs, local-level organizations frequently declare interactions with other territorial levels. Street protests and even personal reform initiatives do not exclude discussion of politics and public policy formulation. In reality, the GJM professes interest in the creation of governance institutions at different territorial levels since it advocates a return of the state against the market. In particular, there are significant calls for alternative institutions and policies as a result of the stigmatization of the democratic deficit in the operation of international governmental organizations. In this way, our groups support a global democracy that can control economic globalization rather than a return to nation-state sovereignty. In this view, paying attention to the transnational level is crucial because, although being very difficult, developing a democracy from the bottom up at the global level is seen as important.

This is especially true in regards to the EU, as the majority of groups harshly condemn the organization's real policies and politics while also highlighting the need of democratic European institutions and a social Europe. Sometimes considered to be among the most vociferous supporters of an identitarian vision of European integration, civil society organizations have also been among its most vocal detractors.A no vote was strongly promoted by several social movement groups during the French referendum campaign on the Constitutional Treaty. Recent studies have questioned whether these organizations and activists should be classified as euro-sceptics, instead suggesting that they should be called critical Europeanists, who are not opposed to more support for European institutions in principle but are unhappy with its current politics and policies. This framework criticizes the current Europe of the market for promoting neoliberal policies and calls for an alternative social Europe. Our movement groups have internal disagreements, but they don't seem to want a return to the nation-state's exclusive dominance. instead, they are constructing a process of Europeanization from, which involves the creation of European identities and organizational networks. Support and opposition often pertain to the integration process's shape and substance as well as to the process itself. The 'war over Europe' has really been symbolically linked with other concerns as the argument over it has heated up, adding new cleavages on top of the original geographical ones.

This interest in politics and policies does not preclude a lack of faith in institutions and apprehension about being co-opted. Although working with institutions is frequently acceptable, our organizations typically assign themselves a role that centers on democratic control. In actuality, collaboration is characterized as critical and selective. Participation is emphasized as a core virtue under this idea of democratic governance, but it is also paired with a defense of the civil society's independence from the state. First and foremost, democratic decision-making should be open to the public and transparent. Public institutions should make more and more opportunities for citizen engagement available in order to be accountable. Most often, mistrust in public institutions is expressed as a result of personal experiences rather than general principles.

But the internal diversity of our GJM organizations' attitudes and behaviors toward institutions also became apparent. In our study, we examined both external and internal environmental factors, concentrating on how they affected people's perceptions about institutions. Instead of addressing them as competing theories, we examined how each one affected our dependent variable according to how it was operationalized in the organizational foundational documents.Contextual factors first became prominent, but association patterns were difficult to use to support the idea that more cooperative SMOs are found in inclusive and consensual nations, while more rebellious ones are found in exclusive and violent ones. In actuality, the level of variety inside each nation was more important. Particularly throughout the era of our groups' formation, contextual influences are filtered via a kind of imprinting.

Instead, our analysis shows that some structural organizational characteristics have a very high explanatory power, enabling us to distinguish between two main organizational constellations. The resources, organizational excellence, professionalism, and membership of the entities that are more receptive to cooperation are often greater. The less important ones, however, are tiny, underfunded, volunteer, and grassroots organizations. When dealing with international institutions instead than local ones, this is much truer.This does not imply, however, that views toward institutions are always determined by the kind of resources that are accessible. Not only is the causal chain unclear, but views toward institutions also seem to be a component of larger identities that include wider ideals. According to this perspective, the more a group emphasizes the democratic norms of debate and participation, the more critical they are of the institutions that they see as not upholding those values. Organizations linked more with control than with rejecting relationships with institutions—which instead strengthens anti-capitalist valuesdeveloped, in particular those that arose within the Global Justice Movement and those that took a unique network structure. In reality, a group's 'generation' has an impact on how they feel about institutions. Younger organizations were up as being particularly important to their partnership[6].

Global Justice Movement: Structure and Culture

Social movement organizations differ significantly in how they make decisions, as do democratic ideas and practices more broadly. This article examines potential reasons for the variations in internal decision-making seen across Global Justice Movement groups. Indeed, there are significant differences in how various democratic models are adopted by the study's included organizations. The last column of this indicates that the associational model is the most prevalent, followed by the two deliberative models and, lagging far behind, the assembleary model, based on data derived from the organizations' online and offline documents as well as from a structured questionnaire submitted to them. Therefore, deliberation is the preferred

method of decision-making for half of the organizations, and the deliberative participative model is used by about one-fourth of them.The also demonstrates how different democratic models are used in various nations, particularly the deliberative participative form. All nations, with the exception of Spain, favor the associational model above the deliberative participatory one. Comparatively speaking, the latter approach is much less common in France, Germany, and Switzerland than in the other nations, including Spain. While these variations are undoubtedly attributable in part to our sampling criteria, they may also be attributable to the movement's greater sensitivity to participatory and deliberative democracy in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in Britain. However, since no discernible pattern appears, it is difficult to interpret them as the result of variations in national political opportunity structures.

In our analysis, we will add a more aggregated measure of nation variation based on Lijphart's typology of democratic systems, specifically his contrast between majoritarian and consensual democracies, in order to study this issue.The major goal of this, however, is not to explain why different democratic or decision-making models are adopted differently across different countries. Instead, we look at key structural and cultural factors that influence whether or not organizations involved in the movement adopt a deliberative participatory form. The deliberative participatory model, which is often emphasized in the vocabulary of the Global Justice Movement, is the area in which we concentrate more intently. This democratic model best exemplifies the threat to established forms of representational democracy because it places a strong focus on the value of agreement and widespread involvement in democratic processes. Indeed, the GJM's core values include participation and consensus[7].

We put out a number of hypotheses on the effects of three structural elements related to the organizational internal structure and three cultural factors related to the tradition of conflict that serves as the foundation for their mobilization. We also take into account the larger institutional context of the nation where the organizations are headquartered. The findings of two different types of analysis on a combined sample of organizations from the study's six participating nations are used to challenge these assumptions. To determine which organizational characteristics are influential and to determine their relative weight, we first conduct a logistic regression. Second, we investigate numerous and conjunctural impacts using qualitative comparative analysis. However, before we discuss the analyses' findings, we need to go into more detail about our theoretical predictions and how they were operationalized[8].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion,the influences on attitudes toward institutions have been examined. According to the argument made by, attitudes about institutions are influenced by a complex interaction of structural and human elements, including values, beliefs, interests, and experiences, as well as institutional design and performance, political and economic environment, and larger cultural and social influences. In order to fully understand attitudes toward institutions, it is important to use a holistic approach that considers both individual and structural elements as well as their intricate interactions. This strategy is crucial for scholars who want to comprehend the processes of institutional change and stability as well as for policymakers and practitioners who want to foster confidence, legitimacy, and engagement with institutions

.

REFERENCES:

[1] S. O. Ogundoyin and I. A. Kamil, 'A trust management system for fog computing services', *Internet of Things (Netherlands)*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.iot.2021.100382.

[2] J. Costa-Font and F. Cowell, 'Social identity and redistributive preferences: A survey', *J. Econ. Surv.*, 2015, doi: 10.1111/joes.12061.

[3] F. Giavazzi, F. Schiantarelli, and M. Serafinelli, 'Culture, Policies and Labor Market Outcomes', *SSRN Electron. J.*, 2021, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1506310.

[4] Z. Y. Liu, N. Spitsyna, S. Zubanova, and A. Vekilova, 'Using internet resources for remote language learning', *Int. J. Emerg. Technol. Learn.*, 2020, doi: 10.3991/ijet.v15i13.14653.

[5] J. Anderson and A. Lightfoot, 'Translingual practices in English classrooms in India: current perceptions and future possibilities', *Int. J. Biling. Educ. Biling.*, 2021, doi: 10.1080/13670050.2018.1548558.

[6] M. Dash, P. B. Bhusan, and S. Samal, 'Determinants of customers' adoption of mobile banking: An empirical study by integrating diffusion of innovation with attitude', *J. Internet Bank. Commer.*, 2014.

[7] M. S. Agir, 'The Effect of Perceived Teacher Behaviors on Students' Self-Esteem and Attitudes Towards Learning', *J. Educ. Learn.*, 2019, doi: 10.5539/jel.v8n5p203.

[8] G. P. Soriano, 'Psychometric Properties of "Attitude towards e-Learning Scale" among Nursing Students', *Int. J. Educ. Sci.*, 2020, doi: 10.31901/24566322.2020/30.1-3.1135.

CHAPTER 9

STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Praveen Kumar Mall, Associate Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Email Id:- drpraveenmall@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

It aims to explore the structural and cultural determinants of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy is an approach to democratic decision-making that emphasizes the importance of dialogue, deliberation, and public reasoning. The paper argues that the success of deliberative democracy depends on a range of structural and cultural factors. It explores the structural determinants of deliberative democracy, including institutional design, decision-making processes, and participation mechanisms. These factors can enable or constrain deliberation and shape the outcomes of deliberative processes.The cultural determinants of deliberative democracy, including norms and values around participation, trust, and dialogue. These cultural factors can influence the level of engagement and participation in deliberative processes, as well as the quality and inclusiveness of dialogue.

KEYWORDS:

Civil Society, Culture, Deliberative, Democracy, Institutional Design.

INTRODUCTION

Our goal is to explain the democratic methods used in the Global Justice Movement's decision-making processes, not only to describe them. We concentrate on internal factors, both institutional and cultural, that contributed to our sample's acceptance of the deliberative participatory form of democracy. We focus on the effects of the groups' internal structure and the heritage of conflict that underpins their political mobilization. We put up a theory regarding how each factor would affect democratic models, particularly the deliberative participatory model. But rather than being in a confirmatory mode, we are in an exploratory one. As a result, rather than serving as predictions to be checked against actual data, these hypotheses are meant to serve as a tool to direct the investigation.The first two factors deal with how organizations are internally structured. Resource mobilization theory has placed a focus on these elements while studying social movements. According to this idea, the availability of resources and the degree of internal organization within social movements are essential for the creation and activation of movements. The internal structure of the organizations affects how they evolve through time. Kriesi proposes four aspects, such as organizational growth and decline, internal structuring, external structuring, and goal orientations and action repertoires, for the examination of organizational development. Here, we concentrate on internal structuring, which is the second factor. We focus on the effects of two indicators: size and formalization level.

The key concern is whether the internal structure of the organizations can be credibly connected to the democratic form of decision-making that they use, particularly the deliberative

participative model. We propose that the deliberative participative model will be more prevalent in organizations with a lower level of formalization. Contrarily, organizations that are more structured have a tendency to give the most crucial choices to a select few leaders. This is partially attributable to the fact that these companies are more professionally oriented and, as a result, have a limited, competent committee to make and carry out decisions. As a result, established organizations would favor majority vote over discussion and representation above participation. A lesser level of formalization is also likely to be associated with a consensus rule of decision-making as opposed to a majority rule, which more accurately represents the practices of a professional board and formal organizations in general. We anticipate organizations with a lesser level of internal structure to embrace a deliberative participatory form of democracy if we combine the two elements.

The same logic may be used to determine organizational size. Again, for pragmatic reasons, it stands to reason that larger organizations would be less likely than smaller ones to favor consensus over delegation of authority in the decision-making body. In larger groups, it is more difficult to achieve participation and deliberation. Smaller organizations should thus adhere to the deliberative participatory democratic paradigm.Size and formalization level are internal organizational characteristics, strictly speaking. The geographical reach of the organizations is a third factor that may be seen as being a component of the internal structure of the organizations. Organizations having an international or transnational reach are distinguished from those with a purely domestic focus in this section. One could argue that domestic organizations are more likely to adopt the deliberative participative model because they can afford to be more open to participation and deliberation to the extent that they have a more limited reach, even though it is more difficult to advance a clear-cut hypothesis for this aspect. Contrarily, since they are more complicated, international organizations need more efficient decision-making processes, which can only be provided by a high level of delegation and a majority rule.

Furthermore, achieving consensus and widespread participation is made more challenging by the multilevel game implied by involvement on both the domestic and the inter- national/transnational levels[1].The first three components are all structural requirements for the democratic models that organizations have chosen to use, but the latter two may be seen as cultural requirements since they speak to their cultural origins. The importance of social and cultural divisions in the creation and mobilization of social movements has been emphasized by social movement scholars, particularly those from the European tradition. Many people have emphasized how the newer social movements differ from older movements, most notably the labor movement, in terms of their cultural foundations. Others have examined the socioeconomic foundations of the new social movements, contending that they represent a struggle within the new middle class and that this conflict is primarily the basis of their ability to mobilize people. According to this viewpoint, the structural and cultural changes that have marked the postwar development of the European nations are the primary sources of the new social movements.

Here, we use this line of thinking to look at how the movement area that the organizations under study are a part of affects their tendency to adhere to a certain democratic model. This allows us to gauge how the companies' deeper cultural divisions have affected their overall position. In this sense, we might speculate that organizations that represent the cultural cleav- age reflected by the new social movements should have a greater propensity to embrace a participatory and deliberative form of decision-making.

The'softer' approaches to making choices that are promoted by the new social movements include participation by members of civil society. As a consequence, we could anticipate that they'll be more inclined to agree that consensus should be used more often and with less delegation to reach decisions. Organizations that do not follow this legacy of conflict, however, should place greater emphasis on delegation and majority rule when making decisions. This ought to be especially true for conventional parties and unions, which favor representation above participation and are often less likely to look for agreement.The extent to which people identify with the Global Justice Movement also trends in the similar way. An organization may be considered to share the movement's ideals and claims to a greater or lesser extent. As a result, we might anticipate that groups that exhibit a high degree of identification will be more likely to embrace a deliberative participatory form of democracy since they will be more inclined to value participation and consensus inside their own organization.

We also take a look at the organizations' founding years. This is done to gauge the historical era in which the organizations first appeared. Although this topic has not received as much attention in the literature on social movements, we believe it will likely have an impact on the traits of the organizations under investigation and, most importantly, their conceptions of democracy. We make a distinction between businesses established before 1989 and those established after 1989. This year marks a turning point in both the history of political conflict and that of Europe. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, organizations and movements encountered a very different environment that was less constrained by ideological cleavages and more willing to cooperate across those cleavages. What we now refer to as the Global Justice Movement is considered to have originated around that period, which is very significant for our current goal. We believe that more recent organizations will be more likely to embrace a deliberative participatory form of democracy. These are the groups that emerged during the GJM-led wave of protest. Since this movement emphasizes the need for an inclusive and open democracy, we can anticipate that the organizations that make up its foundation will adopt this understanding of democracy in their daily operations[2], [3].

DISCUSSION

Finally, we use a variable that is related to the larger institutional context of the nation where the organizations are situated to control our findings. We specifically aim to determine if variations in the nation's democracy may account for why certain organizations are more likely than others to adopt more deliberative methods. This is accomplished by using Lijphart's well-known typology of democratic systems, which differentiates between majoritarian and consensual democracies. France and particularly Britain are instances of majoritarian democracies among the nations in our analysis, while Germany and particularly Switzerland are examples of consensual democracies. We may add mixed instances, intermediate circumstances in which the nation has a high score on the executive-parties dimension and a low score on the federal-unitary dimension, or vice versa, to these two pure varieties. This is the situation for Spain and Italy according to our statistics. The rationale behind the use of this typology is that given that the larger institutional environment is already receptive to inclusive, consensual, and horizontal forms of governance, we may expect organizations coming from consensual democracies to be more inclined to adopt a deliberative participative decision-making model. However, given that they are situated in more exclusive, unitarian, and vertical systems, organizations from majoritarian democracies are predicted to be less likely to adhere to this democratic model. Organizations in mixed democracies need to occupy a middle ground.

We have put up a variety of theories on the circumstances under which an organization may decide to use a deliberative participatory form of democracy for internal decision-making. We specifically anticipate that newly founded, smaller organizations with a low level of formalization, a domestic territorial focus, a position close to the cultural cleft reflected by the new social movements, and strong identification with the GJM will embrace such a democratic model. Additionally, we anticipate that organizations with a consensual political system will be more likely to adhere to the deliberative participatory model than those with a majoritarian political system.We may first confront these assumptions with the available actual data using a multivariate regression analysis. However, unlike a more conventional statistical approach, our analysis does not just look for the net effect of each of the five variables under control of the others or just attempt to address these hypotheses separately. We are also interested in learning more about the combinations of factors that influence companies' decisions to favor consensus and internal engagement. In doing so, we go beyond a linear and additive logic to explain democratic models in the GJM and adopt an approach that enables us to recognize potential combinations of circumstances that could influence a decision to choose a certain democratic model as well as many avenues that might lead to such a decision. For investigating such numerous conjunctural causality, QCA is very well suited.

Data and Techniques

A standardized questionnaire that was sent to a sample of groups involved in the Global Justice Movement in each of the six nations was used to gather the data. We only employed 168 of the 225 firms in our sample for our empirical studies. We need non-missing data for each variable in order to properly apply the QCA. Organizations are left out of the assessments since this is not the case. Even if there are a lot of examples that are lost, our analysis shouldn't be harmed by this. First off, 225 organizations made up our first sample, which is not thought to be statistically representative. Even if the omitted instances are not distributed randomly across the variables, this is not statistically significant for our study. Second, and perhaps most significantly, the missing instances are spread at random among the primary variables. Therefore, we can assume that the removal of the missing cases has no impact on the general significance of specific types of organizations.As was previously said, our model has seven explanatory variables. The majority of them are just immediately operationalized using the information from the structured questionnaire. But there was too much data missing for some variables. Missing values were supplemented using information from other variables or using information found in the papers supplied by the organizations in order to avoid omitting too many instances. The operationalization of the variables used in the study is then presented, beginning with the dependent variable.

Democratized Forms

We used both the information from the structured questionnaire and the information derived from the organizations' internal documents, starting from the former and retrieving missing information from the latter, to categorize the chosen organizations according to the typology of democratic models. This made it feasible for us to include as many examples as we could into the study. A complicated operationalization including a variety of variables is the foundation for the classification of a particular organization as assembleary, associational, deliberative representative, or deliberative participative, which enables us to categorize the organization on the two dimensions of the typology.

Formalization level

We considered three factors while developing the measure for the organization's level of formalization: the number of the staff, the organization's budget, and the presence of a membership card. First, dummy variables were created for each of the three factors with the following values: a paid staff of more than 30, a budget of more than 10,000 euros, and the presence of a membership card. The criterion for paid employees and the budget was determined by the median value for each factor. The three indicators were then combined to form an additive index. Finally, a fake variable was created from the index that was so retrieved.

Size

The number of individual members was used as a variable to calculate the organization's size. The organization is regarded as big if the number of members exceeds the median value. Two variables were created based on the information retrieved from the documents produced by asking for information directly from the organizationsone measuring the number of individual members and another measuring the number of collective members. When available, missing information on this variable was replaced by a variable measuring the number of people participating in the assembly. This was carried out in 123 instances.

Territorial Horizon

The top tier of the organization's campaigns operationalized its geographical reach. For the latter, a direct inquiry was used to determine the highest geographical level of the campaigns the organization often runs. We made a distinction between the national level and the global or transnational level. If available, missing data on this category was replaced for 101 instances by a variable that asked if the organization had any kind of partnership with foreign entities.

Move-Around Area

We utilized a variable that categorizes the organizations based on several sources to quantify the organization's affiliation with a certain movement area. This variable makes distinctions across six key categories, including the New Left, the Old Left, anarchist, autonomy, new social movements, solidarity, peace, and human rights, as well as other topics. By combining the third, fourth, and fifth categorieswhich we believe to be part of the same larger category we might refer to as new social global movementsinstead of all the other categories, we were able to establish a dummy variable[4].By utilizing 1989 as a threshold, the year the organization was founded was operationalized in a straightforward way. Organizations established before 1989, which is seen as a turning point in the history of conflict in Europe and in current history in general, are referred to as old, and those established after 1989 are referred to as new.

Support for the Global Justice Movement

The issue of whether the group sees itself as a part of the larger movement served as the operationalization of the variable assessing the organization's level of identification with the Global Justice Movement. For 83 instances, missing data on this variable was replaced, where available, with data indicating whether the organization actively participated in events covered by the GJM.

Democracy Type

Lijphart's difference between majoritarian and consensual democracies operationalizes variations in the institutional environments in which the organizations are placed. According to him, nations may be categorized using a two-dimensional map that is constructed using the executive-parties and federal-unitary axes. To categorize our nations into one of these two groups, we utilized the ratings he determined for each nation in his research based on these two aspects. As a result, Germany and Switzerland are regarded as consensual democracies, Italy and Spain as mixed examples, and Britain and France as majoritarian democracies.Our studies are conducted on what is frequently referred to as a medium-sized sample, hence we use logistic regression and QCA to test our hypotheses. We can estimate the relative importance of each explanatory factor on the democratic model that the organizations selected using the logistic regression. However, in general, we do not anticipate highly significant results given the size of our sample. When dealing with a small number of cases, QCA offers a more reliable tool.

Furthermore, it offers significant logical and methodological benefits, particularly for small to medium-sized samples like ours. First, the method is built on an accessible logic with basic algebraic foundations. The variables are input into the model in the most straightforward format possible: the binary form. Additionally, QCA findings are presented in a concise but thorough manner by separating the requirements that must be met in order for a certain outcome to exist from those that are sufficient. This makes it possible to grasp the outcomes directly and right away. Second, the main objective of QCA is to include the context's complexity into the analysis. It incorporates the interactions between contextual or causal factors to achieve this. According to Scharpf, this approach emphasizes multi-causality and does not necessarily presuppose that variables are independent since it focuses on combinations of factors rather than individual variables.

Additionally, QCA has an equifinal or functional equivalent view, which means that different context configurations can result in the same result[5].Our sample size is the main issue with QCA in this situation. According to the literature on the issue, using too little of a sample makes it more likely that no deterministic solution won't be discovered. In this situation, there are too many conflicting combinations to allow for a parsimonious solution. A large number of independent variables also exponentially increases the number of possible factor combinations, increasing the likelihood that no deterministic solution will be discovered. In this article, we provide an empirical approach that will help us deal with these two issues that arise when the sample size is too large. In the discussion of the findings, we propose this solution.

Analysis of Regression

Our major objective is to investigate some of the structural and cultural aspects that influence the adoption of a deliberative participatory form of democracy in internal decision-making by organizations involved in the Global Justice Movement. We utilize logistic regression in this initial stage since our dependent variable is binary. We conducted three independent models: one with only the three structural variables, another in which we included the three cultural variables, and a comprehensive model which includes the control by form of democracy to evaluate the explanatory power of each set of components considered individually.Comparing the first two models reveals that structural variables have a much greater capacity for explanatory power than cultural factors. In fact, adding the latter only raises the explained variance by less than 10% whereas the former's explained variance is equivalent to 40% for the first set of variables. The

whole model produces a sizable influence on the institutional variable but contributes nothing to the explained variation. Organizations in majoritarian democracies, in particular, are less likely than those in mixed systems to use a deliberative participatory approach. The probabilities for the group of consensual democracies are similarly lower than 1, indicating a negative link. It is true that the impact is only significant at the 10% level. However, this finding suggests that the expected direction of the influence of institutional setting on the adoption of a deliberative participatory model of democracy.

Organizational size is by far the most crucial of the three structural characteristics we took into account in our analysis. It really exhibits the only statistically significant impact. Deliberative participatory models are exceptionally likely to occur, and even adjusting for other criteria, small firms are roughly 40 times more likely to embrace this democratic form than big ones. Additionally, the effect is strong because it holds true across all three models. This result is in line with our theory on this factor. Insofar as it is more challenging to engage each member in a decisional process intended to take into account the viewpoints of everyone, larger organizations may be considered as creating a substantial hindrance to successfully deliberative and completely inclusive decision making. On the other hand, the level of formalization and the geographic breadth are irrelevant. Therefore, organizations with looser organizational structures and those that base their campaigns on domestic issues are not more likely to use an inclusive internal decision-making process[6].

Although they have a less significant impact, all three cultural factors are statistically significant. Identification with the Global Justice Movement has the most impact. groups that strongly identify with the movement are ten times more likely than the rest to choose a deliberative participatory approach. However, this effect only becomes noticeable at a 10% level. A statistically significant and powerful influence is also shown by formation after 1989 and membership in the new social global movement region. All three effects are strong and continue to be significant when comparing for democracy type. The fact that they all support our hypotheses is crucial because it confirms our expectations that organizations whose mobilization is based on the tradition of conflict first carried by the new social movements and more recently by the GJM are more likely to use the deliberative participatory model in their internal decision-making.We converted the outcomes of the logistic models into projected probabilities of occurrence in order to better grasp the significance of the involvement of the statistically significant components produced by the regression analysis.

More specifically, we display the deliberative participative model's anticipated probabilities under the interaction between size and, respectively, movement area, identification with the GJM, and year of foundation. By doing this, we want to establish the structural component that the logistic regression revealed to be important in interaction with each of the three cultural elements that we also determined to have a substantial impact.All three instances follow a very similar pattern. Starting with the impact of movement area and size, it is clear that small size and membership in the new social movement, as well as the new social global movement area, both significantly increase the likelihood of using a deliberative participatory democratic model, as indicated by the results of the logistic regression. Comparing the two categories on the horizontal axis will show the influence of organizational scale, which is especially powerful, while comparing the two segments on the vertical axis will show the impact of movement area. The presence of a strong interactive effect is the most significant finding here, though, as it shows that smaller organizations are especially affected by the distinction between organizations

belonging to the new social movement and new social global movement area and those belonging to other movement areas. In fact, there is almost any difference among bigger organizations, but among smaller ones, the anticipated probability of the deliberative participatory model vary from around 20% to more than 50%. To put it another way, tiny organizations affiliated with the new social global movements are significantly more likely to embrace this democratic model than huge organizations associated with previous movement sectors[7].

Identification with the Global Justice Movement results in a comparable interaction effect. The anticipated likelihood of the deliberative participatory model occurring are lowest for big organizations with just a limited affiliation with the movement and greatest for small organizations with strong identification with it. Again, size is more important, and the difference between organizations that support movements and those that do not is essentially only seen for smaller firms.Last but not least, the relationship between organizational size and year of foundation follows a very similar pattern. Again, for smaller organizations, size has a very strong impact. however, for larger organizations, there is little difference between newly founded organizations and older ones. The adoption of the deliberative participatory model is thus explained by how organizational size interacts specifically with the historical era in which it was created, increasing its likelihood among small organizations but not so much among large ones.

Comparative Analysis of the Qualitative

The influence of the many explanatory variables on the adoption of a deliberative participatory model of democracy is one of the things that the regression analysis points to. The very small number of examples for this kind of analysis, however, places a constraint on it. Additionally, it provides no information regarding the combined effects of the chosen variables. As a result, results from logistic regression need to be supplemented by those from other methodologies. Applying QCA to our data is one way to accomplish this. Built on a non-linear logic, QCA is best suited for small-N samples when a group of explanatory variables are anticipated to work together to explain whether a certain result is present or not.In theory, QCA is less accurate and dependable when there are too many observations. Because there are more conflicting paths available in this situation, the likelihood that there won't be a deterministic solution is much higher. Even though this issue is present in our sample, we still use QCA to examine the impact of structural and cultural factors on the adoption of a deliberative participatory paradigm. However, we must modify the traditional crisp-sets QCA in order to lower the risk of non-determination as a result of our sample size being insufficient.

We do this by proposing a pseudo-probabilistic methodology that accounts for the likelihood that any conjunctural route will result in the desired result.Following this method, likelihood and occurrence scores are computed for each path that makes up the final causal equation.Likelihood, which is based on the weighted ratio between the two distinct solutions produced by conflictive combinations, quantifies the likelihood that the route will really result in the QCA's anticipated outcome. The possibility that a combination leads to one is 90%, for instance, if it consists of 9 instances going to 1 and 1 case leading to 0.A straightforward weighting approach is used to determine the probability of a minimization based on the number of instances connected to each route that led to the minimizing.8 Simply said, occurrence quantifies the relative significance of each route. For instance, we claim that a route has a 25% incidence if it is developed on 10 examples in a N = 40 analysis. When they are near to 1, both scoreswhich are given in a

standardized formatproduce superior outcomes. The acceptance or rejection of a causal route may then be determined by setting a threshold, just as it is done in conventional probabilistic statistics. In this analysis, we determined that a path cannot be credibly accepted as relevant unless it leads to the predicted outcome in at least 50% of the cases on which it is based and at least 20% of the cases entered in the model after the contradictions are resolved. These criteria are utilized to comprehend the QCA's findings and are compatible with what is written in the literature.

These two scores provide a number of benefits. First, they offer an easy-to-understand method for determining the relative weights of each causal path that makes up the QCA solution. This aids the researcher in better understanding the findings and identifying the driving factors behind the outcome. Second, they enable us to run the QCA models on a larger number of examples. As we previously said, the more examples there are, the more likely it is that there won't be a deterministic answer since there are more conflicting combinations. The contradictory examples are immediately included into the computation of a probability score via a weighting mechanism in our approach, so avoiding many of the issues that arise from having an excessive number of conflicting situations.9 In short, our technique mitigates some of the key issues that often arise in such circumstances and enables the researcher to run QCA models with not-too-small samples.In order to determine the joint impact of the chosen factors on the existence or absence of a deliberative participatory model, we conducted a first QCA. Even using our approach for resolving discrepancies, the initial QCA did not provide any results. This is likely caused by a ratio between instances and conditions that is too small. Excluding the variables with the least empirical and/or theoretical relevance is one way to deal with this issue.

We made the decision to eliminate the variable relating to the institutional context of the nation in which the organizations are situated since it was only included in the logistic regression as a control variable, despite being one that was founded on particular theoretical predictions[8]. In the first path, the coexistence of five conditionsa small organizational size, a recent foundation, strong identification with the Global Justice Movement, belonging to the new social global movement area, and domestic territorial scopeleads to the presence of a deliberative participatory model. This course is entirely in line with what we anticipated, and it clearly illustrates how structural and cultural variables work together to influence the adoption of the deliberative participatory model. Degree of formalization, which was similarly unimportant in the logistic regression, is the sole explanatory variable we are examining that does not seem as a need for this democratic model. It is crucial to emphasize that only when all of these circumstances exist at once does the result occur. When seen separately, they don't reflect the prerequisites for this democratic system to exist.

This initial causal pathway is supported by a considerable number of examples and quite a high probability of resulting in the desired result.A recent foundation, strong connection with the Global Justice Movement, membership in the new social global movement area, and an international/transnational territorial reach are the four requirements that make up the second route. The fourth condition is not consistent with our expectations, even if the other three are once again. Here, contrary to what we discovered in the first path, we discover that having activities that extend beyond the national level works in conjunction with the other three factors to promote the adoption of the deliberative participative model. Small organizations likely focus more on the domestic level, so when size is not a factor in the causal chain, having an

international/transnational territorial scope enters the explanation. The fact that size does not matter here may provide us with a clue to explaining this apparent contradiction[9].

CONCLUSION

It emphasizes the need of a thorough analysis that considers both structural and cultural aspects in order to comprehend the determinants of deliberative democracy. This method is essential for scholars who want to understand the dynamics of democratic decision-making as well as for policymakers and practitioners who want to foster deliberative democracy. Overall, the paper emphasizes the significance of fostering environments that support deliberative democracy, such as the requirement for accessible and inclusive participation mechanisms, open and transparent decision-making procedures, and norms and values that encourage debate and public deliberation. By doing this, we may develop decision-making procedures that are more democratic, legitimate, and successful and that take into account the variety of voices and viewpoints in society.

REFERENCES:

[1] D. Talukder and J. B. Pilet, 'Public support for deliberative democracy. A specific look at the attitudes of citizens from disadvantaged groups', *Innov. Eur. J. Soc. Sci. Res.*, 2021, doi: 10.1080/13511610.2021.1978284.

[2] S. Gherghina and B. Geissel, 'Support for direct and deliberative models of democracy in the UK: understanding the difference', *Polit. Res. Exch.*, 2020, doi: 10.1080/2474736X.2020.1809474.

[3] J. S. Dryzek, 'Democratization as deliberative capacity building', *Comp. Polit. Stud.*, 2009, doi: 10.1177/0010414009332129.

[4] S.-P. Grecu and H. C. Chiriac, 'Challenges for deliberative democracy in the digital era', *Tech. Soc. Sci. J.*, 2021, doi: 10.47577/tssj.v26i1.5386.

[5] D. R. Moscrop and M. E. Warren, 'When is Deliberation Democratic?', *J. Deliberative Democr.*, 2016, doi: 10.16997/jdd.256.

[6] B. Gundelach, P. Buser, and D. Kübler, 'Deliberative democracy in local governance: the impact of institutional design on legitimacy', *Local Gov. Stud.*, 2017, doi: 10.1080/03003930.2016.1261699.

[7] K. Lundell, 'Deliberative Capacity of Individuals – Dimensions and Determinants', *Adv. Soc. Sci. Res. J.*, 2014, doi: 10.14738/assrj.14.234.

[8] C. Bedock and J. B. Pilet, 'Enraged, Engaged, or Both? A Study of the Determinants of Support for Consultative vs. Binding Mini-Publics', *Representation*, 2020, doi: 10.1080/00344893.2020.1778511.

[9] E. Montecinos, 'Diseño institucional y participación ciudadana en los presupuestos participativos los casos de Chile, Argentina, Perú, República Dominicana y Uruguay', *Polit. y Gob.*, 2014.

CHAPTER 10

ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES

Sushim Shukla, Associate Professor
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- sushimshukla07@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Organizational size is a crucial factor that can impact the implementation of democratic practices within an organization. As an organization grows larger, it becomes increasingly challenging to maintain a participatory and inclusive decision-making process, which is essential for democratic practices.In small organizations, employees have more opportunities to engage in open discussions, share ideas, and participate in decision-making processes. However, as an organization grows larger, decision-making processes often become more hierarchical and centralized, with power concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or groups.

KEYWORDS:

Democracy, Democratic Practices, Organizational, Organizational Structure, Power Dynamics.

INTRODUCTION

The key takeaway from this, however, is that if we compare the variables that showed up in the first two paths, we can see that the QCA's findings indicate three prerequisites for an organization to adopt a deliberative participatory model of democracy 12 being founded after 1989, identifying with the GJM, and being a part of what we called the new social global movements. To adopt a deliberative participatory paradigm, all three of these prerequisites must be present. In other words, although it does not rule out the potential of additional elements combining with these three, this democratic paradigm cannot be accepted without their combined presence. All three circumstances support our hypotheses. As they emerged within the protest wave led by the Global Justice Movement, we anticipated that organizations founded more recently would be more inclined to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy. We anticipated that the organizations that make up this movement's backbone would adopt a similar perspective of democracy in their internal operations given that this movement stresses the need for an inclusive and open democracy.

The outcomes of the QCA support this. In a similar vein, we anticipated that the more an organization identified with the GJM, the more one might say that it shared its claims and principles. Since the organization will be more inclined toward consensus and participation as organizational values, it was anticipated that strong identification with the movement would increase the likelihood that a deliberative participatory model of democracy would be adopted. Once again, the QCA's findings are consistent with this theory. Last but not least, it was anticipated that organizations associated with the new social global movement area, which prioritizes consensus and widespread involvement, would be more likely to embrace the

deliberative participative democratic model. The QCA's findings in this area also support what we predicted.

We have referred to the three elements that make up the required condition as the cultural determinants of democratic models. This agrees with the outcomes of the regression analysis that we conducted before. In fact, the logistic regression models demonstrated that the existence of a deliberative participatory model is statistically significantly influenced by all three cultural factors in the predicted manner. These elements seem to be essential for the Global Justice Movement groups to embrace this democratic approach.Additionally, the first causal path combines the presence of a small organizational size with the necessary condition. This is also consistent with the findings of the regression analysis, which revealed that the organizational size was the best predictor of the deliberative participatory form of democracy. The QCA, however, contends that the organizations' geographical reach also counts, whether positively or negatively. According to the results of the logistic regression, this component was not statistically significant. Finally, the QCA confirms that the level of formalization has no effect, proving that our assumption regarding this aspect was incorrect. Similar to the logistic regression, if we simply take into account the first two causal pathways, this element does not show in the QCA as a criterion leading to the deliberative participative model.

The QCA findings, however, seem differently if we interpret all four of the analysis's identified causal routes without taking into consideration the two relevance scores. The third and fourth approaches, which produce unexpected consequences, are really far more difficult to comprehend. If we take a look at the third path, for instance, the deliberative participatory model appears to be, as expected, the result of the small organizational size, but also together with earlier year of foundation, belonging to another movement area, international/transnational territorial scope, and high degree of for- malization. The final four circumstances all seem to be inconsistent with the findings of the regression analysis and to act against our hypothesis. The influence of two elements that are consistent with our projections, but again in conjunction with two unexpected circumstancesan earlier year of founding and an international/transnational territorial scopeis shown by the fourth route. Furthermore, if we ignore the relevance scores, the QCA results show that there is no necessary condition. However, as we previously stated, we believe that ignoring them would put our conclusions in doubt.

Particularly, both instances are extremely rare. This indicates that just 2% and 3% of the instances are used to determine the result. Additionally, the likelihood of the fourth path is extremely low. It is certainly difficult to reach definite conclusions under these circumstances. Additionally, it demonstrates that organizations that were founded after 1989, strongly identify with the GJM, and belong to what we called the new social global movement area are more likely to adhere to the deliberative participative model. All of this fits with our theories. On the other hand, the QCA emphasizes the significance of cultural elements more than anything else, further supporting our assumptions. In particular, we have discovered that the adoption of the deliberative participative model requires the coexistence of the three cultural variables.The QCA's findings are in line with the regression analysis's: the three cultural elements are all significant drivers of the decision to choose a certain model of democracy for internal decision-making. The QCA adds to the explanation by demonstrating that the cultural factors combine qualitatively to influence the organizations' choice of the deliberative participative democratic model, even though the regression analysis also suggests that one of the structural factors, namely organizational size, has the strongest impact in quantitative terms[1].

As a last point, we should emphasize a discovery that was not the focus of our research but is nevertheless deserving of attention. We are referring to the fact that Lijphart's typology indicates that organizations based in majoritarian democracies are less likely to use the deliberative participatory democratic model for internal decision-making. Organizations based in consensual democracies are less likely to adhere to this democratic model, therefore this impact clearly contrasts with the other form of democracy identified by Lijphart. However, this finding raises the possibility that social movement organizations and the larger institutional environment may be institutionally isomorphic.The absence of democracy in international financial organizations like the G8, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank is one of the main issues raised by the Global Justice Movement. These organizations are known for their lack of democracy and rely on a small group of elite politicians who often have strong biases in favor of the interests of Western businesses to make decisions. They, the smallest and least representative minority in the world, claim to have a mandate from the people when they do not, and then they accuse us of being unconstitutional. Their rule is sovereign while being unproven and unapproved.

It becomes a specific challenge for Global Justice Movement Organizations to guarantee that they themselves do not lack democratic elements in their own decision-making since this sort of criticism of IFIs is a cornerstone of the GJM's framework. If GJMOs do not live up to their own ideals, it is disingenuous of them to support a minority's criticism of the status quo that disregards the will of the majority. As a result, GJMOs itself should avoid being run by a tiny, unrepresentative minority and should include rank-and-file movement members in decision-making in order to prevent accusations of hypocrisy. To do this properly, beautiful decision-making that is inclusive, open, transparent, and accountable must be used. Such decision-making is satisfying for its members and promotes the flourishing of creative freedom. It is the opposite of ugly decision-making, which prioritizes organizational efficiency above participation and creative freedom and as a consequence, becomes closed, exclusive, non-transparent, and non-accountable, frustrating participants[2], [3].

DISCUSSION

However, it can be challenging to put beautiful decision making into practice, particularly in large organizations that, as is frequently mentioned, have a tendency to become more oligarchy-like as they expand their resource base. Undoubtedly, as GJMOs have grown in size and popularity, their organizational structures have become more formal and complex. At the same time, however, they continue to face challenges in resolving complex problems with local, national, and international implications. But is it accurate to say that smaller GJMOs, which have fewer resources and fewer members, appear to find it simpler to implement beautiful decision making than their larger and better resourced counterparts, as the literature on this topic tends to predict? In other words, do smaller GJMOs do better than bigger ones in putting democracy into practice? Are they more adept at employing prefigurative politics to build the perfect democratic environment, or do they also have some democratic flaws?

Do large organizations consistently have oligarchic structures, or can they find ways to involve their employees in decision-making? Or, regardless of their size or formality, have GJMOs been able to effectively escape the oligarchy that they so loathe at the level of setting foreign policy?We might propose that smaller organizations have a higher probability of avoiding oligarchy than bigger ones. As we'll show, this straightforward theory ignores the propensity for

small groups to have infor- mal oligarchs in the absence of constraints like rotating facilitators, circular seating configurations, transparency, and the use of hand signals. Additionally, it ignores GJMOs' propensity to experiment with novel forms of participation, regardless of their size, which makes them less vulnerable to oligarchy than some other kinds of SMOs.Using Schumacher's maxim that small is beautiful as a framework, this study of the literature on organization and oligarchy in social movements first introduces the topic. In order to determine if it is accurate to say that bigger GJMOs are more oligarchic than smaller ones, the study then examines the findings of a survey of the decision-making procedures of 210 GJMOs of varying sizes.

Next, it examines whether or not rules like rotation, transparency, working groups, seating arrangements, and/or hand signals exist to prevent the emergence of informal oligarchies in order to determine how beautiful both large and small organizations actually are. Before coming to a conclusion, it will examine two competing transnational GJMOs in further detail: ATTAC, which, at least in France, matches the description of large and ugly, and Indymedia, which is best described as large but beautiful. The examination of ATTAC will compare its decision-making to ideal small group politics and show that its activists consider its non-participatory character to be ugly, in line with scholarly criticisms of oligarchic decision-making systems. The exploration of Indymedia, by contrast, will show how a vast network has been able to avoid oligarchy by simulating the ideal beauty of small group decision making[4].

Any organization, no matter how big or small, needs to have some degree of order and clarity because nothing gets done when things are disorganized. In order to achieve both orderliness of order and disorderliness of creative freedom, every organization must consistently strive for both. Schumacher's landmark economic treatise, Small is Beautiful, explicitly acknowledged that an organization's size counts despite the fact that he was writing about economic groups. He made special notice of the necessity to strike a balance between oligarchy, which suppresses participation and creative freedom, and structurelessness, which decreases order. Smaller organizations are apparently more likely to exhibit the former, structurelessness, whereas bigger organizations are more likely to exhibit the later, oligarchy. However, Schumacher believes that small businesses are preferable because they foster creative freedom and keep establishments from degenerating into moribund and a desert of frustration. Schumacher claims that tiny groups are ideal when the organizational activity is active and intimate, which is true of most social movement activities.

In social movements, it is crucial to strike a balance between order and clarity on the one hand, and chaos and creative freedom on the other. As resource mobilization theorists have attempted to demonstrate, it takes some kind of organizational'structure' to unite individuals in the struggle for a shared goal. However, as others have cautioned, excessive organization can lead to the alienation of the majority by a select group of decision-makers. Smaller groups will find it easier to get together and have in-depth conversations, thus the majority is less likely to get estranged from its cadre. Due to the time commitment and organizational challenges, it is not always feasible for all members of a large organization to engage in such intense involvement. Therefore, achieving a balance between organizational size and efficient decision-making is a challenge for social movement organizations. We might anticipate inclusive, innovative, but disorganized decision-making in small organizations. Instead, we would anticipate greater order, but also greater annoyance and less creative freedom, in larger movement organizations[5].

There is a continuing scholarly fixation on Michels' iron law of oligarchy, which is similar to the notion that small is beautiful or that large is ugly. This iron law emphasizes how oligarchy would inevitably come from widespread organization: It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandatories, of the delegates over the delegators. Whoever says organization also says oligarchy. Smaller or informational groups should be able to resist this trend more readily since they are far better equipped to promote involvement from all members.However, is the 'iron law' compliance by big businesses really inevitable? Because of its widely acknowledged support for open and inclusive decision making and its refusal to succumb to the same criticisms it levels against its main rivals, the International Financial Institutions, the GJM presents an interesting challenge to the iron law and a novel case upon which to test it. For instance, Della Porta showed that agreement and discussion are both desired and attainable in social forums, such as the GJM's debating arenas, which draw in and welcome involvement from thousands of people. We'll see, but it's possible that GJMOs are unique circumstances to which the iron rule does not apply. But first, let's go back to the academics whose theories confirm Michels' claim.

The research of academics like Jordan and Maloney lends credence to the notion of a iron law. They contend that elite-run, modern protest businesses like Friends of the Earth and Amnesty in Britain lack internal democracy because of their large and passive memberships, which do not participate in decision-making and can only be heard by leaving. They contend that this is inadequate:Organizations involved in campaigns have grown more bureaucratic and hierarchically structured. While the volunteers perform the 'depoliticized' menial tasks of sending in the money, selling raffle tickets, or purchasing items from catalogs, the elite or policy entrepreneurs control the policy agenda. It is equally dangerous to romanticize this work as it is to describe it as meaningfully participating in politics[6].

Regarding the work of Jordan and Maloney, there are three things to note. The first is that, in line with Michels, they consider the absence of decision-making involvement to be unattractive or ugly. This is due to the fact that it limits volunteers' involvement in protest enterprises to menial jobs and keeps them out of the firms' actual work. Second, their results are strikingly similar to McCarthy and Zald's seminal observations on the professionalization of movement organizations. According to them, this process entails organizations hiring full-time staff, decreasing reliance on volunteers, and consequently eroding and ultimately removing adherent control over the organization. Third, and perhaps most significantly, they lack an independent variable to explain why campaign groups have evolved into bureaucratic, and oligarchic, structures, much like McCarthy and Zald. Is it due to their advanced age, their stature, their need for efficiency, or something else entirely? Other researchers have mainly used age and size as their dependent variables when examining the'iron law.

Rucht, for instance, found that the iron rule was far more flexible than previous academics had suggested when using age as the independent variable to determine oligarchy in German environmental groups. He asserted that environmental groups move through stages and sometimes make conscious efforts to fight against oligarchization, or as Michels put it, to paralyze it. This was the goal of the New Left, which Breines has highly praised. Rucht ignored the significance of organizational size in favor of focusing on age. The organizational size, perhaps one of the most important aspects in establishing decision-making frameworks, appears to be overlooked quite a bit. Despite the correlation between organizational age and size, it's important to remember that the two don't always grow together. Older organizations that have

aimed to stay informal and unprofessional may continue to be tiny and, as a result, more participative than their formal, professional, and huge rivals.When a political party has tens of thousands of members, it is evident that it is impossible to carry on the affairs of this gigantic body without a system of representation and such a gigan- tic number of persons belonging to a unitary organization cannot do any practical work upon a system of direct discussion. Therefore, organizational size should be considered a key independent variable in identifying oligarchic tendencies because it tends to produce representative forms of democracy that are frequently controlled by a small number of people without the majority directly participating[7].

Scholars have not ignored the idea that big organizations have a propensity to devolve into oligarchies. Tan discovered that bigger political parties had more complicated decision-making procedures and tended to be less participative than their smaller counterparts in his research of political parties in Europe. He also discovered that certain complex organizations—even though they constituted a small minorityactually engaged their grassroots networks, contributing to their complexity in the process. Similar to this, Hands observes that the majority of parties and unions have fairly elaborate governmental structures designed to permit, or to ensure, rank and file control over the leadership.Thus, it is clear that previous research points to a tendency, but not an inevitable, decline in participation with increasing SMO and political party size. But does this inevitably mean that less formal, more democratic tiny groups are good examples of democracy in practice?

According to earlier studies, the answer is no since small does not necessarily equate to beautiful. The same way that formal and informal organizations may exist side by side, so can official and informal oligarchs. Formal oligarchs may be in command of bureaucratic organizations with legitimacy, whilst 'informal oligarchs' are more likely to control collectivist institutions with no legal authority. This argument is consistent with Jo Freeman's seminal paper on the tyranny of the structurelessness, which she argues may result in what Leach refers to as informal oligarchs due to a lack of formal regulations. Informal oligarchs are social movement participants who are the most sociable or who belong to the closest friendship groupings and who, as a result, automatically take improper group leadership. Small and informal decision-making processes, in Freeman's opinion, can only be described as 'beautiful' when they include delegation, responsible power, distribution, rotation, and allocation, diffusion of knowledge, and equitable access to authority.But how does this apply to GJMOs, from which we should anticipate that they would work more actively than other forms of social movement groups in preventing oligarchy as a consequence of their criticism of IFIs and regardless of size?

Oligarchy and Organizational Size Measurement

In this, we're interested in how much participation GJMOs have in their major decision-making bodies. Because the term is frequently used carelessly in the literature, it is imperative that we operationalize it in this context as a first step. Since Plato and Aristotle, most authors that debate oligarchy have failed to define the notion, according to Schmidt, who claims that this is because they presume the term is understood in light of its Greek derivation.Our explanation of oligarchy so far has suggested, but not officially stated, that it essentially entails a decision-making elite that the majority is excluded from. We define oligarchy in this context as ruling power that belongs to a low proportion of SMO membership, to put it simply. The oligarchy score, which divides the number of people in the primary organizational decision-making body whether it be a president, an executive committee, a thematic group, or an assembly by the total number of

members has been calculated for the purposes of this. Since a small cadre dominates highly oligarchic organizations, as predicted by Michels, they have low oligarchy scores. A high score, on the other hand, indicates that there is less oligarchy since many members are involved in making decisions. For instance, a group with 10,000 members but a president who makes all the decisions is extremely oligarchic since power is concentrated in the hands of a tiny minority. As a result, it gets a poor oligarchy rating. In contrast, a 500 member group that defers to a 1000 member assembly for major decisions is non-oligarchic and receives a high oligarchy rating[8].

If decision-making is restricted to a tiny cadre, participation still lacks meaning and might be seen as oligarchic. Deliberation alone cannot make participation meaningful. Since we already know that many large organizations, like democratic representative organizations, do use it, we do not test how the level of deliberation is affected by organizational size. In any event, oligarchic practices may still be applied to deliberative representative organizations provided their methods of deliberation continue to exclude the vast majority of members. Instead, we will investigate whether it is accurate to say that GJMOs with low member involvement in decision-making tend to be big, whereas those with strong member involvement tend to be smaller. To categorize organizations as large or small, we look at their yearly operating budgets, the total number of members, and the number of paid employees and volunteers.

We define an organization as small if it has at least one of the following characteristics: fewer than 15 volunteers, no paid staff, an annual budget of less than 1000 euros, and between one and 100 individual members.These cut-off values for smallness were selected because they represent an approximation of the size beyond which ideal small-group decision making becomes challenging to implement due to size constraints[9]. Remember that the criteria for large and small organizations are not mutually exclusive categories when interpreting the data based on these measures. For instance, at the worst extreme, 45.1% of the organizations that are large according to their budget are classified as small based on the number of volunteers. Due to this, it is crucial to think of the organizational size measurements primarily in isolation from one another and as approximative indicators of size. However, it should also be noted that compared to the measure of budgets, most measures of largeness are more exclusive. The data is derived from Work Package 4 of the Demos Project based on structured interviews with organizational elites from 209 global justice movement organizations across western Europe. For instance, of those organizations with a large number of individual members, none have a small number of staff, just under one-quarter have a small budget, and only 6.1% have a small number of volunteers. Details of real organizational decision-making procedures were collected via interviews[10].

CONCLUSION

In recent years, deliberative democracy has gained popularity. However, despite the political theory literature being replete with normative discussions of this idea, little is known about how deliberation actually occurs in real-world settings. We still don't fully understand the motivations for social movement groups to emphasize agreement and involvement in internal decision-making, in particular. This is especially crucial since the Global Justice Movement and the new social movements that came before it placed a lot of focus on these elements. In this article, we've concentrated on a few structural and cultural factors that might help to explain why organizations involved in the Global Justice Movement in a number of European nations adopt a deliberative participatory model of democracy that emphasizes the pursuit of consensus and wide

internal participation. Regression analysis, based on a linear logic and looking at the net effect of each variable, on the one hand, and QCA, in order to examine multiple and conjunctural causation, on the other, were two types of analysis that we conducted, also with the idea of triangulating them. The results demonstrate that in order to understand why this democratic model was adopted, it is important to consider both the internal structure of the groups and the history of conflict upon which their mobilization is based. On the one hand, the logistic regression reveals that the most important factor is organizational size. Smaller organizations are more likely to use a deliberative participatory democratic approach specifically.

