INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

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ABSTRACT:

The book introduces International Relations (IR) and the challenges of defining it. It explores diverse interpretations of international relations, including state-centric diplomacy, cross-border interactions, and the impact of globalization. It underscores the interplay between real-world and knowledge realms, where definitions shape understanding. In contrast to natural sciences, the social sciences lack self-definition due to political influences. The conventional IR definition centers on states, sovereignty, and security, while globalization challenges this with its interconnectedness. Globalization proponents emphasize worldwide ties across political, economic, and cultural spheres, questioning the primacy of states. The book presents multiple IR definitions, each shaping the field's study. It recognizes no definitive definition due to evolving global dynamics. Overall, the book aims to comprehensively explore international relations, embracing diverse dimensions and perspectives within its contested definitions

KEYWORDS:

Cross-Border Interactions, International Relations, Global, Primacy States, Sovereignty, Challenges.

INTRODUCTION

The book under consideration serves as an introduction to the intricate landscape of International Relations. IR and delves into the complex process of defining this academic discipline. The author navigates the reader through a spectrum of interpretations associated with international relations, encompassing varying viewpoints that shed light on the multifaceted nature of this field. These perspectives include the conventional understanding of state-centric diplomacy, the intricate web of cross-border interactions, and the transformative impact of globalization on the global stage.

One of the book's key themes is the interplay between the tangible reality of the world and the abstract realm of knowledge, with a spotlight on how definitions play a pivotal role in shaping our comprehension of the world. This interplay between the empirical and conceptual domains underscores the mutual influence between the external world and the intellectual constructs that attempt to make sense of it. Unlike the natural sciences, where subjects often possess a clear and universally accepted definition, the social sciences, including IR, grapple with challenges arising from the dynamic interplay of politics, ideologies, and societal influences. The author illuminates how differing definitions in these disciplines are often contested, reflecting the complex tapestry of societal values and perspectives [1]–[3].

At the heart of this exploration lies the conventional definition of IR, which centers on the primacy of states, their sovereignty, and the critical matters of security. This state-centric approach has long been a cornerstone of IR theory, with a focus on diplomatic, military, and strategic aspects of state

interaction. However, the emergence of globalization as a defining force in the contemporary world challenges this conventional perspective. Proponents of globalization argue that the world is becoming increasingly interconnected across political, economic, and cultural dimensions. This perspective highlights the emergence of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations, whose influence transcends traditional state boundaries. This shift prompts critical questions about the extent to which states continue to hold central significance in the realm of international relations.

By presenting a range of viewpoints on the definition of IR, the author underscores the fluid and evolving nature of the field. These various perspectives reflect distinct vantage points, each offering a unique lens through which to analyze global affairs. The book acknowledges that no single definition can capture the complexity of international relations comprehensively. Instead, the field's contours are constantly shaped by evolving global dynamics, emerging challenges, and shifts in the balance of power.

In essence, the book aims to provide a holistic exploration of international relations, encompassing its diverse dimensions and perspectives within the context of its contested definitions. By navigating through the intricacies of defining IR and engaging with the various interpretations that have emerged over time, the reader gains a deeper appreciation for the nuanced nature of international relations as an academic discipline and a reflection of the ever-changing world stage.

DISCUSSION

The book under consideration offers a comprehensive introduction to the intricate landscape of International Relations IR and delves into the complex process of defining this academic discipline. As the author navigates the reader through the pages, they skillfully unveil a spectrum of interpretations associated with international relations, encompassing varying viewpoints that illuminate the multifaceted nature of this field. These perspectives span from the conventional understanding of state-centric diplomacy to the intricate web of cross-border interactions and the transformative impact of globalization on the global stage. Central to the book's exploration is the interplay between the tangible reality of the world and the abstract realm of knowledge, with a spotlight on how definitions play a pivotal role in shaping our comprehension of the world. This interplay between the empirical and conceptual domains underscores the mutual influence between the external world and the intellectual constructs that attempt to make sense of it. This interplay highlights the intricate dance between our perception of the world and the lenses through which we view it.

The book effectively illustrates that the way we define and conceptualize international relations inherently influences our understanding of global dynamics. In contrast to the natural sciences, where subjects often possess a clear and universally accepted definition, the social sciences, including IR, grapple with challenges arising from the dynamic interplay of politics, ideologies, and societal influences. The author adeptly navigates through this complex terrain, illuminating how differing definitions within the social sciences are frequently contested. These contests reflect the intricate tapestry of societal values, political agendas, and cultural perspectives that shape the way we frame the world. By acknowledging the inherent subjectivity of definitions in the social sciences, the author underscores the nuanced nature of IR and its sensitivity to the diverse contexts in which it operates. At the heart of the book's exploration lies the conventional definition of IR, which centers on the primacy of states, their sovereignty, and the critical matters of security.

This state-centric approach has long been a cornerstone of IR theory, with a historical emphasis on diplomatic, military, and strategic aspects of state interaction. The author delves into the roots of this perspective and examines its enduring influence on the study of international relations. However, the emergence of globalization as a defining force in the contemporary world challenges the traditional state-centric viewpoint. Advocates of globalization argue that the world is becoming increasingly interconnected across political, economic, and cultural dimensions. This perspective highlights the ascendancy of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations, whose influence transcends traditional state boundaries. This shift prompts critical questions about the extent to which states continue to hold central significance in the realm of international relations. The author masterfully engages with this evolving discourse, presenting the arguments for and against the continued dominance of states. By examining the rise of non-state actors and the growing interconnectedness of global affairs, the author encourages readers to ponder the changing landscape of international relations and consider alternative conceptual frameworks. The book's strength lies in its presentation of a range of viewpoints on the definition of IR.

These various perspectives are not merely intellectual exercises but hold profound implications for the way we analyze and engage with global affairs. Each vantage point offers a unique lens through which to understand the world, revealing the rich tapestry of international relations. The author meticulously dissects these perspectives, highlighting their implications and complexities. By showcasing diverse viewpoints, the book underscores the fluid and evolving nature of the field, ultimately emphasizing that no single definition can fully encapsulate the complexity of international relations. This recognition of the field's dynamism is further bolstered by the author's acknowledgment of the ever-evolving global dynamics that continually reshape international relations. As the world witnesses rapid technological advancements, shifts in economic power, and emerging challenges such as climate change and global health crises, the contours of IR are constantly being redrawn. The book successfully conveys that the study of international relations is not static but rather a reflection of the ongoing evolution of the global stage.

In essence, the book's overarching goal is to provide a holistic exploration of international relations. It seeks to encompass the diverse dimensions and perspectives that characterize this field, all within the context of its contested definitions. By navigating through the intricacies of defining IR and engaging with the various interpretations that have emerged over time, the reader is invited to embark on a journey of understanding the nuanced nature of international relations. Through this exploration, the book not only sheds light on the academic discipline of IR but also offers a lens through which to view the ever-changing dynamics of our interconnected world. It encourages readers to critically engage with the diverse interpretations of international relations, ultimately fostering a deeper appreciation for the complexity of this field and its profound impact on global affairs [4]–[6].

The book adeptly underscores the dynamic nature of International Relations IR by emphasizing the profound impact of ever-evolving global dynamics on shaping the field. In a world marked by rapid technological advancements, shifting economic power dynamics, and emerging challenges, IR remains in a constant state of flux, mirroring the transformative forces at play on the global stage. Technological progress has ushered in an era of unprecedented connectivity and information exchange, transcending geographical boundaries. The advent of digital communication platforms, social media, and real-time data dissemination has revolutionized the way states, non-state actors, and individuals engage with one another on the international arena. This digital revolution not only

facilitates instantaneous cross-border interactions but also presents new avenues for global cooperation and conflict.

Furthermore, shifts in economic power have redefined the dynamics of international relations. The rise of emerging economies, such as China and India, alongside the persistent influence of established powers, has led to a recalibration of global economic hierarchies. As economic interdependencies deepen, states find themselves navigating complex webs of trade agreements, investment partnerships, and economic alliances. These interactions not only shape economic relations but also exert a considerable influence on diplomatic negotiations and strategic maneuvering. Emerging challenges, ranging from climate change and environmental degradation to transnational terrorism and global health crises, further contribute to the dynamic nature of IR. These challenges demand collective responses that transcend national borders, compelling states to cooperate, negotiate, and navigate shared risks. Such challenges underscore the interconnectedness of global issues and emphasize the need for innovative approaches to address them effectively.

In this context, the book aptly conveys that the study of IR is not static but rather a reflection of the ongoing evolution of the global stage. The ever-changing landscape of international relations is a testament to the intricate interplay between states, non-state actors, and emerging global challenges. As IR scholars grapple with the complexities of defining the field, they must also remain attuned to the fluidity of global dynamics that continually reshape the contours of international relations. In an era of unprecedented interconnectedness and complexity, the study of IR remains an essential endeavor to comprehend, analyze, and navigate the multifaceted interactions that shape our world [7]–[9].

CONCLUSION

the book offers a captivating journey through the diverse and intricate landscape of International Relations IR, shedding light on the complexities of defining this dynamic academic discipline. As readers navigate the thought-provoking pages, they are guided through a tapestry of interpretations that span the spectrum of international relations. From the traditional state-centric diplomacy to the contemporary challenges posed by globalization, the book masterfully navigates the realms of theory, practice, and the interplay between the real world and the realm of knowledge.

A central theme that resonates throughout the exploration is the delicate interplay between the tangible realities of the world and the abstract constructs that underpin our understanding. The book emphasizes the profound role of definitions in shaping our comprehension of global dynamics. It underscores that while natural sciences often possess clear-cut definitions, the social sciences, including IR, grapple with the intricate dance of political agendas, ideologies, and societal influences. This sensitivity to diverse contexts and perspectives reveals the nuanced nature of IR and underscores its dynamic nature.

The heart of the exploration lies in the juxtaposition of the conventional definition of IR and the transformative force of globalization. By meticulously dissecting the state-centric approach and engaging with the rise of non-state actors, the author prompts readers to critically reflect on the changing landscape of international relations. The book's strength lies in its presentation of a spectrum of viewpoints on the definition of IR, each offering a unique lens through which to comprehend global affairs. This showcase of diversity underscores the fluid nature of the field and highlights the inadequacy of a single definition to capture its multidimensional complexity.

As the book navigates through these varying perspectives, it accentuates the ever-evolving global dynamics that continuously reshape the contours of international relations. Rapid technological advancements, shifts in economic power, and emerging challenges contribute to the dynamic nature of IR. In this context, the book conveys that the study of international relations is a reflection of the ongoing evolution of the global stage.

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CHAPTER 2

EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY DURING THE 20TH CENTURY

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ABSTRACT:

In 1919, proponents of liberal internationalism believed that the interests and aspirations of "the people" favored peace, with democratic regimes naturally nurturing these desires. They deemed militarist, authoritarian, anti-democratic governments, which had supposedly dominated pre-World War I Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, as the impediments to peace. While certain crises of the 1930s did indeed stem from such regime's Japanese militarism in Manchuria, 'Francoism' in the Spanish Civil War others did not. Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, though not traditional autocracies, seized power through quasi-democratic means and garnered popular support. Although elections ceased in Germany after 1933, evidence suggests that the National Socialists maintained considerable backing, possibly even until the war's end. Curiously, these regimes, despite their popular support, exalted warfare. Fascism and national socialism celebrated armed conflict as vital for nation-building. Their aims, like turning the Mediterranean into an Italian domain and reshaping Eastern Europe, necessitated war. While Hitler framed his actions as responses to alleged provocations, it was evident that this was a pretext unless interpreting self-preservation as stubbornness. Post 1945, realism emerged as the dominant theory in International Relations.

KEYWORDS:

Interdependency, Realism, Relation Theory, Regime, Theory.

INTRODUCTION

It mirrored conventional wisdom, especially among diplomats, and took root in academia and media, shaping discourse. Remarkably, realism's prominence persists, evidenced by its continued influence despite the rise of its critics. The subsequent narrative will explore the clash between realism and its dissenters. Although these critics have gained ground over time, realism remains the principal mode of discussion. This paradox highlights the brevity of the segment on the post-war realist synthesis, as the substantive theories developed then still shape contemporary discourse and warrant further exploration. While Carr's influence remained, the ascendancy of post-war realism can be attributed more to others. Carr shifted focus, and figures like Martin Wight in Britain and George Kennan in the United States contributed to the realist narrative. Notably, Hans J. Morgenthau, a German-Jewish émigré in the 1930s, authored influential works including "Politics Among Nations," which became a defining textbook on International Relations for generations, solidifying realism's prominence in the field.

Returning to the root ideas of liberal internationalism, it is easy to identify the problems this approach faced in the 1930s. In 1919, liberal internationalists believed that 'the people' had a real interest in and desire for peace and that democratic regimes would, if given the chance, allow these

interests and desires to dominate. The enemy of peace, on this account, was the kind of militarist, authoritarian, autocratic, anti-democratic regime which had, allegedly, dominated Germany, Austria Hungary, and Russia in 1914. Now, some of the crises of the 1930s were caused by this kind of regime Japanese militarism in Manchuria and China and 'Francoism' in the Spanish Civil War fit the bill quite well but most were not. Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy were not traditional military autocracies; rather, they were regimes that had come to power by quasi-democratic means and remained in power by the mobilization of popular support. There were no elections in Germany after 1933, but what evidence exists suggests that the National Socialists had clear majority support well into the war, perhaps even to its very end. Moreover, these regimes, although popularly supported, actually glorified war. The rhetoric of fascism and national socialism stressed the virtues of armed struggle and its importance in building the nation.

And, of course, the stated ends of these regimes turning the Mediterranean into an Italian lake, depopulating Eastern Europe of Slavs, Jews, and other alleged inferiors and repopulating it with 'Aryans' – could not be achieved by any means other than war. Although Hitler still maintained in his public orations that he was forced to resort to force by the obstinate and malicious behavior of the enemies of the Volk, it was quite clear that this was nonsense unless a reluctance to commit suicide is deemed a sign of obstinacy. The fact that Nazism remained a popular force despite this posture dealt a terrible blow to liberal thinking. After 1945, realism became the dominant theory of International Relations, offering a conception of the world that seemed to define the 'common sense' of the subject. Nicholas Spykman 1942 and the diplomat George Kennan Kennan 1952 . However, the key realist of the period was Hans J. Morgenthau, a German-Jewish émigré to the United States in the 1930s who published a series of books in the 1940s and 1950s, the most influential of which was Politics Among Nations The Struggle for Power and Peace, a book that was to become the standard textbook on International Relations for a generation or more Morgenthau 1948.

