

# INTERMEDIATE MACROECONOMICS A STATISTICAL APPROACH

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Dr. Dasinis Nathan Annette Christinal



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Dr. Dasinis Nathan Annette Christinal





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## CHAPTER 1

### A BRIEF STUDY ON ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF ORGANIZATION

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#### ABSTRACT:

Economics' alternative kinds of organisation, looking at various organisational types and how they affect how businesses operate, make decisions, and perform. The research examines several business structures, including sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, and cooperative, and examines their features, benefits, and drawbacks. In order to make well-informed decisions on the structure and governance of firms, entrepreneurs, managers, and legislators must have a thorough understanding of diverse kinds of organisation. The research found that a variety of variables, including education and skill level, technology innovation, work organisation, management practises, and employee motivation, had an impact on labour productivity. Investments in training and skill development provide the workforce the skills and knowledge they need to do jobs effectively. Through automation, digitization, and enhanced manufacturing methods, technological improvements significantly contribute to increasing labour productivity. Productivity may also be increased by using management and work organisation techniques that encourage cooperation, good communication, and employee empowerment. Furthermore, increased productivity is a result of staff involvement and motivation.

#### KEYWORDS:

BusinessOperations, Decision-Making, Organization, Organizational Structures.

#### INTRODUCTION

an essential qualification to this assumption as profit maximisation is a key presumption in most economic analysis of business behaviour: Different types of organisations have goals that are quite different from profit maximisation. A significant example of one of these organisations is the cooperative, which is a group of companies or individuals that are owned and run by its members for their mutual benefit. A cooperative agreement, for instance, may be reached by multiple farms to combine their resources in order to distribute and sell milk to customers. Each farm will work to maximise its own earnings (rather than the profits of the cooperative as a whole), treating the shared marketing and distribution agreement as granted since each participating member of the milk cooperative is an independent economic entity. In agricultural markets, these kinds of cooperative arrangements are typical.

One may join a food cooperative, which aims to provide its members access to food and other necessities at the most affordable price, in many towns and cities. A food cooperative often resembles a shop or a small supermarket. Shopping is either limited to members only or unlimited with discounts for members. The cooperative's prices are set to prevent losses, but any gains are incidental and given back to the members (often in proportion to their purchases). Co-ops for housing are another illustration of this kind of structure. A co-op might be an apartment

complex where a company holds the rights to the land and the structure. The co-op's member residents possess shares in the company together with the right to inhabit a unit, creating a situation akin to a long-term lease. Organising social events, managing money, and even choosing their neighbours are just a few of the ways that co-op members may become involved in the operation of their building. Similar to other cooperative business models, the goal of this one is to provide members high-quality housing at the most affordable price [1]–[3].

The condominium is a similar sort of organisation that is particularly pertinent to housing. A condominium (or "condo") is a type of housing unit (an apartment, connected townhouse, or other type of real estate) that is individually owned, but where use and access to communal amenities like hallways, heating systems, lifts, and exterior spaces are jointly controlled by an association of condo owners. These owners also contribute to the cost of maintaining and running such communal amenities.

### **Firm Shut Down**

A business is in the red. Should it cease operations and quit the market. The response is influenced by the firm's predictions for its future business environment. It could make sense to operate at a loss in the near term if the company feels that things will get better and the company will become profitable in the future. However, let's suppose for the time being that the company anticipates that the cost of its product will stay the same for a reasonable amount of time. So what should it do? Keep in mind that when the firm's pricing is lower than the average total cost at the profit-maximizing production  $q^*$ , it is losing money. If there is little prospect that the situation will get better in such circumstances, it should close shop and quit the sector. The company minimizes its losses at output  $q^*$  if it keeps producing, but because price is below average total cost, it will still experience losses rather than profits. Also take note of the fact that average total cost surpasses average variable cost and average total cost also exceeds price due to the existence of fixed expenses, indicating that the business is in fact losing money. Remember that although fixed expenses cannot be reduced if a company closes down, they do not alter with the amount of production. The wages of plant managers and security guards, as well as the energy used to power the lights and heat, are examples of fixed expenses.

Will turning off always be the best course of action? No, not always. Because it anticipates returning to profitability in the future when the price of its product rises or the cost of manufacturing decreases, the company may operate at a loss in the near term. Although operating at a loss may be difficult, it will leave the possibility of better times in the future open. Additionally, by continuing to operate, the company has the freedom to alter the amount of capital it utilises, lowering its average overall cost. Since operating at  $q^*$  will enable the business to pay some of its fixed expenses, this option sounds especially enticing if the product price is higher than the average variable cost of production.

### **Long-Run Competitive Equilibrium**

Long-term equilibrium can only occur under certain economic circumstances. In order for there to be no market withdrawals, there must also be no market entry attempts from outside companies. But how precisely do profitability, entrance, and long-term competitive equilibrium relate to one another? By connecting economic gain to the motivation to join and leave a market, we may discover the solution.



## Zero Economic Profit

When a company invests in a business, it does so with the hope of seeing a return on that investment. An economic profit of zero indicates that the company is making a typical, competitive return on its investment. The opportunity cost to the company of utilising its funds to purchase capital as opposed to investing them elsewhere is represented by this typical return, which is a component of the user cost of capital. Consequently, a company that generates no economic profit does as well by spending its capital as it might by investing elsewhere—it earns a competitive return on its investment. Therefore, such a company is operating well and ought to continue operating. (However, a company making a loss should think about closing its doors if it has no plans to repair its financial situation. We will find that in highly competitive marketplaces, economic profit eventually equals zero. Zero economic profit does not indicate that businesses are underperforming, but rather that the market is competitive. When a company has no economic benefit, it lacks motivation to leave the sector. Similarly, other businesses lack any unique motivation to participate. When three requirements are met, a long-run competitive equilibrium is reached:

1. All businesses in the sector want to maximise profits.
2. No company is motivated to join or leave the business since every company is losing money economically.
3. The product's price is set at a level where the amount provided by the industry and the amount desired by customers are equal.

It may be difficult to understand the dynamic process that results in long-run equilibrium. Businesses join the market with the hopes of making a profit, and they leave due to financial losses. However, in long-run equilibrium, businesses make no money. Why would a company join a market knowing that it would ultimately make no money? The explanation is that a return on the firm's financial capital investment of zero economic profit is competitive. The company has no motivation to move since it cannot make more money by doing so when there is no economic benefit. Better still if the company manages to join a market early enough to reap a short-term economic profit. Similar to this, a company might reward its investors by promptly leaving a market that is not lucrative. As a result, the idea of long-run equilibrium helps us predict the course that a firm's behaviour will likely follow. The possibility of a long-term equilibrium with zero profits should not deter a management; rather, it should be seen as a chance to generate a competitive return [4]–[6].

## DISCUSSION

### Companies With Identical Costs

Assume that all companies have equal costs to see why all the requirements for long-run equilibrium must be met. Now think about what might transpire if an industry had an excessive number of businesses arrive in an effort to profit. Industry supply curve will go even farther to the right, causing the price to drop below \$30, maybe to \$25. But at that cost, businesses will lose money. As a consequence, some businesses will leave the sector. Firms will keep leaving the market until the supply curve returns to the S2 position. A market can only be in long-term equilibrium if there is no incentive to leave or join. Companies With Variable Costs Now imagine that the cost curves of all companies in the industry are different. Maybe one company has a patent that enables it to manufacture for less on average than the others. In such instance, a firm's

larger accounting profit and higher producer surplus than other businesses is compatible with long-run equilibrium. They have no motivation to join the market as long as other investors and businesses are unable to get the patent that reduces expenses. On the other hand, the lucky business has no motivation to leave the industry as long as the method is unique to this product and this sector.

Here, it's crucial to understand the difference between accounting profit and economic profit. If the patent is successful, other businesses in the sector will pay to utilise it or try to purchase the company outright to get it. For the company that owns the patent, the increasing value of the patent thus represents a missed opportunity. Instead of using the patent, it might sell the rights to it. Otherwise, if all businesses are equally efficient, the firm's economic profit is zero. However, if the patent-holding company is more effective than competing companies, it will be making a profit. However, if the patent holder is less effective overall, it should sell the patent and leave the sector.

**The Land Opportunity Cost** Other times, businesses that report a positive accounting profit may really be losing money. Imagine, for instance, that a clothes store is situated next to a big mall. Due to the fact that the cost of the land is based on its previous cost, the higher customer flow has the potential to significantly raise the store's accounting profit. However, the cost of the land should account for its opportunity cost, which in this instance is the land's present market worth, in order to maximise economic return. The clothes store's profitability is equal to that of its rivals when the opportunity cost of the land is taken into account. Therefore, for the market to be in long-term equilibrium, the requirement that economic profit be zero is necessary. Positive economic profit, by definition, is a chance for investors and a reason to start a business. Positive accounting profit, however, may indicate that businesses currently operating in the sector have important resources, competencies, or concepts, which may not necessarily stimulate entrance.

### **Economic Rent**

Because they have access to elements of production that are in short supply, such as land and natural resources, entrepreneurial aptitude, or other creative skills, some businesses are able to report bigger accounting profits than others. The desire of other businesses to employ the few production elements in these circumstances renders economic profit in the long run to be zero. Thus, the scarce factors convert the positive accounting profits into economic rent that they may charge. Economic rent is the difference between what businesses are prepared to pay for an input and the bare minimum needed to purchase it. Economic rent is often positive in competitive marketplaces, both in the short and long terms, even when profit is zero. Consider the scenario when two businesses in an industry possess their property entirely, making the acquisition of the land free and clear. However, one company can transport its goods for \$10,000 year less than the other since it is inland and is situated on a river. In this instance, the first company's \$10,000 greater profit is the result of the river location's \$10,000 yearly economic rent. Due to the value of the property near the river and other businesses' willingness to pay for it, the rent is generated. The price of this specialised element of production will eventually rise to \$10,000 due to competition. The cost of land rent, which is the difference between \$10,000 and \$0, is likewise \$10,000.

Noting that the enterprise on the river no longer makes any money despite an increase in economic rent. Economic rent is a reflection of the opportunity cost associated with owning land and, more broadly, any other production input whose supply is constrained. In this case, the

\$10,000 opportunity cost of owning the property is known as the economic rent. Economic rent explains why certain markets are off-limits to enterprises looking to capitalise on profit potential. These markets have a fixed supply of one or more inputs, one or more businesses get economic rents, and all businesses make no economic profit. Zero economic profit indicates to a company that it should only stay in a market if it is at least as productive as other enterprises. It also informs potential market entrants that their arrival will only be lucrative if they can produce more effectively than existing market players.

### **Producer Surplus in the Long Run**

company is making an accounting profit, but there is no incentive for other companies to join or leave the sector. Profit must account for economic rent. What relationship does rent have to producer surplus then? To begin with, be aware that producer surplus relates to outputs whereas economic rent pertains to factor inputs. A producer's surplus, it should be noted, gauges the discrepancy between the market price they get and their marginal cost of production. The economic rent that a company receives from all of its scarce inputs makes up the producer surplus that a business earns over time in a competitive market on the product that it sells.<sup>8</sup>

Consider a baseball club that has a franchise that enables it to play in a certain city. Consider as well that the team's only other option is a city where it will produce noticeably reduced income. As a result, the group will get economic rent related to its existing location. The difference between the rent the company would be ready to pay for its existing location and the rent required to move to a different city would be reflected in this rent. At its present location, the company will also generate a producer surplus from the sale of baseball tickets and other franchise goods. All economic rents, including those related to the company's other factor inputs (the stadium and the players), will be reflected in this surplus<sup>[7]–[9]</sup>. businesses that generate economic rent make the same amount of money as businesses that don't.

The baseball team's economic benefit is shown in part (a) for a city of average size. The average ticket costs \$7, and team expenditures prevent them from making any money. Part (b) displays the revenue of a team with identical cost curves that happens to be situated in a bigger metropolis. The latter club may sell tickets for \$10 each and make an accounting profit of \$2.80 over its average cost of \$7.20 each ticket because there is a greater demand for baseball games. The rent for the better site does, however, come at a cost to the company an opportunity cost since it might sell its franchise to another team. As a consequence, the bigger city experiences no economic gain.

### **The Industry's Long-Run Supply Curve**

In our study of short-run supply, we first determined the firm's supply curve and then demonstrated how the tally of the supply curves of several businesses produced the market supply curve. However, we are unable to examine long-term supply in the same manner: Firms eventually join and leave marketplaces when the market price shifts. As a result, it is hard to sum supply curves since we are unsure of which businesses' supplies should be added together to get market totals. The long-term supply curve's form is determined by how much changes in industrial output have an impact on the prices that businesses must pay for the inputs that go into manufacturing. When there are manufacturing economies of scale or cost reductions from purchasing large quantities of inputs, input costs will decrease as output rises. When there are

scale disadvantages, input costs may rise along with production. The third scenario is that output may not vary as input prices do[10].

### CONCLUSION

The examination of diverse organisational structures and their commercial ramifications is made possible by the study of alternative forms of organisation. Entrepreneurs, managers, and politicians may choose wisely to improve company operations, decision-making, and performance by being aware of the features, benefits, and drawbacks of various formats. The right organisational structure should be chosen since it will support corporate objectives, improve governance procedures, and promote sustainability. The long-term supply curve's form is determined by how much changes in industrial output have an impact on the prices that businesses must pay for the inputs that go into manufacturing. When there are manufacturing economies of scale or cost reductions from purchasing large quantities of inputs, input costs will decrease as output rises. When there are scale disadvantages, input costs may rise along with production. The third scenario is that output may not vary as input prices do

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## CHAPTER 2

### CONSUMER AND PRODUCER SURPLUS: ANALYSIS, MEASUREMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WELFARE

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#### ABSTRACT:

Examining the definitions, computations, and importance of consumer and producer surplus in economics to comprehend market behaviour and wellbeing. The notions of consumer surplus and producer surplus are examined, along with their relationships and the variables affecting their amount. Policymakers, companies, and academics must understand consumer and producer surplus in order to evaluate the efficiency and welfare effects of market transactions.

#### KEYWORDS:

Consumer Surplus, Efficiency, Market Transactions, Producer Surplus, Welfare.

#### INTRODUCTION

In a price-competitive market, buyers and sellers transact at the going rate. However, keep in mind that for certain customers, the value of the product surpasses this market price; if necessary, they would pay more for the commodity. The overall value or advantage that customers get over and above the price they pay for the commodity is known as consumer surplus. Let's say the market price is \$5 per unit. Some customers presumably place a high value on this product and would be willing to pay considerably more than \$5 for it. For instance, Consumer A would spend up to \$10 on the item. The difference between the \$10 value he assigns to the product and the \$5 he must pay to get it gives him a net profit of \$5 since the market price is just \$5. Consumer B places a somewhat lower value on the product. She would be willing to pay \$7, earning her a net gain of \$2. Finally, Consumer C assigns the commodity a value of \$5, which is the precise market price. He doesn't care whether he buys the product or not, and if the market price were one cent more, he wouldn't make the purchase. Therefore, Consumer C does not really gain.

Consumer surplus, which applies to all consumers collectively, is the region between the demand curve and the market price. Consumer gain or loss from a government action may be determined by evaluating the change in consumer surplus since consumer surplus indicates the entire net benefit to consumers [1]–[3]. The equivalent metric for producers is called producer surplus. Some manufacturers are generating units for only a little more than the going rate. But even if the market price was lower, other units might still be made and sold since they could be created for less money. The profit of selling such units to consumers is consequently a surplus for the producers. This surplus, which is calculated for each unit, represents the discrepancy between the market price the producer obtains and the unit's marginal cost of production.

Producer surplus, which lower-cost producers profit from by selling at the market price, is the region above the supply curve up to the market price for the whole market. It is the green

triangle. Additionally, as producer surplus represents the entire net benefit to producers, we may assess whether a government intervention has resulted in a gain or loss for producers by examining the change in producer surplus that results.

### Application of Consumer and Producer Surplus

the welfare implications of a government intervention in the market using consumer and producer surplus. We can calculate who benefits from the intervention and who loses, as well as by how much, to understand how this is accomplished. Producers are prohibited by law from charging more than a cap price that is lower than the market-clearing price. Remember that a price limit like this leads to a scarcity (excess demand) since it reduces supply and increases demand. The only difference between depicts the changes in consumer and producer surplus as a consequence of the government's price-control programmed. Let's go through these modifications step by step.

1. **Modification of Consumer Surplus** As a consequence of the policy, some customers are worse off than others. The people who have been rationed off the market as a result of the decline in output and sales from  $Q_0$  to  $Q_1$  are those who are suffering the most. However, other customers may still buy the product (perhaps because they are there at the proper moment or are prepared to wait in line). These customers do better since they can purchase the product for less money ( $P_{max}$  as opposed to  $P_0$ ).

How much is each group doing better or worse? The blue-shaded rectangle A provides a rise in consumer surplus, which is enjoyed by the customers who can still purchase the commodity. This rectangle represents the price decrease in each unit times the total number of units that customers may purchase at the cheaper price. Contrarily, customers who are unable to purchase the product suffer excess loss, which is shown by the triangle B in green. This triangle represents the value to customers that is lost due to the decline in production from  $Q_0$  to  $Q_1$ , minus the price they would have had to pay. Therefore, A B represents the net change in consumer surplus.

It is crucial to emphasise that we made the assumption that customers who can afford the product place the highest value on it. In the absence of that for instance, if production  $Q_1$  were rationed arbitrarily the lost consumer surplus would be more than triangle B. In many instances, there is no reason to assume that the customers who value an item the highest would be able to purchase it. Because of this, the reduction in consumer surplus may be much greater than triangle B, making price restrictions very ineffective. We also failed to consider the opportunity costs associated with rationing. For instance, individuals who want the good may need to wait in line to get it. In such instance, the lost consumer surplus should also account for the potential cost of their time.

**Modification in Producer Surplus:** In a market with price limitations, some producers (those with substantially lower costs) will remain but will be paid less for their production, while other producers will depart. Producer excess will be lost by both groups. Now, the price is reduced for those that stick around and create a lot of  $Q_1$ . They no longer have the producer surplus that rectangle A provided. But overall productivity has also decreased. The extra loss of producer surplus for producers who have left the market and for those who have remained but are producing less is shown by the purple triangle C. As a result, A C represents the overall change in producer surplus. Price limits always result in losses for producers.



**Deadweight Loss:** Is the advantage for consumers greater than the loss to producers as a result of price controls? No. Price restrictions cause a net loss of total surplus, or what we refer to as a deadweight loss. Remember that the producer surplus change is  $\Delta CS$  and the change in consumer surplus is  $\Delta PS$ . Therefore, the overall change in excess is  $(\Delta CS) - (\Delta PS)$ . As a result, the two triangles B and C indicate a deadweight loss. Price restrictions are to blame for this inefficiency, which results in a greater loss of production surplus than increase in consumer surplus.

Politicians may not give much weight to this deadweight loss from price regulations if they regard consumer surplus more than producer surplus. However, price regulations may cause a net loss of consumer surplus if the demand curve is very inelastic. In that diagram, triangle B, which represents the loss to market participants due to rationing, is greater than rectangle A, which represents the benefit to market participants who are allowed to purchase the product. Here, rationing causes a significant loss for those affected since customers value the commodity highly. Short-term petrol demand is relatively inelastic, whereas long-term petrol demand is significantly more elastic. Oil price regulations that kept local petrol prices from rising to international levels during the summer of 1979 led to petrol shortages. Customers stood in queue for hours to purchase petrol. This was a fantastic illustration of how price regulations harm consumers, the people the rule was ostensibly designed to protect.

## DISCUSSION

### The Impact of a Tax or Subsidy

the cost of goods if the government levied a \$1 tax on each item sold? Many would respond that the cost would go up by \$1, with customers now paying \$1 more each widget than they would have paid in the absence of the tax. But this response is incorrect. Or think about the next query. The government is looking at two ways to collect the 50 cents per gallon tax it plans to put on petrol. According to Method 1, each petrol station's proprietor would place the tax payment (50 cents times the quantity of litres sold) in a secured box, where it would be collected by a government official. In Method 2, the customer would give the government the tax (50 cents multiplied by the quantity of gallons bought) [4]–[6]. Which approach will cost the consumer more? Many might respond "Method 2," however this response is equally incorrect. The cost of a tax (or the benefit of a subsidy) is split between the producer and the consumer. Additionally, both Methods 1 and 2 cost the customer the same amount of money, regardless of who puts the money in the collection box or writes the cheque to the government. We will show that the proportion of a tax that is paid by consumers relies on the forms of the supply and demand curves, particularly on the respective elasticities of the two. In response to our first query, a \$1 tax on widgets would result in a price increase, although often by considerably less than \$1. Let's examine how consumers and producers are impacted by a tax on a product and what happens to price and quantity using supply and demand curves to better understand why.

The impacts of a particular tax we will focus on a single tax for the purpose of simplicity a tax of a certain dollar amount per unit sold. This contrasts with an ad valorem tax, which is a proportionate tax, like a state sales tax. (Ad valorem tax analysis is basically equivalent and produces similar qualitative outcomes.) Federal and state taxes on cigarettes and petrol are two examples of special levies. If everyone complies with the legislation, the government must then earn  $t$  cents from each widget sale. This implies that the price the buyer pays must be greater by  $t$  cents than the net price the seller obtains. This straightforward accounting relationship and its implications.  $P_0$  and  $Q_0$  in this instance stand for the market price and quantity prior to the



imposition of the tax. The price that purchasers pay is  $P_b$ , while the price that sellers get after taxes are deducted is  $P_s$ . Because  $P_b > P_s$ , the government is content. How do we calculate the market quantity once the tax is applied, and what proportion of the tax is paid by purchasers and what proportion by sellers? First, keep in mind that the price that customers must pay is what matters to them:  $P_b$ . The demand curve predicts how much they will purchase; we read this quantity from the demand curve given a price  $P_b$ . Similar to buyers, sellers are concerned with the net price they are paid,  $P_s$ . The amount they will create and sell is calculated from the supply curve given  $P_s$ . Finally, we are aware that the amount sold and the quantity purchased must match. Finding the amount that matches a price of  $P_b$  on the demand curve and a price of  $P_s$  on the supply curve, such that the difference between the two is equal to the tax  $t$ , is the answer.