REFERENCES:

[1] H. Chahal, P. Kumar, N. Kumari, And S. Sethi, 'Exploration Of Stakeholder Marketing Orientation And Its Impact On Business Performance In Indian Pharmaceutical Marketing Companies', *Int. J. Pharm. Healthc. Mark.*, 2021, Doi: 10.1108/Ijphm-05-2019-0035.

[2] J. S. Andoh And B. Ghansah, 'A Study Of Leadership Style On Employees' Performance In Some Selected Private Universities In Ghana', *Int. J. Eng. Res. Africa*, 2019, Doi: 10.4028/Www.Scientific.Net/Jera.43.157.

[3] H. Kitschelt And D. M. Kselman, 'The Organizational Foundations Of Democratic Accountability: Organizational Form And The Choice Of Electoral Linkage Strategy', *Ssrn Electron. J.*, 2012, Doi: 10.2139/Ssrn.1671548.

[4] H. Skandrani, K. Kooli, And N. Doudech, 'Inhibitors Of Non-For-Profit Organisations' Activities And Survival In A Crisis Context', *Qual. Mark. Res.*, 2021, Doi: 10.1108/Qmr-03-2020-0039.

[5] R. Ashkenas And B. Manville, 'The Fundamentals Of Leadership Still Haven't Changed', *Harv. Bus. Rev.*, 2018.

[6] C. Saunders, 'Organizational Size And Democratic Practices: Can Large Be Beautiful?', In *Democracy In Social Movements*, 2009. Doi: 10.1057/9780230240865.

[7] F. Bignami, 'Civil Society And International Organizations: A Liberal Framework For Global Governance', *Ssrn Electron. J.*, 2012, Doi: 10.2139/Ssrn.2031012.

[8] J. Wiefek And K. Heinitz, 'Common Good-Oriented Companies: Exploring Corporate Values, Characteristics And Practices That Could Support A Development Towards Degrowth', *Manag. Rev.*, 2018, Doi: 10.5771/0935-9915-2018-3-311.

[9] A. Bawa Abdul-Qadir And G. Madaki Ayuba, 'Leadership Style And Performance Of Small And Medium Scale Enterprises (Smes) In Kaduna State, Nigeria', *Crawford J. Bus. Soc. Sci. (Cjbass*, 2019.

[10] R. Hall, B. Harley, And M. Tomkins, 'The Bureaucratisation Of Australian Unions ? Evidence From A National Survey', *J. Sociol.*, 2000, Doi: 10.1177/144078330003600302.

CHAPTER 11

GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Sushil Kumar Singh, Professor
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- sushil2844@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The Global Justice Movement (GJM) is a diverse and decentralized network of organizations and activists that seek to promote economic, social, and environmental justice worldwide. GJM organizations emerged in response to the failures of neoliberal globalization and the growing power of multinational corporations and financial institutions.GJM organizations employ a variety of strategies and tactics to achieve their goals, including direct action, advocacy campaigns, and public education. They aim to challenge the dominant neoliberal economic model, which prioritizes profit over people and the environment, and to promote alternative models that prioritize social and environmental justice.

KEYWORDS:

Civil, Global Justice Movement, Organizational, Resource Mobilization, Social Movement Organizations.

INTRODUCTION

When an organization expands in terms of personnel, annual spending, and the number of volunteers and members, oligarchy appears to rise steadily. On all measures, the largest GJMOs are the most oligarchic, with an oligarchy score of less than 0.1. The number of volunteers and the number of members, both individual and collective, are the most discriminating factors. The gap between the degree of oligarchy and the quantity of individual membership is particularly striking: whereas 93.9% of organizations with more than 10,000 members are very oligarchic, just 25% of those with less than 100 members are.By no means can we, however, draw the conclusion that tiny groups are immune to oligarchy. It was suggests that a majority of small and big organizations have a high degree of oligarchy on most metrics of size, with the exception of the number of individual members.Additionally, it is a little unsettling how often small organizations lack policies meant to prevent the dominance of informal oligarchs.

Less than ten percent of our so-called small firms use at least one of these guidelines overall. Even though they aren't utilized very often, circular seating configurations and hand gestures are the most typical. However, only four small organizations mentioned the rotation of moderation or facilitation, one of Freeman's suggested tactics to avoid the tyranny of the structure lessness. However, large organizations appear to use specialized oligarchy-prevention rules even less frequently in their meetings. None of the organizations in our sample with budgets above 500 000 Euros claimed to implement any of the five criteria, and just one organization with more than 100 volunteers claimed to employ rotation, specifically seek transparency, or use hand signals.Some of the larger groups in our sample also defy the parallel theory that big is ugly, in addition to some of the smaller ones that challenge the notion that small is beautiful. Contrary to

Michels, Jordan, and Maloney's predictions, we can observe that certain GJMOs with large budgets and staff numbers have been able to stave off oligarchy, even if they are less prevalent than their more oligarchic equivalents.

The flood of democracy from that has risen with the GJM, for instance, has an impact on even conventionally organized labor unions.For instance, the Federazione Impiegatie Operai Metallurgici and the Italian Confederazine General Italiana del Lavoro have at least tried out deliberation and facilitation. CGIL also states that it seeks to protect minorities' rights, cut back on unnecessary red tape, and ensure participation. However, many socialist organizations still have a hierarchically structured organizational structure, which makes them generally oligarchic. However, for them, this has nothing to do with their size or age and is instead related to their ideology, particularly their attempt to start a top-down revolutionary socialist movement. Still, other GJMOs have engaged in heated discussions about their internal decision-making or have purposefully avoided hierarchy. Those who have avoided hierarchy have done so by imitating, whether consciously or unintentionally, the elegance of little-known, non-oligarchical institutions.

DISCUSSION

Beautiful decision-making includes widespread involvement in the organization's actual politics. Decision-making must resemble ideal small-group decision-making for this to happen. As was said in the beginning, it must be open, pluralistic, and inclusive while also being honest and upfront with its members and backers. The discussion that follows will demonstrate that it is precisely because ATTAC lacks these qualities of good internal democracy that its members express discontent. To further summarize Freeman, it also requires that leadership roles be rotated, that participants have equal access to information, and that they share their skills to prevent power relationships from forming. The debate of Indymedia, on the other hand, shows how it is feasible for a huge group to get close to making excellent decisions[1].

It is true that widespread involvement in an organization's actual politics may compromise effectiveness, as these situations show. But the 'desert of frustration' that comes from participation restrictions is probably preferable to the efficiency that the company promises. The struggle for control inside ATTAC, particularly in France, is what has led to the desert of frustration brought on by restrictions on grassroots engagement. Contrarily, there has been considerable worry in Indymedia about the efficiency loss that comes with widespread involvement. In contrast to ATTAC, however, Indymedia's quandary over its internal democracy is caused by long-established open publishing principles rather than a power struggle. In addition, these two examples were chosen because, although being 'big' corporations, their oligarchy ratings are quite different.

ATTAC

Although ATTAC was founded alongside the growth of GJM, it has had difficulty achieving the democratic goals that its grass-roots membership holds dear. A further reason ATTAC is a suitable case study is because it enables us to examine national branches of various sizes to see how their decision-making processes differ without having to fear that any discrepancies we uncover are the result of sharply divergent beliefs. However, if we were to compare the ways that socialist and autonomous organizations make decisions, we would anticipate that there would be differences in decision-making approaches that are more related to ideology than to size or any

other factor. ATTAC is a crucial case study because it shows how a democratic crisis can arise as a direct result of organizational expansion. When the organization's membership was small, there were fewer people who were disempowered by exclusion, so its oligarchic decision-making was not seen as a problem[2].

We will address the democratic challenges that ATTAC has had in France, Germany, and Italy after analyzing the oligarchy ratings of various ATTAC groups. We will focus on what makes ATTAC's decision-making 'ugly' - both philosophically and for its activists. Although the three ATTAC organizations for which we have data all have low oligarchy scores, they all employ various decision-making models, some of which are more deliberative than others. With 25 000 individual members and 50 collective members, ATTAC France, the biggest, employs an associational style of decision-making. The other two, which are far smaller and have only around 15 000 individual members each, operate on a deliberative representative format. Does this imply that the iron rule of oligarchy has prevailed in our quest to understand the differences between the bigger and smaller ATTAC groups? Would ATTAC Germany and ATTAC Italy also become associational if they added another 10,000 members?

It doesn't seem like this is the case. The decision-making processes used by various ATTAC groups don't seem to be affected by size in any appreciable way. The fact that ATTAC France was always associational, even when it was a tiny, fledgling organization, is one of the issues with the assumption that size causes associational behavior in this situation. As it has expanded, its oligarchy score has decreased, indicating more oligarchy, and it has become clear that its grassroots are disgruntled. Additionally, from their forerunner, ATTAC Germany and Italy learned about the rarity of associational decision making. Rather than as a result of their size, rather than as a result of their reflections on ATTAC France's experience, these two nations developed slightly more deliberative decision-making styles. However, the oligarchy scores of all three ATTACs are low, which, as we shall see, has not been well received by their grassroots activists.ATTAC was established in France in 1998 by a number of influential figures from the assistance, commerce, and development sectors. It was Bernard Cassen's idea.

To guarantee a levy on global financial institutions, establish a development fund, and limit stock market speculation was its original priority. Since then, it has expanded to advocate more broadly against unjust trade rules, the World Trade Organization, tax havens, and other concerns relating to international development. The initial constitution of ATTAC France, which was inadequate to handle the extensive network of local units that quickly arose, was followed during the first two years of the organization. The issue, as seen by the local groups, was that they were not given the opportunity to participate in decision-making, which seemed to be controlled by the leadership. Thus, openness, inclusivity, and pluralismthree essential elements of beautiful decision-makingwere absent. Local organizations started to constantly denounce the absence of democracy as a consequence. A Board of Directors-Local Committees was established to look at ways to change the constitution to allow local groups more meaningful chances for involvement as a consequence of local groups' discontent with the national organization's 'democratic' methods. Thus, local group representatives could be admitted to the ATTAC Board. however, this was only a partial success as they were still unable to cast a vote.

When minority initiatives to increase local participation and implement participatory budgeting failed, dissent grew, and in 2004 the chasm between the local and national organization almost reached a breaking point. The turning point seems to be when the leadership came under intense

suspicion of planning the formation of 100% No Global Candidates for the European elections behind the backs of both national and local board members. As a result, it became clear that ATTAC France's decision-making lacked the 'beautiful' attributes of accountability and openness, which fueled resentment[3].Despite being abandoned, the initiative and the events that came before it left behind two opposing factions: one made up of current leaders who were unwilling to cede control to locals, and another of the founding members who desired for locals to have more influence and the authority to join as co-presidents. 70% of attendees at the 2005 general assembly said that they wanted grass-roots members to have stronger representation, and 59% supported co-presidency. Despite this, the leadership continues to seem to be oligarchical. Contrary to romanticized small group 'beautiful' politics, there is a lack of inclusion, a tiny unaccoun leadership continues to rule, and the leaders obstinately hold onto their positions of leadership. Schumacher would anticipate that this internal power struggle has left its activists in a desert of frustration.

Local ATTAC activists have expressed their displeasure and complaints about their mother organization's lack of democracy around the world. Local group members in Germany are only permitted to participate in assembly sessions as delegates, and participation is quite structured. From its inception, ATTAC in Italy aimed to be democratic and transparent. The phrase federative but not fragmented, participatory but not inefficient was adopted, but it quickly had to make a sacrifice on discussion in the sake of efficiency. ATTAC Italia is willing to vote even though it prefers to reach decisions by agreement most of the time. It has also been criticized for being too vertical and for being far more centralized than some Italian activists would want. These critiques have some merit since the national council has the necessary authority, determines which topics are important to the network, establishes the agenda for the assembly, and selects consultation topics. 'Beautiful' small group decision-making is totally different from this. However, the leadership in Italy and Germany is significantly more accommodative to participants than the centralized leaders of ATTAC France, who are unwilling to cede their authority. Regarding ATTAC, there are three additional crucial issues to mention. In the first place, it shows how Schumacher's appeal for striking a balance between orderliness and creative flexibility is recognized in reality. The very identical motto of ATTAC Italia, federative but not fragmented, participa- tive but not inefficient, best captures this. The difficulty appears particularly pressing in the case of ATTAC France, which tends to value organizational effectiveness above grassroots engagement.

The second point focuses on the causes of the democratic crisis in ATTAC France, which manifested as a result of two factors a power struggle inside the organization between locals and the centralized leadership, as well as the quick growth of a group that was not ready for a model of participatory democracy. Third, the ATTAC instance demonstrates the disconnect between its own activity and its criticism of IFIs. For instance, ATTAC France asserts Direct citizen control is not possible over us. Furthermore, during the neo-liberal globalization era, international political institutionswhich are largely beyond the purview of democratic controlhave a monopoly on decision-making[4]. However, it could also be argued that Bernard Cassen holds a disproportionate amount of ATTAC France's decision-making authority, which is far beyond the purview of democratic oversight. In order to avoid being accused of not doing what it teaches, ATTAC France may want to consider taking action to correct the problem. Such a gap between rhetoric and practice has the potential to undo all of the work done to create an effective

movement organization. 17% of activists had already gone by the time of the 2005 general assembly, many of them likely disappointed by the absence of participatory democracy.

Indymedia

Indymedia, as opposed to ATTAC, has managed to keep itself reasonably participative and efficient despite having a large number of members. The Indymedia network of free communication, which seeks to deliver 'passionate tellings of truth' through stories uploaded from independent journalists and activists around the world, is perhaps the best example of a company that defies the tendency for sizable organizations to implement formal and exclusive structures for decision making. It is facilitated via online discussion boards and a public website that anybody with Internet connection may visit[5].Three independent media collectivesIndymedia Italia, EH, and UKthat are all categorized as deliberative participatory were included in our assessment of the democratic procedures of GJMOs. This is true even though Indymedia Italia has a far greater membership than Indymedia EH. All members regardless of organizational size have a voice in decisions since all three organizations have oligarchy ratings of 1. The iron rule is obviously broken in this case: in this instance, it doesn't seem that size breeds oligarchic tendencies. But how did Indymedia manage to evade the iron law's sway?Indymedia organizations, including Indymedia EH, conduct deliberative debates in person.

Others, however, like Indymedia Italia, conduct what Reiter called a telematic assembly in addition to formal meetings and reach decisions through their email list, which has up to 400 members. Because of its worries about the networks' early development into a free for all, lack of editorial quality, and lack of structure, Indymedia in the UK has institutionalized parts of its decision-making. However, even in the UK, it continues to be adamantly committed to the values of horizontality and transparency and gives the creation of news content precedence over bureaucracy. Like in all Indymedias, there has been an effort to purposefully avoid the hierarchical decision-making model that is caricatured in the work of many Left-leaning organizations.On a worldwide scale, Indymedia has been experimenting with a'spokes council' model, with at-a-distance facilitation made feasible by the use of technological means for communication. It is no easy task to carry out inclusive and consensus-based decision making throughout the worldwide Indymedia network, which consists of some 5000 people, 150 organisations, and 50 nations across six continents.

Nevertheless, there have been some, albeit minor, deviations from Indymedia's founding concept of principles of unity, which Pickard refers to as radical democratic principles of inclusivity, plurality, diversity, openness, transparency, and accountability. Principle from this informal constitution document is the most pertinent to this. It reads: All IMCs are devoted to the development of non-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian interactions, from individual relationships to group dynamics. They understand the value of process to societal change. Therefore, they must band together, adhere to the principles of consensus decision-making, and create a direct, participatory democratic process that is open to all of their members[6].Pickard notes that various organizations may define consensus differently, and some may even give significant consideration to majority vote. Additionally, disagreements over strategy based on cultural, national, and international differences are challenging to reconcile. Overall, however, it seems that despite numerous conflicts, the standards of consensus and participation remain guiding principles, especially during times of dispute.

Pickard, for instance, describes how the global Indymedia network overcame a contentious discussion about whether to accept Ford Foundation funding for an international conference in 2002.8 In fact, the global network has gone to great lengths to uphold these principles in situations where organizational efficiency and rationality may have been preferable, once again highlighting the need to strike a balance between efficiency and creativity.Yet Pickard observes that despite such formidable challenges, the IMC network manages to function and flourish.A big portion of Indymedia's open, inclusive, and consensus-based decision-making approach may be linked to the organization's familiarity with electronic decision-making processes that enable direct democracy even in larger groups. Open email lists and Internet relay chat rooms provide open and horizontal decision-making in a way that face-to-face meetings alone could not readily accomplish, in part due to physical space constraints. It is unquestionably true that people with the greatest time or knowledge may become de facto leaders in any Indymedia, notwithstanding its exceptional success at radical democracy. However, certain organizational techniques have evolved to maintain the balance of power, much like those Freeman suggested to prevent informal oligarchy in informal groups.

These practices are used in Seattle Indymedia, for instance, where they include the introduction of vibes watchers, who can bring attention to latent power structures or non-vocalized discontent, rotating spokes positions, facilitation, and empowering certain groups and individuals to operate in ad hoc fashion beyond consensus, and relying on rational self-selection.Therefore, even though it has occasionally been challenging for Indymedia to prioritize beautiful decision-making over efficiency, it has generally been successful. With its open and democratic attitude, skill-sharing objective, rotation of leadership positions, and presence of norms to avoid the tyranny of the structure lessness, Indymedia is thus nearly a classic exemplar of large but beautiful decision making. All of this is made possible by its dedication to radical democratic ideas, which have established themselves as organizational rules, and its creative use of the Internet[7].

Looking at our whole sample of 208 GJMOs, it seems to be true that bigger organizations, whether assessed by budget, the number of volunteer or paid employees, or the number of members, tend to be more oligarchic and less 'beautiful' than their smaller counterparts. Simply said, it is incorrect that all big businesses end up becoming oligarchies. In order to strike a balance between organizational effectiveness and involvement, several huge companies unexpectedly excel at involving their members. The most notable success story is that of Indymedia, which seems to adhere to its model of deliberative and consensus-based decision-making in a number of settings, regardless of size and organizational challenges. This is made possible by a number of factors, including adherence to the principles of unity, the Internet, and a set of guidelines designed to prevent oligarchy. Therefore, size does not always equal ugly, especially when working groups, spokes councils, and creative Internet use are present.

Some major groups, like Friends of the Earth in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, have recently embraced participation in tandem with the growth of the GJM in an effort to keep up with contemporary political innovations like those embodied in the Aarhus Convention and new SMOs that call for greater participation from the grassroots. SMOs are responding to requests for more engagement from grassroots participants in greater numbers, often with the use of the Internet to encourage wider participation. In addition, the necessity to stay current with trends within the larger movement forces GJMOs to encourage greater involvement. As more GJMs adopt participatory decision-making, it gains popularity within the movement.It is inaccurate that

all small organizations closely resemble the ideal representation of democracy in operation, just as it is untrue that all huge organizations eventually end up being oligarchies. Few seem to have particular guidelines to make sure that their organizations do not become vulnerable to implicit or unintended oligarchies or power structures, although they may have values and practices of agreement and discussion. That does not, however, imply that small cannot come close to beauty. As Freeman mentioned, spreading knowledge and seeking to share abilities to improve equality are all beneficial. While some participants will always be more involved and/or committed than others, and natural friendship groups are inevi and not necessarily ugly, it is difficult to prevent the formation of friendship groups and informal oligarchy. The optimal practice would be for members in small groups to at the very least be aware of implicit power structures and to try to militate against them by promoting inclusion and equality to the greatest extent feasible in order to avoid inclinations towards ugly decision-making[8].

GJMOs must keep in mind, nevertheless, that achieving perfect democracy is impossible. Small groups almost always develop friendships and unofficial power structures. The Internet is a helpful tool for large groups to avoid oligarchy, but it should not be overlooked that access to the new technologies is still uneven due to the digital divide, which, in reality, means that white, wealthy, young men continue to be the social group most likely to use the Internet, hardly promoting inclusivity among racial groups, genders, and socioeconomic classes. The best course of action is to strive for as much real participation as you can while giving everyone who wants to participate creative freedom. The most effective strategy for big organizations to enable such freedom to develop is to establish smaller working groups and/or a spokes council arrangement. Even under such a system, however, the more knowledgeable or self-assured people might rise to the position of informal oligarchs, suggesting once again the need of skill-sharing and/or confidence-building for all movement members.

However, giving creative freedom priority can reduce an organization's effectiveness. The problem of whether to sacrifice creative freedom or orderliness, or, to put it another way, participation or efficiency, is at the core of most activist discussions regarding internal organizational decision-making. Some organizations, like Indymedia, where consensus and participatory decision-making strategies appear to prevail even in the face of conflict, clearly prefer creative freedom and participation over orderliness. Other organizations, such as ATTAC France, emphasize their preference for order over participation. Others continue to strive for a middle ground between the two, such as ATTAC Italia, which aims to be federative but not fragmented, participatory but not inefficient.There are additional significant elements in addition to size that influence oligarchic tendencies. It seems that the organization's ideological stance and chosen method of handling organizational issues are important.

Only hierarchically controlled organizations with a mostly passive rank-and-file that adheres to a well defined line of command can formal left-wing groups expect to bring about the kind of revolution they are seeking. It is obvious that the consensus approach will not be preferred by an organization that wants to make choices quickly and effectively. However, it must be remembered that organizational effectiveness can come at the expense of dissatisfaction from members, supporters, and local group activists, as demonstrated by the case study of ATTAC.The most crucial thing that GJMOs may take away from this is how crucial it is to live up to their commitment to democracy. ATTAC wants fundamental improvements in the ways that undemocratic IFIs make decisions, but it does not, or is unable to, put its ideal into practice within the confines of its own organization. If ATTAC wants beautiful global democracy, it can

strive to model that kind of decision-making in the decisions it makes for itself. Even though Indymedia's decision-making is far from perfect, it offers a model to which most large GJMs could aspire, and from which ATTAC, it appears, could learn a lot[9].

The Global Justice Movement Organizations have employed a variety of kinds of action, from prayers and petitions to marches and blockades to the destruction of property, to make their criticism of neoliberal politics known. This intricate language of action reflects the movements calling for a fair and peaceful globalization's often declared variety. However, it is highly improbable that the actual forms of action used dispersed at random across the GJMOs. Instead, structural and ideational factors influence the choice of various activities from the stock of available resources. The majority of research on action repertoires to far has focused on individual decision-making and protest event analysis.

Studies examining movement organizations' repertoiresour main point of referencehave a tendency to concentrate on small samples. By examining the relationship between GJMOs and their action repertoires, we contribute to the body of literature.By providing typologies of action forms and theoretical justifications for the circumstances and factors that influence the decision to choose a certain sort of action, we will first explain our primary categories in this. Second, we will outline our database and how we operationalized the GJMOs' preferred course of action. Third, we provide a descriptive analysis of the empirical distribution of action forms, our dependent variable, and the co-relationships between these forms. The investigation of elements, both internal and external to GJMOs, which correlate with their action repertoires is the focus of the fourth and primary part. Finally, we compile and explain our key results[10].

CONCLUSION

In general, GJM organizations contribute significantly to the advancement of international justice and the development of a fairer and more sustainable world. They are assisting in the creation of a more equitable and democratic future for everybody by opposing the current economic paradigm and promoting alternatives. Organizations affiliated with the GJM are diverse, but they all share a dedication to democracy, human rights, and the fair allocation of resources. At the local, national, and international levels, they have been effective in influencing policy choices and mobilizing public opinion. However, GJM organizations also deal with issues like internal conflicts, repression by governments and businesses, and a lack of resources. GJM groups are increasingly collaborating and creating alliances with other social justice movements, such as the labor and environmental movements, to address these issues.

REFERENCES:

[1] B. Juego, Rethinking Samir Amin’s legacy and the case for a political organization of the global justice movement, *Globalizations*, 2019, doi: 10.1080/14747731.2019.1654774.

[2] P. Almeida, Climate justice and sustained transnational mobilization, *Globalizations*, 2019, doi: 10.1080/14747731.2019.1651518.

[3] A. Choudry and E. Shragge, Disciplining Dissent: NGOs and Community Organizations, *Globalizations*, 2011, doi: 10.1080/14747731.2011.585855.

[4] D. Schlosberg, Reconceiving environmental justice: Global movements and political theories, *Env. Polit.*, 2004, doi: 10.1080/0964401042000229025.

[5] B. Juego, Rethinking Samir Amin's legacy and the case for a political organization of the global justice movement, *J. World-Systems Res.*, 2019, doi: 10.5195/jwsr.2019.949.

[6] A. C. Perez, B. Grafton, P. Mohai, R. Hardin, K. Hintzen, and S. Orvis, Evolution of the environmental justice movement: Activism, formalization and differentiation, *Environ. Res. Lett.*, 2015, doi: 10.1088/1748-9326/10/10/105002.

[7] B. Rodríguez-Labajos *et al.*, Not So Natural an Alliance? Degrowth and Environmental Justice Movements in the Global South, *Ecol. Econ.*, 2019, doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.11.007.

[8] S. Villamayor-Tomas and G. A. García-López, Commons Movements: Old and New Trends in Rural and Urban Contexts, *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*. 2021. doi: 10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-102307.

[9] P. Almeida, Climate justice and sustained transnational mobilization, *J. World-Systems Res.*, 2019, doi: 10.5195/jwsr.2019.946.

[10] M. Deveaux, Poor-led social movements and global justice, *Polit. Theory*, 2018, doi: 10.1177/0090591718776938.

CHAPTER 12

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

Krishna Mohan Malviya, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Email Id:- kmmalviyaadv@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Conceptual and theoretical reflections are critical components of academic inquiry and research. These reflections involve examining and analyzing the underlying concepts and theories that inform our understanding of a particular phenomenon or problem.In academic research, conceptual and theoretical reflections help to clarify and refine the research question, provide a theoretical framework for the study, and guide the selection of appropriate research methods and data analysis techniques. They also help researchers to identify gaps and inconsistencies in existing knowledge and to develop new theoretical models or frameworks.Conceptual and theoretical reflections are also essential in disciplines such as philosophy, social theory, and critical theory. In these fields, scholars engage in critical reflection on the underlying concepts and assumptions that shape our understanding of the world and our social and political structures.

KEYWORDS:

Conceptual Analysis, Epistemology, Social Theory, Theory Development, Theoretical Reflections.

INTRODUCTION

Forms of action may be interpreted extremely broadly to include all varieties of internal activities carried out by movement organizations. However, we concentrate on activities that have an external focus and are intended to advance the cause of the organization. Many of these activities fall under the category of collective protest or collective contention because we are studying social movement groups.Different levels of aggregation can be used to conceptualize forms of action, from very specific activities to somewhat broader categories to generic types or general strategies. We, the international team of researchers2 who developed the study and gathered the data used to support it, did not produce a detailed list of acts that may comprise dozens of categories. Even yet, we continue to differentiate between certain fundamental and commonplace acts, such as protest, strike, and building occupation.

These actions are components of a repertory of contention, which Tilly defined as a set of means has for making claims of different kinds on different individuals or groups. As a grammar of interaction between a challenger group and its target groups in a certain historical context, he proposed the idea of action repertoire. This repertoire's breadth, or the range of alternatives accessible in a certain circumstance, and structure may be examined, exploring how various types of action interact as compatible, distant, and so on. Tilly makes the assumption that groups only have access to a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberative process of choice rather than the complete range of the theoretically possible repertory. Although repertoires are learned cultural creations, they don't derive from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda. instead, they are the product

of struggle. As a result, the decisions made by a single group or a larger group of groups also reveal something about how these groups see the conflict and the targets of that conflict. An organization selects a small subset of the possible ways as an effective and practical strategy to achieve, or at the very least approach, its objectives.

Different forms of action rely on various conditions and convey various messages. Take a look at a few illustrations. The strike is a traditional form of protest that is often lawful and is orchestrated by a specific social group to assert its rights against an employer. State authorities are not, or not directly, addressed, unless there is a true political strike. Contrast this with a civil disobedience act, like as blocking a military camp's entrance to voice opposition to the use of nuclear weapons. In this instance, the protest tactic is not indisputably linked to a particular social group. Additionally, it targets state authorities rather than a private company. Additionally, it frequently involves breaking the law. As a result, it is an unlawful and non-institutionalized form of protest. The protest, whether it be a strike or a blockage, may be very taxing on the participants and may carry the possibility of consequences like losing their jobs or receiving a judge's punishment. When it comes, for instance, to signing a petition encouraging a local administration to establish a children's playground, personal commitment and risk are essentially missing.

Additionally, this activity is not disruptive and does not necessitate the physical presence of all protesters. Social scientists have used scales with a variety of graduating levels in various efforts to identify and standardize various sorts of contentious acts. Tarrow, for instance, offers a three-part categorization of collective action based on a more specialized list of types of action, dividing conventional from confrontational/symbolic and violent forms of action. Using a categorical scale with the poles of conventional politics: voting, lobbying, formal interest groups, etc. on the one hand, and sabotage, guerrilla warfare, hijacking, assassination, bombing, revolution, kidnapping, war, on the other, Marsh and Dalton, with some modifications, have located forms of unconventional political behavior. Between these two extremes, according to Dalton, there are four categories of 'unorthodox' activities: boycotts. unofficial strikes. rent strikes. and illegal protests, occupations, destruction, and violence. It is believed that a threshold must be reached before behavior may shift from being more conventional to being more unorthodox.

For modern democracies operating in a state of normality, survey data has indicated that the more radical an activity, the lower the participation rate. This, obviously, has something to do with both the moral standards of the majority of individuals as well as the increased danger of punishment in situations of extreme action. They see breaching the law as unacceptable or only acceptable in very rare circumstances. And a very small portion of the populace supports political actors who use violence to further their objectives.Political organizations like GJMOs may be categorized in a manner like that of Marsh and Dalton. When all GJMOs are taken into account, they fall under the broad category of conventional politics, somewhat unorthodox, and even some violent behavior, albeit they do not include the most damaging types of guerrilla warfare, bombing, etc. Although the organizational landscape of these movements is ideologically and otherwise very diverse, as suggested by the literature on the GJMs, most groups are far from combining all these forms of action. These groups show a preference for certain types of action but not others in specific circumstances as well as with respect to more general strategic preferences. they are inclined to cling to a particular style or sub-field of action.

This is due to the fact that selecting an action repertoire is not only an instrumental necessity made in response to a particular situation. It is dictated by a habitus5 that makes the employment of one sort of action seem nearly normal while other forms are viewed as irrational and improper and, as a result, are not even given consideration.This claim serves as the foundation for our first hypothesis. It is a widely held belief that certain organizations, especially the group of more formal NGOs, have a pragmatic bent and are willing to communicate and even work with both governmental administrations and private businesses. Radical organizations, in contrast, reject such cooperation and favor the use of disruptive tactics, albeit they don't always exclude all types of moderate activity. For instance, in Germany, we have shown the presence of two rather distinct clusters that are connected by a reasonably potent intermediate cluster that has ambivalence toward both the moderate and the radical branch. We anticipate the GJMOs to fall into two or three major groups when it comes to their preferred modes of action since this intermediate cluster is weak or nearly missing in certain other nations.

The level of knowledge is rather inconsistent when it comes to the subject of what influences the action repertoire or simply what elements determine it. Both theoretical presumptions and empirical results on the micro-level, or the involvement of people, are based on in-depth study. For instance, it has been shown that those with higher levels of education are more interested in politics and more active in both conventional and unconventional forms of political engagement. Furthermore, it has been discovered that younger and more educated individuals are more likely than less educated and/or older individuals to engage in unconventional behavior. The questions that are often asked in this kind of survey research, however, decontextualize political engagement, making it difficult for us to identify for what political purposes, within what organizational framework, and in which particular struggle the respondents took part. The information concerning retail options is fairly sporadic at the level of social movement groups. We anticipate that both organizationally specific and environmental variables are at play[1].

This prompts us to develop further theories. We suppose that organizations with a moderate ideology favor non-confrontational forms of activity whereas so-called anti-systemic groups, in this instance anti-capitalist groups, choose confrontational means of action. We also assume that organizations favoring representational democracy are less likely to utilize confrontational action than those favoring'strong', participatory, or grass-roots democracies, both within their own ranks and on the society level at large. Additionally, the former groups tend to favor more formal, professional structures. Finally, it's crucial to understand the social movement organizations' context in order to comprehend repertoire choices. While SMO structures and values are the best explanation for differences within a region, national trajectories in political culture and political opportunities can be used to explain differences between regions. We hypothesize that organizations in nations with sharp left-right divisions and/or nations with firmly conservative governments are more likely to engage in confrontational types of activity than organizations in other nations.

DISCUSSION

Dataset and operationalization

The analysis in this article is based primarily on interviews with GJMO representatives in six different countries and on a global scale. During telephone or in-person interviews, representatives or activists were questioned about their group's involvement in the protests, relationship with the government, and other topics. One question asked, Has your group engaged

in any of the following forms of action within the last five years? was about the GJMOs' tactical decisions.The associated list included eight items.Although lobbying was specified as a main strategy to achieve the organization's goals, we assume that the common practice of meeting political and administrative representatives can also be treated as a tactical choice similar to organizing a demonstration or blocking a road. We added the results for the item on lobbying that was introduced in the interview as a strategic choice to the responses on this question for analysis. We didn't ask any questions concerning violent forms of action because we believed GJMOs seldom employ violence and, even if they did, their spokespeople wouldn't be willing to confess their organization participated in the damage of property or the use of violence against individuals[2].

We may rely on the responses from the interviews and, to a lesser degree, on information from a review of the written papers from the GJMOs to identify the independent variables. On this foundation, we can reconstruct the groups' internal structures and values as well as details about how the groups interact with their environments.We must be certain about the sample's makeup in order to evaluate the analyses' findings. The selection criteria for the sample favor big, organized organizations that are noticeable on the national level and those that are most relevant with reference to a particular sector in the national context. A sample that had been individually tailored for each national branch of the GJMs would have produced different results for countries where the GJMs inherit a strong horizontal network structure from the new social movements as opposed to being dominated by parties and trade unions. However, this approach would have made it harder to compare the movement sectors of different nations.

The data at first sight reveals that GJMOs use a variety of action mechanisms. The interviewees listed up to nine action types when asked which ones their group had utilized often. More than two approaches were mentioned by seventy percent of respondents. The introduction to this volume previously provided the distribution of the sample's most prevalent action types. As it has been shown, a fairly substantial percentage of all groups engage in protesting and petitioning, whereas only about a quarter of them have engaged in aggressive methods like blockade and occupation.This preliminary discovery has to be looked at in more detail. We conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis linking the action forms based on the replies of the respondents to evaluate our initial hypothesis. The study supports the separation of the acts into two groups. Insofar as strike, blockade, boycott, occupation, and civil disobedience emerge as one distinct cluster, while petition, demonstration, lobbying, and artistic or cultural performance comprise another, the theoretical distinction between confrontational and non-confrontational forms of action is supported[3].

Blockade and building occupancy, the two action types with the largest costs, appear as being most closely related in the first cluster. Blockade and occupation are similar to civil disobedience, a word that has numerous interpretation options but often connotes breaking the law or other formal restrictions. The cluster is further exacerbated by boycott and strikes, two very common forms of protest. Civil disobedience and strikes, despite their lesser intensity, are nevertheless confrontational in the sense that they aim to hurt the enemy, either materially or metaphorically.The second category of action forms is most closely related to petition and demonstration. Both strategies are often used. The next association is with artistic or cultural acts as an expressive, open expression of disapproval. Although lobbying has the greatest distance from other forms of action and is typically invisible to outsiders, it still belongs to the second cluster.As was already said, it is rather usual to distinguish between confrontational and non-

confrontational modes of action when analyzing the strategies of social movements.However, researchers have a tendency to see this divide as a binary. This is mostly because it is used to evaluate protest occurrences as a whole. Protests are typically classified as either non-violent or violent, moderate or radical, conventional or unconventional when action repertoires are examined on a macro level based on newspaper reports.This allows comparisons to be made and trends to be examined.

However, a look at the meso level shows that moderate and confrontational forms of action are not incompatible for GJMOs. Nearly all of the groups we interviewed used non-confrontational action, or at least one form that falls under this category. In addition to this, various organizations argued their points in a combative manner. Out of 202 organizations, 130 used at least one combative tactic in addition to their more restrained arsenal. This result defies our first theory. GJMOs don't fit into categories where some use moderate kinds of action and others use extreme ones. Instead, the moderate repertory is expanded to include combative action patterns. The UN conferences on environment and development, a turning point in global governance, were attended by the German Bund für Umwelt and Naturschutz Deutschland in the 1990s. This environmental NGO used several action forms concurrently. The organization also participated in protests against the official summits outside the conference sites at the same time. For the rest of this, we'll suppose that moderate and confrontational forms of action are used concurrently and make a distinction between those who solely use non-confrontational forms of activity and those that also employ confrontational tactics. This simple example bisection will be used to analyze repertoire selections.

The fraction of organizations that employ the moderate repertoire is often larger among those groups who also use confrontational action, which is likely due to the fact that these groups are typically highly driven and active. The use of lobbying, which is more prevalent among organizations that only utilize moderate activities, is the lone exception to this tendency[4].The actions that respondents added to the pre-existing list offer a sense of the range of protest tactics that the organizations really use. For instance, GJMO officials mentioned street theater, alternative walking tours, protest camps, and speeches at shareholder meetings. Additionally, a lot of the mentioned activities in the interviews highlight the significance of knowledge-based forms of action. Representatives of the GJMO identified significant modes of activity as conferences, speeches, screenings of films, leafleting, and the creation of publications.

The Impact of Democratic Institutions and Principles

Are internal practices and preferences for certain organizational structures connected to the adoption of moderate or confrontational activities, as shown by grass-roots organizations engaging in civil disobedience? The relationships between these two groups of variables demonstrate that organizational values and structures do in fact matter. Compared to GJMOs that are hierarchically organized and use the delegation principle, those that embrace horizontality and first-person politics are more likely to take aggressive measures. When the dependent variable is crossed with the four-fold depending on the level of delegation and the consensus vs the majority principle, the relationship between the two becomes clear. The usage of confrontational modes of action is closely correlated with the two domains that reflect a poor degree of delegation. Only one of the five groups that prefer the assembleary model uses only moderate actions. the other four all favor confrontational behavior[5].

More precisely, the kind of action taken is connected to how inclusive the primary decision-making body is. GJMOs that make decisions largely in assemblies are more likely than other groups to use confrontational strategies like blockade, boycott, or civil disobedience. The preferences for particular organizational models and related processes support the structurally discovered relationship: GJMOs supporting the notion of non-hierarchical decision making are less likely than other groups to limit themselves to the moderate repertoire of action. The other axis in the four-fold does not seem to be a significant component, despite the fact that the degree of power delegation appears to be a very strong predictor of action repertoire. The usage of moderate and aggressive modes of action, respectively, does not reflect the distinction between organizations that follow the majority rule and those that follow the consensus principle. The usage of the consensus vs majority principle in general, or the assembly's manner of decision-making in particular, show no appreciable distinctions between these groups.Returning to the original claim, our study demonstrates that democratic group norms have an impact on the preferred action repertoire. When arguing their points, GJMOs who favor horizontal decision-making and who are ostensibly critical of the representative system as a whole frequently employ aggressive tactics.

The Impact of the Themes and Structural Traits

Values have a role in the decision-making process and organizational structure, but other elements directly connected to the culture and structure of the organization are also likely to have an impact on the action repertoires that are chosen. For instance, while organizations with large numbers of formal members are typically reluctant to use confrontational actions, many small and informal groups may also be more inclined to do so as can be seen with regard to the so-called autonomous groups from the radical Left not least because they typically lack nominal representatives who could be held accountable.To provide another example, organizations that rely on outside funding, particularly those from state governments, may exhibit more restrained behavior than financially independent organizations. For instance, a lot of groups working on environmental or immigration concerns at the level of EU politics have this relationship. A significant amount of the European Union's operating expenses go to the European Environmental Bureau, an umbrella organization of national environmental organisations that spans the whole EU. It is unavoidably more moderate than, for example, Friends of the Earth Europe, which gets minimal income from the EU, and Greenpeace European Unit, which flatly rejects sponsorship from the government and business. Thirdly, Dalton demonstrated a significant correlation between environmental groups' ideological tendencies and their preferred course of action[6].

We find that organizations belonging to the New Left/anarchist/autonomous sector are most likely to engage in confrontational behavior when they are assigned to broader social movement segments based on the context in which they originated, their ideological leanings, and their affiliations to large networks. Old Left organizations come next, then the movements we classified as new social movements. Although one might anticipate that groups focusing on peace and human rights would not strongly tend toward disruptive actions, it was surprising to find that the groups assigned to the new global category that is, the newest cohort of groups that most closely relate to the GJMs are least likely to use confrontational actions. This contrasts sharply with how those groups are portrayed in the majority of the media. Additionally, groups based on collective members are less likely than those based on individual members to engage in aggressive behavior. In particular, when organizations have a nominal leadership that may be

held accountable for unlawful actions, we think that this latter outcome can be explained by the higher reluctance of organizations as a whole to take risks. Additionally, it makes sense that in the context of a GJMO, individual members are more likely to support confrontational actions than are collective members due to organizational logics and internal dynamics.

We find a predictable and obvious conclusion when examining solely the organizations that are overtly anti-capitalist in their self-descriptions. The employment of confrontational tactics is substantially more likely among anti-capitalist GJMOs than it is among all other organizations.Trade unions, grassroots social movement groups, political parties, and youth organizations are shown to have the highest tendency to participate in disruptive behavior when considering the kind of organization. NGOs, official social movement groups, and cooperatives have the least tendency to engage in disruptive behavior. Trade unions' tendency to take the lead does not always reflect their broader propensity for disruption. Instead, it results from unions' use of strikes as a natural weapon, which was a component of the confrontational cluster, per the cluster analysis shown above. Other group factors, such as group age, self-attribution to the GJMs, the number of volunteers, the amount of the budget, the presence of members who pay dues, and the existence of formal laws, do not significantly correlate with the kind of activity[7].

Given that both organizational tendencies are frequently viewed as leading to ideological and tactical moderation and ultimately causing the group to become toothless, it is important to examine the roles of two additional organizational characteristics, including degree of formalization and professionalization. This is especially true in light of Robert Michels' writings on the iron law of oligarchy. A relationship with the form of action may be discovered when five formalization markers are combined. However, only two of the five indicatorsnamely, the existence of a formally adopted program and a formal membershipwere used to arrive at this conclusion. These two traits have a definite correlation with the usage of combative behavior. The conclusion is true even if trade unions are not included in the study. This result runs counter to Michels' presumption.

The only plausible explanation is that radical groups may also adopt a formal resolution or a kind of program and depend on official membership, as is the case with most Trotskyist organizations.However, the outcomes in terms of professionalization are entirely consistent with Michels and many others' hypotheses. Groups with higher levels of professionalism have a stronger propensity for moderately aggressive behavior. When taking into account the quantity of paid members/staff and the presence of outside funding, significant correlations could be found.When considered together, the data on formalization and professionaliza-tion provide us with an ambiguous pattern regarding widely held beliefs on the relationship between organizational characteristics and forms of activity. While the results for formalization are inconclusive, Michels' hypotheses regarding the effect of professionalization on the action repertoire are confirmed.

The Effect of the Environment on the Groupings

Organizational characteristics cannot fully account for the activities of social movement groups. When advocating for political and social change, GJMOs engage with a complex political environment that includes target audiences, adversaries, and third parties. This is partially reflected in strategies that place a strong emphasis on the importance of both objective and perceived political chances.First off, the structural and conceptual traits of the groupings mentioned above are already impacted by outside forces. In contrast to and as an alternative to

representative institutions, which are seen as giving relatively little involvement, organizations who stress grass-roots democracy, for instance, are inclined to do so. Similar to this, organizations that support grass-roots democracy may be skeptical of some of its friends who depend on formal, hierarchical institutions[8].

The struggles of GJMOs to effectively frame issues, bring about or obstruct political decisions, and make marginalized groups visible are also based on prior experiences and imply ongoing interactions with reference groups like governments, other political organizations, and an audience like bystanders or the general public. Their ideas of democracy and social change influence how GJMOs approach these reference groups and, therefore, the particular kinds of action they choose. These ideas change and develop in an interactive process. In many large GJM protests, the left-radical black bloc, for example, expresses disengagement from and opposition to the government and its representatives. The black bloc represents defiance to government efforts to welcome and calm down dissent even in its physical manifestation. By sending out riot police in response to the black bloc, official institutions create experiences of exclusion that serve to reinforce the bloc's symbolic distance from the state.

As predicted, our data show that GJMOs without strong ties to state institutions or who do not seek them out are more likely to engage in confrontational types of activity. Organizations are more likely to use confrontational tactics if they consider rejecting partnerships with representative institutions as a good objective. Of course, these organizations have no favorable interactions with the government that may be endangered by conflicts. More importantly, these groups believe that using their arsenal of confrontational tactics will help them to maintain their challenger status in the conflict arena[9].Even though refusing to cooperate with state institutions is associated with confrontational behavior, this association is only significant at the national and transnational levels. However, there appears to be some ambivalence in dealing with administrations at the local level. As an example, consider the Berlin Social Forum, which favors aggressive tactics. To ensure the survival of an occupied social center, the group had to negotiate with the district mayor, even though they would not see cooperation with administrations as a good value.

Many other groups with a predominately confrontational action repertoire have similar experiences of being forced into negotiations to achieve short-term goals. GJMOs are likely to avoid confrontational acts if they want state funding or plan to work with state institutions, goals that clearly not all organizations share. The desire to be seen as a responsible spouse who merits support and a reasonable participant is the apparent motivation for this self-control. For organizations on the Radical Left spectrum, the situation is different. These organizations wouldn't beg for money, and the government wouldn't want to give it to them. But even Greenpeace, which can hardly be described as a left-radical organization, rejects state funding in order to preserve its independence. After all, civil disobedience was how Greenpeace got its start and is being used today.

Dependence on government financing is one sign of a close connection with the state. Government-backed GJMOs have a significant preference for the employment of restrained actions. The same holds true for organizations that obtain funding from non-governmental sources outside of their own ranks.14 The Bundeskoordination Internationalismus, a German network of leftist organizations that promotes solidarity with the global south, may demonstrate the effect of non-governmental money. The Protestant Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst

provided financial assistance for the network and its annual conference for a number of years. In 2005, the EED withdrew its support when participants in a BUKO-congress alluded to shoplifting favorably as a political tactic. Although the BUKO chose not to condemn the tactics of political shoplifting in this instance by accepting a significant financial loss, it is clear that other groups' decisions are influenced by the threat of financial loss. It is hardly unexpected that extreme Leftist organizations accuse moderate NGOs of sacrificing their objectives and range of options in order to get outside financing[10].

Self-restriction in terms of action repertoire happens in relation to more than just the desired state. Boycotting, which is largely used to protest companies, may be dangerous and should only be used under extreme circumstances. Because they have little faith in the awareness of the majority of consumers, some organizations do not view boycotts as an effective tactic. They worry that if a boycott call is only partially heeded, its proponents will suffer more harm than the boycotted company because they will lose their reputation and potential power over businesses and decision-makers. For instance, the Italian organization Campagna Banche Armate, which opposes financial institutions' role in the manufacture and trafficking of weapons, opts not to advocate boycotts. Instead, it organizes mailing activities and disseminates information to maximize support.We must remember that GJMOs grow in broad political and cultural contexts in addition to their specific interactions with their settings. Actually, the concept of action repertoires was first created to explain the nature and extent of conflict in a national context. According to academics, national societies have come to agree on what actions are normal and suitable as opposition expression. In times of transnational mobilization, this domestic protest culture does not, or does not significantly, disappear. Instead, non-domestic and foreign influences alter and permeate national contexts.

Our findings indicate that the frequency of a moderate or confrontational action repertoire is in fact strongly correlated with national origin. Roman nations, which often have a more pronounced left-right divide, are known for their combative protest cultures. Switzerland, Germany, and the UK, in contrast, seem to have created rather successful procedures to lessen conflict, such as opening up governmental institutions to dealing with issues that are expressed from. This may be seen in these nations where GJMOs are less likely to use aggressive tactics.For instance, civil disobedience is pervasive even in official organizations like the communist trade union Confédération générale du travail and the green party in France, the country in our sample where GJMO confrontational acts are most prevalent. Rather than being limited to a radical minority, actions like supporting immigrants facing deportation or destroying genetically modified crops are broadly supported. Left-leaning elected representatives engage in civil disobedience by flashing their mayoral insignias or waving the French flag.

Another characteristic at the national level seems to be important in addition to national protest cultures. In hypothesis, we presupposed that the political inclination of the national government affected the repertoire choice. In fact, over the five years before to the interviews, aggressive forms of activism were used in nations with conservative governments.What modes of action do organizations in the Global Justice Movement adopt, and what factors impact their decisions? Based on a dataset created from interviews with 210 organizations across six European countries, we attempted to provide an answer to these two questions. A list of action forms that the responders might add to was provided. We eventually identified nine alternative types of action, including taking into consideration a second question on the organization's desired approach[11].

Overall, the groups participated in a considerable amount more moderate than disruptive acts, although they did span the whole spectrum from very mild to extremely disruptive actions16. A cluster analysis, which may demonstrate if certain activity types are grouped together, displays a distinct pattern. The nine fundamental modes of activity used by the organizations may be easily divided into two groups. The moderate activities, on the other hand, represent a cluster in which petition and demonstration are most closely related. On the other side, the more antagonistic or disruptive operations comprise a second cluster, with blockade and occupation being the most closely related.However, by using either moderate or confrontational actions, the groups do not completely fit into the two subcategories. A far larger percentage of the groups utilized at least one kind of confrontational action in addition to moderate activities, whereas only around one-third of the groups used just moderate forms of action. Only one group exclusively used combative tactics. These findings significantly refute Hypothesis, in which we connected political orientation to a particular action repertoire. This conclusion is consistent with much earlier findings from the Political Action Study, which were drawn from surveys of people who likewise preferred to mix conventional and unconventional political engagement.

Overall, it was not surprising that GJMOs have a wide range of action styles in keeping with their ideological, thematic, cultural, and structural diversity. The exact actions that groups decide to take, as we have assumed from the start, are impacted by both internal and external forces in addition to being connected to one another.The adoption of horizontal organizational structures, avoidance of delegation, preference for decision-making in assemblies and/or are based on individual membership, as well as membership in the New Left/anarchist/autonomous sector and having a clear anti-capitalist stance are all favorable to the choice of confrontational strategies. Our hypothesis 2 and 3 are supported by these findings. Contrary to popular belief, organizations with a formally adopted program and formal membership are more likely than other organizations to engage in combative behavior. This contradicts a portion of hypothesis. Conversely, more professionalized groups have a tendency to use a moderate action repertoire, which is consistent with Michels' oligarchy thesis and a different aspect of hypothesis.

We discovered that groups that refuse to form connections with representative institutions in general and with national and international public institutions are more likely to use confrontational actions, contrary to what one might expect, but the picture is less clear when it comes to local institutions. The results also support the idea that organizations getting funding from governments or non-governmental organizations are less likely to engage in violent behavior. Furthermore, compared to groups from Switzerland, Germany, and Britain, groups from Spain, Italy, and France as well as nations that were predominately governed by conservative governments during the relevant interview years are more likely to engage in confrontational behavior. This supports our sixth theory. It's interesting to note that the sample's really international organizations had the highest propensity for moderate behavior[12].

CONCLUSION

To conclude,it is important to reiterate two significant and reliable results. First off, although a sizeable percentage of GJMOs stick to the boundaries of the moderate action repertoire, a larger number rely on both moderate and confrontational action, and just one group employed entirely strategies from the confrontational repertoire. The kind of activities selected are strongly influenced by second, ideological inclinations, moral standards, structural qualities of the organizations, as well as aspects of their setting. Theories of rational choice that emphasize the

importance of instrumental considerations in the decision-making process fall short of offering a complete justification. The range of possible actions is influenced by democratic principles and internal decision-making procedures. Groups that favor participatory democracy, group decision-making, and avoidance of confrontation are more likely to use confrontational and disruptive strategies. Insiders are presumably already aware of this, but rigorous empirical research should still be used to demonstrate it.

REFERENCES:

[1] W. K, 'What Means Wellbeing? Distinction of Two Discourses on Well-being - Conceptual and Theoretical Reflections', *Int. J. Psychiatry Res.*, 2021, doi: 10.33425/2641-4317.1100.