DISCUSSION

1. Liberal internationalism and the origins of the discipline

The complexities surrounding liberal internationalism and its challenges during the 1930s, subsequently shifting its focus to the emergence of realism as the prevailing theory in International Relations post-1945. This passage encapsulates the evolving ideologies and prevailing discourses in the realm of global affairs, exploring the intricacies and paradoxes that have shaped the field. Beginning with the revisitation of the foundational principles of liberal internationalism, the passage highlights the obstacles faced by this approach during the tumultuous 1930s. In the aftermath of World War I, proponents of liberal internationalism believed that the innate interests and yearnings of "the people" were inherently aligned with the pursuit of peace. This viewpoint posited that democratic regimes would serve as natural catalysts, nurturing these aspirations for harmony. In contrast, the enemies of peace were identified as militarist, authoritarian, and anti-democratic governments, which were alleged to have dominated Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia before the First World War. These governments were painted as roadblocks on the path to achieving global equilibrium.

However, the passage introduces a nuanced perspective on the crises that unfolded in the 1930s. While some crises indeed emanated from the regimes that adhered to the aforementioned pattern such as Japanese militarism in Manchuria and 'Francoism' in the Spanish Civil War others defied this characterization. The notable cases of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy stand out as

exceptions. Unlike traditional autocracies, these regimes had attained power through a combination of quasi-democratic mechanisms and substantial popular support. It is highlighted that although electoral processes ceased in Germany after 1933, existing evidence points towards the persistence of substantial public backing for the National Socialists, possibly even extending until the conclusion of World War II. The passage takes a thought-provoking turn by investigating the ideological complexities inherent in regimes that garnered popular support despite advocating for warfare. Interestingly, while enjoying significant public endorsement, these regimes glorified war as a means of nation-building. Both fascism and national socialism underscored the importance of armed conflict in shaping and strengthening the nation. The ambitious objectives of these regimes – such as turning the Mediterranean into an Italian domain or reshaping Eastern Europe – were inherently dependent on military endeavors. This analysis challenges the perception of warfare as antithetical to public interests and exposes the dichotomy between public support and the glorification of war. The passage also casts doubt on the authenticity of Hitler's rationale for his aggressive actions, suggesting that his claims of reacting to provocations were a smokescreen for more far-reaching territorial and ideological goals [1]–[3].

2. Challenges to the realist synthesis

Post-1945, the passage shifts its focus to the emergence of realism as the prevailing theory in International Relations. The aftermath of World War II witnessed the ascent of realism as a dominant framework for understanding global dynamics. This shift was rooted in its alignment with conventional wisdom, particularly among diplomats. The theory's influence extended into academia and media narratives, thus molding the discourse surrounding international affairs. The enduring prominence of realism, despite the increasing chorus of dissenting voices, stands as a testament to its enduring influence on the field. Furthermore, the passage anticipates a forthcoming exploration of the interplay between realism and its critics. While these critics have made notable strides over time, realism continues to serve as the primary mode of discussion. This paradoxical coexistence underscores the concise treatment of the segment dealing with the post-war realist synthesis. The theories formulated during this period continue to shape contemporary discussions, necessitating further exploration in subsequent chapters. The passage concludes by acknowledging the transition of influence within the realist school. While E.H. Carr's influence remained, the post-war ascendancy of realism owed more to other notable figures. Carr's shifting focus paved the way for the prominence of individuals like Martin Wight in Britain and George Kennan in the United States, who contributed significantly to the realist narrative.

A pivotal figure in this landscape was Hans J. Morgenthau, a German-Jewish émigré in the 1930s. His influential works, particularly "Politics Among Nations," achieved the status of a defining textbook on International Relations, thereby cementing realism's enduring prominence in the field for generations to come. The provided excerpt delves into the post-World War II landscape of International Relations, focusing on the ascendancy of realism as the dominant theory and its lasting impact. It examines the widespread adoption of realism among diplomats, academics, and opinion-makers, acknowledging the enduring nature of this framework. The passage outlines the forthcoming content of the book, which primarily deals with the interplay between realism and its critics, emphasizing that despite the increasing influence of these dissenting voices, realism continues to shape the discipline's discourse. The section also discusses key figures who contributed to the prominence of realism, especially Hans J. Morgenthau, and explores the historical context and reasons behind the ascendancy of realism. The passage opens by pinpointing the aftermath of World War II as the period when realism emerged as the dominant theory in the

realm of International Relations. This shift was marked by the adoption of a conceptual framework that seemed to encapsulate the "common sense" understanding of the subject. The passage highlights that this shift was not confined to any single segment but rather permeated various strata of society, including practicing diplomats, academics, and influential opinion-makers. It suggests that the discipline of International Relations expanded along broadly realist lines, indicating a shift toward this perspective as the prevailing mode of thought.

3. The 'realist' critique of liberal internationalism

The passage underscores the lasting influence of realism, noting that it remains the primary mode of discourse in International Relations up to the present day. This dominance is paradoxical in that it coexists with the presence of critics who have challenged its assumptions and implications. The forthcoming content of the book is revealed to center around the tensions between realism and its critics, indicating that these debates have played a significant role in shaping the discipline. While the passage acknowledges the effectiveness of these critics over time, it maintains that realism remains the overarching narrative.

The passage also acknowledges the transition in focus within the field, mentioning E.H. Carr's continued influence while noting that his attention shifted from International Relations to Soviet history. This shift highlights the evolving nature of intellectual pursuits and interests within the discipline, leading to changes in emphasis and research directions. In this context, the passage introduces Martin Wight as a notable figure in British International Relations, although his Chatham House pamphlet on Power Politics is characterized as having only a dubious realist influence, despite its title. This illustrates the complexity of intellectual lineages and the nuances in individuals' contributions.

The passage extends its exploration to the United States, where influential figures like Niebuhr, Nicholas Spykman, and George Kennan maintained their relevance in shaping the realist narrative. This highlights the transnational nature of intellectual exchange within the discipline, where ideas and perspectives transcended geographical boundaries. The passage, however, underscores that the pivotal figure of this period was Hans J. Morgenthau, a German-Jewish émigré who had fled to the United States during the 1930s. Morgenthau's contributions were monumental, characterized by a series of influential books published during the 1940s and 1950s. Among them, "Politics Among Nations the Struggle for Power and Peace" stood out as the most impactful. This work solidified Morgenthau's status as a key proponent of realism, serving as a definitive textbook on International Relations for generations. His insights and analyses contributed to the establishment and proliferation of the realist framework within the academic and practical domains

4. International Relations and the behavioural sciences

The nature of "laws of politics" found in Morgenthau's text, which are essentially generalizations meant to apply universally to the realm of international affairs. These laws are aligned with the "covering law" model of explanation, which posits that something is considered explained when it can be accounted for under a general law. This approach resonates with realism's aspiration to treat international relations as a subject of scientific inquiry. However, the passage introduces a critical point the application of these laws is not guaranteed. States and statespersons are not necessarily bound to obey these laws, raising the question of their practical utility. If states and their actors have the freedom to disregard these laws, the notion of persuading them to adhere to these principles becomes paradoxical. The passage proceeds to highlight the perceived

methodological shortcomings in Morgenthau's approach. It points out that the manner in which Morgenthau generates and establishes his laws seems unscientific. An instance of this is illustrated by a quote from Montesquieu in the Preface to the second edition of "Politics Among Nations," where Morgenthau emphasizes the need to judge a lifetime's work based on comprehensive reflection, not on cursory reading. This stands in contrast to the scientific ethos, which prioritizes the logic and quality of an argument over the authority of experience. The passage indicates that the emphasis on seniority and experience might compromise the rigor and logical consistency expected of scientific analysis. The critique is that genuine academic discourse should welcome rigorous scrutiny and constructive critique, even from junior scholars, rather than uphold seniority as a shield against criticism.

Consequently, the passage argues that the scientific claims of realism are juxtaposed with its seemingly unscientific methods. This observation gained traction in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly among ex-natural scientists drawn to the field of IR, particularly in the United States. These individuals, which included physicists concerned about nuclear weapons and systems analysts involved in policy-making, sought to enhance the scientific quality of IR theory. Their approach involved a shift towards a more systematic and rigorous framework, influenced by the behavioral sciences. This was a response to the "wisdom literature" and anecdotal historical approach adopted by traditional realists like Morgenthau. The passage illustrates the behavioralists' endeavor to introduce rigorous and systematic scientific concepts and reasoning to the field of IR. This manifested in various ways, including refining existing theories, generating new data sources, and employing mathematical models for decision-making analysis. The example of Morton Kaplan's "balance of power" models and J.D. Singer's "Correlates of War" Project demonstrates this transition towards empirical rigor. Additionally, scholars such as Thomas Schelling applied game theory and rational choice theory to decision-making analysis. Furthermore, the passage notes that this transformation was not limited to traditional methods but also extended to the creation of new concepts that challenged the state-centric nature of IR. Social theorists like John Burton, Kenneth Boulding, and Johan Galtung introduced innovative perspectives that transcended conventional boundaries. Their work introduced novel conceptual frameworks that expanded the scope of IR analysis [4]–[6].

5. Pluralism and complex interdependence’

Keohane and Nye's transnational relations collection initially lacked a comprehensive theory of the new IR landscape. However, their work "Power and Interdependence" 1977/2000 aimed to fill this gap by introducing the concept of complex interdependence as a theoretical framework to coexist with realism. This classic work contrasted three fundamental aspects between complex interdependence and realism, thereby marking a shift in how international relations were understood. The first major departure was the assumption of multiple channels of access between societies in complex interdependence. Unlike realism's unitary state assumption, which presumed that states were the only significant actors, complex interdependence recognized a broader spectrum of actors, including various branches of the state apparatus and non-state entities. This change reflected a more nuanced view of international relations, acknowledging the diverse agents influencing global dynamics. The second contrast lay in the significance of force in international relationships. While realism emphasized the role of force in shaping global interactions, complex interdependence posited that force would have minimal importance in most international relationships. The traditional role of power as a determinant of outcomes was challenged by this perspective. Instead, a more cooperative and less confrontational environment was suggested,

aligning with the concept of interdependence itself. Furthermore, complex interdependence discarded the hierarchical structure of issues prevalent in realism. Realism asserted that security was the paramount concern, consistently trumping other matters. In contrast, complex interdependence proposed that any issue-area could assume prominence on the international agenda at any given time. This approach acknowledged the fluidity of global priorities and did not grant security a perpetual supremacy over other issues.

This transition to complex interdependence indicated a shift from viewing states as wholly interconnected entities to a more granulated perspective. The emergence of pluralism challenged the traditional realism, emphasizing the disaggregation of relationships into different issue-areas, each with its mode of mutual dependence. This recognition gave rise to the politics of complex interdependence, as various issue-areas demanded distinct analytical approaches. In the realm of complex interdependence, sensitivity and vulnerability of actors were key considerations. Sensitivity referred to the extent to which actors were affected by changes in specific issue-areas, while vulnerability indicated their capacity to control responses to such changes. Different states exhibited varying degrees of sensitivity and vulnerability, allowing them to leverage strengths in one area to compensate for weaknesses in another. This interplay was exemplified in the 'Smithsonian Crisis' of 1971, wherein the United States wielded its trade sanctions and security guarantees to manipulate its comparative advantages.

Moreover, pluralism introduced the concept of 'agenda-setting,' a departure from realism's predefined focus on war and peace. Pluralism acknowledged the potential for any issue to dominate the international agenda, challenging the assumption that only major security concerns were truly significant. Pluralism highlighted the role of international organizations in promoting issues and emphasized the study of how actors advanced their agendas within these contexts. The passage concludes by noting that, during the mid-1970s, pluralism seemed poised to ascend as the dominant IR theory. Pluralism combined some of realism's insightful observations, such as the role of power, with a more intricate and multifaceted framework for analysis. Although critics, notably the 'structuralists,' accused pluralism of oversimplifying global dynamics and perpetuating inequalities, pluralists countered that their model could encompass a diverse range of situations, including those highlighted by structuralists[7]–[9] .

CONCLUSION

Martin Wight emerges as a notable British figure in the realm of International Relations, despite the characterization of his Chatham House pamphlet on Power Politics as having dubious realist influence. This nuance reflects the complexity of intellectual lineages, where even works with titles suggestive of a certain perspective might possess dimensions that challenge easy classification. Such nuances underscore the multifaceted nature of scholarly contributions, which often defy straightforward categorization. The passage delves into the tension between the scientific claims of realism and its seemingly unscientific methods, a debate that gained momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. The influx of ex-natural scientists, including physicists grappling with nuclear weapon concerns and systems analysts shaping policy-making, into the field exemplifies the discipline's adaptability. These scholars sought to elevate the scientific rigor of IR theory by introducing systematic frameworks informed by the behavioral sciences. This marked a departure from the anecdotal historical approach embraced by traditional realists like Morgenthau. This intellectual pivot reflects the field's willingness to evolve in response to changing methodologies and challenges. Furthermore, the introduction of complex

interdependence and pluralism as alternative theories to realism signifies a paradigm shift within IR theory. The concept of complex interdependence challenged traditional assumptions, presenting a vision of international relations characterized by multiple channels of access, diminished significance of force, and a lack of hierarchical issues. This transition was not without its complexities, as actors engaged in nuanced interactions that went beyond state-centric paradigms.