### Market Power

No one vendor or buyer will be able to influence the price of an item due to the abundance of suppliers and customers. Price is determined by supply and demand in the market. The market price is taken as a given by individual businesses when determining how much to create and sell, and by consumers when determining how much to purchase. Monopoly and monopsony, are the exact opposites of perfect competition. A market with a monopoly has a lot of buyers but just one vendor. In contrast, a monopsony is a market where there are several sellers but just one buyer. Due to their strong ties, monopoly and monopsony are discussed together in this chapter.

We start out by talking about monopolist behaviour. A monopolist confronts the market demand curve as it is the only producer of the product in question. This market demand curve connects the monopolist's pricing to the number of goods it sells. We'll see how a monopolist might use its power over pricing and how the price and quantity that maximise profits are different from those that would prevail in a market with competitors. The quantity and price of a monopolist will often be lower and more expensive than those of a competitor. Society pays a price for this since fewer people purchase the goods and those who do, do so at a higher price. Due to antitrust rules prohibiting businesses from controlling most markets, monopolies are prohibited. We shall see how the government might improve efficiency by controlling the monopolist's pricing when economies of scale make monopoly desirable for instance, with local electric power providers.

Pure monopolies are uncommon, although in many markets, there is little interfirm competition. In these marketplaces, relationships between companies may be intricate and can contain elements of strategic gaming, in any situation, the businesses may have some control over pricing and may decide it is profitable to set their prices higher than their marginal costs. These companies possess monopolistic power. We will go through the factors that affect monopolistic power, how it is measured, and how it affects price. We'll discuss monopsony next. A monopsonist pays a price that changes with the amount it buys, unlike a buyer in a competitive market. The challenge for the monopsonist is to choose the amount that would maximise its net gain from the purchase the value received from the item minus the cost of the transaction. We shall highlight the strong resemblance between monopoly and monopsony by illuminating the decision-making process. Although true monopsony is also uncommon, there are numerous marketplaces with a small number of purchasers who may get the product for less than they would pay in a market where there is competition. These clients possess monopoly power. This circumstance often arises in marketplaces for industrial inputs. For instance, the biggest American automaker, General Motors, has monopoly strength in the markets for tyres, auto batteries, and other components. We will go through the factors that affect monopsony power,

how it is measured, and how it affects price. Market power refers to the capacity of either a seller or a buyer to influence the price of an item. Monopoly and monopsony power are two examples of this. We need to comprehend how market power functions and how it influences producers and customers since sellers or purchasers often have at least some market power (in the majority of real-world marketplaces)[7]–[9].

### Monopoly

As the exclusive manufacturer of a product, a monopolist has a special status. In the event that the monopolist chooses to increase the price of the product, it should not be concerned about rivals who, by offering the product at a cheaper price, would gain a bigger market share at the monopolist's cost. The market is the monopolist, and it has total control over the volume of production made available for sale. However, if the monopolist's goal is to maximise profit, this does not imply that it may set whatever price it pleases. This textbook is a prime example. As the owner of the copyright and only producer of this book, Pearson Prentice Hall. So why isn't the book selling for \$500 a copy? Considering that fewer people would purchase it and Prentice Hall would make a considerably smaller profit. The monopolist must first identify its costs and the features of market demand in order to maximise profit. For a corporation to make economic decisions, it is critical to have knowledge about demand and cost. The monopolist must then choose how much to create and sell in light of this information. The market demand curve thus directly influences the price per unit that the monopolist is paid. Alternatively, the monopolist has the power to set the price, and the market demand curve dictates how much of that price it will sell[10].

### CONCLUSION

Consumer and producer surpluses provide insightful information on the efficiency and welfare effects of market interactions. Stakeholders may evaluate the economic results and social welfare related to market exchanges by comprehending the theories, computations, and elements affecting consumer and producer surplus. Maximising consumer and producer surplus via effective resource allocation promotes general welfare and financial stability. According to the research, consumer surplus is the difference between what customers are prepared to pay and what they actually pay for a commodity or service.

The gap between the price at which producers are prepared to sell an item or service and the price they actually get is known as producer surplus, on the other hand. Total surplus, which gives a broad indicator of economic wellbeing in a market, is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Different methodologies, such as those based on demand and supply curves, willingness to pay, and cost analysis, may be used to measure consumer and producer surplus. By comparing real prices to equilibrium prices, demand and supply curves show the link between price and quantity and allow for the computation of consumer and producer surplus. While cost analysis takes into account the expenses paid by producers in providing the products or services, willingness to pay indicates the highest price customers are prepared to pay for an item or service.

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## CHAPTER 3

### ANALYSIS OF SHIFTS IN DEMAND: UNDERSTANDING FACTORS, IMPLICATIONS AND RESPONSES

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#### ABSTRACT:

The variations in demand for different goods and services. It investigates the causes of these changes, including alterations in consumer preferences, alterations in economic circumstances, alterations in technology, and alterations in market competitiveness. Businesses may learn important information about new trends and improve their strategy by examining these movements. The study uses a data-driven methodology to detect and analyse demand trends by using market research, surveys, and historical data. The results give a thorough insight of demand trends and offer useful recommendations for companies looking to streamline their processes and boost profitability. This study intends to analyse changes in demand, investigate the mechanisms behind them, analyse how they affect market dynamics, and look at how firms and governments may best respond. Changes in consumer tastes, income levels, societal makeup, or other factors that influence the amount requested at different price points cause shifts in demand. The research goes into the models and theories used to analyse changes in demand, such as the idea of demand elasticity, the impacts of income and substitution, and theories of consumer behaviour. It looks at the variables that affect demand, such as changes in income levels, population expansion, technical developments, and changes in consumer preferences and tastes. The study also examines how changes in demand affect enterprises, industries, and the economy as a whole. It also looks at practical tactics and solutions for adjusting to shifting demand circumstances. This research offers insights into the examination of demand changes and informs the design of policies for market strategies, product development, and economic planning via empirical analysis, case studies, and theoretical frameworks.

#### KEYWORDS:

Consumer Preferences, Demand Analysis, Economic Conditions, Emerging Trends, Market Research, Technological Advancements.

#### INTRODUCTION

Price and quantity offered have a distinct connection in a market when there is competition. That connection is the supply curve, which, shows the industry's overall marginal cost of production. How much will be produced at each price is shown by the supply curve. Markets with monopolies lack supply curves. In other words, there is no direct correlation between the cost and the output. The monopolist's choice about production is based on the demand curve's form in addition to marginal cost, which is why this is the case. Since a competitive supply curve corresponds to a series of prices and quantities, changes in demand do not follow out that series.

Instead, changes in demand may result in changes in production without a corresponding change in price, changes in output without a corresponding change in price, or changes in both.

the following idea. The demand curve is initially represented in both portions of the picture as  $D_1$ , the matching marginal revenue curve as  $MR_1$ , and the monopolist's starting price and quantity as  $P_1$  and  $Q_1$ . The demand curve is twisted and pushed downward.  $D_2$  and  $MR_2$  represent the new demand and marginal revenue curves, respectively. Be aware that  $MR_2$  and  $MR_1$  have the same point of intersection with the marginal cost curve. As a consequence, the output remains constant. However, the price drops to  $P_2$  [1]–[3]. The demand curve is pushed upward and The marginal cost curve and the new marginal revenue curve cross at a bigger quantity,  $Q_2$ , as opposed to  $Q_1$ . However, the demand curve has changed in such a way that the price charged remains unchanged. Demand variations often result in adjustments to both quantity and pricing. However, the unique situations highlight a crucial contrast between monopoly and competitive supply. A competitive market offers a certain amount at each price. There is no such link for a monopolist, who may provide numerous different amounts at the same price or the same quantity at various prices depending on how demand fluctuates.

### The Multiplant Firm

When production is adjusted such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost, a business maximizes profits. Many businesses have two or more manufacturing facilities, each with a separate operating cost. The reasoning for selecting production levels is, however, quite similar to that of the single-plant corporation. Consider a company with two factories. What should the plant's overall output be, and how much of it should be produced by each plant? In two stages, we may arrive to the solution intuitively.

1. Step 1: Divide the entire production across the two plants, whatever that may be, to ensure that each plant's marginal cost is the same. If not, the company might reallocate manufacturing to save costs and boost profits. For instance, if Plant 1's marginal cost was greater than Plant 2's, the company might generate the same amount of output at a lower total cost by increasing production at Plant 2 and decreasing it at Plant 1.
2. Step 2: We are aware that the overall production has to be such that marginal income and marginal expense are equal. In every other case, the company might boost or cut overall production and enhance profit. Consider the scenario where marginal income was more than marginal cost but marginal expenses were the same at each facility. In such scenario, increasing production at both facilities would benefit the company since the extra units' income would outweigh their cost. We see that profit is maximised when marginal revenue equals marginal cost at each plant because marginal costs must be the same at each plant and marginal revenue must also equal marginal cost.

### Monopoly Power

Pure monopolies are uncommon. It is considerably more typical for many companies to compete in one market. However, we need clarify why each business in a market with several companies is most likely to experience a downward-sloping demand curve and, therefore, produce at a level above marginal cost. Consider, for instance, a scenario where four businesses manufacture toothbrushes and the market demand curve is  $Q = 50,000 - 20,000P$ . Assume that these four businesses are manufacturing 20,000 toothbrushes per day in total (5000 each), with each

toothbrush costing \$1.50. You may check that the market demand is somewhat inelastic at this price of \$1.50, where the elasticity of demand is 1.5.

Now imagine that Firm A is debating whether to reduce its pricing in order to boost sales. It needs to know how its sales might vary in response to a price adjustment in order to make this choice. In other words, it requires knowledge of its own demand curve, not the market demand curve. The company may believe that by increasing the price from \$1.50 to \$1.60, its sales would decline, say, from 5000 units to 3000 units because customers will purchase more toothbrushes from other companies. Sales for Firm A would only decrease to 4500 if all businesses increased their pricing to \$1.60. Sales won't completely stop, as they would in a market with perfect competition, for a number of reasons. First, some customers will be willing to pay a little bit more for Firm A's toothbrushes if they vary somewhat from those of its rivals. Second, other companies may also decide to hike their pricing. Similar to this, Firm A may believe that by dropping its pricing from \$1.50 to \$1.40, it would be able to sell more toothbrushes possibly 7000 as opposed to 5000. The competition may also decrease their pricing, and some customers may still prefer their toothbrushes, so it won't completely corner the market. Therefore, the degree to which Product A varies from its rivals' goods and the degree to which the four businesses compete with one another determine Firm A's demand curve. The demand curve that business A would likely encounter is more elastic than the market demand curve, but it is not indefinitely elastic like the demand curve that a completely competitive business would experience.

## DISCUSSION

### Sources of Monopoly Power

whereas other businesses only have little to none or monopolistic power? Keep in mind that the capacity to set prices above marginal costs is monopoly power, and that the degree to which prices exceed marginal costs is inversely related to the firm's exposure to demand elasticity. The less elastic a firm's demand curve is, the more monopolistic power it possesses, as shown by equation 1. Therefore, the firm's demand elasticity is the main factor in monopolistic power. Therefore, we should reframe our question to ask why certain businesses, like a chain of supermarkets, have demand curves that are more elastic than those of other businesses, like a manufacturer of high-end apparel.

The demand elasticity of a corporation is influenced by three variables.

1. The demand-elasticity of the market. The market's elasticity of demand reduces the possibility of monopolistic power since the firm's own demand will be at least as elastic as the market's demand.
2. The quantity of businesses in the industry. If there are several businesses, it is doubtful that any one of them will have a major impact on pricing.
3. Business interactions. Even if there are just two or three companies in the market, if there is fierce competition among them, each company will find it difficult to successfully increase prices by a significant amount.

### The Elasticity of Market Demand

If there is just one company a true monopolist then the market demand curve applies. In this scenario, the firm's level of monopolistic power is entirely dependent on the demand elasticity of the market. The elasticity of market demand, however, places a lower limit on the size of the



elasticity of demand for each business when several companies are in direct competition with one another. Remember the toothbrush manufacturers from our earlier discussion. Although toothbrush demand on the market may not be highly elastic, demand inside each company will be. The degree to which enterprises compete with one another determines the elasticity of a given company. The elasticity of demand for any business, however, could never be less than 1.5, regardless of how they compete.

Due to the relatively inelastic nature of oil demand (at least in the near term), OPEC had the potential to drive up oil prices much beyond marginal production cost in the 1970s and early 1980s. The demand for commodities like tin, copper, coffee, and cocoa is far more elastic, therefore manufacturers' efforts to cartelize these markets and drive up prices have mainly failed. In each scenario, the potential monopolistic power of lone producers is limited by the elasticity of the market demand.

### **The Number of Firms**

The number of businesses in a market is the second factor that affects a firm's demand curve and, therefore, its monopolistic power. The monopolistic strength of each business will decrease as the number of companies rises, other things being equal: Each company will find it increasingly difficult to increase prices and avoid losing customers to other companies as there are more and more businesses competing. Of course, it's not simply the overall number of businesses that count, but also the number of "major players" those with a sizable part of the market. For instance, if just two huge companies account for 90% of market sales and another companies account for the remaining 10%, the two large companies may have a sizable monopoly. We say a market is extremely concentrated when a small number of companies dominate the sales.

Competition is allegedly the worst worry of American business, and this statement is not usually spoken in jest. That could be true or might not. However, we would predict that when there are just a few businesses in a market, those businesses' management would prefer that no new businesses emerge. The monopolistic strength of any incumbent corporation can only be diminished by an increase in the number of businesses. Finding strategies to erect obstacles to entry, or circumstances that discourage the admission of new rivals, is a crucial component of competitive strategy [4]–[6]. There are sometimes inherent impediments to access. One company, for instance, may own a patent on the technology required to make a certain product. Other businesses cannot join the market as a result, at least not until the patent expires. Similar to how copyrights can prevent multiple businesses from selling a book, piece of music, or piece of software, government licence requirements can prevent new businesses from entering the telephone service, television broadcasting, or interstate trucking markets. A few companies may find it too expensive to serve the whole market due to economies of scale. When economies of scale are very significant, it may be best for a single company a natural monopoly to supply the whole market.

### **The Interaction Among Firms**

The interactions between competing businesses might be the most crucial factor in determining monopoly power. Consider a market where there are four companies. They could engage in aggressive price-cutting competition to get a larger market share. Prices may drop to levels that are almost competitive as a result. Each company will be concerned that, if its price is raised, it would be undercut and lose market share. It won't have much monopolistic strength as a

consequence. However, the companies may not engage in much rivalry. They could even conspire to restrict supply and boost prices (in contravention of antitrust rules). Collusion may result in significant monopolistic power since it is more likely to be lucrative to raise prices collectively than individually. We go into further information about how businesses interact with one another. Currently, all we want to do is emphasise the fact that, when everything else is equal, monopolistic power grows when organisations collaborate and decreases when they compete fiercely.

Keep in mind that a company's monopolistic power often varies over time as its operational circumstances, market demand and cost, its behaviour, and the behaviour of its rivals change. Therefore, it is important to consider monopoly power in a changing environment. The market demand curve, for instance, may be very inelastic in the short run but much more elastic in the long run. Because of this, the OPEC cartel had significant short-term but considerably less long-term monopolistic strength with regard to oil. Furthermore, monopolistic power, whether actual or hypothetical, in the near term might increase a sector's competitiveness over the long term: Large short-term earnings might encourage new businesses to join a market, diminishing monopolistic power over the long run [7]–[9].

### The Social Costs of Monopoly Power

Price and marginal cost are equal in a free market. On the other side, monopoly power suggests that price is greater than marginal cost. We would anticipate that monopolistic power would benefit the corporation more than it would the customer since it leads to higher pricing and lower production volumes. But let's say we place equal weight on producer and consumer welfare. Does having a monopoly benefit or hurt consumers and producers overall. By contrasting the consumer and producer surplus that develops when a competitive industry provides an item with the surplus that develops when a monopolist serves the whole market, we may find the answer to this issue.<sup>11</sup> (We assume that the cost curves for the monopolist and the competitive market are identical.) The average and marginal revenue curves as well as the marginal cost curve for the monopolist. The price and quantity are  $P_m$  and  $Q_m$ , and the business produces at the point where marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal in order to maximise profit. Price must match marginal cost in a competitive market, therefore the competitive price and quantity,  $P_c$  and  $Q_c$ , are located at the point where the average revenue (demand) curve and the marginal cost curve converge. Let's now look at how excess persists when we go from the competitive price and quantity,  $P_c$  and  $Q_c$ , to the monopolistic price and quantity,  $P_m$  and  $Q_m$ .

When there is a monopoly, prices are higher and sales are lower. Due to the greater price, buyers who purchase the product forfeit any excess of the amount indicated by rectangle A. Consumers who would have purchased the item at price  $P_c$  but did not do so also lose excess, namely the sum indicated by triangle B. A B is the resultant total loss of consumer surplus. However, the manufacturer loses triangle C, the extra profit it would have made by selling  $Q_c$   $Q_m$  at price  $P_c$ , while gaining rectangle A by selling at the higher price. A C is the overall increase in producer surplus. A net loss of surplus is shown by B C after deducting the rise in producer surplus from the increase in consumer surplus. This is the cost of monopolistic power in deadweight terms. The production would be lower than under competition-friendly circumstances, even if the monopolist's earnings were taxed away and handed to the buyers of its goods. The societal cost of this inefficiency is the deadweight loss [10].



## CONCLUSION

It is essential for firms to analyse changes in demand in order to adapt and prosper in volatile market settings. Businesses may see developing trends and proactively modify their strategy to match shifting demand by regularly monitoring customer preferences. Demand movements are significantly influenced by economic factors, including changes in inflation, consumer buying power, and income levels. Furthermore, technology developments regularly alter sectors and consumer behaviours, posing both possibilities and difficulties. Demand analysis requires a solid understanding of market competitiveness and extensive market research since these factors reveal the dynamics of the marketplace and consumer preferences. Businesses may improve operations, create specialized marketing plans, and maintain an edge over rivals by using these information. In general, understanding demand changes enables firms to make wise choices, raise customer happiness, and promote long-term success.

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## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN DEMAND: MECHANISMS, IMPACTS AND ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES

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#### ABSTRACT:

The goal of this research is to examine demand changes and how they may affect market dynamics. It looks into the factors behind demand shifts, analyses their effects, and makes recommendations for how businesses and governments may best react. According to the research, alterations in consumer preferences, changes in income levels, alterations in society demography, and advances in technology are only a few of the variables that have an impact on variations in demand. Consumer tastes and preferences may alter as a result of changing fashion trends, societal upheavals, or technological breakthroughs. Income fluctuations may affect consumers' buying power and affect their demand for products and services. Demand patterns may also be impacted by changing demographics, such as population expansion or ageing populations.

#### KEYWORDS:

Competition, Economies of scale, Government regulation, Natural monopoly. Market dynamics.

#### INTRODUCTION

It is essential for firms to analyse changes in demand in order to adapt and prosper in volatile market settings. Businesses may see developing trends and proactively modify their strategy to match shifting demand by regularly monitoring customer preferences. Demand movements are significantly influenced by economic factors, including changes in inflation, consumer buying power, and income levels. Furthermore, technology developments regularly alter sectors and consumer behaviour, posing both possibilities and difficulties. Demand analysis requires a solid understanding of market competitiveness and extensive market research since these factors reveal the dynamics of the marketplace and consumer preferences. Businesses may improve operations, create specialized marketing plans, and maintain an edge over rivals by using this information. In general, understanding demand changes enables firms to make wise choices, raise customer happiness, and promote long-term success. Average costs are falling everywhere, hence marginal costs are always lower than average costs. If the company weren't regulated, it would make  $Q_m$  and sell it for  $P_m$ . The regulatory body would want to drive the company's pricing down to the level of competition  $P_c$ . However, at that point, average cost would not be covered by pricing, and the company would cease operations. The optimum option is to fix the price at  $P_r$ , which is the point where average cost and average revenue converge. In such scenario, the company doesn't make a monopoly profit and production is kept as high as it can go without forcing the firm out of business [1]–[3].

## Regulation in Practice

Remember that the intersection of the firm's average revenue (demand) and marginal cost curves marks the competitive pricing. In the same way, a natural monopoly: The intersection point between average cost and demand is where the minimal practicable price is located. Unfortunately, since the firm's demand and cost curves may change when market circumstances change, it is sometimes difficult to precisely establish these prices in practise. Because of this, the regulation of a monopoly may sometimes be based on the rate of return on its capital. The regulating body establishes a price that is permitted in order to make this rate of return in some way "competitive" or "fair." The term "rate-of-return regulation" refers to this practise: Based on the (anticipated) rate of return that the company will experience, the maximum price permitted is determined. Unfortunately, putting rate-of-return legislation into practise leads to challenging issues. First, a firm's capital stock is challenging to assess even though it plays a crucial role in determining the firm's rate of return. Second, although a "fair" rate of return must be based on the firm's real cost of capital, that cost also relies on the regulatory agency's actions (as well as investors' expectations for future permitted rates of return).

The inability to reach consensus on a set of figures to be used in rate-of-return calculations sometimes causes regulatory responses to price changes and other market circumstances to be delayed (not to mention costly and time-consuming regulatory hearings). Lawyers, accountants, and sometimes economic advisors are often the main winners. Ultimately, this leads to regulatory lag, which refers to the delays of a year or more often involved in adjusting regulated pricing. Setting price limits based on the firm's variable costs, previous pricing, and maybe inflation and productivity development is another method of control. More flexibility may be possible with a price limit than with rate-of-return restrictions. For instance, under price cap regulation, a company would normally be permitted to increase its prices each year by an amount equal to the actual rate of inflation minus anticipated productivity growth (without needing regulatory agency consent). This kind of price cap legislation has been used to limit the cost of local and long-distance telephone service. The regulatory landscape in the US had drastically transformed by the 1990s. Similar to how several states had deregulated their electric utilities, many sectors of the telecommunications industry had as well. Scale economies had mostly run their course, thus there was little need to see these companies as natural monopolies. In addition, technical advancements made it extremely simple for new enterprises to enter the market.