[2] É. Espinoza-Cisneros and L. Álvarez-Vargas, 'Conceptual and theoretical reflections on the agency-structure binary from a humanenvironment geography perspective', *Estudios Geograficos*. 2021. doi: 10.3989/ESTGEOGR.202068.068.

[3] D. Herrera-Pastor, N. Frost, and C. Devaney, 'Understanding contemporary Family Support: Reflections on theoretical and conceptual frameworks', *Soc. Work Soc. Sci. Rev.*, 2020, doi: 10.1921/SWSSR.V21I2.1420.

[4] V. Madureira, D. Silva, M. Trentini, and S. Souza, 'Conceptual analysis methods in nursing: a theoretical reflection', *Esc Anna Nery*, 2021.

[5] A. M. P. Sánchez and J. R. S. Palacio, 'The cause-effect relationship between social and financial exclusion/inclusion. A theoretical approach', *REVESCO Rev. Estud. Coop.*, 2021, doi: 10.5209/REVE.69168.

[6] D. Zahavi and A. Roepstorff, 'Faces and ascriptions: Mapping measures of the self', *Conscious. Cogn.*, 2011, doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.011.

[7] M. Busse and R. Siebert, 'Acceptance studies in the field of land use—A critical and systematic review to advance the conceptualization of acceptance and acceptability', *Land use policy*, 2018, doi: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.05.016.

[8] J. Nafuna, B. K. Chacha, and C. Choti, 'Squarter Question and Politics of Settlement Schemes in Trans-Nzoia Kenya: Some Conceptual and Theoretical Reflections', *Sch. J. Arts, Humanit. Soc. Sci.*, 2021, doi: 10.36347/sjahss.2021.v09i06.005.

[9] E. Crettaz, 'The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on working poverty: Theoretical and conceptual reflections', *Sociol. Lav.*, 2021, doi: 10.3280/SL2021-161001.

[10] L. Bornmann, 'Letter to the editor: On the conceptualisation and theorisation of the impact caused by publications', *Scientometrics*, 2015, doi: 10.1007/s11192-015-1588-4.

[11] A. M. Terzi, D. P. Matos, M. L. Rodrigues, and M. Demarzo, 'Mindfulness in education and Paulo Freire: A reflective approach', *Interface Commun. Heal. Educ.*, 2020, doi: 10.1590/Interface.200015.

[12] C. Ziebart and J. C. Macdermid, 'Reflective Practice in Physical Therapy: A Scoping Review', *Physical Therapy*. 2019. doi: 10.1093/ptj/pzz049.

CHAPTER 13

ONLINE UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICS: INTERNET AND GLOBAL JUSTICE

Radha Vij, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Email Id:- csradhavij@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Unconventional politics online refers to the use of digital and social media platforms to engage in political activism and advocacy that falls outside of traditional or mainstream political channels. Unconventional politics online includes a diverse range of activities, such as online petitions, protests, social media campaigns, and hacktivism.The rise of digital and social media has transformed the political landscape, providing new opportunities for citizens to engage in political activism and advocacy. Unconventional politics online has enabled marginalized groups and individuals to amplify their voices and challenge traditional power structures.

KEYWORDS:

Activism, Digital Activism, Online Mobilization, Political Communication, Social Media, Technology.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet, like other communication technologies, has an impact on how people and organizations behave, interfering with interaction at both the individual and group levels. In comparison to traditional forms of communication like the press, telegraph, radio, television, telephone, and fax, it seems that social scientists anticipate the electronic revolution to bring about significant changes that will need the use of specialized ideas. The terms e-participation, e-governance, and e-voting all refer to a broader transition brought about by new technologies, one that promotes a e-democracy, which is characterized by more chances for people to engage in politics because of the Internet. As with other technologies, the argument over their benefits and drawbacks has long divided observers into skeptics and supporters. From this vantage point, the discussion and study around the Internet and the different aspects of democracy that this book addresses have become linked.

In terms of participation, the Internet has been positioned as a technological advancement that might increase both the amount of information producers and users, in contrast to television and other expensive forms of communication. By making more information accessible to citizens, inequality would be reduced and the participation of the weaker people would be facilitated. This belief has been refuted by studies on the digital divide, which highlights the fact that, like previous technologies, the Internet benefits those who are better off in terms of individual and communal resources. It has been suggested that the Internet might enhance democracy's deliberative character by enhancing communication and aiding in the development of an alternative public realm. From this vantage point, it is clear that the Internet has enhanced both the quantity and diversity of information sources accessible. More intensive social relationships are also associated with its usage. However, more pessimistic opinions have also surfaced in this area regarding the ability of new technologies to foster communication across social and

ideological divides. Onand offline communication environments don't seem to vary much in terms of communication quality.

The early research, which were focused on political players and institutions, emphasized how little interaction there is on the websites of political parties and organizations. Political parties and politicians utilize the Internet in much the same manner they use other media platforms in this regard, since potentialities are limited not just by available resources but also by deeply ingrained cultural practices.Social movement groups, as well as loose networks and unorthodox political structures more generally, have become more open to experimentation and permeable to technological developments, with a more creative and dynamic use of the Internet, thanks to their greater flexibility. Particularly, it appears that new technologies have given those actors a quick and affordable means of communication across borders, encouraging mobilization and favoring looser and more flexible organizational structures. However, other authors have offered a more pessimistic view on the Internet's democratic potential, even in the field of social movement studies, due to the limited availability of interactive channels as well as the low uptake of these services when they are made available. Since both conventional and non-conventional political actors appear to struggle to fully utilize the Internet's democratic potential, it presents both new opportunities and challenges for resource-poor actors' collective action.

In our empirical research, we have addressed the general issue of social movements using the Internet by introducing specific questions in a survey of attendees at the 4th European Social Forum in Athens and in our questionnaire to organizations involved in the Global Justice Movement in our selected countries, as well as by systematically analyzing some general qualities of the Web sites of 261 organizations that are part of the GJM.The information that follows will initially provide information on the Internet use of GJM groups and activists. Then, we'll concentrate on relevant characteristics of websites, evaluating the empirical performance of our population of sites on indicators related to information provision, identity construction, transparency, mobilization, and lowering user access and usage disparities. After examining the internal correlations between the various qualities we identified, we will then focus on possible explanations for the disparate attention paid to different potential qualities of the Web sites. Finally, we will evaluate the impact of organizational and contextual factors on the qualities of Web sites[1].

Online unconventional politics: How activists use the Internet and their opinions on its effectiveness. The Internet may be used for many different things, much like previous communication channels. Some of these goals have received particular attention in research on social movements. First off, it has been said that the Internet increases the ability to organize people via the dissemination of alternative information and through protest. Epistemic communities and advocacy networks convey knowledge on global problems with the use of the internet, emphasizing the negative effects of economic globalization, potential alternatives to neoliberalism, and diverse battles throughout the globe. These organizations assisted in the development of the GJM by connecting organizations operating in various regions of the world and offering alternative expertise on certain topics. They also provided access to and exposure on the Web. For the mounting of international campaigns, inexpensive communication has been especially important. Protests are increasingly being thought of, organized, carried out, and assessed with the aid of the Internet, according to mounting evidence. Computer-mediated communication made it possible to use e-petitions, which have also been used to call attention to specific human rights violations, pressure governments to abolish the death penalty, and target

European institutions. It also made it possible to use net-strikes, in which many users connect simultaneously to the same domain at a predetermined time, jamming a site that is seen as a symbolic target and blocking other users from reaching it.

Second, it has been noted that the administration of social movement groups makes significant use of the Internet. In reality, computer-mediated communication may alter organizational structures, making more decentralized organizational structures feasible. The fundamental characteristics of the types of social movements developing in the Information Age are compatible with the Internet. To use a historical comparison, the industrial factory serves as the organizational foundation for the labor movement's constitution throughout the industrial age.The internet is more than just a technology. it is both a communication medium and the physical foundation of one particular organizational form, the network. The movement is being shaped on its own web-like image, according to Naomi Klein, with hubs at the core of activities and spokes that link to other centers, which are autonomous but interconnected. Transnational campaigns are now longer-lasting, less centralized, harder to start and stop, and more adaptable in terms of networks and objectives owing to the Internet.Third, the Internet has been commended for fostering the development of new collective identities by providing a public forum for discussion. Social movement academics have emphasized how the Internet may create new identities. The Internet offers opportunities for reflexivity, as shown by our earlier study on the usage of SMOs' Web sites during the mobilization against the G8 in Genoa in 2001.

Online discussion groups and email lists encourage disagreements over particular options before to a protest and, subsequently, encourage 'remote' activists to reflect collectively on a demonstration's success or failure. The Internet may be effective in organizing and teaching inside social movements, but in terms of expressing identities, it is a valuable but limited instrument, it is true that the Internet's contribution to the collective identities of social movements mostly consists in reinforcing existing ones. Even said, real communities can and do take root in internet-based space, according to this statement. In reality, virtual communities may take on an identifying role, developing social networks with internal cohesion and shared values that operate both online and offline. Internet use among Global Justice Movement activists is a crucial component of communication, according to the DEMOS poll of Athens ESF participants. A significant portion of respondents, in particular, use the Internet to express their political opinions, share information with their own group, and engage in modest online protest. The Internet is often utilized as a tool for information sharing with one's own group and is frequently used for lobbying and campaigning as well. Opportunities to express political beliefs online are there but less common[2].

Internet usage is connected to the degree of activity of the respondents, as the more mobilized populace also utilizes the Internet more, whereas gender and education show no relationship with frequency and kind of use.With identification with the movement, multiple organizational memberships, participation in GJM protest events, and the use of multiple forms of political participation, the various Internet uses all increase. Offline and online demonstrations are closely connected and often support one another, as has previously been mentioned elsewhere. More activists utilize the Internet to engage in civil online action and to voice their political beliefs, both inside and outside of their own organization, the more they identify with the GJM. The significance of belonging to one or more organizations is further shown by the fact that activists utilize the Internet more often as a means of political protest and opinion expression the more groups they are active in. If we take the degree of mobilization into account, we may see similar

tendencies. The peculiar characteristics of these activists, who tend to belong to specific types of loose organizations and to have a repertoire of action more oriented towards radical forms of protest than does the rest of the sample, are confirmed by the lower scores of correlation coefficients concerning Internet use for net-strikes and activists performing other radical forms of online protest.

When we asked speakers for GJMOs about the impact of the Internet in general and their organizations' websites in particular on their communication with various actors and constituencies during a portion of our research, the results at the individual level are highly compatible with their assessments. Over 40% of the groups reported a positive impact, but the overall assessment of how the Internet has affected communication with public officials is largely negative. Only one-fifth of interviewees give a negative evaluation of the impact on relationships with the media, while more than 70% of respondents say that the Internet has improved communication with the media, according to interviews with GJMOs. Finally, optimism is prevalent, especially when respondents are questioned about the role that the Internet plays in connecting with supporters and members. Negative assessments in this scenario are very rare and were only seen in southern European nations, where around one-quarter of the groups had a mixed view[3].

DISCUSSION

A representative of a local social forum summarizes the widely held beliefs about how the Internet affects various publics by sayingI don't get the impression that the Internet encouraged increased engagement with elected officials. On the contrary, they typically disregard online behaviors that are usually unsuccessful. In this instance, we launched a cyberattack on the National Institute of Nuclear Physics' website as part of our campaign against the massive infrastructure projects the Berlusconi government had planned. During the consideration of directives pertaining to topics like genetically modified food, water, and the Bolkestein directive, we also arranged a mail-bombing at the European level using the email addresses of MPs, but it was ineffective. This is a result of public decision-makers' lack of knowledge about these internet behaviors. When it comes to our relationship with the media, I believe that the Internet is fundamental since press releases, images, and other materials are posted on our website and utilized as sources by journalists for their articles. Nevertheless, I think that the Web site primarily helped us draw in informed and interested visitors. however, it didn't prove to be very effective for reaching out to the general public because TV and in-person interactions are more crucial for that.Therefore, it is particularly useful for certain public opinion groups that are already informed but not for the general public[4].

Our activists do not completely reject computer-mediated communication with public administration and politicians, despite it being less trustworthy. The Internet has a crucial and strategic function for us. it is a component of our communication and pressure-applying strategy, according to a representative for the ecopacifist organization Rete Lilliput. We are utilizing it in a really innovative manner to plan online pressure campaigns against national lawmakers as well as against local legislators. We have utilized mail-bombing to target political figures, and the results have been fascinating.It is important to note that most respondents mentioned the topic of Internet communication outside of our particular questions and framed it as being vital throughout our study. Some interviewees draw attention to the possibility that new technologies can make the distribution and sharing of power easier, particularly in relation to the impact of the

Internet on organizational internal life. Particularly, online resources like mailing lists turn into permanent assemblies. Some organizations use open publishing and open management systems to increase participation in organizational life and democratize the organization, preventing the concentration of power in the hands of a select group of highly skilled technologists. In fact, several respondents stigmatize the potential for new inequities since technological skill tends to provide authority to a select few. Fear of alienating certain activists caused individuals to restrict the use of new technology and favor face-to-face contact in some circumstances. In other cases, people formed organizations dealing with Internet-specific concerns in an attempt to educate their members about Internet usage.

Additionally, GJMOs occasionally choose not to use interactive tools because they believe it would be too time-consuming. Particularly more established groups like unions are concerned about this. We don't provide people the opportunity to directly express themselves and to post their opinions on platforms and agreements, even if this is what they ask us for more, according to the webmaster of the left-leaning metalworkers union in Italy,Opening a forum would need a new approach to website administration since it would require devoting one person to the forum, but we don't have that option[5]. When it comes to conceptualizing and understanding the Internet, some of our interviewees mention a generational divide within and between old and traditional organizations/members and new and innovative groups/activists, with older generations not conceptualizing the new media as something radically different from traditional ones. Some activists emphasize the unique ability of the Internet to foster participation and deliberation, going beyond an instrument- al vision of the medium. A leader of the Italian Young Communists claims that the use of digital technologies has revolutionized political activity. Actually, the internet is a political platform. It's more than simply a tool. It's a place where, despite the strong drive for privatization and control, millions of people work together to create criticism and oppose the exclusive vision of the Internet that Microsoft and Windows advocate. It is also a political space since it stands for an arena of debate and conflict without parallel.

However, using the Internet cannot be thought of in isolation from other forms of communication. Face-to-face interactions are crucial for the development of virtual networks, which do not develop on their own, according to several respondents. Additionally, rather than serving as a replacement for current relationships, the Internet is frequently seen as something that enhances them. The internet is extremely essential to us, but it is just a tool and cannot replace other types of contact that we value highly, according to the Rete Lilliput spokeswoman. Other interviewees strongly emphasize the need for visual and physical contacts, saying things like, We have chosen to have a series of physical meetings like seminars and assemblies because we think that some events cannot be mediated or replaced by the internet. In conclusion, the Internet is seen as a way to increase participation in organizational life, but it also raises worries about the potential of exclusion for those who do not have access to it, as well as the corresponding power inequalities. It enables communication with journalists and fosters the development of close bonds with members. However, none of the people we spoke to believed that face-to-face interactions could be replaced by online communication. rather, they believed that it merely increased the possibilities and frequencies of communication among geographically separated people[6].

Attributes of Websites

We considered the actual implementation of these possibilities as a matter for an empirical investigation that, following some prior research, we have focused on the organizational Web sites. If our SMOs and their activists are indeed interested in the Internet as an instrument that might reduce the cost of communication and make it more inclusive. We also hypothesized that different Web site designs may pay attention to certain qualities in different ways. In the sections that follow, we'll analyze several strategic decisions made while building one important piece of Internet-based technology, a website, and describe how those sites performed on certain key analytical dimensions.The dissemination of information is the Internet's first significant contribution, particularly in terms of enabling greater discourse. A website may perform a crucial task by selecting a portion of reality, organizing a collection of meanings, and offering an interpretation. More than other social movements in the past, GJM-affiliated SMOs emphasize the value of developing a specific knowledge base. The majority of the websites we examined provide a considerable quantity of information. They typically include bibliographical references as well as possibilities for political education via articles, papers, and dossiers.

Nearly four out of five of our websites have a news section, and more than half of them publish conference and seminar materials that let interested users learn more about particular subjects. We may remember that the Web sites of Eastern European NGOs supplied a news section in only 48% of the instances and information about conferences in only 16% of the cases in order to put our findings in a broader comparative context.The usability of a website, or its capacity to help visitors access pertinent information quickly, is another crucial factor that influences the content's quality. Site maps and search engines should make it easier for users to locate what they're looking for quickly. It seems that SMOs recognize this need since almost 60% of them provide a search engine, and nearly 30% do the same for a site map. However, only about a quarter of the websites offer translations of the group's basic facts, and only about a fifth do so for the section identifying them. If we take into account the very global character of the movement's concepts and activity, this appears like a rather low percentage. Language barriers continue to be problematic barriers to transnational communication, even though one could argue that borderless communication develops more through mailing lists than on websites. It appears that national civil society organizations still find it challenging to communicate with each other across borders in a globalizing world[7].

The ability of the Internet to support debate by encouraging the creation of new identities online is a second significant possibility it presents. While specific tools like forums and mailing lists encourage ongoing communication and discussion among activists, websites provide opportunities for self-presentation to the general public. The value of Web sites for creating a record of an organization's work and for information dissemination is often emphasized by the activists we have spoken with. Websites serve as electronic business cards for organizations, reflecting their identity and prior accomplishments. The identification and history of the group itself are one sort of information that is often displayed on the websites of GJM groups. In all, almost two-thirds of those analyzed provide a press release archive, an archive of annual reports, or a timeline of the organization's history. Additionally, about two-fifths of the organizations in the survey have online collections of old leaflets and records of previous meetings that are regarded as crucial moments in their collective history. Less than 25% of the websites under analysis post the group's internal work schedule publicly, but more than 50% of them offer a newsletter that is typically accessible to all visitors. A members-only area may be found on the

websites of organizations that are more focused on improving internal communication with their members. this is the case for one-quarter of the websites under analysis.

This brings up a further quality that is important for the formation of a group identity via online discussions.The existence of certain apps on a website, such as forums, mailing lists, blogs, or chat lines, demonstrates the organization's dedication to multilateral interaction via the establishment of public platforms for discourse among varied individuals. The websites under analysis provide a variety of applications for multilateral interactivity. About one-third of the websites offer an asynchronous discussion forum. Similar indicators reveal that roughly one-fifth of Eastern European NGOs provide tools for engagement through bulletin boards, chat rooms, and the like, so this is not a particularly low percentage. It also shows that the majority of our groups do not see websites as forums for open discussion, nevertheless. Only 10% of cases involve the use of the newest information management techniques, such as open publishing, and the same percentage of websites allow users to respond to specific requests for comments from organizations or to surveys and questionnaires designed to gather user opinions on a range of subjects[8].

The enormous information storage capacity of the websites also offers chances to enhance accountability and transparency, two other crucial aspects of democracy. The vast majority of the SMOs in our sample utilize websites to increase openness regarding their internal operations. Up to 80% of websites include information about the organization's reach and physical location, which is 70% of the time either immediately available from the homepage or is only a click away. Even more groups post their bylaws online, and almost two-thirds of them do so with information about the group's organizational structure. Information regarding the Web site itself is less common. just 16% of sites provide any indication of users' access to the site, and only 25% of sites provide information about the recent upgrading. Only 25% of websites provide information on their organization's finances, likely also due to frequently low budgets.

The organization's readiness to open itself up to public scrutiny by opening up direct lines of communication with website visitors is shown by the availability of contact information for those who are actively participating, both with leadership and with other recognized responsibilities. In this way, the presence of contact information signifies a development beyond one-way communication tools. Nearly 90% of websites offer a general email address for the business, 30% of which are on the homepage. Both the examination of European parliaments online and the example of Eastern European NGOs revealed a comparable proportion. The distribution of email addresses for other members of the organization is not as common, though, with only 40% of the websites under analysis including the webmaster's address, 31% including other members of the organization or departments, and 14% including the person in charge of international relations.

Less than half of the groups that recognize the presence of a leader share information about that individual, and approximately a quarter provide the leader's contact information to other users. The responses to an email we sent requesting information about the site's management also demonstrate the general information service and webmaster's responsiveness.6 Overall, the response rate ranged from 31% for the request sent to the general email address to 45% for the one sent to the webmaster.As was previously stated, activists are particularly attentive to the potential for online mobilization and the resulting increased chances for political engagement. The degree to which mobilization duties are performed on the websites of our selected SMOs

varies greatly. The use of the Internet for offline protest is the most common. When compared to Eastern European NGOs, which only publish their action calendars online in 42% of cases, more than 60% of organizations do so. A third also makes the online action calendars of other GJM groups available, and a similar share offers specific details on offline forms of action. Nearly one-fifth of the Web sites under analysis deal with the planning of physical meetings for offline forms of action, and about one-third of them provide information on these forms of action[9].

Up to two thirds of our websites promote the organization's involvement in a protest effort. Additionally, the Internet offers tools for online protest like e-petitions, net-strikes, and mail-bombings. Many hackers who focus on the Internet and engage in online protest are members of the GJM who fight for privacy rights and against copyright. On our websites, however, online forms of action are promoted less frequently than offline strategies: nearly 30% of the Web sites under analysis use online petitions. nearly 18% suggest an online mobilization method like the e-postcard. and 15% provide specific details about online forms of action. If we take into account calls for net-strikes and/or mail-bombings, the proportion drops even further. other types of online mobilization are far more common, but they are still only seen on a small number of sites.The ability of websites to bridge the digital gap might be their ultimate desirable trait. The degree to which the Internet enables the mobilization of various demographic groups, particularly the least technologically educated, is an open subject often explored by activists and in Internet literature.

Although they also highlight the role of movement organizations in introducing their members to the Internet, our own data from a survey of activists attending the first European Social Forum in Florence partially confirm the existence of a digital divide within social movements. However, it doesn't seem like the organizations we chose for our analysis are particularly interested in this matter. In reality, less than 10% of companies provide labs, help desks, and other electronic tools to introduce their consumers to the Internet. 5% give free email. and just 8% host Web pages or websites. Only about 5% of the websites offer a text-only version that makes their content accessible to users with slow connections or outdated hardware. On the homepage of an examined website, we very seldom found mention of the accessibility problem. Therefore, only a small number of SMOs that are focused on this issue address the issue of the digital divide, while others obviously do not see it as a top priority.

Contextual Traits, Organizational Traits, and Website Attributes

How can we explain the different Web sites' differing accentuations on the various facets of communication? The impacts of technological advancement have often been explained in terms of technology. Similar to this, technical know-how has been used to explain the characteristics of Web sites, for instance, when the sites of political groups show a noticeable improvement as a result of hiring expert Webmasters to handle their design and administration. The models that adapt technology to organizational styles and tactics as well as contextual factors have been found in recent study, nonetheless. Most researchers today concur in highlighting the importance of the agency in defining the online environment, challenging the technical interpretation of the Internet as being ableowing to its intrinsic networked logic to favor decentralization of power and empowerment of individuals.

Therefore, it is believed that there is a twoway relationship between technology and its users social relations shape how more hierarchical organizations are used because they are more static and less interactive, while technology influences social relations. Third, there is a strong

correlation between online and offline mobilization and intervention on the digital divide. Organizations that do well in both areas seem to be more focused on empowering individuals by promoting participation and exposing them to new technology.The correlation coefficients between the aforementioned additive indices and contextual factors demonstrate that the Internet is more likely to be utilized as a tool for offline mobilization in the group of protest-oriented nations where Internet access is still patchy. It is more often used for information providing and identity construction in the same nations. The likelihood of using the Internet, particularly as a tool for promoting transparency or accountability, is greater in nations that are more oriented toward traditional modes of activity and where Internet access is more widespread[10].

Transparency, information supply, and online mobilization may all be explained by the initial organizational qualities we took into account. As informal and local groups pay less attention to formal structures, the degree of formalization and the territorial level of organizations are both correlated with the index of transparency. Organizations with more centralization seem to spend more on information provision. in fact, a role-based structure is linked to increased focus on the creation and dissemination of online knowledge. The degree of openness may be explained by the organization's age and financial capabilities. therefore, older and richer organizations are likely to be more honest online. In contrast, less formal groups are more likely to mobilize online since they seem to employ this medium's more innovative features as a tool to increase their mobilization capabilities. However, organizational characteristics do not help to explain how the Internet is used to bridge the digital divide or spread knowledge about offline mobilizations.

We also tested whether elements of democratic models used by the organizations under analysislike power distribution and decision-making processeswere linked to online democracy indices. It was shown that transparency was adversely connected with limited delegation and consensus-based decision-making. This outcome was predicted since younger, less institutionalized, and resource-poor organizations tend to be more imaginative when it comes to democratic methods. As a consequence, they provide less financial and organizational structure information on their websites. On the other hand, we see that an organization is more likely to address the digital gap if it gives the executive less authority. Greater awareness of the risk of exclusion brought on by new technologies and a greater willingness to allocate resources to what might be considered the democratic deficit of the Internet appear to characterize younger organizations born within the cycle of protest against neoliberal globalization.

We have kept an eye on how movement traditions affect our indices of online democracy since the GJM is a movement of movements, often made up of people and organizations affiliated with previous social movements. First, despite the fact that correlation coefficient values are frequently significant, it is important to note that the majority of them are not particularly high. It is clear that the index of transparency is adversely correlated with the new global organizations that arose with the establishment of the GJM and tend to be less structured and resource-rich than the norm. The contrary explanation explains why older movement areas like the Old Left, solidarity/peace/human rights, and new social movements do better on transparency than other SMOs. While new international organizations struggle to provide information, they do a better job of using the Internet to mobilize people both offline and online. This may be accounted for by their more recent appearance and favorable attitude toward an original and imaginative use of new technology. The Internet is increasingly actively utilized by SMOs that fall within the category of new social movements in order to build and enhance their online identities. Human rights, peace, and solidarity groups spend even less money online to bridge the digital gap. This

evidence reaffirms the problematic nature of this dimension, given that different social movement sectors have been concentrating their efforts on increasing mobilization and openness.

Real and virtual

The Internet has been hailed as a democratic media in addition to being a new one. Undoubtedly, our data show that social movement organizations and their activists heavily rely on it, particularly for internal organizational functions and public mobilization through informational campaigns and protests. The Internet enables the construction of international and cross-issue networks by lowering communication costs. It enhances several core democratic principles, particularly the opportunities for participation and discourse, by improving internal and external communication.

In Social Movements, Democracy

The research of the websites of GJM-affiliated groups demonstrates the significance of the Internet. However, we found that SMOs give the various Web potentialities varying amounts of attention. The main purposes of websites are to disseminate information, mobilize offline, and foster more transparency. In contrast, there is a very restricted use of the Internet to socialize and mobilize people to new technology, and interaction is lower than predicted, but not in absolute numbers when compared to comparable groups[11].The organizational and contextual factors contribute to an understanding of the strategic decisions made by SMOs. SMOs often prioritize information availability and openness in northern nations while prioritizing identity creation and mobilization in southern nations as a means of cultural adaptation. Our study supports the idea that actors define the particular goals that must be accomplished via the use of new technology. Deterministic presumptions are questioned by the realization that technology is not a distinct item that acts externally to affect social interactions, as Pickerill discovered in studies on online environmental activism.

In actuality, various SMOs often take use of various technical advancements, resulting in the creation of websites with unique attributes. The focus placed on certain traits is encouraged by various circumstances, and organizational models seem to be reflected in the features of websites. Particularly, SMOs focused on more formal and hierarchical organizations appear to use the Internet more traditionally, whereas less formalized groups typically use more interactive online tools as well as various computer-mediated protest techniques. The many aspects of the Web sites are influenced by movement traditions as well as democratic ideas.In general, our data appear to demonstrate a trend of path dependency in the characteristics of Web sites less resourceful, informal, and younger SMOs tend to develop a more innovative use of the Internet, whereas more resourceful, formal, and older groups tend to use it as a more conventional communication medium. Further investigation and empirical data are needed to support this observation. In fact, despite the fact that we discovered that tiny, unconventional firms are more likely to innovate with new communication technologies, they often underperform on other Internet potentials. Parallel to this, some formal organizations are expanding their use of the Internet beyond its conventional role as a source of information.

CONCLUSION

Overall,online unconventional politics is a quickly developing sector that presents both potential and difficulties. While it has the potential to challenge established power structures and give

citizens more agency, it also calls for critical thought and ethical deliberation to make sure that it upholds democratic principles and advances social justice. However, there are drawbacks to unconventional politics online, such as the spread of misinformation, cyberbullying, and the swaying of public opinion. Online platforms may be used to promote misinformation or misleading information, as well as to magnify extremist or intolerant viewpoints. The Arab Spring and the Black Lives Matter movement are two examples of how unconventional politics online have helped advance social and political change. By using digital and social media, activists may swiftly organize, plan actions, and participate in global networks to accomplish their objectives.

REFERENCES:

[1] L. Mosca and D. della Porta, Unconventional Politics Online: Internet and the Global Justice Movement, in *Democracy in Social Movements*, 2009. doi: 10.1057/9780230240865_9.

[2] D. K. K. Leung and F. L. F. Lee, Cultivating an Active Online Counterpublic, *Int. J. Press.*, 2014, doi: 10.1177/1940161214530787.

[3] L. Mosca and D. della Porta, Unconventional politics online: Internet and the global justice movement, in *Democracy in Social Movements*, 2009. doi: 10.1057/9780230240865.

[4] R. M. Milner, The world made meme: Discourse and identity in participatory media, *ProQuest Diss. Theses*, 2012.

[5] F. Trevisan and P. Reilly, Ethical dilemmas in researching sensitive issues online: lessons from the study of British disability dissent networks, *Inf. Commun. Soc.*, 2014, doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2014.889188.

[6] R. M. Milner, The World Made Meme: Discourse and Identity in Participatory Media. University of Kansas, *Univ. Kansas*, 2012.

[7] F. Trevisan and P. Reilly, Ethical Dilemmas in Researching Social Media Campaigns on Sensitive Personal Issues: Lessons from the Study of British Disability Dissent Networks, *SSRN Electron. J.*, 2012, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2164729.

[8] S. H. Lee, Why Does the Press Still Matter? Explaining the Conditional Effects of Online Mobilization of Protest on Newspaper Market Structures in Asia, *Korean J. Int. Stud.*, 2018, doi: 10.14731/kjis.2018.08.16.2.253.

[9] C. Ritzi and A. Wagner, New Ways of Being Critical. The Political Participation of ‘critical citizens’ at Different Ages, *Polit. Vierteljahresschr.*, 2018, doi: 10.1007/s11615-018-0105-9.

[10] A. Carrington, Speculative fiction and media fandom through a lens, darkly, 2009.

[11] J. Ettler, When I Met Kathy Acker, *M/C J.*, 2018, doi: 10.5204/mcj.1483.

CHAPTER 14

GENERATIONAL IMPACT: AGE AND VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Karishma Agarwal, Assistant Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Email Id:- karish.amit@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The age of an organization can has a significant impact on its vision of democracy. Younger organizations may be more likely to embrace more radical or transformative visions of democracy, while older organizations may be more conservative or pragmatic in their approach.Younger organizations may have a stronger sense of urgency and a greater willingness to experiment with new forms of democratic practice, such as participatory decision-making or grassroots mobilization. They may also be more likely to challenge traditional power structures and to promote more radical visions of social change.

KEYWORDS:

Democracy, Generational, Global, Intergenerational Dynamics, Organizational.

INTRODUCTION

Organizations engaging in the global justice mobilizations have been portrayed as the creators of new forms of transnational collective participation, offering creative strategies for uniting, organizing, and discussing. According to this perspective, the Global Justice Movement is innovative in terms of organizational structure.A critical critique of this viewpoint is offered in many books. They stress on the intricacy of the relationship between the local and the transnational levels while highlighting the national foundations of global justice movement. Understanding the growth of the GJM in France involves both a focus on the individual trajectories of trade unionists and activists in the late 1980s and early 1990s as well as an analysis of the effects of François Mitterrand's 1981 presidential win on the French mobilizations in the 1980s. In a similar vein, Rucht et al. also emphasize the effects of the reunification process on the German protest scene while analyzing the rise of global justice mobilizations in Germany.Furthermore, the concepts of local and global should not be mutually exclusive. Indeed, mobilizations that are global can produce local Transnationalization is really a polysemic term that refers to at least three distinct processes: the spreading of new difficulties, the internationalization of domestically organized demands, and the externalization of global stakes.Such specifications allow us to put two visions at a distance from one another.

Transnational forms of protest are a mechanical result of capitalism's globalization, according to certain commentators or activists. The network nature of capitalism also explains why protest is often reticularly organized and drawn to ideals like openness, consensus, and horizontality. Such an analysis has to be qualified: While Francesca Polletta's work on US social movements throughout the twentieth century demonstrates the long history of consensus-driven and horizontal forms of organization, organizations involved in mobilizations dubbed as altermondialiste are very infrequently centered around transnational claims.But one shouldn't use

these reflections as a reason to completely discount the likelihood that the GJM and its organizations will create new features and a genuine transnational engagement. In fact, many players in modern movements identify as part of the GJM, expressing more than a mere name but rather a shared identity or culture.Using the DEMOS interviews, this will concentrate on these topics. We will discuss generational disparities within our groups in order to explore how time affects the organizational aspect of the global justice mobilizations. Here, we'll consider whether these organizations actually put their purported novelty and transnationality into practice by implementing specific guidelines and strategies that would make a movement out of the nebula involved in Social Forums, counter-summits, campaigns, and other forms of global justice sociability.Given that the GJM is based more on the bloc recruitment of already-existing organizations, movements, and networks than it is on the direct enlistment of individuals, focusing on the organizational dimension and the role of age is particularly crucial. The debate over innovative principles or new democratic forms, on the one hand, and the existence of a vast variety of organizations made at various eras, on the other, make the question of organizational generations far from a peripheral one[1].

DISCUSSION

Age, in our view, is either associated with innovation and change, or stability. As a result, it is difficult to define precisely what age implies for an organization. The significance of age, which may be seen from numerous angles, cannot be resolved by analyzing the effects of organizations' ages on their practices and tenets. On the one hand, the analysis may be tied into the idea that social movements and actors change through time as they gain knowledge from their errors and work to avoid making the same ones again. This is because newly formed organizations take into account the triumphs and failures of earlier ones. The innovations brought with reference to and in opposition to prior experience may be related to differences between the newest components of the mobilizations on global justice and the oldest players engaging in them.On the other hand, one may emphasize that there are several stages in the growth of any group of people youth, for instance, could be a safeguard against institutionalization, routinization, and the loss of radicalism or, conversely, a contributor to political naivete. The fact that not all organizations go through the same stage of growth at the same time might be used to explain differences. Therefore, when examining how age affects an organization's features, claims, and practices, it is important to keep in mind that age has multiple meanings.

We built a relevant periodization using the year that the companies in our sample were founded in order to operationalize our concept of age. Thus, we identified four periods. The 'old' organizations were established in the first. The 68 global mobilizations mark the end of this era since 1968 may be seen as a turning point in both the social and political spheres. Before such mobile organizations, the workers' movement was the dominant, if not the only, social movement. Trade unions often had close links to left-leaning political parties, and its hierarchical, delegation-based structure required that the majority of members elect representatives to different levels of the organization. But not all of these old organizations are unions or political parties. many charitable organizations, whether or not they are religious in nature, were founded at the turn of the nineteenth century.Organizations established after 1968, on the other hand, were analyzed in terms of new social movements, or cultural movements, which questioned the tenets of societies rather than challenging the mode of production. The second phase, which started in 1969 and lasted until the fall of the Berlin Wall, is a complex one. While worker mobilizations and strikes decreased as a result of the economic crisis of the 1970s,

the so-called new social movements stabilized organizationally and were able to propagate their demands. Some leftist activists have used political violence in some European nations. Again, regional differences matter. For example, in the 1980s, François Mitterrand's rise to power in France on the basis of a programme commun endorsed by socialists and communists did not have the same effect on social movements as Margaret Thatcher's neoliberal policies did in the UK[2].

The year 1989 may be seen as a significant global turning point since the collapse of the Berlin Wall ushered in a time of suspicion of ideologies and speculation about the end of history. Social movements distanced themselves from political parties as a result of having to reevaluate the function and political significance of the communist parties.The 'Battle of Seattle' brings to an end the time period when the collapse of the Berlin Wall began. The demonstrations against the WTO Millennium Round staged by various informal networks of activists in 1999 might be seen as the prelude to the global justice mobilizations. Furthermore, these events are crucial to the activist imaginary because they were horizontally organized, frequently by a small group of activists, and heavily reliant on the Internet. Some scholars have even examined the Internet as a crucial instrument for creating a global civil society whose structure mirrors the World Wide Web. However, it is crucial to keep in mind that global mobilizations on issues did not start with the Seattle protests. Although their generalization and spread began in 1999, the origin of these mobilizations can actually be traced back to the early 1970s.

The distribution of the organizations under study during the four eras is as follows. In the combined database, 14% of the organizations were founded before to 1968, followed by 19.9% between 1969 and 1989, 35.6% between 1990 and 1999, and 30.5 in or after 2000. We arrive at certain conclusions on the transnationalization of the newest groupings by looking at the geographical scales these organizations operate on. In fact, organizations created during the GJM's expansion are less likely than earlier organizations to incorporate international levels: 51.5% of organizations founded before 1968 do, compared to 38% of the most recent. The national level has also seen a decline, from 97.5% of organizations existing before 1968 to 64.5% of those existing in 2000 and after. However, Tilly has noted that this most recent phase is not the only one of denationalization, and that 21.4% of the groups formed between 1968 and 1989 lack a national level. This most recent phase began immediately following the time Tilly has identified as the most significant for national protests. While older organizations have the most multilevel structures that are largely present at all levels, the youngest organizations appear to be more drawn to the smaller scales.The next section will examine the many generation-specific traits of our organizations. For heuristic reasons, we shall distinguish between the internal and exterior dimensions of democracy, which pertain to interactions with institutions[3].

Age of Organizations and Democratic Practices

Analyzing the interior dimensions in terms of prefiguration According to Polletta, the label prefigurative has remained popular as a way to describe movement groups whose internal structure is characterized by a minimal division of labor, decentralized authority, and an egalitarian ethos and whose decision-making is direct and consensus oriented: organizations can shape their claims and test alternative practices while engaging in concrete forms of direct democracy.In fact, the GJM has made allegations pertaining to democratic problems. Its participants work to make democracy more effective, direct, participatory, or transparent. They have focused on more than just these assertions and demands, too. seminars conducted in Social

Forums, local assemblies held in squats, and unofficial gatherings held at counter-summits have all included discussions of the topic of democracy in the movement.

Delegation

The horizontality of the Global Justice Movement has been noted. Its participants have made an effort to stay away from representative processes in favor of more direct forms of democracy, with delegation being in opposition to participation. For instance, dele- gation is expressly forbidden on social forums. Their activists have emphasized reticularity and openness through public gatherings and affinity groups. Their organizational structure is frequently project-driven. in reticular universes, projects are the focal point around which horizontal engagement of cooperation will first begin[4].By examining several indicators connected to certain characteristics of our companies, we may analyze the degree of reticularity and, conversely, hierarchy. Delegation is not allowed, choices should be decided by agreement, and the network must grow.

These are only a few of the distinctive characteristics that have emerged in reticular spaces. Each of these factors has a role in determining the hierarchy and level of reticularity of GJM organizations. Delegations may be monitored using a variety of factors, including how transparent the decision-making process is and how institutionalized the job division is. A group may assign decision-making authority to a representative body. On the other hand, it may decide to totally open up its assemblies and allow all of its members to participate in the decision-making process. In this way, we may assess the possible impacts of generation on group democratic practices using two variables from our survey with representatives of GJM organizations. The first relates to those who are permitted to participate in group assemblies' decision-making procedures, while the second emphasizes the existence of an executive committee.

Recently founded firms value transparency. In fact, it is evident that the more recent an organization is, the more open it is. for instance, while no organization founded before 1968 permits 'whoever wants to join' to participate in the decision-making process, this is the case in 4.9% and 19.0% of organizations founded between 1969 and 1989 and 1990 to 1999, respectively. This openness may only be seen as a formal declaration when considering the actual operations of organizations. In fact, non-constitutional mechanisms can tend to close the entry, even if it is intended to be open to everyone. Friendship and affinity groups, as well as a lack of public notice of meetings, can limit participation to the most active members, effectively excluding potential participants as effectively as, for example, requiring a membership card. While only 11.7% of these young organizations define delegates as the decision-makers, it is undeniable that they have a tendency to oppose delegation. Organizations founded before to 1968, however, favor delegation.

The proportion of organizations that place members at the center of their decision-making process stays unchanged even as openness rises throughout the course of the four periods. In fact, one organization's democratic procedures may be determined by looking at the makeup of its assemblies and the way they make decisions. Groups may choose for a system in which only a select number of its members are in responsibility of putting the choices reached at assemblies into action. This may result in the professionalization of contestation, the effects of which have been examined in a number of studies, some of which highlighted the role it played in the resurgence of protest. However, groups with different sensibilities may choose not to attend

meetings of a specialized body if they see flatness as a way to strengthen democracy.This plainly shows that, at least via formal resort to an executive committee, the younger the organization, the more it resists specialization or task division. In fact, just 42.2% of the most recent organizations have such a committee, compared to 90.3% of the older ones. In addition, all organizations from the first three decades have an executive committee present at high levels. only in the most recent time are there more organizations without an executive committee than organizations with one. These variations may be attributed to the nature of organizations created after 1999, which tends to arrange groups around an open assembly as the exclusive forum for discussion and decision-making. However, the young age of the organizations can also be a factor in their horizontality because they may still be small enough to function without an executive committee. In a similar vein, they lack the funding necessary to establish an executive committee.

Indeed, as Polletta noted, opening up spaces for discourses serves to justify members' continued participation and is a goal in the development of the method of consensus. Through this continued participation, holding more meetings is a way to strengthen the group's cohesiveness outside of the decision-making process. In fact, refusing to formally establish a group in charge of the daily buildup may be a tactic for encouraging participants to often participate in the group. This involves a significant time investment, but when nascent organizations mobilize to build the bonds among its members, time may become a resource in this situation. Young organizations are still at a period when the goal, objective, and guiding principles need to be considered since they are not always well-established. It is crucial to include all members in these talks as a result. In fact, it may be said that participation is all the more important for collective actors that have few material incentives to distribute and must, therefore, win and maintain the commitment of their members on the basis of shared beliefs.

Decision-Making Method

One of the characteristics of the GJM has been identified as consensus, which is connected to the preference for reticular types of organization. The variety of the entities engaged makes it difficult to agree on voting processes. some propose the rule of one organization-one vote, while others advocate one member-one vote. However, it most importantly satisfies activists' desire to foreshadow the world they fight for. According to this viewpoint, consensus would be opposed to more traditional organizational structures that prioritized hierarchy and majority rule[5]. Agreement is less attractive to older organizationswhereas only 14.8% of organizations founded before 1968 make decisions by agreement, 24.4% of those founded between 1969 and 1989 do. The majority of organizations founded after 199055,4% of those born between 1990 and 1999, and 66,1% of those founded after 2000adopt consensus decision-making. But reciprocity is not always apparent: starting in 1990, organizations founded between 1969 and 1989 tend to vote more frequently than other organizations. Up until 1990, the majority vote was seldom used, whereas the usage of consensus grew steadily. Consensus may be attracted to as a direct result of transparency since when delegation is prohibited, no one can speak for anybody else. Therefore, only those who are in attendance at the assembly can make decisions.

Group's Transparency and Membership

The new forms of democracy's allure to openness would be one of its defining characteristics. Networks are designed to grow, or to link ever-more knots. For instance, the World Social Forum's Charter of Principles makes unambiguous reference to this objective. Numerous social science studies contrast older engagement practices with more modern ones that are

characterized by their plasticity and fluidity. Collective identities are seen as unstable and constantly shifting. Organizationally, this would result in various membership connections. We will concentrate on how organizations define membership in this section using three different indicators: first, groups can declare themselves to be open to recruiting members, which means they can distinguish between those who are members and those who are not. second, groups can formalize membership through cards or choose informality. third, membership can be free or, on the other hand, linked to fees, which can become an important financial resource for the group. Finally, we will concentrate on another important aspect of our groups: do they include just individuals or, on the other hand, only groups? Or do they adopt a hybrid nature that accepts both people and groups?Reticular universes place a high importance on variety and strive to tie together an increasing number of unique knots. When we examined the accessibility of non-members to participate in assemblies, we already had a preliminary understanding of openness. Here, we'll examine how the idea of openness manifests itself in our interactions with the group's members in more detail. A organization's declaration that membership is impossible really indicates that the group does not distinguish between members and outsiders[6].

More often than more contemporary organizations, those founded before 1989 announce that they are open to membership. Furthermore, only the third generation of organizations offer the option of terminating membership 13% of the organizations created between 1990 and 1999 claim to be without members. With this percentage increasing to 23.4% in the most recent generation, the proportion increases among the youngest organizations. Organizations founded after 2000 usually want to make their membership accessible to everyone, sometimes rejecting the whole idea of membership. This is also related to the distinctive culture of certain horizontal networks, which are averse to membership-based thinking. A noteworthy example is the French Inter-galactique Network, which was established to coordinate the G8 counter-summit groups in 2003. The group's activists refer to themselves as participants rather than members in the group's activities: One does not become an activist due to membership, but rather due to involvement in a group's activities, as suggested by Jacques Ion in his study of modern activism: membership is not dependent on declaration and recognition but rather on engagement.

Formalizing membership is uncommon. just 28.7% of organizations say they provide membership cards to their members. This assertion runs counter to a prevalent understanding of membership that was likely derived from the structure of working class political parties or labor unions. To identify long-time members from new ones, new members were given a card when they joined, which was often numbered. Even in more contemporary institutions, this symbolic quality still has a place. Open letters and emails, for instance, were sometimes signed with the contributor's name and credit card number during the ATTAC France issue. the smaller the number, the more credibility it was meant to convey. Less than one-third of the groups announce formalizing membership, which should cause academics to reevaluate an entire period of activism history that was built on the paradigm of working class movement. In actuality, informality predominates even in 'older' organizationsthe purportedly most 'classical'as just 40% of them admit to delivering cards to members. With 37.8% of organizations formalizing membership in the second period and 30.9% in the third, this ratio falls for the most recent periods, reaching a relatively low 10.4% for organizations founded in 2000 and later[7].

In reality, formalizing closure need not result in closedness. On the contrary, by making it obvious what the limits of organizations are, it may promote transparency. Clearly describing how to join, or how to become a member, is equally necessary when declaring who is in and who

is out. It's not just possible for engagement to stay flexible and pliable when there is little or no for- malization. The effectiveness and democracy of organizations are negatively impacted by lack of structure, as Jo Freeman's examination of feminist movements has shown. The absence of formalization, according to her, does not imply that all members are equal. rather, it means that the structure and, therefore, the distribution of power, remain implicit. This might create problems when organizations try to expand their membership or when they decide to take part in other political activities in addition to just raising awareness.As a matter of fact, it is true that very often, the most formal procedures enable the achievement of a always relative equality in participation and handling. Another excellent illustration of the effect of a lack of clear structure on a group's openness is the Intergalactique network. In it, the phrase becoming a member simply refers to signing up for the group's mailing list, where activities are discussed. Cooptation is the basis for membership. unlike trade unions, members of the organization do not actively seek out new members. rather, they co-opt people who approach them and express an interest in joining.

Additionally, joining can be challenging because ties that are initially weak in a horizontal network strengthen as a result of the group's activities, which can quickly start to become more selective. For instance, no new members have joined the email list of the Intergalactique network since 2006. It might be difficult for newcomers to understand how to participate in the group's activities if members choose not to differentiate between insiders and outsiders.Formalizing membership also affects the resources available to organizations since it may be either free or fee-based. If we take a look at paid dues, we can corroborate the trend towards the growth of informal activity. The percentage of membership without paid dues increases significantly during the whole time considered, from 9.7% for organizations started before 1968 to 24.1% for those founded between 1990 and 1999, and to 52.1% for those founded after 1999.Two distinct theories may be used to explain this ongoing pattern. First, a decline in formality would result in new membership categories and new membership regulations. In fact, other forms of resources, such as an organization's ability to mobilize outside of its active members, should also be considered when evaluating the political power of a group. In fact, the line between members, supporters, and friends is blurred by new forms of protest that do not always demand a significant commitment from their supporters[8].

Second, the emergence of a new activism could have caused a shift in the makeup of organisations, resulting in hybrid membership. Both individuals and groups are capable of forming new organizations. The core group of ATTAC, which was founded in France in 1999, is an excellent illustration of both the advantages and disadvantages of such a structure. Up to 20 000 individual members and founding organizations make up its membership.In truth, the organizations makeup in terms of collective vs individual members has evolved throughout time. Single groups, or direct recruitment organizations, are obviously on the decline: just 34.4% of groups founded in 2000 and later are'single' groups, while this is true of 75.6% of the oldest organizations. The formal membership concept, which is supported by dues and an official card, seems to be exclusive to these organizations. In fact, the rise of federations and ad hoc groupings in two distinct periods is what led to their demise. Only 24.4% of organizations founded between 1969 and 1989, 42% of those created in the years after, and 45% of those founded in 2000 and later are federations and networks. Ad hoc groups, or the temporary assembling of groups for a particular collective activity, begin to take shape after 1989 and spread quickly: 20,3% of groups formed after 1999 are ad hoc groups. This pattern demonstrates how activism has evolved from

distinct organizations to the collaboration of groups working on many issues and the development of campaigns with global perspectives[9].

CONCLUSION

Overall,A variety of elements, such as the organization's history, setting, leadership, and culture, influence the effect of organizational age on conceptions of democracy. Organizations may create more effective methods for furthering democratic practices and their desired social change by comprehending these variables. Older organizations, on the other hand, could be more well-established, have more resources, and have institutional backing, but they might also be more change-resistant and more firmly rooted in conventional patterns of democratic practice. They could be more interested in preserving stability and consolidating power than in overthrowing current power systems. Organizations may change over time, therefore the effect of organizational age on democratic ideas is not always predictable. While younger organizations may become more pragmatist and institutionalized as they grow and mature, older organizations may adjust to shifting social and political conditions and adopt more transformative visions of democracy.

REFERENCES:

[1] O. Bartov, ‘September 11 in the rearview mirror: Contemporary policies and perceptions of the past’, in *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, 2010.

[2] T. Brabazon, ‘Freedom from Choice’, *M/C J.*, 2005, doi: 10.5204/mcj.2461.

[3] E. A. Abade *et al.*, ‘All of a sudden, the Giants have bash and flash.’, *PLoS One*, 2019.

[4] K. Milberry, ‘Reconstructing the Internet: How Social Justice Activists Contest Technical Design in Cyberspace’, *M/C J.*, 2006, doi: 10.5204/mcj.2593.

[5] L. Green, R. Morrison, A. Ewing, and C. Henkel, ‘Ways of Depicting: The Presentation of One’s Self as a Brand’, *M/C J.*, 2017, doi: 10.5204/mcj.1257.

[6] B. Fredericks and A. Bradfield, ‘Co-Designing Change’, *M/C J.*, 2021, doi: 10.5204/mcj.2801.

[7] D. Barry, ‘Wilde’s Evenings: The Rewards of Citizen Journalism’, *M/C J.*, 2008, doi: 10.5204/mcj.29.

[8] R. Cohen, ‘Globalist: Paying a deadly price for U.S. global hubris’, *International Herald Tribune*, 2005.

[9] H. Combes, N. Haeringer, and I. Sommier, ‘The generational issue: The impact of organizations’ age on visions of democracy’, in *Democracy in Social Movements*, 2009. doi: 10.1057/9780230240865.

CHAPTER 15

GENERATION AND INTERACTIONS WITH INSTITUTIONS

Maneesh Yadav, Professor,
College of Law, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:- maneeshyadav1982@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The generation an individual belongs to can significantly impact their interactions with institutions, such as government, education, and the workplace. Each generation has unique experiences and cultural values that shape their attitudes and behaviors towards institutions. For example, baby boomers, who were born between 1946 and 1964, came of age during a period of economic prosperity and political activism. They tend to value stability and respect for authority, and they may be more inclined to trust institutions and work within the system to effect change. In contrast, millennials, born between 1981 and 1996, came of age during a period of economic instability and political disillusionment. They tend to be more skeptical of institutions and may be more inclined to challenge traditional power structures and advocate for more radical social change.