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CHAPTER 3

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT:

The legitimization of academic disciplines as "science" involves referencing specific philosophies of science. "Traditional" IR differs from the "scientist" understanding rooted in natural sciences, with divergent views on the subject, knowledge acquisition, valid knowledge, and methods. Philosophy of science emerged in the 1920s, traced back to ancient Greece, gaining appeal due to natural science's success and societal prestige. The philosophical exploration of ontology, epistemology, and methodology and their roles in shaping the foundational principles of scientific inquiry. Ontology explores the nature of existence and reality, considering questions about the essence of reality and the relationships between entities. Epistemology focuses on the nature of knowledge, its legitimacy, and its sources, with varying perspectives like empiricism emphasizing sensory experiences. Methodology involves practical techniques for knowledge acquisition, applying philosophical principles to scientific investigation. The interplay of ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions forms the basis for theoretical reasoning. The contrast between positivism, seeking unity through reductionism, and the rise of antireductionism is noted. The emergence of social constructivism and debates in International Relations exemplify these trends. Reductionism's singular causality concept is discussed, underlining its role in explaining phenomena. Overall, this exploration shapes the core principles and practices of scientific inquiry.

KEYWORDS:

Natural, Ontological Science, Philosophy, Reductionism, Theory.

INTRODUCTION

Modern academic fields are frequently justified as "science" by citing a certain philosophy of science. For instance, you already know that "traditional" IR refers to a distinct view of science than that of the "scientist" approach that depends on the natural sciences from reading the materials produced by Bull and Kaplan. Both interpretations of science are based on various scientific ideologies. They adopt contrasting stances on fundamental issues including the "nature" of the pertinent subject that needs to be researched by IR, how to learn about it, what constitutes legitimate "knowledge" in IR, and which techniques should be applied during the knowledge acquisition process. The Vienna Circle's work and Karl Popper's writings helped the philosophy of science become a recognised academic topic in the 1920s and 1930s. The beginning of inductive science as a field of study may have occurred at the end of the 19th century, when the physicist Ernst Mach was appointed to the first chair of "History and Theory of Inductive Science" in Vienna. Of course, philosophy of science as a school of philosophical inquiry into the nature of science and the study of science has a considerably longer history, at least dating back to ancient Greece.

This school of thought in Greek antiquity is most closely linked to the writings of Greek philosophers like Democritus, Aristotle, and Plato, to name a few. We will return to their concepts of science that are implicit in their philosophy in greater depth in Unit 3. Since the early 20th century, philosophy of science has drawn a lot of interest from the social sciences due to the enormous success of contemporary natural sciences like physics, mathematics, chemistry, and biology as well as the prestige these fields have attained in contemporary societies Wight 2002 25; 41 . Imagine your existence without the technological and industrial advancements of the 20th century. This will give you an idea of the prestige that science enjoys and the important part it plays in our modern society. Without the development of natural sciences, your life as you know it now would not be possible. The philosophical investigation of the fundamental essence of existence and reality is known as ontology [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

Modern academic fields are frequently justified as "science" by citing a certain philosophy of science. For instance, you already know that "traditional" IR refers to a distinct view of science than that of the "scientist" approach that depends on the natural sciences from reading the materials produced by Bull and Kaplan. Both interpretations of science are based on various scientific ideologies. They adopt contrasting stances on fundamental issues including the "nature" of the pertinent subject that needs to be researched by IR, how to learn about it, what constitutes legitimate "knowledge" in IR, and which techniques should be applied during the knowledge acquisition process. The Vienna Circle's work and Karl Popper's writings helped the philosophy of science become a recognized academic topic in the 1920s and 1930s. The beginning of inductive science as a field of study may have occurred at the end of the 19th century, when the physicist Ernst Mach was appointed to the first chair of "History and Theory of Inductive Science" in Vienna.

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Without the development of natural sciences, your life as you know it now would not be possible. The nature and practice of science itself are the subject of study within the field of philosophy of science. The field looks for distinctive features in theoretical frameworks and scientific explanations. What distinguishes science from, say, speculation, intuition, or philosophical or religious systems of knowledge? Any science philosophy is built on a variety of presumptions. These include ontological claims about existence and being, epistemological claims about what constitutes valid knowledge and the justifications for such claims, and methodological claims about the practice of science and the particular methods of gaining knowledge assumptions Wight 2002. In essence, all three of these types of assumptions are the foundation of any science

philosophy. The theory or philosophy that is "behind" or "above" a theory of international relations and whose subject is theory itself is referred to as "meta-theory" in philosophy of science viewpoints. It's crucial to pay close attention to the terms. Assumptions and claims are statements that are assumed to be true and do not need to be supported by evidence when discussing the philosophy of science. The concept and word "assumptions" have its roots in Greek logic and philosophy. It resembles an axiom, premise, or the foundation of an argument quite a bit. A logical conclusion can be drawn from a starting point in theory building by deducing or inferring a theory from it. Due to the fact that assumptions are "starting points" and that there is nothing else from which they logically flow, they cannot be proven through evidence.

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Any science philosophy is built on a variety of presumptions. These include ontological claims about existence and being, epistemological claims about what constitutes valid knowledge and the justifications for such claims, and methodological claims about the practise of science and the particular methods of gaining knowledge assumptions Wight 2002. In essence, all three of these types of assumptions are the foundation of any science philosophy. The theory or philosophy that is "behind" or "above" a theory of international relations and whose subject is theory itself is referred to as "meta-theory" in philosophy of science viewpoints. It's crucial to pay close attention to the terms. Assumptions and claims are statements that are assumed to be true and do not need to be supported by evidence when discussing the philosophy of science. The concept and word "assumptions" have its roots in Greek logic and philosophy. It resembles an axiom, premise, or the foundation of an argument quite a bit. A logical conclusion can be drawn from a starting point in theory building by deducing or inferring a theory from it.

Due to the fact that assumptions are "starting points" and that there is nothing else from which they logically flow, they cannot be proven through evidence. As a result, what we are discussing is an intellectual construct of reality that cannot be shown to be "true" or "false." You might be surprised to learn that starting with something that cannot be "proved" is part of the very nature of science and theory. This is true for all types of knowledge systems as well as the concept of knowledge about the world in general, rather than just science. It follows logically from what you have learnt thus far about assumptions that there are several accounts of what constitutes science and, as a result, various scientific philosophies within the field of philosophy of science as a whole. Step 2 will illustrate the fundamental components of a philosophy of science ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions using the example of a particular philosophy of science, positivism, in order to better comprehend the nature of a philosophy of science. However, we will require a fundamental understanding of the key concepts in a philosophy of science before we can explore positivism [4]–[6].

1. Methodology, Ontology, and Epistemology

Ontology is the philosophical study of the fundamental categories of being and their relationships in particular, as well as the nature of being, existence, or reality in general. Ontology is, in a nutshell, the philosophy of being. Ontological queries include the following What is? Which is? What is there? What materials makes up reality? What are the items and entities' most fundamental characteristics and relationships? The ontological assertion that only material reality can be said to exist is one example. This is the response to the question, "What is? “Matter only” ontological materialism or materialism as an ontological claim is the definition of the phrase. Another illustration of how "things" relate to one another is the age-old ontological conundrum of how a "universal" and "particular" relate to one another. I'm sure you're acquainted with the ontological "problem" posed by the query, "Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts? An ontological individualist claim the whole is always and only the sum of the individual parts or an ontological holistic claim the whole is more than the sum of its parts; it possesses a quality of its own that is not reducible to the properties of the individual parts could each provide an answer to the question. Therefore, an ontological assumption in the philosophy of science refers to a group of entities that have been asserted to exist. This is accomplished using a specific idea or school of thought. We talk about a theory's ontology.

The premise that states are the fundamental "units" of the international system and that the international system is "made up" of sovereign nations forming an anarchical structure is an example that you are already familiar with from the first unit and is used by many IR theories. Keep in mind what was said before regarding the nature of assumptions they act as the foundation for the development of theories. Many influential theories of international relations IR start with this premise that the international system is composed of individual states, which are seen as "units" or even unitary agents. But even if they are just beginning points that don't need to be proven to be "true" or "false," assumptions aren't "free" thought experiments, as Unit 3 will show. Instead, assumptions always represent particular, culturally changing cognitive patterns since they are drawn from and imbedded in larger, long-lasting world views. In an IR theory or even meta-theory, assumptions are typically not subject to explicit explication because they are reflections of deeper "orders of thought." Instead, they substantially influence how we think and how we perceive the world. This statement is true for all knowledge acquisition, not only scientific information. As a result, not just science but all systems of knowing contain assumptions. Later, we'll talk more specifically about this idea. In conclusion, "ontology" refers to the study of what-questions or what is known.

Epistemology, which derives from the Greek term episteme knowledge, is distinct from ontology. The area of philosophy that deals with the theory of knowledge is called epistemology. Epistemology, or the philosophy of knowing, is the study of how we learn and acquire knowledge. The definition of knowledge, accounting for the sources and standards of knowing, identifying the different types of knowledge that are possible, establishing the relationship between the knower and the things they know, and establishing the justifications for accepting or rejecting knowledge are all examples of epistemological difficulties. In other words, epistemology is concerned with the standards by which we judge what knowledge is legitimate or reliable. Empiricism is an epistemological claim that holds that we can only know what we can witness or experience with our senses and that our knowledge must have an empirical basis in order to be considered legitimate. The final component of the philosophy of science is methodology, which is concerned with the particular techniques used to acquire knowledge. Methodology, to put it another way, is

how science is done. In essence, ontological, epistemological, and methodological principles constitute the foundation for all theoretical reasoning. They work as the foundation of a specific science philosophy. Now, using positivism as an example of a philosophy of science, these fundamental components of a philosophy of science the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions will be addressed in more detail. In light of the fact that positivism has so far had the greatest influence across all scientific fields, including both natural and social sciences, positivism offers the most pertinent place to start.

The majority of academic work in IR is founded on a positivist philosophy of science, either implicitly or overtly. Step 2 thus serves a dual purpose first; the fundamentals of a science philosophy are illustrated using positivism as an example. This should make it simpler to understand what has been mentioned so far concerning philosophy of science. Second, you will already be becoming acquainted with the fundamental presuppositions that form the basis of numerous theoretical approaches to international relations at the same time. The single theories of IR will be simpler to understand as a result of the second component. Of course, at this point, this understanding will still be at the meta-theoretical level of philosophical discussions of science. When discussing certain IR theoretical approaches later on, our talks will assume a more serious shape.

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2. Science's Coherence

Positivist confidence in the ideal of a unity of science is likewise reductionist. This theory contends that the fundamental, elementary science of classical physics may ultimately account for all observed occurrences in the universe. With the expectation of a unified view of reality, this theory reduces all scientific disciplines to a "elementary science". For instance, a belief in the unity of science presupposes that biology is reducible to chemistry and chemistry then to physics, that chemistry is reducible to physics, and that psychology is reducible to biology or biochemistry holding, for example, that the explanation of depression is ultimately reducible to a lack of neurotransmitters, which in turn is "observable"/measurable. In its most extreme manifestation,

the idea of the "unity of science" leads to the conclusion that even the social sciences may be reduced to physics, or that a social science theory should be consistent with the main discoveries of the natural sciences. Since the 1950s, the concept of the unity of science has gained popularity. Oppenheim and Putnam 1958 are one example. The idea of a unity of science grants the natural sciences and their methods a preferred position as an epistemological and methodological standpoint. The idea that any discipline, including the social sciences, should be based on the procedures and model of justification employed in the natural sciences starts to take hold. Because there is only one scientific technique that can be used to analyse both the natural and social worlds, social science can thus be studied in the same way as natural sciences. The writings of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, and Georg Gadamer, among others, contain opposing ideas. According to these books, the social world necessitates a different kind of analysis than the natural world, such as hermeneutics the study of how to interpret and comprehend texts. They adopt this stance because all analysis in the social world is influenced by language, history, and ideas of truth; reason is itself historically created. Furthermore, since the subject who interprets and observes is a component of the world they are studying, there can never be genuinely objective information in the social sciences [7]–[9].

Both in the 20th century and in the present, reductionism might be considered as the most conventional viewpoint. It could be interpreted as a prioritising and absolutizing of physics. Without a doubt, reductionism's success has its roots in the achievement of modern science. Antireductionism, on the other hand, has been on the rise for about 30 years. This trend mostly came about as a result of neurophilosophical or biophilosophical discoveries that highlight the shortcomings of a reductionist explanation of things like human consciousness. More generally, it appears that social world events or things like the human mind cannot be reduced to things that can be explained using the traditional natural science method. A good indicator of the rise of antireductionism in the social sciences is the expansion of social constructivist theories, which postulate the existence of "immaterial factors" such as the significance of norms, collective ideas and collective representations, and learning, among others. In terms of methodology and epistemology, it is still a basic fact that the sciences have not been united. Instead, there was a diversification in the ontological, epistemological, and methodological stances that underlie theory development. The so-called positivism-post positivism debate, which has been going on since the 1990s, is when this shift away from reductionism in IR finally became apparent. The discussion of this controversy will take place in section 2.3. Let's focus on causality and the specific kind of explanation to bring our examination of positivism as an example of a science philosophy to a close. Reductionism is synonymous with a particular theory of causality and explanation the notion that every observed phenomena is ultimately the result of a single cause [10], [11].

CONCLUSION

The philosophical study of ontology, or the nature of existence, includes research into the fundamental nature of reality and the connections between entities. It successfully examines the components and fundamental features of reality in an effort to answer questions like "What is there?" and "What exists?" For instance, ontological materialism asserts that the only things with real reality are things made of matter. Epistemological concerns delve into the nature of knowledge, encompassing its definition, sources, validity criteria, and the relationship between the knower and the known. It also addresses the relationship between general concepts and particular instances, as summarised in the age-old question "Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts?" The goal of epistemology is to lay the foundation for accepting knowledge as legitimate.

Empiricism, for instance, bases the epistemological foundation on observable reality and claims that knowledge must originate from sensory experience in order to be considered true. The systematic ways and processes used to acquire knowledge are included in methodology, the practical aspect of science philosophy. The practical side of scientific inquiry is formed by it, which essentially transforms philosophical concepts into scientific practise. The foundation of theoretical reasoning is the trinity of ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions. Positivism tries to explain all occurrences by applying the principles of classical physics. It is based on the idea of the unity of science and is influenced by reductionism. It favours scientific methods from the natural sciences and seeks to integrate several scientific disciplines into a single framework. On the other hand, antireductionism is gaining ground and contests reductionism's universal application. The rise of social constructivism and the positivism-post positivism debate in the study of international relations IR are tangible examples of this tendency. According to reductionism, which is in line with the idea of a single cause for every phenomenon, this is possible.