## The Social Costs of Monopsony Power

monopsony power would benefit the buyer and hurt the supplier since it leads to lower prices and lesser quantities bought. But let's say that both buyers' and sellers' wellbeing is equally important. How does monopsony power influence overall welfare. between buyers and sellers with the surplus produced when a single buyer dominates the market. The average and marginal expenditure curves as well as the marginal value curve for the monopsonist. By acquiring a quantity  $Q_m$  at a price  $P_m$  such that marginal value matches marginal expenditure, the monopsonist's net gain is maximised. Price and marginal value are equal in a market that is competitive. The intersection of the average expenditure and marginal value curves is where the competitive price and quantity,  $P_c$  and  $Q_c$ , are discovered. Now let's examine the impact of switching from the competitive price and quantity,  $P_c$  and  $Q_c$ , to the monopsony price and quantity,  $P_m$  and  $Q_m$ , on excess.

Monopsony results in lower prices and fewer sales. Sellers forfeit a certain percentage of the excess shown by rectangle A as a result of the lower price. Additionally, due to the decreased sales, sellers lose the excess that triangle C provided. Therefore, A C represents the whole loss of producer (seller) surplus. The buyer gets the excess presented by rectangle A by purchasing at a lesser price. However, the buyer purchases  $Q_m$  rather than  $Q_c$ , which results in the loss of the excess provided by triangle B. Therefore, A B represents the complete excess gain to the buyer. B C represents the overall surplus loss. The deadweight loss resulting from monopsony power is this. The production would be lower than under competition, even if the monopolist's earnings were taxed away and allocated to the producers, creating an inefficiency. The societal cost of this inefficiency is the deadweight loss.

## DISCUSSION

### Bilateral Monopoly

It's difficult to say. Bilateral monopolies are markets where there is only one customer and one vendor. Unfortunately, there is no easy formula to decide who, if either, will receive the best deal. If the price is too low or too expensive, one side may have more time and patience or be able to persuade the other party that it will walk away. Bilateral monopolies are uncommon. More often, markets exist when a small number of producers have some monopoly power and sell to a small number of consumers who also have some monopoly power. Even if there may still be some negotiation, we may use the following general rule: Monopoly power and monopsony power will often work against one another. In other words, when buyers' effective monopoly power increases, sellers' effective monopoly power decreases and vice versa. This tendency does not guarantee that the market would seem completely competitive; the residual monopoly power would still be strong, for instance, if monopoly power is high and monopsony power is low. However, in general, monopolistic power will cause prices to move towards the marginal cost, whereas monopsony power will cause prices to move towards the marginal value.

### Limiting Market Power

Excessive market power also creates issues of equality and justice since it allows businesses to benefit at the cost of consumers. Theoretically, a company's surplus earnings may be taxed away and allocated to the consumers of its goods, although this is often difficult. It is difficult to identify the percentage of a company's earnings that can be attributed to monopolistic power, and it is much more challenging to track down every customer and pay them back in accordance with their purchases [4]–[6]. So how can society regulate market power and stop it from being abused to harm competition? Direct price control is the solution for a natural monopoly, such as an electric utility business. However, preventing companies from acquiring too much market power via mergers and acquisitions as well as stopping companies that currently possess market power from utilising it to stifle competition are the more general solutions. Since antitrust rules differ from country to country, they are still in effect in the United States.

However, it is important to stress that, notwithstanding certain limitations (such as coordinating with other enterprises), market dominance or being a monopolist is often not unlawful in the United States or anyplace else. On the other hand, it has been shown that copyright and patent laws protect the monopolistic positions of companies that have developed original concepts. Microsoft essentially has a monopoly on personal computer operating systems since other businesses aren't permitted to copy Windows. Even if Microsoft had a complete monopoly on

operating systems (which it doesn't since Apple and Linux both compete on the market), it wouldn't be illegal. However, it could be illegal for Microsoft to utilise its hegemonic dominance over personal computer operating systems to discourage other businesses from creating competing operating systems or to reduce competition in other markets.

### **Restricting**

when a firm like Apple acquires market dominance by creating products like the iPhone and iPad or when a pharmaceutical company does so by creating a new, life-saving medicine because innovation fosters economic development and improves consumer welfare. However, there are less admirable methods for businesses to attain market dominance, and this is where antitrust laws come into play. The laws operate fundamentally in the manner described below. Contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that restrict commerce are forbidden under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (acted in 1890). An express agreement among producers to limit their production and/or "fix" prices above the level of competition is one clear example of an unlawful combination. Such unlawful alliances and agreements have occurred often, as shown by Example 10.7. It may also be considered illegal to engage in parallel behaviour that demonstrates implicit collaboration. An implicit understanding might be inferred, for instance, if Firm B consistently adopts Firm A's pricing strategy (parallel pricing) and engages in behaviour that is inconsistent with what one would anticipate businesses to do in the absence of collusion (such as raising prices in the face of decreased demand and excess supply).

It is against the law to monopolise or seek to monopolise a market, and monopolization-causing conspiracies are also forbidden under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Clayton Act (1914) made significant contributions to identifying the kind of practises most likely to be anticompetitive. For instance, the legislation forbids a company with a substantial market share from requiring a buyer or lessor of an item not to purchase from a rival. Additionally, it makes it unlawful to use predatory pricing, which is pricing intended to drive out existing rivals and deter newcomers (so that the predatory company may charge more in the future). Monopoly power may also be obtained by the acquisition of another corporation through the purchase of its shares, the merging of smaller, less powerful enterprises into a bigger, more powerful one, or both. Mergers and acquisitions are not permitted under the Clayton Act if they "substantially lessen competition" or "tend to create a monopoly."

The antitrust laws also place various restrictions on potential anticompetitive behaviour by businesses. For instance, it is unlawful to discriminate by charging customers of basically the same goods different rates if such price disparities are likely to harm competition, according to the Clayton Act as revised by the Robinson-Patman Act (1936). Even then, companies are exempt from liability if they can demonstrate that the pricing discrepancies were required to combat competition. (Price discrimination is a prevalent practise, as we shall see in the next chapter. It only becomes the subject of antitrust action when consumers incur financial losses and competition is diminished.

The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914, revised in 1938, 1973, and 1975), which established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), is another significant element of the antitrust laws. Through a comprehensive list of restrictions on unfair and anticompetitive practises, such as misleading advertising and labelling, agreements with merchants to exclude rival products, and more, this act complements the Sherman and Clayton acts by promoting competition. The

legislation gives the FTC sweeping powers that go beyond those of other antitrust laws since these restrictions are interpreted and enforced in administrative actions before the FTC.

The wording of the antitrust legislation about what is and is not permitted is genuinely ambiguous. In order to provide the Justice Department, the FTC, and the courts broad authority in interpreting and enforcing them, they are designed to offer a comprehensive legislative framework. This strategy is crucial since it might be hard to predict what can impede competitiveness in advance. Such uncertainty necessitates the use of common law, which is the process by which courts interpret legislation, as well as supplementary provisions and decisions (made, for example, by the FTC or the Justice Department)[7]–[9].

### **Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws**

Three methods are used to enforce antitrust laws:

1. Via the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. Because it is a part of the executive branch, its enforcement practises closely mirror the viewpoint of the current government. The department has the option to launch a criminal investigation, file a civil lawsuit, or do both in response to an external complaint or an internal investigation. A criminal conduct may result in sanctions for the business as well as fines or prison time for the people involved. For instance, those who intend to set pricing or rig bids may be charged with a crime and, if convicted, may get a prison term. Keep this in mind if you want to use your understanding of microeconomics to launch a lucrative business career! When a business loses a civil lawsuit, it is forced to stop engaging in anticompetitive behaviour and often pays compensation.
2. Using the Federal Trade Commission's administrative processes. Again, the FTC may take action as a consequence of an outside complaint or on its own initiative. In the event that the FTC determines that action is necessary, it may either ask for a voluntary agreement to abide by the law or obtain a formal commission order demanding compliance.
3. In secret procedures. Plaintiffs or defendants may seek triple (three-fold) damages for harm caused to their assets or enterprises. The possibility of triple damages may serve as a powerful deterrence to potential offenders.

Injunctions may be requested from the courts by people or businesses to stop wrongdoers from engaging in anticompetitive behaviour.

### **Antitrust in Europe**

As the European Union has expanded, so have its antitrust enforcement strategies. One organisation, the Competition Directorate, based in Brussels, is in charge of enforcing antitrust laws when they include two or more member states. Those concerns whose impacts are perceived primarily or wholly inside certain nations are handled by separate and independent antitrust bodies within individual member states. The antitrust rules of the European Union and the United States first seem to be pretty similar. Similar to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Article 101 of the Treaty of the European Community addresses trade barriers. In many respects, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102, which focuses on powerful corporations abusing their market dominance, are identical. Finally, the European Merger Control Act is conceptually comparable to Section 7 of the Clayton Act in terms of mergers. However, there are still a number of substantive and procedural distinctions between European and American antitrust laws. In



practise, it is simpler to demonstrate that a European corporation is dominant than it is to demonstrate that a U.S. firm has monopolistic power since merger reviews are often completed more swiftly in Europe. Both the U.S. and the European Union have been vigorously pursuing rules against price fixing, although the U.S. may also inflict jail terms in addition to fines, whereas Europe solely imposes civil penalties. Over the last ten years, antitrust enforcement has spread fast over the globe. There are now active enforcement agencies in more than a hundred nations. Although there isn't an official global antitrust enforcement organisation, the International Competition Network hosts meetings for all enforcement agencies at least once year. Because there are so few manufacturers in many sectors, each one has considerable monopolistic power. Additionally, a lot of businesses have some monopsony power in the marketplaces for these factor inputs as purchasers of raw materials, labour, or specialised capital products. How to best use their market dominance is the challenge these companies' management must solve.

In order to maximise profit, they must pick the amounts of factor inputs, establish pricing, and define production over the short and long terms [10]. Managing businesses with market power is more difficult than managing businesses with perfect competition. A company with perfect output market competition has no impact on the pricing of the market. As a consequence, the firm's management only need to worry about the costs associated with running the business, picking output in such a way that the price is equal to the marginal cost. However, a monopolistic firm's management must also be concerned with the features of demand. In order to establish what that price (and related production level) should be, even if they set a single price for the firm's output, they must at the very least have an approximate estimate of the elasticity of demand. Furthermore, businesses often do significantly better when they use a more complex pricing approach, such as charging various costs to certain clients. Managers require creativity and more demand data to develop these pricing schemes.

How companies with market power determine pricing is explained in this chapter. We start with the fundamental goal of any pricing strategy, which is to capture customer excess and turn it into extra profit for the business. Then we go through how price discrimination charging different rates to different clients, sometimes for the same goods and other times for little differences in the product can be used to accomplish this purpose. It is crucial to comprehend how price discrimination works since it is often used in one way or another. The two-part tariff, which demands consumers to pay in advance for the right to acquire units of an item at a later time (and at an extra cost), is the topic of our next discussion. The traditional illustration of this is an amusement park, where visitors must first pay a price to enter before paying more costs for each ride. The cost of a Gillette razor, which allows the owner to buy Gillette razor blades, a tennis club where members pay an annual fee and then an hourly rate for court time, or the monthly subscription cost of long-distance telephone service, which allows users to make long-distance calls, paying by the minute as they go. Despite the fact that amusement parks may seem like a rather specialised market, there are many other examples of two-part tariffs.

Additionally, we'll talk about bundling, a price tactic that entails grouping things together and offering them for sale as a set. A personal computer that includes many software programmes, a one-week trip that includes flights, a rental car, and a hotel, or a luxury vehicle with extras like a sunroof, power windows, and leather seats that are considered "standard" features. Finally, we'll look at how companies with market dominance employ advertising, the choice of how much money to spend on advertising is directly influenced by the firm's price decision and needs

knowledge of the demand. a straightforward guideline for figuring out the advertising-to-sales ratio that maximises earnings.

### CONCLUSION

Owing to economies of scale or other inherent advantages, a natural monopoly develops when one company can manufacture and distribute an item or service more effectively than other businesses.

High fixed costs, declining average costs over a large scale of production, and entry obstacles that prohibit rivals from joining the market are all characteristics of a natural monopoly. Natural monopolies may have certain advantages, such as cost savings and economies of scale, but they can also present issues with fair competition, customer choice, and pricing power. Implementing focused marketing efforts, doing market research, creating new goods, and encouraging cooperation and partnerships are all effective ways for businesses and governments to adapt to shifts in demand. Emerging trends, changes in consumer preferences, and market gaps may all be found via market research. To satisfy shifting customer needs, product development initiatives may concentrate on innovation, diversity, or personalization.

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## CHAPTER 5

### INTERTEMPORAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND PEAK-LOAD PRICING

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#### ABSTRACT:

Intertemporal price discrimination and peak-load pricing are examples of business tactics used to increase profitability and effectively manage resources. Utilising changes in customer demand across time, intertemporal price discrimination entails setting different prices for the same good or service depending on when it is purchased. The goal of this study is to examine the concepts of peak-load pricing and intertemporal price discrimination, as well as the processes and techniques that underlie them, and to determine how they affect businesses, customers, and market dynamics. Peak-load pricing entails establishing higher prices at times of peak demand, while intertemporal price discrimination refers to the practise of charging varying prices for a product or service dependent on the timing of purchase. The research dives into the theories, models, and frameworks, such as dynamic pricing models, demand elasticity, and consumer behaviour theories, used to analyse peak-load pricing and intertemporal price discrimination. It looks at how businesses use capacity management, dynamic pricing algorithms, and personalised pricing to execute peak-load pricing and intertemporal price discrimination. The study also examines how different pricing tactics may affect businesses, customers, rivalry in the market, and overall economic efficiency. This paper offers insights into intertemporal price discrimination and peak-load pricing and informs evidence-based decision-making and policy formulation relating to pricing strategies, consumer welfare, and market regulation via empirical analysis, case studies, and theoretical frameworks.

#### KEYWORDS:

Consumer Behavior, Market Efficiency, Peak-Load Pricing, Price Discrimination, Pricing Strategies.

#### INTRODUCTION

There are two more significant and often used types of pricing discrimination that are closely related. The first of them is intertemporal price discrimination, which involves charging various prices at various times to categorise customers with various demand functions into separate groups. The second is peak-load pricing, which entails raising rates during times of high demand when capacity restrictions result in high marginal costs. Both of these systems include setting different prices at various intervals, although they do so for quite different reasons. Each will be addressed in turn.

### Intertemporal Price Discrimination

Intertemporal price discrimination aims to separate customers into groups with high and low demand by imposing a price that is high initially but decreases over time. Consider how an electronics manufacturer could price new, cutting-edge equipment, such as high-performance digital cameras or LCD television displays, to demonstrate how this method works. He (inelastic) demand curve for D1, which represents a small set of customers who highly value the product and do not want to wait to purchase it (for example, photography enthusiasts who want the newest camera). The demand curve for a larger customer base that is more likely to pass on a product if the price is too high is D2. Therefore, the plan is to first offer the product at a high price P1, selling mostly to customers along the demand curve D1. The price is then reduced to P2 and sales are made to the bigger group of customers on demand curve D2 after this first group of consumers has purchased the goods [1]–[3].

Other instances of intertemporal pricing discrimination also exist. One includes setting a high price for a first-run film and then decreasing it after a year has passed after its release. The practise of charging a high price for a book's hardcover edition and then releasing the paperback edition at a considerably reduced price around a year later is another that practically all publishers do. Contrary to popular belief, the paperback's cheaper cost of manufacture is not the reason for its lower price. The marginal cost of printing an extra copy of a book, whether in hardcover or paperback, is relatively cheap once it has been edited and typeset, perhaps costing just a \$1 or two. Because the hardbound edition is in great demand and has already been acquired by customers, the paperback edition is offered for significantly less than the hardbound edition. Customers who still purchase paperbacks often have more flexible needs.

### Peak-Load Pricing

Peak-load pricing also entails charging various rates at various times. However, the goal is to promote economic efficiency by charging consumers prices that are near to marginal cost rather than absorbing consumer surplus. Demand peaks for various commodities and services at specific times, such as during commuter rush hours for roads and tunnels, late summer afternoons for power, and weekends for ski resorts and amusement parks. Due to capacity issues, marginal cost is also high at these peak times. Therefore, prices should be higher during busy times which depicts this, shows D1 the demand curve for the peak time and D2 the demand curve for the off-peak period. The company obtains the high price P1 for the peak time and the lower price P2 for the nonpeak period, selling corresponding quantities Q1 and Q2, and setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost for each period. This tactic boosts the company's earnings over what it would be if it maintained a flat rate throughout. Additionally, it is more efficient since prices are more closely aligned with marginal costs, increasing both producer and consumer surplus.

It's critical to consider the efficiency benefit from peak-load pricing. The regulatory body should set the prices P1 and P2 at the locations where the demand curves, D1 and D2, meet the marginal cost curve rather than where the marginal revenue curves intersect marginal cost if the company were a regulated monopolist (such as an electric utility). Customers then benefit from the full efficiency increase. Keep in mind that third-degree price discrimination is not the same as peak-load pricing. Marginal revenue and marginal cost must be equal for each group of customers when there is third-degree pricing discrimination. Why? because the expenses incurred while servicing the various groups are not separate. In the case of unrestricted vs reduced air prices, the cost of selling unrestricted tickets is impacted by the number of discounted seats sold—marginal

cost increases as the aircraft fills up. However, peak-load pricing and the majority of intertemporal price discrimination cases do not follow this pattern. The cost of selling more ski lift or theme park tickets during the week does not considerably increase the cost of selling more tickets over the weekend. The cost of selling power during peak hours won't dramatically rise if more electricity is sold during off-peak hours. As a consequence, by establishing marginal cost equal to marginal income for each period, pricing and sales in each period may be decided separately. Another example is movie theatres, which charge more for evening showings than for matinees. In the majority of movie theatres, the marginal cost of serving patrons at a matinee is unrelated to the marginal cost of serving patrons during an evening showing. Using estimations of demand and marginal cost for each session, the proprietor of a movie theatre may decide on the best rates for the evening and matinee performances separately.

### DISCUSSION

Small numbers of buyers and sellers are present in certain factor marketplaces. In such circumstances, a price will be negotiated between an individual buyer and an individual vendor. Depending on who has greater negotiating power, the final price may be high or cheap. The quantity of contending buyers and contending sellers affects a buyer's or seller's negotiating power. However, the type of the purchase itself also affects it. Each buyer may often play the sellers off against one another while negotiating a price by making big, occasional purchases, giving them a lot of bargaining leverage. Commercial aviation is a market where this sort of negotiating power is evident. Planes are undoubtedly one of the most important inputs for airlines, and they seek to purchase them for the least amount of money. There are several airlines, but only Boeing and Airbus are the two main commercial aircraft manufacturers. Therefore, one may assume that Boeing and Airbus would be at a significant pricing advantage.

Contrarily, this is real. It's critical to comprehend why Airlines seldom purchase one aircraft at a time, and they rarely do so every day. A firm like American Airlines normally only orders new aircraft every three to four years, at a cost of several billion dollars every order that may include 20 or 30 aircraft. Despite how large Boeing and Airbus are, this is no little buy, and each vendor will do every effort to get the contract. American Airlines is able to benefit from this knowledge. American might pit the tw

o manufacturers against one another when negotiating a price if it had to choose between 20 brand-new Boeing 787s or 20 brand-new Airbus A380s (both are comparable aeroplanes). Thus, American may approach Airbus and urge it to perform better if Boeing gives a price of, let's say, \$300 million per jet. American will then go back to Boeing and seek a greater discount while stating (true or not) that Airbus is providing significant savings. Then back to Boeing, then back to Airbus, and so on, until American has been able to get a sizable discount from one of the two businesses[4]–[6].

### DISCUSSION

#### Investment Time and Capital Markets

In competitive marketplaces, businesses weigh the marginal revenue product of each element against its cost to determine how much to spend each month. choices made by all businesses Identify the market demand for each element. The market price is the price at which the amount provided and sought are equal. This image is quite full for factor inputs like labour

and raw commodities, but not for capital. Capital may persist and contribute to output for years after it is obtained because it is durable. In certain cases, businesses may employ labour and rent capital in a similar manner. For instance, a company may employ a worker for a monthly salary and pay them monthly rent for office space. But more often, capital expenditures entail the acquisition of long-lasting plants and equipment. The concept of time is therefore introduced. When a business chooses whether to invest in machinery or establish a factory, it must weigh the current costs against the potential future profits that the new capital will bring in. It must answer the following dilemma in order to draw this comparison: What are projected future earnings now worth? When buying raw goods or employing labour, this issue does not come up. The company merely has to weigh the present expenditure on the factor such as the salary or steel price against the factor's current marginal revenue output to arrive at those decisions.

We will learn how to estimate the present value of future cash flows in this chapter. Our investigation of the firm's investment choices is based on this. We will look at how businesses might conduct this comparison and decide if the expenditure is justified since the majority of these judgements include comparing a current expense with future returns. Future earnings from a capital investment are often either more or lower than expected. We'll examine how businesses might account for this sort of unpredictability.

### **Adjustments for Risk**

An acceptable discount rate for future cash flows that are assured is a risk-free interest rate. Future cash flows, however, are not at all assured for the majority of projects. For instance, we would anticipate uncertainty at our electric motor manufacturing over future copper costs, future motor demand and pricing, and even future labour rates. Therefore, the company is unable to predict its production profitability for the following 20 years. The company's best-case scenario for earnings is \$960,000 annually, but real profits might be greater or lower. Adding a risk premium to the risk-free rate to raise the discount rate is a frequent practise. The theory contends that since the company's owners are risk averse, future hazardous cash flows are valued less than those that are assured. This is accounted for by decreasing the present value of those future cash flows when the discount rate is raised. But how much of a risk premium is appropriate? As we will see, the response is based on the kind of danger.

### **Diversifiable versus Non-diversifiable Risk**

Care must be taken when including a risk premium in the discount rate. The firm's management must make a distinction between diversifiable and nondiversifiable risk if they are acting in the interests of the investors. By investing in several projects or owning the stocks of numerous businesses, it is possible to completely remove risk that might be diversified. This method cannot completely reduce nondiversifiable risk. Only nondiversifiable risks should be included in the risk premium since they have an impact on the opportunity cost of capital.