KEYWORDS:

Civic Engagement, Generational, Intergenerational Relationships, Institutional Trust, Political Attitudes.

INTRODUCTION

GJM organizations carefully construct institutional ties. These organizations do try to link regional and international issues. Due to the fact that, as highlighted by Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, surprisingly little attention has been paid to inter-action between social movements and the state, we won't be able to draw any conclusions without investigating this connection as described by the representatives of the groups that made up our sample.The organizations that collaborate with local institutions the most are those that were established before 1968 and between 1968 and 1989, respectively. The fact that groups created in 1968 often collaborate with regional political organizations now disproves path dependency. Only 34.4% of the most recent organizations have partnerships with regional public institutions, which suggests that recent organization formation has an impact on these connections. However, it's important to put this in perspective because, despite their recent formation, only 14.8% of respondents claim they are unable to cooperate. It is also important to note that many organizations declare a critical or selective involvement in response to the level of power, thematic emphasis, and/or political tilt of the regional institutions.

Similar results are seen when looking at ties with public institutions at the national levelthe GJM organizations collaborate with national institutions more as they become older and less as they get younger. However, only 23.8% of the newest organizations express indifference toward institutions, and only 19% of them reject collaboration. In reality, it is clear that as organizations become older, they become less indifferent to institutional collaboration. When looking at ties with public institutions globally, the distribution is the same: the older the organizations, the more they interact. Furthermore, it should be noted that for the three time periods prior to 2000,

the refusal to cooperate is marginally higher than 9%. However, it increases to 21% for companies established after 1999.Therefore, organizations from the same generation tend to have fairly consistent attitudes toward institutions, regardless of the level of the institution. Unwillingness to collaborate, for example, is quite prevalent regardless of level, and there is seldom more than a 5% difference within a single generation. Organizations place greater importance on the institution's profile. According to representatives of many French organizations, the magnitude is not a sufficient factor to choose whether to partner with an institution. They emphasized that they would not see UNESCO in the same way that they did the World Bank or the Ministry of Social Affairs in the same way that they did the Ministry of the Interior.

We met with a member of the executive committee for the French Foundation Copernic, who said, It depends on the proximity of the institutional actors to the association. Making a generalization like we have positive relationships with some institutions and no relationships with neoliberal institutions is challenging.Instead of aggressively defending universal ideological principles, we could consider developing a more accepting attitude that welcomes lobbying and pressure in order to accomplish real results on specific issues. Depending on the administrations, governments, and themes, involvement in advisory authorities usually complements mobilization and protest action. As Jack Goldstone points out, there is no reason to believe that protest and conventional political action should be substituted, with groups abandoning the former as they become capable of employing the latter. While some groups may occasionally be more in, that is, more integrated and in line with institutional authorities, other groups may occasionally be more out. Thus, there is a complex relationship between the dynamics of protest and a group's integration into institutionalized politics. In general, we can see a growing tendency toward critical cooperation or participation in advisory bodies that is focused on managing public institutions.

The objective in this active resistance is to ensure that elected officials keep their commitments via supervision, opposition, and review while also figuring out how to uphold the original demand of a service for the general good. On the other hand, age disparities had astonishingly little impact on the group's judgment of the impact of trials with public involvement in decision-making on the standard of political decisions. No matter when they were established, around 20% of organizations believe that these trials do not increase the standard of political judgements, while 40% believe they do. The other groups' philosophies are not well-established.This point of view contends that collaboration for projects with a finite lifespan, such as campaigns, develops around shared values. In fact, these project-driven organizations coincide with the growth of ad hoc campaigns and the collapse of single group. Since political projects and perspectives are increasingly being conceptualized in terms of their activities rather than their collective and conscious identities, differences between organizations from different generations may be related to changes in how political projects and perspectives are thought of.

An appeal to consensus-driven decision-making processes strengthens openness to and antipathy toward centralization, which seems to be a significant novelty of more contemporary organizations, whose definitions of boundaries tend to vary from those of older models[1]. The informality and the desire for openness, however, do not mean that this openness is always realized. Contrarily, informality may keep barriers in place while making them harder to see and, thus, to overcome. Since their definition of membership differs from that of more established organizations, as our poll has shown, organizations that place a strong emphasis on open

assemblies may also refuse to make distinctions between members and non-members. Once again, membership will become more focused on ad hoc projects and perspectives, motivated as much by common interests as by objective and strategic alliances. This isn't only the result of the foresight of the founders of more modern organizations who chose not to repeat the errors of their forefathers. Newer organizations are inherently less institutionalized than more established ones.

They innovate to mobilize alternative resources that are more readily available in order to offset a lack of physical resources. Ad-hoc alliances could really be quite significant. Our research has shown that there are differences between the groups participating in the global justice mobilizations' conceptions of democracy. As a result, they often align themselves with specific initiatives rather than very fluidly with larger ideologies. This container's architecture is adaptable enough to accommodate organizations with different democratic practices while yet respecting common democratic expectations and claims. As a consequence, it provides an especially productive environment for the flow of different resources, enabling, for instance, younger people to participate in international mobilizations. In this way, the organizations that participate in global justice mobilizations directly look forward to various forms of democracy.

Crossing Borders: Transnational Activism in European Social Movements

Since the late 1990s, the Global Justice Movement has made a significant impact on the political landscape of the world. It has successfully coordinated a rising number of cross-border demonstrations on a range of global issues, such as justice, peace, and democracy. How was this increase in global activism possible? In this essay, we investigate the many factors, both inside and beyond social movements, that have brought global issues to the fore of transnational engagement in European countries. The main origins and processes of transnational activism will be discussed in this chapter, along with the characteristics of the groups from the major European nations that are most involved in cross-border mobilizations. The remainder of the book examines the goals and deeds of GJMOs as well as their notions and applications of democracy as a cornerstone of their international mobilizations.The following section analyzes the relevant literature as well as the conceptual frameworks used and investigations of the causes and mechanisms of cross-border mobilizations. The final section examines the GJM groups from the DEMOS project in terms of the disputed issues, scales, and styles of international action. A quantitative research is done in the fourth section to look at the major variables affecting international action. Then, various outcomes are presented.

Characteristics of Global War

In order to address contentious politics within national contexts, social movement literature has traditionally concentrated on the relationships between domestic political institutions and state power. Such a tactic has been used in recent years to a number of cross-border mobilizations.The creation of specific national campaigns with cross-border components, such as the capacity to access information, resources, support, legitimacy, or political alliances with activist organizations from other countries, was the subject of a first category of study. Acts of North-South solidarity, backing for the protection of human rights, and environmental concerns are a few examples of such circumstances. In these studies, national governments' decisions, acts, or behaviorssometimes in reaction to pressure from supranational organizations, more powerful countries, or multinational corporationsoften served as the focal point of internal conflict.

National mobilizations often relied on networks with experience dealing with the same external influences and were able to establish ties outside of the country in order to reject such policies.

When national activism benefits from collaborations with international social movements or institutional players in the pursuit of domestic political change, Keck and Sikkink underlined the advantages of transnational ties for domestic mobilization and proposed that a boomerang effect may be at play. The protection of human rights may be the clearest case in which dispute is focused on a single government action the choice of repressive regimes to ratify globally recognized human rights treaties, or to halt abuses or noncompliance by its authorities.3 The opening of a transnational dimension has little effect on the political process of national contention, according to Kriesi's approach, because political opportunity structures, the characteristics of political actors, and the context of interaction are still primarily influenced by national factors in this situation.

Research on movements in support of or against supranational institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, or the International Criminal Court has also been studied. International activism is important in these circumstances and is often organized by huge networks of organizations or groups present in many different countries. Disagreement surrounds the complex system of governance that oversees issues including business, economics, development, and crimes against humanity. Social movements fight over supranational institutions' choices, policies, and actions, which are heavily affected by the most potent state actors, like the US and the EU, even while the importance of most national governments is decreasing. Contradictions at the national level really often revolve on the government's role in forging an international consensus and the implications of those decisions for the country, including the appropriate policy responses.

In these circumstances, the structure of political opportunity, the positioning of political actors, and the context of interaction all naturally reflect the complex systems of governance governing these issues. A transnational perspective on contentious politics and social movements has not yet been articulated in this literature. rather, these studies have generally focused on issues with global governance, international relations and political economy, or civil society involvement. The 1999 Seattle WTO protest, the growth of continental and international social forums, and the 15 February 2003 Global Day of Protest against US war preparations against Iraq are examples of the Global Justice Movement that have been the subject of a third line of more in-depth study. While these mobilizations cover a wide range of activities, from locally focused ones to campaigns against supranational organizations, their defining characteristic is their focus on global concerns.

DISCUSSION

These mobilizations are fairly comparable since they have three things in common. First, multilevel governments frequently have deeply ingrained, hotly contested global issues. Second, there is an increase in transnational mobilization due to new varieties of international networks and campaigns. Third, it seems that these movements are accompanied by the emergence of new identities that are aware of their responsibilities to the world, welcoming of difference, and able to form broad alliances[2].Another element is the creativity of strategy and action repertoires. As successful models are quickly spread out and the level of activity varies, GJMOs typically combine aggressive protest with more restrained lobbying of the government. Their toolkits also frequently change quickly. However, these dynamics do not appear to be specific to the GJM as

they have frequently been seen in national contexts of social movements that have expanded rapidly. The local contexts of conflict are still significant in these mobilizations, but only as a part of a bigger, global issue. Both the international and domestic components are there from the beginning and reflect the multifaceted governance system. Cross-national disparities in movement cultures, viewpoints on international problems, political chances, and action repertoires are still present.All three approaches address the novelty of transnational mobilizations while emphasizing particular aspects of the process. Regarding the crucial elements of the analysis of global movements, they frequently reach different conclusions, though.

Some authors emphasize the similarity between national and transnational mobilizations, much like the first of the approaches mentioned above. This conclusion, however, is challenging to reconcile with the circumstances covered by the second research perspective, in which mobilizations are centered on complex political and governmental structures and where critical conflict dynamics play out on a global scale. The second group of works is limited since it has been challenging to provide an appropriate conceptual framework for global disagreement because to the diversity and distinctiveness of these mobilizations.This is an effort made in Tarrow's study of transnational activism, which begins with the expansion of various cross-border mobilizations. It explores the effects of transnational activism on social actors, their claims and techniques, and the relationships between non-state actors, states, and inter-national politics without addressing the conditions that first sparked such mobilizations.The strategy that places a strong emphasis on the Global Justice Movement seems to be a viable perspective for developing a workable multifaceted framework for international contentious politics that goes beyond its vision of global problems. By focusing on GJM organizations in Europe and offering new insight into the dynamics of global conflict, this studywhich expands on the research discussed aboveaims to aid in understanding the variables that drive the transnational activity associated with the Global Justice Movement[3].

We investigate the applicability of the elements listed above as significant features of GJM mobilizations using a number of assumptions that will be put to the test in the empirical study of the following sections. The first is the diversity of the global issues they address, which is characterized in various ways by political opportunity structures shaped by multilevel systems of governance, by political actor configurations centered on global networks and institutions, and by cross-border contexts of interaction. As a consequence, we may assume that the significance of transnational activities will rise in direct proportion to how multinational the conflict is.The second characteristic is related to social movement components, notably internal organizational structures. There is no doubting that greater resources may assist to maintain transnational activism, even if such alliances have considerably aided in making it possible for tiny organizations or activist groups with little resources to engage in cross-border activity. Transnational networks of social organizations and movements have, as we have shown, played a significant and innovative role in mobilizations on international concerns. As a consequence, we may assume that GJM groups with more funding, affiliation with networks or campaigns, or both, will take part in global action to a greater degree.

Third, it's crucial to consider the complex subject of identities. Global mobilizations will likely need a lot of motivation from both individuals and organizations since they are likely to be seen, even by activists, as being removed from everyday concerns and local strife. We might assume that a group identity that is largely based on involvement in such global concerns can be linked

with a higher level of organization involvement in transnational action.A fourth factor that has to be looked at is how the organizations use their tactic and action repertoire repertoires. Since it is challenging to distinguish the GJM from other national social movements in this regard, as was already mentioned, no firm explanation can be offered[4].We shouldn't discount the enduring nature of national characteristics, which, as was previously said, are based on differences in national political philosophies, economic structures, and movement cultures.The next sections conduct an empirical investigation of the significance of these factors in comprehending the rise of global activism.

Empirical Research

In this empirical evidence, which is based on a survey of 210 organizations working on various global issues as part of the DEMOS project, we focus on the information that is crucial for highlighting the dynamics and drivers of transnational activism. The four elements that are thought to affect cross-border mobilization engagement are challenges, organizational structures, identity, and strategies. These are explained first. Then, we examine a number of international activism movements and offer a composite metric to assess their impact on GJMO activity.

Elements that Shape Global Activism

The worldwide grounds of contention that have influenced distinct cross-border mobilizations within the GJM are the first subject to be discussed. The eight key categories of global challenges are the organizations under investigation's principal areas of focus. Among them are democracy and human rights, issues with the global economy, development, international collaboration, and environmental problems. Political parties, political organizations, and labor unions linked with the GJM. The Appendix includes examples of relevant organizations as well as a full discussion of the activities covered by these difficulties. The most well-represented sectors are political groups and labor unions, followed by media/think tanks, cooperation and development, and global economic challenges. Democracy, human rights, social justice, and labor rights are further important areas. The subjects pertaining to peace and the environment are the least common among the groups studied[5].

Different levels of national or international activity are being focused on these issues. National political parties, unions, media, and think tanks are strongly anchored in domestic possibilities and settings and often concentrate the bulk of their engagement at the national level, even when they are connected to GJM mobilizations. Since campaigns to protect social and labor rights are frequently conducted within specific national con- tracts, a similar direction might be anticipated in this area. It is not surprising that these actions are more prevalent among national groups and have less of an impact on transnational groupings. However, as was already mentioned, the global aspect of the dispute is more pertinent when it comes to issues of global economics, development, and cooperation. As a result, the significance of international action will vary depending on the viewpoint of the specific groups polled. All of these issuesdemocracy, human rights, peace, and the environmenthave a strong global component and significant contention with national governments, which have significant decision-making authority in these areas.

The second consideration is organizational structure, which encompasses the kind of organization and the volume of resources it possesses. Single organizations, networks, and campaigns make up an equal portion of the organizations covered in this study. While the latter are networks or campaigns, the former are more common among national groupings and

frequently consist of media/think tanks, parties/trade unions. The latter ones are the most common among multinational corporations and are more likely to focus on addressing global democratic and economic concerns. This result is correlated with the ability of networks and campaigns to tolerate diversity and adapt to different sociopolitical circumstances by marrying a practical restriction with a desire for local autonomy and plurality. Organizational size is likely to be a significant determinant in cross-border activities.

It often takes large financial resources, as well as competent personnel, to handle complicated global issues. While organizations with more resources frequently have more paid staff and volunteers, networks and campaigns typically have smaller budgets and fewer paid employees.In answer to the third question of the DEMOS survey, which inquires about the identity of GJM organizations, more than 90% of the groups surveyed said that they consider themselves to be a member of the GJM.The organizations' action plans and toolkits are the fourth component. In the poll, over 90% of the groups claimed they employ political awareness- and education-raising as a tactic. The promotion of alternatives, protests, and lobbying come next. The adoption of many strategies is essential in this regard. 70% of the study's groups use a multi-focus strategy, which is seen to be the most effective way to affect a multilevel system of governance and transnational opportunity structures. When there are larger budgets, more strategies are employed[6].

When we link the techniques used to the concerns of activism, we discover a larger inclination towards political education, lobbying, and building alternatives in groups focusing on democracy, global economic challenges, development, and the environment. The organizations that protest most often include those that support social and labor rights, political parties, unions, as well as causes for peace and the environment. The answer is no73% of environmental groups and 60% of those involved in international trade use all four strategies concurrently.Most GJM groups work with institutions in line with the use of various strategies, notably at the local and national levels. 54 percent of cases include working with international organizations, compared to 14 percent of the time and 33 percent of the time when the groups demonstrate disinterest. Older groups with greater resources cooperate with institutions more, whereas networks and campaigns continue to work less constructively together. Organizations that cooperate with international organizations often protest and participate in lobbying, and they place a greater emphasis on political options and education.

Tracking International Activism

GJM groups have created a variety of cross-border mobilization kinds and forms. To accurately reflect the uniqueness of the GJM, identification of the many elements of international activity and the creation of a precise measurement system are necessary. Four separate international initiatives carried out by GJM groups have been taken into account. They include:

1. Two methods exist for participating in international events:
2. Days of global action or parallel summits.
3. International and European social forums.
4. There are two distinct international relationships with other organizations:
5. Participation in global initiatives.
6. Participation in global networks.

Whether a group has participated in parallel summits or global days of action is indicated by the first variable. 75% of the investigated groups have attended one of these events, which have functioned as large and substantial con- tentious gatherings of social movements on global issues.The organizations surveyed's participation in the World or European Social Forums is the second element. Since 2001, social movements have mostly gathered in Social Forums on a global and regional scale. Again, these events were participated in by over 75% of the groups. Less than 66%, however, took part in regional and national social forums.The third variable shows the different ways in which organizations take part in global campaigns, whether as members or as promoters. During the 1990s, transnational campaigns gained importance as a tool for cross-border mobilization. Eighty percent of the groups surveyed, including British, Italian, and international organizations, take part in international campaigns. Campaigns on democracy account for 25% of cases and campaigns on social issues for 40%.The fourth variable looks at the organizations under assessment's participation in global networks. We have previously stressed the importance of cross-border mobilizations as well as the importance of network participation on the part of the analyzed organizations[7].

We argue that organizations completely involved in transnational mobilizations would participate in any of the four kinds of activity, while strictly national organizations wouldn't. As a result, an organization that actively participates in cross-border mobilizations would have an organizational structure impacted by its ties to international networks and an activist stance that includes taking part in such campaigns. As part of these efforts, it would participate in both specific parallel summits as well as bigger GJM gatherings, such the World and European Social Forums. As a result, we propose that the logical total of these four elements be an indicator of worldwide engagement with values ranging from 0 to 4. We argue that our index provides a practical criteria to assess the degree of global engagement of GJMOs, preferring multifaceted organizations over those that are narrowly focused. This argument has to be examined in light of the real cross-border activism trends that this index identifies.

The results for all organizations and the seven country categories for the four factors that make up the transnational activity index. The analyzed organizations usually show a high degree of cross-border interaction with a TN4 score of 2.96. When the four elements are taken into account, inter-organizational ties are less frequent than participation in international events. Participating in parallel summits and international days of action is the most common cross-border activity, but networking is more common than joining campaigns.Observing how other nations run is fascinating. It should come as no surprise that, with an average score of 3.59, the transnational organizations in our research exhibit the highest degree of cross-border participation since they all take part in transnational networks. Italian and French organizations are ranked highly in terms of transnational engagement due to their extraordinarily high participation rates in GJM events. British and German organizations are in the middle. and Spanish and Swiss organizations are near the bottom of the list.

The issue of activism has a big impact on cross-border activism. The most trans nationalized organizations are those addressing global economic issues, followed by political parties, unions, and those promoting world peace, global development, and environmental protection. Transnational networks have emerged as a potent and realistic model for the contestation of economic domination, with high ratings across the board for the vast majority of organizations concerned in global economic issues. The tendency is similar among groups that are working on development and collaboration. Political parties and labor unions usually engage in events where

they may acquire attention and influence, whereas environmental organizations follow the reverse trend, eschewing participation in networks and campaigns. Not to mention, media/think tanks and groups promoting social, labor, and citizenship rights are mostly active at the national or local level, with limited engagement in all cross-border activities[8].

Cross-border mobilizations are significantly influenced by organizational structure. When we examine the values of the transnational activism index by type of organization, we find that networks and campaigns tend to be more transnational than single organizations. They participate in alternative summits, for example, more often, and despite already being networks or campaigns, they frequently join other networks and campaigns, forging a complex web of links. While participating in Social Forums, the values of the two types of organizations are the same.Human resources are not restricted in the same way as financial resources, which may be a hindrance to an organization's high degree of transnationalization. Cross-border action does not need a big workforce. in fact, smaller organizationsthose with less than 100 paid workers and 15 volunteersare more likely to be transnational than larger ones. This is true even if a larger organization's funding tends to make it more transnational.

Organizations that firmly identify as GJMs have a tendency to be more internationally spread than those that do not, according to the identification issue's results. 90% of the organizations with a GJM identity participate in global days of action or parallel summits, 79% in social forums, and 74% in global networks. When it comes to participation in foreign campaigns, where the number of groups without a GJM identity is least, the discrepancy is most pronounced.Information on the effects of organizational tactics is scarcer. On transnational actions, there are few differences between the four factors, and the lobbying and alternative-promoting organizations show higher levels of international engagement. The conclusion that applies most to this debate is that having a variety of approaches boosts an organization's probability of taking part in international initiatives. Organizations working with various institutions exhibit varying degrees of cross-border engagement. As can be expected, persons working with international organizations are more trans nationalized than those involved at the national and local levels.

In summarizing the empirical evidence to far, we can say that the 210 European groups represented in the DEMOS survey accurately reflect the characteristics, goals, and strategies of GJMOs involved in international activities. The transnational activism index we've proposed includes a wide variety of international activities and provides a thorough picture of the degree of transnational involvement among European organisations taking part in the GJM. These organizations take part in global initiatives, join networks and campaigns addressing global issues, and forge close connections with one another inside the GJM. Even However, the variety of groups results in a markedly different pattern of mobilization among EU member states. Nationalism is still important. For instance, cross-border mobilization is more suited to the sociopolitical environment of countries like France or Italy.

When we return to the four factors that, in accordance with our hypothesis, may affect how transnationally active European groups are, we observe that the four factors differ significantly among organizations, with those engaged in global economic and development issues exhibiting a higher level of transnational activism. Organizational structures are crucial since networks and campaigns seem to be more feasible means of cross-border organizing inside the GJM. A focus on international issues is crucial in cross-border activity. The inclusion of various tactics is

correlated with increased cross-border action, even while there are little distinctions in methods across groups. The next section provides a quantitative study of the correlations between these characteristics and the amount of international engagement.

CONCLUSION

There are many different behaviors and characteristics among the organizational elements of global justice mobilizations. Compared to more recent organizations, older organizations employ consensus decision-making less often. These older groups are nonetheless attracted to delegation even while more contemporary organizations tend to reject it in favor of horizontal forms of involvement. Similar to this, membership can mean different things to different generations. Because age affects the geographic areas that a particular organization serves, it affects how people interact with organizations. These disparities significant when talking about the idea of the Global Justice Movement as a whole. Even though there are differences, it is still feasible to bring together the wide cast of participants to form a movement. However, it forces us to define this movement in terms of its variety, plasticity, and the pragmatic alliances that its participants form as a result of a common democratic microculture.

REFERENCES:

[1] H. Nordin, D. Singh, and Z. Mansor, 'Interface design for E-learning: Investigating design characteristics of colour and graphic elements for generation Z', *KSII Trans. Internet Inf. Syst.*, 2021, doi: 10.3837/tiis.2021.09.005.

[2] W. M. Al-Rahmi, M. S. Othman, and M. A. Musa, 'The improvement of students' academic performance by using social media through collaborative learning in malaysian higher education', *Asian Soc. Sci.*, 2014, doi: 10.5539/ass.v10n8p210.

[3] H. Tinmaz, 'Social Networking Websites as an Innovative Framework for Connectivism', *Contemp. Educ. Technol.*, 2020, doi: 10.30935/cedtech/6080.

[4] E. Yu and C. Suny, 'Student-inspired optimal design of online learning for generation Z', *J. Educ. Online*, 2020.

[5] I. G. P. Bagus Suka Arjawa and Zulkifli, 'The social integration of hindu and muslim communities: The practice of ‹menyama-braya› in contemporary bali', *Studia Islamika*. 2021. doi: 10.36712/sdi.v28i1.10914.

[6] G. K. Pakpahan, I. Salman, A. B. Setyobekti, I. S. Sumual, and A. M. Christi, 'Internalisasi nilai-nilai Pancasila dalam upaya mencegah radikalisme', *KURIOS*, 2021, doi: 10.30995/kur.v7i2.351.

[7] N. Arranz, M. F. Arroyabe, and M. Schumann, 'The role of NPOs and international actors in the national innovation system: A network-based approach', *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*, 2020, doi: 10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120183.

[8] A. Handulle and A. Vassenden, '"The art of kindergarten drop off": how young Norwegian-Somali parents perform ethnicity to avoid reports to Child Welfare Services', *Eur. J. Soc. Work*, 2021, doi: 10.1080/13691457.2020.1713053.

CHAPTER 16

EXPLORING THE DETERMINANTS OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM

Dr. Amarpal Singh, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:amarpals.mgmt@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

Transnational activism is a form of political activism that seeks to challenge global power structures and address global issues, such as human rights, environmental degradation, and economic inequality. The determinants of transnational activism are complex and multifaceted, influenced by a range of factors, including political, economic, social, and cultural factors.One of the key determinants of transnational activism is globalization. Globalization has facilitated the flow of information, people, and resources across borders, creating new opportunities for activists to connect and mobilize transnationally. It has also created new forms of inequality and exploitation, which have fueled transnational activism.

KEYWORDS:

Civil Society, Globalization, Identity Politics, International Relations, Political Networks, Resource Mobilization.

INTRODUCTION

Building on the empirical data mentioned above, we examine in this section the factors that influence cross-border activity using a quantitative analysis that links important traits of the organizations that participated in the survey to the ideals represented by the transnational activism index. In this approach, we can put to the test the aforementioned assumptions and evaluate the impact of a number of variables that encouraged social movements in Europe to mobilize across national boundaries in response to hotly contested global problems. We are able to conduct this analysis because to the DEMOS database, which contains a substantial number of instances and provides an accurate picture of European mobilizations.

In this research, we seek to account for the variability of national settings while attempting to explain the values of the index of transnational activism using a set of independent variables that represent the four components mentioned above: problems, organizations, identity, and strategy. The eight issues of activism, the network or campaign form, the size of the staff, the sense of belonging to the GJM to account for identity factors, the presence of multiple strategies, the adoption of distinct strategies, and forms of action to document repertoires of action, are among the independent variables used. All variables are binary with the exception of the size of the staff and the number of tactics, whose values vary from 0 to 4. Additionally, country dummies are used in the analysis to take into account regional variations.

Due to the nature of the dependent variable, which may take values between 0 and 4, an ordered logit model is used for the analysis. In addition to producing odds ratios that show the likelihood that TN4 values will change rank when an independent variable changes from 0 to 1, or moves to a higher rank, while all other variables remain the same, the model also provides results on the

significance of independent variables. If the independent variable's odds ratio is 1, it is probable that it will have a negative impact on the TN4 index. The fraction of instances whose TN4 values are properly predicted offers a clear evaluation of the model's strength in ordered logit models, where the R-square is not a direct measure of the quality of fit. The primary findings of the ordered logit estimates for two different iterations of the model, together with the odds ratio and the significance of each coefficient. The findings indicate that the model does an excellent job of explaining how transnationally active the examined organizations are.

According to the first model, organizations' engagement in contentious problems relating to the global economy and development seems to be strongly and substantially correlated with the degree of transnational activism. Organizational structures, as measured by staff size, are very important since more cross-border action is possible with a bigger team. The GJM identification variable has a high value and is very significant, and the use of numerous tactics also strongly correlates with increased transnational activism. It is important to clarify the odds ratio's significance. Organizations engaged in global economic activism are more than four times as likely to be transnational as those engaged in activism in other domains, while organizations engaged in development activism are twice as likely to be transnational. The likelihood of becoming more transnational is more than five times higher for groups that claim membership in the GJM than for those who deny it. On the other hand, a bigger staff and the cohabitation of many techniques, such as protest, lobbying, alternative promotion, and teaching, only somewhat increase the likelihood of higher cross-border action.

When an organization is based in the UK, Germany, Spain, or Switzerland, there is a small probability that the model will show a lower level of transnational activism. When we compare the dependent variable's predicted scores from the model with the actual values, we discover that the prediction is correct in 54% of the time. Many of the above-mentioned hypotheses regarding the variables influencing transnational activism seem to be confirmed by this model, which seems to effectively summarize the relationships between organizations' characteristics and level of cross-border activism.Given that GJM identity is as we mentioned in the conceptual discussion above both a determinant and a result of transnational activism, this model may have a shortcoming related to the nature of the variable on GJM identity. In order to avoid using such a variable, a second version of the model has been estimated. the results are shown in the second column.

With this image, the results hardly alter. The variables on global economic concerns continue their great influence and relevance, while the variables on development raise both of these variables' importance together with the two pertinent issues of activism. A bigger staff has a more limited effect, and the variable's significance to the organization's network or campaign character has changed. Similarly, the inclusion of the variable pertaining to the use of demonstrations as a form of action is combined with a slight weakening of the impact of the existence of multiple strategies. generally, the impact on transnational activism anticipated from the variables on organizations and strategies is roughly half that resulting from points of contention.The model's country controls for Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom corroborate the adverse impact. In 50% of situations, the TN4 projected values are accurate.This second model supports the earlier findings and widens the scope of pertinent factors that were covered in the empirical research of the previous section and that affect transnational activism.

The four criteria identified above contentious topics, organizational structures, identity, and methods seem to be connected with the establishment of international action by European groups, but with very different levels of importance, according to these findings. Organizations working on the global economy and international development are particularly pulled toward cross-border mobilizations because these topics have a significant transnational component to their opportunity structures and governance systems. An organizational identity connected to the GJM plays a crucial role as well, but it also influences cross-border initiatives in the other direction. The characteristics reflecting the organization's nature, its strategy, and national background have a more constrained impact. This indicates that for GJM organizations, the transition from national to transnational activism is not a straightforward process. rather, it is shaped by the contentious issues brought up by European movements, by the opportunity for groups' identities to develop, by a choice of organizational models based on networks or campaigns, and by the capacity to confront authorities using a variety of tactics.

We further evaluated if the inclusion of these groups, which by definition have a larger inclination towards cross-border action, may have distorted the findings given that the questioned organizations included a group of transnational ones without a clear place of origin. As a result, only national organizations have been used to estimate the two models, leaving out instances of international organizations.Regarding the magnitude of the odds ratios as well as the relevance of the factors, the findings are generally supported. The key distinction is that in model 1 development and cooperation loses significance, while in model it is weakened. Additionally, model 2 does not consider the multiple strategies variable to be significant. The country restrictions in the models were established in reference to the global group. The odds ratios were derived using the average of Swiss organizations as Switzerland was not included in the estimates presented. the findings indicate that Italian and French nationality have a very beneficial impact, while German and UK origin have a more muted positive impact. The findings of this investigation into the factors that influence cross-border activism seem to be resilient to modifications in the model and the dataset. Therefore, we can claim that these models adequately account for key factors influencing GJM organizations in Europe's transition to transnational activism[1].

Transnational activism has been on the increase, and one of the main reasons for this is the engagement of organizations in controversial topics with a clear multilevel governance framework. Trade, finance, and economic policy issues, as well as those related to cooperation and development (poverty, assistance, fair trade), are sectors that powerfully 'pull' organizations into international projects and have an impact on the shape and substance of a large portion of their engagement. Such topics have a primarily transnational political potential structure. the composition of political players includes supranational organizations and multinational companies, necessitating coordinated transnational mobilization.The same result did not occur for equally universal issues like democracy, human rights, peace, and the environment because national states still retain significant influence in these areas. Instead, disagreement frequently centers on specific government decisions, such as those relating to democratic reforms, rights protection, military involvement, and climate change action. Additionally, a significant portion of the organizations surveyed worked on these topics at all levels, taking advantage of political opportunities on various scales. Cross-border activism is less common among groups working for social and citizenship rights, as well as in the media and think tanks, where action is more common at the national and local levels.

A specific example is the political parties and trade unions in our survey, which demonstrated a strong involvement in the GJM and participation in global events but not in networks and campaigns. it is possible to infer that they shared the ideological motivation of the GJM and saw participation in parallel summits and Social Forums as a means of exercising influence and gaining visibility. however, in terms of forms of political contestation, they maintained their traditional practices.The significance of a strong organizational structure based on networks and campaigns also emerges from our results. This strategy is characteristic of the GJM, particularly of the mobilizations on global economic and political concerns, as we have previously said. Transnational networks have really served as the backbones of the GJM, planning and supporting the many waves of mobilization on particular themes and offering linkages across diverse concerns, as we have discussed previously.An additional component is the strength of identity: transnational action is strongly linked to a feeling of belonging to the Global Justice Movement and a new transnational political goal.This function may resemble, in some respects, the influence of ideology in earlier waves of national social movements: a shared opposition to neoliberal globalization may serve as the basis for a common identification with international battles. However, the GJM's identity encompasses many different aspects, such as the emergence of pluralistic and tolerant identities, which have enabled the wide alliances that are characteristic of the GJM.

The combination of a unifying transnational political project a vision of resistance to globalization, or of globalization from - and a highly plural model of cross-border activism based on significant events, networks, and campaigns may be at the heart of the widespread identification with the GJM by European social movement organizations. Greater participation in cross-border initiatives may have resulted from increased awareness of global conflict, which in turn supported an even stronger identification with the GJM. As a consequence, cross-border mobilizations have increased and a wide range of organizations, social groupings, and cultural sensitivities have developed strong bonds with the GJM.The capacity to combine protest with the offering of alternatives, lobbying, and education seems to be what leads to international initiatives in this process rather than any one technique. A flexible and multifaceted strategy of dispute is likely to define the groups with greater levels of transnational activity. Global concerns are often characterized by a complex pattern of confrontations and chances for engagement with international institutions[2].

These findings support the theory put forward in this book on the novelty of the Global Justice Movement, with its'multilevel and multiform' activities and capacity to engage with national and transnational institutions. When examining the causes of cross-border activism, it has been discovered that the need to address global issues and take on multilevel governance systems, as well as internal movement developments such as the emergence of flexible network structures, the adoption of multiple strategies, and the development of shifting identities, have all played major roles. Many of these changes are connected to the value that democracy is placed upon, both in the struggle with the authorities and in the search for efficient democratic practices within the GJM, themes that are explored in various chapters of this book. With its pervasive transnational action, bringing fresh demands for political change to the global stage, and ongoing challenges to national political systems, this development has supported the growth of the Global Justice Movement.

The following list of contentious problems that the organizations polled by the DEMOS project may be related to is made using a few examples of themes, campaigns, and specific

organizations.We categorized Social Forums, from local to worldwide levels. human rights groups. movements utilizing extreme forms of involvement and political engagement. and those networks engaged on global democratic concerns in the sphere of democracy and human rights.Campaigns, networks, and groups working on worldwide economic concerns including debt, trade, poverty, and financial transactions are included in the area of global economic issues.Organizations that focus on development concerns including agriculture and food sovereignty, cooperate with third-world nations, promote fair trade, and operate solidarity networks make up the area of development and cooperation.Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Legambiente are among the organizations that work on environmental concerns.Organizations that advocate for peace include pacifist and anti-war groups. Organizations working on problems like immigration, anti-racism, and citizenship. unemployment and precarity. and women's, gay, and lesbian rights may be found in the area of social, citizenship, and labor rights. These organizations are often grass-roots and local[3].

DISCUSSION

Democracy in Movement

Alternate democratic visions have been carried by social movements. They have developed demands for dramatic changes in both politics and policy as a result of organizational experimentation. Our study on the Global Justice Movement demonstrates its ongoing interest in addressing the meta-issue of democracy, with some continuity and innovations relative to prior experiences, while the social movements of the 1980s and 1990s were characterized as more pragmatic and single-issue focused. Our organizations evolved as political actors, organizing in a variety of ways to bring about structural changes while simultaneously attempting to put those innovations into practice within the confines of their own internal life. As we saw, the GJMOs take on a particularly significant function in the prefigurative role of internal democratic practices by emphasizing the need of consistency between what is advocated outside and what is really practiced within.What democratic ideas did we uncover in the Global Justice Movement, and how can we explain the diverse organizational choices? These are the primary concerns addressed in the introduction. In this conclusion, I will synthesize some key findings provided in the several s.

Which Democratic Notions?

Like the organizations we researched, the goal of our book is to further the conversation on democracy. In this regard, I would emphasize, first of all, that the Global Justice Movement builds upon some conceptions of democracy that have long been present in the social sciences' normative and empirical analysis of democracy, but that have been eliminated or marginalized in the'minimalistic' conceptions of democracy that became dominant in both the political and scientific discourse. But second, I'll argue that when contrasted to earlier conceptions and practices of democracy in movements, this focus on particular democratic attributes gains new traits.

GJM and Counter-Democracy

According to a number of studies, the crisis of representative democracy is also accompanied by the creation of new democratic ideas and behaviors. Political involvement empirical study has shown that although certain more traditional forms of engagement are waning, protest forms are

becoming more popular. Even though fewer citizens vote, they are nonetheless interested in and educated about politics. While some traditional types of associations are becoming less common, others are gaining members, resources, and legitimacy[4].Additionally, historical and normative research has shown the existence of various conceptions of democracy, each of which places a different emphasis on various aspects of democracy. The history of true democracies, according to Pierre Rosanvallon, cannot be dissociated from a permanent tension and contestation. In his opinion, democracy requires counter-democracy as well as legal legitimacy. A circuit of monitoring, grounded outside of state institutions, has evolved side by side with the institutions of electoral accountability throughout the historical development of democratic regimes. Confidence, a need for democratic legitimacy, requires defiance in the form of tools of external control and willing players. in actuality, democracy evolves via ongoing contestation of authority.

Citizens' close attention to those in positions of authority is thus described as a unique sort of political involvement, distinct from decision-making but yet a crucial component of the democratic process. In the past, actors such as courts, independent agencies, the media, specialists, and social movements have all performed this surveillance duty. The latter are thought to be particularly important for the growth of a expressive democracy because they correspond to the prise de parole of the society, the manifestation of a collective sentiment, the formulation of a judgment about the governors and their action, or again the production of claims. Given the crisis of representative, electoral democracy, surveillance is even more crucial. Our study found that social movement groups take seriously the democratic role of control, mobilizing to exert pressure on policymakers as well as creating open public spaces and counter-knowledge.

In many instances, particularly but not only at the local level, they work in conjunction with governmental institutions on both specific issues and more general campaigns. They are given particular tasks to contract out, but they are also often helped because of their role in creating counter, democratic places. Our groups, in particular, see themselves as in charge of the public institutions, advocating for alternative policies but also, more generally, urging for more democracy. They emphasize the need of more public and less private, more state and less market, while simultaneously emphasizing the need for democratic control of the governors and independence from institutions. They aid in the advancement of ideas and practices by creating public places. Our SMOs help to draw attention back to the counter-democracy of surveillance, which has historically received preferential treatment over the power of electoral accountability in the historical development of procedural democracy. In light of the apparent difficulty in adjusting democratic concepts and practices to the growing transfer of competence towards the international level, as our study made clear, democratic monitoring takes on a unique significance.

Our organizations participate in the discussion on global democracy during this transition by advocating for a globalization of democracy and creating a global public sphere, as well as by criticizing the lack of democratic accountability and even transparency of many existing IGOs. Targeting the international financial organizations as well as other IGOs, transnational protest campaigns have grown in number over the past few decades, focusing in particular on issues like environmental protection, gender discrimination, and human rights. Global networks were strengthened throughout these efforts as shared frameworks for global justice and democracy emerged. The GJMOs that we have researched do in fact have transnationally networked

organizational structures, global and cross-issue framing, and active engagement in international protest. They accuse national and international elites of promoting market freedom at the price of social rights that, at least in the North, had become integral to the very idea of citizenship. They condemn globalization as a free market. As the international system based on sovereign nation-states appears to have evolved into a political system composed of overlapping multilevel authorities, they also urge the development of democracy at the transnational level as being all the more urgent[5].

Deliberation and Participation as Democratic Virtues

Rosanvallon's idea of counter-democracy is similar to, but distinct from, two other ideas: participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. While majority voting and delegation are the main tenets of representative procedural democracy, democratic conceptions have always balanced these tenets with public interest-focused deliberation. Parallel to this, if institutional decision-making is mostly under the power of a small group of professional politicians, the existence of several venues for public engagement is essential for a healthy democracy. Rules for voting are part of democracy, but speaking venues are much more important.Theories of participatory democracy have emphasized the value of engaging people beyond elections, whereas theories of representational democracy have concentrated on electoral laws. Citizens should be given as many chances to engage in decision-making as there are decision-making domains, according to this perspective.

According to participants' potential levels of influence on the outcome of an event, Carole Pateman distinguished between pseudo, partial, and full levels of participation. She defined full participation as a process where each individual member of a decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions. In a similar vein,'strong democracy' has been described as a system of governance in which individuals are involved at least sometimes in making choices that have an impact on their daily lives. Given that there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process, citizen power is defined as necessitating citizen involvement.The participatory democracy participants in these theories are mostly found outside of the public institutions.

While participation was concentrated primarily within and among political parties in party democracy, social movements are becoming more important in democracy of the public. As highly reflective actors, they do more than simply present demands to decision-makers. instead, they address a meta-political critique of traditional democracy. The alternative they advocate is typically framed in terms of participatory democracy, or, in the words of Herbert Kitschelt, that ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organization of collective decision making against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or represent democracy. Social movements have, in reality, challenged delegation as well as oligarchic and centralized authority, while instead legitimat- ing grassroots, horizontal, egalitarian organizational structures. This criticism dates back at least to the 1960s[6].

As shown by our study, participation has continued to have a plural but relevant meaning for the GJM groups. The existence of a variety of democratic beliefs and behaviors reflects its character as a movements of movements, as observed by Herbert Reiter. Participation, in particular, takes on diverse connotations depending on the kind of movement. The emphasis on participation seems to be a return to the core principles of democratic centralism in the Old Left, who saw

delegation and participation as extremely compatible organizational concepts. While solidarity groups and new social movement organizations place more of an emphasis on the prefigurative role of participation as a school of democracy, the New Left places more of an emphasis on direct democracy and self-organization. Similarly, the groups forming with the GJM develop counter-models that mix realistic reform ideas with an idealistic element in an effort to find consistency between their criticism of the current democratic institutions and their internal practices.Deliberative democracy and the idea of counter-democracy are related ideas.

Deliberative democracy refers to decision-making processes where, in the presence of equality, inclusivity, and transparency, a communica- tive process based on reason is able to transform individual preferences, ultimately leading to decisions that are focused on the public good. The discursive quality of democracy is given special consideration in the concept of deliberative democracy as well as by our organizations, with a focus on four components: the modification of preferences, the orientation to the common good, the use of arguments, and the formation of consensus[7]. Deliberative democracy is characterized as being directed to preference development whereas representational democracy is focused on the accumulation of exogenously created preferences. Initial preferences change through the confrontation with opposing points of view in deliberative processes. Particularly, the interaction of various positions results in a shift in how one perceives their own preferences. Deliberation is founded on the idea that if I listen to the other person, even if I won't change my viewpoint, I may learn something. This necessitates that the deliberative process take place in a plurality of values environment, where individuals have diverse viewpoints yet share similar issues. As the debates draw identities and citizens' interests in ways that contribute to the public building of the public good, a definition of the public good should emerge. Through persuasive reasoning, this ought to be accomplished.

People are persuaded by the strength of the stronger argument in a deliberative democracy because it is founded on reason. Deliberation should be facilitated in particular by horizontal communication flows, multiple discussion participants, abundant opportunities for interaction, confrontation based on rational argumentation, and a mindset of reciprocal listening. Recognizing others' motivations promotes consensus-building, which enables decision-making by persuading others of one's own position. As a result, they must be able to be approved by all participants, as opposed to majority-rule democracies, in which votes are used to legitimize decisions.In accordance with this viewpoint, democracy grows apart from public institutions. While Joshua Cohen holds that deliberative democracy develops in voluntary groups, particularly in political parties, John Dryzek singles out social movements as being better positioned to create deliberative spaces because they maintain a critical view toward institutions. Habermas postulates a double-track process, with informal deliberation taking place outside institutions and then, as public opinion, influencing institutional deliberation. Similar views suggest that debate should occur in a variety of autonomous enclaves, including social movements, which are not subject to institutional authority.

Protest is not excluded by discourse. it includes street demonstrations and sit-ins, musical works and cartoons, as much as parliamentary speeches and letters to the editor. Deliberative democracy involves individuals embedded in associative networks, able to develop democratic skills among their followers, if social movements foster dedicated, critical attitudes toward public institutions, as Claus Offe has noted. These assertions may be qualified by empirical studies on the actual decision-making procedures of social movements.Our study shows that the GJMOs adopt deliberate rules, sometimes overtly but more often not. First of all, they emphasize

that no simple answer is available and cannot be taken from major ideologies given the complexity of reality. Many conflicts must be handled by relying on the chance for mutual understanding that could arise in an honest, excellent discussion. It is customary to think about the concept of a common good, which should be created via dialogue, intellectual interchange, and information sharing.

The importance of conversation among free and equal citizens is reflected in the positive emphasis on diversity and inclusion, but it is also reflected in the attention given to the creation of structured forums for the exchange of ideas, with the testing of some rules that should permit horizontal flows of communication and reciprocal listening[8]. Particularly, consensus was mentioned as a general value and an organizational principle in internal decision-making by half of the organizations we spoke with. Even though SMOs have emphasized conflict as a dynamic component of society, they increasingly seek to balance it with a commitment to other values like communication and understanding among people. In place of majoritarian decision-making, which is criticized for suppressing and/or alienating minority, consensus is offered as an alternative. Instead, using consensus-based decision-making would help in working on what unites, creating a shared vision while respecting diversity, as well as increasing legitimacy by highlighting the collective contribution to decisions[9].

The Zapatistas' experience had a symbolic significance, tangible networks were created around it, and the Social Forum process gradually adopted consensual ideas and practices, all of which helped agreement in the GJM grow internationally. The movement's dissemination of consensus methods and the notion of consensus was aided by specialized publications, workshops, and training sessions. However, we should also highlight the various connotations that consensus has. Consensual decision-making is seen as a technique to create a collective accord that expresses a strong communitarian identity, especially when combined with an assembleary, horizontal heritage. This perspective, which is especially prevalent among tiny and often local organizations within the autonomous tradition, is egalitarian and anti-authoritarian in focus. Here, group life primarily takes on a prefigurative value. The new networks are promoting a different, more realistic point of view. Here, the emphasis on diversity and the need to respect it is accompanied especially by the need to improve mutual understanding through effective communication[10].

CONCLUSION

The GJM's massive mobilizations across Europe, which started in the late 1990s and have persisted to the present, could only be maintained with the systematic participation of organized groups, whether they were single organizations, networks, or campaigns. This has looked at what motivated many social movement groups in Europe to participate in the kind of international mobilizations that the GJM was known for. Both philosophically and experimentally, a number of crucial elements of the developing dynamics of international conflict have been recognized. They set apart approaches to social movements that primarily concentrate on domestic political conflict from analyses of GJM mobilizations. The complexity of the process leading organizations to cross-border activism is a general lesson that emerges from our analysis. In order to achieve high levels of transnational activity, several complementary developments in issues of contention and identities, strategies, and resources must be present. Several important factors stand out in such a multifaceted process.

REFERENCES:

[1] M. B. Flynn, Global capitalism as a societal determinant of health: A conceptual framework, *Soc. Sci. Med.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113530.

[2] M. Vancea and À. Boso, El transnacionalismo político de las asociaciones de inmigrantes en Barcelona, *Papeles Poblac.*, 2017, doi: 10.22185/24487147.2017.94.030.

[3] M. Vancea and À. Boso, The political transnationalism of the immigrant associations in Barcelona, *Papeles Poblac.*, 2017, doi: 10.22185/24487147.2017.94.030.

[4] E. Cezne, Forging transnational ties from below: Challenging the Brazilian mining giant Vale S.A. across the South Atlantic, *Extr. Ind. Soc.*, 2019, doi: 10.1016/j.exis.2019.10.007.

[5] R. F. De Moraes, Transnational Activism and Domestic Politics: Arms Exports and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in the UK-South Africa Relations (1959-1994), *Foreign Policy Analysis*. 2021. doi: 10.1093/fpa/orab023.

[6] K. R. Shekha, Determinants of Latin American activism: Domestic and transnational political opportunities and threats, *Sociol. Compass*, 2011, doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00396.x.

[7] L. Temper, D. del Bene, and J. Martinez-Alier, Mapping the frontiers and front lines of global environmental justice: The EJAtlas, *J. Polit. Ecol.*, 2015, doi: 10.2458/v22i1.21108.

[8] E. Prussing, Critical epidemiology in action: Research for and by indigenous peoples, *SSM - Popul. Heal.*, 2018, doi: 10.1016/j.ssmph.2018.09.003.

[9] J. Anaf, F. Baum, M. Fisher, and S. Friel, Civil society action against transnational corporations: Implications for health promotion, *Health Promotion International*. 2020. doi: 10.1093/heapro/daz088.

[10] A. Portes, C. Escobar, and R. Arana, Bridging the gap: Transnational and ethnic organizations in the political incorporation of immigrants in the United States, *Ethn. Racial Stud.*, 2008, doi: 10.1080/01419870701874827.

CHAPTER 17

AN OVERVIEW ABOUT ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITIES

Dr. Vijendra Singh, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:virendra.mgmt@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

Organizational diversities refer to the differences in various aspects of organizations, including the people, culture, structure, and practices. These diversities can have significant impacts on organizational performance and effectiveness, as well as on individual experiences and outcomes.One important aspect of organizational diversity is demographic diversity, which refers to differences in characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, and age among employees and leaders. Demographic diversity has been shown to have positive effects on organizational performance, including increased creativity, innovation, and problem-solving ability. However, it can also create challenges, such as communication barriers and conflicts arising from differing perspectives and experiences.

KEYWORDS:

Diversity Management, Equality, Inclusion, Structure, Social Justice.

INTRODUCTION

Visions and practices of democracy in the GJM differ, but there is a consistent emphasis on participatory and deliberative features. Debates often focus on two primary aspects, as we've seen in past discussions. Those based on the transmission of authority to representatives are contrasted with participatory views that emphasize inclusivity of equals. In this regard, we investigated the persistence of direct forms of democracy that placed a high value on the assembly as well as the degree to which the institutionalization of social movement organizations had expanded the idea of power delegation. The preponderance of majoritarian voting-based decision-making, as opposed to one that gives particular weight to public discourse, the common good, reasonable argumentation, and the transformation of preferences, as we just said, is the second dimension. On this, we emphasized how a rising focus on values and practices that instead emphasise excellent communication challenges the conventional use of vote as a decision-making mechanism even within the assembleary organizational paradigm[1], [2].

We have used a typology of democratic forms of internal decision-making that, across the two dimensions of participation and deliberation, identifies four democratic models: associational, which gave more weight to delegation and majoritarian voting. deliberative representative. assembleary, with an emphasis on participation but also on majoritarian decision-making. and deliberative participatory, with a combined stress on delegation and consensus. According to our study, all of these models are quite prevalent in our movement, which stands out for its diversity not just in terms of organizational resources or action repertoires but also internal organizational structures. The participation of organizations from diverse movement traditions as well as recently emerging groups on global concerns was reflected in organizational distinctions. They

also represented the many ages and organizational forms that make up the movement of movements, which also includes political parties, labor unions, co-ops, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While all of these differences have contributed to tensions within the GJM, they have also facilitated the cross-fertilization of various models, leading to the creation of new forms like contemporary networks as well as the transformation of preexisting groups.

Beyond just describing them, we also attempted to explain the differences between them and comprehend the interpretations activists and social movement groups gave to them. We repeated this process for all of the democratic concepts and practices we looked at, including the degree of delegation, the mention of deliberative ideals, the methods of interactions with public institutions, the level of oligarchy, the conceptions of e-democracy, and others.National political possibilities revealed here as essentially inadequate reasons for organizational choices, although in earlier phases of our study we concentrated on cross-national comparison. Although cross-country differences contributed to the understanding of the various modes of action or the democratic characteristics of Internet Web sites, the internal diversity present in each nation and at the transnational level was more pertinent.

However, we preferred to concentrate on the organizational level given that our sampling strategy did not permit for strong statements about the representativeness of our groups. We have sought to find inspiration in the resource mobilization strategy while also combining it with the neo-institutional acknowledgement of the importance of ideas. This is in keeping with the general discussions in organizational sociology and particularly of its application in social movement studies. Although we did not compare the two approaches as rivals, we discovered that neo-institutionalism was helpful in addressing some of the shortcomings of the resource mobilization strategy.In our, we compared and outlined cultural and structural justifications, as well as instrumental and prefigurative decisions. In the introduction, I made the case that, despite widespread agreement about the significance of collective actors for social mobilization, the explanations of organizational methods have differed. I did this by relying on organizational sociology. First, the focus has switched to the environment's function as a force for change as opposed to the initiative of social movement groups.