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CHAPTER 4

CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

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ABSTRACT:

In the 1960s, the IR theory debate centered on Morgenthau versus critics, evolving over time to shift Morgenthau's prominence to Waltz. Rational choice theory's prominence in US political science asserts that politics can be understood through goal-driven, rational calculations to maximize gains or minimize losses. This "neo-utilitarian" stance influenced the study of US domestic politics from the 1960s, using tools like game theory and quantitative methods. While the late 1970s suggested neo realism versus pluralism as the international theory's core, the US, as the discipline's hub, took another path. The 1980s and 1990s saw "neoliberal institutionalists" replacing pluralism and converging with neorealism under scholars like Keohane and Axelrod. Their models illustrated how rational egoists could collaborate in anarchical systems, rooted in international anarchy and states' rational egoism. Critics of rational choice IR challenge its state-centered focus and underlying assumptions, notably the presupposed predetermined world. These critics split into two groups constructivists and English School counterparts, and critical theorists, poststructuralists, and others. Rapidly expanding constructivism lacks precise definition, including those seeking independence from mainstream American IR while retaining credibility. Rejecting neo-utilitarian and rational choice rationale, constructivists lean towards post-positivism or even anti-positivism.

KEYWORDS:

Theory, International, National, States, Choice.

INTRODUCTION

Similar to Hans Morgenthau's post-war synthesis, Kenneth Waltz's "Theory of International Politics" 1979 has had a lasting influence on international relations IR. Realists and anti-realists alike were interested in Waltz's revival of realism. In the same way that Morgenthau was the focal point of discussion in the 1960s, Waltz's theory took centre stage in later years. Waltz's viewpoint is consistent with the development of rational choice theory in US political science in the 1980s. Through the rational benefit-seeking of individual actors, this approach analyses political behaviour. It is heavily used in domestic politics, has economic roots, and supports quantitative techniques. The US context resonates with its individualism. His book serves as the neorealism and rational choice theory bridge. Waltz's realism avoids detailed narratives and concentrates only on the global system. He emphasises systemic awareness while criticising unit-centric strategies. His thesis makes a distinction between hierarchical and anarchical systems and asserts the dynamics of self-help in international anarchy. States ensure self-preservation in the absence of authority because they are unified actors. They modify security-related regulations through a self-help system. Power dynamics based on this behaviour start to emerge. In contrast to Morgenthau's moralistic realism, Waltz's rational choice balance of power idea is supported by neoclassical economic analogies. Waltz's contributions influenced the development of "defensive" and "offensive" strands of structural realism. While offensive realists aim for maximum power,

defensive realists prioritise state security through system posture. Incorporating unit-level analysis, recent researchers have improved neorealism by incorporating personal and domestic aspects [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

1. The opponents of the rational choice hypothesis

In the 1960s, it was claimed by Kenneth Thompson that the debate over IR theory was between Morgenthau and his detractors; in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, Waltz's name should have taken the place of Morgenthau's although, in both instances, it is more important to focus on what the author is thought to have written than what was actually on the page. The virtues of Theory of International Politics will be explored below, however even if these are admirable features, they do not guarantee the book's success. The rise to prominence of rational choice theory in the political science community in the United States provides the broader context. The premise of rational choice thinking is that politics can be understood in terms of people's goal-directed behaviour, who behave rationally at least in the sense that they make ends-means calculations intended to maximise the benefits they anticipate receiving from specific circumstances or, of course, minimise the losses. From the 1960s onward, this general viewpoint sometimes referred to as "neo-utilitarian"was widely used in the study of domestic politics in the US, with electoral, interest group, and congressional politics at the forefront. It draws much of its strength from the field of economics, where rational choice assumptions are fundamental. It promotes the use of tools like game theory in the study of politics and makes quantitative research using regression analysis and other statistical methods mostly created by econometricians possible.

The dominance of this approach in the US, as opposed to its relative unimportance in Britain and, until recently, much of the European continent, may be explained by the individualism of rational choice theory and its scientific aspirations being particularly friendly to the American psyche. The possibilities made possible by assimilating Waltz's approach to rational choice theory account for the long-term significance of his work. In contrast, the most vehement and persistent criticisms of Waltz have come from opponents of rational choice theory, despite the fact that structuralism is frequently described as the antithesis of rational choice theory. Waltz effectively made it possible for IR theory to be incorporated into the predominant way of politics in the US; it needs to be seen, however, whether this represents a significant improvement in our understanding of IR or a significant diversion in the wrong direction. Different types of units are arranged in a hierarchical structure under a defined chain of command. Units that are similar in nature but have vastly different capabilities interact with one another in anarchical systems. Waltz emphasises the need of distinguishing between hierarchy and anarchy; he contends that the current system is unmistakably anarchical and has been since its late mediaeval roots. The pluralists' suggested adjustments don't amount to a systemic shift; such a development would need the establishment of hierarchical institutions, i.e., a global government. Theory of International Politics devotes a significant portion of its discussion to arguing that this is not the case and that the pluralists' highlighted trends are merely the tip of the iceberg and that the fundamental nature of the system has not changed. States, which are theoretically supposed to be unitary actors, are required to take care of themselves because no one else is available to do so in the international system, which is a "self-help" system.

Waltz makes the assumption that states want to protect themselves but does not necessarily infer that they are aggressive, self-aggrandizing bodies. In other words, they must be worried about their

security and must-see other governments as potential enemies. Their perception of their own power and the power of others must be taken into account as they constantly modify their position in the environment. A power balance develops as a result of these motions. The international system is based on the balance of power. Power dynamics can be described in terms of the number of 'poles' in the balance, which is defined by the number of states that can seriously endanger one another's basic survival. Waltz claims that this indicates that the system in 1979 is bipolar. Only the US and the USSR have the capability of endangering one another's existence. We shall see that the majority of writers on the balance of power consider bipolar balances to be intrinsically unstable since changes in one actor's capacity can only be met by equivalent changes in the other, and this process is always likely to become out of sync. Waltz disagrees, claiming that because there are fewer interested parties, bipolar systems are simpler to administer. This is a theory of how the international system is structured, therefore a fair question would be how structure connects to 'agency' - what does it mean to suggest that states must act in particular ways? Again, how can it be assumed that a balance of power will always emerge or that states will be able to manage a bipolar system when most states would rather eliminate potentially threatening states i.e., all states other than themselves? Waltz's response to these questions is that there is no real assurance that balances will develop or that power management will be effective.

However, states that do not pay attention to the signals sent to them by the international system, that is, states that ignore the distribution of power in the world, will find that they suffer as a result, and in some cases, they may even lose their independence. States are likely to take the necessary action since they do not want this to occur Waltz 1979. But they might not; some states, though not many in the twentieth century, have actually lost their independence, whereas others have the luxury of being able to make a number of errors in interpreting the requirements of the international system without suffering serious consequences because of a favourable geographical position or another natural advantage. Nevertheless, states have a propensity to react to their stimuli. Waltz uses analogies from neoclassical economics, particularly the theory of markets and the theory of the company, here and at various times throughout the essay. The pure competitive market is a well-known illustration of a structure that develops without the involvement of buyers and sellers but is nonetheless brought into being as a result of their actions. The word "must" in this context simply means that, for example, farmers who try to sell at a price higher than the market will bear will be unable to unload their crops, while farmers who sell for less than they could get are passing up opportunities for gain which will be taken up by others who will drive them out of business. In a similar vein, purchasers will not be able to pay less than the current rate and will not want to pay more than is necessary. These choices have an impact on the market structure, which in turn shapes the choices. The comparison can be developed further. A small number of businesses are able to control prices and output in an oligopoly, a market where there is little direct rivalry, such that each firm is better off than it would be otherwise.

These companies don't care about each other's survival; Ford wants General Motors to go away, and vice versa. However, as profit-maximizing businesses, they are aware that any attempt to eliminate the competition would be far too risky to even consider; a price war could destroy both companies. The Soviet Union and the United States had a similar interest in controlling competition, even if both would have preferred to see the other vanish if it could have been done without any risk or expense. The 'neo' in 'neorealism' could be considered to be justified by this economic parallel. Waltz is essentially giving a "rational choice" version of the balance of power, where nations are believed to be self-interested egoists who decide their strategies by selecting

those that maximise their welfare. This is key in terms of the importance of his theory. This is a far cry from Morgenthau and the "righteous realists' agonised reliance on the mainspring of the sinfulness of man" Rosenthal 1991.

The need to add unit level analysis to structural neorealism in the recent work of scholars like Wohlforth 1993 , Schweller, and Zakaria is another departure from Waltzian philosophy. Using the insights of classical realists like Machiavelli, Morgenthau, and Kissinger, this work which is referred to as "neoclassical" or "postclassical" realism argues that state behaviour cannot be explained using the structural level alone and reinstates the individual and domestic governmental level variables which Waltz rejected in Man, The State and War, 1959 into explanations of state behaviour in the international system. Waltz's neorealism is undoubtedly divisive, but it continues to be the most persuasive defence of the realist stance in recent memory and a restatement that connects IR theory to the mainstream of American political science. The most significant work on international relations theory of its generation is, deservedly, Theory of International Politics.

2. Neorealism followed by neoliberalism

From a late 1970s perspective, it may have been assumed that International Theory would develop in the remaining decades of the 20th century along the lines of a contrast between neo realism and pluralism, with, perhaps, a left-wing critique of both theories lurking in the background. To some extent, this has occurred, and a number of explanations of modern International Relations theory are offered in terms of three perspectives or 'paradigms'. However, theory evolved in a very different fashion in the United States, the discipline's actual home country. The 'neoliberal institutionalists' of the 1980s and 1990s largely replaced the pluralists of the 1970s, and in the process, they grew closer to neorealism than may have been anticipated. Neorealism was heavily influenced by models created by academics like Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod Keohane 1984, 1989; Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985. Their analysis aimed to demonstrate that rational egoists may collaborate even in anarchical systems; they accepted the two fundamental assumptions of international anarchy and the rational egoism of states. They acknowledged that cooperation under anarchy was always likely to be brittle by using information from the same kind of sources as the neorealists, including game theory, public choice, and rational choice theory. 'Free rider' states, which reaped the benefits of cooperation without bearing any of the costs, would always be a concern, and the 'prisoner's dilemma' game very clearly demonstrated the challenge of relying on commitments to cooperate made in situations when enforcement was impossible [4]–[6].

However, the prospects for collaboration would be improved if international systems could be put in place where information could be exchanged and obligations could be formalised. Establishing regimes is a challenging process, and the majority of current regimes, particularly in the international political economy, were established by the United States, a "hegemonic" power, in the immediate post-war period. A "hegemon" in this context is defined as a state that has the capacity to create and enforce rules of action and the willingness to act in accordance with this capacity. One of the main claims made by the majority of these authors is that US hegemony has significantly waned in recent years, which raises the question of whether collaboration can continue "after hegemony." The typical response is "yes," but at less-than-ideal levels, as the dictatorship is surviving off of the wealth amassed during hegemony. Although the neoliberals and neorealists have distinctly different viewpoints on international cooperation, both have a commitment to rational choice theory, placing them within the same larger trend. The issues of

contention between the two groups are eloquently outlined by the neorealist Joseph Grieco in his work "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperationk" Grieco 1988. Grieco contends that a crucial issue relates to absolute rather than relative gains from collaboration.

Neoliberals presumptively believe that states are primarily focused on the absolute benefits of cooperation; as long as they are content with their own circumstances, they won't be overly bothered with how well other nations are faring. Here, there is an obvious similarity to liberal trade theory, where it is believed that the fact that all parties will benefit from trade reflecting comparative advantage is more significant than the notion that they will all benefit equally. Neorealists, on the other hand, presuppose that each state will be interested in relative advantages from cooperation, that is, that it will care about both how well it is doing and how well other states are doing. This is a natural outgrowth of the neorealist emphasis on the balance of power, which is predicated exactly on the idea that nations would constantly monitor one another for indications that their relative power positions are shifting.

Grieco argues that because of this difference in attitude, neorealists and neoliberals focus on quite different issues when it comes to the bounds of collaboration. Neoliberals find it quite simple to understand why governments work together because it is in their exclusive best interests. Instead, as we've shown, the issue is that states prefer to cheat and become "free riders," so some sort of mechanism to stop cheating is required. It is simple to understand why this school of thought is referred to be neoliberal since it would enable nations to realise their actual long-term interest in collaboration instead of succumbing to the temptation to settle for short-term gains. On the other hand, "cheating" is more or less a non-issue for realists. According to them, the challenge is establishing cooperation in the first place since governments will only work together if they believe their gains will be greater than, or at least equal to, those of all other relevant parties. This is a challenging standard to satisfy. Grieco argues that observations of how states actually behave in the international system and public opinion data, which he shows suggests that at least the US public is more concerned with relative gains than with absolute gains, support the neorealist assumption that states concentrate on relative gains. Neoliberals, on the other hand, can refer to the vast network of international institutions that already exists and, in fact, is constantly expanding, which tends to cast doubt on the idea that nations are persistently hesitant to cooperate. Neorealists believe that the neoliberals are involved in a futile endeavour.

Neoliberals contend that collaboration is possible in the absence of a Hobbesian "sovereign," although accepting an essentially Hobbesian understanding of the situation, namely the two conditions of anarchy and rational egoism. Although cooperation will not be ideal, neoliberals contend that it will still be possible. Whatever the outcome of this argument, it is certain that neoliberals and neorealists today are considerably more alike than their non-neo antecedents. The latter, stressing either the harmony or disharmony of interests and the importance or unimportance of domestic structures, understood the world in fundamentally incompatible terms, whereas the 'neos' both base their arguments on what are believed to be the facts of anarchy and the rational egoism of states. Creating a single "neo-neo" viewpoint could be pushing it Waever 1996, but the two positions are clearly near enough to be understood as providing various interpretations of what is fundamentally the same rational choice research project.