### **Differentiated Risk**

that diversifying may reduce various risks to understand this. For instance, I am unable to predict whether a coin will land on its head or tails. However, I can predict that around half of a thousand coin flips will result in heads. Similar to how they can't predict how long I'll live, insurance companies who offer me life insurance cannot. However, it can be quite certain of the proportion of individuals who will pass away each year since it has sold life insurance to

thousands of people. The same may be said for choices about capital investments. The aggregate risk will be much lower if the company invests in dozens of initiatives, as most major corporations do, even if the profit flow from a single investment may be quite dangerous. Additionally, investors may readily diversify even if the firm only invests in one project by owning the shares of twelve or more other companies, or by owning a mutual fund that has a variety of securities. As a result, stockholders—the business's owners—may minimise risk that can be diversified.

Investors cannot anticipate to get a return greater than the risk-free rate by assuming diversifiable risk since they can reduce it: You won't be paid for taking a risk that is unnecessary. In fact, investments with merely diversifiable risks often provide returns that are near to risk-free rates. Now keep in mind that the opportunity cost of investing in a project instead of another project or asset with comparable risk characteristics is represented by the discount rate for that project. The opportunity cost is thus equal to the risk-free rate if the project's sole risk is diversifiable. The discount rate shouldn't be increased by a risk premium. Unchangeable risk

What about danger that cannot be varied? Let's first be clear about the potential sources of such danger. The potential of a large conflict presents nondiversifiable risk to a life insurance firm. No matter how many clients it has, the corporation cannot assume that a "average" number of them would pass away every year due to the possibility that a conflict may significantly raise death rates. Because of this, the majority of insurance policies whether for life, health, or property do not cover damages brought on by hostile activities. Nondiversifiable risk occurs with capital investments since a firm's profitability often rely on the state of the wider economy. Corporate earnings often increase when the economy is growing well. The demand for motors is going to be high for our plant making electric motors, increasing earnings. Profits, on the other hand, often decline during a recession. Diversification can't completely reduce risk since the rate of economic development in the future is unknown. By taking on this risk, investors should (and really can) receive larger profits.

### **The Capital Asset Pricing Model**

The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) compares the projected return on an investment with the expected return for the whole stock market to determine the risk premium for that investment. Consider initially investing in the whole stock market (maybe via a mutual fund) to get a better understanding of the concept. In such situation, you wouldn't be exposed to any diversifiable risk since your investment would be fully diversified. However, since the stock market often moves in tandem with the wider economy, you would be exposed to nondiversifiable risk. (Economic conditions have an impact on predicted future earnings, which are reflected in the stock market.) The projected return on the stock market thus exceeds the risk-free rate. The risk premium on the market is represented as  $r_m - r_f$ , where  $r_m$  stands for the projected return on the stock market and  $r_f$  for the risk-free rate. This is the extra projected return you get in exchange for assuming the non-diversifiable stock market risk [7]–[9].

Now think about the nondiversifiable risk connected to a single asset, such the shares of a corporation. The degree to which the asset's return tends to be associated with (i.e., move in the same direction as) the return on the stock market as a whole may be used to quantify that risk. For instance, there can be absolutely no link between the stock of one business and the market as a whole. That stock would typically see price fluctuations independent of changes in the market, resulting in little to no nondiversifiable risk. Therefore, the return on that stock ought to be about



equal to the risk-free rate. But another stock can have a strong correlation to the market. Its price variations may potentially intensify alterations in the market as a whole. That stock would carry a significant amount of nondiversifiable risk possibly even more than the whole stock market. If so, its average return will be higher than the market's average return.

### **Investments in Human Capital**

Both businesses and consumers may choose whether to invest in tangible capital, such as buildings and machinery for businesses and durables like vehicles and major appliances for individuals. We have shown how to use these choices using the net present value rule: Invest only when the rewards from the investment outweigh the expenses at the current time. Instead of physical capital, some extremely significant investment choices employ human capital. Given that you are reading this book right now, you are undoubtedly currently investing in your own human capital.<sup>16</sup> You are gaining important information and skills that will increase your future productivity by studying microeconomics, maybe as part of an undergraduate or graduate degree programme. Human capital refers to the information, abilities, and experience that increase an individual's productivity and, as a result, their lifelong earning potential. You are investing in human capital whether you attend college or graduate school, take postgraduate courses, or sign up for a specialised work training programme. The time, money, and effort you put into developing your human capital will probably pay off in the shape of more fulfilling or well-paying career prospects.

How should a person choose whether to make a human capital investment? The same net present value rule that we used to analyse investments in physical capital may be used to respond to this query<sup>[10]</sup>. Imagine you are choosing, for instance, whether to attend college for four years after high school or to forgo it and enter the workforce. Let's make things as straightforward as possible by focusing just on the financial implications of this choice and ignoring any potential benefits (such as parties and football games) or drawbacks (such as tests and papers) that attending college could have. We shall determine the net present value (NPV) of the expenses and advantages of a college education.

### **A College Education's Npv**

There are two main expenses related to attending college. First, you will pay the opportunity cost of the missed money that you might have made had you chosen a job since you would be learning instead of working. These missed earnings might amount to around \$20,000 annually for a typical high school graduate in the United States. The second main expenditure is for tuition, board, and other costs (like the price of this book). Depending on whether a student is attending a public or private college, whether they are living at home or on campus, and if they are getting a scholarship, the cost of tuition and room and board may vary greatly. Let's assume \$20,000 as a ballpark average for the year. (While many private schools and universities are more costly, most public institutions are less expensive.) As a result, we'll assume that the entire financial cost of attending college is \$40,000 per year, spread over four years. The chance to earn a greater wage throughout your working life is a significant advantage of attending college. In the US, the average salary difference between a college graduate and a high school graduate is roughly \$20,000. In actuality, the pay gap is greatest during the first 5 to 10 years after college graduation, after which it narrows. But for the sake of simplicity, let's say that this \$20,000 income difference continues for 20 years.

## CONCLUSION

Businesses use peak-load pricing and intertemporal price differentiation as pricing techniques to increase profitability and effectively distribute resources. Businesses may take advantage of changes in consumer willingness to pay over time by using intertemporal pricing discrimination, which involves setting various prices for the same good or service depending on when the customer makes the purchase. This tactic capitalizes on shifts in customer demand and has the potential to boost sales and enhance market segmentation. Peak-load pricing entails assessing higher fees at times of maximum demand and assessing lower fees during times of little demand. Businesses may more effectively manage capacity utilization<sup>6</sup> and resource allocation by altering pricing based on changes in demand. By encouraging customers to change their spending habits to off-peak times, this pricing method helps to relieve traffic congestion during peak hours.

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## CHAPTER 6

### INTERTEMPORAL PRODUCTION DECISION DEPLETABLE RESOURCES

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#### ABSTRACT:

The objectives of this research project are to analyse the intertemporal production choice process while dealing with finite resources, evaluate the variables affecting production decisions, look at optimisation techniques, and assess the sustainability implications. To optimise output and maintain long-term sustainability, intertemporal production choices include resource planning and allocation throughout time. The decision-making process, however, becomes more complicated and calls for the consideration of sustainability concerns when resources are finite. The analysis of intertemporal production choices with depletable resources is covered in detail in this research using theories, models, and frameworks such as the Hotelling's rule, optimum extraction models, and dynamic programming. It looks at the variables that affect production choices, including resource accessibility, extraction costs, consumer demand, and environmental concerns.

The study also examines resource allocation methods, extraction rates, and investments in renewable energy sources as optimisation tactics that strike a compromise between immediate rewards and long-term sustainability. It also looks at the effects of intertemporal production choices on the environment, economic development, and social welfare. This study offers insights into the intertemporal production decision process with finite resources and informs the formulation of policies for resource management, sustainability, and economic growth through empirical analysis, case studies, and theoretical frameworks.

#### KEYWORDS:

Depletable Resources, Economic Growth, Environmental Sustainability, Intertemporal Production Decision, Resource Extraction, Resource Prices.

#### INTRODUCTION

Making a choice on manufacturing typically involves considering how it may affect future costs or sales. One example of this is the learning curve. The company gains experience that decreases future expenses by producing now. The value of this investment must be considered when evaluating costs and benefits in this situation since production today is in part an investment in future cost reduction. Another example is the creation of a finite resource. There will be less oil available for production in the future if an oil well owner pumps oil today. This has to be considered when determining how much to create.

### The Production Decision of an Individual Resource Producer

Imagine receiving an oil well from your wealthy uncle. 1000 barrels of oil may be produced from the well at a marginal cost of \$10 per barrel with constant average production. Should all the oil be produced now, or should some be saved for later?

You may assume that the solution is based on the potential financial gain from extracting the oil from the earth. After all, if the price of the oil exceeds the expense of extraction, why not take it out? This, however, disregards the opportunity cost of burning up today's oil so that it won't be there tomorrow [1]–[3].

Therefore, the right response relies less on the profit level right now than it does on how quickly you anticipate the price of oil to increase. Like money in a bank, oil in the ground should only be kept there if it generates returns that are at least as high as the market interest rate. You would be better off extracting and selling all of the oil now, selling it for a profit, and investing the money if you believe the price of oil would stay the same or increase gradually. However, you should leave it in the ground if you anticipate a sharp increase in the price of oil.

### A Variety of Interest Rates

as if there were a single market interest rate, individual needs and supply. In reality, lending and borrowing occurs on a variety of terms and circumstances between people, businesses, and the government. As a consequence, "market" interest rates are very variable. Here, we provide a quick description of a few of the most significant interest rates that are cited in the press and sometimes used to guide capital investment choices. Rate on Treasury Bills an American government short-term bond (of one year or less) is known as a Treasury bill. It is a pure discount bond, which means that rather of paying coupons, it is sold at a discount to its eventual redemption value. A three-month Treasury note, for instance, may sell for \$98. It offers an effective three-month return of around 2% and an effective yearly yield of about 8% since it may be redeemed for \$100 in three months.<sup>22</sup> The interest rate on Treasury bills may be thought of as a short-term, risk-free rate.

Rate on Treasury Bonds A Treasury bond is a longer-term bond that the US government issues, often for a period of 10 to 30 years. Rates change based on the bond's maturity. Rate of Discount From time to time, commercial banks borrow money from the Federal Reserve for brief durations. The rate that the Federal Reserve assesses on these loans—referred to as discounts—is the discount rate. Government Funds Rate For overnight loans of government money, banks charge each other an interest rate of this amount. Money in circulation and deposits maintained at Federal Reserve institutions make up federal funds. To satisfy reserve requirements, banks maintain money in Federal Reserve banks. At the federal funds rate, banks with extra reserves may lend these cash to banks with insufficient reserves. The Federal Reserve's primary tool for monetary policy is the federal funds rate.

Rate for Commercial Paper Short-term (six months or less) discount bonds issued by reputable corporate borrowers are referred to as commercial paper. The rate for commercial paper is often less than 1% more than the rate for Treasury bills since it is only marginally riskier than Treasury bills. Premier Rate This rate, also known as the reference rate, is posted by sizable banks as a benchmark for short-term loans to their largest corporate debtors. This rate does not change from day to day as other rates do, as we observed Rate on Corporate Bonds The average yearly rates

on long-term (usually 20-year) corporate bonds in various risk categories (such as high-grade, medium-grade, etc.) are reported in newspapers and official publications. These average yields show the cost of long-term debt for firms.

## DISCUSSION

### General Equilibrium Analysis

It is sufficient to do a partial equilibrium analysis to comprehend market behaviour. Market interactions, though, might be significant. We learned how, depending on whether two products are complementary or substitutable, a change in the price of one might impact the demand for another. We learned that a rise in a firm's input demand might result in an increase in both the market price of the input and the price of the final output.

General equilibrium analysis, in contrast to partial equilibrium analysis, estimates the prices and quantities in every market concurrently and explicitly accounts for feedback effects. A price or quantity adjustment in one market brought on by price and quantity changes in linked markets is known as a feedback effect. Imagine, for instance, that oil imports are subject to a levy by the US government. By increasing the cost of foreign oil, this approach would instantly cause the supply curve for oil to move to the left and drive up the price of oil. However, the tax's effects would not stop there. The demand for and price of natural gas would rise as a result of the increased oil price. Oil demand would grow (shift to the right) as a result of the increased natural gas price, pushing up the price of oil even more. The oil and natural gas markets will keep interacting until ultimately a balance is established when the amount supplied and required in both markets are equal. In reality, it is impossible to do a full general equilibrium study, which examines how changes in one market affect all other markets. Instead, we limit ourselves to two or three closely connected markets. For instance, in addition to considering the oil market, we may also include the natural gas, coal, and electricity sectors.

## DISCUSSION

### Reaching General Equilibrium

The price of DVDs will alter as a result of the market price of films, which will then have an impact on the price of films, and so on. The last step is to concurrently establish the equilibrium pricing and quantities of DVDs and films. The intersection of the equilibrium supply and demand curves for movie tickets ( $SM^*$  and  $DM^*$ ), which equal \$6.82, The intersection of the equilibrium DVD supply and demand curves ( $SV$  and  $DV^*$ ) yields the equilibrium DVD price of \$3.58. The DVD market supply and demand curves were developed under the assumption that movie tickets cost \$6.82, therefore these prices reflect general equilibrium. Similar to how DVDs have been assumed to cost \$3.58 when drawing the curves for cinema tickets. In other words, neither set of curves contradicts the pricing in linked markets, and there is no reason to believe that each market's supply or demand curves will continue to move in either direction. We must concurrently identify two prices that equalise amount provided and quantity requested in all associated marketplaces in order to determine the general equilibrium prices (and quantities) in practise. Four equations the supply of movie tickets, the demand for movie tickets, the supply of DVDs, and the demand for DVDs need to be solved for our two markets [4]–[6]. Be aware that even if we were simply considering the movie industry, it would be crucial to take the DVD market into consideration when estimating the effects of a film tax. According to this example's

partial equilibrium analysis, we can infer that the tax will cause movie tickets to rise from \$6.00 to \$6.35 in price. However, a general equilibrium study demonstrates that the tax has a higher effect on the cost of movie tickets: In actuality, it would rise to \$6.82. DVDs and films are interchangeable products. You should be able to persuade yourself that a partial equilibrium analysis would overestimate the effect of a tax if the items in issue are complements by creating diagrams similar to those for petrol and cars. Gasoline's price will rise as a result of a tax, but this rise will result in a decrease in demand for cars, which in turn will result in a little decrease in gasoline's price.

### **The Economic Efficiency of Competitive Markets**

Markets are true both in a general equilibrium environment with perfect competition in all markets and in an exchange framework. It teaches us that the economy would naturally allocate resources in a Pareto effective manner without the need for governmental oversight, making it the most straightforward approach to explain how Adam Smith's famous invisible hand operates. Markets may operate in an economically effective way because of the autonomous decisions made by consumers and producers who accept pricing as givens. It should come as no surprise that the invisible-hand outcome is often employed as the standard by which the operations of all real-world markets are measured. Some claim that since markets are so competitive, the invisible hand supports the normative case for less government involvement. Others contend that the government should play a larger role in society and argue that intervention is necessary to increase market competition.

### **The Utility Possibilities Frontier**

Remember that in our two-person exchange economy, the utility levels that James and Karen may attain are shown at each point on the contract curve. We presented the data from the Edgeworth box in a different style. On the horizontal axis, James' utility is calculated, and on the vertical axis, Karen's utility. Each point in the Edgeworth box corresponds to a point on the contract curve because each allocation produces benefit for both parties. James' utility increases with every motion to the right, whereas Karen's utility increases with every move up.

All Pareto optimal allocations are represented by the utility possibilities frontier. It displays the degrees of fulfillment attained after the two people have reached the contract curve. James has no commodities and hence no utility at point OJ, whereas Karen has no goods at point OK, which is the other extreme. One person cannot be made better off without making the other person worse off since all other points on the frontier, such as E, F, and G, correspond to points on the contract curve. However, Point H illustrates an inefficient allocation since each deal inside the shaded region benefits either one or both sides. Both parties would benefit from reaching L, but L is not feasible since there aren't enough of both items to provide the utility levels that the point denotes.

The idea that an allocation must be Pareto efficient in order to be fair may appear logical. Compare the points H, F, and E. Both F and E are effective and, in contrast to H, each benefits one person without harming the other. We may thus agree that it is unfair for James, Karen, or both to get allocation H rather than F or E from an economy. But imagine that the only allocations available are H and G. G: Is it more fair than H? No, not always. G provides James with more utility than H while providing Karen with less. G and H both seem fairer to some persons than H does to others. It follows that one Pareto inefficient resource allocation may be more fair than another Pareto efficient one. How to define an equal distribution is the issue. We may still

question which of these locations is the most fair even if we limit ourselves to all points on the utility possibilities frontier. The answer relies on what one believes equity to be, and hence, on the value comparisons between people that one is ready to make.

### Functions Of Social Welfare

In economics, a social welfare function is often used to express the wellbeing of society as a whole in terms of the individual members' utilities. When evaluating policies that have an unequal impact on various parts of society, a social welfare function is helpful. One of these functions, the utilitarian, gives equal weight to everyone's utility and, as a result, maximises the overall utility of everyone in society. Each social welfare function may be linked to a certain equity viewpoint. However, certain viewpoints cannot be modelled by a social welfare function because they implicitly disregard the importance of personal utility. For instance, a market-oriented perspective says that the competitive market process's result is fair since it rewards those who are most capable and diligent. Even if products are distributed less equitably in E than F, E would be seen to be more fair than F in the case when E is the competitive equilibrium allocation.

The definition of equity is complicated when there are more than two parties involved. The Rawlsian viewpoint<sup>3</sup> takes into account a scenario in which individuals are unaware of their future endowments [7]–[9]. According to Rawls, in a world where you are unaware of your own "fate," you would choose a system that ensures that the individual with the least means in society would be treated fairly. In particular, the most equal distribution, in Rawls' opinion, maximises the value of the least fortunate member of society. The Rawlsian viewpoint could be egalitarian, envisaging a fair distribution of resources among all societal members. But it's not necessary. Assume that we can motivate the most productive people to work harder by paying them more highly than the least productive individuals. More commodities and services might be produced as a result of this strategy, some of which could then be redistributed to benefit the most vulnerable people in society.

### Equity and Perfect Competition

A Pareto efficient but potentially unfair conclusion results from a competitive equilibrium. In reality, depending on the initial allocation, a competitive equilibrium might happen at any point along the contract curve. Imagine, for instance, if Karen received all of the food and clothes from the original distribution. This would be at OJ, and Karen would have no motive to trade. A competitive equilibrium would thus exist at point OJ, point OK, and all other intermediate locations on the contract curve. In order to fulfil equality objectives by redistributing money or products across families, society needs to some part depend on government since efficient allocations are not always fair. The tax system may be used to accomplish these objectives.

For instance, a progressive income tax that redistributes money from the rich to the poor by funding programmes that benefit families according to income. The government may also distribute money via programmes like food stamps or provide public services like Medicaid, which offers medical assistance to the needy. According to his thesis, any equilibrium that is seen to be fair may be reached by allocating resources among people in an appropriate way, and that distribution need not necessarily result in inefficiencies. Sadly, any programme that redistributes money in our society is expensive from an economic standpoint. Taxes may encourage people to work less or force businesses to focus more of their resources on evading taxes than on creating

goods and services. As a result, there is a trade-off between the equality and efficiency objectives, and difficult decisions must be made. The first and second theorems are built upon by welfare economics, which offers a valuable framework for discussing the moral concerns surrounding the equity-efficiency problem in public policy [10].

### CONCLUSION

The intertemporal production choice is essential for efficient management of finite resources. Firms must carefully weigh the trade-offs between present consumption and future resource availability when determining the time and pace of resource extraction. The best depletion tactics combine short-term economic rewards with long-term sustainability, according to economic models like Hotelling's rule. Decisions for intertemporal production that use depletable resources must carefully take sustainability issues into account to maintain long-term viability. This research study set out to examine optimisation techniques, analyse the variables affecting production choices, and look at the consequences for sustainability. According to the research, intertemporal production choices include planning and resource allocation throughout time in order to maximise output and financial gains. However, decision-making gets more difficult when resources are limited. The availability of resources, the cost of extraction, consumer demand, and environmental concerns all play a role in production choices. Making choices that balance immediate advantages with long-term sustainability requires an understanding of how these aspects interact.

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## CHAPTER 7

### PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES FRONTIER: ANALYSIS, APPLICATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS

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#### ABSTRACT:

The highest output combination that economy can achieve given its resources and technology is represented by the Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF), a key idea in economics. The PPF framework, its design, and examples of how it has been used to examine trade-offs, efficiency, and economic growth are all covered in this article. This study intends to evaluate the trade-offs involved in production choices, analyse the production possibilities frontier (PPF) framework, and explore its applications in economic analysis. In particular, the resources and technology at hand, the production possibilities frontier shows the widest range of products and services that a particular economy is capable of producing. The paper dives into the models, frameworks, and theories that were utilised to analyse the PPF, such as resource allocation, efficiency, and opportunity cost. It examines the PPF's applicability in a range of economic scenarios, including resource allocation, trade-offs between different commodities, and economic expansion. The study also explores the trade-offs in production choices along the PPF curve, including the declining marginal returns theory and the effects of technological development. This research offers insights into the PPF framework and informs the creation of policies linked to resource allocation, economic planning, and productivity improvement via empirical analysis, case studies, and theoretical frameworks.

#### KEYWORDS:

Efficiency, Economic Growth, Decision-Making Production Possibilities Frontier, Trade-Offs, Resource Allocation, Trade-Offs.

#### INTRODUCTION

The frontier of production possibilities depicts the different combinations of food and clothes that can be produced with constant inputs of labour and money, keeping technology constant. The production contract curve is used to create the frontier. Each point on the production possibilities frontier and contract curve represents a level of food and clothes that was produced effectively. One extreme, represented by Point OF, in which only clothing is created, and the other, represented by Point OC, in which only food is produced.

The sites at which both food and clothes are effectively generated are B, C, and D, respectively. The production possibilities frontier is within Point A, which represents an inefficient allocation. In every point of the triangle ABC, labour and capital are used to the fullest extent possible in the manufacturing process. However, a labour market distortion, maybe brought on by a rent-maximizing union, has made the economy as a whole ineffective in terms of productivity.