Second, and related to the first point, there has been a shift from an instrumental to a normative interpretation of organizational paths. Whereas the resource mobilization approach emphasized the instrumental logic in decision-making, prioritizing efficiency, more recent attention has been paid to their prefigurative logic, prioritizing norma- tive concerns. While not discounting the importance of some incentives and structures, a neo-institutional turn in organizational sociology has emphasized the role of cognitive processes and normative motivations. The relative significance of instrumental and normative, structural, and cultural elements has been evaluated and debated in the majority of the following. Our study assisted in identifying which sorts of organizational traits impact which particular democratic beliefs and behaviors, rather than just favoring one set of explanations over the others in the final verdict.Indeed, as a result of the structural traits of our groups, various approaches to dealing with institutions have emerged.

The more an organization prefers to work with institutions, and the converse is true, the more formal, professionalized, massive, and territorially multilayered it is. When examining democratic models, the organizations that are less participatory are more likely to collaborate, whereas the others have a higher propensity to refusal but especially critical collaboration. However, interactions with institutions that do appear to be a part of broader organizational

conceptions and to be influenced by more universal values cannot be fully explained by structures alone. When principles like democracy, inclusivity, and autonomy are articulated, opinions toward public institutions become more critical. Values are ingrained in movement spaces as well: cooperation tends to decline for anarchist and New Left groups as well as for the new global organizations, while collaboration tends to increase for the Old Left as well as for the new social movement spaces.

A few organizational traits also have an impact on references to participation and consensus. Participation is seen as a good general value by companies at all levels in the scale of delegation, despite the fact that it is more likely to be addressed internally when delegation in decision-making is low. Despite being mentioned by both large and small groups, the size of GJMOs has a negative correlation with participation in actual decision-making. Similar to this, smaller, less wealthy, and more participative groups respond more favorably to criticisms of delegation and references to consensual values.Significantly, mentions of democratic values are linked to allusions to anti-globalist issues. in particular, references to consensual values are more prevalent in organizations that were founded during the most recent wave of anti-globalist protest, experiment with novel organizational models or emphasize horizontal structures, and keep a more multi-issue focus. By combining multivariate regression with qualitative comparative analysis, Marco Giugni and Alessandro Nai shown that some structural traits favor deliberative participation.

Cultural traits like connection with the movement and membership in new social movements and global domains, however, have an even greater potential for explanation. Particular types of values, reflecting recent cultural shifts, appear to be more prevalent in organizations established after 1989.The examination of the effects of organization size provides evidence for the significance of normative motivation. Clare Saunders highlighted the importance of size as well as organizational normatively based decisions when measuring an oligarchy score. It's true that large organizations tend to come out as uglier, favoring efficiency over involvement and orderliness above creative flexibility. Cultural orientations, which are represented in particular organizational decisions, nonetheless, have a significant effect in facilitating or reversing the trend. On the other hand, if tiny organizations wish to rein in oligarchic inclinations, they too must invest in specialized techniques. However, even large organizations have the potential to deliberately defy the iron law of oligarchy by combining innovative new technological applications with novel networked decision-making models based on spokes councils[3].

Outwardly oriented tactics are influenced by a combination of structural and cultural elements as well. These strategies are not only selected for their instrumental utility but also because they have complex implications for how the conflict is defined and how one's own identity is represented. Unconventional forms also resonate with more democratic conceptions of participation here, giving the assembly a bigger role and appealing to horizontal values as well as the less professionalized, those who do not receive public funding, and those who are less cooperative towards institutions. Less confrontational organizations include those working on solidarity, human rights, peace problems, and NGOs. this is also true of New Global groupings and contemporary networks that allow for collective membership. In this instance, the answer seems to be related to the peculiarities of international intervention, where acting on the street is more challenging.

The scope and modes of Internet usage by GJMOs to enhance the democratic aspects of organizational decision-making as well as of the larger society are also influenced by structural and cultural variables. Our activists and their groups do, in fact, make extensive use of the internet, which enables them in particular to foster internal discourse, create networked structures, and plan demonstrations. Documents about global issues and solutions are available on the websites of organizations, along with information on their own histories and selves. However, our organizations have different perspectives on and uses for computer-mediated communication. More formal, bigger, more multidimensional organizations seem to engage in expanding openness and the broad distribution of information, in contrast to more participative and smaller groups who utilize their websites to mobilize dissent and foster identity.The examination of the level of transnationalization of our organizations emphasizes the need of structural resources as well as a cultural commitment. Pianti, Marchetti, and Zola report that the degree of transnationalization rises specifically in relation to the nature of the concerns and the degree of identification with the GJM in their analysis of the factors of an index of transnationalization. Despite the importance of resources, a network structure enables even smaller and resource-limited groups to mobilize globally[4].

In conclusion, our analysis shows the Global Justice Movement to be at least twice a democratic booster. It experiments with democracy within its own practices on the one hand, and develops ideas for democratic transformation of institutions at all levels, on the other. In this approach, it highlights several democratic values that are becoming less and less valued by modern organizations. The increasing emphasis on democratic characteristics in the social sciences attests to the understanding of inherent conflicts between various democratic principles and objectives. In reality, many notions of democracy that are each associated with different ideals might be counterpoised. Efficiency, delegation, individual, majoritarian, vote, institutions, processes, instrumentality, singular, professionalism are words that come to mind while discussing representative democracy. Inclusion, direct power-exercise, associative behaviors, discursive discourse, the process, the normative, pluralism, and lay people are prioritized in participatory counter-democracy. If some of these values have been given preference throughout representative democracy's historical development, the renewal of democracy should result in a re-evaluation and adaptation of components that were very much present in ancient conceptions of democracy.

The various components of what Rosanvallon called counter-democracy, whether they are new or old, do not represent the opposite of democracy, but rather the form of democracy that contrasts the other, the democracy of indirect powers that are disseminated in the social body, the democracy of organized defiance as opposed to electoral legitimacy. The discussion of post-national, global democracy, its moral foundation, and empirical views makes meditation on the many democratic features all the more pertinent. Growing economic interconnectedness is accompanied by a significant internationalization of public authority associated with a corresponding globalization of political activity, even if the national political framework still buffers the influence of global movements on national politics. Indeed, globalization has raised awareness of global commons that cannot be protected at the national level alone and that pose a threat to hierarchical structures based on territorial dominance. The GJMOs that we have researched have aided in critiquing current IGOs as well as advocating for the growth of global democracy.

DISCUSSION

Social Movements and Public Policy: Eggs, Chicken, and Theory

In 1965, there were a variety of valid arguments against American involvement in the Vietnam War, and as the conflict became worse, those arguments became more and more compelling, prompting opponents to demonstrate in public. Lyndon Johnson said in July 1965 that the United States would increase its military presence in South Vietnam by roughly 50,000 soldiers, requiring a more active use of the military conscription. The conscription fueled the nascent antiwar movement and made the war in Vietnam, a pressing subject, more approachable. The conscription gave the antiwar movement a focus and gave college campuses a feeling of urgency to take action to oppose the war. When Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach pledged to look into the anti-draft movement in October 1965, while local Selective Service officials revoked the student exemptions of anti-war protesters when they were arrested, the Johnson administration, most likely unintentionally, helped activists who wanted to focus on the draft.

The importance of the conscription gave fresh life to tiny pacifist and socialist groups that had been organizing and coordinating the early opposition to the war, bringing more new activists to local and national events than any of the groups could manage. The conscription made it possible for pacifists, who ordinarily spoke to small crowds, to address much larger ones. Additionally, organizations like Students for a Democratic Society, which showed a wide commitment to complete democratic reform in the United States, grew fast to less prestigious college campuses. Millions of young men might physically participate in the draft, making it a possibility that needed to be addressed. Resistance to the draft was often expressed via the ritualized act of shredding a draft card.

The antiwar movement's rapid development presented challenges for those who wanted to organize it as well. The newly swollen antiwar organizations provided a larger venue, as well as the prospects of higher payoffs, for intramural fights about ideology and tactics, effectively encouraging bitter sectarian disputes and an internal social control problem for organizations concerned with managing their public face by limiting their expressed tactics. Many businesses failed to survive.If rapid growth caused issues for the antiwar movement, they were no less significant than those it caused for political leaders. A government seeking, at the very least, domestic peace found its life made more difficult by the bigger, more volatile, more visible, and more diversified antiwar movement. Richard Nixon acknowledges in his memoirs that the antiwar demonstrators limited his choices in Vietnam, thus preventing the useor the effective threat of using—nuclear weapons. One answer to the antiwar movement was to expand the voting age to 18. another was to implement a draft lottery before finally abolishing the draft.

Following the ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment the year before, the end of the draft in 1972 drastically changed the political landscape for the antiwar movement. As electoral opportunities arose, organizers lost some of the ardent new converts who opposed the war while also being terrified for their own lives. The history of Vietnam, according to James Fallows, demonstrated the difference between abstract and self-interested behaviors. Although the antiwar movement may have triumphed as U.S. involvement in Vietnam eventually came to an end, the pacifists lost their connections with movement politics, and broader claims about invigorated and genuine democracy, as expressed by SDS, mostly disappeared from American political life or were reformulated in much more moderate terms as procedural reforms.

The proposed example highlights a number of linkages between protest, policy, and democracy. my goal is to provide a framework for comprehending those wider relationships. I start by carefully examining the literatures on social movements and public policy, looking for any gaps and places of convergence. Although the exact mechanisms by which this occurs are rarely specified, scholars of public policy, for instance, frequently attribute social movements a role in the agenda-setting process: something outside institutional politics affects the agenda within. Similar omissions are made by social movement scholarship. The connection of both substantive and symbolic changes in policy with the growth of a challenge movement is undertheorized and understudied, despite the fact that policy is often viewed as one social movement consequence. Fundamentally, policy researchers consider movements as undifferentiated and unitary actors that respond by disruption, while social movement scholars treat movements as a black box inside the state that movements may periodically shake and upset into action. Scholars, however, provide a considerably more nuanced understanding of complexity and contingency in their primary research fields.These issues are essential to how American democracy operates. On one hand, the emergenceno, the proliferationof social movements indicates that people in the United States generally believe that the country's political institutions are unable to adequately represent and address their problems.

A threat to democracy's operation arises when the government reacts to social movements that don't represent a majority. Instead of seeing social movements as an alternative to institutional politics, as most activists do, I shall do so in this context. Undoubtedly, a movement without allies in mainstream politics will find it difficult to influence the policy-making process. The more interesting topic to think about is whether involvement in social movements has become required, but certainly not sufficient, to influence policy for the majority of groups. We shall discuss these topics again in the conclusion, but for now let's focus on the political and social movements[5].According to the literature, I contend that in order to acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the process and stakes of an increasingly prevalent style of politics in democratic polities, analysts would do well to concentrate on the links at this time. I briefly describe the specific set of constraints and opportunities that distinguish the American context before providing an integrated model that specifies the multi-dimensional connections between social movements and public policy in the country while taking into account how both movements and policy develop over time. I advocate for additional in-depth study on the relationship between protest and policy as I draw to a close.

Policy and Protest

A significant number of linkages between protest and policy, articulated over a period of just around seven years, are brought into sharp focus by the inaugural example of U.S. policy on conscription. Conscription-based policies that increase the number of young men available for the military simultaneously produce a grievance and a constituency that is most acutely affected by it: young men who are eligible for the draft and their families. The conscription policy was made a temporary target for the antiwar movement, and its administration offered a number of locations or targets where pro-tests might be launched, as well as a number of strategies. Because of the structure of American draft law, antiwar groups now have a means of reaching their supporters: draft counseling. Additionally, it forced young men to confront the policy both directly and abstractly, leading them to make decisions about their own draft status and strategies while dealing with varying levels of anxiety and information.

Young menand those who cared about themwere propelled into the whole spectrum of American political institutions, including the Selective Service bureaucracy, local draft boards, the courts, and election campaigns, by both resistance to the draft in general and anxiety over one's own destiny. For a foreign war conducted without reluctantto put it mildlyAmerican conscripts, it is difficult to envision the antiwar movement having the intensity and potential for expansion that it had thanks to the high stakes of the conscription for young men. Additionally, the policy gave the government an easy, albeit illegal, way to try and suppress anti-war sentiment and impose social order. Protests against American involvement in the Vietnam War have influenced a variety of policies ever since. The United States has depended on a voluntary military force since Vietnam, at least in part due of the antiwar movement, even if the registration of young men for the draft was reinstated in 1980. More generally, since that time, U.S. foreign policy has been constrained by the political ramifications of the antiwar movement. Due to the so-called Vietnam syndrome, countries were reluctant to send ground forces into battle unless the United States sent in an overwhelming force and had a good chance of winning and leaving quickly[6].

The military suddenly had to handle workers who had the option of quitting, which altered a variety of personnel procedures. Without a draft, decision-makers and administrators must concentrate on improving the standard of living for military members, which includes paying much more attention to recruitment as well as concerns about pay, housing, child care, and career progression. Formerly a nearly universal experience for young American men, military service is now restricted to a relatively small percentage of the population. Instead of being a duty assumed by all young men, military service became a vocation selected by members of the military. A group of neoliberals made a case for the reinstatement of the draft due to perceived negative effects of this shift on the polity and the military. However, in order to make sure that such a program was not mandatory, cautious politicians reframed new policy options as a broader national service program, including all kinds of non-military activities. They then scaled it back and underfunded it.I want to underscore the variety of ways that policy and testing have overlapping influences. We must adopt a wide interpretation of connections in order to comprehend these links, one that allows for intricate and iterative interactions rather than distinct results or beginnings, and we must take a longer look at patterns of influence.

Mutual Recognition and Neglect in Existing Theory

Public policy or social movement scholars often acknowledge the significance of other phenomena in their area of study, but they seldom go farther than that. These reciprocal exclusions are ironic given that most of the key research on movements in the 1960s and 1970s concentrated on the political benefits of mobilizing social dissent. Michael Lipsky's work upheld protest as a legitimate political tactic for those who lacked the political clout to effectively promote their issues via conventional channels. His main argument was that protest might occasionally be effective. Similar- ly, the relationship between government policies toward the poor and their reaction has been very clearly examined in the work of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward. They contended in Regulating the Poor that welfare expenditure was fundamentally an effort by the government to preserve social harmony, a strategy intended to quell unrest.

In Poor People's Movements, they looked at the relationship from the other side, arguing that disruptive protest was the best way for the poor to affect government policy on their behalfbecause, as they had earlier noted, welfare spending was a way to buy quiescence. They

did this by providing extended analyses of four historical cases. They argued that during uncertain election periods, governments may react to unrest by making policy accommodations to groups the demonstrators purportedly represented. They criticized organizers who did not learn from the past that organization building blunted or curbed the disruptive force which lower-class people were sometimes able to mobilize by framing their insight as a prescription to them in unambiguous and scathing words. Although Piven and Cloward's work sparked a lot of debate, primarily about the veracity of their claims about welfare and the poor, there was much less in the way of in-depth analysis of their assumptions about how protest influenced policy or the extent to which their claims about poor peoples' movements were applicable to the social protest efforts of the nonpoor, who have been responsible for organizing most of the major social movements in the advance[7].

William Gamson's The Strategy of Social Protest, another important study on movements and policies from this time, concentrated on the organizational qualities that were associated with success. Between 1800 and 1945, fifty-three representative challenging groups tried to exert influence in the United States. Gamson identified these groupings and evaluated their political outcomes. Using a sample frame of fifteen years after the apex of each challenge, he was especially interested in whether each organization had achieved official recognition as a genuine participant in American politics and if it had succeeded in any of its policy demands. Gamson, to his credit, repeated some of the subsequent disputes in the second edition of his book. Gamson's technique naturally highlighted a number of important problems regarding how to define and quantify success.

The study focused instead on the kind of organizational resources, structures, claims, and strategies that were likely to be connected with success, which is more relevant for our purposes since it regarded policy as an end and output but didn't explore the process by which protest converted into influence.Few of the essential problems identified in these 1970s critical works were systematic ably investigated in the decades that followed, despite the fact that they opened up a significant field for inquiry. The setting and results of political mobilization were discussed by social movement scholars, but public policy was seen as a relatively unimportant component of the framework of political possibilities that may motivate social movements. From the perspective of social movements, policy is often seen as the result of mobilization, and changes in policy are typically tracked back to identify the role played by movements. In either scenario, the policy-making process is presented as a mysterious, impenetrable black box.

In fact, Thomas Rochon argues in his significant new book on the influence of social movements that a concentration on policy investigates just one area of social movement influence, one that is often less receptive to movement influence[8].Although it is a relatively small place, social movements have been acknowledged by public policy students as having a place in the policy-making process. The recognition of social movements as exogenous political forces that may influence various aspects of the policy-making process, most notably agenda-setting or the creation of social issues, target constituencies, and policy options, follows a general pattern. Rarely, though, does the analysis go any further or address the ways in which movements impact the formulation of policy. However, by referencing the literature on policy and movements, we can create a framework for comprehending how policy and movements are related.

CONCLUSION

Finally,diverse organizational approaches to problems like sustainability, social responsibility, and diversity and inclusion are referred to as diverse organizational practices. To solve these concerns, many policies, procedures, and techniques may be used. The reputation of an organization, stakeholder participation, and long-term viability may all be significantly impacted by these differences. For example, hierarchical vs flat organizational structures, centralized versus decentralized decision-making, and formal versus informal communication routes are all examples of structural variety. Organizational efficiency, adaptability, and creativity may be impacted by structural diversity, but if it is not well managed, it may also lead to disputes and misunderstanding. In general, businesses must recognize and manage organizational diversity if they are to maximize their potential and accomplish their objectives. Organizations may establish more productive and inclusive teams, take advantage of different ideas and experiences, and foster a more pleasant workplace culture by recognizing and respecting diversity.

REFERENCES:

[1] A. Hajro, C. B. Gibson, and M. Pudelko, 'Knowledge exchange processes in multicultural teams: Linking organizational diversity climates to teams' effectiveness', *Acad. Manag. J.*, 2017, doi: 10.5465/amj.2014.0442.

[2] A. Hsiao, E. Ma, and C. Auld, 'Organizational Ethnic Diversity and Employees' Satisfaction With Hygiene and Motivation Factors—A Comparative IPA Approach', *J. Hosp. Mark. Manag.*, 2017, doi: 10.1080/19368623.2016.1181020.

[3] Q. M. Roberson, 'Diversity in the Workplace: A Review, Synthesis, and Future Research Agenda', *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*. 2019. doi: 10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-012218-015243.

[4] C. F. Machado and J. P. Davim, *Managing organizational diversity: Trends and challenges in management and engineering*. 2017. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-54925-5.

[5] Y. Fujimoto and C. E.J. Härtel, 'Organizational diversity learning framework: going beyond diversity training programs', *Pers. Rev.*, 2017, doi: 10.1108/PR-09-2015-0254.

[6] S. Teerikangas, 'A Comparative Overview of the Impact of Cultural Diversity on Inter-Organisational Encounters', *Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions*. 2007. doi: 10.1016/S1479-361X(07)06003-6.

[7] S. Ram, 'Encyclopedia of communication theory', *Choice Rev. Online*, 2010, doi: 10.5860/choice.47-2913.

[8] Q. M. Roberson, 'Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Diversity in the Workplace: A Review, Synthesis, and Future Research Agenda', *Annu. Rev. Organ. Psychol. Organ. Behav*, 2019.

CHAPTER 18

MOVEMENTS AND POLICY: FIRST PREMISES

Dr. Vinesh Kumar, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:vinesh.somc@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

Movements and policy are intertwined in complex ways, as movements seek to shape policy through various means, such as protests, lobbying, and direct action. At the same time, policy can shape movements by either facilitating or constraining their activities.The first premise of movements and policy is that movements arise in response to social and political issues that are not being adequately addressed by existing policy. Movements can serve as a critical force for change, highlighting issues and pushing for policy reform through public pressure and advocacy.The second premise is that policy can both facilitate and constrain movements. Policy can provide resources, such as funding and legal protections, that enable movements to thrive and achieve their goals. Conversely, policy can also limit the activities of movements through restrictive laws and regulations, or through co-optation by the political establishment.

KEYWORDS:

Advocacy Groups, Agenda Setting, Grassroots, Interest Groups, Policy, Political Participation.

INTRODUCTION

By beginning with what we already know about movements and public policy, we may construct some first premises. The policy-making process, for starters, does not rigorously adhere to any of the linear frameworks presented in textbooks, and innovation and change may originate from a broad range of sources. Although useful heuristics, rational actor models do not accurately capture the way that policy-making actually occurs, which is as a struggle between various actors trying to appease various constituencies. The definition of specific conditions as problematic and amenable to purposeful intervention by government, the range of tools that may be lawfully used by government, and the ultimate goals of any policy intervention are all examples of policy disputes, in addition to conflicts over the relative influence of the various interested parties.Second, although not one of pleasure, the typical pattern of policy in any given sector is one of stability. Policy monopolies, or networks of organizations and people working within and outside of government who are recognized by one another as legitimate players involved with a certain set of policies, are responsible for maintaining such policies.Elected officials, bureaucratic managers, and activists in well-known interest groups all make up this monopoly.

Conflict between these parties often results in a deadlock that only permits minor changes to policy. Reform initiatives made by individuals outside of these networks are often overlooked. Numerous policy monopolies operate independently of one another, frequently going unnoticed by the larger political establishment.Third, Kingdon describes periods of opportunity for policy change as open windows that only sometimes coincide with the emergence of a societal issue. As Kingdon points out, changes in politics, policies, or issues might open a window, but the crucial

factor to pay attention to is the potential reorganization of a policy monopoly. Policy changes result from a shift in the political power dynamics inside that monopoly, and these changes have the potential to cause or thwart additional political changes.However, there are times when opportunities for change pass byor are ignoredwithout any effective action being taken. Even if they go mostly unnoticed, such untapped windows, or missed opportunities, are important because they may not always present themselves with new prospects for improvement. Lack of change may strengthen the status quo inside a policy monopoly. Take Bill Clinton's original attempt to overhaul American health insurance as an example. The political cost of Clinton's failure, notably the Democratic party's defeat in the 1994 midterm elections, discouraged Clintonand possibly his successorsfrom thorough reform initiatives.

Fourth, policies mirror and then mold the prevailing societal constructs of both the issues and the people who cause them. The government legitimizes political and social activity on their behalf by designating particular players as deserving. more importantly, it gives these actors the ability to organize on their own behalf. Of course, the opposite is also true: by blaming certain individuals for their own problems, government not only justifies official inactivity, but also makes it difficult for them to organize themselves on a social, political, and psychological level.Several important points are established by the social movement literature. It is important to first comprehend the unique characteristics of a social movement. Movements are defined by Sidney Tarrow as collec- tive challenges based on common purposes, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities in his succinct and insightful definition. The following definition's salient aspects need emphasis: A social movement is bigger than any one event, signifying a problem that spans time, and it engages in some kind of dynamic engagement with mainstream politics. These factors are all reflected in the wide framework, which allows for the inclusion of both institutionally focused and extra-institutional activities.

Second, keep in mind that motions are not composed of a single performer. Social movements are made up of coalitions of actors acting on some aspect of common objectives and contending for prominence in defining claims and tactics, notwithstanding the grammatical ease of including the or a in the title. Tracking a number of players functioning in a range of settings throughout time is necessary to understand the impact of a social movement.Third, it's crucial to take into account the situations in which various players are likely to collaborate since staging a huge, difficult movement requires forging alliances and networks among entities that do not always operate in unison. In recent years, social movement experts have placed a greater emphasis on the conditions that cause movements to flourish or fail. The emphasis on context, or political opportunity structure, draws attention to the connections between protest politics, mainstream politics, and public policy.

Fourth, depending on how a specific group is positioned, government vacancies may either spark or quell unrest. Such research is predicated on the idea that the likelihood that certain causes, alliances, and strategies would find support in mainstream politics has a significant impact on how prominent such issues and constituency become in social movements. Political opportunity theory was first framed as a curvilinear relationship between systemic opportunities and extra-institutional dissent. Those that can accomplish their objectives without using protest politics will do so. Those that, regardless of their methods, have limited chance of gaining influence will be less inclined to organize. Government efforts to engage certain populations in the political process and address their concerns might thus lead to protest, while similar efforts to engage other constituencies may have the opposite effect. Fifth, social movement groups seek to finance

themselves as well as bring about legislative improvements. The search for concerns and solutions is done with two main audiences in mind: authorities and supporters. Another is a source of resources, whereas the first is a target for influence.

Groups are under conflicting demands from the audiences. If organizations can work together to achieve their objectives and coordinate their strategies, they can have the most impact on how policy is made. If groups can set themselves apart from one another, they can each find a favorable position for gaining support.Sixth, over time, at least in part because of resources, collaboration and differentiation between organizations within a movement coalition alter. Groups are more likely to work together when resources are more easily accessible and resources are in high demand. Groups without a particular interest in a problem area are also more likely to establish one when these conditions exist.Consider the nuclear freeze movement, when individuals and organizations from churches to service groups to neighborhood associations showed a freshfound interest in nuclear weapons and international affairs. However, as public interest wanes, groups are more likely to diverge, focusing on different aspects of related issues or giving up on movement-related issues altogether. Thus, the dynamics of a cycle of protest are accelerated and amplified by coalition dynamics. Seventh, social movement activists may create institutions to pursue their demands over an extended period of time, especially in liberal polities.

Organizations created in the height of social upheaval often endure, even if it means harming the movements that gave birth to them. These groups also provide the infrastructure needed for later mobilization.Additionally, activists can create or locate safe spaces within well-established organizations, such as political organizations. Such locations are referred to as habitats by Mary Katzenstein, who also points out that women who joined the second wave of the feminist movement in the 1970s created habitats in some rather improbable settings, such as the Roman Catholic Church and the U.S. military. Such habitats may act as platforms to advertise certain policies in addition to providing safe spaces for particular ideas or communities. The creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which later provided housing not just for African-Americans but also for other ethnic minorities and women, was one result of the civil rights movement. People who are interested in moderation in the arms race or in environmental destruction have occasionally found homes thanks to the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1963 and the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, both of which were partially responses to the peace movement.

More thorough study is needed to determine how well these institutions have reflected the values and ideologies of the movements that gave birth to them.Eighth, a social movement only has a short window of opportunity to capture the political attention of a sizable number of mainstream actors, such as elected officials and the media, and it is helpful to think of the decline process in terms of coalitions. Many performers identify with a certain persona or set of claims during the height of a movement. This connection reaches to bring together participants in institutional politics and extrainstitutional political actors. As this peak passes, many members of this large coalition leave in a variety of ways. the majority either abandon the issue in favor of one that is more urgent or promising or stop engaging in politics altogether. Some organizations and people forgo the compromises required for coalition building or engaging in dialogue with mainstream politics in favor of outlining their own views more forcefully and vehemently. Others turn away from social movements' overarching objectives and extra-institutional strategies in favor of concentrating on little victories within the established political institutions.

When considered together, this process of decline makes up political institutionalization when the polity and participants of a social movement negotiate an implicitly more routine and less disruptive relationship that can be sustained over time[1]. Research on their linkages should likely center on this process of political institutionalization, according to what is known about movements and policies. Institutionalization describes how policy changes can be handled without inciting a movement response both substantively and procedurally, as well as how movement actors can either be included in the policy process as legitimate actors or effectively excluded from mainstream political relevance. The possibilities and limitations posed by the structure of government have a significant role in determining the processes involved in political institutionalization and policy outcomes. These opportunities and restrictions are oddly mixed together in the American political system. We may start to acquire a deeper grasp of the movement-policy link by comprehending the fundamental framework of American institutions and the policymaking process.

DISCUSSION

Social Movements and Democracy in America

James Madison promised that the government he helped create for the American Constitution would alloweven encouragepeople to organize and mobilize in support of their interests, but would make it extremely difficult for them to persuade the government to act on those interests. Madison believed that restricting liberty would stifle democracy and eventually lead to another revolution, but that both the government and the people needed to be safeguarded against organized groupsincluding minorities and majoritieswho would attempt to influence government to act on their behalf. He and his colleagues created a system that, in essence, fosters the growth of social movements and all but guarantees their abysmal failure.The Constitution outlined a framework for a government that was predicated on mistrust of Americans, believing solely that people and organizations would prioritize their own interests above those of others.

Its fundamental structure divided power in order to make it difficult for any interested party, or faction in Madison's terminology, to wield the government's authority without widespread and consistent support from a variety of other players. The Constitution prevented the misuse of power by dividing it. Even if a group took over a piece of the government, it would be limited in what it could do. This was ostensibly an effort to stay away from the tyrannies of monarchies and mobs. On another level, however, it was a prescription for a less effective administration. All Americans are still faced with this conflict between rhetoric about democracy and involvement and the reality of a delayed and unresponsive government[2].When we focus more intently on the constitutional design, we can see more. In the United States, there is a division of authority between the federal government, state governments, and local governments. This creates a conundrum for activists on which level of government they should concentrate their efforts on. Local governments are often more attentive to their concerns but less free to act upon them. The political system offers activists a variety of targets and gives officials a trusted way to shift blame.

The legislative, executive, and judicial divisions of the federal government are further split into several spheres of authority. The Senate and the House of Representatives, which each represent different districts and are elected at relatively different times, are further separated into the legislature, which is obviously intended to be the most powerful part of the government. Activists may push their efforts at the federal government level in a variety of forums and against

a variety of objectives. The ability to modify policy, however, ultimately rests with the other branches of the government. Local elected officials, state legislatures, and state courts, for instance, are arguing over their respective authority to permitor forbidgay marriage as I write. Since the president and members of Congress have expressed their opinions and threatened to take action, it is obvious that the federal judiciary will be required to address the matter in some way. Nobody can instantly tell with certainty who is in the best position to alter policy or prevent it from doing so.

Social movement activists are unsure about the Democratic influence on those who hold these viewpoints. Activists must continually assess the viability of an electoral strategy since elections for the legislature and the executive office are quite often. However, electoral politics are time- and money-consuming, and even putting a strong ally in a position of influence does not ensure policy responsiveness. Due to the structure of elected office in the governmentwhich is filled by residents of sizable single-member districtsconflict tends to center on the centre of the political spectrum. Additionally, it promoted the growth of a two-party system, which was used to both run for office and win legislative majorities. Of fact, parties in the United States swiftly evolved into large coalitions themselves given the diversity of interests in each district, much less the country as a whole. This makes it such that elected officials, regardless of how political or dedicated they are, must compromise and form new coalitions after taking office, giving in to or even coopting the concerns of their followers[3].

The Madisonian design was essentially all about institutionalizing dissent, bringing political conflict into the executive branch of government, in order to limit the range of claims that activists might make and to encourage partisans to engage in peaceful political conflict as opposed to using force or rejecting the system. Conflict between the government and dissidents was seen to be better than conflict inside the government. However, this decision leads to an ineffective and unresponsive federal government. The Bill of Rights, which legally protected the rights of individuals who would strive to influence government, was a part of the ratified Constitution. The portions of the First Amendment that guarantee the rights to free speech, the press, and assembly are the most pertinent for our purposes. However, despite the Bill of Rights' remarkable clarity on fundamental principles, the government has frequently trampled on its protections. Since John Adams and up until George W. Bush, presidents have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to restrict their political rivals' access to important audiences through the media.

The American government has sometimes pursued individuals for their political convictions and intimidated others due to their religious allegiances. It's critical to not disregard such stark deviations from civil liberty ideals. At the same time, Americans have traditionally been given considerable political freedom throughout American history to attempt to persuade others to support their interests. The premise behind free speech is that even the most awful ideas become less terrifying and easier to handle when they are publicly expressed. The majority of social movement politics in the United States have taken place in public, with all of the possibilities and restrictions that entails. Similar to this, although there have historically been significant restrictions on press freedom, the idea of a free press means that activists can attempt to use mainstream media to learn about topics of interest to them and to share their concerns and efforts with others.

Again, the goal is to make opposition more visible while preventing it from becoming a movement with the potential to be revolutionary. But as we shall see, inviting dissent is not the same as responding to it.We may now continue to develop a more comprehensive synthetic approach to comprehending the relationships between movements and policy in the United States after taking into account the American context and key elements of established, separate literatures on policy and movements. In fact, this relationship offers a kind of diagnostic of the democratic process in well developed liberal governments. The kind of influences movements and policies may have on one another are what I will now discuss[4].

Motions and Policy: a Classification of Effects

Government policies and actions have a lot of potential to affect how social movements grow. First, laws that make voting easier or harder or that require public involvement in hearings may have a direct impact on how permeable the political landscape is. Government acts provide openings or closings that affect the appeal of protest and social mobilization as a tactic by incorporating a variety of players as legitimate in the polity. People are less inclined to support political chances when they perceive they have more direct, and less hazardous or expensive, methods to influence policy, according to Peter Eisinger's insight on the curvilinear character of political possibilities. Opening up institutional spaces to large-scale involvement may reduce the appeal and possibility of protest as a political tactic.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, repression may make protesting more expensive and dangerous to the point where few individuals are ready to do so in order to gain political influence that seems doubtful. Of course, some people may take extreme measures regardless of the dangers to themselves or to certain constituencies, less concerned with the political repercussions of their actions than with bearing witness to or bringing about some vision of justice. Rarely, though, do such dramatic events gain traction and give rise to what we typically refer to as a social movement. Opportunity is commonly racial, classed, and gendered by public policy since openings are frequently not equally accessible to all constituencies. States may also enable or exclude certain constituencies. Thus, policy establishes constituencies and the groundwork for developing strategies[5].

In a similar vein, political organization techniques may benefit from government intervention. McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson, for instance, claim that American tax law encourages outspoken people to create nonprofit organizations and that government regulations specify certain organizational requirements and legal strategies that such organizations must use. For instance, changes in the rules governing the financing of American elections in the 1970s led organizations to adopt certain organizational structures and to adopt specific strategies, such as direct mail fund-raising and campaign donations. Government may also outlaw certain strategies via monitoring, repression, and severe criminal penalties. Early in the 1990s, despite some anti-abortion activists adopting more aggressive and disruptive methods, nonviolent clinic demonstrations were largely put an end by federal and state enforcement of civil and criminal fines against protestors who obstructed clinics.

Effectively, public participation rules may direct advocates to adopt certain strategies, organizational structures, and even claims. Policy also gives rise to problems or complaints. Concerns about anything the government is doingor not doingare expressed through social movements. We may imagine a regular stalemate during which most individuals are hesitant to voice their concerns about institutional politics or about policy in general. People get mobilized

due to worries about changes in policy or changes in external circumstances that seem to call for a change in policy. Concerns may arise as a result of well considered policy adjustments or as a result of abrupt changes in how certain policies are being implemented. The draft serves as an excellent illustration of this notion, but we may also consider policies in a variety of other contexts, such as zoning hazardous waste disposal or carrying out a military operation overseas[6].Constituencies are created by the way policies are framed and may then be arranged in many different ways. By sharing a same ideology or set of beliefs, constituencies may support certain projects while opposing others. Depending on how important the topic is, each policy area has the opportunity for mobilizing groups on either side of a proposed change. For instance, the public's perception of nuclear power development in the United States has drastically changed as a result of news coverage of the most recent nuclear catastrophe and the price of petrol. A policy that labels certain people as included or ostracized may also more firmly unify constituencies. For instance, Social Security, which provides benefits to senior citizens, connects a sizable number of individuals as receivers with a shared interest. Such individuals might be more frequently mobilized on the basis of other affiliations if not for the program. Additionally, the development of policy has the potential to demobilize and disempower people.Although social protest mobilization is frequently a result of the policy process, it can also be the cause. Social protest mobilization may result in quick increases in spending or regulations in an established policy area, such as welfare spending or environmental regulation, when combined with institutional politics.

Protest movements have the power to introduce new types of regulations, offer benefits to newly recognized political constituencies, or control previously unregulated areas[7]. Policies that allow new players to participate in their implementation and subsequent renegotiation might be impacted by mobilization. Weed, for instance, shows how crime victims impacted criminal justice policy by organizing for themselves and ensuring their own participation in discussions about upcoming changes to criminal justice policy. In other words, they secured a position as recognized players in the policy realm. The effectiveness and assessment of a policy are impacted by how it is being implemented, as well as the following mobilization of the affected individuals. Policy may also be impacted by the lack of mobilization from a recognized constituency. Organized interests may influence policy domain results by shifting the power dynamics thereor not.Although it is crucial to see social movements as having an impact on policy, movement effects go beyond just this. Regarding how movements have an impact on the policy-making process, there is some debate in the literature.

According to Piven and Cloward, the possibility of social and political unrest in the setting of unpredictable elections prompts policy makers to pursue measures meant to restore public order, some of which may include making accommodations to demonstrators. According to Amenta, political institutions serve as a conduit for the demands of movements, and popular instability gives lawmakers a chance to implement their favored policies. Burstein focuses on the particular mechanism of public opinion, contending that elected officials in democracies are required to react to the public in some way and that social movements may affect policy by altering public opinion or by making a particular problem more salient.All of these observations concentrate on relatively immediate effects on policy. Others point out that social movements may have an impact on culture, values, organizations, later social movements, and individual participants and that policy results are simply one aspect of social movement influences. Movements transform

the political climate in which policy will be produced, even if they fail to have a short-term impact on policy because they change firmly held beliefs or behaviors in society[8], [9].

CONCLUSION

The relationship between movements and policy is complex, with movements often emerging in reaction to social and political challenges that are not sufficiently addressed by current policy. While policy can both support and impede movements, it can also be shaped by movements using a variety of strategies, including grassroots organizing and conventional lobbying. In addition, policy may influence movements by enabling or restricting their actions. It is essential to comprehend the intricate interactions between movements and policy in order to advance social and political change and build more democratic and inclusive societies. Policymakers and grassroots activists may solve urgent social and political concerns and build a more fair and equitable society by cooperating.

REFERENCES:

[1] A. Bernstein, 'Personal And Political Histories In The Designing Of Health Reform Policy In Bolivia', *Soc. Sci. Med.*, 2017, Doi: 10.1016/J.Socscimed.2017.01.028.

[2] B. Baum, 'Diversity, Equity, And Inclusion Policies: Are Organizations Truly Committed To A Workplace Culture Shift?', *J. Bus. Behav. Sci.*, 2021.

[3] S. E. Robinson, M. G. Everett, And R. M. Christley, 'Recent Network Evolution Increases The Potential For Large Epidemics In The British Cattle Population', *J. R. Soc. Interface*, 2007, Doi: 10.1098/Rsif.2007.0214.

[4] F. A. Canaza-Choque, 'La Gran Estampida. Humanos Caminando En La Modernidad Líquida', *Encuentros. Rev. Ciencias Humanas, Teoría Soc. Y Pensam. Crítico*, 2020, Doi: 10.5281/Zenodo.3951233.

[5] F. A. Canaza-Choque, 'The Great Stampede. Humans Walking In Liquid Modernity.', *Encuentros (Maracaibo)*, 2020, Doi: 10.5281/Zenodo.3951233.

[6] D. Šakalytė And V. Indrašienė, 'Evidence-Based Practice Teaching Integration In College Nursing Studies: Historical And Legal Aspects', *Soc. Integr. Educ. Proc. Int. Sci. Conf.*, 2021, Doi: 10.17770/Sie2021vol1.6182.

[7] M. Y. Pereira, 'The Right To (Agricultural) Development Under Socialism With Chinese Characteristics: The Current Sino-Brazilian Relationship', *Rev. Estud. Antiutilitaristas E Poscoloniais*, 2021, Doi: 10.51359/2179-7501.2021.252154.

[8] T. R. Krüger, 'Sus: Da Perda Da Radicalidade Democrática Ao Novo Desenvolvimentismo', *Rev. Katálysis*, 2014, Doi: 10.1590/S1414-49802014000200007.

[9] L. Haddad, 'An Integrated Approach To Early Childhood Education And Care And Integration Within Education: The Brazilian Experience', *Creat. Educ.*, 2016, Doi: 10.4236/Ce.2016.72026.

CHAPTER 19

CONTEXT MATTERS AND PATTERNS OF INfIUENCE: AGENDAS AND ALLIANCES

Dr. Neha Sharma, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:nehas.somc@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

Context matters in understanding patterns of influence in political agendas and alliances. The relationships between actors, the structures of institutions, and the broader social and political context can all shape the ways in which actors exert influence and collaborate with one another.One key factor in shaping patterns of influence is the structure of institutions. Institutions can provide channels for actors to influence policy, but can also create barriers to change through bureaucratic structures and entrenched interests. Understanding these structures is crucial for actors seeking to shape policy agendas and build alliances.

KEYWORDS:

Agenda, Contextual Factors, Framing, Interest Groups, Issue, Lobbying.

INTRODUCTION

Studying the web of relationships between challengers and the policies they oppose is crucial, as seen by the listing and classification of mutual effects in the preceding section. It does not, however, provide a hypothesis that may direct further investigation. I make some progress in that direction in this part, once again relying on the theory created by public policy and social movement academics.For heuristic reasons, it makes sense to begin with policies as the precursor to protest, even if we must admit that it's rather unclear whether policies come before protests or the other way around. There is undoubtedly a reciprocal effect, and beginning with either source will allow for fruitful examination. At the same time, the development of social movements depends on the existence of the modern state, and states are defined by their ability to enact at least a basic set of laws, most notably the ability to run an army to protect their borders and levy taxes to support themselves.

Key players in the policy monopoly are dedicated to working within institutional politics to accomplish minor changes in the direction of their chosen final policy, which is why policy is often backed by stalemate rather than satisfaction. Progressive taxation proponents, for instance, aim to include certain aspects of progressivity, whilst its opponents work to gradually flatten the tax structure. The majority of these talks and disputes go unnoticed by the general public, and regular involvement in politics helps the many conflict-resolution activists on both sides of the issue. Through formal and informal networks, elected officials and bureaucrats are connected to one another and a small group of active actors outside of government, such as leaders of well-known interest groups, party activists, and independent experts, frequently from the academy. The general populace is sufficiently content, uninterested, or dissatisfied to not play a significant role in the day-to-day administration of the policy area.Generally unnoticed and largely off the

government's radar, activists commit to some alternative vision of policy work while remaining largely unaffected by political discourse or public attention.

Some of these organizations repeatedly launch campaigns that are still only marginally successful in an attempt to reach a larger audience. Others, whose leaders consider the situation unsuitable for mobilization, concentrate on upholding the organization and its principles while being less concerned with mobilization. They are cut off from influence in either situation, whether it is in popular culture, politics, or the decision-making process.Threats to a policy monopoly's stability, which may result from politics, policy, or other crucial events, provide chances for mobilization that may reach a wider audience and for the prospective renegotiation of the policy monopoly's borders. Because institutional politics have changed, political mobilization is now more appealing to the public in these situations. Because of explicitly stated changes in policy or the arrival of new players in the policy monopoly, it may suddenly look permeable to new demands. This might encourage mobilization that appears to have potential for success. The reconfiguration of a policy network, on the other hand, is often indicated when institutional losers appeal to the public for help because institutional politics seem insufficient and citizen efforts seem essential to develop a response to novel conditions.

DISCUSSION

In each scenario, the relevant policy monopoly's makeup has undergone the most significant alteration. A shift in the policy monopoly really alters the potential for extra-institutional mobilization, either by bringing in new players with extra-institutional connections or by eliminating existing actors who then seek out movement connections. Social movement politics are defined by connections between the edges and the mainstream during moments of peak mobilization. Government policies, which are exceptionally visible and prominent to a wide public, look changeable, and the viewpoints and critiques of those on the edges no longer seem inconsequential and may reach a bigger audience.The calculations of players with an institutional orientation are changed by volatile social movement mobilization. An organized movement may render outdated methods of governing policy useless and suddenly render feasible long-simmering ideas. Institutional players must also speak to a larger audience than is typical more often and in more depth. As a result, President Reagan was obliged to explain and rearticulate his own policies toward South Africa far more than any of his predecessors, who had all effectively handled the same strategy, throughout the era of anti-apartheid riots in Washington, DC.

More substantial adjustments may be achievable if the policy-making process and its outcomes are subjected to more external scrutiny[1]. The composition of the relevant policy monopoly may therefore be changed by social movements through replacement, conversion, re-creation, or reconfiguration. The technique of replacementeliminating a rogue and elevating an ally in their placemay be the most basic to traditional democratic governance. Movements often have a marginal impact on election campaigns, but marginal effects may be significant.One element that might cause con- version is the potential for that little influence. By changing the makeup of a policy monopoly without replacing it, one may expose a refractory lawmaker or administrator to the influence of a movement's ideas or, alternately, to the influence of the movement's promoter. Determining whether conversions, like George Bush's decision to oppose abortion rights in 1980 or Jesse Jackson's decision to take a pro-choice stance in 1983, emerge from opportunistic calculation or reflective soul-searching is not significant for the purposes of this research. The policymaking process and end result are changed in each scenario. In fact, the calculator may

exhibit the enthusiasm of the convert more often and may engage in institutional politics more skillfully and strategically.

A third option to alter the balance of power on a subject is by creating a new policy area and establishing a new policy monopoly, which often involves significant changes. In this regard, the establishment of the aforementioned institutional habitats, such as the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, or the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, signifies the institutional presence of concerns that were previously represented idiosyncratically, depending on the concerns and abilities of elected officials. Political mobilization may push seasoned policymakers to build these habits, possibly institutionalize them or confine them, but once they are in place, they take on a life of their own and have constituencies, interests, and lives of their own. Jenness and Grattet explain how creating a new category of crime allowed for new political actors to make claims unrelated to criminal justice[2].

Last but not least, political mobilization may reshape current policy monopolies by introducing new players to them. How the newly institutionalized presence of players who were previously merely spectators transforms what occurs not only in the courts but also in the legislatures is shown in Weed's story of the victim's rights movement. Similar to this, Matthews' analysis of the feminist antirape movement shows how political mobilization by feminists against rape altered policy implementation and content as well as led to the establishment of new institutions, such as rape crisis centers, which eventually led to an alliance with local law enforcement agencies. In both instances, activists essentially broadened the scope of a political conflict to change the prejudice present.

However, policy changes change the circumstances in which activists mobilize. The structure of political opportunities, in particular, alters as policy makers react to social movements, favoring and precluding certain claimants and influence tactics. In addition to tightly defined policy outcomes, a government may react to a movement via rhetorical appropriation, official recognition of movement organizations or persons within a policy area, and the appointment of movement actors to elected or administrative posts. As rape is the most dangerous and egregious aspect of patriarchy, the feminist campaign against it has been transformed into a public safety initiative. In Matthews's words, campaigners and the government formed a partnership with the aim of managing the rape issue when the persecution of women was ended. The government's ownership of the anti-rape movement, which included utilizing its resources to manage the issue's perception as well as recruit and hire activists as service employees, made it harder for activists to organize.

It becomes more difficult for activists to organize on the same conditions as a result of the institutionalization of movement issues, which may result in modified policies even if this is not what activists want. Typically, activists see their most visible policy demandbe it the outright outlawing of the pesticide DDT, the passage of a voting rights act or an equal rights amendment, or the halting of the nuclear arms raceas the spearhead of a larger movement to fundamentally alter the course of history. In varying degrees, institutionalizing a concern means settling for something less. As a result, those appointed to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency learn to only discuss the first goal in the organization's name, while those opposed to pollution learn to bargain for acceptable levels of toxins. Feminists also learn to depend on lawmakers who,

although disregarding systemic oppressions in society, make it simpler to prosecute and punish rapists.

Social movement coalitions often redefine themselves, their claims, and their partners in response to these developments. Policy changes destroy movement alliances, fragment them, and demobilize them. Participating groups have a variety of objectives when they join social movements, thus it seems sense that they would have different perspectives on the results. Since participants are constantly aware of how certain alliances' viability and value are changing, coalition dynamics are by their very nature unstable. Coalitions are especially flexible in the United States and, for that matter, in liberal democracies with somewhat permeable political structures.This idea is shown through a current instance. Human genome laboratory research seldom receives much attention from or comprehension from the general public, but periodic decision windows provide an opportunity for organizations to voice their concerns. Decisions from the abortion issue are revisited and reconfigured in the fight over funding for research on human stem cell lines. Research scientists, who abstained collectively from the abortion discussion, spoke out strongly in favor of stem cell research, rallying those suffering from a variety of ailments that may be healed thanks to new scientific advancements. Some anti-abortion activists threatened to organize if research on discarded embryonic cells gained approval because they viewed it as disrespectful to human life[3].

Each side threatened a more significant mobilization, which was only conceivable if the policy result were very appalling. Above all else, President George W. Bush aimed to make a decision that would prevent this kind of mobilization. The administration developed a response in response to the concerns of all constituencies with the goal of reaching an equilibrium point where extra-institutional mobilization and persistently vehement opposition would be unappealing to each opposing party. At this point, it is unclear whether this effort was effective in the short run, but we have heard activists on both sides criticize the choice while simultaneously declaring that it is acceptedfor the time being. It's excellent news for the government that wants to handle and institutionalize the problem because a component of each coalition has chosen to join. Longer term, however, it is evident that this policy point's stability is only transitory. The battle's location was changed by proponents of embryonic stem cell research, who successfully mobilized in California to persuade the state to support fundamental research.

State-level innovations and scientific breakthroughsor setbackswill put the Bush compromise to the test and either reenergize or shatter movement alliances on both sides. Analysts must adopt an analytical emphasis that recognizes the continual interplay between social movements and decision-makers and an iterative approach to the process of political institutionalization.This section builds on the logic of the introduction by emphasizing the direct relationships between the state and difficult social movements. These begin by explicitly taking into account the procedures, conventions, and structure of American political institutions. When combined, they also imply a timeline of political evolution throughout the roughly fifty years represented here. The main theme running through them all is that reality doesn't really fit the idea that social movements are wholly independent of the state. Instead, movement leaders are closely entwined with those who make decisions about public policy, at least within some parts of the state. The governance process includes some of the concepts, people, and issues raised by social movements. At the same time, oppositional social movements seek to the government for resources to engage in political conflict as well as policy responses[4].

The politics of old-age security in the 1930s are examined by Edwin Amenta. Beginning with a short description of the American political system, he highlights the difficulty of federalism. The 1930s saw widespread economic upheaval, which offered a chance for policy change and sparked a wave of social movements aimed at resolving economic instability. Amenta contends that the only way to understand how social movements affect public policyin this example, the Townsend Plan's impact on old-age policyis to concentrate on how movement tactics are matched to political circumstances or possibilities. He discusses a circumstance in which significant social movement activity failed to elicit any local reaction because pitiful policy officials were unable to fully capitalize on Townsend forces. He essentially contends that in order to choose plans and tactics that have the best chance of success, social movement participants must be aware of the conditions around them.

Although the scope of government activity was significantly increased during the 1930s New Deal, it continued after Franklin Roosevelt's presidency. The fundamental social safety net established by the New Deal was maintained, and as the United States' influence in the globe increased during and after globe War II, so did its influence on military and global affairs. Frank Baumgartner and Christine Mahoney monitor changes in the makeup of legislative agendas over time using a special database of government activities. The core agenda has expanded and become more diversified, despite certain policy areas losing importance, and manybut not allof these topics are in reaction to social movements. A relatively stable sector of Washington-based social movement organizations that monitor government, represent interests, and make claims has grown as a result of the establishment of ongoing policy discussions about social movement issues, such as the status of women or environmental protection. New concerns and movements may have a harder time gaining traction due to the very full government agenda[5].

John McCarthy investigates a new kind of organization, the community advocacy coalition, in the latter section of this article by examining antidrug initiatives. He concludes that there are no clear lines separating the government from the advocacy coalition and asserts that a large portion of public mobilization is a direct outcome of government initiatives and the work of elected officials. The highly lax membership criteria, tremendous diversity of players and interests, and substantial elite backing characterize the advocacy coalition. McCarthy provides a complex portrayal of civil society and political advocacy by tracing public involvement through elite sponsorship and governmental action.To have an influence, social movements often gather resources and take part in group action. Little progress has been achieved in conceptualizing and analyzing these implications despite recent attempts by researchers to go beyond comprehending mobilization to explain these effects, often focused on state-oriented consequences, particularly those relating to public policy. Establishing the causal impact of any challenger has been challenging, and evaluating theoretical arguments regarding the effects of challengers has proven to be even more challenging given the number of people involved and the complexity of political circumstances.