3. The 'English School' and constructivism

As we shall see, proponents of globalisation reject the'state-centrism' inherent in neorealist/neoliberal rational choice theory in favour of a strategy that emphasises global social,

economic, cultural, and political dynamics. Other sceptics of rational choice IR are less concerned by its emphasis on the state and more critical of the implicit assumptions that underlie that emphasis, particularly the assumption that the nature of the state is, in some ways, given and that the laws governing state behaviour are merely a byproduct of natural law rather than a creation of human invention. By definition, rational choice IR theories presuppose that states engage in goal-directed behaviour, but within a context that is predetermined. They examine how states engage in the game of being rational egoists in anarchic environments, but they presuppose that states are rational egoists and that the world's designation as anarchic is unproblematic, meaning that the rules of the game are predetermined. Critics contest this collection of presumptions. It is difficult to identify even a basic classification scheme for these critics, therefore for the sake of exposition, they are divided into two categories. These critics are united by a dislike of rational choice approaches, but they have little in common other than that.

Constructivists and their English School relatives' work will be investigated first, followed by critical theorists, poststructuralists, and other writers who are incorrectly referred to as postmodern writers as we move farther and further away from the mainstream of IR theory. Constructivism is the opposing movement within IR theory that is expanding the fastest, although a large portion of this expansion is a result of the absence of a precise definition of what this approach might include. Constructivism, sadly, has turned into a bumper-sticker phrase that has been adopted by people who want to claim some independence from mainstream American IR theory while yet keeping some credibility Adler 1997. This wasn't the situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Then, constructivist ideas were established as a truly radical alternative to conventional IR in the writings of Friedrich Kratochwil 1989, Nicholas Onuf 1989, and Alexander 1987, 1992.

The context is provided by a notion of anarchy that is essentially incontrovertible and unchanging. Each component of this formulation is contested by constructivists. Identity does matter. For example, US relations with France and Canada differ from those with Egypt and the People's Republic of China not just for security reasons, but also because the first two countries share a common broad identity with the US while the latter two do not. More dramatically, as Ruggie points out, it mattered greatly that the US became briefly hegemonic post-1945 rather than the USSR, in ways that cannot be captured by those who merely focus on security. Additionally, it is untrue to claim that there is only one "anarchy problematic"; anarchy simply implies "no rule," however it does not necessarily imply disorder. It's possible for norms to develop in an anarchistic environment. The second half of Alexander Wendt's ambitious Social Theory of International Politics provides a thorough development of this latter idea. Although, as the title also suggests, it pays a kind of homage to the preceding volume, this book is a deliberate attempt to mount an opposition to Waltz's Theory of International Politics. While the second half of Social Theory develops ideas about the importance of identity and norms, as well as the politics of various types of anarchy, including the possibility of the emergence of an "anarchical society," the first part of Social Theory presents a clear, if occasionally anodyne, version of constructivist epistemology. This latter possibility draws attention to the similarities between this form of constructivism and the theories of a group of philosophers commonly referred to as the "English School.

4. 'Postmodern', critical, and poststructuralist international thought

Insofar as they reject the neo-utilitarian reasoning and rational choice of mainstream IR theory, all constructivists are in some ways post-positivists or even anti-positivists. However, the constructivist trend that is currently dominant, as represented by and Ruggie, is still very much in

line with the mainstream's research agenda, which is the relations of states, specifically issues of cooperation and conflict. Since there is no single source of inspiration for this "new learning," the writers to be taken into account in this final section on contemporary IR theory are much less committed to this conventional agenda. Instead, they draw their inspiration from a variety of other places. Here, we find feminist writers, Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, writers who were influenced by the French thinkers of the last fifty years in particular, Foucault and Derrida and even, despite the term's frequent overuse, the occasional true "postmodernist." With the exception of two key intellectual commitments, these thinkers do not share much in common. They all want to understand international relations not as a self-contained discourse with its own terms of reference, but rather as one manifestation of a much larger social thought movement, and they all believe that theory must disturb pre-existing categories and unnerve the reader.

IR must be viewed in the perspective of Enlightenment and post Enlightenment philosophy on both counts. Its proper interpretation in this context is in dispute, and in order to comprehend this dispute, one must go back in time to the Enlightenment itself. To respond to the inquiry, "What is Enlightenment?' In a study of this scope is not conceivable, but a rough-and-ready description of what is now commonly known as the 'Enlightenment Project' can be offered, building on Kant's famous response to this question - Enlightenment is 'humanity's escape from self-imposed immaturity' Reiss 1970 54. In other words, the Enlightenment demanded that human reason be applied to the goal of emancipation for all people. The great thinkers of the Enlightenment pushed people to gain knowledge of themselves and their surroundings and to use that knowledge to break free from ignorance and superstition as well as, more directly, from political tyranny and, possibly, the tyranny of material necessity.

Originally, 'liberalism' in one form or another served as the primary carrier of the project of emancipation. However, all the authors we have looked at here and most constructivists share the opinion that modern forms of liberalism, such as the neo-utilitarianism embodied by mainstream IR theory and rational choice theory, no longer serve this purpose. According to Robert Cox's famous formulation, contemporary liberal theory is "problem-solving" theory because it accepts the dominant definition of a given situation and works to resolve the issues this definition creates, whereas emancipatory theory needs to be "critical" by questioning accepted beliefs Cox 1981. Therefore, unlike neorealist/neoliberal thinking, which accepts the "anarchy problematic" as a given and looks for ways to mitigate its worst effects, new approaches either seek to explore and explain how this problematic serves specific types of interests and shuts down specific types of arguments, or they seek to shift the discussion to a completely unrelated topic.

There is disagreement among these scholars as to whether the emancipation project itself can be revived, even though it is generally accepted that modern liberalism cannot be seen as an emancipatory discourse. Here, a very clear division forms between those who think it is liberal, even if not along contemporary International Relations Theory Today, and those who think that liberalism's failure in this area is an indication of a fault with the idea of emancipation itself. Linklater is more focused on the evolution of political community concepts and an increasingly inclusive dialogue than on institutional change. These are topics that unmistakably tie to Habermas's ideas, although many authors in the field of critical international studies, particularly in subfields like "Critical Security Studies," adopt a larger perspective of the critical theory endeavour. Compared to Linklater and Held, Neufeld and Jones both continue to be more closely aligned with the Marxian roots of critical theory and are generally more critical of the dominant forces in modern-day world politics. These brief remarks can only provide a taste of the critical

theorists' work; readers are advised to continue reading the works mentioned below, but there has been enough said to demonstrate how significantly their view of international relations departs from mainstream IR. The Review of International Studies Forum on Linklater's The Transformation of Political Community provides a useful illustration of the gap in question; Randall Schweller, speaking for the mainstream, responds with an almost-comically hostile reaction due to his lack of understanding. However, R.'s equally critical comments on the same Forum. B. J. Walker makes a different suggestion. The emancipatory project of the Enlightenment is ultimately the focus of Linklater's type of critical theory, but can this aim be saved? Should it be? Perhaps the Enlightenment Project is being too authentically represented rather than betrayed by work like rational choice IR [7]–[9].

International Relations Theory Today, If the above account of Habermas and critical theory is dangerously thin, any attempt to provide an equivalent background for these scholars within a study of this scope presents even more difficulties once again, readers are urged to follow up some of the references given below. This is the approach taken by writers typically referred to as poststructuralist or sometimes, usually inaccurately, postmodern. Only a few themes stand out the first is "inside/outside," which builds on the previous mention of Walker; the second is closely related a new perspective on ethics and pluralism; the third is speed, simulation, and virtual reality; and the fourth is the contribution of feminist writing. The community must necessarily be exclusionary, according to critical theorist Linklater, but the goal is to be as inclusive as possible and to reduce the costs of exclusion. This is obviously a normative project, but Linklater maintains that trends towards this end are immanent in the current global order. Walker may share some of these normative objectives, but his focus is more squarely on how the basic structure of sovereign states is built on a clear inside/outside dichotomy. The Westphalia System and, more subsequently, the language of international relations itself were both founded on the formation of this clear divide in the early modern period.

CONCLUSION

This chapter's goal was to give a summary of current international relations theory. The reader should now have some understanding of how the often-baffling range of IR theories relate to one another, although, as with any sketch-map, it may not be possible to pinpoint a specific location by using it. The subsequent reading suggestions provide the information needed for that task. As the debate above indicates, one response is "not very closely." The authors discussed in the second half of the chapter all reject neorealism, as suggested in the chapter's introduction, but they don't agree much else. Since 1980, IR theory has engaged in a dialogue with Kenneth Waltz's work; at times, the term "running battle" would be more appropriate. The epistemological position of rational choice theory and, more broadly, a "foundationalist" account of the world, according to which knowledge can be grounded by the correspondence of theory to a knowable reality, are perhaps the only characteristics shared by post-positivist writers. Post-positivists, despite the occasional epithet of their detractors, do not reject the existence of a "real world," but they do reject our capacity to understand it without the aid of theoretical frameworks that cannot be supported by an untheorized reality. Beyond these epistemological similarities, it is challenging to pin down the 'neo-neo' consensus's detractors. However, it is hoped that the reader will now be able to understand what conceptual baggage is connected with each theoretical viewpoint when it is presented in subsequent chapters and know where to look for a more thorough exposition. With this in mind, it is now possible to shift focus away from a focus on theory and towards the actual world that these theories have produced, at least for the time being. The next three chapters will

open up the discussion to include the theories that challenge the realist orthodoxy by examining global forces and theoretical issues that are specifically related to globalisation. The following three chapters will examine the issues that realism is concerned with.

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CHAPTER 5

A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON FOREIGN AND STATE POLICY

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ABSTRACT:

The realism agenda will be studied in this chapter as well as the following two, which means that these chapters will deal with the state, foreign policy, power, security, conflict, and war. This is the "realist" agenda in the sense that these are the issues that realism and neorealism have identified as being crucial to the study of international relations. However, there is no reason to limit oneself to saying things that are realist about this agenda; in fact, some of the conclusions reached here may not be those that realism would reach. Instead, the goal is to engage in a critical discussion of these issues. It is of course debatable whether this realist agenda should continue to be the main focus for the study of IR, but there are good reasons to at least begin with it. After all, this agenda has been used to define the field for the majority of the last century, and even if the goal is to develop a different agenda, there is much to be said for starting with the familiar before moving to the unfamiliar. A state-centric approach to international relations is presented by realism, which places a strong emphasis on issues like deciding on foreign policy, analysing national strength, and the distinction between interstate war and other social conflicts. But the fact that realism lacks a distinct theory of the state exposes a serious issue at the centre of both realism and the academic discourse of international relations. Realisticism provides a thorough description of the state and its origins, but few comprehensive works concentrate on "the state and IR." The state is described as a territorially based political body with centralised decision-making and enforcement mechanisms that exhibits legal sovereignty by not acknowledging internal or external superiors. It resides in a universe of politically autonomous territorial units that have comparable characteristics.

KEYWORDS:

Enforcing, Centre, IR, Analyzing, Realism., Enforcement.

INTRODUCTION

By contrasting the state with other historical political entities, the definition is established. In contrast to mediaeval Europe, which saw personal or group-based political power that frequently disputed territorial claims, classical Greece's political emphasis was on inhabitants rather than territory itself. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the loss of universal Church authority, new military techniques that favoured larger political units, economic prosperity brought about by exploration, and other causes all contributed to the emergence of the modern state. Administrative methods made it difficult for a continent-wide political structure to develop, but territorially based political units, capable on their own soil but recognising equivalent external units, did.

Realist theory makes a distinction between these two types of policies, contending that while the state has authority and resources for domestic policy, interdependent decision-making occurs for foreign policy since there is no authority in an anarchic international system. This distinction

suggests that there are two components to researching foreign policy conception and execution. The process of formulating policy, which is frequently centred on identifying and expressing the "national interest," modifies held beliefs to account for emerging facts. For instance, British foreign policy changes made before World War I redirected attention away from longtime foe France and towards ascent of rival Germany. Similar to this, in the 1940s, the United States moved from isolationism to alliances. The aim of international relations is to understand basic patterns of foreign policy-making and national interest identification, even though diplomatic historians can provide specific explanations using the documents that are now available. Instead of examining specific cases, this calls for the identification of behavioural patterns [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

Intergovernmental Relations and the State

Because the state is seen as being at the centre of international relations, realism emphasises subjects like the study of foreign policy decision-making and the analysis of the elements of national power. For the same reason, interstate "war" is seen as being sui generis, distinct from other types of social conflict. This state-centricity implies that realism should have a distinct theory of the state, which should serve as the logical starting point for the rest of its thought. In actuality, this is not the case; rather, the absence of such a theory is a significant issue at the core of realism, as well as of the academic discourse of international relations. It is remarkable that there are so few high-quality studies of "the state and IR"; John M. Hobson's superb new book is the first introduction to the topic to be published in many months Hobson 2000. Despite the lack of theory, realism provides a rather detailed explanation of the state and its genesis.

The state is a territorially based political unit that has a central government and enforcement apparatus a government and an administration; it is legally 'sovereign' in the sense that it does not recognise an internal or external superior; and it exists in a world made up of other territorial, sovereign political units with similar characteristics. The best way to determine each of these requirements is to make use of alternative political structures, some of which served as the forerunners of the contemporary state. By contrasting the state with what it is not, we may thereby discern what it is. There is no reason why politics should be organised on a territorial basis; the state is a territorial political unit. In classical Greece, the political referent was the local populace rather than the location itself; as a result, 'Athens' is never used when speaking of the city; rather, 'the Athenians' are always referred to. The Athenians undoubtedly resided in a territory, but they were the centre of attention rather than the land itself. While the city's walls were clearly delineated, the bounds of the larger area the Athenians occupied were not.

Political authority was not always territorial in the mediaeval European society that gave rise to the modern state, but rather it might be personal or group-based. While a monarch may theoretically assert some level of control over a region, such a claim would always be subject to challenge from other sources of control and power. The Pope presided over the global Church, which had members both lay and clerical who were required to reject the secular ruler's authority in a number of crucial policy areas. Guilds and companies frequently prevailed in their "liberties" claims against kings and princes. Numerous people had allegiances to influential local magnates who, in turn, might have had allegiances to 'foreign' rulers rather than the official monarch of a given realm. Any given person was likely to have a number of different identities, with territorial identity possibly being the least politically significant for a discussion of the resurgence of non-territorial identities in the twenty-first century. All of these factors fed into issues like "political

identity." Being 'English' or 'French' would have far less significance for the typical villager than would being a Christian or the bondsman or lady of a specific lord.