The demand for the two products among consumers will determine where we land on the boundary of manufacturing possibilities. Let's say, for instance, that customers choose food above apparel. shows a potential competitive equilibrium at position D[1]–[3]. A location on the production possibilities frontier that is nearer to OF will be where the competitive equilibrium occurs if customers choose apparel over food. Why does the frontier of production possibilities slope downward? One must move inputs from the efficient manufacture of clothes to the efficient production of food, which decreases the level of clothing production. All of the points inside the frontier are off the production contract curve because they are all inefficient.

### **Marginal Rate of Transformation**

The production possibilities border is concave (bowed out), meaning that the more food is produced, the steeper the slope becomes. The size of the slope of the border at each point is what we refer to as the marginal rate of transformation of food for clothes (MRT) in order to explain this. The MRT calculates the amount of clothes needed to create each extra unit of food. The expanded portions, for instance, demonstrate that at B on the border, the MRT is 1, as 1 unit of clothes must be sacrificed in order to receive 1 more unit of food. However, in D, the MRT is 2, as it takes 2 pieces of clothes to get 1 extra unit of food. Be aware that the MRT rises as we go along the border of production potential, increasing food output. This rise is due to the fact that labour and capital are more productive when employed to manufacture more clothes or food, respectively. Let's say we start at OF, where just clothes is made. We now shift some labour and resources away from the manufacture of garments, where their marginal products are comparatively low, and towards the production of food, where their marginal products are high. Very little clothing manufacturing is wasted in these conditions in order to get the first unit of food.

However, as we advance along the frontier and produce less clothes, the productivities of labour and capital in the production of clothing increase while those in the production of food decline. Productivities are equal and the MRT is one at B. As we go farther along the frontier, we see that the MRT exceeds 1 because the input productivities for clothes increase higher while the productivities for food decline. In terms of production costs, we may also define how the production possibilities frontier is shaped. The marginal cost of manufacturing food is particularly low at OF, where relatively little clothing production is sacrificed to generate extra food: Very little input results in a large amount of output. In contrast, it costs a lot of both inputs to make one more item of clothing, which raises the marginal cost of clothing production. Therefore, the ratio of the marginal cost of producing food (MCF) to the marginal cost of manufacturing clothes (MCC) is low when the MRT is. The slope of the production possibilities border, in reality, quantifies the marginal cost of manufacturing one item in comparison to the marginal cost of generating the other.

### **The Efficiency of Competitive Markets**

for any initial resource allocation, a competitive process of interpersonal trade, whether through exchange, input markets, or output markets, would result in a Pareto efficient result. The first theorem of utility economics states that a competitive economy would achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of resources by relying on the self-interested aims of consumers and producers and the capacity of market prices to educate both sides. Second, we have shown that any optimal resource allocation may be accomplished by a competitive process with a proper redistribution of those resources when the indifference curves are convex. There might, of course, be several Pareto-

efficient outcomes. But according to the second theorem of welfare economics, questions of efficiency and fairness may be handled separately under certain (admittedly perfect) circumstances. We know that there is a competitive equilibrium that maximises consumer and producer surplus, i.e., is economically efficient, if we are ready to set equity concerns aside. Market competition is an essential presupposition for both welfare economics theories. Sadly, none of these conclusions is necessarily true when markets are no longer competitive. We will cover the causes and remedies for market failure in the next two chapters. But first, it's important to go through what we know about how the competitive process works. Thus, we provide a list of the prerequisites for exchange, input, and output market economic efficiency.

## DISCUSSION

When a producer or supplier of a factor input has market power, inefficiency results. Consider the case when the food producer in our Edgeworth box diagram has monopolistic power. In order to determine the output quantity where marginal revenue (rather than price) equals marginal cost, it decides to sell less product at a higher price than it would in a market where there is competition. A lower marginal cost of food production will result from the decreased output. The marginal cost of producing garments will rise as a result of the allocation of the freed-up manufacturing inputs. Because  $MRTFC = MCF / MCC$ , the marginal rate of transformation will therefore fall. On the production possibilities frontier, for instance, we may arrive at A. Because enterprises with market power utilise different pricing in their production choices than customers do in their consumption decisions, it is inefficient to produce too much clothes and too little food. Market dominance in an input market would be justified using a similar justification. Assume that unions provided employees the ability to control the supply of their labour in the food producing industry. Then, too little labour at an excessively high pay ( $w_F$ ) would be provided to the food business, and too much labour at an excessively low rate ( $w_C$ ). Because, the input efficiency requirements would be met in the apparel sector. However, wages in the food sector would be higher than those in the apparel sector. As a result, equals  $MRTSLK$  C. Because efficiency demands that the marginal rates of technological substitution in the production of all items be equal, the outcome is input inefficiency [4]–[6].

### Incomplete Information

market system will not function effectively if customers do not have reliable information about market pricing or product quality. Due to a lack of knowledge, companies may be tempted to overproduce certain items while underproducing others. In other instances, some customers could choose not to purchase a product even when doing so would benefit them, while others choose to purchase goods that harm their situation. For instance, customers can purchase weight-loss drugs only to discover that they are useless medically. And last, certain markets may never grow because of a lack of knowledge. For instance, it can be hard to buy some types of insurance because insurance providers don't have enough data on customers who might be at danger.

### Externalities

Market prices educate both producers and consumers, which makes the pricing system effective. Market pricing, however, don't always represent the actions of either consumers or producers. When a consumption or production activity influences other consumption or production activities in a way that is not immediately represented in market pricing, this is known as an externality. The phrase "externality" is used because impacts on other people—benefits or costs—

are not internal to the market. Imagine, for instance, that a steel company releases waste into a river, rendering a leisure area downstream unfit for fishing or swimming. Because the manufacturer of steel does not pay the full cost of wastewater and utilises excessive amounts of wastewater to make its steel, there is an externality. This externality results in inefficient input. The price of steel, which is equal to the marginal cost of manufacturing, will be cheaper if this externality permeates the whole industry than it would be if the cost of production represented the effluent cost. As a consequence, excessive amounts of steel will be produced, leading to production inefficiencies.

### **Public Goods**

The market's inability to provide items that many customers value is the last cause of market failure. A public product may be made easily affordable for a large number of users, but once it is made accessible to certain users, it is exceedingly challenging to stop them from using it. Think about a company debating whether to do research on a novel technology for which it cannot apply for a patent. Once the innovation is made available to the public, anybody may copy it. The study will not be lucrative as long as it is challenging to prevent other businesses from selling the product.

### **Asymmetric Information**

Information that is asymmetric is fairly prevalent. A product's vendor often has greater knowledge about its quality than does the consumer. Employers often underestimate the capabilities and abilities of their employees. Additionally, company managers are better knowledgeable than the owners of their companies when it comes to expenses, competitive advantages, and investment prospects. Numerous institutional systems in our society are also explained by asymmetric knowledge. It's one of the reasons why automakers provide guarantees on new vehicle components and services, why businesses and workers sign agreements including incentives and rewards, and why stockholders of organizations are required to keep an eye on management' conduct.

We start by looking at a scenario where product sellers know more about a product's quality than purchasers do. We'll look at how asymmetric information of this type might cause a market to collapse. In the second part, we show how by providing signals about the caliber of their goods, merchants may mitigate some of the drawbacks of asymmetric knowledge. Product warranties provide a sort of protection that is useful when buyers and sellers have different levels of knowledge. However, as the third part demonstrates, when buyers have more knowledge than sellers, buying insurance comes with its own set of challenges.

In the fourth part, we demonstrate that when it is expensive for owners of private firms to oversee managers' actions, they may pursue objectives other than profit maximization. To put it another way, managers have more knowledge than owners. We also demonstrate how businesses may encourage managers to maximize profits even when doing so is expensive. Finally, we demonstrate that when workers have more knowledge than employers have about their productivity, labor markets may function inefficiently.

### **Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons**

There is asymmetric information regarding the quality of used automobiles, which is why they sell for considerably less than new ones: A used car's seller is far more knowledgeable about the

vehicle than is the potential buyer. Although the buyer may pay a technician to inspect the vehicle, the seller will be better knowledgeable since they have used it before. Additionally, the very fact that the vehicle is up for sale suggests that it could be a "lemon" after all, why sell a dependable vehicle? The potential purchaser of a secondhand automobile will thus always be sceptical of its quality and for good reason.

George Akerlof's original analysis of the effects of asymmetric knowledge on product quality covered far more ground than just the used automobile market. Asymmetry in information regarding product quality also exists in the markets for employment, insurance, and financial credit. Starting with the used vehicle market, we will examine the ramifications of asymmetric information before examining how the same concepts apply to other markets.

### The Market for Used Cars

Assume there are two different categories of secondhand automobiles: high-quality cars and low-quality cars. Consider as well that both buyers and sellers may identify the kind of automobile they are purchasing. Following then, there will be two markets, the supply curve for premium automobiles is SH in portion (a), while the demand curve is DH. Similar to that, the supply and demand curves for low-quality autos are represented by SL and DL in section (b). Owners of high-quality automobiles are more hesitant to part with them and must get a higher price to do so, hence SH lies to the left of SL for any given price [7]–[9]. Similar to DL, DH is greater than DL due to purchasers' willingness to spend extra for a high-quality vehicle. According to the graph, 50,000 vehicles of each class are sold, with the market price for high-quality vehicles being \$10,000 and for low-quality vehicles being \$5,000. Actually, the seller of a used automobile is considerably more knowledgeable about its condition than the customer is. Buyers don't realise how good an automobile is until they've had it for a time.

Think about what might transpire if consumers were unaware of the quality of the automobiles being sold. Buyers may first believe that there is a 50/50 chance that an automobile will be of good quality. Why? Because 50,000 vehicles of each category are sold when both dealers and purchasers are aware of the quality. As a result, when buying an automobile, purchasers consider all vehicles to be of "medium quality," meaning that there is an equal probability of receiving either a high- or low-quality vehicle. The demand for automobiles considered to be of medium quality, shown by DM is below DH but above DL (of course, after purchasing the car and driving it for a time, they will realise its actual quality). The graph depicts the approximate \$7,500 price per vehicle for these mid-range vehicles. However, there will be 75,000 more low-quality automobiles sold than high-quality cars, a decrease of 25,000.

Customers' perceptions of demand change when they become aware that the majority of sold cars—roughly three-fourths of the total—are of poor quality. As the new perceived demand curve may be DLM, this indicates that, generally speaking, people believe vehicles to be of low to medium quality. The mix of vehicles then significantly leans towards poor quality. The perceived demand curve moves farther to the left as a consequence, further skewing the mix of automobiles towards lower quality.

This transition keeps happening until only subpar autos are offered for sale. Consumers properly expect that any automobile they purchase would be of poor quality since at that moment the market price would be too low to enable the production of any high-quality vehicles for sale. As a consequence, D will be the sole meaningful demand curve [10].

## CONCLUSION

The highest output combination that economy can achieve given its resources and technology is represented by the Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF), a key idea in economics. The PPF framework, its design, and examples of how it has been used to examine trade-offs, efficiency, and economic growth are all covered in this article. The paper looks at the main elements that affect how the PPF curve moves and looks at the consequences for resource allocation and decision-making. The results help to clarify the PPF idea and demonstrate its usefulness in economic research. Resource allocation, trade-offs, and economic development may all be studied using the production possibilities frontier (PPF) paradigm. This study set out to analyse the PPF, investigate its uses, and look at the trade-offs that come into play when making production choices. According to the research, the PPF encapsulates the broadest range of commodities and services that a particular country is technologically and economically capable of producing. It exemplifies the trade-offs that arise when resources are divided among several products or services. grasp the PPF requires a grasp of the idea of opportunity cost, which is the value of the next best option forgone when opting to manufacture a certain mix of products.

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## CHAPTER 8

### IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA FOR OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING DOES THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA DOOM

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#### ABSTRACT:

Game theory's notion known as the Prisoners' Dilemma has substantial ramifications for comprehending how businesses behave when setting prices in oligopolistic market structures. The consequences of the Prisoners' Dilemma for oligopolistic pricing tactics are summarised in this abstract. The objectives of this study are to analyse the Prisoner's Dilemma's ramifications, investigate cooperative tactics, and look at how game theory is used to explain decision-making in diverse contexts. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-known game theory example of the conflict between personal interests and group interests. The analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma includes game theory, Nash equilibrium, and the notion of dominating tactics, among other theories, models, and analytical frameworks. It explores cooperative tactics that could help people work together and find a solution to the problem. The study also examines the uses of game theory in a variety of disciplines, including economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. This research offers insights into the consequences of the Prisoner's Dilemma and supports the development of evidence-based decision-making and policy in the areas of collaboration, negotiation, and conflict resolution. It does so via empirical analysis, case studies, and theoretical frameworks.

#### KEYWORDS:

Industry-Specific Regulation, Oligopolistic Pricing, Policy Implications, Prisoners' Dilemma, Oligopolistic Pricing, Suboptimal Outcomes.

#### INTRODUCTION

To strong competition and poor earnings in oligopolistic firms? No, not always. Despite the fact that our fictitious convicts only have one chance to confess, most businesses repeatedly set production and pricing, constantly monitoring the actions of their rivals and modifying their own appropriately. This enables businesses to build reputations on which trust may be based. Because of this, oligopolistic coordination and cooperation may sometimes succeed. Consider an industry with three or four long-standing companies as an example. The management of those companies may eventually weary of losing money as a result of price wars, and an unspoken agreement may form wherein all companies maintain high pricing and no company attempts to steal market share from its rivals. Each company may be tempted to undercut its rivals, but its management are aware that the benefits won't last long since the rivals will respond, which will lead to more long-term conflict and lower earnings[1]–[3].

In certain sectors, the prisoners' dilemma is resolved in this way, but not in others. Sometimes managers want to compete aggressively in order to gain market share rather than being satisfied



with the somewhat high earnings produced via tacit collaboration. Implicit understandings might be challenging to achieve at times. For instance, businesses may dispute over the "correct" collusive pricing if their expenses vary and they make differing estimates of the market's demand. While Firm B believes the price to be \$9, the "correct" price is \$10. Firm A may see a \$9 pricing as an effort to undercut it and respond by dropping its price to \$8. A price war occurs as a consequence. Implicit collusion is thus transient in many businesses. War breaks out if one company is seen by its rivals as "rocking the boat" by altering its pricing or expanding promotion because there is often a core layer of distrust.

### **Price Rigidity**

Oligopolistic enterprises often have a strong demand for pricing stability since implicit collaboration is frequently weak. Price rigidity may thus be a sign of oligopolistic sectors. Businesses are hesitant to alter prices even when costs or demand shift. They worry that reducing pricing would send the incorrect signals to their rivals and spark a price war if costs go down or market demand drops. Additionally, if costs or demand increase, they are hesitant to raise prices out of concern that their rivals would not do the same. The kinked demand curve model of oligopoly is based on the concept of price rigidity. This model predicts that each business will encounter a demand curve that is kinked at the present price  $P^*$ . The demand curve is very elastic for prices higher than  $P$ . The company does this because it thinks that if it increases its price over  $P$ , other companies won't do the same, and as a result, it would lose sales and a significant portion of its market share. However, the company thinks that if it drops its pricing below  $P^*$ , other businesses would follow suit since they won't want to lose their market share. In such instance, sales would grow solely to the amount that higher overall market demand is brought about by a lower market price.

### **Price Signaling and Price Leadership**

The fact that it is hard for companies to come to an agreement (without speaking to one another) on what the price should be is a major barrier to implicit collusive pricing. When cost and demand conditions and hence, the "correct" price change, coordination becomes very challenging. Price signalling, a kind of implicit cooperation, may sometimes get around this issue. For instance, a company may declare that it has increased its pricing (perhaps via a press release) in the hopes that its rivals would heed the news and do the same. All of the businesses will make more money if rivals follow suit.

Sometimes a trend develops when one company announces price adjustments on a regular basis, and other businesses in the sector do the same. Price leadership is the name given to this pattern: Implicitly, one company is acknowledged as the "leader," while the other companies are the "price followers," matching its pricing. The issue of coordinating prices is resolved by this action: The leader sets the price, which is what everyone pays. Consider the scenario where three oligopolistic businesses are now charging \$10 for their goods. (If everyone is aware of the demand curve in the market, this might be the Nash equilibrium price.)

Imagine if they could agree on a price of \$20 and significantly boost their earnings by collaborating. It is unlawful to meet and determine a \$20 price. Instead, imagine that Firm A increases its pricing to \$15 and informs the business press that the price increase is necessary to revive the industry's economy. The obvious message here, according to Firms B and C, is that Firm A wants their help in boosting prices. Then, they may increase their own costs to \$15. Firm

A may then raise the price even more, say, to \$18 and Firms B and C may follow suit. Regardless of whether the \$20 profit-maximizing price is achieved (or exceeded), a pattern of collaboration has been created that, from the perspective of the company, may be almost as successful as meeting and officially agreeing on a price. <sup>6</sup>

This extreme case of pricing leadership and signalling might result in an antitrust lawsuit. However, in certain sectors, a large company may emerge as the front-runner, at which point the other companies decide that it would be better to just match the leader's pricing rather than attempt to undercut the leader or one another. A prime example is the American car sector, where General Motors has long been the market leader in terms of pricing. Price leadership may also help oligopolistic businesses overcome the resistance to changing pricing that results from apprehension about being outbid or "rocking the boat." Firms may find it more and more important to adjust previously fixed pricing when cost and demand factors change. They could then turn to a price leader to indicate when and how much the price should change in such situation. Sometimes a big business will naturally take the lead; other times, multiple companies may take the lead intermittently.

## DISCUSSION

### The Dominant Firm Model

In certain oligopolistic marketplaces, a single big company accounts for a significant portion of overall revenues, with a number of smaller companies supplying the remaining portion of the market. In such case, the large company could behave in a dominating manner by determining a price that maximises its own profits. The other businesses, who individually may not have much control over pricing, would then behave in a completely competitive manner by accepting the price established by the dominating business as given and producing in accordance with it. But what price ought should the prevailing business set? It must consider how the production of the other enterprises relies on the price it sets in order to maximise profit [4]–[6].

How a dominating corporation determines its pricing is Here,  $D$  is the supply curve (i.e., the aggregate marginal cost curve) of the smaller peripheral companies, and  $SF$  is the market demand curve. The dominating company must identify its  $DD$  demand curve. The slope in the illustration simply represents the gap between market demand and the supply of niche businesses. For instance, the supply of periphery companies is about equal to the market demand at price  $P_1$ , therefore the dominating company cannot sell anything at this price. Fringe companies cannot offer any of the product at a price of  $P_2$  or below, leaving the dominating company in front of the market demand curve. The dominating business is confronted with the demand curve  $DD$  at prices between  $P_1$  and  $P_2$ .

### Cartels

In a cartel, producers formally agree to work together to determine production levels and pricing points. It is not necessary for all producers in an industry to join the cartel, and most cartels only include a portion of producers. However, if enough producers abide by the cartel's rules and if market demand is sufficiently inelastic, the cartel may raise prices much above levels of the competition. Global cartels are common. While American corporations are not allowed to collude, other nations' antitrust laws are far weaker and sometimes not well implemented. Furthermore, nothing bans the formation of cartels by nations or by businesses that are owned or

controlled by foreign governments. For instance, the OPEC cartel is a global pact among nations that produce oil that has been successful in pushing global oil prices above levels that are competitive.

Other global cartels have also been successful in driving up costs. For instance, the International Bauxite Association (IBA) doubled bauxite prices in the middle of the 1970s, while a covert international uranium cartel increased uranium prices. The success of certain cartels lasted longer: A cartel known as Mercurio Europeo held mercury prices at monopoly levels from 1928 until the beginning of the 1970s, while an international cartel controlled the iodine market from 1878 to 1939. Most cartels, however, haven't been able to boost costs. Even though there is a global cartel for copper, the prices of copper have never really been affected by it. Tin, coffee, tea, and cocoa price increases attempted by cartels have also failed.

### **Requirements For Cartel Success**

What causes certain cartels to prosper while others do not? For a cartel to succeed, there are two requirements. It is necessary to first establish a stable cartel organisation whose members abide by the agreed-upon pricing and output levels. Contrary to our inmates in the prisoner's dilemma, cartel members may communicate with one another and come to a formal agreement. However, this does not imply that consenting is simple. Different members can wish to establish prices at various levels because they have varying expenses, opinions about the state of the market, and even different goals.

Each cartel member will also be motivated to "cheat" by modestly decreasing its price in order to take up more market share than it was given. Most often, the only thing that stops this kind of deceit is the prospect of a long-term return to competitive pricing. However, if the benefits of cartelization are substantial enough, that threat could be enough. The possibility of monopolistic power constitutes the second requirement. If a cartel encounters a very elastic demand curve, it will have limited ability to increase prices even if it can resolve its organisational issues. The most crucial need for success may be prospective monopoly power; if the benefits of collaboration are high, cartel members will be more motivated to address their organisational issues.

### **Analysis of Cartel Pricing**

Rarely do all the manufacturers get together to create a cartel. When setting prices, a cartel must take into consideration the supply response of rival (noncartel) producers as it often only controls a small fraction of overall output. Thus, by using the dominant business model previously stated, cartel pricing may be examined. This model will be used to analyse the OPEC oil cartel and the CIPEC copper cartel. This will make it clearer to us why CIPEC failed to raise prices while OPEC did.