I address these theoretical and methodological issues in this. I'm claiming, broadly speaking, that state-oriented challengers' collective behavior is politically mediated. Challengers must influence the opinions and conduct of institutional political players in order to have an effect. More specifically, I contend that the political environment will affect the viability of various forms of coordinated opposition activity. Though I also go beyond them, my arguments about resource mobilization, collective action tactics, and political opportunities are the foundation of my argument. In contrast to what rational models of collective action or bargaining models often

predict, my thesis is that mobilizing resources and using them in collective action does not always result in any predicted rate of return. In addition, I contend that making an impact requires more than just selecting the most effective approach or the right organizational structure or objectives. Furthermore, making a difference requires more than just being active at the appropriate moment or location. Instead, political challengers must align their strategy with the political environment in order to succeed[6].

I elaborate on these points and provide a preliminary evaluation of them by mentioning the Townsend Plan, a U.S. organization from the Great Depression that was named after the California doctor Dr. Francis E. Townsend. The corporation and its policy, which advocated for a nationwide, large old-age pension for any person aged sixty or older who consented to be retired and to spend the money rapidly, were both known as The Townsend Plan, formerly known as Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd.1 It was intended to eradicate both old age poverty and the Great Depression. Although Townsend's plan was never passed into law, scholars have frequently cited it as having had a significant impact on old-age policy. They contend that the Townsend Plan advanced both the timing of the Social Security Act and the content of its old-age programs. My evaluations are focused on public social-spending policymaking for the elderly, which is a key objective of the Townsend Plan and has significant significance for both older Americans and all Americans.

Today, the majority of social spending in the United Stateswhich includes Social Security, Medicare, and Supplemental Security Incomeaccounts for the majority of government spending in the country. Saying that the United States has transformed into a welfare state for the elderly is not a great exaggeration. The Townsend Plan is useful for evaluating theoretical claims about the impacts of challengers, which is equally important for my purposes. Its support fluctuated over time and was stronger in some countries than others. it employed various collective action strategies under various political conditions for more than a decade. I look at the Townsend Plan's effects on a variety of national collective action campaigns and old-age policy making events. In order to take analytical advantage of the states diversity in political environments and the Townsend Plan's initiatives, I also briefly discuss old-age policy making in the states. The Townsend Plan's efforts are puzzling since it didn't have the most influence at its most effective mobilization, most forceful collective action, or during politically advantageous times for social expenditure programs. With my arguments, I hope to find answers to these puzzles.

A Model for Political Mediation

It is presumably essential to mobilize relatively large numbers of devoted individuals in a democratic political system to get new collective benefits for state-oriented challengers. Challengers are more likely to succeed, no matter how well-organized they are, when institutional political players perceive some benefit in supporting the group they are running for. Challengers must take concerted action that changes the calculations of important institutional political players, such as elected officials and state bureaucrats, since they are seldom able to enact new state laws or regulations or enforce them on their own. These actors must perceive a challenger as potentially supporting or impeding their own objectives, which may include enhancing or solidifying new electoral coalitions, gaining public support, acting on political convictions, and boosting support for the objectives of governmental agencies, among other things. Challengers will often need assistance or complementary action from like-minded institutional actors or other movement groups in order to obtain additional benefits. I believe that

political institutions and states influence challengers, who then influence states in a circular pattern. Since all movements arise from specific political circumstances, it is best to start with political institutions when discussing causal influences because states and other organized political groups, such as parties, have a tendency to dwarf movements and are typically resistant to rapid change[7].

Deterring American Political Institutions

Contrary to conventional wisdom, which holds that the U.S. polity is more susceptible to the influence of movements because of its federal structure and relatively under-bureaucratized executive bureaucracy, in my opinion, U.S. political institutions and processes have been unfavorable to the collective action of challengers. The political institutional barriers of the American political and party systems often lessen the impact of a political challenger's group activity.There are three key ways that American political institutions have proved unfriendly to challengers. The style and extent to which it is democraticizeda systemic and slow-changing polity characteristicis a crucial component of the polity for social movements. The United States, like Switzerland and Australia, had early democratization among white males but lagged behind in terms of democracy in the 20th century, particularly in the South. The United States still has more voting limitations than other wealthy democracies in the twenty-first century.

Another significant obstacle is the vast horizontal dispersion of authority in the US. Members of the polity have significant veto power over proposed laws due to the fact that the executive branch, legislature, and judiciary all share legislative authority. This arrangement also deters challengers' activities by limiting their capacity to establish new claims as fact. Additionally divided into committees, the two legislative bodies have rules that prevent majorities. The American election system is biased towards challengers, which is the third major obstacle. Challengers are deterred from establishing political parties by winner-take-all voting systems, such as those used in America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. By applying a winner-take-all formula to the electoral votes of each state and creating a distinct procedure for acquiring ballot spots for candidates in each state, American presidential election laws set the bar even higher. The predicament is made worse by the decentralization of national American political power. While winning a few seats in Congress is much simpler for a new party than winning the presidency, these seats have much less political clout than those won in a parliamentary system like Canada[8].

The U.S. political party structure has actively discouraged state-focused opponents from making their claims. One of the key reasons is that U.S. parties have often been patronage-oriented: hierarchical organizations that expand their influence by running for office and winning, then giving specific benefits to supporters as part of the office's benefits. Political parties that prioritize patronage have a tendency to ignore requests for the automatically granted common benefits, particularly those made by competitors with a strong social agenda. Additionally, American parties are of the catchall variety, competing for votes from various groups while having no organic ties to them. U.S. parties have been more receptive to the influence of challengers in many states where parties are not patronage-focused, but they are equally vulnerable to takeover by the challenges' better-funded rivals.

Party caucuses have been less important during the course of the twentieth century, and factions of parties and individual lawmakers have become more independent, particularly since the 1980s as the expense of political elections has increased. As a result, the main parties lack external

motivations for discipline. By the middle of the 20th century, the Republicans had evolved into a largely unified right-wing party supported by business interests, while the Democrats had evolved into an odd centrist party with a southern wing that was far more conservative and under-democratized in its northern wing. The parties have become more polarized over issues of social spending and taxation as southern Democrats have drifted into the Republican Party in the wake of the democratization of the South in the last quarter of the 20th century, but the Democratic party has remained centrist in large part due to the enormous influence of money[9].

CONCLUSION

The goal of this study is to combine the research of social movement and policy researchers in order to concentrate particularly on the interactions between movement coalitions and the American polity. Participating in social movements is a frequent aspect of democratic life since American political systems are open to its actors and ideas. The feasibility of certain movement coalitions cannot be shown, despite the fact that the importance of social movements in modern democracy is widely established. The ground on which social movements organize may changerapidly or graduallyas a result of changes in policy, especially in the makeup of a policy monopoly. Opportunities for inclusion always pose a challenge to the perceived requirement of extra-institutional mobilization to make certain claims or to the urgency of such demands. Even the smallest portion of a movement coalition need not be appeased by the government in order to significantly hinder future popular mobilization. Understanding this reality requires elected officials to constantly seek towards equilibrium points that will sustain policy monopolies, appease political groups, and provide just enough to soothe disruptions while preventing disruption from the opposite side. Understanding this connection requires activists to do some serious math on the advantages and disadvantages of making compromises on issues of policy and political inclusion. Consider the trade-offs involved in acquiring institutionally oriented friends, identifying better bargains, and negotiating them. Realizing that the chances for sustained mobilization are limited, in part owing to the dynamics of coalition politics.

REFERENCES:

[1] J. C. Greene, L. Benjamin, and L. Goodyear, ‘The Merits of Mixing Methods in Evaluation’, *Evaluation*, 2001, doi: 10.1177/13563890122209504.

[2] J. Bates and R. H. Ellaway, ‘Mapping the dark matter of context: a conceptual scoping review’, *Med. Educ.*, 2016, doi: 10.1111/medu.13034.

[3] N. Schwarz *et al.*, ‘How are urban green spaces and residential development related? A synopsis of multi-perspective analyses for Leipzig, Germany’, *Land*, 2021, doi: 10.3390/land10060630.

[4] M. Kitanova, ‘Youth political participation in the EU: evidence from a cross-national analysis’, *J. Youth Stud.*, 2020, doi: 10.1080/13676261.2019.1636951.

[5] P. S. Velayudhan, N. Schwab, L. N. Hazrati, and A. L. Wheeler, ‘Temporal patterns of microglial activation in white matter following experimental mild traumatic brain injury: a systematic literature review’, *Acta Neuropathologica Communications*. 2021. doi: 10.1186/s40478-021-01297-1.

[6] M. Bon, J. Grall, J. B. Gusmao, M. Fajardo, C. Harrod, and A. S. Pacheco, 'Functional changes in benthic macrofaunal communities along a natural gradient of hypoxia in an upwelling system', *Mar. Pollut. Bull.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.marpolbul.2021.112056.

[7] S. Niedzwiecki and S. Anria, 'Participatory social policies: Diverging patterns in Brazil and Bolivia', *Lat. Am. Polit. Soc.*, 2019, doi: 10.1017/lap.2018.77.

[8] M. J. Isaacson and M. E. Minton, 'End-of-life communication nurses cocreating the closing composition with patients and families', *Adv. Nurs. Sci.*, 2018, doi: 10.1097/ANS.0000000000000186.

[9] N. Aoki and S. Rawat, 'Performance-Based Pay: Investigating its International Prevalence in Light of National Contexts', *Am. Rev. Public Adm.*, 2020, doi: 10.1177/0275074020919995.

CHAPTER 20

A BRIEF OVERVIEW ABOUT UNITES STATES POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

Dr. Amarpal Singh, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:amarpals.mgmt@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

Political campaigns are an essential aspect of democratic societies, as they provide a means for candidates to communicate their platforms and policies to voters. These campaigns involve a variety of tactics and strategies, including media advertisements, grassroots organizing, and public events, with the aim of persuading voters to support a particular candidate or party.One key element of political campaigns is messaging. Candidates seek to craft messages that resonate with voters, emphasizing their strengths and addressing concerns and issues that are important to the electorate. Effective messaging requires an understanding of the political climate and the concerns of different constituencies.

KEYWORDS:

Advertising, Campaign, Finance, Media, Political.

INTRODUCTION

The degree to which the political system has become democratic and its makeup have changed significantly throughout time and across the nation. The old Confederacy was plagued with under-democratized polities in the first half of the 20th century, and the most powerful patronage-oriented parties were found in many states in the Northeast and Midwest. In the latter half of the 20th century, these parties' lost strength, and they became less patronage-oriented. the diversity of American politics in the middle of the 20th century. Although it differed greatly across the nation, the American political system provided a hostile environment for challengers. The majority of the West was democratic and without any kind of patronage party.

Strategies and Protest Environments

There are two basic schools of thought about what causes the influence of actively engaged competitors. On the one hand, it is often maintained that some types of collective action aims and techniques are productive or unproductive of collective benefits regardless of the political context in which they are implemented. On the other side, it is sometimes said that once a challenger is mobilized, the political backdrop or opportunity structure is the major factor affecting its influence. Instead, I contend that state-focused challengers must adapt their strategies to the current political climate in order to succeed. In various political contexts, several types of techniques are likely to be required to achieve communal benefits. The essential premise is that the more advantageous these conditions are, the less an organized challenger has to do to secure collective benefits, and the more aggressive a challenger needs to be the more challenging the political conditions. Less aggressive approaches are more likely to succeed only under the most advantageous conditions, while more assertive approaches are more likely to succeed

throughout a variety of conditions. However, in ones that are favorable, they might waste money and goodwill and their efforts might fail.

What defines favorable and unfavorable political circumstances, and what does it mean for collective action to be more or less assertive? The orientation of the ruling regime toward the objectives of challengers is a key middle-range feature of the political setting in relation to political circumstances. The mobilization and group action of a challenger are anticipated to have a greater influence under a favorable environment than they would under an unfavorable one. Parties often have long-standing links to ideologies or organizations whose objectives may clash with those of opponents. The regime's stance on increasing taxes is crucial for state-oriented competitors seeking communal benefits via continued public expenditure. Since the 1930s, the national Democratic party and Democrats outside the South have tended to be reform-orientedmore open to taxation and to claims requiring taxation on relatively well-off people. In contrast, the U.S. Republican party and its representatives have tended to oppose automatic, programmatic spending claims because they imply higher taxation.

Missions, operations, and authority of governmental agencies in charge of domestic programs relating to the adversary make up another crucial aspect of the political backdrop. When appropriate state actors are available and have initiative, skill, and power, programs linked to a challenger's interests will be more readily developed. Domestic bureaucrats may believe that generating group benefits collectively advances their bureau's objective and that their personal actions may increase the influence of challenges. On the other hand, a lack of such skilled state actors can lead the public to conclude that new initiatives would be poorly run and squander money. However, not all implementation capabilities will be advantageous to challengers. I would anticipate them to lessen the effect of a challenger's collective action if significant and strong state departments have missions that disagree with the challenger's arguments[1].

I anticipate that certain tactics will be more effective in various situations. Limited protest based primarily on evidence of mobilization is likely to be sufficient to offer higher collective benefits if the political system is favorable and the domestic bureaucrats are professionalized and helpful. The competitor just has to show that it has backing. Recruiting more people might do this. This might be accomplished by time-tested methods like protests, petitions, letters, or public awareness and education campaigns. The mechanisms of influence the patterns of thought and deed would presumably operate along these lines: The evidence of mobilization and mild protest will likely be used as proof of the beneficiary group's relative relevance in an electoral coalition by supporters of a reform-oriented administration. The demands of the mobilized may get particular consideration under a government that is likely to encourage social expenditure. The mobilization will probably be seen by domestic officials as a sign that the program needs to be expanded, implemented more quickly, or enforced more strictly. Those organizations that are most effectively engaged are likely to get the biggest benefits in public policy for their constituency, especially if the regime wishes to expand its coalition or if domestic bureaucrats have a goal that has not yet been accomplished.

In contrast, it is likely to be more challenging to achieve communal benefits via public policy in the absence of either a supporting administrative power or a supportive framework. A minimally assertive collective action is likely to have at most a small impact when the regime is hostile to the challenger or does not see the benefit of including its beneficiary group in its coalition as well as when local state agencies are unfriendly or nonexistent. Some political players may

resurrect outdated ideas or consider brand-new ones as a ploy to postpone taking action until the problem is resolved. If the bureaucracy is opposed to the mission, it will either ignore the problem or take comparable strategic actions. Given the circumstances, a challenger who takes minimally assertive action has little chance of influencing the legislative agenda, the content of legislation, its likelihood of passing, or its implementation, and as a result, has little effect on the provision of collective benefits[2].

DISCUSSION

Matching Strategies to Contexts

More aggressive or bolder collective action is needed in order to achieve collective benefits when political conditions worsen, as seen by the movement from the top left to the bottom right corner. When I say that political actors need to be more forceful, I mean that they need to apply more harsh punishments to change the things they value, such their positions, their ideas, or their rights or prerogatives. They primarily function by organizing enormous crowds of people around a course of action, often having electoral ramifications. This coordinated effort may be intended to persuade members of the public or officials who share their views of the righteousness of the cause, but it may also serve to show those officials that a sizable portion of the population is prepared to cast their votes based on a particular topic.Instead of drawing the traditional distinction between assimilative and disruptive methods or institutional and noninstitutional strategies, I specifically refer to assertiveness.

Even though the sanctions of this collective action can vary greatly and noninstitutional action, like protest, may be less assertive than institutional action, the assimilative category is frequently overly broadened to include all collective action that engages institutional politics. Although by no means exhaustive, the examples below provide a sense of the potential variations in penalties and assertiveness in political institution action by challengers. A limited amount of assertiveness is required to make an influence, although supporting acceptance of a particular proposal or help for a group and engaging in education efforts are also vital. Simply organizing support for a program is less assertive. It is more vigorous to get time commitments from participating members than to compile email lists of compatible donors. Campaigns including letters are more forceful, yet they might differ depending on the assertions they make. More forceful than education campaigns are protests directed against certain programs or administrations. Making public comments of support for specific politicians or policies. More forceful yet are public efforts to remove elected officials from their positions or to block the nomination of new ones. in democracies, elected officials dread recall campaigns far more than protest movements.

Contesting elections is also more aggressive because it punishes politicians who support certain ideology or policy ideas and run for reelection at the same time. Many extremely assertive institutional action lines have a systemic bent, even though the assertiveness of an action and its potential systemic effects are not the same. In certain democracies, institutional action, such as initiatives, which might be more forceful than running for office, can replace the traditional institutional political players. With initiatives, a challenger may be able to put their issue on the ballot, outline their proposal, and organize the effort to pass it. A challenger-led effort may not only result in significant collective gains but also significantly shift the political landscape in the challenger's favor and support the challenger's further development. Direct democratic mechanisms, which may be used by opponents who are probably better financed, are only accessible in a small number of U.S. polities and are likewise subject to their use. A challenger's

alternative, which is severely constrained in the U.S. context, is to elect its own leaders or supporters to these offices via the creation of a new party, which is equally aggressive but more systematic[3].

By tailoring their activities to fit administrative or legislative situations, challengers are likely to gain an advantage. Collective action will be most effective if it focuses on elected officials if the appropriate state bureaucratic actors are present and either supportive or neutral and if the political regime is not supportive of the challenger's organization. Such an activity could persuade those who might otherwise be antagonistic or uninterested in legislation to support it or at the very least not object to it. Domestic bureaucratic capabilities must be produced or current bureaucratic actors must be penalized if the political regime is neutral or supportive and domestic bureaucrats are either nonexistent or opposed to the challenger's constituency. Only the most vigorous methods will be likely to obtain collective benefits when the political regime and the relevant state bureaucracy are both hostile to the challenger's constituency. The quickest method to change this situation is for challengers to seize political power through democratic channels, including via initiatives or the formation of new parties.

Less aggressive election tactics would be more effective than modest protest, which would be more effective than insignificant edu- cation or information initiatives. In more favourable political contexts, assertive measures could be successful, but they might also backfire, risk alienating potential friends within the polity, and squander resources that could be better employed elsewhere. In other cases, no collective action has any chance of succeeding when the regime is very adverse to the challenger's issue or constituency[4].In adverse political environments, strong collective action may be effective in both direct and indirect ways. The straightforward approaches are the clearest to observe and are more likely to result in the best outcomes. If the legislature is otherwise tightly aligned, the electoral support of favorable members may skew political settings further in the challenger's favor and even result in new legislation that benefits the challenger's constituency. Successful referendum and initiative campaigns may result in new laws and often new administrative power. The implementation of laws in favor of the challenger's constituency may be improved by collective action that results in the replacement of unfriendly administratorsthrough firings or electoral challenges.

A successful effort to establish new parties may also result in new legislation that is favorable to the challenger. In the best-case scenario, challengers would be able to dominate a political regime or administration and maybe even permanently change the political environment.However, even if assertive collective action falls short of its stated objectives, it can still benefit a challenger's supporters in unfavorable political climates. A determined attempt to dislodge a lawmaker may result in that person softening his or her stance on the program or other programs, benefiting the challenger's base and reducing the likelihood of a subsequent challenge. Legislators may feel compelled to make compromises for the constituency if a well-supported initiative effort fails since it would be clear that a significant portion of their constituents care deeply about the subject. Protests against the activities of administrators may result in either their ultimate replacement, legislation to reform their methods, or adjustments to their methods to avoid replacement. The indirect advantages of unsuccessful third-party offers operate considerably differently. presenting a major party candidate who is already supportive of the constituency or issue with a believable threat that it needs to get greater attention. When the new party candidate shows support and then receives benefits in return for withdrawing from the race,

the approach is indirectly successful. However, persevering to the bitter end will frequently backfire and hurt a U.S. challenger's support base[5].

The challenger's policy environment is a crucial component of the political setting. It is worthwhile to break down the process of enacting new laws that provide for communal benefits into the following steps agenda setting, legislative substance, legislative message, and legislation execution. Social movements cannot usually navigate the process of getting a bill on the political agenda on their own. this process often depends on the political system, the necessary agencies, and the nature of the present programs. Nevertheless, motivated challengers will put in a lot less effort if their issue is already on the political agenda or is scheduled to be added to it. Groups only need to organize when a measure is about to be put on the agenda via presidential initiatives or congressional hearings in order to keep it there and to draw attention to its significance. This might contribute to the challenger's constituency receiving more benefits. After then, challengers can try to boost the benefits of the current legislation or persuade lawmakers to join the coalition in support of it. At this point, social movements may provide alternatives, which, if well-supported, might be utilized as levers to change the legislation's text in favor of a constituency.

There could be options for compromise that shouldn't be shut off by the challenger's actions. Before a program or policy becomes heavily institutionalized, during the early legislative stages it is simpler for challengers to have an impact on it. The likelihood of further attempts to modify policy in a positive direction is increased if movement players are engaged in the institutionalization of policy, that is, if they are placed in a bureaucracy executing policy or have influence over the hiring process for these posts. However, this is not typically the case. Situations in which domestic bureaucracies are properly managed by state authorities with clear purposes, hire professionals devoted to the mission, and have a strong sense of teamwork are somewhat less advantageous. In these situations, the bureau will push for the mission, which, although not always, will align with the interests of a challenger's constituency. Even worse for movements is when inexperienced political operators seize control of domestic bureaus and undermine their objectives.

Patronage political parties often recruit non-expert party loyalists to fill posts in the bureaucracy, and even worse, domestic bureaucracies may be taken over by rival interest groups, as is the case with regulatory agencies that are appointed by representatives of the industry that they are supposed to monitor. Additionally, these organizations may develop relationships with influential Congressmen and form iron triangles or policy monopolies that get harder for rivals to influence over time.I'm not claiming anything significant about the motives behind opponents' strategic decisions. Even challengers with the highest strategic skills normally need to make deci- sions fast and with little information, making it unlikely that perfect matches of plan to scenario will typically happen. Different factions within identical movements frequently utilize different tactics. Some challengers may base their strategy decisions on their moral convictions, preferences, or sense of self. Others may use tactics that are appropriate for the political climate at the time of their establishment but are unable to adapt to changing conditions. A conventional approach that is suitable for just part of the polities may be used by national or international adversaries operating in several polities[6].

Assessing the Townsend Plan's Effects: A First Cut

Let me first describe my points before introducing the Townsend Plan. Dr. Francis E. Townsend, a sixty-four-year-old Long Beach physician who had been laid off, and Robert Earl Clements, a

thirty-nine-year-old real estate trader, created Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd. in January 1934. Townsend had first introduced the Old Age Revolving Pension proposal in a few letters to the editor of the Long Beach Press Telegram in September 1933. The organization's goal was to advance its passage. The plan was created to end the Great Depression, secure prosperity by large-scale mandatory expenditure, abolish old-age poverty, and improve the status of the elderly. It provided $200 monthly pensions to all non-working individuals over sixty, barring criminals. Townsend served as the corporate personification and spokesperson for OARP, acting something like Colonel Sanders, and Clements marketed the pension plan similarly to how real estate is sold, attaching Townsend's name to it. Townsend clubs were established by Clements and Townsend to sustain excitement and guarantee a flow of funds. These regional affiliates met often to hear speakers, talk about upcoming events, and provide money but did not have a formal decision-making function. In fact, they were mostly fan clubs[7].

The Townsend Plan was a significant political phenomenon, although being mostly forgotten now. The Townsend Plan was the ninth most publicized topic in twentieth-century America in 1936 as a result of the New York Times publishing more than fifty front-page articles on it. OARP enrolled two million senior citizens into Townsend clubs that year, fast emerging as one of only fifty-seven voluntary membership organizations to draw 1% or more of the adult population in the United Statesa number never attained by any group associated with the feminist or civil rights movements. By the end of 1935, OARP was raising money far more quickly than the dominant Democratic party and at a pace similar to that of the Republican party.Finding out if a movement had any repercussions at all and, if so, which ones, is the first and most difficult step towards figuring out why. I take a number of angles while tackling these problems. I determine if institutional political actors altered their beliefs and behaviors in reaction to the Townsend Plan via extensive historical research.

I make use of analogies between the outcomes of several Townsend Plan campaigns and old-age policy-making events, noting changes in political circumstances and tactics along the way. I also compare states within the United States, where the structural and immediate political situations vary greatly. The Townsend Plan's approach to the states evolved over time, giving them little consideration in the 1930s but engaging in various forms of opposition in the 1940s.I begin by discussing a few viable counterarguments. Social movements are logical attempts to achieve power, hence their collective activity should result in benefits for everybody, according to this theory. One major barrier to a challenger's capacity to take coordinated action is the mobilization of resources. The relationship between resources and influence is interesting exploring since bargaining models also predict that, other things being equal, a challenger's resources should help it achieve aims. After all, the Townsend Plan looked for funding to support its campaigns for collective action[8].

However, the historical trajectory of the financial and human resource mobilization behind the Townsend Plan does not neatly match its impact. Early in 1936, when the Townsend Plan was at its height, little change had been made to old-age policy. In contrast, even though it had only started to mobilize, the Townsend Plan contributed to improving the ideas for the elderly in the administration's Economic Security Act in 1934. The Townsend Plan was more effectively implemented in 1935, but Congress softened the administration's security legislation's provisions for old age benefits. The Townsend Plan was at its height following the Social Security Act's enactment, despite occasional claims to the contrary. The group continued to make great efforts to raise money, but much of its influence was lost when the majority of its members departed

later in the 1940s. In summary, the Townsend Plan had influence over public policy with radically varying degrees of support, indicating that a membership base was important for influence over old-age policy but was not the sole criterion.Political leaders did not act in accordance with false perceptions of support for the Townsend Plan in order to explain why there was a lack of a direct correlation between mobilization and outcomes. The Committee on Economic Security dispersed a staff member to monitor the organization's development, and in 1935, the publicist for OARP protested that the administration was not duped by false claims of support in the press media. Furthermore, Clements discovered that only congressmen from districts with a large number of clubs supported an amendment in the House that year that was based on Townsend's proposal, indicating that they too were aware of OARP's support[9].

The Townsend Plan's impact was also unrelated to how much it promoted collective action. Collective action under the Townsend Plan often proven to be a waste of time and money, perhaps backfiring during the 1935 Social Security Act discussion. Additionally, the Townsend Plan had some of its greatest impacts on state-level Old Age Assistance programs during the 1930s, despite its initial national focus. This occurred despite the Townsend Plan's occasional opposition to OAA advancements.It is sometimes said that the use of constraints in group activity is likely to produce outcomes in favor of challengers. However, the Townsend Plan's strategy of supporting its allies in Congress and punishing its rivals did not automatically give it influence over decisions regarding old-age policy. When the Townsend Plan had its first impact on old-age policy in 1934, this method had not even started. Additionally, the Townsend Plan endorsed more than 100 members of the House at the time the endorsement strategy's apparent productivity peaked in the early 1940s. However, the expansion of old-age policy was dropped from the political agenda in the early 1940s.Furthermore, contrary to what arguments about the influence of political opportunity might imply, the Townsend Plan's effects were not strongly related to changes in the political environment in favor of social policy.

Follows the political outcomes of congressional members from left-leaning parties and northern Democrats, whom I've dubbed prospective pro-social spenders. Gains in social policy are often considered to need the dominance of this group. I concentrate on this group because it is the primary source of systemic changes in the political environment. Roosevelt, a Democrat from the north, served as president from 1933 through 1945, keeping much of his influence steady. It appears odd that the Townsend Plan had an impact on the security bill's proposal stage in 1934 but not on the final stages in 1935 or 1936, when the Congress was expanded with more northern Democratic representatives as a result of the party's extraordinary midterm victory. The Townsend Plan had less of an impact in 1937–1938, when Washington's political climate was even more favorable to social spending increases, but it performed better in 1939, after an election in which pro-spenders in Congress fared much worse and saw a significant decline in their numbers. The figure does, however, imply that there was no prospect for the Townsend Plan or any rival to significantly enhance social policy once the systemic political climate had moved significantly against social expenditure, as it did in 1943.

Campaigns for the Townsend Plan, 1934–1946, including collective action tactics anticipated to yield collective benefits under specific political circumstances. Campaigns that the Townsend Plan successfully matched in terms of strategy and context are shown in italics, whereas unsuccessful campaigns are indicated in bold. In each case, the Townsend Plan improved when the strategy and context matched, whereas the Townsend Plan did not improve when the approach and context did not match. The Townsend Plan had an impact when it matched the

right political context-appropriate techniques, but not when it did not. What follows is a discussion of some movements for collective action and old-age policy formulation. From 1934 through 1939, when the Social Security Act was first proposed and approved, and from 1940 forward, when old-age concerns disappeared from the national agenda and the Townsend Plan concentrated on the state level, I divide the events of controversy and policy creation into two time periods.

The Economic Security Act of 1934's Creation

In its first year, the Townsend Plan's political approach was not too forceful and the political environment was mostly supportive. In addition to not working for candidates, OARP issued no official legislative endorsements. Most often, OARP made an effort to inform individuals about the pension plan, foster excitement for it, and establish clubs. Prior to 1934, Congress supported the Wagner-Lewis unemployment compensation measure and the Dill-Connery old-age pension bill, putting social programs for the elderly and other groups, such as unemployment insurance, on the legislative agenda. Roosevelt requested the formation of a Committee on Economic Security to draft a comprehensive plan for social policy, including old-age policy, after Congress voted on these two measures in the spring of 1934.Democratic majorities controlled both Houses of Congress, and a New York Democrat committed to change served as president. However, because they did not hold a majority position in Congress, the congressional forces most likely to support social spendingnorthern Democrats and representatives from left-wing partieswere not quite numerous enough to overcome opposition from Republicans and southern Democrats alone. The environment for old-age policy was likewise favorable on a bureaucratic level.

The Federal Emergency Relief Administration was in charge of the largest social policy initiative in American history, and one of its initiatives was helping the elderly who were living in poverty. In reaction to the Townsend Plan, old-age policy seems to have moved well ahead on the administration's priority list that fall. The Committee on Economic Security advocated the implementation of both an old-age insurance scheme and an old-age assistance program, both of which would be funded by payroll taxes. A scheme similar to Old Age Assistance was proposed in the Dill-Connery bill, but with lower matching payments and a smaller budget. In addition, the CES's plan for Aid to Dependent Children received funding at a lower matching rate than it did for Old Age Assistance, and health insurance was entirely ignored. Although there is no concrete proof, there is every reason to think that OARP's generous pension plan helped mobilize the elderly, which led to an improvement in old-age policies. After all, the committee sent a staffer to monitor OARP, received letters from OARP supporters from the White House, and then offered more for old age than it had originally intended. A plan that was already on the legislative calendar of a reform-minded government was advanced thanks to the Townsend Plan's approach of pure mobilization, educational efforts, and limited collective action[10].

Social Security Act to Economic Security Act Transition, 1935

The political climate for supporters of old-age and other social expenditure initiatives had significantly improved by 1935. The 1934 congressional elections were expected to result in the Democratic or presidential party losing about 25 House seats, decreasing the likelihood of social spending innovations. Instead, the Democrats made significant gains in seats in the House and Senate. The election results were attributed by the media to Roosevelt's emergency relief initiatives rather than to the Townsend Plan or other social movement groups still in existence. Although some of them could delay or reduce benefits in bills due to their seniority and strategic

position, social spending programs in the House could now pass without the support of southern Democrats. In any case, the situation in the Senate was not as favorable. The government moved on with its economic security plan and wanted $5 billion for a work relief programa historically large amount that would make up more than half of the budget and about one-tenth of the nation's gross domestic product.

In 1935, OARP modified its approach in an effort to capitalize on the fact that old-age policy was a hot political topic. After the start of the new year, Congressman John McGroarty, an older man himself who had just been elected from the congressional district of Townsend and Clements and had run primarily on the basis of his support for the Townsend pension plan, introduced a bill on behalf of the Townsend Plan. OARP approached Congress in a far more direct and forceful manner than it had in the fall, rallying Townsend residents behind a letter-writing campaign to members of the House Ways and Means Committee and other powerful lawmakers, threatening them with severe consequences if they didn't support the McGroarty bill. Townsend and more OARP witnesses gave testimony in support of the legislation. The Townsend Plan's top officials adopted a pretty rigid stance and refused to negotiate on old-age benefits with anybody. The administration's measure was criticized for offering pauper's benefits[11]. The outcomes weren't helpful. The McGroarty measure was heavily criticized because the levies it proposed would only raise around 25% of the revenue required to fund the pensions.

A second McGroarty plan that would give pensions to all eligible people at a smaller sum, perhaps $40 or $50 per month, that could be sustained by taxes, replaced this one on April 1. The House Ways and Means Committee cut benefits in the old-age provisions of the security measure while the OARP worked on revising the McGroarty bill. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration was withdrawn from control of the Old Age Assistance program, merit hiring procedures were abandoned, and the program was changed to give states greater freedom to pay lesser benefits and impose stricter eligibility requirements. Additional domestic helpers and agricultural workers were also excluded from old-age insurance benefits. The Townsend Plan congressional contingent won a standing vote on a Townsend-plan-inspired amendment on the House floor, but it was soundly defeated (206–56). A better-supported proposal that would have increased the federal matching ratio for OAA and would have given higher benefits to many more people was not supported by OARP, and it also failed. Given the Democrats victory in November, it seems likely that the security law would have been enacted regardless of the outcome. The reductions in old-age benefits were likely not the result of OARP's actions, but they did nothing to mitigate them, and the money and goodwill invested in them were mostly lost.

CONCLUSION

Mobilizing voters on election day is essential for political campaigns since it includes getting them to the polls and making sure they have the tools and assistance they need to cast their votes. A robust ground game, involving volunteers and resources to give transportation and assistance to voters, is necessary for effective mobilization. Another important aspect of political campaigns is media attention. Through interviews, debates, and press conferences, candidates try to attract favorable media attention while also fending off criticism or attacks from rivals. The capacity to create captivating messaging, react rapidly to unfolding events, and have a thorough awareness of the media environment and the news cycle are all necessary for effective media

strategy. Political campaigns are, in general, complex and diverse endeavors that need for a thorough comprehension of the political environment, voter concerns, and the methods and tactics that best energize support. Candidates may create effective campaigns and accomplish their political objectives by using these strategies well.

REFERENCES:

[1] R. A. Kusuma, 'Media Baru dan Jurnalisme Warga: Sebagai Sumber "Hoax" dan "Black Campaign" pada Agenda Politik', *J. Dakwah dan Pengemb. Sos. Kemanus.*, 2019.

[2] R. A. Mowatt, 'A People's History of Leisure Studies: Where the White Nationalists Are', *Leis. Stud.*, 2021, doi: 10.1080/02614367.2019.1624809.

[3] R. A. Kusuma, 'Media Baru dan Jurnalisme Warga', *MAWA'IZH J. DAKWAH DAN Pengemb. Sos. Kemanus.*, 2019, doi: 10.32923/maw.v10i1.739.

[4] C. Joppke, 'Immigration and the identity of citizenship: The paradox of universalism', *Citizensh. Stud.*, 2008, doi: 10.1080/13621020802450445.

[5] K. Ash, 'Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism', *Terror. Polit. Violence*, 2016, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2014.880836.

[6] Y. Y. Tan, 'Singlish: An illegitimate conception in Singapore's language policies?', *Eur. J. Lang. Policy*, 2017, doi: 10.3828/ejlp.2017.6.

[7] Y. A. Nisnevich, 'Elections of Deputies of the State Duma of the Second Convocation (1995-1999): the Success of the Anti-reform Opposition, the Failure of the "Party of Power" and the Defeat of the Democrats (to the 30th Anniversary of the Russian Federation)', *Post-Soviet Issues*, 2021, doi: 10.24975/2313-8920-2021-8-3-379-396.

[8] T. Estes, 'Harnessing Harmony: Music, Power, and Politics in the United States, 1788–1865 by Billy Coleman', *J. South. Hist.*, 2021, doi: 10.1353/soh.2021.0093.

[9] K. Philip, 'Doing interdisciplinary Asian studies in the age of the anthropocene', *J. Asian Stud.*, 2014, doi: 10.1017/S0021911814001648.

[10] J. Coulson, 'The Holodomor in Collective Memory', *Gen. Assem. Rev.*, 2021, doi: 10.5206/tgar.v2i1.10421.

[11] J. Coulson, 'The Holodomor in Collective Memory: Constructing Ukraine as a Post-Genocide Nation', *Gen. Assem. Rev.*, 2021.

CHAPTER 21

THE TOWNSEND PLAN: PENSIONS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY

Dr. Vijendra Singh, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:virendra.mgmt@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

The Heyday of the Townsend Plan refers to a period in American history during the 1930s when the Townsend Plan, a social security proposal, gained widespread popularity among seniors and other advocates for the elderly. The plan was created by Dr. Francis E. Townsend, a retired physician who believed that the government should provide a pension of $200 a month to all citizens over the age of 60.During the Great Depression, the Townsend Plan gained significant momentum, as many elderly Americans were struggling to make ends meet and found the proposal appealing. Supporters organized themselves into local clubs and held rallies and marches to promote the plan. At its peak, the Townsend Plan had over 8 million members and was a significant force in American politics.

KEYWORDS:

Issues, Potilical, Policy, Plan, Social.

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1935, OARP made an effort to improve upon its errors. Clem- ents observed that only legislators from districts with active Townsend clubsprimarily in California and a few isolated areas of the West supported the Townsend amendment. As a consequence, he began a nationwide recruiting campaign, depending on state area organizers who received commissions and were instructed to employ one subcontracting organization for each congressional district in the nation. The Social Security Act's approval, which was contrary to the administration's aims since it recognized the elderly's right to old-age payments but did not immediately provide them, also assisted OARP's cause. A conference put up by OARP in October attracted 6,000 members of Townsend clubs to Chicago. An OARP-endorsed candidate won a crowded Republican primary in an off-year House election in Michigan. Both occasions boosted OARP's national profile and helped with recruitment. In terms of its political tactics, the group abandoned its hectoring letter-writing campaign and started respectfully requesting that House members confirm in writing that they would support the second McGroarty bill.

The number of House members who had signed in favor was in the sixties as Congress prepared to return in the New Year.The Townsend Plan was flourishing by 1939. The group was highlighted in January's March of Time, a collection of documentary shorts that shown in cinemas around the country. Additionally, OARP was making a ton of money. It outperformed the Democrats in fund-raising by a wide margin with the $350,000 it raised in the last quarter of 1935, which was comparable to the amount the Republican party raised on the eve of an election year. By March, there were over 7,000 clubs, with maybe two million members total. Although the number of OARP clubs remained concentrated in the West, they were beginning to spread to

other states like Florida, Minnesota, Iowa, and Maine. Additionally, the political environment had not significantly changed since 1935, the year in American history when national social spending policies were at their most favorable.The Townsend Plan did not significantly advance old-age policy in 1936, despite its excellent resource mobilization and the favorable political environment. The Townsend Plan focused its emphasis on Congress, where there was an unexpected lack of influence. That the McGroarty measure did not pass far was not surprising. To be able to be released from committee, OARP needed around 100 more votes in the House. However, no additional bills to enhance old-age benefits were brought up for discussion.

At the federal level, the fast expansion of the Social Security Board, particularly its Bureau of Public Assistance, which counseled states on their Old Age Assistance programs and offered recommendations for approval, was the key old age narrative. It was advocating family budgeting needs assessments in state OAA programs that were relatively limited, but OARP did not specifically target this entity or its activities. At the state level, the majority of old age expenditure activity was taking place. The problem was now on every state's political agenda as a result of national incentives. As state governments passed and demanded national certification for new Old Age Assistance programs far more quickly than for Aid to the Blind and Aid to Dependent Children programs, it appeared that the Townsend Plan mobilization had at least indirect effects in this area. Compared to eleven for the blind and 10 for dependent children, sixteen states had enacted or sought approval of old-age programs before the first day of the new year.

Old-age programs were also preferred in many states, considered more like pensions relatively unrestricted grants than public assistance, which sometimes had severe limits and inconvenient caseworkers. Such antiquated pension schemes were swiftly adopted by California, Washington, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Colorado. Townsend club networks are fairly substantial in three of these states.The reason why OARP has a significant influence at the state level but less at the federal level mostly has to do with how old-age policy is treated on various political agendas. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration's (FERA) help to the elderly came to an end, and national matching payments became available. These events drove the old-age problem onto the political agendas of all states. Political regimes gave benefits for the aged a greater priority among the new public assistance programs as a result of the power of the Townsend organization. Despite no encouraging moves in this direction by OARP and the sporadic attempt at prevention, state officials were more likely to pay higher old-age benefits in a pension-like manner in states where Townsend clubs were particularly prevalent[1].

At the federal level, the government wasn't putting up any legislation, thus there was no opportunity, as in 1934, to change any proposals before they were sent to Congress. Additionally, there was no chance to improve old-age legislation in Congress, which had been a real possibility in 1935. Even though OARP was much more powerful and astute in political matters, it did not have nearly enough support in Congress to use the discharge-petition procedure to force old-age policy onto the agenda. As a result, the condition of the OARP was not favorable when contrasted to that of veterans' organizations like the American Legion, which had just finished a protracted fight to win support in Congress for a World War I veterans' bonus bill. Further support for my claims about the coincidence of strategy and context comes from the growth of OAA at the state level. The Townsend Plan took no steps in its first years to enhance state Old Age Assistance programs, but Townsend clubs were differently mobilized throughout the states, creating radically different political conditions. Here, I look at all the nations that were

comparable in that they had a strong presence of Townsend clubs and came from democracies that were free from patronage parties.

Depending on whether a pro-Townsend political regime was in power or not in these seven states, the Townsend Plan had a different effect. For the majority of the time following 1935, Democrats or left-wing parties controlled the government in five states, while they did not in two of them. The average old-age benefit prior to the Townsend Plan for the two states with unfavorable regimes in power between 1935 and 1938 was 47.1 percent of the state's per capita revenue. Only a 5.5 percentage point increase, or 52.6 percent, had occurred by 1939 for this figure. Contrarily, benefit levels increased significantly from 27.4 percent of per capita income to 53.3 percent in the five states with Democratic or third-party governments in power. They caught up with and narrowly outperformed states that had started out with far higher leads.

California, the state that created the Townsend Plan, serves as an example of a missed chance to improve old-age policy. As elsewhere, the Townsend Plan gave OAA little consideration and instead pushed the legislature to pass legislation memorializing Congress's adoption of the Townsend plan. The Townsend Plan's think nationally/act nation-ally approach and high level of mobilization were insufficient to advance California's old-age policy. For the majority of the time, the governor's office and the state House were under Republican control, and the California Department of Social Welfare shared control of the state's aging laws with the more repressive county boards of supervisors. To increase old-age benefits to $50 per month, legislation introduced by EPIC lawmakers received no support from OARP. Before the existence of OARP, California had been a pioneer in old-age politics. However, following its inception, California's old-age program started to lag behind that of other states, particularly in terms of promoting eligibility. Only 18% of people aged 65 and older received old-age benefits, moving California to twenty-fourth place overall.

Contrarily, in Colorado, where the political climate was equally unfriendly, a group comparable to the Townsend Plan actually, one that was founded by leaders and clubs who split with OARP pressed for a legislative initiative to provide substantial old-age pensions. The National Annuity League was able to get its initiative on the general election ballot, which put immediate pressure on state officials to raise pensions. This was accomplished despite some opposition from the Townsend Plan, which saw the initiative as diverting attention away from the national level. Due to the advocacy of the National Annuity League, Colorado's old-age assistance program quickly rose to the top of the country's programs in terms of both benefits and coverage. This incident suggests that, had the Townsend group sought to influence state-level politics in the middle of the 1930s, it may have had a significant effect in states with comparable geographic conditions.

DISCUSSION

In 1936, the Townsend Plan failed. Now that he was in control, Dr. Townsend discovered that his learning curve was high. The Townsend Plan lost supporters in 1936 and 1937 as a consequence of a Congressional probe and Townsend's own errors, which included his removal of Clements, McGroarty, and other important leaders. his disregard of organizing. and his fruitless struggle against Roosevelt. But eventually Townsend was able to gather his supporters under his new organization, the Townsend National Recovery Plan, Inc. The TNRP had 700,000 members by 1939. A renewed focus on organization, a severe economic downturn in 1937–1938 that the administration's detractors dubbed the Roosevelt Depression, and an agreement among

the administration and both parties in Congress that the old-age policy needed to be reviewed all served as catalysts for the recovery[2].

The political climate was different in 1938 and 1939 because the Roosevelt administration brought back old-age policy on the political agenda. The institution of survivors' insurance was one of several modifications that the Social Security Board proposed with the help of an advisory group. Both party factions in Congress wanted to turn old-age insurance into a pay-as-you-go system. Since old-age insurance benefits weren't supposed to start being paid out until 1942, liberal Democrats were worried that the old-age payroll tax was amassing reserves at the expense of the economy and potential existing beneficiaries. Republicans and other conservatives were worried by the tax's high cost and productivity because they thought that if Congress thought the program was doing well, it would be compelled to provide far larger benefits. However, northern Democrats suffered numerous defeats in the 2014 congressional election, reducing the number of potential pro-spenders in the region. The Townsend Plan's course of action was also unique. It turned its attention back to the House elections and ended up supporting 147 victorious candidates, three of whom were on the crucial Ways and Means Committee.

Although it wasn't enough to convince Congress to pass a new Townsend Plan bill, the TNRP had an impact on the 1939 Social Security Act amendments. Although the Townsend Plan congressional forces were unable to pass a bill, once one was put back on the political agenda, they were able to improve an administration-supported bill. The Townsend group had a far bigger impact on legislation than was shown in 1935, when the Townsend Plan failed to stop reductions in benefits for the elderly in the Social Security Act, thanks to its congressional endorsement approach[3].Little had changed in 1941, with the exception that the administration had once more completed its plan for addressing old age. The Townsend Plan brought back a comparable supported contingent to Congress, and the political alignment remained moderately favorable to increases in social expenditure.Roosevelt was re-elected with about the same degree of legislative support. Hearings presided over by Senator Sheridan Downey of California, a supporter of the Townsend plan who was elected in 1938, gave the old-age issue some life.

The SSB developed plans for a double-decker old-age scheme in response to the hearings, going against its natural tendency. Each elderly person would get a flat-rate pension, while a qualified subset would receive larger amounts based on prior wages. This was done in case a Townsend plan bill gained significant support after coming out of committee. However, the news from Pearl Harbor interrupted the hearings, removing social policy from the political agenda.A coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats postponed previously enacted and scheduled increases in the old-age and survivors' insurance payroll tax. This was worse for the prospects of social policy because the 1942 elections decimated the ranks of northern Democrats, undermining the political alignment for social policy reform. Despite the fact that there were more Townsend-backed members of Congress than ever before, this occurred. The data from the middle of the war era reveals that even a modest level of Townsend Plan membership strength and strong political endorsement effectiveness was unable to stop a reduction in old-age funding policy. The president was concerned with overseas affairs, and the legislative alignment was blatantly anti-social in its expenditures[4].

The Townsend group focused increasingly on the states as the war dragged on, even though most of them had political climates that were likewise hostile to social policy change. The Townsend Plan used a variety of tactics. Notably, the group launched campaigns for little Townsend plan

projects in certain states. By 1944, the TNRP had submitted these ballot measures to voters in California, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, and all three of those states' capital cities. They demanded a monthly payment of $60 for all people aged sixty-one and older. Each state's measures failed. in California, there were around two million against and one million in favor.However, as some state-to-state comparisons show, the drives were not entirely in vain. Once again, I look at states that were comparable in that they had a strong Townsend club presence in democratically-functioning governmental systems.

The primary difference this time was that some states had initiative campaigns for small Townsend plans, a more forceful form of activity, while others did not. This time, however, each of the states had an unfavorable regime in power. By contrasting what transpired in the three states where the Townsend Plan pursued 60 after 60 with the seven comparable states in which it did not, the consequences of these efforts can be observed. The little Townsend plan efforts, despite their failure, probably increased the average OAA pension in the three states. Prior to initiatives, benefits were marginally less generous in the three states targeted than in the seven states that were not. The average OAA pension in the seven states was 35.6% of per capita income, although after five years the amount remained stable, reaching 35.5% by 1946. The average pension in the three states targeted for initiative drives was 31.7 percent of per capita income in 1940–1941. However, by 1946, this number had risen to 42.4 percent, an increase of more than ten percentage points and roughly seven points higher than in the comparable states without initiatives.

Another example is California, although this time it's a better one. Near the end of the 1930s, TNRP started to assertively challenge specific elements of the California OAA law, particularly its unfair administration. Townsendites protested the imposition of liens on the estates of old-age beneficiaries in 1939 by staging protest marches at conservative county boards in Los Angeles and San Francisco. These decisions prohibited old-age beneficiaries from leaving their belongings to future generations, discouraging many elderly people from requesting benefits. Townsend Plan protestors called attention to the boards' position on liens and said that pensions should be provided to people of California as a right. The attempt to amend the lien policy may have contributed to getting it on the political radar even though it did not appear on the ballot. Despite having stated that he hoped to avoid pension issues that session, Governor Culbert Olson, a Democrat who had previously worked for EPIC, requested the repeal of the lien provision at the beginning of the 1940 legislative session. With the help of TNRP, two repeal initiatives gained more than 500,000 votes and were approved.

Despite the fact that Democrats never had power in California, their political status there deteriorated following the elections of 1940 and 1942, when a Republican was chosen as governor and the number of Democrats in the legislature decreased. Nevertheless, increases in old-age benefits happened as a result of the Townsend Plan initiative drives. In order to lessen the burden on family members to provide for the elderly, increase the amount of personal property a recipient could own, and mandate that the state pay five-sixths of non-federal costs instead of one-half, California passed legislation in 1943, as the first drive was getting underway. This increased the maximum grant from $40 to $50. California's average payout increased by more than $10 per month, making it the highest award of any state, and the Golden State's old-age coverage ranking rose to seventeenth place. Following the small Townsend plan campaigns, California's old-age program was changed to follow the Townsend plan's guidelines. This was

the Townsend Plan's final stand, but it was doomed by the end of the Great Depression, attrition Townsendites were literally dying off, and competition from new pension rivals.

These claims are supported by old-age benefits. When the Roosevelt administration put old-age policy on the political agenda in 1934, under favourable national circumstances, OARP's quick mobilization was sufficient to boost collective benefits for the elderly in planned social legislation. Even more fortunately, in 1935, OARP adopted a posture that was inappropriate for the context and failed to promote old-age policy in Congress. The Townsend Plan had an impact on old-age policy in several states after 1935 despite taking practically no concerted effort to promote it, partly because the adoption of federal law put the topic on state legislators' electoral agendas. A significant mobilization of the elderly by OARP and a social spending regime were not adequate to improve old-age policy at the national level in 1936 after the administration had withdrawn the old-age problem off the political agenda. In 1938 and 1939, when the administration and Congress resurrected the old-age problem and the political climate remained reasonably supportive of social expenditure increases, a reformed Townsend Plan was able to acquire traction.

The Townsend Plan made its first serious attempts to elect representatives to Congress, giving it influence there that it had not had four years before. Townsend forces assisted in persuading Congress to increase the Old Age Assistance matching payments. The TNRP started to pay greater attention to state politics in the 1940s and took initiative drives and forceful action in short-term negative political situations. Despite their failure, these campaigns increased the average old-age benefits in California and two other states[5].All of this shows that in order to fully comprehend the influence of challengers on states and their public policies, academics need to pay more attention to challenger tactics and political settings in democratic polities. Short-, medium-, and long-term political circumstances all have a significant impact on the effectiveness of challengers' coordinated activity. Assertiveness, punishments, and direction of challenger methods that are grouped together as assimilative or institu- tional might differ significantly, with consequences for the effectiveness of action. It is important to consider these options because the settings in which collective action is done affect its efficacy.

Since World War II, the American government's agenda has undergone a significant transformation, with social movements and the organizations they have inspired playing a significant role. That statement can be supported by a wide range of examples, including those related to women's rights, handicapped rights, environmental protection, and other issues. In a similar vein, there is no denying that public policies influence how established social movements and the organizations that result from them will behave in the future in terms of participation and attitudes. But how can we systematically show these connections? To suggest that social movements often result in significant policy changes is by no means to imply that they drive public policy or even that they are more significant than other factors in policy change. After all, a wide range of other factors, including as corporate operations, stochastic shocks, the preferences of policymakers, or public opinion, may also result in changes in policy. The relative significance of social movements in comparison to other potential factors that influence policy change is a significant question that is beyond the purview of any one, in-depth treatment. In this chapter, we clarify a method for answering the query and show that it is workable. Due to increasingly accessible data resources, the longer-term research aim of proving the connections between social movements and public policy in many areas of interest may now be viable[6].