The Roman Empire cast a long shadow, which is understandable given that, at its height, it had provided more efficient authority than any of its mediaeval predecessors. Furthermore, this latter, broader identity served as a reminder that the political order and the religious order had once been universal in Europe. The end of this era, which is typically dated to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, resulted in the formation of a system of states. The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, is sometimes considered as a fitting beginning point for the new order. There are several reasons why the new system was created. Larger political units were favoured and the defensive strength of towns and castles was weakened by new military techniques and technology, particularly the professionalisation of soldiers and advancements in siege-craft. Larger political units may arise thanks to economic expansion, which was related to but also supported the conquest of the Americas and explorations of the East. However, administrative methods and communication technology did not support continental political organisation, and the division of the worldwide Church damaged the philosophical foundation of European unification. As a result, relatively powerful territorially based political units emerged. These units could exercise control at home but were compelled to recognise the presence of other, similarly structured political entities abroad. This is the Westphalia System, which through the years spread effectively around the globe to form the current international order [4]–[6].

This is the creation tale of the system that state-centric international relations tell, and it's a fine one with lots of room for interpretation. Marxists and political economists in general can thus present the narrative from a materialist viewpoint while emphasising changes in the global economy and the production processes. New advances in weaponry and ship design can be cited as influences by technological determinists and military historians. Others focus on the significance of ideas, particularly the Renaissance's resurrection of classical learning, which included ancient political ideals, as well as the rise of the Protestant faith and the ensuing division of the worldwide church. Most likely, a mix of these elements contributed to the development of the Westphalia System. Regardless of which version is chosen, it is still up to us to define what states actually do, even though we know where they originate.

The absence of a theory of the state from the standard account of the system's origins is a critical oversight because, for instance, without a clear understanding of the motivations, functions, and workings of states, understanding "foreign policy" and "statecraft" will be significantly hampered. State-centric international relations do, in fact, have something resembling a theory of the state, but because it is largely implicit and poorly stated, it brings together a number of incompatible ideas that must be reconciled if advancement is to be made. So, what is the state? One response to this query is that the state is only a concentration of strength, power, and fundamental military force. This was Treitschke's vision of Machtpolitik in the nineteenth century, and it does, in fact, fit the facts of state creation in sixteenth-century Europe, as well as in some Third World countries today Treitschke 1916/1963.

For instance, Charles Tilly describes how nations in the sixteenth century increased taxes and waged war, two complementary activity Tilly 1975, 1990. The State and Foreign Policy 65 States that waged war effectively increased their territory, which also increased their revenue base. With a larger tax base, they were able to generate more money to build larger armies, which allowed them to acquire more territory, and so on. The work of historical sociologists like Michael Mann

and social theorists like Anthony Giddens has recently added credence to the concept that the state is fundamentally a military institution. The Westphalia System's history is one of militarism and successful conquest, according to Mann, who also contends that "societies" are artificial constructs held together by force. Giddens contends that the role of the nation-state and violence has received insufficient attention from scholars, an omission he hopes to correct. With approbation more or less in the instance of Treitschke, and with resignation in other cases, some realist writers have endorsed this militarist interpretation of the state. Christian realists like Niebuhr and Wight believed that if one understood how the state and its system functioned, the only moral attitude that could be adopted towards international affairs was one of detachment from the conflict. This belief contributed to their practise of pacifism.

However, there are grey areas in both situations. While Wight's ambiguity on the subject allowed us to understand him as both the foremost British postwar realism and an intellectual leader of the English school, Niebuhr did believe that the state may be founded on something other than force Bull 1976. A Weberian concept of power mixed with responsibility has been more indicative of realism than a straightforward military description of the state. Although Marxism is no longer the official ideology of one of the two superpowers, Marxist ideas remain influential, especially when filtered through individuals like Noam Chomsky. In fact, since many Marxist theorists now stress the relative autonomy' of the state, Chomsky and his followers are the main contemporary group of theorists who adhere to a theory of relative autonomy. Last but not least, it should be noted that this extreme stance frequently aligns Marxist/Chomskyan ideas with the 'hard' realist view of the state as merely a concentration of power. Chomsky shares with realism a complete rejection of the notion that the state could represent the 'people' or a community, much less be some kind of ethical actor; Chomskyans, Marxists, and realists all agree that such talk represents liberal obfuscation. The tremendous appeal of Chomsky's conspiracy ideas may be attributed more than anything else to the chance he provides to be a "left-wing" realist. Cynical realists can find justification in Chomsky's saloon-bar, Understanding International Relations, without giving up their sympathies for progressivism.

The 'choice' as the center of attention in both home and Foreign Policy

These conceptions of the state are obviously highly distinct; therefore, it makes sense that they would produce ideas of foreign policy and statecraft that are also very different. On the general, however, this has not occurred; as we shall see, most analyses of foreign policy do not explicitly tie back to a theory of the state, which is somewhat to their detriment. Instead, a generally liberal view of the role of the state in issue solving lurks in the backdrop of much foreign policy analysis FPA, albeit it is rarely explicitly stated. Most FPA start with the premise that the state is a social institution that exists in two environments on the one hand, there is the internal environment, which is made up of all the other institutions that are present within the state's boundaries and their interactions with it and with one another; on the other hand, there is the external environment, which is made up of all other states and their interactions with it and with one another. Traditional theories of international relations hold that states continually engage in "domestic" and "foreign policy," or efforts to act in both environments. Realist theory, as opposed to, say, pluralism, assumes that these two types of policy are distinct from one another. In the case of domestic policy, the state is, in theory, capable of enforcing its will once it has chosen a course of action, which means it has both the authority and the means to do so.

This is not true in foreign policy, where decisions are made in a manner that is interdependent. The government cannot assume that this fits the type of analysis that traditional theories of the national interest favour. The formulation of foreign policy is viewed as a reasonable reaction to a specific circumstance by a single unitary state actor. Rationality is viewed in terms of ends and means, which assumes that states make decisions based on what will maximise their gains and minimise their losses in the context of a certain set of values. Armchair analysis, which involves the analyst putting themselves in the shoes of the decision-maker and attempting to recreate the thought processes that would have led the decision-maker to act as he or she did, is one method for studying decisions.

It is necessary to identify the goals the Soviet Union wished to achieve as well as the line of reasoning that convinced them that such a deployment would help them achieve those goals in order to understand why they deployed missiles at the time and location they did. However, it is important to keep in mind that these goals may not be those that are actually stated explicitly; rather, it may be best to approach the real goals by working backward from the actions taken. A comprehensive "simulation" would require the analyst to know all the information available to the decisionmaker, and only this information, which is a big order. Rational reconstruction is a challenging endeavour. Even so, we frequently engage in this type of reconstructive thinking and can typically come up with a fairly believable explanation for how judgements are made. According to Allison, there are two different types of issues with this concept. First, there are issues with the idea that an action is completely "rational."

The conditions for logical behaviour are never really satisfied. They involve a completely described set of values that must be maximised, a description of all options open to the decision-maker, and a collection of algorithms that let us foresee the effects of any course of action. Perfect information like this is just unavailable, whether to the decision-maker who made the decision initially nor to subsequent analysts. Even the fastest computer would not be able to practically access such information, which is akin to, say, a fully described chess decision tree. We have some rules of conduct that help us, especially in the early stages of a game when we face known situations. Later, when faced with unknown situations, we explore what we believe to be the most promising moves and act when we are confident that we have found the best move we can given the time constraints. Although it is always possible that the next alternative we may have considered will be better than our final decision, this is a "rational" method to play the game or make The State and Foreign Policy 71 decisions.

However, it is very challenging to reconstruct a game played in this manner. Time pressure will need to be replicated because intuition may be more useful than completely rational reasoning processes. Even if a grandmaster makes a move, we cannot automatically assume that it is the best move because everyone makes mistakes when time is of the essence. The RAM makes the premise that states always intend the effects of their decisions, but the actual conditions in which choices are made may be inconsistent with this assumption. The RAM has a second issue that is more applicable. There are virtually always anomalies that remain unexplained, even when we reach a conclusion via reasonable reconstruction. Thus, Allison suggests that the most likely RAM explanation for the Soviet Union's deployment of IRBMs is that it was intended to close what they perceived to be a growing capability gap with the US.

However, this leaves unanswered some of the deployment's actual characteristics, which appear to have been almost calculated to encourage early discovery by the US. The alternative theory,

according to which they were in fact intended to be found, accounts for the anomalies but provides less overall explanation than the missile-gap theory. There might be a better RAM explanation, but Allison advises that we switch to a different decision-making model. The Organisational Process Model OPM assumes that decisions are made by multiple organisations, each of which has distinctive ways of doing things organisational routines and standard operating procedures and is resistant to being organised by any kind of central intelligence.

The Rational Actor Model RAM assumes that decisions are the result of calculation by a single actor. This complements earlier remarks on adjusting to incomplete knowledge not by accident. Organisations like the KGB, Soviet Rocket Forces, or the American Navy and Air Force don't try to solve problems from scratch as they arise; instead, they dig into their institutional memories to recall how they handled comparable issues in the past. Thus, when tasked with constructing a missile base in Cuba, Soviet Rocket Forces SRF follow the same fundamental design they did in the Soviet Union because experience suggests that this is the best way to construct a missile base; they do not consider the fact that it will be recognised as such by US air reconnaissance. On the other hand, the KGB transports the missiles covertly and late at night because that is how the KGB operates. This is strange given the SRF's virtually publicity-seeking tactics, but it only appears strange if one considers that someone is ordering both organisations to act in this manner.

The concept of rational central decision-making is minimised by the organisational process model. Allison emphasises the extent to which political issues outside of the overt international issue may influence decision-making in his final Bureaucratic Politics model, which deconstructs rational decision-making from a different perspective. The way bureaucracies view the world from the standpoint of their own organisation is one facet of this. Where you sit dictates where you stand, as the catchphrase goes. The State Department of the United States typically supports negotiation, UN Representative action, US Navy action, and so on. It is not reasonable to anticipate that organisations will advocate for policies that do not entail raising their own budgets.

The fact that leaders must safeguard and defend their own political positions is more significant. Although interestingly, research now suggests that this was not a deciding factor in his actions Lebow and Stein 1994 -95, it is clear that President Kennedy was aware that his actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis could have caused serious political problems for his chances of re-election and, more immediately, the Democratic Party's prospects in the mid-term Congressional elections in November 1962. The Rational Actor Model and general realism make the assumption that judgements regarding foreign policy will be based on such considerations. According to the bureaucratic politics model, this is frequently not the case. Despite the fact that further research using American and Soviet data made accessible since the end of the Cold War has supplanted Allison's case study, the conceptual frameworks Allison articulated in Essence of Decision have held up fairly well. But it's obvious that the models need to be expanded. The major omission in Allison is the lack of a complete sociopsychological account. This could be read in two different ways. Accordingly, foreign-policy decision-making is one of the best-established fields in international relations, and the lack of recent innovation in this sector is a point in its favour. It may be that this shows how well built the models were. On the other hand, this longevity may be interpreted as a sign of weakness, indicating that little research has been done in this area of international relations theory.

From power to foreign policy

Despite giving lip respect to the value of studying foreign policy, Waltzian neorealism presents a top-down theory of international relations, according to which the key to making good foreign policy is being able to read the signals that the system sends. Rather than being a creative artist, the decision-maker is a skillful craftsman. Neoliberalism likewise provides a top-down explanation of international relations, but one that places an emphasis on the potential for collaboration. In each instance, the premise that states are logical egoists acting in anarchic circumstances restricts the scope of foreign policy as an independent field of study. Even if the circumstances are different, the rational actor paradigm is effectively being resurrected. The irony of rational choice's predominance in current mainstream International Relations theory is that it seems to be at odds with FPA. One could have assumed that national pressures would take precedence over requirements of the balance of power. There is a difficulty with 'agency' in this situation, or to put it more simply, a problem with finding a German administration that could implement this policy without being driven from power. However, this is a secondary issue. On this point, foreign policy is compared to doing a crossword puzzle; we have the grid and the clues, and the goal is to arrive at the correct answer. The policy-maker/solver cannot determine or influence this answer; they can only find it and apply it as effectively as possible. The State and Foreign Policy 75 The assumption that regime-type is of no consequence is considered as plain ridiculous from nearly every other position with Chomsky's being the likely exception [7]–[9].

Intuitively, it appears improbable that the leaders created by liberal-democratic political systems will respond to outside influences in the same way as those who organise military takeovers or who are in charge of totalitarian mass parties. Although there may be pressures pushing people in the same direction, as the example of modern Germany and nuclear weapons demonstrates, their personal values will undoubtedly have some bearing on the choices they make. Furthermore, it seems improbable from the outset that domestic social and economic structure has no bearing on foreign policy that is, that a country's social makeup has no bearing on its behaviour abroad. The so-called "democratic peace" hypothesis, which asserts that constitutionally stable liberal-democratic states do not go to war with one another although they are, generally speaking, as war-prone as other states when it comes to relations with non-democracies, provides one very contentious but intriguing investigation of these intuitions. This is particularly intriguing because, in contrast to some other challenges to the neorealist frame of thought, it is an argument that uses the same positivist technique as the rational choice realists use. In this way, it challenges the neorealists on their own turf. However, its main proponents in the 1990s were empirical researchers using the most up-to-date statistical techniques to refine the initial hypothesis and identify a robust version thereof Doyle 1983; Russett 1993; Gleditsch and Risse-Kappen 1995; M. E. Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller 1996. Although the idea was first made popular as a somewhat unconventional extrapolation by Michael Doyle of the work of the political philosopher Kant to contemporary conditions. Chapter 10 discusses potential theories for the democratic peace.

A rather conventional study plan with regard to FPA would be reinstated and relegitimized if democratic peace thought were to become established, and in some ways, it already has. Prior to the dominance of structural explanations of international relations, institutions, public opinion, norms, and decision-making were the mainstays of foreign policy studies. It is interesting that neorealists and Chomskyans have been its main, and loudest, opponents because both understand how crucial it is for their positions that the proposition be refuted or defeated Layne 1994 Barkawi and Laffey. The 'Democratic Peace' has brought this older agenda back as a potential central focus

for contemporary International Relations. Although attempts to broaden democratic peace thinking have largely failed, the central claim that constitutionally stable liberal democracies do not wage war on one another remains unchallenged. The worst that can be said about this claim is that this highly specific kind of peacefulness may be the result of some factor other than regime type, or a statistical artefact produced by genera. If this central claim is upheld, we are left with a significant anomaly in modern international relations theory because, despite the appearance that a persuasive argument that is unmistakably "reductionist" has successfully contested the neorealist position's application to these issues, the logic of neorealism is unaffected.