### **Gaming and Strategic Decisions**

the process of making strategic decisions. Any circumstance in which players (the participants) must make strategic decisions, i.e., choices that account for one another's actions and reactions, is referred to as a game. Examples of games include price-setting competition between businesses or a group of buyers bidding against one another for a piece of art at an auction. Players get payoffs from their strategic choices in the form of advantages or awards. The payoffs for the price-setting companies are profits; the payoff for the winning bidder at the auction is her

consumer surplus, or the value she assigns to the artwork minus the price she must pay. The best strategy for each participant should be determined, which is one of game theory's main goals. A game-playing guideline or action plan is known as a strategy. A strategy for our price-setting businesses may be: "I'll keep my price high as long as my competitors do the same, but once a competitor lowers his price, I'll lower mine even more." A bidder at an auction may use the following strategy: "I'll make a first bid of \$2000 to show the other bidders that I'm serious about winning, but I'll withdraw if other bidders raise the price above \$5000." A player's best course of action is the one that maximises predicted gain. We will concentrate on games with rational players who consider the implications of their choices. We are mostly interested in the following issue: How should I consider my rivals' behaviour when making choices if I think they are rational and seek to maximise their own rewards? Of course, you can run with rivals in real life who are unreasonable or less competent than you to consider the effects of their choices. However, a decent place to start is by supposing that your rivals are as logical and intelligent as you are.<sup>1</sup>[7]–[9]

As we shall see, it is not as easy as it would appear to take into consideration the behaviour of rivals. Even in situations of total symmetry and perfect knowledge (i.e., when my rivals and I have the same cost structure and are completely aware of each other's expenses, demand, etc.), choosing the best strategy may be challenging. In addition, we'll focus on more complicated scenarios where enterprises must deal with a variety of prices, kinds of information, and levels and types of competitive "advantage" and "disadvantage."

### **Noncooperative versus Cooperative Games**

Firms might choose to play cooperative or noncooperative economic games. Players in a cooperative game may form legally binding agreements that let them develop shared strategy. Negotiation and the execution of legally binding agreements are impossible in a noncooperative game. The haggling over a rug's price between a buyer and a seller is an example of a cooperative game. A cooperative solution to the game is conceivable if the buyer values the rug at \$200 while the cost of production is \$100: The total of the buyer's consumer surplus and the seller's profit will be maximised if the rug is sold for any price between \$101 and \$199, benefiting both sides. Another cooperative game might have two businesses haggling over a combined investment to create a new technology (presuming that neither business would have the necessary expertise to succeed alone). It is feasible to reach a cooperative conclusion that benefits both parties if the businesses can sign a legally enforceable agreement to split the earnings from their joint venture.

A scenario in which two rival businesses separately determine their pricing while taking into consideration one another's expected behaviour is an example of a noncooperative game. Each business is aware that it may increase its market share by undercutting its rival. However, it is aware that by doing so, it runs the danger of starting a pricing war. The auction stated above is yet another non-cooperative game: When choosing the best bidding strategy, each bidder must consider the expected actions of the other bidders. Keep in mind that the contracting possibilities are the main distinction between cooperative and noncooperative games. Binding contracts are conceivable in cooperative games but not in non-cooperative ones. Non-cooperative games will be our main focus. But whatever the game, remember this crucial aspect of making smart decisions: Understanding your adversary's perspective and predicting how they will react to your actions is crucial.

This statement may sound self-evident of course, one must comprehend an adversary's point of view. However, even in straightforward game scenarios, individuals often overlook or incorrectly assess their opponents' positions and the logical actions that such positions entail. Unusually, a \$1 note is put up for auction. The dollar is awarded to the highest bidder in exchange for the sum offered. The second-highest bidder, however, will likewise have to pay the sum that was offered and get nothing in return. How much would you offer if you were playing this game to win a \$1 bill? [10] According to classroom experience, kids often end up offering more than a dollar for a dollar. Typically, two players will each make a 20- and 30-cent offer. The lower bidder now faces a loss of 20 cents but decides to raise his offer by 10 cents in the hopes of earning a dollar. Up until two players push the bidding to \$1 versus \$.90, the escalation keeps on. The 90-cent bidder now has a choice to make: pay 90 cents to receive nothing, or bid \$1.10 for the dollar.

### CONCLUSION

The policy ramifications of the Prisoners' Dilemma under oligopolistic pricing may be discussed in the conclusion. It could cover the need of antitrust legislation, competition policy, or sector-specific rules to resolve market imperfections and advance equitable and effective results. This study intends to evaluate the trade-offs involved in production choices, analyse the production possibilities frontier (PPF) framework, and explore its applications in economic analysis. particular the resources and technology at hand, the production possibilities frontier shows the widest range of products and services that a particular economy is capable of producing. The paper dives into the models, frameworks, and theories that were utilised to analyse the PPF, such as resource allocation, efficiency, and opportunity cost.

It examines the PPF's applicability in a range of economic scenarios, including resource allocation, trade-offs between different commodities, and economic expansion. The study also explores the trade-offs in production choices along the PPF curve, including the declining marginal returns theory and the effects of technological development. This research offers insights into the PPF framework and informs the creation of policies linked to resource allocation, economic planning, and productivity improvement via empirical analysis, case studies, and theoretical frameworks.

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## CHAPTER 9

### ANALYSIS OF MIXED STRATEGIES

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#### ABSTRACT:

The notion of mixed tactics, their mathematical representation, and their effects in diverse game contexts are all explored in this work. It investigates the use of mixed strategies in many fields, such as economics, politics, and evolutionary biology, and looks at how they might result in equilibrium results. The analysis also shows the drawbacks and difficulties of blended tactics, revealing new directions for further study. This study intends to evaluate the trade-offs involved in production choices, analyse the production possibilities frontier (PPF) framework, and explore its applications in economic analysis. Particular the resources and technology at hand, the production possibilities frontier shows the widest range of products and services that a particular economy is capable of producing. The paper dives into the models, frameworks, and theories that were utilised to analyse the PPF, such as resource allocation, efficiency, and opportunity cost. It examines the PPF's applicability in a range of economic scenarios, including resource allocation, trade-offs between different commodities, and economic expansion. The study also explores the trade-offs in production choices along the PPF curve, including the declining marginal returns theory and the effects of technological development. This research offers insights into the PPF framework and informs the creation of policies linked to resource allocation, economic planning, and productivity improvement via empirical analysis, case studies, and theoretical frameworks.

#### KEYWORDS:

Decision-Making, Game Theory, Mixed strategies, Mathematical Representation, Probability, Uncertainty.

#### INTRODUCTION

A good illustration is the game "Matching Pennies." Each player picks heads or tails in this game, and then both players simultaneously unveil their own coins. If the coins line up (i.e., both come up heads or both come up tails), Player A wins and pays Player B \$1. In the event that the coins do not line up, Player B triumphs and pays Player A \$1. In the payout matrix is shown. It should be noted that in pure tactics for this game, there is no Nash equilibrium. Consider the scenario where Player A decided to play heads. Player B would therefore like to play tails. However, Player A would likewise prefer to play tails if Player B were to participate. There is never a heads or tails combination that makes both players happy; one or the other will always want to switch up their tactics. While there is no Nash equilibrium for pure strategies, there is one for mixed strategies, which include players making arbitrary decisions between two or more alternative actions based on sets of predetermined probabilities. To play heads with a probability of  $1/2$  and tails with a probability of  $1/2$ , Player A might just flip the coin in this game. In reality, if Player A employs this tactic and Player B adopts it as well, a Nash equilibrium will result:



Given what the opponent is doing, both players will be exerting every effort. Although the result is random, it should be noted that each player's anticipated reward is zero.[1], [2]

It could seem unusual to play a game where the actions are chosen at random. However, imagine that you are Player A and consider what might happen if you used a different approach than just tossing a coin. Let's say you choose to play heads. Player B would play tails if she were aware of this, and you would lose. If the game were played regularly, Player B might ultimately identify your pattern of play and decide on a strategy that contradicted it, even if she didn't know your approach. This would not be a Nash equilibrium since, of course, you would want to alter your approach. The only situation in which neither of you would have any motivation to switch tactics is if you and your opponent both randomly choose heads or tails with probability  $1/2$ . (You may verify that a Nash equilibrium is not produced by using alternate probabilities, such as  $3/4$  for heads and  $1/4$  for tails. Some games (like "Matching Pennies") do not have any Nash equilibria in pure strategies, which is one reason to take into account mixed strategies. However, it can be shown that every game has at least one Nash equilibrium provided we take into account mixed tactics. Therefore, when pure methods fail, mixed strategies may be used to win games. Of course, the individual game and participants will determine whether or not solutions combining mixed tactics are appropriate. For "Matching Pennies," poker, and other similar games, mixed tactics are probably extremely logical. On the other hand, a company may not think it is logical to assume that its rival would set its pricing arbitrarily.

Sexes Nash equilibria exist in certain games for both pure and hybrid tactics. One such is the game "The Battle of the Sexes," which you may be acquainted with. It proceeds as follows. Although Jim and Joan would want to spend Saturday night together, their entertainment preferences are different. Joan likes mud wrestling, while Jim would rather go to the opera. According to the reward matrix, Joan and Jim both prefer watching mud wrestling together over going to the opera alone. Jim would much rather go to the opera with Joan. First, it should be noted that there are two Nash equilibria for this game in pure strategies: the one when Jim and Joan both watch mud wrestling, and the one where they both go the opera. Both of these possibilities are equilibrium neither Jim nor Joan would wish to modify their choice given the other's decision. Joan, of course, would prefer the first of these outcomes and Jim the second. Jim picks wrestling with a probability of  $1/3$  and opera with a chance of  $2/3$ , whereas Joan chooses wrestling with a probability of  $1/3$  and opera with a probability of  $2/3$ . You can verify that if Joan employs this tactic, she will not be able to succeed with any other tactic, and vice versa. Because the result is unpredictable, Jim and Joan may expect to get a payment of  $2/3$  each.

### **A Game That Repeats Endlessly**

the game is endlessly replayed. In other words, my rival and I consistently establish rates year after year. The logical reaction to a tit-for-tat tactic is cooperative behaviour (i.e., charging a high fee). (This presupposes that my opponent is aware of or is able to determine that I am using a tit-for-tat tactic.) Consider a scenario in which I am undercut by a rival in a month to understand why. He will realise a sizable profit throughout that month. However, since my rival anticipates that I will maintain a low price the next month, his profit will decline and stay low as long as we both maintain our low prices. The cumulative loss of revenues that occurs from the game's endless repetition must be greater than any immediate gains made during the first month of undercutting. Thus, undercutting is illogical.

To make cooperation its own reasonable strategy in an eternally repeated game, my opponent need not even be aware that I am playing tit-for-tat. Even if my rival thinks there is just a remote possibility that we are engaging in tit-for-tat, he will still feel it reasonable to start with a high price and keep it for as long as I do. Why? The projected benefits of collaboration will exceed those of undercutting in an infinitely repeated game. This will be the case even if it is unlikely that I am playing tit-for-tat (and will thus continue collaborating).

### **Absolute Maximum Of Repetitions**

Now imagine that the game is played a certain amount of times, like  $N$  months. As long as  $N$  is finite, it may be enormous. If Firm 2, my rival, is logical and thinks I am logical, he would reason as follows: "Because Firm 1 is playing tit-for-tat, I (Firm 2) cannot undercut that is, until the final month. Since the game is finished once I undercut the previous month, I stand to gain significantly that month and Firm 1 is unable to respond. As a result, I'll charge a premium fee up until the very final month before dropping it. But since Firm 1 has also discovered this, I also want to charge a cheap price in the last month. Of course, Firm 2 is aware of this and is aware that I'll set a low price for the last month. What about the following month, though? Firm 2 decides to undercut and charge a cheap price in the next-to-last month as there won't be any collaboration in the final month anyhow. Of course, I've worked this out too, so in the next to final month I'll also set a low price. The game collapses because the same justification is true for each month before: The only logical consequence is that we both charge a little amount each month.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **Tit-For-Tat In Practice**

placing us in the same predicament as the captives. In actuality, though, titfor-tat might sometimes succeed and collaboration can win out. There are two main causes. First, because most managers are unsure of how long they will be in competition with their competitors, cooperating with them is a wise course of action. The unravelling argument that starts with a definite anticipation of undercutting in the previous month no longer holds water if the outcome of the replayed game is unclear. It will make sense to play tit-for-tat, just as it would in an eternally repeated game [3]–[5]. Second, the degree of my reasoning could be questioned by my rival. Let's say my opponent suspects (he need not be positive) that I am engaging in tit-for-tat. He also believes that I may be playing titfor-tat "blindly" or with limited reason if I haven't figured out the above-discussed logical ramifications of a constrained temporal horizon. My rival believes, for instance, that maybe I have not realised he would undercut me in the most recent month, so that I should likewise offer a cheap price, and so on.

Maybe Firm 1 would play tit-for-tat blindly, charging a high price as long as I charge a high price, speculates my rival. assuming so, it makes sense for my rival to keep his pricing high up until the final month when he will undercut me, assuming the time horizon is long enough. The word "perhaps" has been emphasised, as you can see. The fact that I am playing tit-for-tat "blindly" or even that I am playing tit-for-tat at all should not be known to my opponent. If the time horizon is large enough, cooperative behaviour might be advantageous just by being a possibility (till near the end). Although my opponent's assumption about how I am playing the game may be incorrect, cooperative behaviour is advantageous in terms of anticipated value. With a long time horizon, even if my opponent is the first to undercut, the aggregate of present

and future gains, weighted by the likelihood that the hypothesis is accurate, may surpass the sum of profits from price competition. After all, if I am mistaken and my rival charges a low price, I can change my plan for only one period's profit a little expense in comparison to the significant profit I may earn if we both decide to set a high price. The inmates' conundrum may thus have a cooperative resolution in a subsequent game. Managers are unsure of how "perfectly rationally" they and their rivals behave since the game is often replayed over a protracted and unknown period of time. As a consequence, cooperation dominates in certain sectors, especially those where there are few enterprises that compete for a long time under stable demand and cost circumstances, even when no contracts are established. An example is the water metre business, which is covered below. However, there is little to no cooperative behaviour in many other businesses.

There are occasions when too many enterprises prevent cooperation from starting or lead it to fail entirely. Failure to collaborate occurs more often as a consequence of quickly changing cost or demand factors. It is challenging for the enterprises to come to an implicit understanding of what collaboration should include due to uncertainty regarding demand or expenses. Keep in mind that an express agreement reached via meetings and conversations may result in a breach of antitrust laws. Suppose, for instance, that cost disparities or varying demand perceptions cause one business to believe that cooperating requires charging \$50, while a second firm believes it requires charging \$40. If the second company costs \$40, the first company could see it as a market share heist and counter with a \$35 pricing. There might then be a pricing war.

### Sequential Games

At the same moment, both players move. For instance, in the Cournot duopoly model, both businesses simultaneously set output. Players move in turns in games that are sequential. One company sets output before the other does in the Stackelberg model, which is a sequential game and. There are numerous other examples, such as a company's decision to advertise and the response from its rival; a company's investment to prevent entry into a market; a potential competitor's decision to enter the market; or a new government regulation and the investment and output responses of the regulated companies. The secret to winning a sequential game is to consider each player's potential moves and logical responses. back to the straightforward example of the product selection issue that was initially covered in This issue includes two businesses competing in a market where they can effectively launch two new varieties of breakfast cereal as long as they each launch only one.

Let's alter the payout matrix a little bit this time. The demonstrates that the new sweet cereal will always sell better than the new crispy cereal, generating a profit of 20 instead of 10 (perhaps due to customer preferences favouring sweet over crunchy foods). However, as long as each is released by a single company, both new cereals will continue to be lucrative. Assume that both businesses must make their choices public simultaneously and independently without knowing what the other is planning. Then both will likely start selling the sugary cereal, which will result in financial loss for both. Let's say Firm 1 can ramp up production more quickly and launch its new cereal first. Now the game is sequential: Firm 1 offers a new cereal, followed by Firm 2. What result will this game have? Firm 1 must take into account its rival's logical answer when making a choice. It is aware that Firm 2 will offer a competing cereal to any it introduces. As a result, it will provide the sweet cereal, anticipating that Firm 2 would counter with the crunchy one [6]–[8].

### Threats, Commitments, and Credibility

Two examples of how a corporation that acts first might establish a *fait accompli* that provides it an edge over its rival are the product choice dilemma and the Stackelberg model. We'll look more broadly at the benefit that a company might get by relocating first in this section. We'll also talk about the factors that affect whether company moves first. We will concentrate on the following issue: What steps may a company take to improve its position in the market? How, for instance, might a business prevent new rivals from entering the market or persuade those that already exist to increase their prices, cut their production, or exit the market entirely? Remember how the Stackelberg model favoured the corporation that went early by committing to a high output? Making a commitment—limiting its behaviour moving forward is essential. Consider the possibility that Firm 1, the original mover, might subsequently alter its viewpoint in reaction to what Firm 2 does to understand why. Considering that it is aware that Firm 1 would react by decreasing the production it first stated, Firm 1 must commit in order to benefit from first-mover advantages. Firm 1 effectively controls Firm 2's behaviour by controlling its own.

Although it may sound counterintuitive, we'll soon discover that the notion of controlling your own behaviour in order to obtain an advantage is not. Let's think about a few instances. Let's first go back to the product selection issue. The company with the earliest launch of their new morning cereal will succeed. Who will launch their cereal first, though? Even if both businesses need the same amount of time to set up production, each is motivated to focus on the sweet cereal first. The crucial verb is commit. Firm 2 will have little incentive to trust Firm 1 if it only claims that it will manufacture the delicious cereal. Since Firm 2 is aware of the incentives, it may make the same statement with more fervour. Firm 1 must somehow restrain its own behaviour in order to persuade Firm 2 that Firm 1 is compelled to manufacture the delicious cereal. Prior to the new sweet cereal's release, Firm 1 may spend a lot of money on an expensive advertising campaign, risking its standing.

A contract for the forward delivery of a significant amount of sugar might likewise be signed by Firm 1 (and sent to Firm 2 in addition to making the contract public). The plan is for Firm 1 to commit to making the sugary cereal. By committing, Firm 2 will be persuaded to do the action that Firm 1 desires, which is to create the crunchy cereal [9], [10]. Why can't Firm 1 just make a threat, saying that it will make the sweet cereal even if Firm 2 does the same? Because Firm 2 can make the same threat and has little reason to trust the first one. Only a genuine threat is effective. The example that follows ought to make this apparent.

### CONCLUSION

Game theory's consideration of mixed strategies indicates its importance in comprehending intricate decision-making procedures under uncertainty. Mixed strategies provide a more accurate representation of strategic interactions by enabling participants to choose actions probabilistically, mirroring the strategic uncertainty seen in real-world circumstances. The identification of equilibrium outcomes in situations in which participants' decisions are mutually coherent and stable is made possible by the mathematical modelling of mixed tactics. Applications of mixed strategies in numerous fields show its value in economics, politics, and evolutionary biology. The precise modelling and prediction of mixed strategy behaviour, as well as the creation of mechanisms that support desired results, are difficult tasks. Future study should concentrate on overcoming these constraints and further investigating the effects of hybrid methods in various circumstances. Overall, the study of mixed strategies improves our

comprehension of how decisions are made during strategic interactions and provides insightful information for deciphering and improving complex systems.

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## CHAPTER 10

### EVOLUTION OF PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

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#### ABSTRACT:

the development of profit maximisation as a business philosophy. Beginning with the conventional strategy that placed a higher priority on immediate financial rewards, the idea has expanded to include wider factors including stakeholder interests, social and environmental obligations, and purpose-driven objectives. The study examines significant turning points in the development of profit maximisation and emphasizes The term refers to the concept that if you use your labour, for instance, in one application, you lose the chance to use it in another. Consequently, such missed earnings are included in the price of production. The farmer has the option of renting his property to another person, the transition to methods that are sustainable and purpose-driven. It also emphasises the need of striking a balance between short-term financial success and long-term value creation and social impact.

#### KEYWORDS:

Managerial Perspective, Profitmaximization, Stakeholder Theory, Triple Bottom, Triple Bottom Line.

#### INTRODUCTON

The term refers to the concept that if you use your labour, for instance, in one application, you lose the chance to use it in another. Consequently, such missed earnings are included in the price of production. The farmer has the option of renting his property to another person, but he decides instead to rent it to himself in order to avoid missing out on the rental money. The potential cost of his work includes the foregone rentals. According to the economic concept of profit, all inputs and outputs must be valued at their potential costs. Because accountants often utilise historical costs what a component originally cost instead of economic costs what a factor would cost if acquired now earnings are not always appropriately measured in terms of economic profits. Although there are many different ways to use the word "profit," we will always adhere to the economic meaning [1]–[3].

Time scale misunderstanding is another issue that sometimes causes difficulty. The factor inputs are often seen as being measured in terms of flows. The production per week will be determined by the number of labour hours and machine hours used each week. The factor prices will then be expressed in units suitable for the acquisition of such flows. Naturally, wages are stated as dollars per hour. The rental rate the price at which you may hire a machine for the specified time period would serve as an analogue for machines. Since businesses normally purchase their capital equipment, the market for renting machinery isn't often extremely well established. In this situation, we must figure out how much it would cost to purchase a machine at the beginning of the period and sell it at the conclusion of the period in order to get the implicit rental rate.



## The Organization of Firms

In a capitalist system, people own businesses. Since businesses are only legal entities, their owners ultimately bear responsibility for the actions of their businesses and receive the benefits of or incur the expenses associated with those actions. Firms may often be set up as sole proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations. A business that has a single owner is known as a proprietorship. A partnership is a business that has two or more owners. Even though a company often has several owners, it is legally considered to have a distinct existence from that of its owners. Therefore, a relationship can only continue as long as both parties are still alive and willing to uphold it. A company may exist after all of its owners have passed away. For this reason, the majority of big businesses are set up as companies [4]–[6].

The owners of each of these many business models could have distinct objectives for how they want to run their business. In a proprietorship or partnership, the owners of the business often have a direct role in managing the day-to-day activities of the business, putting them in a position to achieve whatever goals they have for running the business. Normally, business owners would want to maximise profits, but if they have charity objectives, they may absolutely pursue them instead. When a company is involved, its owners and management often do not work together. As a result, ownership and control are divided. The corporation's owners must establish a goal for the managers to work towards and then do their utmost to ensure that they truly carry out the owners' intentions. Profit maximisation is a prevalent objective once again. As we'll see further below, if this purpose is understood correctly, it should prompt the firm's management to make decisions that are in the owners' best interests.