An overview of the Policy Agendas Project is provided here. The comprehensive compilations of all Congressional hearings, all Public Laws, all stories in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, a sample of abstracts taken from the New York Times Index, and a consistently coded, inflation-adjusted time series of the Federal Budget are among the data sets that make up the Policy Agendas Project. Each of the data sets spans the years 1947 to the present. The majority are categorized using a complicated, in-depth, and historically reliable system of 226 subject and subtopic codes. This makes it possible to track the focus of the government and the media on issues like water pollution, inflation, the availability of health insurance, military spending, and any other area of government action across the whole second half of the 20th century. Scholars of social movements and public policy can both benefit from this new data resource, which is freely accessible to all users. The information gathered as part of the Policy Agendas Project enables one to track the development of new concerns as well as the size, make-up, and structure of the overall governmental agenda.

We document the growth of several sets of social movement organizations and their impact on the policy agenda by tracing the growth of women's movement groups, human rights organizations, minority and civil rights groups, environmental groups, and the membership of the American Association of Retired Persons. As we will note, the size of the agenda and the areas of activity of the U.S. federal government changed dramatically over the fifty years following World War II. Then, we show how over the past fifty years, the entire public agenda the collection of all issues grabbing the government's attention has changed. While some issues have become more pressing and others less so, the public agenda has overall become much more diverse. We finish off by talking about the connections between the demands and mobilization of social movements and the actions and concerns of the government, noting that they are very interactive. Governmental reaction to the expansion of social movements of all kinds has been prompt. At the same time, areas of governmental action have an impact on social movement groups, particularly following the development of significant new public programs that have an impact on their interests[7].

What connections exist between the expansion of social movements and public attention? However, once established, these governmental programs have significant effects on the social movements themselves, particularly on the organizations and interest groups connected to them. Social movements can be at the center of attracting initial attention and governmental activity in a new area of public life. Agenda-setting processes and popular movements often leave behind government initiatives and new programs, according to Baumgartner and Jones' argument in Agendas and Instability in American Politics. They pointed out that a typical response of the government to the emergence of new concerns is to develop a program, agency, or budget geared to deal with the new issue, in contrast to the Downsian perspective which suggests that topics come onto and recede from the public agenda with little long-term influence on government.

Once created, these new initiatives seldom ever stop. Instead, they develop into well-established programs that influence professionals, service providers, contractors, and beneficiaries while creating their own constituencies. Examples include the Medicare and Medicaid programs, various environmental and pollution control initiatives, conservation and land-use initiatives, civil rights and nondiscrimination policies, and a wide variety of other programs that were developed with the encouragement of social movements or communities of professionals and others supporting and typically benefiting from the policy. In the latter half of the 20th century, the American government expanded significantly, in part thanks to new social movements'

efforts to get new issues on the federal agenda. Women, environmentalists, civil rights workers, human rights activists, and elderly people are just a few of the newly organized groups that were successful in drawing government attention to their problems. Affected constituents, service providers, and others formed long-lasting relationships with the government authorities in charge of these new programs as new programs were developed to address their concerns, and the expenditure that went along with them produced new interests of their own. The outcome is self-perpetuating and contributes to the explanation of both the expansion of government and the increase in the variety of its operations. At the same time, the organizational fields related to each of these sectors have been impacted by the rising significance of government in many spheres of social life. One of the explanations provided by Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell for why groups in a certain organizational field tend to converge over time is the state's function[8].

These challenges are discussed in this part together with five of the most significant post-World War II social movements. Using a study of entries from the Encyclopedia of Associations, Debra Minkoff has developed one of the most thorough summaries of the evolution of social movement groups across time. Her data collection contains details on staff size, funding, membership numbers, strategies, and objectives for all women's, minority, and civil rights organizations in each year from 1955 through 1988. We use Minkoff's data to trace the growth of SMOs associated with the women's movement as well as those associated with civil rights and racial minorities. Early in the postwar era, Congress paid only occasional, inconsistent, and unique attention to matters specifically or notably affecting women. Prior to 1970, there were only 61 hearings on women's issues, or less than three hearings annually on average, according to 2.1. Since 1970, there have been an average of over twenty hearings every year, peaking in 1991 with forty-seven hearings.

According to Minkoff's research, there was a significant growth in the number of SMOs associated with the women's movement over this same time period, rising from 57 organizations in 1968 to 165 groups in 1972 and continuing to rise consistently in the years after this first burst. Certainly, the rise of interest groups and social movement organizations dedicated to these issues is only one factor in the increased focus on women's issues in Congress.

During this time, more women were elected to the legislature, congressional attention to medical issues affecting women increased, and public opinion and social mores changed. There is no denying, however, that the expansion of the resources and membership of women's social movement organizations had a significant impact on legislative priorities[9]. It is not unusual to use the example of the women's movement and how it related to Congressional attention. Let's think about the environmental situation. the quantity of environmental hearings held by Congress, as well as a count of active environmental interest organizations, both collected from the EA.

Beginning in 1960, Baumgartner and Jones identified all organizations working on environmental or conservation issues4 that were included in the EA at ten-year intervals. They estimated the number of environmental SMOs active in 1961, 1970, 1980, and 1990 using the creation dates of the organizations listed.5 Similar to the women's movement, congressional attention to environmental issues was scant prior to roughly 1970. Hearings really only averaged twenty per year from 1960 to 1968, and only sixteen per year on average until 1959. Then, hearings started to climb dramatically and steadily, and by the 1980s and 1990s, they were routinely above one hundred per year.

The figure clearly shows that the sharp rise in congressional interest is associated with a correspondingly significant rise in the number of interest organizations engaged in pushing environmental issues. Similar to women's problems, we wouldn't want to claim that this rise in legislative attention is solely due to one factor. There were several factors, outside only social movement pressure, that contributed to increasing congressional attention. It didn't hurt, though.

Debra Minkoff's research may be utilized once again to track the expansion of organizations involved in minority and civil rights concerns. We use these data and compare them to a gauge of Congressional attention to these issues.Although the timing of the rise in attention to civil rights issues is slightly earlier than that of women's issues and, to a lesser extent, environmental issues, the correlation between the expansion of the active interest-group population and the level of congressional attention to the issue is just as striking. During the 1960s and 1970s, groups dedicated to issues of minority representation and civil rights experienced a sharp increase. Congress's focus increased in the middle to late 1960s, but it decreased under the Nixon administration before picking up again in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since 1987, there has been a particularly sharp fall in congressional attention to civil rights and anti-discrimination concerns. this may be due to legislation that was passed as well as greater litigation and debate over affirmative action policies. In any event, we see that the expansion of groups is closely tied to the expansion of congressional attention to the region during the course of the time when we have data on both organizations and agendas. comparable information on human rights[9].

It is interesting to note that President Carter did not bring the issue of international human rights abuses into the open in a completely vacuum. as in other cases, the issue was partially softened-up by some preliminary attention to the topic. Congressional hearings on human rights issues are essentially nonexistent until the mid-1960s and surge particularly in the mid- to late 1970s. However, the Carter administration undoubtedly dramatically increased attention by making human rights a focal point of its public discourse on international affairs.

Additionally, after Carter left office in 1980, congressional interest in the subject of global human rights did not diminish. Instead, attention levels stabilized at previously unheard-of levels, and during the course of the time, the number of interest organizations devoted solely or mostly to human rights concerns increased. While the president was instrumental in getting international human rights issues on the congressional agenda in the 1970s, social movement organizations grew as a result of this increased attention and helped keep the president in office by making sure that these issues did not fall off the agenda after he or she left office. The reciprocal character of the relationships between public policy and social movement groups may be seen here possibly more clearly than in the other instances.

The instance of the elderly demonstrates how new governmental policies may initiate or foster the development of new social movement groups. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations' emphasis on aging and senior concerns, as shown in their formation of the White House Conference on Aging, helped increase congressional attention to issues relating to the aged in the early 1960s. While many social organizations were concerned with issues related to aging and the elderly, there weren't many organizations that were solely dedicated to serving this group of people. Government expenditure on pensions, healthcare, and other services for the elderly started to soar in the 1960s with the introduction of Medicare and the growth of the Social Security program. The number of AARP members increased as legislative attention to problems affecting the elderly increased. The AARP is now the biggest membership organization in

America that represents the interests of the aged. in fact, it is the largest membership group of any kind in the nation. However, one SMO cannot be claimed to represent a complete social movement. A useful measure of the expansion of the organizational component of the senior movement is the group's membership growth. This expansion unmistakably occurred after, not before, the expansion of legislative attention to problems affecting the elderly[10].

CONCLUSION

My fundamental argument has been that state-oriented challengers' collective behavior and their impact on public policy are politically mediated in certain ways. State-oriented challengers are likely to have a significantly reduced presence and influence under particular political institutional circumstances, most notably limitations on democratic processes and the entrenchment of patronage-oriented political parties. Because of particularly adverse political institutional conditions in various sectors of the polity, the American political system was comparably less conducive to the activity of social movements at the turn of the 20th century. Only about half of the states in the United States had political structures that could be influenced by challenger collective action. However, I contend that in order to have an impact, challengers must match particular collective action strategies to particular short- and medium-term political conditions, even in structures and systems that are favorable or mixed. Generally speaking, when a reform-oriented administration is in power and when state officials in charge of social expenditures are friendly and strong, collective action is more likely to be fruitful. In these circumstances, the challenger's group is likely to benefit collectively from mobilization and mildly assertive action strategies. Mobilization is important but insufficient to deliver communal benefits under more challenging medium- and short-term conditions. To succeed, a targeted and forceful collective action campaign is also required. The prominence of a topic on the political agenda also plays a significant mediating role in the effectiveness of the challengers' combined effort. The likelihood of influence is significantly increased if the topic is on the political agenda, which is connected, in part, to the presence of a supportive regime. However, the issue's position on the political agenda presents varying opportunities for action that are typically transient and vary in the setting from political leaders to legislators to administrators.

REFERENCES:

[1] R. Richards, ‘When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan And The Rise Of Social Security’, *J. Am. Hist.*, 2007, Doi: 10.2307/25094896.

[2] E. Amenta, ‘The Social Security Debate, Now And Then’, *Contexts*, 2006, Doi: 10.1525/Ctx.2006.5.3.18.

[3] G. M. Janes, ‘New Books’, *Am. Econ. Rev.*, 1936.

[4] A. Q. Weinstein, ‘Onward Townsend Soldiers: Moral Politics And Civil Religion In The Townsend Crusade’, *Am. Polit. Thought*, 2017, Doi: 10.1086/691172.

[5] E. Amenta, ‘Political Contexts, Challenger Strategies, Y Mobilization: Explaining The Impact Of The Townsend Plan’, In *Routing The Opposition. Social Movements, Public Policy And Democracy*, 2005.

[6] J. Crittenden, A. Holtzman, And W. J. Cohen, ‘The Townsend Movement: A Political Study.’, *Am. Sociol. Rev.*, 1964, Doi: 10.2307/2090887.

[7] H. Cantril And M. Sherif, 'The Kingdom Of Father Divine', *J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol.*, 1938, Doi: 10.1037/H0054247.

[8] N. Van Dyke, 'When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan And The Rise Of Social Security', *Contemp. Sociol. A J. Rev.*, 2007, Doi: 10.1177/009430610703600645.

[9] E. Amenta, 'Four. The Townsend Plan Versus Social Security', In *When Movements Matter*, 2020. Doi: 10.1515/9780691221212-006.

[10] E. Amenta, 'Eight. The Townsend Plan Versus Social Security, Part 2', In *When Movements Matter*, 2020. Doi: 10.1515/9780691221212-010.

CHAPTER 22

SHIFTING PRIORITIES: GOVERNMENT'S POLICY AGENDA EVOLUTION

Jaikant Tiwari, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:jaikant.somc@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

The transformation of the policy agenda of the Federal Government refers to the changes that occur in the priorities and goals of the government's policy agenda over time. The Federal Government's policy agenda is shaped by a variety of factors, including political ideologies, economic conditions, social movements, and crises or emergencies. Over the course of American history, the policy agenda of the Federal Government has undergone significant transformation. For example, during the New Deal era of the 1930s, the government's policy agenda focused on addressing the economic crisis and promoting social welfare programs. In more recent years, the policy agenda has been shaped by issues such as healthcare, climate change, and income inequality. Political ideologies have also played a role in shaping the policy agenda, with Republican administrations typically focusing on deregulation and tax cuts, while Democratic administrations tend to prioritize social welfare programs and environmental protections.

KEYWORDS:

Civil Rights, Economic, Environmental, Foreign,Policy.

INTRODUCTION

The federal government has changed from the end of World War II to the present. Many people have taken notice of these changes, particularly the size of government: from a small social welfare state to a large one. Government employment has increased, as has the amount of the federal budget, the number of rules, and the number of federal programs. All of this is widely known. State governments undoubtedly employ a lot more people than the federal government, and their growth over the past 50 years has been even more impressive than that at the federal level. In addition, tax expenditures, outside contracting, the privatization of services, and tax subsidies have increased over the years as federal policymakers have tried to conceal the true size of government. No matter how one looks at it, throughout the course of the second half of the 20th century, government expanded and diversified significantly. A particularly sharp increase in hearings between 1960 and 1980. During this time, the average number of hearings in congressional committees of all stripes about quadrupled, from 1,000 to around 2000 hearings annually.

The decentralization of Congress, which resulted in hundreds of subcommittee chairs and almost every member of Congress serving as chair or ranking member on at least one subcommittee, coincided with this dramatic change in the levels of legislative activity. Numerous members were given considerable autonomy within a particular area of public policy thanks to this decentralization. Most importantly, it is possible to interpret this change in congressional

structure as a response to the heavier workload. De-centralization-focused Congressional changes were a natural outcome of the federal government's astronomically increased size and scope of operations between 1947 and 1980. These changes helped Congress to adjust to a more complicated environment with more agencies to supervise, programs to monitor, funds to allot, constituent demands to manage, and a larger number of separate areas of governmental activity. Government expanded throughout the time period covered here, but when we take into account the variety of its functions, as many observers have noted, it has changed much more dramatically. The government not only engages in a greater variety of activities, but also a greater number of them.

The Policy Agendas Project lists 226 categories of government action, from macroeconomic strategies that target inflation to concerns about medical malpractice. Shows the number of unique subtopics for which at least one congressional hearing was conducted from 1947 to 1997 in the Policy Agendas Project congressional hearings data collection. Congress only paid attention to, on average, around 125 subtopics in the early postwar period. However, over time, this number rose significantly, reaching and sustaining attention to about 200 concerns from 1970 forward. Numerous actions that we now consider to be normal and accepted areas of federal intervention are actually relatively recent ones. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, only three themes dominated congressional hearings defense-related matters, government operations as a whole, and public lands, Interior Department difficulties, and water/irrigation projects. Less than 5% of attention was paid to other topics including science and technology, housing and community development, international trade, transportation, social welfare initiatives, education, domestic commerce, the environment, law enforcement, or health care.

Eisenhower's administration accomplished relatively little in a variety of policy areas. Over time, there was a significant shift in the distribution of the issues receiving attention. Early postwar congressional concentration was confined to a small number of conventional government activity areas, namely military, Interior Department concerns and public lands, and government operations itself. Before the creation of the Medicare program, environmental concerns, space, science, and technology policy, as well as foreign trade before the more recent expansion of our integration into the global economy, were all areas that Congress simply did not pay much attention to. These are all areas that today receive a great deal of attention that were simply not on the radar at the time. The three categories that received the most attention in the beginning of the time period collectively decreased from a high of making up 70% of the hearings in 1952 to just approximately 30% over the time since the late 1970s. Hearings before Congress have focused a lot of attention on a variety of issues that were essentially absent from the early years' agenda. 2.9 marks the surge in interest in five problem areas.

Over the past fifty years, congressional hearings on a wide range of topics have proliferated, including the environment, health, law, crime, and family issues, as well as space, science, technology, and communications. These topics, which made up less than 10% of the agenda space in the late 1940s, made up 35% of it in 1998. As long-established federal programs demanded and justified continued congressional oversight of them, attention to all five areas peaked in the late 1960s and steadily increased in the 1970s and 1980s. Together, we can see how drastically the political agenda has changed. It is also obvious that congressional attention, historically dominated by a limited number of issues, is increasingly dispersed across numerous, even if it is not immediately apparent from the way the data is presented. Government attention

has increased most in several sectors that have the most well-known social movements at their heart.

DISCUSSION

Social Movements and Policy Change

This offers us a general sense of where to search for social movements' effects on public policy. It should be made clear that social movements are not the exclusive producers of new public policy and are not likely to have an impact on society as a whole. Within their organizational domains, they work closely with other organizations when they have a long-term influence on public policy. A number of constituencies have been mobilized and organizational fields themselves have changed as government operations have expanded, sometimes in response to initial demands made by social movements. As a result, social movements may set off a chain reaction of interest, money, and attention that may have a lasting impact on public policy, social movements themselves, and other organizations like professional and trade associations. New groups of participants will become active in issue areas as these areas become the focus of significant state activity, spending, and regulation thanks to the dynamics of public policy.

We can see the enormous influence of many social movements on American politics across a wide range of topics, including health care, aging, and environmental concerns of all types. Similar to this, we have seen a continuous decline in expenditure as well as attention in the traditional areas of large government activity that have not been the focus of social movement mobilizations. The emergence of fresh social movements has significantly changed the federal government's agenda in the decades after World War II[1]. There are some key similarities and differences in our analysis of the relationships between organizational mobilization and legislative attention across five sectors of social movement activity. The data's most significant constant aspect is the long-term correlation between the two trendswhen social movement groups proliferate in large numbers, legislative attention also increases. It is evident that growing governmental interest about emerging concerns is not just a result of social movements and the organizations they give rise to.

In addition to other elements, public opinion, technical advancement, demographic change, and presidential efforts are important. Regardless of where the initial attention spike originates, however, there is a recurring trend in all five of our cases Washington-based interest organizations connected to the social movement grow significantly in size and take action to draw attention to continuing government participation in that subject area. Public policy and social movements have tight but not straightforward or unidirectional ties. Even while more mainstream social movement activities have slowed down, these Washington-based campaigners are calling for legislative attention. According to Minkoff's study of the women's and civil rights movements, while protests events decreased over time, SMOs continued to form until the advocacy communities reached a critical density. After this point, formal organizations' growth slowed down somewhat but they still maintained a strong organizational presence. A framework for comprehending how the increased collective action of the civil rights movement expanded to other problem areas as well as how protest activity may wane is provided by Tarrow's work on cycles of protest.

Numerous subsequent movements, including the four others we discuss here, have been mobilized as a result of the civil rights movement. The rise of civil rights and minority

movements altered the political environment in a way that made it easier for women, peace activists, environmentalists, and antinuclear advocates to organize, whether this is described as a change in the opportunity structure or the introduction of a master frame. However, it is inherent to a cycle of protest that over time, both the overall cycle and the specific movements taking place within it will become less intense and more infrequent. While the movements' activity may decline, the formal institutions they gave rise to will continue. Our data amply supports this claim. for all four social movements for which we have data on the number of SMOs, the number of enduring groups substantially surpasses the number of disbanded ones. Furthermore, the period of time during which the social movements themselves were at their height of activity and protest was greatly outlasted by this growth and subsequent institutionalization[2].

The role of structured social movement groups has historically been disputed in the literature, with some contending that the difficult nature of social movements needed an antisystem approach that favored the employment of outside measures. Some argue that attempts to change governmental institutions preclude the use of institutionalized channels of influence. This viewpoint has changed to one that is now generally accepted, as demonstrated in almost all study from the standpoint of resource mobilization, that formal SMOs play a fundamental role in social movement groups. As a result of Diani's analysis of several conceptualizations of the word social movement made by some of the most influential researchers in the field, a consensus definition that clearly moves away from seeing social movements simply as antisystem actors is reached. It is crucial to acknowledge the crucial function of institutionalized SMOs. As discussed, well-established institutions and organizations that collaborate closely with supportive government entities may maintain a movement that has lost its appeal to its supporters. Additionally, insider tactics do not preclude the use of outsider tactics, as a significant body of interest-group literature has shown, but the ability to employ both gives social movements more opportunities for successful political action.

A certain number of SMOs affiliated with a movement are likely to become institutionalized with staff resources in Washington and grow acquainted with institutional procedures as more of these SMOs are founded. The movement obtains access to fresh and different information, improves its insider approach, and eventually becomes stronger at influencing public policy as these insider organizations expand and evolve. The adoption of outsider tactics by an organization or by allied groups derived from the same broad movement is not prohibited by its inclusion as a participant in official institutions of government. In any event, our five examples demonstrate that the expansion and development of Washington-based interest groups is a natural result of social movements that are effective in attracting government attention. Certainly, this process has the potential to change social movements. However, it is important to examine a movement's growth alongside the interest groups it gives rise to and supports. These organizations are more likely to be directly linked to the growth of government attention, money, and programs than any other spontaneous or disorganized components of the movement. In turn, their development aids in maintaining that government focus. Therefore, it can be challenging to evaluate the long-term effects of a social movement on public policy without paying close attention to the formal organizations that share its objectives[3].

Numerous studies in political science and sociology present findings that are comparable to or akin to those that we present here. This rising body of scholarship collectively implies that social movements and the interest-group communities they create should be closely analyzed alongside their interactions with the government since it is obvious that they are interdependent.

Furthermore, it seems that this is a general phenomenon that applies to a wide range of organizations, including trade associations, business groups, engineering groups, health care organizations, agriculture organizations, and others. It is not just a problem for social movement organizations. In their assessment of how the character of the national interest-group system has changed over time, Baumgartner and Beth Leech charted the expansion of various sorts of organizations. According to the number of groups listed in annual volumes of the EA, they discovered that public affairs groups, healthcare groups, social welfare organizations, and others that are connected to many of the areas of growth in government activity were among the fastest growing sectors of the group system. The categories with the slowest growth include, among others, organizations for veterans and farmers. The proportional levels of Congressional attention paid to those same areas of public policy seem to be correlated with the regions of growth and decrease in the group system.

Different growth rates were seen in the profit, nonprofit, and citizen sectors according to Jack Walker's study, and he clearly identified these trends as being closely related to the shifting political agenda. Walker expressly connected new concerns on the legislative agendas to existing communities of professionals working in Washington and abroad in his 1977 essay on agenda setting, in addition to social movements. This connection may have been much stronger. The relevance of recent social upheavals and the institutionalization of the new-left citizens' groups in Washington during the last few decades are both pointed out in Jeffrey Berry's recent examination of the evolving federal agenda, and in particular the growth of postmaterial problems[4]. DiMaggio and Powell suggested that, among other things, more state participation in the field would cause organizational fields to become more homogenous. Our five instances demonstrate an expanded presence in Washington that may be attributable to one of the three factors they name: imitation, in which organizations imitate ideas from others that seem to succeed, state participation, most obviously, and professionalization.

The expansion of environmental NGOs on a global scale and governmental engagement in environmental concerns are closely related, as noted by David John Frank, Ann Hironaka, and Evan Shofer. Environmental protection has evolved into a typical, bureaucratized, and anticipated component of the policy portfolio of all governments, as we have highlighted in the case of the United States. Therefore, a wide range of studies point to outcomes and procedures like those we discuss here. Another recent project that links group activity to government attention claims that the long-term congressional interest in a particular issue is the best explanation for variations in lobbyist activity levels in Washington as seen in lobby registration reports in Congress, which are available over six-month reporting periods and in seventy-four different areas of congressional activity. The lobbying activity is driven by government attention, according to a detailed pooled-time-series analysis by Leech and colleagues, and this relationship is stronger than that for government spending or for indicators of the level of activity in the relevant economic sector. In other words, the demand for lobbying is generated by public policy just as it is through lobbying and social movement action[5].

It's obvious that social movements are at the heart of a lot of policy change. However, there are many other sources of new issues that attract attention besides social movements. Furthermore, the processes described here are not inov. Even when social movements do become well-known and get government attention, they may or may not give birth to wealthy SMOs engaged in maintaining the focus on their causes. Among the scenarios that seem likely here, the interaction between SMOs and established professional communities, particularly among service

providers—whether they be social workers, medical researchers, environmental engineers, or the producers of pollution abatement equipment may have the greatest long-term impact on social movements. Eventually, despite their pure social movement foundations, the majority of organizations integrate themselves far more deeply into the Washington policy process. While not the only transformation that could occur, this trend toward greater bureaucratization is a common one. The stabilization of an SMO's resource flow, the development of its internal structure, the moderation of its goals, the conventionalization of its action repertoire, and its integration into well-established systems of interest intermediation are all included in Hanspeter Kriesi's discussion of this institutionalization process. Rucht characterizes the process as a change over time in the type of movement structure from a traditional grassroots model, characterized by a loose, decentralized structure, engaging in protest activities, and depending on dedicated adherents, to an institutionalized interest-group or party-oriented model, characterized by reliance on formal organization. Nevertheless, growing institutionalization need not imply unfavorable undertones of co-optation and concession.

In their later years, a group of idealistic and frequently ideologically devoted activists may believe that joining the Washington policy community, making agreements with companies or service providers hoping to profit from government spending programs, and dealing with issues of policy implementation are the worst possible outcomes. However, it is clear from the data presented here that such a result might end up being among the most significant and influential in the long run. New programs are frequently established as movements or other sources succeed in maintaining continued government attention to their issues. Whether it be pension and health insurance plans, environmental protection or anti-discrimination laws with their accompanying enforcement mechanisms, or human rights organizations working continuously over time, these programs and activities spawn and perpetuate additional relationships with nonprofits, companies, and other interests concerned with the new policy and the social problem it is designed to address. In a complex web of mutual interdependence, social movements, their organizational representatives, and public policies are thus intertwined.

There is obviously a need for more thorough investigation on these links. Undoubtedly, a significant portion of it will result from thorough research of certain policy areas, such as those developed around particular social movements. Some of it could also explore the more general subject of whence new problems originate. some do so via social movements, while others do not. David Meyer refers to the chicken and egg question about the connections between social movements and state policy in his introduction to this collection. The close ties between social movements, social movement organizations, and the government are without dispute, at least in the situations covered here. We have argued that these connections are so strong and their combined impact is so significant that throughout the 1960s to 1970s, a time of intense social unrest, the fundamental character of American government underwent a transformation.

Scholars of public policy are strongly advised to pay special attention to the growth and roles of social movements and the organizations they spawn in developing theories of public policy, whether they are focusing on specific policy areas or the whole federal government. By the same token, we see a future in which students of social movements are unable to comprehend the growth or impact of the movements they research without also taking into account knowledge of public policy and the reaction of the government. Social movements may first emerge in places apart from public policy and governmental institutions, but if they are successful, they subsequently discover that their actions are closely related to the upkeep and creation of new

public policies. The degree to which social movements genuinely influence particular social policy is a hotly contested topic among scholars of modern U.S. social movements. However, there is a fair amount of agreement among these scholars that a large portion of the work done by citizen groups in their attempts to affect social change aims to have an impact on the actions of government actors and the content of public policies.

The majority of modern researchers hold the idea that social movements are made up of autonomous groups of individuals that band together to make disputed demands against governments, which reflects the salient characteristics of historical accounts of the creation of national social movements in the nineteenth century. As a consequence, disagreements over the details of public policy reveal the fundamental relationships between governments and citizen actors. The idea of autonomous social movements arising from local civil society resonates particularly with tales of the insurgent players of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. This idea is compatible with what we know of many contemporary U.S. social movements. The romantic caricature of social movements is embodied by indigenous social actors who valiantly overcome huge obstacles to change the social environment[6].

Contrary to this perception, however, there is much evidence that suggests that a significant amount of local citizen collective action has been supported and fostered in recent years in the United States by elite and governmental players. In order to pressure governments for the social policies they want, elites organize citizen organizations. This interpenetration of the state and civil society is fundamentally at variance with the popular caricature of the beginnings of collective action. Moving beyond the presumption that local collective actors who are indigenous and completely autonomous are the source of local collective action is necessary if we are to comprehend the whole spectrum of mobilization of local collective action. Community anti-drug coalitions provide a fruitful chance to investigate the degree and the modes of elite support of grassroots mobilization around public policy problems.

Newly formed issue alliances have proliferated more often over the last fifteen years in states and localities all around the United States. In order to affect social and public policy change, these coalitions work to mobilize institutional actors as well as individual individuals. The coalitions are widely supported by elites, including all tiers of government, foundations, corporations, and nonprofit entities, in addition to regular people from all walks of life. They seem to be disproportionately prevalent in some social concern fields, such public health. In the areas of environmental and international conflict, as well as those involving class and racial conflict, new alliances tend to be less likely. Community-level coalitions are a historically distinct institutional style of collective action that has become more common in recent decades across American communities and problem areas.

These alliances are extremely effective tools for elite-sponsored mobilization because of their unique characteristics. The majority of community coalitions are substance addiction partnerships, which will be the main topic of the next several paragraphs. The recent expansion of financial assistance from foundations and the federal government increased local actors' incentives to follow the model for drug addiction community partnerships. These coalitions often enlist a sizable membership and work to coordinate significant organizational and private citizen efforts. In contrast to other coalition kinds, their membership is more loose-knit and unorganized. The ties between members and these coalitions are frequently quite informal. membership may only necessitate attending coalition meetings, unlike the highly institutionalized iron triangles of

an earlier era that connected congressional committees, public agencies, and client industries. Members may join and leave these coalitions with a simplicity akin to Velcro fasteners[7].

The dynamic community coalition form, which prioritizes citizen mobilization around problems that are the focus of the new community coalitions, has shown a particular vigor in recent years. The local geography of institutional and citizen mobilization, and therefore the demography of collective aspirations for social change in local communities, are essential factors in building these elite-sponsored community coalitions. Since substance abuse has become one of the most prominent local social issues in communities across the United States, the emergence and growth of these coalitions inevitably has an impact on the public policy process in local communities. Before I go into detail on the recent development of local antidrug coalitions, I first take into account the vast diversity of coalition forms that have been the focus of social movement historians. This enables me to define these coalitions' key characteristics and put them into a larger theoretical context. I then go on to talk about elite mobilization of local anti-drug coalitions and citizen collective action in general. I analyze the effects of the quick growth of these coalitions on the level of local public mobilization around policy issues and its ramifications for shaping local policy agendas as my conclusion.

Contextualizing Social Movement Coalition Research

Social movement academics have focused more on explaining the circumstances under which and among whom coalitions are likely to develop in order to better understand the formation and dynamics of coalitions. Coalitions, in general, are more or less officially established agreements between existent groups, organizations, and, sometimes, individuals to work together in the pursuit of shared objectives. Such intentions or concerns most often translate into policy goals in the contemporary setting. Coalitions differ in a variety of significant ways, such as the circumstances that lead to them, how long they last, and who makes up their membership. The idea that external threats might play a significant role in coalition building is supported by a number of research on coalition formation. Additionally, it is believed that the availability of resources makes it easier to form coalitions.

Coalitions may exist for short-term or long-term aims, with the specificity and viability of their shared objectives often determining their permanence. For instance, coalitions are often created to organize protests, but they fall apart after the event is put on. Other coalitions are created with the intention of pursuing particular legislative objectives, and they might not endure whether or not those objectives are successful. More nebulous problem and policy agendas are more likely to serve as the foundation of long-term partnerships. The strength of the links that hold coalition participants together varies depending on the coalition. The working connections between coalition partners may range from formal written agreements to more casual ones that just include lending a group's name to a shared endeavor. The degree of commitment of resources, both financial and human, together with the stability of those contributions, and to joint efforts might be connected to the strength of links and their longevity.

Finally, coalitions may be identified by the diversity of the membership's com- stance. It has been acknowledged that evaluating the possibility of coalition formation requires an awareness of the variety among coalition partners' constituents, issue agendas, and cultures/identities. Potential coalition partners that have comparable support bases and share similar issue objectives are seen to be less inclined to cooperate on projects. According to this idea, coalitions are more likely to develop when partners with various constituencies and similar problem objectives are

involved. One argument for constituencies contends that coalitions are more probable among partners that have similar identities, in contrast to the argument for constituencies that emphasizes organizational interests. Such an assumption is in line with the worries voiced by some who have advocated for broad progressive issue alliances over the challenges of uniting efforts across class and other identity barriers[8].

CONCLUSION

Overall, the Federal Government's policy objective has changed, reflecting the shifting interests and aspirations of the American people as well as the larger political and social context. In order to create and promote policies that represent people' beliefs and goals, politicians and citizens alike must both have a thorough understanding of these shifts. The policy agenda may also be significantly impacted by social movements and catastrophes. As an example, the war on terror and national security have received fresh attention as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, whereas the civil rights movement of the 1960s resulted in substantial changes to government laws on racial discrimination.

REFERENCES:

[1] G. Schütte, 'What kind of innovation policy does the bioeconomy need?', *New Biotechnology*. 2018. doi: 10.1016/j.nbt.2017.04.003.

[2] E. Di Piero, 'Educational Policies, Inequalities and the Secondary Level in Argentina in the 21st Century: from the Expansion of Rights to Funding Cuts and Meritocracy (2003-2019)', *Foro Educ.*, 2021, doi: 10.14516/FDE.913.

[3] F. Brasil and A. C. Capella, 'The dynamics of government attention on health policies in brazil: Balance and punctuation in the first decades after re-democratization (1986-2003)', *Saude e Soc.*, 2019, doi: 10.1590/s0104-12902019180570.

[4] C. M. Sørbøe, 'Politics of Urban Transformation in Pre-Olympic Rio de Janeiro: Contentions and Confluences Between Citizen- and Market-centred Agendas', *Forum Dev. Stud.*, 2021, doi: 10.1080/08039410.2020.1832569.

[5] R. M. Nogueira, B. Barone, T. T. De Barros, K. R. L. S. L. De Queiroz Guimarães, N. S. S. Rodrigues, and J. H. Behrens, 'Sixty years of the national food program in Brazil', *Rev. Nutr.*, 2016, doi: 10.1590/1678-98652016000200009.

[6] M. Adesugba and G. Mavrotas, 'Youth employment, agricultural transformation, and rural labor dynamics in Nigeria', *Int. Food Policy Res. Inst.*, 2016.

[7] C. J. Obiora and A. I. Emodi, 'Restructuring the Agricultural Extension Service for Effective Agricultural Transformation Agenda in Nigeria', *Greener J. Agric. Sci.*, 2013, doi: 10.15580/gjas.2013.3.061013660.

[8] A. Nadal *et al.*, 'Social perception of urban agriculture in Latin-America. A case study in Mexican social housing', *Land use policy*, 2018, doi: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.02.055.

CHAPTER 23

SUBSTANCE ABUSE COMMUNITY COALITION'S RISE

Nidhi Srivastava, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:nidhis.somc@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

The growth of the substance abuse community coalition movement refers to the increasing number of community-based coalitions that have formed in response to the problem of substance abuse in the United States. These coalitions typically bring together a diverse group of stakeholders, including local government officials, healthcare professionals, law enforcement agencies, and community members, to develop and implement strategies to address substance abuse at the local level.The movement has grown significantly in recent years, as substance abuse has become an increasingly urgent public health issue. According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), there were over 5,000 community coalitions focused on substance abuse prevention and treatment in 2019, up from just a few hundred in the 1990s.

KEYWORDS:

Drug Abuse, Health, Policy, Public Health, Prevention.

INTRODUCTION

During the first two decades of the American war on drugs, numerous local anti-drug coalitions had already been formed. Police continue to fight this continuing struggle on American streets and borders, in state and federal legislatures, in the courts, in the media, and under the leadership of presidents, governors, and mayors. The War on Drugs developed piecemeal, as conflicts often do, as a result of the dreams, fears, and goals of individuals with various motivations and divergent points of view. In name and in spirit, the War on narcotics began during the 1968 presidential campaign when the nation saw how narcotics might be used as a crutch for a variety of issues that were too embarrassing to be discussed openly[1], [2]. Richard Nixon's use of the battle analogy was successful that year. It still works for politicians ranging from Jesse Jackson to Jesse Helms because almost everyone can find an excuse to join parents horrified by their children's behavior, police in need of funding, conservative politicians pandering to their constituents' moral dungeon, liberal politicians needing a chance to look tough, presidents seeking diversion from scandals, whites and blacks trying to explain the ghetto, editors filling page one, spies and colonels.

Local anti-drug coalitions have developed in towns and cities all throughout the country as a result of this campaign. More than two thousands of these coalitions claimed to be the lead coalition against substance abuse in their locality when an effort to count them all in 1992 and 1993 was made. Although the war on drugs created the conditions for the growth of these coalitions, the majority of them have not shared the national leaders' strong emphasis on law enforcement and interdiction, which is reflected in the war's budget. Instead of emphasizing

supply solutions to drug issues, these varied coalitions have chosen to focus on prevention and treatment, which they regard to as demand rather than sup- ply solutions. Additionally, they have placed just as much, if not more, emphasis on tobacco and alcohol as they have on illegal substances. This may be observed in the fact that 26% of coalitions reported considerable activities directed at cigarette use while 75% of coalitions reported extensive program activities targeted at alcohol consumption.

Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of national-level programs significantly increased the potential for these organizations by funding, validating, and offering them better technical support. The private sector produced one of the first. Fighting Back, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's biggest demonstration program to date, was started to decrease drug demand via community coalitions. According to RWJF, the government programs' origins may be traced back to the Fighting Back philosophy. RWJF only directly supported a small number of community coalitions, but one account of the formation of the movement claims that Fighting Back not only directly funded coalitions, but also served as a catalyst for the movement with its call for applications. Many of the initial grant applicants who were unsuccessful were able to secure funding elsewhere, and these coalitions served as a solid foundation for the coalition movement.3

Beginning in 1990, a brand-new government initiative that is run by the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, a branch of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, started awarding money to regional community anti-drug coalitions. Between 1990 and 1996, 251 coalitions received funding for a total of almost half a billion dollars. A second government project was started shortly after that one. The president's 2002 budget plan would double financing for community anti-drug coalitions to $350 million over 5 years, including a $11 million boost in 2002. Since 1997, the Office of National Drug Control Policy has provided 464 anti-drug coalitions with an extra $95 million in funding. Early in the 1990s, two national projects were started, and as a consequence, local coalitions had access to continuous sources of technical help. 450 persons from 172 communities attended the first national gathering of community coalitions in November 1990 in Washington, DC. The Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America, a new organization, became the national public voice for these growing coalitions with the help and support of the President's Drug Advisory Council.

The President's Drug Advisory Council promoted the creation of CADCA in 1992 to address the dramatic increase in the number of substance abuse coalitions and their need to exchange ideas, problems, and solutions. Jim Burke, the former chairman and CEO of Johnson and Johnson and the current chairman of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, served as the council's advisor. Alvah Chapman, a former chairman and CEO of Knight Ridder Inc. and the organization's director, led the group's official debut in October 1992. He also served as CADCA's first chairman. With their help, the group has developed into the main federal organization dedicated to preventing drug misuse, collaborating with local coalitions, and advocating for their causes at the federal level[3]. Today, CADCA asserts that it represents more than 5,000 community coalitions nationwide. The John S. and James L. Knight Foundation and RWJF provide the majority of CADCA's funding. The following is a lengthy quote from the CADCA's mission statement:

More than any other group, community coalitions are well-positioned to connect various community sectors, including companies, parents, the media, police enforcement, schools, faith-

based organizations, healthcare providers, social assistance organizations, and the government. Each participant gains a deeper grasp of the issues facing the community by working together via the coalition. The partners coordinate their anti-drug activities by organizing and creating strategies and programs together. The outcome is a comprehensive, neighborhood-wide strategy to address drug misuse and its associated issues. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has provided funding to Join Together, a nationwide organization that supports neighborhood-based initiatives aimed at decreasing, preventing, and treating drug dependence. Since 1991, Join Together has assisted coalitions around the country with strategy creation, finance, and operations thanks to a grant of $16 million from the RWJF[4].

DISCUSSION

Community Coalitions against Substance Abuse

A subgroup of the 1992 and 1993 identified local community drug addiction coalitions were surveyed. In addition to surveying the more than 2,100 coalitions that identified themselves as the lead drug addiction coalition in their town, the researchers were able to find more than 5,000 such organizations. When the survey was finished, they had been around for an average of 5.4 years, making up the majority of the population. I provide a succinct summary of the survey's findings. The number and variety of members. Nearly all coalitions were made up of local law enforcement, alcohol and drug prevention organizations, and schools. Businesses made up 63% of the sample, while religious institutions made up 61%. Civic/fraternal organizations made up 34% of the coalitions, while citizen action groups had the largest growth in terms of membership, with 32% of coalitions adding such organizations between 1992 and 1993.

Leaders and groups from the media were a part of 41% of the coalitions. Nearly 60% of the coalitions claim that their membership is evenly split between professionals, big organizations, citizens, laypeople, activists, and government officials. It offers a more thorough description of the coalition's membership. Unfortunately, responding coalitions were not questioned about the size of their membership. However, we do have such reports for 24 CSAP-funded coalitions. These organizations had an average of 40 member partners in 1992. But, by 1996, the average number had progressively increased to 120. The information from these many sources suggests that antidrug coalitions often include a significant number of member participants and that these participants come from a diverse variety of community institutions and organizations.

However, descriptions of specific coalitions imply that membership is frequently quite informal. For the SAFE 2000 El Paso, Texas, community partnership, for instance, there was no formal process for being a partnership member: those who expressed an interest and desire were considered members. This absence of a formal procedure was deliberate. And membership in the Springfield, Missouri, Ozarks Fighting Back alliance was less formal, being defined in terms of actual program participation. A formal agreement was signed by participating organizations. Membership in the coalition requires registration at two previous meetings, which entitles an individual or organization to vote on forthcoming initiatives and the overall direction of the coalition, according to the Aberdeen, South Dakota, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council. Let everyone who wants to join the coalition be a member, is what an American Public Health Association coalition manual advises. There are no official requirements for participation in the Campus Community Partnership United Against Dangerous Drinking, of which I am a member. All of this information confirms the Velcro-like or loosely coupled nature of the ties that bind anti-drug coalition members to these regional initiatives.

The budgets of one-third of the coalitions are less than $50,000, while one-fourth have budgets above $500,000. Eighty percent of the total funding for the responder coalitions comes from the federal government, which also happens to be the largest donor. 41 percent get some government assistance. The Drug Free Schools and Communities Act, the Bureau of Justice Assistance community demand-reduction funding, and the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention Partnership Program have all been used by the federal government in recent years to build community coalitions. Additionally, state and local governments provide 27% and 14% of the funds, respectively. Only 3% of the total financial support reported by survey respondents came from foundations, despite the leading role several foundations have played in funding and supporting regional drug abuse coalitions, as described above. A significant portion of the coalitions are financially entirely reliant on government assistance[5].

Over 55,000 volunteers, or more than 25 volunteers per coalition, were reportedly involved in the respondent coalitions' activities overall. The reports of the twenty-four CSAP-funded coalitions, where on average more than two thousand hours of volunteer work were recorded for each six-month reporting period from late 1993 to early 1996, are consistent with this picture. Therefore, in addition to signing up partners or members, who may not do much more than attend regular coalition meetings, these organizations also organize collective action projects that involve numerous local residents in anti-drug initiatives. Therefore, the growth of anti-drug partnerships within and between communities has undoubtedly helped to mobilize group action on substance abuse issues. The alliances come in many different shapes. The corporate community in Miami established the alliance.

Its executive committee is made up entirely of non-governmental figures, and one of its founders is the head of Knight Ridder newspapers. In San Francisco, the coalition is housed in the mayor's office. The mayor's office-based coalition and a coalition with members from the public and private sectors both exist in Boston. A fifth of the coalitions have their headquarters in governmental health organizations. Freestanding groupings make up the remaining 22%. These are more intimate meetings that often concentrate on alcohol-related difficulties. 15% of the organizations are recognized nonprofits with headquarters in places like YMCAs and community centers. Therefore, these coalitions frequently have access to local institutional sponsorship in addition to the financial support that is available to them. The following policy changes were backed by more than 70% of the coalitions: restrictions on alcohol advertising, lowered blood alcohol thresholds for adult and young drivers, higher alcohol taxes, increased financial support for community coalitions, increased enforcement of drug and alcohol laws, and harsher penalties for drug sales and possession. The majority of them opposed decriminalizing drug sales and possession, but few of them actively engaged in efforts intended to achieve these specific end[6].

Antidrug Collaborations as a Type of Coalition

Issue coalitions are a relatively prevalent organizational structure at the national, state, and local levels, despite the obstacles that have been identified in their creation. Local issue coalitions can consist of both individual and organizational members, and the organizations might vary from those with a primary focus on the problems that brought the groups together to those with merely peripheral interests. Between 10 and 25 percent of local organizations working to empower underprivileged citizens have been found to have social change coalition structures, which are widely prevalent.6 The new community antidrug partnerships are not unusual in their fundamental organizational structure. They stand out for their ability to represent an

exceptionally wide range of communities in membership as well as the usual lack of commitment many members have to the coalitions as a whole.The extent of their support and the inclusiveness of their membershipboth crucial to comprehending the strengths of the local antidrug coalitions are described in contrast between two state-level issue coalitions in the drug policy domain before I present the case for their distinctiveness. I'll wrap off this part by giving a quick overview of how local community coalitions have exploded both inside and beyond the realm of issues related to drug misuse[7].

Anti-Drug Coalitions at the State Level

Coalition for a Smoke-Free Minnesota. According to Mark Wolfson, the Minnesota Smoke-Free Coalition was founded as a result of a conference called by the Minnesota Medical Association and the Minnesota Department of Health. The group has been active in influencing public policy as well as institutional policy. For example, it has pushed to get hospitals to become smoke-free. The Metrodome Stadium became smoke-free in 1988 after it persuaded the Metropolitan Sports Facility Commission to do so. The coalition's Public Policy Committee has also been quite active in state legislation, aiming to organize a roughly coordinated lobbying effort on behalf of its component organizations.

The alliance was formed with close links to the Minnesota Association for Nonsmokers. ANSR was one of the first single-issue tobacco control organizations in the United States and the first in Minnesota. In 1973, an employee and a group of volunteers started working on the problem of second-hand smoking as a program for the American Lung Association's Hennepin County office. The coalition's membership demonstrates how the movement has tapped into the vast resource pool found within state and local health organizations. In the middle of the 1990s, the coalition's organizations, not its individual members, included the following:

1. Voluntary Health Organizations.
2. Groups That Offer Health Services And Insurance.
3. Professional Organizations For Health.
4. Groups That Advocate For Tobacco Control.
5. The Minnesota School Of Public Health At The University.
6. Government Institutions.

State/City Alliances supporting the Partnership for a Drug-Free America. With funding provided by the American Association of Advertising Agencies, the Partnership for a Drug-Free America was established in 1986. By 1992, it had invested more than $350 million in local and national advertising programs aimed at lowering the use of illegal drugs. Businesses from a broad range of industries, including the pharmaceutical, cigarette, and beer industries, supported the organization. The organization relied on free or heavily discounted media copy contributions from advertising firms that were used in a variety of media channels. Since launching in 1991, PDFA's State/City Alliance Program has expanded to include 55 member Alliances, reaching more than 93 percent of all homes in the United States. Each alliance develops a media campaign for drug misuse prevention that is specifically adapted to the requirements of its community while working closely with the Partnership staff.

The goal of Alliance campaigns is to ensure continuing engagement from every media source that is accessible. Alliances among partnership members provide a level of media penetration that no national organization could ever aspire to achieve. A group of devoted media volunteers

known as Key Market Coordinators in the top 50 media markets supports alliance initiatives. These experts, who are mostly senior executives of advertising companies, represent the PDFA in respective cities and have tight links to the media. Regional managers who are in charge of the top 75 media markets in the country serve as additional sources of assistance for the Partnership's member alliances. While a sizeable minority appeared to be nested in independent substance abuse coalitions, browsing the websites of PDFA State/City Alliances suggests that many of them are housed in state and local public health substance abuse programs. It seems that PDFA has partnered with already-established community coalitions for the prevention of drug misuse. For instance, Drug Free Pennsylvania is committed to lowering the demand for illicit drugs by leveraging the influence of the media, the strength of unions, and the influence of corporations. Prior to the creation of the PDFA State/City Alliance program, DFP was started in 1990. The governor, attorney general, and physician general are members of the DFP board of directors.

A judge, members of the state legislature, officials from a bank, several companies, the Pennsylvania Business Round, the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association, a U.S. attorney, Blue Cross Blue Shield, the Pennsylvania Medical Society, and the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO are also among them. The membership diversity of these two state-level anti-drug coalitions is where they most plainly diverge from one another. In contrast to Drug Free Pennsylvania, which has participation from a far wider spectrum of community organizations, the Minnesota Smoke-Free Coalition is predominantly made up of people who have a direct interest in the tobacco health problem. This somewhat reflects the agreement on public policy on these two topics. An organized remnant, largely made up of tobacco makers and merchants, may and does continue to present a public resistance to substance abuse, even if it is unlikely that state-level organizations, institutions, or notable people will do so any more. There is a much lower chance that a large coalition will emerge to support a cause when there is a possibility of conflict in a state or local community.

Important Components of the Local Drug Coalition Form

The enormous and widely diversified memberships, the elite sponsorship and backing they get, along with the loose and informal style of membership, are the most significant organizational characteristics of the local antidrug coalitions and their public health relatives. The first two features are covered in this part, and the third feature is covered in the section after this. Since there are typically few formal requirements for joining these coalitions and few, if any, detailed expectations for membership behavior beyond attending coalition events, these coalitions tend to have relatively weak organizational structures. Typically, a coalition partner will permit the use of his, her, or its name by the coalition, lending the coalition, at least in part, any public legitimacy that name may have.

Membership may also mean that an organization partner is ready to devote some of its personnel to the coalition's efforts, may provide the coalition additional resources, particularly in-kind resources, and may designate persons for temporary leadership positions. The fact that practically all coalitions include both individual and organizational members and give membership in them its Velcro-like nature might be attributed to the coalitions' flexible definition of membership. Remember that a quarter of the drug misuse coalitions questioned by Join Together reported annual budgets of over $500,000. this indicates that many coalitions employ professional staff. However, even when coalitions have staff, it is common for senior

executives and active board members to volunteer. This characteristic of coalitions benefits the members with the most resources in determining a coalition's activities and problem focuses.

Due to the relatively lax requirements for membership, coalitions may include participants with widely varying levels of commitment to their primary issue, from community organizations focused on a single issue to corporations and governmental bodies that are only tangentially interested in most of their agenda. Coalitions have the characteristic that their membership changes year after year. The component groups that provide the most funds to maintaining the coalition's structure and achieving its objectives are likely to change from year to year. These fluctuating resource commitments are the consequence of a mix of evolving alignments between component organizations' and the coalition's goals as well as changes in their capacity to provide resources to the coalition. Based on the few data we have, it is pretty amazing how big and extraordinarily diversified the members of these alliances seem to be.

As an organizational structure, these coalitions seem to have been successful in overcoming the challenges of bringing together people and organizations with various interests and cultural backgrounds. This success is the result of both the groups' ambiguous goals and their lax membership requirements, which revolve around the common problem of substance abuse. The war on drugs, which has been vigorously pursued, has made it such that practically no organization is willing to oppose the decline in substance addiction. One shortcoming of the coalition structure that lends it a transient, more fragile nature is the looseness of membership connection to coalitions, as opposed, for example, to the tightness of commitment of s to a national organization such as MADD. However, coalitions resemble the network form of organization that firm researchers have identified. Comparing that design to more typical hierarchical models, its advantages include more flexibility and adaptation to changing external situations[8].

The Widespread Development of Community Coalitions

Additional hundreds of millions of dollars are being invested in coalition development as a prevention and health promotion interven- tion are being made in addition to the coalition-building initiatives by CSAP and RWJF that have already been mentioned. Other initiatives to encourage the formation of regional coalitions on community issues. Johnson & Johnson supports the local, state, and national alliance SAFEKIDS to reduce childhood injuries. The Community-Based Public Health Initiative of the Kellogg Foundation supports partnerships between public health schools, regional health case management organizations, and neighborhood-based groups to advance community-based public health education and service. The National Institutes of Health funds the National Cancer Institute's COMMIT and ASSIST community tobacco reduction initiatives.