CONCLUSION

The next step in this research is to transition from developing foreign policy to putting it into practise, which is the domain of diplomacy or, to use an old phrase that has just made a revival, "statecraft." A more thorough investigation of these topics would cover the finer points of diplomacy, negotiation, and other related topics. This section of the book, which is overly concerned with state-centric International Relations and shaped by the realist tradition, makes more sense to shift to another aspect of implementation - the ways in which states use power to get their way in the world. Later chapters on, for example, the establishment of international economic regimes, will touch upon such matters. However, an emphasis on "power" necessarily introduces considerations that go beyond foreign policy as such; as a result, the next chapter will look at power as a whole and the issues it causes. The two schools of thinking appear to be in conflict with one another. Since "microeconomics" has a dominating theory of the company that does not seem to mesh well with "macroeconomic" theories describing the economy as a whole, we actually have something that is fairly comparable to the discontinuity that exists in economics. It is debatable whether we should consider this a problem or not; economists don't seem overly concerned with their particular issue, and perhaps their approach of going forward on many fronts while expecting that eventually some unifying ideas will emerge is the rational one to take.

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CHAPTER 6

A BRIEF STUDY ON PEDAGOGY AND APPROACH

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ABSTRACT:

The approach is predicated on the belief that an organised learning process based on standards generated from philosophy of science discussions will provide significant insights on theory formation that, absent a disregard for their philosophical underpinnings, would otherwise not be attained. There will only be one self-study instruction and two review questions because the main focus of this learning unit is the didactics and methodology. The main points will be presented as a tabular summary of the criteria created in this unit. the standards for a planned education in IR theory. They must be "translated" and applied to international relations for the purposes of our book. In order to learn about specific theoretical approaches to IR in an organised manner, it is important to identify a variety of criteria. To put it another way, the next chapter outlines a set of standards that will be applied subsequently to a discussion of five specific theories of international relations. It is crucial to reiterate that the discussions of the book will be centred on "learning by example"; the larger goal is to provide advice for your structured self-study of any IR theory, not just those covered in the book, based on meta-theoretical and philosophical considerations. Five example theories will be used to illustrate how this concept is applied.

KEYWORDS:

Pedagogy, Rationally, Reiterate, Standards, Waltz.

INTRODUCTION

There is theory "behind" the specific theories of IR in that a theory of IR implicitly or explicitly are built on a set of assumptions that are derived from a specific understanding of science, as has been discussed in learning. Theory building is "informed" by and embedded in meta-theory, as has been discussed in learning. Furthermore, a particular historical "order of thought" and a larger scientific worldview are also components of how science is understood. It is created with the idea that you need a basic awareness of the fundamental issues with theory building in the social sciences in order to comprehend the distinctions between theoretical approaches to IR. As a result, you learned about theory development relates to the meta-theoretical level of philosophy of science.

The fundamental concepts of any philosophy of science are now familiar to your ontological claims about what is, what exists, what reality is made of, and what the most fundamental properties and relationships of things and entities are; epistemological claims about the types of knowledge that are possible and the standards for valid knowledge; and methodological assumptions about how to best learn and explain. Additionally, you are aware of the integration of scientific beliefs into larger worldviews. Without these world perspectives, it would be challenging to comprehend how we get at the particular theoretical constructions at the core of theories as well as our underlying assumptions. Even if a theory's supporting philosophy of science perspective is

rarely explicitly stated, this is even more true for the larger scientific world view. Both can be viewed as a form of "hidden" theory that affects how we perceive social reality in general as well as what and how we might learn about it. Next, we'll connect our philosophical thoughts to the study of international relations. Our goal will be to specify a set of inquiries and standards for the more expert examination of certain IR ideas. In the philosophy of science, words like ontology, epistemology, and methodology have very specific applications and purposes [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

Assumptions regarding the nature of the actors and the systems involved in international relations

The ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations upon which theoretical constructs in the social sciences are usually based. These are typically three assumptions for a theory of international relations about the relevant actors, specifically the "type" of actors that are deemed to be most significant and their "properties", about the context of interaction, or the structures of international relations; and about the relationships between the entities, or how the actors and structure relate to one another. When statements are made concerning existence and being, the entities that exist, and their characteristics and relationships, you may be certain that they are ontological assumptions. They are epistemological presumptions insofar as they relate to issues with how knowledge is acquired and what constitutes true knowledge. They fall under the category of methodological assumptions when they pertain to the procedures for learning. Now, let me explain what the "assumptions about actors and structure" criterion means when applied to IR theories.

Suppositions regarding actors

A theory will often inquire about actors in order to reflect on the politically significant interactions. Who are the important players in global politics? What are the "nature" of the actor and the interactions that are occurring? Keep in mind that the answers to these questions are merely "starting points," unsupported by any "proof," and hence qualify as what we refer to as "assumptions." One such example is the widespread belief that inter-state politics is the "nature" of international relations, that states are the main actors and that they act rationally. The most influential IR theoretical methods concur with this assertion. However, there are alternative theories as well, such as those that begin with the premise that the "nature" of international politics is a setting of interconnected, network-like social ties between various types of actors within a "global society". State and nonstate social actors are both relevant in this context for the "existence" of international relations.

The perspective on the "being" of international politics, or the perspective of ontology, varies for each example. This distinction whether you consider state interactions within a system of states to be international relations, or, alternatively, think of a global society when discussing "international relations" affects both the theoretical framework and the explanatory model that a particular theory offers. Since action is by its very nature intentional and purposeful even though, of course, it can have inadvertent repercussions and consequences, action is typically seen as the prerequisite for action and interaction between social actors. As a result, theories frequently rely on assumptions regarding the "driving forces" behind actions and interactions as well as how individuals arrive at judgements. In other words, they are ontological presumptions about actors and their "properties" that relate to the actor's motivation, objectives, requirements, cognitions such as values, beliefs,

attitudes, knowledge, and perceptions, interests, or preferences. For instance, many IR theories make use of action theory and assume that agents are "rational actors" in their behaviour. It is claimed that for rational actors, their "source" of action is "internal" their "interest" and involves utility-maximization, which is seen as a "property" of the particular actor. Utility-maximization theory argues that actors have individual preferences for numerous potential outcomes in any situation and can rank the outcomes in terms of their desirability as a result. They then decide which approach or course of action increases the likelihood of the better outcomes, maximising the actor's "utility" rational choice. These presumptions are present in most other social science theories as well as in economics. The theories that most convincingly show individualism and the rational actor-assumption are those that formalise mathematical models of decision-making. Examples include game theory, which focuses on small groups of players engaging strategically, and decision theory, which emphasises lone decision makers Kydd 2008 provides a helpful review of rational choice in IR.

According to these ontological presumptions, IR theories that assume rational agents ultimately interpret the results of international politics in terms of the rational behaviour of the individual actors. Different theories of international relations IR operate on the general premise of rational individual actors, depending on the specific actors assumed to be relevant for international relations these could be individual actors from a state's society as is the case in liberal theory, or unitary states as in neorealist theory . Discussions on philosophy of science are especially pertinent at this point. You are aware that this strategy is known as methodological individualism. Because the "individual" in this situation is the state, it is frequently referred to as "methodological nationalism" or "methodological statism" in international relations. The issue of how to theoretically treat actors in international politics is challenging in general. This applies to both the state and other actors in addition to the state. How, for instance, can we explain actors like international organisations? How do we hypothetically envision the UN or the EU as players in world politics? The implications for explanations of ontological presuppositions about the "being" of collective and individual agents are significant. The fundamental ontological question of how the "whole" relates to the "parts" is also directly tied to this point is the UN, an international organisation, more than the sum of its members, the states? Is the UN a "collective" actor that should be viewed as a "global community" with a "quality" greater than the sum of the interests of the individual actors' states? Is "society" more than the accumulation of its parts, or of the various societal actors? Discussed in relation to the challenging ontological, epistemological, and methodological elements.

Structures based on assumptions

In addition to actors, theories in the social sciences typically consider the "context" of social actions the structural context or "structure" is frequently used to refer to the social environment of actors. The term "structure" refers to the social hierarchy or system that actors interact and behave within. For instance, both individual and group actors citizens, interest groups, parties, trade unions, etc. operate within state structures "inside" the state. Structures are not just physical organisations; they also represent the standards and laws that govern and regulate actor behaviour and penalise inappropriate behaviour. States and non-state actors are typically thought to act and interact within an international system "outside" the state in international relations. The essential premise that the "type" of social order present in the international system is frequently seen as "anarchy" as opposed to hierarchy within the state has already been covered. The presumption of anarchy in the international system typically refers to assumptions made about its structural

elements. There is no greater authority "to govern" world politics. When viewed as a system of nations, sovereignty is the fundamental principle inherent in the design of the international system. In summary, theories of international relations implicitly or explicitly rely on presumptions on the "nature" of the most important structures in international relations and their "effects" on actors in those relations. The "nature" of the structural environment, or to what extent can we presume that the international system's structures are composed of material conditions, is a very fundamental ontological question. Do they instead include concepts like norms or accumulated knowledge? or both, as an alternative? Structures are easily understood in terms of the distribution of material resources, technological advancements, military might, financial clout, etc. However, we can also consider structures in terms of immaterial standards and laws that are part of the system or in the forms of social institutions that can be found in international relations, such as international organisations or international regimes. Assumptions about material and/or ideational properties of the world are among the most fundamental ontological "starting points" of all reasoning. Thus, the theories discussed in this book will show various ontological viewpoints on both structures and actors. We shall study many IR theories since they each have a unique theoretical approach to taking into consideration the structural context of actor-actor interactions [4]–[6].

Presumptions on how agency and structure are related

The agent structure-problem in IR is centred on the interaction between active, self-reflecting agents and the structural environment in which their activity occurs. Agency typically refers to a human actor's ability to behave autonomously and make their own free decisions. All social environment elements that restrict or facilitate human action are collectively referred to as structure. This relationship's "nature" or "being" is a matter of social ontology, an ontological perspective that prioritises structure or agency. Social structure or human agency is ontologically "prior" to human behaviour. This inquiry raises further concerns concerning the nature of the entities, in this case the actors and social structures that we previously explored. The ontological dimensions of the relationship between agency and structure as well as the epistemological and methodological ramifications of various ontological stances on the agent-structure dilemma will be covered in the following units for systematic reasons. Please be aware that this issue has ontological roots at its foundation. It is covered in the section titled "Ontological assumptions about actors and structures" as a result. The agent-structure problem will, however, be discussed separately in the overview at the end of this unit due to its methodological and epistemological ramifications.

In other words, the question of the relationship between agency and structure is methodological as well as ontological. Does structure "cause" agency, or does agency "cause" structure? This epistemological issue seeks an answer in terms of the relationship between agency and structure. This is typically interpreted as a temporal cause-effect relationship in the Human sense discussed in this chapter. But as will be demonstrated later, there exist IR theories that make a different "causality" assumption about how agency and structure interact. There are two fundamental viewpoints on this issue, methodological individualism and methodological holism, as we discovered. Social existence IS a "whole"; it has its own "ontological quality" that is more than the sum of its part's ontological holism, also known as ontological structuralism. These two components, the ontological and the explanatory, relate to one another as follows. Ontologically, "structure" or the "whole" comes before agency. Thus, the action of this structural whole epistemological and methodological holism can largely account for agency. Agency is always explained "in terms" of structure, such as human behaviour or individual identity. In that the

structure is viewed as the "cause" of actors' behaviour, "structure" is also epistemologically "prior" to agency. To put it another way, agency is justified as a direct result of structure. Social life IS agency; in other words, the construction and reconstruction of individual actors' worlds constitutes the "being" of the world. The sum such as "society" is not greater than the sum of its parts the various actors. There isn't a social whole with its own qualities ontologically. Only people who behave in accordance with their own internal "properties," or personal interests, exist ontological individualism. The production of social worlds through the agency of specific human actors can then be largely explained through epistemological or methodological individualism. Finally, the "social" is explained "in terms" of the components the actor's personal interests.

General approach to international relations as a discipline and to the conduct of international politics

That "individualists" and "holists" concur that agents and structures are in some way linked is clear. They do, however, approach this relationship in various ways. Actors are the primary components of social systems, according to the ontological perspective shared by theorists who subscribe to the idea of epistemological and methodological individualism. Social structures can be explained as the outcome and repercussions of individual actors' actions and interactions. The characteristics and interactions of the agents can be used to define the structures. This idea is one that you are familiar with because of your reductionism education. On the other hand, those who subscribe to methodological holism see actors as entrenched in ontologically antecedent social institutions that limit, facilitate, or generally affect people's motivations and capacity for action. An actor's line of action is determined by irreducible "emergent" features of the structure. Social structure should be considered the main and most important explanatory component in this situation.

The individual/society problem, often known as the micro/macro problem, is similar to the agent-structure problem. Both structuralist and actor-centered theories that emphasise the importance of the impacts of action on structure may be found in IR theory. Structuralism emphasises the structural influences on an actor's behaviour. You'll discover a third philosophical "solution" to the agent-structure problem, though, which ontologically presupposes that agency and structure are interdependent. In this case, the "problem" with explanation is that if agency and structure exist in the social world but none is ontologically prior, how can their relationship be explained? How can agency and structure be given the same explanatory weight? As you'll see, our conventional understanding of causality as a temporal relation of cause and effect, with the cause occurring before the effect in time, is seriously challenged by this third ontological perspective that agency and structure are ontologically interconnected. The term "mutual constitution" is frequently used to explain this ontological stance of interdependence.