## Profits and Stock Market Value

Investment choices may be valued in the same manner using financial markets and interest rates. Consider a scenario in which a company's flow of future income is completely assured, is well recognised. The firm's current worth would then be equal to the present value of those earnings. It would be determined by how much someone would be prepared to spend to buy the business. As we said above, the majority of big businesses are set up as corporations, which implies that many people own them in concert. To prove ownership of stock in the company, the corporation provides stock certificates. The corporation will sometimes pay dividends on these shares, which constitute a portion of the company's income. The stock market is where the corporation's ownership shares are purchased and sold. The present value of the dividend stream that investors anticipate from the company is reflected in the share price. The overall market value of a company on the stock exchange indicates the current value of the predicted future stream of income. Therefore, the company's purpose, which is to maximise the present value of the earnings the company creates, might also be referred to as the objective of maximising stock market value. These two objectives are identical in a world where there is certainty.

Since this will increase the value of the shares they control, the owners of the company will often desire the company to choose production plans that maximise the firm's stock market value. As we saw, regardless of a person's preferences for consumption at various points in time, they will always choose an endowment with a greater present value over one with a lower present value. A company operates in the best interests of all of its shareholders by increasing stock market value, which increases the owners' budgets as much as feasible. Instructing managers to maximise profits is meaningless if a company's stream of income is unclear. Do they need to increase predicted profits? Should they aim to maximise predicted profit utility? What mindset should the



managers adopt while making hazardous investments? Profit maximisation is a tough concept to define when there is ambiguity. Nevertheless, increasing stock market value still has value in a world full with uncertainty. The owners of the company the shareholders will be as wealthy as possible if the management work to increase the value of the company's shares. Thus, in almost all economic situations, the firm's goal function is given a clear definition by maximising stock market value.

Despite these observations regarding time and uncertainty, we will often restrict our analysis to relatively simpler profit-maximization issues, i.e. those where there is only one output and one time period. This straightforward narrative yet yields important insights and develops the necessary intuition for researching more expansive theories of company behaviour. All of the concepts that Whether the products or services in question are externally delivered by a monopoly or by a competitive market is one important point. Managers often prefer to purchase products and services in a competitive market, if they are offered. Dealing with a monopolist within your organisation is the second-best option. The worst option of all, in terms of cost and service quality, is doing business with an outside monopolist.

Consider using a photocopying service. Having a large number of suppliers competing for your business is good since you will then be able to find low pricing and high-quality service. There can be a lot of photocopying businesses competing for your business if your school is big or located in a city. On the other side, tiny rural schools could provide fewer options and often charge more. The same is true for companies. Users have a wide range of options in an atmosphere that is very competitive. An internal photocopying division could be less desirable in contrast. Prices may be inexpensive, but the service may be slow. But having to surrender to a single external source is undoubtedly the least desirable choice. Even if an internal monopoly supplier may provide subpar service, at least the money is kept inside the company. What is normally within the company changes as technology evolves. Many services were self-managed by businesses forty years ago. They now often outsource as much work as they can. External companies that specialise in these services often provide food service, photocopying, and cleaning services. These businesses' specialisation often enables them to provide their clientele more affordable, higher-quality services [4], [7], [8].

### **Fixed and Variable Factors**

Typically, a company may be required by contract to use certain inputs at specific amounts. An example of this would be a building lease, where the company is legally required to acquire a certain amount of space during the time period in question. A production factor that is in a set quantity for the company is referred to as a fixed factor. A factor is considered variable if it may be applied at various dosages. The short run is defined as the duration of time during which there are certain fixed factors factors that can only be employed in set amounts as we saw in Chapter 18. On the other hand, because all components of production are changeable factors, the business is free to change any of them over the long term. The distinction between the short run and the long run is not a hard line. Depending on the issue being investigated, a certain time frame may be required. The fact that certain production parameters are stable in the near term and flexible in the long term is crucial. A company is always free to decide to consume zero inputs and make zero output, which is to say to cease operations, since all components are changeable over the long term. Thus, zero profits are the lowest amount of earnings a company can produce over the long term.

Even if the company chooses to create little product in the near term, it is still required to use certain elements. Therefore, it is very feasible that the company may experience short-term losses. Fixed elements are components of production that, by definition, must be paid for even if the company chooses to do nothing. For example, if a company has a long-term lease on a building, it must make the lease payments every period regardless of whether it decides to produce anything that time. However, there is another group of expenses that must only be covered if the company chooses to generate a surplus of production. Lighting powered by electricity is one example. The company is not required to supply illumination if it generates no output, but if it does, it must acquire a certain quantity of power to be used for lighting. These kinds of factors are referred to as quasi-fixed factors. They are production inputs that must be employed in a certain quantity, regardless of the firm's output, so long as the output is positive. When examining the economic behaviour of the company, the difference between fixed and quasi-fixed components might be helpful.

### DISCUSSION

The majority of individuals find this assertion unexpected. Aren't businesses looking to maximise their profits? How is it possible that they will ultimately generate no profits? Consider what would occur if a company attempted to grow endlessly. Three things may happen. First, if the company grows too much, it may not be able to function properly. Simply expressed, this means that the business doesn't really experience consistent returns to scale across the board. It could eventually move into an area of declining returns to scale as a result of coordination issues. Second, the company can grow to such a size that it completely controls the market for its product. There is no justification in this situation for it to act in a competitive manner and assume the output price remains constant. It would make more sense for such a company to attempt to leverage its scale to affect the market price. Since it would essentially have no rivals, the paradigm of competitive profit maximisation would no longer be a rational way for the corporation to act. When we address monopoly, we'll look at more pertinent models of company behaviour in this circumstance. Third, every company with access to the same technology may achieve positive profits if one company with a consistent returns to scale technology can. Other businesses would seek to increase their production if one business did. But if every company increases its production, the price of output will undoubtedly fall, which would reduce everyone's earnings.

Currently, the United States government gives farmers between \$40 and \$60 billion annually in subsidies. The production of several goods, including milk, wheat, maize, soybeans, and cotton, is subsidised with a significant portion of this sum. On occasion, efforts are made to cut down on or get rid of these subsidies. The loss of these subsidies would result in a decrease in the price of the commodity that farmers get. Farmers may occasionally claim that removing subsidies for milk, for instance, would not result in a decrease in the overall supply of milk since dairy farmers would opt to expand their herds and milk production in order to maintain their level of living. This is not conceivable if farmers are acting in a way that maximises their earnings. As we saw above, the logic of profit maximisation demands that a drop in an output's price result in a drop in its supply: if  $p$  is negative, then  $y$  must also be negative. Small family farms may have objectives beyond the straightforward maximisation of earnings, while bigger "agribusiness" farms are more likely to be profit maximizers. Consequently, the paradoxical reaction to the end of subsidies mentioned above could only take place on a small scale [3], [9], [10].

## Cost Minimization

A company must be minimising the cost of creating output  $y$  if it is maximising profits and decides to provide part of it. If this were not the case, then there would be a less expensive method to produce  $y$  units of output, which would indicate that the company was not initially maximising profits. This seemingly insignificant finding proves to be quite helpful in analysing corporate behaviour. The profit-maximization issue may be conveniently divided into two stages: We determine whether level of production is really a profit-maximizing level of output by first determining how to minimise the expenses of achieving any desired level of output  $y$ .

These are referred to as derived factor demands or conditional factor demand functions. They assess the link between pricing and production as well as the firm's best factor selection under the assumption that it will produce a certain amount of output,  $y$ . Keep in mind the distinction between the profit-maximizing factor demands outlined in the previous chapter and the conditional factor demands. For a given level of production, the conditional factor demands provide cost-minimizing options; for a given output price, the profit-maximizing factor demands provide profit-maximizing options. Conditional factor demands are a fictitious concept that are often not directly seen. They provide a solution to the query of how much of each element the company would use in order to generate a certain level of production in the most cost-effective manner. However, the conditional factor demands may be used to distinguish between the issues of choosing the most efficient production strategy and selecting the ideal amount of output.

## Sunk Costs

Another kind of fixed expenses is sunk costs. The greatest way to communicate the idea is through an example. Let's say you've chosen to rent an office for a year. You have agreed to pay a predetermined sum of rent each month because you must do so regardless of how much production you create. Let's say you decide to paint the workplace and purchase new furniture to update it. Although the price of paint is set, it is also a sunk cost since it is a payment that has already been made and cannot be reversed. However, because you may sell the furniture after you are through with it, the expense of purchasing it is not wholly lost. The only amount that gets sunk is the price differential between new and old furniture. Consider borrowing \$20,000 at the start of the year at, say, a 10% interest rate to better understand this. You agree to a lease for an office and pay \$12,000 in rent up front for the next year. You spend \$2,000 painting the office and \$6,000 purchasing furnishings for the workplace. You sell the secondhand office equipment for \$5,000 and repay the \$20,000 loan at the end of the year together with the \$2,000 interest payment.

The \$12,000 in rent, the \$2,000 in interest, the \$2,000 in paint, and the \$1,000 in furniture are all considered to be sunk expenditures. However, \$5,000 of the original furniture expense is recoverable. Sunk costs and recovered costs might vary significantly from one another. Five light trucks costing \$100,000 may seem like a significant investment, but if they can subsequently be sold for \$80,000 on the secondhand truck market, the true sunk cost is just \$20,000. It is completely different to spend \$100,000 on a specially constructed press for producing gadgets that has no market value; in this scenario, the whole cost is buried. Making careful to address all expenses on a flow basis that is, how much does it cost to operate a firm for a year is the easiest method to keep these concerns clear. This reduces the likelihood of forgetting the capital equipment's resale value and increases the likelihood that the line between sunk expenses and recovered costs will remain distinct.

## Market Environments

Every business must make the crucial choices of how much to create and what price to charge. A profit-maximizing corporation would set an arbitrarily high price and create an indefinitely enormous volume of product if there were no restrictions on it. However, in such an unrestricted setting, no company can exist. There are two main types of restrictions on the firm's ability to act. It must first overcome the technical limitations that are best summed up by the production function. Only a limited number of input-output combinations are practical, and even the most profit-driven company must take into account the laws of physics. We've previously spoken about how to condense technical limitations, and we've seen how technological limitations result in economic limitations that the cost function condenses.

But now, a new limitation is introduced or, at the very least, an old constraint is seen from a new angle. The market limitation is this. A company can create as much as is technically possible and can establish its own prices, but it can only sell as much as consumers are prepared to pay for it. It will sell a given quantity of product  $x$  if it sets a certain price,  $p$ . The demand curve confronting the company is the connection between the price a firm sets and the volume it sells. The demand curve that the business would face if there were only one company in the market would be fairly straightforward to explain since it is just the market demand curve that was discussed in previous chapters on consumer behaviour. The quantity of the item that consumers wish to purchase at each price is measured by the market demand curve.

The market restrictions that a company with a monopoly market must contend with are therefore summarised by the demand curve. However, if there are other companies in the market, each business will face various restrictions. When deciding on its pricing and production, the business in this scenario must make an educated bet as to how the other companies in the market would act. Both businesses and economists will find it challenging to find a solution to this issue. There are many alternative options, and we'll attempt to evaluate them all systematically. We'll refer to the interactions between businesses when discussing the pricing and production choices as the "market environment."

## Pure Competition

The word "competition" connotes fierce rivalry to the average individual. Students are sometimes taken aback by how passive the economists' notion of competition seems. A market is said to be completely competitive if each business believes that the market price is unrelated to its own level of production. As a result, in a market where there is competition, each business just has to consider how much production it wants to create. Anything it generates must be sold for the current market rate.

What kind of setting would this be a reasonable assumption for a company to make? Let's say an industry exists that is made up of several companies that all manufacture the same thing, but each company only makes up a little portion of the market. The wheat market would be a nice illustration. In the United States, there are thousands of wheat growers, yet even the biggest ones only generate a tiny portion of the overall supply. In this situation, it is legitimate for any business operating in the sector to assume that the market price has already been decided. A wheat farmer doesn't have to worry about what price to set for his crop since he must sell it at market value in order to make any sales at all. He accepts prices as they are; all he has to worry about is how much to create. He is a price taker.

This sort of scenario An identical product and several tiny businesses is a prime illustration of when price-taking behaviour is appropriate. However, it is not the only situation in which price-taking behaviour may occur. Even if there are just a few businesses operating in the market, they could still see the market pricing as being beyond their ability to influence. Consider a situation where a perishable commodity has a limited availability, such as fresh seafood or cut flowers at a market. Even if there are just 3 or 4 businesses in the market, each business may be forced to accept the pricing of the others. The lowest price being provided is the market price if consumers only purchase products at that price. One of the other businesses will have to sell at market value if it wants to sell anything at all. Therefore, in this kind of circumstance, competitive behavior considering the market price to be outside of your control seems also logical.

A graphic similar to that may be used to explain the link between pricing and quantity as seen by a competitive company. You can see how straightforward this demand curve is. A business that is in competition thinks that if it charges more than the going rate, it won't sell anything. If it sells for the market price, it can sell as much as it wants, and if it sells for less, it will satisfy the whole market's need. As usual, there are two ways to conceptualise this kind of demand curve. This curve indicates that you may sell whatever amount you want at or below the market price if we consider quantity as a function of price. The market price will be independent of your sales no matter how much you sell, if we consider of pricing as a function of quantity. Of course, this need not be the case for every sum. For whatever quantity you could think about selling, the price ought to be independent of your production. The cut-flower vendor's pricing must be fixed regardless of how much she sells, up to the utmost she would contemplate

The market demand curve analyses the link between the market price and the total quantity of production sold, and it is crucial to grasp the distinction between the "demand curve facing a firm" and the "market demand curve." The link between the market price and the production of a certain business is measured by the demand curve the firm is facing. The behaviour of customers affects the market demand curve. The behaviour of other companies as well as that of customers affects how a firm's demand curve will develop. The competitive model is often justified by the fact that when there are numerous small businesses competing in a market, each one has a demand curve that is basically flat. even if there are only two companies in the market and one of them insists on charging a set price regardless of circumstances. As a result, the competitive model could be more applicable than it first seems to be.

## CONCLUSION

Over time, there has been a substantial development of the profit maximisation notion. The concept of profit maximisation has evolved from its conventional foundations of emphasising just short-term financial advantages to take into account a wider range of elements and objectives. The stakeholder theory stressed the need of taking into account the interests of numerous stakeholders, whereas the management viewpoint recognised the necessity to balance diverse goals. The integration of economic, social, and environmental factors under the triple bottom line framework produced a more all-encompassing strategy. Sustainable profit maximisation, which emphasises the interaction between financial performance and environmental, social, and governance aspects, has gained popularity in recent years. Another emerging trend emphasises the connection of economic operations with a higher purpose and social effect. This is known as purpose-driven profit maximisation. A rising understanding of the significance of long-term value creation and the taking into account of wider stakeholder

interests may be seen in the history of profit maximisation. Adopting strategies that strike a balance between financial success and sustainable practises and significant social contributions is essential as firms continue to operate in a terrain that is always changing.

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## CHAPTER 11

### A BRIEF STUDY ON DIVERSIFICATION

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#### ABSTRACT:

Examining how discourse analysis may be used to comprehend how stateless states are constructed in political theory, this junction of discourse analysis and stateless state theory is discussed. Language analysis is a technique for looking at how language is used in different social circumstances. It may be used to uncover the underlying ideologies and power structures that influence political discourse. The state is a discursively produced institution that depends on the collective imagination of its people, according to the Stateless State Theory, which challenges conventional ideas of the state as a sovereign body with a monopoly on legal violence.

#### KEYWORDS:

Collective Imagination, Discourse Analysis, Discursive Construction, Dominant Discourses, Ideologies, Political Discourse.

#### INTRODUCTION

Recent discourse-analytical research contends that the state is an illusion created by political imaginaries, not anything that really exists. Therefore, the prevalence of state discourses affects people's beliefs about the existence of the state. It manifests on the political stage as a result of political forces behaving in a way that is directed towards the "state," as if it really existed. The state is at best a polyvalent, polycontextual phenomenon that changes shape and appearance with the political forces acting towards it and the circumstances in which it occurs. This is so because there is no common discourse of the state (there is, at most, a dominant or hegemonic discourse) and diverse political forces orient their action at diverse times to diverse ideas of the state [1]–[3].

From a variety of theoretical or analytical perspectives, this allegedly heretical proposition has been advocated. The institutional ensemble that makes up government, for instance, can be studied without the concept of the state, and the "idea of the state" itself can be studied as a distinctive collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies that conceals the true nature of political practise. This is why Abrams (1988) advocated abandoning the concept of the state. He contends that "the state notion" plays a crucial part in masking political dominance. This calls for historical examinations of the "cultural revolution" (or ideological transformations) brought forth by the modernization of state structures. Similar to this, Melossi (1990) urged the development of a "stateless theory of the state." This views the state as a merely legal notion, one that allows

individuals to carry out state functions, to provide themselves and others a useful lexicon of reasons for their own (in)actions, and to explain the state's unity amid a divided and unequal civil society [4]–[6].

Third, state and state-building-specific narrative, rhetorical, or argumentative aspects of state power are gaining more attention. Therefore, case studies of policy making suggest that state policies do not objectively reflect "real" problems in the internal or external environments of the political system or represent the interests located in or beyond the state. Policies are the result of battles to define and narrate "issues" that may be resolved by and via state action. Policies are discursively mediated, if not entirely discursively-constituted. Therefore, the rhetorical and argumentative framing of policies and their implementation have a significant impact. In fact, the development of the state notion was vital to the organisation of the many parts of the modern state (such as the military, bureaucracy, taxes, legal system, and legislative assembly) as a rather cohesive institutional ensemble.

Such discourse-theoretical work obviously diverges from Foucauldian interpretations and state-centered theorising. It stresses the important significance of narrative and rhetorical practices in fostering confidence in the existence of the state while simultaneously rejecting the reification of the state on the one hand and the state on the other. Depending on your point of view, this function may be described as mystification, self-motivation, pure narrativity, or self-description; nonetheless, discourses about the state play a crucial fundamental role in determining the state's identity as a complex ensemble of political connections connected to society as a whole.

### **The "Strategic-relational Approach"**

Jessop and others have created a novel approach to the state and state-building in an effort to get rid of different sorts of one-sidedness in the Marxist and state-centered traditions. His "strategic-relational approach" expands on Poulantzas' assertion that the state is a social connection (see above) and provides a broad explanation of the dialectic of structure and agency in the context of government. According to Jessop, the use and efficacy of state power depend on the balance of political forces operating within and outside of the state, which is influenced by the unique institutional structures and practices of the state apparatus as they are ingrained in the larger political system and surrounding societal relations. As a result, a strategic-relational analysis would look at how a specific state apparatus might favour some actors, identities, strategies, spatial and temporal horizons, and actions over others; and the ways, if any, in which political actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging by engaging in "strategic-context" analysis when choosing a course of action [7]–[9].

A unique evolutionary perspective is also added by Bob Jessop in SRA 124 to the analysis of the state and state power in order to show how the general evolutionary processes of selection, variation, and adhesion may work under unique circumstances to produce relatively coherent and resilient structures and tactics. This suggests that chances for strategic reorientation and structural reorganisation are themselves susceptible to structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and hence have path-dependent as well as path-shaping characteristics. For instance, in order to remove or change certain limitations and opportunities related to particular state

structures, it may be essential to pursue tactics spanning different geographical and temporal horizons of action and to mobilise diverse sets of social forces in diverse circumstances. Additionally, as such tactics are employed, political forces will be better or worse able to draw lessons from their mistakes and modify their behaviour in response to shifting circumstances.

Recursively selected strategies and tactics and recursively reorganised structures have a propensity to co-evolve over time to produce a relatively stable order, but this order is still susceptible to collapse due to the inherent structural contradictions, tactical conundrums, and discursive biases present in complex social formations. Furthermore, there is always room for actions to override or get around structural constraints because structures are selectively applied rather than completely limiting. Failure is always a possibility since subjects are never completely united, are never totally aware of the circumstances of strategic action, are never fully prepared to implement their chosen strategies, and may always encounter actors pursuing other strategies or tactics. This strategy is meant to be a heuristic, and even if they do not explicitly use these words or ones that are similar, many evaluations of the state may be readily reinterpreted in strategic-relational terms. But in order to identify the specific selectivities that operate in different types of states, state forms, political regimes, and specific conjunctures, the development of a strategic-relational research programme will also necessitate numerous, in-depth comparative historical analyses.

## DISCUSSION

### **New Directions of Research**

In-depth study of states and state power grew from the 1990s forward, despite waning interest in the more esoteric and abstract techniques of state theorizing. The historical variability of statehood (or stateless), relative strength or weakness of states, the future of the national state in an era of globalization and regionalization, the changing forms and functions of the state, issues of scale, space, territoriality, and the state, as well as the rise of governance and its articulation with government, are some of the major themes.

The first reason for interest in stateness is growing unease with most state theory's abstract character (specifically its presumption of a universal, unitary, sovereign state) and rising curiosity about the historical variation of real states. As a result, some theorists investigate the many manifestations of the notion of the state and concentrate on it as a conceptual variable. Some researchers look at the state's differential presence as a unique political form. As a result, Badie and Birnbaum (1983) make a helpful distinction between the state as one potential institutional location of this centre and the political centre necessary in any complicated social division of labour. According to them, the state's structural diversification, autonomy, universalism, and institutional stability define it. The quintessential state in a centralised society is France; Switzerland has neither; Britain has a political centre but no state; Germany has a state but no centre. Such strategies emphasise the state concept's enormous institutional diversity and historicalization. There has been much research on these concerns at all geographical sizes, from the local to the global, with a focus on meso-level variation. Second, there is increased interest in the elements that contribute to state power. This relates to a state's ability to direct events and

exert control over social forces within a larger society on the inside, and on the outside, it refers to the state's influence within the interstate system.

Recent theoretical and empirical research on predatory and/or developing states makes this worry more apparent. The former generally wield the autocratic power of command, are basically parasitic upon their economies and civil societies, and may ultimately destroy the economy, society, and state itself. Additionally, infrastructure and network power are resources that developing states use in ostensibly market-conforming ways. Coherent analysis is unfortunately threatened by the vast range of strengths (and weaknesses) interpretations. According to Lauridsen (1991), states are considered strong if they have a large public sector, authoritarian authority, strong social support, a weak and gelatinous civil society, unified bureaucracy, an interventionist policy, or the ability to control outside interference. Furthermore, when strength is measured solely in terms of results, some studies run the risk of tautology. Investigating the potential for variation in state capacity by policy area, across time, and in particular contexts is one theoretical option.