The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's PATCH initiative to promote cardiovascular health. Native American tribal health promotion activities funded by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation's Office of Minority Health in the United States. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Community Consortium Demonstration Project There are also other initiatives aimed at creating strong local community coalitions. The National Civic League was asked to assist in the beginning of the U.S. Healthy Communities Initiative in 1989 when the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services publicly accepted the idea of healthy communities. Since then, the Healthy Communities approach to community development has been embraced by hundreds of community partnerships and community-based organizations.

Additionally, Communities That Care coalitions have multiplied recently. These organizations work to mobilize local communities in support of young people's and families' health development, with a particular emphasis on drug misuse prevention. For instance, Pennsylvania now has twenty-eight Communities That Care networks[9].

High densities of local community issue coalitions have developed as a consequence of their widespread growth in many localities. Although it can be challenging, the director of the Penn State Prevention Research Center has done so for the community I live in. There are at least thirteen community partnerships in the counties of Centre County and State College, Pennsylvania. These organizations include the Partnership: United Against Dangerous Drinking, the Tobacco Coalition, Centre County Communities That Care, Centre Region Communities That Care, Stand for Children, Smart Start-Centre County Child Care and Education Initiative, Interfaith Coalition, the Safety Net, Healthy Communities, and the Partnership: United Against Dangerous Drinking.

CONCLUSION

Overall,a potential strategy for tackling the intricate and varied issue of drug misuse in the United States is the drive toward the creation of substance abuse community coalitions. These coalitions are significantly enhancing the lives of people and communities impacted by addiction by cooperating at the local level. The effectiveness of the community coalition strategy is founded on the conviction that local communities are in the greatest position to recognize and address the particular causes of drug misuse in their region. Community coalitions may establish focused initiatives to prevent drug misuse and provide effective treatment and support to individuals afflicted by addiction by bringing varied stakeholders together and participating in collaborative problem-solving. Substance addiction prevention and treatment have significantly improved throughout the nation as a result of the rise of the community coalition movement. Numerous coalitions have created creative initiatives and programs that have been effective in lowering drug abuse rates and enhancing access to support and treatment services.

REFERENCES:

[1] B. C. Waterhouse, *Lobbying America: The politics of business from Nixon to NAFTA*. 2013. doi: 10.1093/jahist/jau566.

[2] A. Markham and J. Wiser, ‘A Heritage Coalition’s Call to Action’ on Climate Change and Cultural Heritage’, *Forum J.*, 2015.

[3] T. Norris and M. Pittman, ‘The healthy communities movement and the coalition for healthier cities and communities’, *Public Health Reports*. 2000.

[4] D. J. Hess, ‘Coalitions, framing, and the politics of energy transitions: Local democracy and community choice in California’, *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.*, 2019, doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2018.11.013.

[5] J. Krinsky and E. Reese, ‘Forging and sustaining labor-community coalitions: The workfare justice movement in three cities’, *Sociological Forum*. 2006. doi: 10.1007/s11206-006-9036-0.

[6] E. M. Adam, 'Intersectional Coalitions: The Paradoxes of Rights-Based Movement Building in LGBTQ and Immigrant Communities', *Law Soc. Rev.*, 2017, doi: 10.1111/lasr.12248.

[7] C. Kremen and A. M. Merenlender, 'Landscapes that work for biodiversity and people', *Science*. 2018. doi: 10.1126/science.aau6020.

[8] P. Cullen, 'European Union Non-governmental Organizational Coalitions as Professional Social Movement Communities', *J. Civ. Soc.*, 2015, doi: 10.1080/17448689.2015.1052228.

[9] C. F. Bright, E. E. Haynes, D. Patterson, and M. Pisu, 'The value of social network analysis for evaluating academic-community partnerships and collaborations for social determinants of health research', *Ethn. Dis.*, 2017, doi: 10.18865/ed.27.S1.337.

CHAPTER 24

ELITE FACILITATION OF LOCAL COLLECTIVE ACTION

Mr. Arun Kumar Tyagi, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:arunkt.somc@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

Elite facilitation of local collective action refers to the involvement of influential individuals, such as political leaders, business executives, or community organizers, in supporting and promoting collective action at the local level. These elites can play a critical role in facilitating the organization and coordination of collective action by providing resources, expertise, and connections to key stakeholders. The concept of elite facilitation of local collective action has gained increasing attention in recent years, as scholars and practitioners have recognized the important role that elites can play in promoting community development and social change. Elite facilitation can take many forms, including providing funding and resources to local organizations, advocating for policy changes, and using their networks and influence to mobilize support for collective action initiatives.

KEYWORDS:

Leadership, Local Politics, Political Participation, Power Dynamics, Social Capital.

INTRODUCTION

Collective action has typically been thought of by academics as an autonomous insurgency that targets and opposes the state. Scholars of social movements have paid less attention to the direct role of the state in facilitating the emergence and expansion of collective action, even though some analysts emphasize the indirect role of the state in facilitating collective action through the creation of opportunities and openings. Despite ample evidence of such governmental aid, this is true. Even less focus has been placed on corporate facilitation of social movements, both directly and indirectly. But for those familiar with the work of scholars from interest groups, the extent of such facilitation comes as no surprise. For instance, Jack Walker's Washington, DC, surveys revealed significant financial assistance being given by both the government and businesses to aid in the creation of citizens organizations. Additionally, it is well known that private foundations significantly fund social movement organizations in the fields of women's, environmental, and civil rights. Therefore, the pattern of elite sponsorship we observe for the anti-drug coalitions is not novel, despite the possibility that its sheer scope, as revealed by the sponsorship of coalitions across local communities, marks a departure from previous American experiences[1], [2].

A significant new tendency, what Mark Wolfson refers to as state-movement interpenetration, may be the deep interpenetration of the governmental, commercial, and non-profit sectors in the conception and spawning of coalitions as well as participation in their continuous activities at the local level. The findings of a group of academics and nonprofit leaders gathered by the Aspen Nonprofit Sector Research Fund provide evidence of this tendency. The Nonprofit Sector

Strategy Group draws attention to a new kind of business-nonprofit collaboration it dubs corporate citizenship, which is a trend that is fast growing. This new approach has resulted in a new pattern of corporate engagement with the nonprofit sector, including. Broader 'community partnerships' in which corporations join with nonprofit organizations, and frequently government agencies, in long-term, multi-pronged efforts to address complex societal issues, according to the report. The organization asks for further investment in these cross-sector coalition arrangements while also being cautious of the dangers involved in such collaboration across industries. An extensive effort to organize public involvement may be seen in the formation of community coalitions. These organizational vehicles are a crucial tool for creating the possibilities necessary for citizens to get active, since they are often unwilling to do so until given the chance. As a result, the creation of coalitions by governmental organizations, businesses, foundations, and other nonprofit organizations directly promotes extensive public mobilization.

DISCUSSION

Facilitating Mechanisms

Templates for collaborative action are provided by sponsors. Generating and broadly disseminating the blueprint for forming one of these new coalitions is one of the most significant ways that elite groups have mobilized them. Although there are now extensive written materials that provide the outlines of the coalition template for any group interested in starting one, the direct funding of local coalitions does, of course, come with guidelines for creating them. Examples include The Spirit of Coalition, a guide for how to organize a coalition, how to raise money for it, how to run its meetings, develop its leaders, and attract and keep members, and Community-Based Public Health A Partnership Model, a book by the Kellogg Foundation and the American Public Health Association.

Another illustration of this system is the contribution of eminent sponsors to the design of the Mothers Against Drunk Driving template. A public health expert called Candy Lightner soon after she conducted a news conference in Sacramento, California, to announce the creation of MADD and offered to share his extensive lobbying experience with her. He quickly helped the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration secure a grant, enabling him and Lightner to create a collection of materials that eventually constituted the starter kit. These resources were made available to local activists, first in California and then more broadly throughout the United States, with further backing from NHTSA and foundation funding. The creation and dissemination of this template for collective action helped local organizations to emerge quickly. Since then, the MADD template has been frequently imitated. For instance, after doing a thorough investigation before deciding on the MADD template, ACES, a nonprofit that advocates for stricter child support enforcement, made that decision. In the late 1980s, ACES created its own starting materials based on the MADD model, helping to facilitate the creation of more than 300 local chapters of the organization[3].

Resources being made available. Once coalitions are established, local sponsors may donate a variety of resources to them. In their investigation of how local homeless groups were mobilized, Dan Cress and David Snow created a very helpful classification of resource kinds, each of which had been made accessible by outside sponsors to at least part of the organizations they researched. We can find evidence of resource subsidies from elite sponsors for each of the sorts of resources they list in the comprehensive facilitation of coalitions.A group's goals and deeds may get moral support from other groups and well-known individuals. The federal executive

branch of the United States provided unwavering rhetorical and moral support to those citizens and groups who might wish to become involved around the issue of drug abuse in the country. This support began with the appointment of William Bennett as the first drug czar during the Reagan administration and continued through the Bush and two Clinton administrations. State authorities reinforced similar themes, with a few small deviations.

Governments at the federal, state, and municipal levels have previously shown their substantial financial support for local coalitions. Many local institutional members may also contribute material resources through grants as well as the provision of tangible goods and services like supplies, meeting space, office space, and transportation. These institutions include universities, law enforcement agencies, schools, and religious organizations[4]. The operation of local coalitions depends on informational resources, including the provision of technical and strategic assistance. As we've previously seen, CADA and Join Together provide direct technical help to local coalitions, and foundations and other national organizations have generated significant textual resources, including websites, which are now available to them. The majority of local citizen organizations, in contrast to these coalitions, have minimal material resources, making human resources one of their most crucial resources.

Time and effort given to a coalition constitute its human resources. These coalitions' diverse membership implies that the reasons people join for a variety of reasons. Individual members represent a variety of demographic categories, such as young individuals, those quitting drugs, and conscientious citizens. Their engagement should demonstrate a blend of the normal elements that spur social movement participation, such as network connections, invitations to join, and excitement on the side of individuals who are invited to join for the coalition's objectives. However, representatives of organizations, associations, and both public and private agencies make up the vast majority of the coalition's members. These members' participation in the alliance may reflect an organizational choice to affiliate rather than an individual one, since they are often designated by their respective institutions. These organizations' motivations may include excitement for the coalition's nebulous aims, but they also likely include at least the value of participation in terms of public relations and a desire to mold coalition operations to suit their own objectives. The processes used by constituent coalition partner groups to decide whether to join the coalition differ greatly[5], [6].

These can include selecting a CEO with authority in more hierarchical firms, delegation based on technical job divisions in many agencies, or consensus delegation processes among some citizen groups. In any case, because many representatives are assigned, their participation is not entirely voluntary and is often seen as a requirement of their position. More contentious topics will reduce the likelihood of building wide coalition memberships to the degree that broad support among coalition partner groups is required for participation. Gary Delgado noticed that community groups made up of alliances of religious congregations were extremely constrained in the types of topics they might agree to pursue together as a result of this approach. Only problems with strong public support are likely to be able to attract a broad variety of groups to a coalition around them.

Antidrug Coalitions Influence Local Collective Action Mobilization

The historically positioned coalition model that has been developed in recent years to address the problem of drug misuse and other related public health concerns seems to have been successful in inspiring widespread and comprehensive collective action in local communities. What impact

will this victory have on the environment for citizen collective action in localities throughout the country? What are the repercussions for local agendas for public policy and attention? Over the past ten years, anti-drug coalitions have been able to mobilize a sizable number of individuals and groups in communities across the United States. Social issue groups that enlist citizen members one at a time have an edge over coalitions when it comes to mass mobilization. The effectiveness of bloc recruitment is crucial. The process of enlisting a group to join a coalition is comparable to the one used to enlist an African-American church in a civil rights effort. If successful, such a tactic may acquire many supporters far more quickly than finding isolated people one at a time. Of course, this is only accurate to the degree that the heads of coalition partner organizations can secure the cooperation of their personnel.

Even though many of the participants in these coalitions are only involved because their employers have delegated them to the coalition, it still creates opportunities for citizen engagement for those who take part in them. Numerous other participants show up in their individual or group capacities as representatives of citizens. And as we have seen, these coalitions mobilize substantial volunteer efforts. Those who have bemoaned civic engagement's perceived decline and made attempts to document its scope and shape in recent years have not taken note of or given an explanation for this sort of participation. Those observers would not have likely been encouraged by this surge in citizen engagement even if they had noticed it. Similar to those who investigate insurgent collective action, people who mourn the decrease of citizen engagement see citizen collective action as a process that accumulates public preferences from the bottom up. It is doubtful that top-down mobilization of public preferences and elite social construction of problems would be seen as a remedy to the decline in citizen participation.

When elite sponsorship of local collective action is as effective at mobilizing local actors as the anti-drug campaign has been, it has significant effects on how the overall problem emphasis of local collective action is shaped. These effects happen as a result of the associated processes of channeling and crowding. When environmental conditions restrict and focus either the nature or the content of collective activity, channeling takes place. At least two significant environmental mechanisms state control of organizational structure and elite financial support have been linked to channeling effects. In the United States, state regulation of collective action generally acts via federal regulations controlling nonprofit organizations, and it has the most influence on organizational structure and strategy. Regulated collective agents exhibit great moderation in their choice of strategies and re- markable uniformity in organizational structure. Although a significant portion of social movement organizations that do not receive elite funding do register, receiving elite funding almost always comes with the requirement that the organization do so, typically as a 5013 entity.

The channeling mechanism of elite financial support also works by favoring a select group of collective players in their efforts to organize around certain topics. This results in the formation of the substantive composition of collective action. Chan- neling citizen collective action to combat drug misuse has undoubtedly had the effect of elevating the range of concerns covered by its wide framework in local communities throughout the country. What seems to be vast grassroots support for the war on drugs has been generated by elite finance. Remember that the Join Together poll revealed resounding anti-drug coalition support for a number of specific policy changes, including enhanced police enforcement and harsher punishments for drug possession. It is obvious that the elite-sponsored mobilization has had a direct influence on the attention cycles for local policy issues as well as the prioritization of local policy agendas[7].

In addition to channeling, mobilization crowding is another related technique that may have an even greater influence on local communities. The majority of academic study of these channeling systems, as well as study of policy and creation of policy agenda, concentrates on the national level. At that level, it is implicitly assumed that there will always be a large number of collective actors. As a result, even if some of them are privileged to receive elite support and as a result are able to mobilize more extensively, other collective actors pursuing competing substantive agendas are likely to continue their efforts regardless. However, it is more logical to assume that issue mobilization is more finite at the local level, ultimately being constrained by the time that individual and collective actors have available. Although it is not entirely a zero-sum game, there is a high likelihood that widespread local mobilization around one substantive issue agenda will crowd out mobilization around other substantive agendas. Therefore, elite funding for issue agendas in local communities may actually prevent the emergence of collective actors around competing issue agendas in addition to favoring some collective actors over others.

It remains to be seen if other initiatives to encourage citizen involvement in local communities have been displaced by the emergence and expansion of the several coalitions outlined, those produced by the war on drugs and its public health relatives. If so, the massive elite penetration of local communities as described here may contribute to the apparent decline in citizen engagement by absorbing the efforts of numerous potential individual community activists into collective action projects that focus their energies on professional locations rather than personal values.The community coalition form is especially well suited as a vehicle for vast and varied issue mobilization in local communities because of its loose, Velcro-like membership qualities. Its quick spread across several problem spheres is proof of both its institutional legitimacy and perceived efficacy. The template is a public good, so activists working for various causes may readily customize it to suit their needs. However, my analysis suggests that its applicability should be restricted to local issues that have been effectively framed as having widespread community support[8].

CONCLUSION

It has shown how the effectiveness of local collective action projects may be significantly impacted by elite facilitation. For instance, community members have been more involved and engaged, they have had easier access to funds and resources, and they have been more successful in accomplishing collective action objectives in places where political or commercial leaders have backed such activities. Overall, the idea of elite facilitation of local collective action emphasizes the significant role that powerful people may play in fostering social change and communal development. Elites may assist in mobilizing and supporting local collective action projects by using their resources, knowledge, and networks, which will eventually result in increased community participation, empowerment, and advancement. The local effects of the elite-sponsored proliferation of anti-drug coalitions on local social policy processes remain my guesses. they are nothing more than that. Local communities have largely been disregarded by scholars studying the origin and activities of social movements as well as those studying public policy processes. We thus know very little about either area in local settings, which means that we also know relatively little about how social movement mobilization at the local level influences local problem attention, policy attention, or the processes of policy-setting and implementation. The antidrug coalition movement's almost ubiquitous penetration into local communities continues to provide a fantastic chance to investigate these topics.

REFERENCES:

[1] Y. Gong and R. Tan, 'Emergence of local collective action for land adjustment in land consolidation in China: An archetype analysis', *Landsc. Urban Plan.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.landurbplan.2021.104160.

[2] J. Bellows and E. Miguel, 'War and local collective action in Sierra Leone', *J. Public Econ.*, 2009, doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.012.

[3] P. Sultana, P. M. Thompson, N. S. Paudel, M. Pariyar, and M. Rahman, 'Transforming local natural resource conflicts to cooperation in a changing climate: Bangladesh and Nepal lessons', *Clim. Policy*, 2019, doi: 10.1080/14693062.2018.1527678.

[4] J. McCray, R. Warwick, A. Palmer, and T. Thompson, 'Experiencing temporal patterns of action learning and the implications for leadership development', *Int. J. Manag. Educ.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.ijme.2020.100433.

[5] J. J. Patterson, 'Exploring Local Responses to a Wicked Problem: Context, Collective Action, and Outcomes in Catchments in Subtropical Australia', *Soc. Nat. Resour.*, 2016, doi: 10.1080/08941920.2015.1132353.

[6] J. Corcoran, R. Zahnow, R. Wickes, and J. Hipp, 'Neighbourhood land use features, collective efficacy and local civic actions', *Urban Stud.*, 2018, doi: 10.1177/0042098017717212.

[7] J. Phillipson, M. Gorton, and L. Laschewski, 'Local business co-operation and the dilemmas of collective action: Rural micro-business networks in the North of England', *Sociol. Ruralis*, 2006, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00401.x.

[8] M. Schut, J. J. Cadilhon, M. Misiko, and I. Dror, 'Do mature innovation platforms make a difference in agricultural research for development? a meta-analysis of case studies', *Exp. Agric.*, 2018, doi: 10.1017/S0014479716000752.

CHAPTER 25

A BRIEF OVERVIEW ABOUT SOCIAL MOVEMENT STATE NEXUS

Mr. Hardeep Parkash, Assistant Professor,
Department of Management, Sanskriti University, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, India,
Email Id:hardeepp.somc@sanskriti.edu.in

ABSTRACT:

The social movement-state nexus refers to the dynamic and often complex relationship between social movements and the state. This relationship is characterized by a tension between the demands and goals of social movements and the power and interests of the state.The concept of the social movement-state nexus has gained increasing attention in recent years as scholars have sought to understand the ways in which social movements interact with and impact the state, and vice versa. This relationship can take many forms, including cooperation, conflict, co-optation, and repression.

KEYWORDS:

Civil society, Collective action, Government, Interest groups, Mobilization, Policy.

INTRODUCTION

In order to comprehend the complicated interaction between social movements, the state, and public policy, social movement academics and public policy experts traditionally distinguish between insiders and outsiders of the socio-political realm. Insiders are people who have strong ties to governmental institutions and are best positioned to understand the outlines of public policy since they are closest to the decision-making process. State administrators, politicians, and other individuals that essentially design public policy are considered insiders. Contrarily, outsiders are individuals who are at least one step away from the official governing process but nonetheless attempt to influence the creation, substance, and execution of public policy via the use of divisive politics. Local activists, associations of all kinds, and the networks that surround them participate in what Best refers to as outsider claims making to achieve this.

They act in this way in reaction to current public policy or to help define the creation of new policy. With these important actors in place, it has often been necessary to investigate when and how outsiders organize to compel insiders to write some kinds of public policies but not others in order to understand the creation and execution of public policy. This conventional interpretation of the connection between social movements and the state is becoming more problematic, although being useful for analytical reasons and undoubtedly capable of producing significant theoretical breakthroughs. The borders between insiders and outsiders are blurry at best and entirely false at worst, according to recent empirical research that uncovers complex social structures and processes. It is necessary to have a more sophisticated understanding of how social movements and the state interact. The next three sections attempt to analyze the mechanisms and procedures by which the relationship between social movements and public policy emerges and becomes important for policy, focusing on quite diverse empirical referents and historical periods.

Mrill Ingram and Helen Ingram investigate how regulatory legislation develops and evolves through time in Creating Credible Edibles the Organic Agriculture Movement and the Emergence of U.S. Federal Organic Standards, which focuses on the Organic Food Production Act's approval in 1990. They use extensive archival, interview, and media data to trace the origins and evolution of the regulatory standards contained in this historic legislation as well as the idea of organic itself. They treat the passage of this federal law as a major policy achievement for an effort long sidelined in mainstream agricultural politics. By doing this, they may show how a public conversation between important parties such as organic farmers, retailers, scientists, environmentalists, representatives of certifiers and agencies, consumer advocacy organizations, and politicians has evolved over time.

Rising public concern over food safety, steadfast opposition to federal agricultural policy, and a rapidly expanding market for organic products that represented both opportunity and risk for the development of public policy related to creating credible edibles shaped the political dialogue and attendant policy trade-offs made between these stakeholders. The following theoretical insights into the interactive and mutually constitutive character of the social movement-state nexus are provided by this work: The content of proposed and enacted policy shapes social movement strategies, and vice versa, and both change over different stages in the policy process. Additionally, over the course of the policy-making process, social movements can move inside the state and the government can move outside the state even as the basic distinction between the two is reinforced. Social movements' reliance on markets as a source of political opportunity can lead back to government.

Lee Ann Banaszak contends that we must re-examine the lines created between a social movement and others, particularly the state, in Inside and Outside the State: Movement Insider Status, Tactics, and Public Policy Achievements, which is consistent with the points made in the by Ingram and Ingram. Banaszak uses interview and demographic data to focus analysis on the state-movement intersection in the context of the contemporary women's movement and public policy intended to improve the position and welfare of women, notably equal employment legislation. Banaszak makes a strong case that the state-movement junction consists of self-identified members of the movement who hold recognizable positions within the state, departing from others who look at how institutional activists and movement institutionalization affect public policy.

The number of movement activists inside the state, the category of movement outsider status held by those within the state, and the kind of location inhabited within the state are the three quantitative dimensions along which movements might be more or less positioned within state institutions. Despite providing an empirical analysis of the first dimension of the state-movement intersection the number of women in state structures over time Banaszak still believes that empirical research on all of these aspects of the intersection will help us better understand how public policy affects the development and composition of the state-movement intersection by introducing new locations for movement activists within the state as well as new operating rules and norms. In turn, this will help us develop more effective public policy.

Last but not least, Ryken Grattet's The Policy Nexus: Professional Networks and the Formulation and Adoption of Workers' Compensation Reforms carries on the search of a more nuanced understanding of the link between movements and governments. Grattet explains how a coalition of political actors that made up the policy nexus pulled off a string of legislative victories in a

short period of time by examining the social movement that sought to ensure that workers receive financial compensation for work-related injuries and attendant disabilities. Grattet skillfully demonstrates the ways in which movement professionals were uniquely positioned to influence policy formation, in this case the passage of state-level workers' compensation laws throughout the United States in the early part of the 20th century. Grattet makes the argument that movements that orient toward social change via legislative reform and involve professionals rather than aggrieved persons might have different engagement processes with the state than other types of movements. Grattet explains how these relationships were essential to the timing, substance, diffusion, and institutionalization of workers' compensation reform using both qualitative and quantitative data.

In particular, he shows that the policy nexus in this instance was made up of a network of connections between state officials, researchers, and insurance men, but not between labor or management, victims, or business owners. Moving away from the specifics of this case, Grattet contends that the policy nexus affects policymaking in three ways: it is essential for the creation of policy templates that synthesize abstract ideas for reform, which can come from a variety of nexus sectors. it provides a setting where conflicting interests can be managed, including the creation of justifications that can mute grounds for opposition. and it can have an impact on the content of policy proposals. Grattet theorizes how a policy nexus might overcome the problem of uniformity of action via state-movement interpenetration that makes it easier to coordinate action based on these analytical considerations.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture received a sizable and generally unfavorable response when it posted its proposed guidelines on organic food production for public comment in 1997. Over a quarter of a million letters, postcards, and emails from individuals, farmers, traders, environmentalists, scientists, and consumers poured in in the months after the release and invitation to comment, constituting the largest public response ever to any USDA proposed regulations. The fact that the proposed regulation recognized the use of genetically modified organisms, irradiation, and sewage sludge as acceptable organic practices attracted the attention of a large number of commenters. The vast majority of the 2.4 million commenters strongly disagreed with these three facets of the proposed legislation. People claimed that the USDA's fatally flawed proposal was a insult to the intelligence of the organic community and that it was attempting to hijack organic agriculture. They also claimed that they were shocked and outraged by it. They have no interest in giving our organic community a historically significant and accurate guideline, according to Edward Brown, produce manager at Wedge Co-op in Minneapolis.

They remove the boundaries between conventional and organic farming. We had no idea how corporate agriculture would profit from the USDA terminology and gain a foothold in the organic movement. The USDA took note of the comments, at least in part, and reacted by eliminating the problematic three parts and making other requested changes to the draft regulation. In 2000, a fresh draft regulation underwent yet another round of commenting, and in December of that same year, a final rule was published in the Federal Register. The alternative agriculture community succeeded in establishing a set of federal standards for organic agriculture ten years after the Organic Food Production Act of 1990 authorized federal organic regulation. These standards not only establish uniform guidelines for the production and handling of all organic food in the United States, but also validate a formerly alternative method of food production as a recognized component of the modern food system[1].

A wide range of agricultural techniques are included in alternative agriculture. The emphasis of the new federal laws is on organic farming, which is described in the legislation as management practices that foster the cycling of resources, promote ecological balance, and conserve biodiversity. Application of synthetic chemicals, particularly pesticides and fertilizers, is prohibited in organic management practices. For many customers, the term organic now denotes food that is safer, cleaner, and more nutritious as well as an alternative to the conventional food production system. The comment period was a pivotal moment in the development of the alternative agriculture movement and the growth of the organic food sector, and it represents a significant legislative victory for a cause that has long been marginalized in agricultural politics. In order to illustrate how social movements, affect policy creation and the growth of social movements attempting to affect political change, this article studies the origin of the organic regulations and utilizes them as a focus point.

DISCUSSION

Theoretical Implications

An examination of the multidimensional connections and iterative interactions between social movements and the policy process is necessary, according to recent literature on public policy and social movements, which stresses how policy and citizen movements influence one another. Rao, Morrill, and Zald look at organizational field conditions that set many of the political constraints and opportunities that social movements and new organizational forms face as they emerge and attempt to sustain them in their research on the creation of new institutions ourselves. The writers explore this situation as they look at how activists create boundaries for and legitimize new groups as well as institutions[2]. By describing both the field conditions for the emergence of organic agriculture and the procedures by which activists established new institutional forms and validated them, this case study aims to advance our understanding of the interactive relationships between social movements and public policy. Our case study provides insight into the process by which marginalized groups formulate and plan their arguments in order to position themselves as authorities and be included within the confines of acceptable discourse. The iron triangle of agency staff, agricultural commodity interest groups, agribusiness, and members of congressional subcommittees, who set budget and spending priorities to serve the interests they represent, has long been a well-known example of policy stagnation at the federal level.

It is interesting to see how the organic agricultural movement was able to use a small opportunity provided by the Organic Food Production Act of 1990 to mobilize people and create a site and venue for policy change even in hostile contexts. Less scholarly attention has been paid to the connections between social movements and economic forms, despite the fact that social movements' impact on public policy has received a lot of attention. The extent to which new organizational forms, including economic institutions, emerge in the context of actions taken by governmental institutions and social mobilization of networks around shared ideas and cultural frames has been theorized by cultural institutional scholars. Fligstein takes the idea of markets as politics a step further. The market has given the organic movement a ton of support and validation, and the capacity of activists to create new institutions and regulations, particularly around organic certification, was a crucial pillar in the development of federal-level organic legislation. The government was forced into a conflicted position as it tried to support status quo

agricultural interests and agency positions while also responding to and seeming legitimate to growing public interest in alternative food production.

This process gave them legitimacy and allowed them to gain a foothold in an unfriendly federal agricultural establishment. The movement had considerable consumer support from the market as well, which allowed it to advocate for a different structure for the food system than that used by conventional agriculture. The degree to which organics tackles resource inequities or constitutes a redistribution of access and privilege needs to be seen. this is a topic we'll return to later. It's unclear how different this architecture is now that the restrictions are in place.Because of its participation in the commercial and policy realms, the organic movement underwent a significant evolution. This case offers a chance to examine how successful market participation influenced the relative strength of various social movement components, even the idea of organic itself, in addition to cultural aspects of the marketplace and changes in economic organization as a result of social movement action. We will demonstrate how the proponents of the commercial organic movement benefited from broad and rising public concern about food safety. In its efforts to influence public policy, the social movement was urged to pursue certain techniques over others by business imperatives such as the need to distinguish the organic agricultural product from rivals[3].

The organic standards have been hailed as a major accomplishment in bringing a farming method that was previously exclusively practiced by back-to-the-land nuts into the mainstream. However, the regulations have also been criticized as a failure for the organic movement, in part because they make it easier for large agribusinesses and other groups who do not share the movement's core values to enter the market. This is true even after the USDA made changes in response to public comments. The conversation around the laws reflects both apprehension and excitement as a hitherto marginal movement entered the mainstream. The organic regulations are the result of what has been referred to as a public conversation that included the original farm groups who pushed for organic certification at the state level, the commercial interests who lobbied Congress for federal legislation, and the quarter of a million interested consumers who commented on the draft organic rule. This is undoubtedly a continuing discussion given the National Organic Standards Board's continuous involvement in implementation, appeals for amendments to and exclusions from the rule, and engagement from various organizations with express expectations about the law's objectives.

Any final judgment on success or failure or the degree to which related new forms indicate significant speciation is difficult due to the legislation's youth. According to the differences between new and old core features, such as objectives, authority relations, technology, and serviced markets, Rao, Morrill, and Zald categorize new organizations as having a strong or weak speciation. Success is difficult to define, as academics of social movements and politics have noted. The debates over whether or not the regulations are a success or a failure bring up the issue of co-optation, for instance, which has characterized studies of social movements and their relationship to governmental institutions ever since Philip Selznick's investigation into how the Tennessee Valley Authority sacrificed a progressive social agenda in order to achieve a political and organizational victory.

The concept of co-optation, according to William Gamson in The Strategy of Social Protest, is when a social movement is acknowledged as a legitimate participant in policymaking without really advancing that activity. More recently, academics have strayed from a strict definition of

co-optation in order to better comprehend the compromises social movements make in order to advance their objectives or gain broader societal acceptance. We also want to go beyond the all-or-nothing conception of co-optation and examine the policy-making process in order to better understand how social movements formulate their arguments and plan their strategies in order to win political victories and gain wider support. This process also affects the choice of policy tools and, in the end, the characteristics of the social movement itself. Understanding this dynamic is crucial if one wants to comprehend the current national conversation regarding the organic rule[4].

In order to follow the discourse of organic agriculture across time and across institutional contexts, we gathered information and data for this case study from a variety of sources. Since the original rule's formulation, the analysis of National Organic Standards Board meeting minutes has been supplemented by interviews with those involved. Interviews with organic farmers, certifiers, and agency personnel also included their viewpoints on how the rules have changed over time. Our research included a content analysis of public comments submitted to the USDA regarding the draft rule, a sample of which was made available on the USDA's National Organic Program Web site. These comments were made in addition to examination of governmental and trade reports about the development of the industry and at tendance at organic farming workshops and meetings. In order to track changes in the level of mainstream media attention, the tone of the stories, the sources of authority identified, and the consistency of particular goals and issues, such as human health, environmental health, and agricultural economics, we also conducted a content analysis of newspaper articles on organic agriculture published in the New York Times and the San Francisco Chronicle between 1989 and 2000.

Field Situation: The Monopoly of Traditional Agricultural Policy

We start by discussing early efforts to bring ideas about alternative and organic agriculture into mainstream political circles and then concentrate on the policy monopoly connecting the Department of Agriculture to commodity groupings and agribusiness. According to public policy researchers, policy stagnation is more frequent than policy change, and networks of interests with similar basic values and problem-solving philosophies tend to control both policies and the institutions that produce and administer them. As previously said, the iron triangle of commodity groups, district representatives, and federal bureaucracy that has sustained itself for decades is a prime illustration of this form of stasis. The Department of Agriculture has been heavily active in agricultural research and teaching since the Progressive period at the beginning of the 20th century. In order to meet agricultural needs, the majority of pre-New Deal initiatives were created from the ground up. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which established extensive agricultural programs run by the federal Department of Agriculture and mandated parity prices for the commodities that farmers produced, institutionalized the Department of Agriculture's strong focus on customer service.

Farmers' political access shifted over time away from the conventional lobbying organization, the Farm Bureau, and toward constituency organizations that reflected the main crops cultivated in certain congressional districts. Commodity concerns had been incorporated into Congress' organizational structure by the 1950s. Ten commodities subcommittees, which attracted members from congressional congressmen whose districts farmed mostly that specific crops, dominated the House Committee on Agriculture. Legislators seldom participated in subcommittees that did not directly benefit their own districts. Subcommittee recommendations

related to specific commodities were seldom contested in committee or even on the floor of Congress due to informal principles of specialization and reciprocity. Despite the decreasing number of farmers and the fierce opposition from consumer and environmental groups, the House Agricultural Committee's constituency orientation has endured.Beyond price supports, Congress and the USDA have complete control over the commodity agriculture sector. The agricultural establishment has close connections to production-focused academics at land-grant colleges because to its competitive funding programs. Large agribusiness companies that provide seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and increasingly genetically modified agricultural goods are intimately connected to these researchers. Particularly in light of the declining number of farmers and their proportionate contribution to the welfare of the national economy, the endurance and resilience of this network are impressive.

Organic farming had a very negative reputation in political circles throughout the 1960s and 1970s.Organic farmers' refusal of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides was mocked as coming from a bygone period of industrial agriculture, and detractors dismissed it as backwards and unscientific. Earl Butz, a former secretary of agriculture, remarked in a 1971 statement on organic farming, We can go back to organic farming if we must we know how to do it. However, someone must choose which 50 million of our population will starve before we take that step. By adopting new terminology like low-input agriculture and sustainable agriculture, proponents and lobbyists tried to counteract the detrimental organic image in the 1980s. However, the new labels did little to guarantee the success of the legislation. The few members of Congress who support organic farming made unsuccessful attempts to draft legislation in 1982 and 1985 to encourage and enable scientific research into and understanding of organic farming practices and to help family farmers and others employ organic practices.

The phrase organic, much less sustainable, was avoided in the 1985 agriculture bill. It wasn't until 1988 that congress, with a meager $3.8 million allocation, began a research and teaching program on low-input sustainable agriculture. Contrarily, hundreds of millions of dollars were allotted for traditional agricultural research and teaching initiatives to create goods that were also subject to government price supports. Some people erroneously believed the new program to be business as usual with fewer inputs rather than a novel approach to farming. These experiences taught proponents of alternative agriculture who attempted to change federal farm policy that Congress and the USDA were not interested in giving them the same kinds of distributive benefits, like research and education, as were given to conventional agriculture[5]. The passing of the 2002 farm bill is an example of how the old policy monopoly has maintained despite multiple promises by Democratic and Republican administrations to stop expensive agriculture subsidies that favor a select few. Ann Veneman, the secretary of agriculture during the Bush administration, has made modest attempts to change the way the government distributes funds. Farm subsidies of $20 billion annually came to an abrupt end in 2001.

Dan Glickman, who succeeded her and oversaw agriculture for six years under President Clinton, was unsurprised. In terms of agriculture policies, we generally followed Congress' lead, he said. Agriculture committees are quite localized yet highly effective. I focused on issues like food safety where I could have an impact and avoided agricultural subsidies where I didn't have much of an impact. We may better grasp the field conditions for the formation of novel agricultural forms thanks to Veneman's experience and Glickman's remark. The federal agriculture policy field is dominated by a small number of powerful individuals who oppose changes to the status quo. Agricultural policy as a whole, however, covers a wide range of topics

that go beyond production and subsidies, such as international trade, the advancement of new technologies, nutrition, rural development, migrant labor, food security, and food safety. As we shall see again in the next section, the organic movement benefited from recurring issues and institutional failure in a number of these related but distinct fields. This has been referred to by Morrill as the interstitial emergence of new institutional forms, which he defines as the result of activists and other players in overlapping fields who criticize current practices, innovate, and create new forms, gaining legitimacy as their causes and ideas resonate across various overlapping fields.

The Alternative Agriculture Movement's Branches and Roots

Production-oriented commodity agriculture has long been criticized, despite its dominance in policy. In fact, farmers and others have been criticizing the social repercussions and perceived collusion of government and industry in support of the chemical approach to food production ever since the application of synthetic chemicals in farming started to emerge as a solution to soil fertility and pest problems. The artificial manure industry, the Ministry of Agriculture, the experiment stations, the agricultural colleges, the agricultural press, and the country agricultural committees have all been amalgamated, according to Sir Albert Howard, who expressed his shock at the state of British agriculture in 1940. All exhort farmers and gardeners to use an increasing amount of chemicals, almost as a moral obligation.

As supporters of organics continued to express doubt and mistrust of science and government involvement in agriculture over the ensuing decades, this critique was frequently repeated. This doubt was fueled by the fact that government only supported an agriculture focused on commodities and production. Many of Howard's concepts were introduced to the country by publisher J. R. Rodale, and despite the hostile environment toward alternative farming methods in land-grant universities and university extension programs, the movement grew. Alternative farming methods are frequently pursued by those who are deliberately rejecting conventional methods, such as independent-minded farmers wary of government-funded advice in the first place or back-to-the-landers, who did not grow up farming but chose it as a means of distancing themselves from society and the government[6].

It is important to stress that the new federal organic requirements only represent a small portion of the wide range of attitudes and behaviors toward agriculture. The alternative agriculture movement has always included various breakthroughs in producing food and fiber in addition to a criticism of traditional agriculture and agricultural science. It has been developed through the on-farm research of individual farmers as well as through enduring institutions like publishing houses and research institutes, such as Acres U.S.A. and Rodale, and supported by critical communities of farmers, crop consultants, academic scientists, publishers, journalists, gentleman farmers, gardeners, health officials, and others perhaps the very definition of organic intellectuals. In the organic industry, a burgeoning market niche throughout the 1970s and 1980s called for ways to prove to consumers that goods were, in fact, cultivated without the use of chemicals. Organic growers' groups were formed by farmers, who also developed training and certification programs and supported their own organic brands.

The programs were self-regulatory. organic farmers performed inspections, served on certification boards, and set the bar blocking entrance to competitors who did not conform to standards defined as organic much of this work was performed on a volunteer basis. Similar to beauticians, barbers, real estate brokers, construction contractors, and other professionals who set

their own standards for practice. A resilient and self-reliant group of people, who do their own research, their own teaching, their own extension, develop their own companies, has been defined as organic activists create their own organizations in the absence of any institutional or governmental support.A plethora of labels and worries about fraud quickly prompted proponents to seek state government certification and engagement in certain areas. California farmers founded California Certified Organic Farmers in 1973 and followed Oregon's example in developing a state legislation that passed in 1980. Oregon enacted a statute defining organic as early as 1974. Over half of the states had laws or regulations governing the production and marketing of organically grown food and fiber by the mid-1990s, many of which were very different from one another. These early initiatives trickled up to the federal level, and the USDA financed a study on organic farming that was released in 1980 as a result of growing interest in alternate methods of food production.

Problems in the Mainstream, Market Opportunities

Although the government report was generally well received, it did not significantly alter current policy. Only as the economic, environmental, and social problems in conventional agriculture started to mount during the 1980s and as the organic product started to succeed in the marketplace did the need for more dramatic transformation become apparent. In the middle of the 1980s, over 200,000 farms filed for bankruptcy. The greatest nonpoint cause of water contamination, according to the EPA, is agriculture. The majority of states' groundwater was found to contain pesticides and nitrates from fertilizers and manures. Antibiotics and pesticide residues in food became significant problems, as seen by the 1989 Alar apple incident. Daminozide, often known as Alar, is a synthetic growth promoter that was sprayed on apples to get whole orchards to mature at the same time. It is a trademark of Uniroyal Chemical Company.

A 60 Minutes segment based on a Natural Resources Defense Council research on the toxicity of Alar and its special hazards for children was inspired by mounting evidence that Alar is a human carcinogen. The drug was taken off the market as a result of widespread public uproar, which also received backing from Meryl Streep, an actress. Long-term public concerns included pesticide risks and food safety. As demand for chemical-free food increased, organic food started to show up in stores like Wegmans and Safeway. The slogan Don't Panic, Eat Organic became the catchphrase for a growing organic industry that capitalized on consumer concern over food safety.3 Ongoing public concern about the effects of chemical residues on produce, especially for children, contributed to the passage of the thorough Food Quality Protection Act in 1996. Because milk makes up such a large portion of children's diets, organic dairy products experienced some of the earliest and most explosive market growth, particularly after worries about the use of the growth hormone rBGH[7].

Observed by Rao, Morrill, and Zald, Organizational and Market

Failures offer up fresh opportunities. Opportunities for change emerge when issues or problems persistently cross organizational boundaries. According to consumer studies, environmental conservation is a major driving force behind the purchase of organic food, even if the majority of customers do so out of concern for their own or their children's health. A substantial portion of the agricultural industry has for decades seen rising concentration and integration as a consequence of growing economic pressures and technical advances, leading to more and bigger factory-type farming operations. In rural places, this tendency has supported significant changes in labor demographics, working conditions, and new environmental issues. Residents in rural

areas now often dwell close to enormous livestock enterprises that house tens of thousands or even millions of animals. The public's perception of agriculture is becoming more critical due to issues with odor, noise, and air and water pollution, which is partially reflected in increased legislative and regulatory attention, such as in the U.S.

The EPA's Confined Animal Feeding Operations regulations and several state and local government initiatives to limit the growth of livestock operations. Conventional agriculture has expanded into a new environmental frontier for a variety of causes and in several locations. The lack of attention the organic movement gives to the environment has long been lamented by many organic advocates. Certainly, the environmental movement hasn't given agriculture much attention in the past. However, there has been a rise in concern over agricultural abuses of the environment and corresponding interest in organic agriculture's ecological focus. The National Research Council released a paper in 1989 that highlighted some of the environmental advantages of alternative farming. These problems offered the organic movement a great deal of potential by attracting large numbers of followers and creating a compelling frame for organics.

An Early Win: The Organic Food Production Act of 1990

By the end of the 1980s, the patchwork of state laws and inconsistent business practices posed a growing threat to interstate trade. Problems with false organic claims and a report that the FDA meant to outright abolish the organic label also encouraged a varied collection of supporters to unite in favour of more widespread regulation. The organic market was already experiencing the 20 percent annual growth rate it would maintain over the next ten years at that point. Anyone involved in the developing industry could see its potential, and a federal standard promised to ease domestic and international trade, boost consumer confidence, and prevent the organic product from being absorbed by established agribusiness.

State governments were becoming more interested in fostering the growth of the organic industry, in addition to organic farmer associations, which were often represented by certifying organizations. Senators Peter DeFazio of Oregon, Gary Condit of California, Wyche Fowler of Georgia, and Richard Lugar of Indiana sponsored legislation for federal organic law in the late 1980s.Consumer advocacy organizations were a significant additional source of help. Some claim that the Alar scare served as the turning point in federal involvement in organic regulations. It undoubtedly sparked a spike in consumer interest. After the incident, the Center for Science in the Public Interest gathered 236,000 signatures on a petition calling for national organic law, expressing their support for the legislation[8].

However, the commercial sector provided a significant amount of the driving force and financial support for the effort to pass federal organic legislation. A sophisticated network of packers, distributors, processors, and retailers formed as organic marketing expanded beyond the food stands where neighborhood farmers sold fruit to city residents. This network organized itself in a variety of trade groups with avowedly political objectives. The Organic Trade Association, which represents the greatest organic trade interests, made the 1990 Organic Foods Production Act one of its main targets. As Horizon Organic Dairy founder and former OTA board president Mark Retzloff put it, Many of us had seen the term 'natural' become diluted and meaningless, and we didn't want to see that happen to 'organic' the OTA was a part of the Organic Food Alliance, a group formed specifically to support an umbrella set of guidelines for use of the term organic. People who support and practice organic agriculture often share the story of how profit-seeking

agribusinesses successfully took over the production of healthy and natural foods. This common experience has prompted a variety of organics proponents to call for stringent legislation.

Retzloff represents many who are interested in the financial viability of organics, despite it being hypocritical for the creator of a $127 million public firm to criticize the profit-making strategies of other significant and successful food sector companies. Although many have criticized the current food system as being corrupt, these supporters still felt confident pursuing their goals within it. The commercial sector's aim of governmental control and legitimization of agricultural production of a cleaner, safer product won out over issues that worried many social justice, farmer, and environmental organizations. The public's strong support for organic foods as a safe food source and the relative weight of the commercial agenda both had an impact on the policy-making process. The proponents for the organic business focused all of their emphasis on the markets for goods devoid of chemicals. Their vision for organics and their influence on the rule-drafting process were both influenced by the need for a product that could be verified as being pure.

These organizations actively lobbied Congress to pass the 1990 Organic Food Production Act, which was supported by them. By being presented by Senator Patrick Leahy straight to the House floor to be included as Title XXI, this measure was enacted as an amendment to the agricultural bill and avoided the House Agricultural Committee. There was no backing for any organic research or advancement in the amendment. Leahy and others were wary of using the label to advance the research and education agenda because of their prior failures to achieve federal organic legislation. A consensus definition of sustainable agriculture, for instance, was difficult to come by. The 1990 farm bill as a whole included many initiatives for environmental protection and sustainable agriculture research and education, but most of those lacked the clarity and necessary backing to see them through implementation.

The National Organic Standards body, a diverse fifteen-member body made up of four farmers, two handlers/processors, one retailer, one scientist, three consumer/public interest advocates, three environmentalists, and one certifier, was established as an important aspect of OFPA. The NOSB was tasked with gathering data from national stakeholders and creating a set of organic norms. The board was also charged with creating a final list of compounds that might be used in organic farming. The House Agricultural Committee did not unanimously endorse OFPA, and legislative support for organic farming remained modest. Since the federal government took so long to implement the 1990 act and provide funding for the NOSB to begin working on draft regulations, the two years that followed its passage have been referred to as the lost years. After two years, the NOSB received funds, members were chosen, and the board began the laborious process of creating a set of federal standards for organic agriculture and soliciting input from farmers and the organic business throughout the country.

Although the NOSB served as a hub for activism and a platform for expressing political preferences, it was not universally embraced by those involved, as many believed the board's representation was biased against the full expression of the core social agenda of mainstream organic farmers. Farmers were unhappy that there were only four farmers on the fifteen-member board, and that those four included people who represented large organic businesses like Gene Kahn of Cascadian Farms and Craig Weakley of Muir Glen, whom other organic farmers perceived as lacking in extensive farming experience and representing a strong industry interest. Finding consensus amongst several state programs, for instance, or appeasing both food

processors and consumer groups were just a few of the difficulties the NOSB had while crafting a set of recommendations that would be largely accepted by the divided organic community.

In order to sell more processed foods with longer shelf lives in mainstream outlets, food manufacturers and handlers pressed on the use of certain synthetic chemicals and stabilizers. Farmer groups favored a law that would call for newcomers to comprehend an alternative agricultural philosophy that went beyond only preventing environmental damage to really enhancing it. On the other side, commercial and consumer interests favored a regulation that paid less attention to the full manufacturing process and guaranteed an utterly pure product. The NOSB sent the secretary of agriculture a draft suggested organic regulation in June 1995 for approval. Farmers' voices may have been muffled during negotiations with the NOSB, but when the board's recommendations were transferred to the USDA's internal staff, their avenues of communication with the political process were essentially closed off. Given how little they had accomplished in terms of legislation, proponents of organic farming had little experience with the interagency review process. It has proven to be very difficult to maintain the original integrity of alternative agricultural projects and keep them financed and operating once they reach the twin black boxes of USDA and appropriations.

The creation of administrative rules largely benefits the existing interests in policy monopolies. Officials from the USDA testified on behalf of the viewpoints of their long-term constituency as they took advantage of the chance to reconsider the proposed rules. Agencies outside of the USDA asked the secretary of agriculture for modifications on behalf of their respective missions and customer interests. The Office of Management and Budget, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug Administration would be difficult to get the regulation through, according to NOP employee Grace Gershuny. The use of genetically modified organisms was forbidden under the proposed organic criteria, although the EPA and FDA had both previously made declarations regarding the scientific data proving their safety. One common criticism of organic farming is that the promises it makes about the benefits to the environment and to human health have not been amply supported by mainstream, peer-reviewed scientific studies.

Advocates cite a variety of factors as the cause of this, including a lack of funding, a low research status for organic issues, the absence of organic land at experiment stations, and research methodologies that focus on yield rather than the complexity and efficiency of an integrated production system. Despite the paucity of scientific evidence, the organic food industry has prospered thanks to its reputation for producing food that is better for humans, livestock, and the environment. However, the EPA and the FDA both based their decisions during the agency review process on evidence produced by peer-reviewed risk assessment science, the same science that informed previous decisions about the safety of GMOs and sewage sludge. While there is an expanding body of peer-reviewed published science on the issues, its paucity makes it a frequent target of critics. This caused the proposed regulation to modify, some of which were so extreme as to spark a significant amount of public outrage[9].

CONCLUSION

Overall,the social movement-state nexus notion draws attention to the intricate and dynamic interaction between social movements and the state. By comprehending this connection, academics and professionals may better comprehend the elements that affect the success or failure of social movements and create plans to encourage more collaboration and coordination between social movements and the state. The relationship between the state and social

movements may greatly influence whether social movements are successful or unsuccessful. For instance, social movements may be able to accomplish policy objectives or institutional reforms when they are successful in forging alliances or partnerships with favorable state actors, such as politicians or bureaucrats. On the other side, when the state represses or co-opts social movements, it may damage the movement's credibility and efficacy. The relationship between social movements and states is also impacted by larger political and social conditions, including the degree of democracy, the make-up of civil society, and the significance of outside forces like international organizations or transnational networks.

REFERENCES:

[1] I. Duque Franco, C. Ortiz, J. Samper, and G. Millan, 'Mapping repertoires of collective action facing the COVID-19 pandemic in informal settlements in Latin American cities', *Environ. Urban.*, 2020, doi: 10.1177/0956247820944823.

[2] G. Argüello, 'Large-scale collective action in the Arctic Ocean the role of international organizations in climate governance', *Ocean Coast. Manag.*, 2021, doi: 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2021.105706.

[3] G. Ertan, 'Collective Action, Civil Society, and Public Policy in Turkey', *J. Comp. Policy Anal. Res. Pract.*, 2020, doi: 10.1080/13876988.2019.1617958.

[4] Ó. D. R. Fuentes, 'The civility of civil society: Collective actions and legitimacy from a human rights perspective', *Rev. Estud. Soc.*, 2019, doi: 10.15359/RP.18.2.

[5] R. J. Sampson, H. MacIndoe, D. McAdam and S. Weffer-Elizondo, 'Civil society reconsidered: The durable nature and community structure of collective civic action', *American Journal of Sociology*. 2005. doi: 10.1086/497351.

[6] E. Isgren and B. Ness, 'Agroecology to promote just sustainability transitions: Analysis of a civil society network in the Rwenzori region, western Uganda', *Sustain.*, 2017, doi: 10.3390/su9081357.

[7] Y. Theocharis, S. Vitoratou, and J. Sajuria, 'Civil Society in Times of Crisis: Understanding Collective Action Dynamics in Digitally-Enabled Volunteer Networks', *J. Comput. Commun.*, 2017, doi: 10.1111/jcc4.12194.

[8] A. Rao and M. J. Dutta, 'Repertoires of collective action in an "IT City": Urban civil society negotiations of offline and online spaces in Bangalore', *Commun. Monogr.*, 2017, doi: 10.1080/03637751.2016.1257140.

[9] K. L. Niewolny, 'Boundary politics and the social imaginary for sustainable food systems', *Agric. Human Values*, 2021, doi: 10.1007/s10460-021-10214-0.