Third, current research on globalisation raises new concerns about the survival of nation states in general and national territorial governments in particular. Scholars who are concerned with the multiplicity of scales on which significant state operations take place from the local to the urban to the regional to cross-border to continental cooperation and a variety of supranational entities also bring up this topic. However, initial predictions of the national territorial state's and/or the nation state's impending demise have been disproven. This has implications for the flexibility of state administrators and state apparatuses, the ongoing significance of national states in maintaining conditions for economic competitiveness, political legitimacy, social cohesion, and other factors, as well as the function of national states in coordinating state activities on other scales, including local, triad, international, and global levels.

Fourth, interest in the unique forms and purposes of the capitalist kind of state has increased after a brief drop in Marxist theoretical study. This can be investigated in terms of the state's function in (a) ensuring favourable conditions for private enterprise the role of economic policy; (b) reproducing wage-labor on a daily, yearly, and intergenerational basis the function of social policy taken generally; (c) managing the scalar division of labour; and (d) making up for market failure. Jessop (2002) refers to the conventional state structure of postwar advanced capitalism as a Keynesian welfare national state on the basis of this. It was characterised by an economic strategy focused on securing the conditions for full employment in a largely closed economy, the welfare state's generalisation of mass consumption norms, the importance of national scale in policymaking, and the importance of state intervention to make up for market failure. Additionally, he calls the new state structure that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s a Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime.

A focus on innovation and competitiveness in relatively open economies, the deference of social policy to economic demands, the relativization of scale with the movement of state powers upward, downward, and sideways, and the increased significance of various governance mechanisms in addressing market failure are its distinguishing characteristics. The same terminology has been used to explain other sorts of states, such as developmental states. Fifth, the

shifting political playing fields are of importance. While some theorists are inclined to view the national state crisis as shifting political organisation and action from the primary scale to the global, regional, or local scale, others contend that scale has become relativized. Because, in the post-Fordist era of postwar boom in Europe and North America, the national state served as the primary scale of political organisation, the current post-Fordist era is characterised by the dispersion of political and policy issues across diverse scales of organisation, with none of them clearly primary. This thus creates issues with ensuring action coherence at various scales. The novelty of the European Union as a new state structure, the resurgence of empire as an organising principle, and the possibilities for a global state have all been sparked by this.

Finally, "governance" refers to types of coordination that don't depend on the market's anarchy or the government's mandatory coordination. They involve self-organization instead. Different organisational scales from the enlargement of supranational and international regimes through national and regional public-private partnerships to more localised networks of power and decision-making are used in governance. Although this trend is frequently interpreted as indicating a decline in state capabilities, it may actually strengthen states' ability to protect their interests and give them a new or expanded role in the meta-governance or overall coordination of diverse governance regimes and mechanisms see Zeitlin and Trubek's 2003 analysis of Europe and Slaughter's 2004 analysis of the global order.

Interest in governance is sometimes connected to the issue of "failed" and "rogue" regimes. Normal politics is a key mechanism for learning from and adjusting to failure. All states fail in some ways. "Failed states," on the other hand, lack the ability to reinvent or refocus their efforts in the face of repeated state failure in order to preserve "normal political service" in domestic policy. Some regimes are regularly stigmatised as being involved in both interstate and domestic politics through the discourse of "failed states." Similar to this, the term "rogue states" is used to disparage states whose acts are seen as a challenge to the current international order by hegemonic or dominating states in the interstate system. However, some radical critics contend that the USA has long been the world's worst rogue state.

### **An Emerging Agenda**

When it comes to the state apparatus's and the state's power's contingency, there is a striking theoretical convergence. First, most approaches have dethroned the state from its superordinate position in society and analyze it as one institutional order among others. Marxists dispute the idea that it represents the ideal form of collective capitalism, neostatists no longer view it as a sovereign legal entity, Foucauldians have dismantled it, feminists have abandoned the idea that it represents the patriarch general, and discourse analysts believe it is shaped by a variety of contingent discursive or communicative practises. The state is essentially seen as an emerging, imperfect, and unstable entity that interacts with other systems in a complex social order. More precise, historically specific, institutionally sensitive, and action-oriented research are needed in order to adequately address the state's huge growth in contingencies and its activities. This is reflected in in-depth studies of stateness and the relative merits (and deficiencies) of various political systems.

Second, the state's structural powers and capabilities can only be comprehended when placed in a larger "strategic-relational" framework. Its powers are always relational or conditional as a result of its structural selectivity and unique strategic capabilities. Their actualization is dependent on the structural relationships between the state and the political system that surrounds it, the tactical alliances between state administrators and other political forces, and the intricate web of social networks that connect the state and political system to its larger environment.

Last but not least, it is becoming more and more accepted that a proper theory of the state can only be formed as a component of a larger theory of society. But it's here that we find a lot of the state theory's unanswered questions. For a paradox exists there, in the state. It is one institutional ensemble among many inside a social formation, but it is also oddly tasked with overarching responsibility for preserving the cohesiveness of the formation of which it is a member.

It is constantly requested by various social forces to address society's problems as both a portion and a whole, but it is equally destined to produce "state failure" since many issues are beyond its control and may even become worse by attempted involvement. Contradictory responses to distinct structural and strategic phases of this conundrum are at the heart of many differences among state theorists. An effective starting point for resolving some of these contradictions and offering a more thorough understanding of the strategic-relational nature of the state in a polycentric social formation may be to attempt to understand the general logic (or, perhaps, "illogic") of this dilemma.

### **Development of Civil Society**

Civil society is the most elusive and confusing idea in political philosophy and political science, and it always has been. From the latter days of the Roman republic to the present, historians, theorists, and current actors have interpreted the word "civil society" and the actual arrangements it denotes in a variety of ways. Even if they vary in focus and depth, several of these understandings may be recognised as coming from a common intellectual lineage. Others have been so profoundly and radically opposed to one another that the phrase sometimes appears to relate to institutions, values, conceptual frameworks, and views of civilization that are not just highly different but incompatible with one another.

Since government, law enforcement, and the collection of institutions known as "the state" are portrayed as virtually coterminous with civil society, this central tradition of writing about it has been adopted (Model 1). Private property rights, commercial capitalism, and the numerous legal, institutional, and cultural support-systems that they imply have been associated in a very diverse history with civil society (Model 2). Another school of thought asserts that civil society is fundamentally made up of civic, mutual-help, and non-profit activities that coexist with but are fundamentally different from the domains of both governments and markets (Model 3). And in very recent discourse, the concept of "civil society" has come to be associated more and more with the declaration of universal standards of democracy, just processes, the rule of law, and respect for human rights (ideally to be imposed through cultural permeation and persuasion, but nonetheless supported by economic sanctions, international courts, and the threat or use of physical force) (Model 4).



## CONCLUSION

It can be assumed that "civil society" is of little significance as a manner of thinking about how political institutions really function due to its tremendous variety and ambiguity. However, this has been very far from the truth. Political experts all across the world have rediscovered and reapplied this age-old but long-forgotten idea since the 1980s. Promoting the ideals of "civil society" has received a lot of support in eastern and western Europe, north and south America, as well as in Africa and Asia as a tactical response to perceived flaws in many modern governments' political cultures, governmental systems, and social structures. Unusually, these tactics have gained backing from all political parties, both nationally and internationally. There has been broad support for the objectives and principles perceived to be associated with "civil society" from neocommunists to free-market liberals, from radical activists to civic conservatives, and from both proponents and opponents of "globalisation. In evaluating how language usage affects political discourse and state formations, discourse analysis and stateless state theory converge. The power dynamics and ideologies that underpin political speech may be revealed via discourse analysis, and stateless state theory questions conventional ideas of the state and emphasizes the importance of collective imagination in its creation.

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## CHAPTER 12

### DETERMINATION OF DIVERSIFICATION IN INTERMEDIATE MACROECONOMICS

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#### ABSTRACT:

The determination of diversification in the study of intermediate macroeconomics refers to the examination of how people, businesses, and economies distribute their resources throughout various industries or sectors. It looks at the variables that affect the degree and kind of economic diversity as well as the effects on general economic growth, stability, and welfare. The notion of diversity as it relates to investing is examined in this essay. To lower risk and improve overall portfolio performance, diversification refers to the approach of distributing investment holdings across several assets or asset classes. The purpose of diversity is examined, along with several diversification strategies, and their advantages and drawbacks, in this essay. Diversification's importance in reducing risk and maximising profits in investment portfolios is also covered.

#### KEYWORDS:

Collective Imagination, Discourse Analysis, Discursive Construction, Dominant Discourses, Ideologies, Political Discourse.

#### INTRODUCTION

Diversification is a widely recognized and utilized strategy in the field of investment management. The rationale behind diversification is based on the principle of spreading investment holdings across different assets or asset classes to reduce risk and potentially enhance returns. By investing in a variety of assets that have low or negative correlations with each other, investors can mitigate the impact of individual asset or market-specific risks on their overall portfolio. This approach aims to achieve a balance between risk reduction and potential returns. Various diversification techniques exist, such as diversification by asset class, geographical region, industry sector, or investment style. These strategies allow investors to allocate their capital across a range of investments, diversifying their exposure to different sources of risk. By doing so, they can potentially enhance risk-adjusted returns and protect against significant losses in the event of adverse market conditions affecting a particular asset or sector. While diversification offers benefits in managing risk, it also has its limitations. Over-diversification can dilute potential returns, particularly when returns from a highly performing asset are overshadowed by underperforming ones. Additionally, in extreme market conditions or during systemic events, correlations among assets may increase, limiting the effectiveness of diversification in mitigating risk [1]–[3].

It is a valuable strategy for investors to manage risk and potentially improve portfolio performance. By spreading investments across different assets or asset classes, investors can reduce their exposure to specific risks and increase the likelihood of capturing positive returns from various sources. However, it is essential for investors to carefully consider their investment goals, risk tolerance, and the specific characteristics of their investment holdings when implementing a diversification strategy. Recent discourse-analytical research contends that the state is an illusion created by political imaginaries, not anything that really exists. Therefore, the prevalence of state discourses affects people's beliefs about the existence of the state. It manifests on the political stage as a result of political forces behaving in a way that is directed towards the "state," as if it really existed. The state is at best a polyvalent, polycontextual phenomenon that changes shape and appearance with the political forces acting towards it and the circumstances in which it occurs. This is so because there is no common discourse of the state (there is, at most, a dominant or hegemonic discourse) and diverse political forces orient their action at diverse times to diverse ideas of the state[4], [5].

From a variety of theoretical or analytical perspectives, this allegedly heretical proposition has been advocated. The institutional ensemble that makes up government, for instance, can be studied without the concept of the state, and the "idea of the state" itself can be studied as a distinctive collective misrepresentation of capitalist societies that conceals the true nature of political practise. This is why Abrams (1988) advocated abandoning the concept of the state. He contends that "the state notion" plays a crucial part in masking political dominance. This calls for historical examinations of the "cultural revolution" (or ideological transformations) brought forth by the modernization of state structures.

Third, state and state-building-specific narrative, rhetorical, or argumentative aspects of state power are gaining more attention. Therefore, case studies of policy making suggest that state policies do not objectively reXect "real" problems in the internal or external environments of the political system or represent the interests located in or beyond the state. Policies are the result of battles to define and narrate "issues" that may be resolved by and via state action. Policies are discursively mediated, if not entirely discursively-constituted. Therefore, the rhetorical and argumentative framing of policies and their implementation have a significant impact. In fact, the development of the state notion was vital to the organisation of the many parts of the modern state (such as the military, bureaucracy, taxes, legal system, and legislative assembly) as a rather cohesive institutional ensemble.

Such discourse-theoretical work obviously diverges from Foucauldian interpretations and state-centered theorizing. It stresses the important significance of narrative and rhetorical practices in fostering confidence in the existence of the state while simultaneously rejecting the reication of the state on the one hand and the state on the other. Depending on your point of view, this function may be described as mystification, self-motivation, pure narrativity, or self-description; nonetheless, discourses about the state play a crucial fundamental role in determining the state's identity as a complex ensemble of political connections connected to society as a whole.

To combat various forms of one-sidedness in the Marxist and state-centered traditions, Jessop and others have developed a fresh approach to the state and state-building. In addition to

extending Poulantzas' claim that the state is a social link (see above), his "strategic-relational approach" also offers a thorough explanation of the dialectic between structure and agency in the context of governance. The balance of political forces operating within and outside the state, which is influenced by the distinctive institutional structures and practises of the state apparatus as they are ingrained in the larger political system and surrounding societal relations, determines the use and effectiveness of state power, according to Jessop. A strategic-relational analysis would therefore examine how a particular state apparatus might favour some actors, identities, strategies, spatial and temporal horizons, and actions over others; and the ways, if any, in which political actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging by engaging in "strategic-context" analysis when deciding on a course of action.[6]–[8].

A unique evolutionary perspective is also added by Bob Jessop in SRA 124 to the analysis of the state and state power in order to show how the general evolutionary processes of selection, variation, and adhesion may work under unique circumstances to produce relatively coherent and resilient structures and tactics. This suggests that chances for strategic reorientation and structural reorganisation are themselves susceptible to structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and hence have path-dependent as well as path-shaping characteristics. For instance, in order to remove or change certain limitations and opportunities related to particular state structures, it may be essential to pursue tactics spanning different geographical and temporal horizons of action and to mobilise diverse sets of social forces in diverse circumstances. Additionally, as such tactics are employed, political forces will be better or worse able to draw lessons from their mistakes and modify their behaviour in response to shifting circumstances.

the advantages of diversity. Assume you are thinking about investing \$100 in two separate businesses—one that manufactures raincoats and the other, sunglasses. You've been informed by long-range weather forecasts that next summer will beHedge your bets by investing a portion of your funds in each, wouldn't that make senseAssume, for instance, that the current share price of the companies selling the raincoats and the sunglasses is \$10. The value of the sunglasses firm will be \$5 and the value of the raincoat company will be \$20 if it is a wet summer. The rewards are flipped if it's a bright summer: the manufacturer of sunglasses will be worth \$20 and the manufacturer of raincoats will be worth \$5. You are gambling if you put your full \$100 into the eyewear business since there is a 50% chance that you will get \$200 and a 50% chance that you will get \$50. If you put all of your money into the eyewear firm, the payoffs are of equal size: in both cases, you may anticipate receiving \$125.

However, observe what occurs if you invest half of your money in each. If it's sunny, you then get \$100 from your investment in the sunglasses and \$25 from your investment in the raincoat. However, if it rains, you get \$100 from your investment in the raincoat and \$25 from your investment in the sunglasses. In any case, you undoubtedly get \$125. You were able to lower the total risk of your investment while maintaining the projected return by spreading your investment over the two businesses. The two assets in this scenario were fully negatively linked, meaning that when one increased, the other decreased, making diversification simple. These kinds of asset pairs may significantly lower risk, which makes them very attractive. Unfortunately, they are also incredibly difficult to locate. The majority of asset prices are

correlated, therefore when GM stock is high, Ford stock is high, and vice versa for Goodrich stock. However, there will be some benefits from diversification as long as asset price fluctuations are not entirely positively linked.

Recursively selected strategies and tactics and recursively reorganised structures have a propensity to co-evolve over time to produce a relatively stable order, but this order is still susceptible to collapse due to the inherent structural contradictions, tactical conundrums, and discursive biases present in complex social formations. Furthermore, there is always room for actions to override or get around structural constraints because structures are selectively applied rather than completely limiting. Failure is always a possibility since subjects are never completely united, are never totally aware of the circumstances of strategic action, are never fully prepared to implement their chosen strategies, and may always encounter actors pursuing other strategies or tactics. This strategy is meant to be a heuristic, and even if they do not explicitly use these words or ones that are similar, many evaluations of the state may be readily reinterpreted in strategic-relational terms. But in order to identify the specific selectivities that operate in different types of states, state forms, political regimes, and specific conjunctures, the development of a strategic-relational research programme will also necessitate numerous, in-depth comparative historical analyses.

## DISCUSSION

### New Directions of Research

In-depth study of states and state power grew from the 1990s forward, despite waning interest in the more esoteric and abstract techniques of state theorizing. The historical variability of statehood (or stateless), relative strength or weakness of states, the future of the national state in an era of globalization and regionalization, the changing forms and functions of the state, issues of scale, space, territoriality, and the state, as well as the rise of governance and its articulation with government, are some of the major themes. The first reason for interest in stateness is growing unease with most state theory's abstract character (specifically its presumption of a universal, unitary, sovereign state) and rising curiosity about the historical variation of real states. As a result, some theorists investigate the many manifestations of the notion of the state and concentrate on it as a conceptual variable.

Some researchers look at the state's differential presence as a unique political form. As a result, Badie and Birnbaum (1983) make a helpful distinction between the state as one potential institutional location of this centre and the political centre necessary in any complicated social division of labour. According to them, the state's structural diversification, autonomy, universalism, and institutional stability define it. The quintessential state in a centralised society is France; Switzerland has neither; Britain has a political centre but no state; Germany has a state but no centre. Such strategies emphasise the state concept's enormous institutional diversity and historicalization. There has been much research on these concerns at all geographical sizes, from the local to the global, with a focus on meso-level variation.

Second, there is increased interest in the elements that contribute to state power. This relates to a state's ability to direct events and exert control over social forces within a larger society on the

inside, and on the outside, it refers to the state's influence within the interstate system. Recent theoretical and empirical research on predatory and/or developing states makes this worry more apparent. The former generally wield the autocratic power of command, are basically parasitic upon their economies and civil societies, and may ultimately destroy the economy, society, and state itself. Additionally, infrastructure and network power are resources that developing states use in ostensibly market-conforming ways. Coherent analysis is unfortunately threatened by the vast range of strengths (and weaknesses) interpretations. According to Lauridsen (1991), states are considered strong if they have a large public sector, authoritarian authority, strong social support, a weak and gelatinous civil society, unified bureaucracy, an interventionist policy, or the ability to control outside interference. Furthermore, when strength is measured solely in terms of results, some studies run the risk of tautology. Investigating the potential for variation in state capacity by policy area, across time, and in particular contexts is one theoretical option.

Third, current research on globalisation raises new concerns about the survival of nation states in general and national territorial governments in particular. Scholars who are concerned with Stiglitz and Walsh's book had a poor score of 2.68% while Schiller's book had a high score of 7.94% for supply and demand-related issues. Market participants, goals, constraints, specialisation and exchange, market interactions, the two markets, dollars and exchange, supply and demand, demand, individual demand, determinants of demand, shifts in demand, movements versus shifts, market demand, the market demand curve, the use of demand curves, supply, determinants of supply, the market supply curve, shifts in supply, equilibrium, market clearing, surplus, and shortfall are just a few of the topics covered in Schiller's book. Even though there is a significant percentage variation, the subjects addressed in Stiglitz and Walsh's book are substantially comparable to those mentioned above.

The area of economics known as macroeconomics focuses on the operation and decision-making of the overall economy. Krugman, Wells, and Olney's book had a macroeconomics percentage range of as low as 24.79% and as high as 45.38%, whereas Frank and Bernanke's book had a higher percentage range at 45.38%. It was not unexpected that Bernanke wrote the book with the largest proportion of macroeconomics as its primary subject. It was therefore not unexpected that macroeconomic themes made up the least of the material written by Krugman, Wells, and Olney, the authors of the textbook with the largest proportion of microeconomics. In Stiglitz and Walsh's book, the range for total supply and total demand was 0.22%; in Krugman, Wells, and Olney's book, it was 6.99%.

A number of topics are covered by Krugman, Wells, and Olney, including aggregate supply, the short-run aggregate supply curve, shifts of the short-run aggregate supply curve, the long-run aggregate supply curve, changes from the short to the long run, aggregate demand, the multiplier, the aggregate supply - aggregate demand model, short-run macroeconomic equilibrium, and shifts of the SRAS curve. Stiglitz and Walsh haven't even got anything set up. Early in the 1980s, the market for microcomputers that were compatible with the IBM-PC was contested by a number of operating system manufacturers. The maker of the operating system would typically charge the computer manufacturer for each copy of the operating system that was installed on a microcomputer that the computer manufacturer sold at the time.



Microsoft Corporation provided an alternate scheme in which the maker would be paid depending on how many microcomputers they produced. Microsoft placed their licencing price at a level that made the producers want to use this strategy. Note the cleverness of Microsoft's pricing strategy: when a manufacturer signed a contract, there was no marginal cost to installing MS-DOS on a machine that had already been built. On the other hand, installing a different operating system may cost \$50 to \$100. Microsoft received payment for the operating system from the hardware manufacturer (and eventually the customer), but the price arrangement helped MS-DOS stand out from the competitors. As a consequence, Microsoft became the standard operating system for microcomputers and attained market penetration of more than 90%.

Draw industry supply curves for each potential firm count in the market, and then search for the greatest firm count compatible with nonnegative profitability. This architecture is both completely rigorous and simple to use. However, there is a helpful estimate that often yields an outcome that is very near to the correct one. Let's attempt to combine the  $n$  curves we have above to create a single industry supply curve. First, it should be noted that any supply curve points below  $p$  can never be long-run functioning positions, thus we can rule them all out. However, we can also rule out some of the supply curves' apex positions. The market demand curve is often thought to have a falling slope. Therefore, a vertical line is the demand curve with the sharpest slope. Given that any downward-sloping demand curve that went through  $A$  would also have to cross a supply curve linked to a higher number of enterprises.

### CONCLUSION

As a result, we can rule out a piece of each supply curve as a potential location for the long-run equilibrium. Long-run equilibrium cannot be compatible with any location on the one-firm supply curve that is to the right of the point where the two-firm supply curve intersects the line generated by  $p$ . The same goes for any point on the two-firm supply curve that is located to the right of the point where the three-firm supply curve intersects the  $p$  line. ... and no position on the  $n$ -firm supply curve that is located to the right of the point where the  $n + 1$ -firm supply curve intersects the  $p$  line can be justified by equilibrium. The black line segments  $i =$  represent the portions of the supply curves where the long-run equilibrium may genuinely take place. All the price and output combinations that are compatible with having  $n$  businesses in long-run equilibrium are shown in the  $n$ th black line segment. Be aware that if we analyse higher and higher levels of industrial production, including an increasing number of enterprises, these line segments get flatter and flatter.

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