Agency and structure both make up one another; one defines the other. It is common to refer to this reasoning as "constitutive" If taken seriously, this notion of "causality" differs significantly from the well-known Human causation. This finding brings us to the second condition for understanding IR theories the kind of model or explanation and the idea of causality. Let's review the prior criterion before talking about this one. An essential third criterion for our systematic learning process concerning theories of IR will be the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions regarding the interplay between agency and structure. Each unit will inquire if the theory provides a structuralist or agency-centered explanation, or if it provides a different kind of explanation. You will learn about explanations in terms of human action,

explanations in terms of structural impacts, and explanations in terms of the mutual construction of agency and structure in the conclusion. The following query is more focused on the fundamental makeup of explanation. What qualifies as a global political explanation? What information regarding international relations is based on reliable science.

Methodology and epistemology

Epistemological issues with knowledge and how we acquire it are closely related to ontological issues. These issues typically centre on explanation, understanding, whether knowledge qualifies as legitimate knowledge, and how to acquire valid information. In this book, we will analyse several forms of explanations provided by various theoretical approaches to IR in order to address such epistemological and methodological assumptions. What is the most effective way to explain global politics? What kind of explanation is it? What justifications can an IR theory offer in order for their explanation to be regarded and validated as "legitimate" knowledge of international politics? These are illustrative instances of guiding questions that aid in outlining the precise response provided by each theory to the central issue Criterion 1 in the corresponding theoretical approaches. Three factors in particular will be significant. What is the relationship between agency and structure that is at the core of the explanation, first? We discussed the ontological core and the associated epistemological and methodological implications in the previous section, which introduced this as largely an ontological dilemma. I'm bringing it up one more here for formality's sake. What is the "nature" or style of the explanation and its causality assumption, secondly? The theory's response to the level of analysis problem, which is actually an analytical idea rather than a philosophy of science requirement, is the third feature. It is known as this in the social sciences. Since it is a well-known "problem" in IR and is mentioned in most IR theories, it will be used here in an indirect way. This also applies to theories that disagree with the idea because they have a different conception of science; in these cases, they make reference to the level of analysis difficulty to explain their view of science. It would be helpful to see how various IR theories address the level of analysis problem because this will provide key insights into how well they grasp theory and science in general.

Explanation type and causality

Regarding a key epistemological criterion how does one acquire knowledge and what constitutes valid knowledge the "type" of explanation is crucial. It necessitates a closer examination of explanation, or how the interaction between the ontological entities is viewed from an epistemological standpoint. In actuality, we inquire about knowledge when we inquire about explanation. What qualifies as legitimate understanding of international politics in the field of IR? As it was explained for the positivist account of science in Unit 2, "knowledge" typically takes the shape of a "causal relation" law-like regularities that may be stated in terms of if-then temporal sequences and that allow prediction. For instance, the Correlates-of War research at the University of Michigan found that "democracies do not fight each other," which has been put as a quasi law based on empirical observation supported by statistics. The following if-then statement can be used to express this conclusion if a state is a democratic state, then the likelihood of war and conflict with other democratic states will be reduced. Based on the belief that democratisation will contribute to peace and stability, the knowledge has been utilised by the West to justify a politics of democratisation in areas like human rights and development policy. They depend on the knowledge of science as a whole. A scientific explanation does not have taken the shape of a generalisation that resembles a rule, nor does "causality" always have to be understood as a link

between cause and effect in which the cause occurs first in time. For instance, Wendt's social constructivist theory emphasises the difference between constitutive and explanatory theory. The structured learning process will therefore employ the criterion "type of explanation and notion of causality" to examine various conceptions of "knowledge" that are at the core of many IR theories [7], [8].

The method of "levels of analysis"

As was already stated, "levels of analysis" is not, strictly speaking, a philosophy of science criterion. Here's a brief explanation of why I'll still include it to the standards for our structured learning approach. This idea is typically offered as the level of analysis issue. The issue is where we should concentrate our study of international relations in terms of levels. "Levels of analysis" as an analytical idea were first introduced by Waltz 1959 and Singer 1961. Waltz 1959 refers to "images of the world" or "images of international relations" in his study on conflict. The first illustration is the individual; studying international conflict at the individual level entails describing how human behaviour affects international politics. The internal makeup of states can be used to explain international conflict at the state level, as is depicted in the second image. In the third illustration, structural aspects of the international system are used to explain international politics at the system level and how they contribute to global conflict.

In a broader sense, the idea is based on the idea that we can examine international relations at three different levels the state or domestic level, the state-level, and the person level. System-level analysis uses the systemic level to describe how international politics play out. International political results are "systemic" to explain. When analysing results in international politics, domestic or state-level analysis indicates that states and their internal processes such as the "type" of political system, the strong interest groups within the state that affect its foreign policy matter most. International political results are explained in "domestic" ways. The focus of individual-level study is on specific human actors. In order to achieve this, it may be necessary to examine intricate decision-making processes, idiosyncratic interpretations of "human nature" or "organisational behaviour" in workplace settings, or the particular worldviews or convictions of a single foreign policy decision-maker. International political results are "individual" explained. In reality, there are three distinct forms of IR theory building as a result of these three levels of analysis. You can readily draw the conclusion that the levels of analysis problem reflect the current positivist scientific theory that reality may be analytically divided into spheres or levels in order to understand more about the objects of inquiry from what we learned. As a result, this idea is a reductionist one. However, discussing IR theories in terms of how they approach the positivist notion of "levels of analysis" will yield significant insights on the concept of science that forms the basis of a certain IR theory. We'll demonstrate that certain IR theories explicitly reject the idea of "levels of analysis" due to their alternative views on science in general. We will examine the justifications offered for their rejection in order to have a deeper understanding of the scientific validity and knowledge of each theory [9].

CONCLUSION

We shall conclude each chapter on a theory by summarising the general approach that is inherent in the theoretical approach to the scientific study of IR and to the practise of international politics. The three main parts of this claim are as follows first; we shall inquire into the philosophy of science at the core of the theoretical framework. The normative perspective of the theory will be the subject of our second inquiry. Any social theory by definition has an implicit or explicit

normative perspective what should the "ideal" international system entail? We will make an effort to determine the type of normative stance or ethics that each theoretical method involves. Inquiring into each theory's unique perspective on change in international relations will also help us understand the theories better. Is there "progress" being made in the creation of the global system? How do things alter in world politics? These inquiries are strongly tied to the third criterion as well. We will inquire about the specific perspective on the study of international relations from the standpoint of how the theorist/researcher/scientist interacts with the "object" of study/research/theorizing. What stance does he or she take on the relationship between the theory of international relations and the practise of international politics? From a philosophy of science perspective, the theories are identical in terms of their underlying individualist ontology; there is only a surface difference between them since they take different actors to be significant. The state is theoretically treated as a "individual" in the case of neorealist theory, as it is in many other IR theories it is predicated that the state is a unitary actor analogous to an individual, with a rational state-specific interest and engaged in rational interaction with other states as individual actors. Such state individualism is prevalent in several IR theories

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CHAPTER 7

A BRIEF STUDY ON SECURITY AND STRENGTH

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ABSTRACT:

The standpoint of foreign policy, states work to alter their surroundings in order to achieve the goals and objectives they have set for themselves. According to a structural point of view, states make an effort to adjust to their surroundings and make the best of the hand the system has dealt them. States influence the world in either case. How? What is the nature of diplomacy or "statecraft," a phrase that has recently gained fresh life despite seeming a little dated? David Baldwin has the finest discussion on this subject and creates a four-way taxonomy of statecraft approaches that serves as a helpful starting place for this conversation. He characterizes propaganda as "influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols," while "influence attempts relying primarily on negotiation" is covered by "economic statecraft," "influence attempts relying on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money," and "influence attempts relying primarily on violence, weapons, or force" is covered by "military statecraft". The concerns that this categorization raises or, in some cases, avoids are examined in more detail in the following chapter. These strategies all have the trait of being 'influence' strategies. A "powerful person" is someone who has influence, according to common sense, but there are other types of influence that do not appear to depend on power in the traditional sense, and there are other types of power that are only loosely related to influence.

KEYWORDS:

Statecraft, Weapons, Neorealist, Alexander, Money.

INTRODUCTION

For a state-centric, especially realist, perspective on the world, this relationship is very crucial, and unlike the distinctions between influence and authority or control, this issue is too delicate to be decided through definition. The realist perspective of the world can only be understood by developing a very sophisticated grasp of power, yet this understanding is also necessary if realism is to be transcended. The issue with this theory of power is that it is self-evidently false, or rather that it can only be made true by adding so many qualifications that the original idea loses its clarity and the thesis simply becomes the tautology that the more powerful state always wins out in relationships. To use a frequently used illustration, it is obvious that the United States was a stronger nation than North Vietnam by any attribute measure of power. Even in terms of resources committed to the Vietnam War, the United States had more soldiers, tanks, planes, and ships than the North Vietnamese did. Neorealist states are cold, impersonal, and without both allies and foes. The hazards of states' fundamental circumstances, however, are heavily emphasised in the neorealist theory of the international system. States are urged to constantly monitor the power imbalances that exist in the world; this vigilance is necessary since, according to Hobbes, the world is in a perpetual state of war. Hobbes believed that life in nature, which is a direct parallel to the neorealist international order, is a state of war, though not in the sense that fighting is always going on but rather that it is always a possibility Hobbes 1946. At first glance, the state-centric theory of

constructivists like Alexander and English School theorists of international society appears to give a less fear-centered description of the world. Although states are sovereign and the fundamental situation described above still applies, it is assumed that they are nonetheless in a social relationship with one another and that there are certain rules and practises that help to lessen any potential fear and tension. States take seriously the laws of international law, which forbid aggression and interference. Certain' settled rules' that govern behaviour exist in international relations. Such standards are not established in the sense that

DISCUSSION

Statecraft, power, and Influence

The easiest way to understand influence is to first consider its two opposites, authority and control, before determining if influence is the same as power. Instead of attempting to exercise authority, states try to influence others because legitimate connections between states do not exist, and authority can only be exercised in certain situations. To put it another way, one of the fundamental characteristics of authority is that those who are subject to it recognise that those who exercise it have the right to do so they are empowered to act. In terms of matters that have any true political significance, there is no authority in the traditional sense in international relations. Influence and control operate quite differently from one another. When control is used, the controlled person loses all autonomy and is incapable of making decisions. From a realist perspective, states would actually prefer to exert control over their surroundings, but if any state were ever in a position to actually control another, the latter would cease to be a "state" in any meaningful sense of the term, and the current international system would be replaced by something else, namely an empire.

With the development of an American Empire, some claim that this process is already in progress. Chapter 12 explores the reasons for and against this claim. Rephrasing these ideas, we might say that nations often interact with one another through the exercise of influence because there isn't a global empire or world government to provide legal global authority or effective global control. The only relationships that exist when these two polar positions are absent are those of influence. Of fact, there might be certain relationships that resemble the two poles in actual practise. In a complex military alliance like NATO, the supreme allied military commander in Europe SACEUR, the governing council, and, in some cases, the president of the United States, could all be said to exercise some level of legitimate power because they have been given permission to act by the other NATO members. This power is flimsy, though, and might be taken away at any time for a price. However, even at the height of Stalinism, the weakest of the People's Republics enjoyed greater freedom of action than the Baltic States, which were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940.

In contrast, the former Soviet Union occasionally came dangerously close to actual control over some of its "allies" in Eastern Europe. In pre-war crises of 1938 and 1939, neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland had any real freedom, aside from that of choosing the conditions under which they would fall under Nazi control, but the way they exercised this final freedom had a real impact on the lives of their populations. Sometimes, freedom of action may only mean the freedom to give way to the inevitable, but even this can be meaningful. Power and influence have a more nuanced relationship. Power is one of those words that is so frequently used in political discourse that it has practically lost all meaning; the proposal that its use should be outlawed is unrealistic but understandable. There is a limit to what any American politician seeking election or reelection can demand in terms of concessions from Israel. As the peace process has progressed, this fact has become if anything even more salient, as has the fact that the exercise of this influence is crucially

related to domestic politics in the US. In any case, the effectiveness of threats and rewards put forth by the US or anyone else will vary depending on the issues in question. As time has gone on and a Palestinian Authority has been established, both parties' core values have risen to the surface, making it harder for outsiders to convince them to make concessions. Although non-decision is a "non-concept" for realists, whether neoliberal or otherwise, the failure of the Camp David negotiations in 2000 and the unwillingness of either side to adhere to the various makings are crucial to the analysis of agenda-setting within regimes. This is due to the fact that there isn't an agenda in the traditional meaning of the word, making it impossible for a state to be prevented from adding something to the agenda.

The issues that states with sufficient clout to attract other states' attention deem to be the most important in international relations at any given time are those concerns. No strong state can be stopped from bringing up a problem; by definition, if a problem is not brought up, it is because the state that wanted to bring it up had the strength to do so. A realist would argue that power has only one meaning. With regard to structural power, it's possible that a similar conclusion may be made, but this calls for a deeper analysis. Power has been discussed thus far in this chapter as though it were something that realists assume to be states, but which could occasionally be other things such as individuals or groups. This actor-oriented methodology is a crucial aspect of how the thought of power evolved from the thought of foreign policy. When he proposed that power is the capacity to persuade another actor to take a particular course of action or refrain from taking a particular course of action Dahl 1970, American political scientist Robert Dahl provided a classic definition of relational power.

We could refer to the first of these relationships as "compellance" and the second as "deterrence." In either case, power cannot be quantified in terms of a state's characteristics; rather, it can only be assessed in action, or the impact one state has on another. Although the difference between power as an attribute and power as influence in a relationship is somewhat obscured by the ambiguity of everyday language, at least in English, where "power" can be synonymous with both "strength" and "influence," in contrast to the French language where puissance power, might and pouvoir capability are more clearly defined, there is still a distinction being made here. Of course, it's possible that what we have here is just two perspectives on the same phenomenon. The fundamental force model of power makes a similar argument, arguing that it is acceptable to assume that an actor's ability to exert power in a relationship is a direct reflection of the amount of power that actor has in the attribute sense [1]–[3].

The extent of power

As a multifaceted and intricate concept, power makes sense to consider under three headings, always keeping in mind the intimate connections between the three Power and Security 81 categories this will produce. Power is a quality that individuals, groups, or states can possess, access, and use to influence events around them. Power is a relationship; it is the capacity for individuals, groups, or states to exert control over others and gain their way in society. The majority of realistic explanations of international relations have a story to tell about these two elements of power, which are obviously not mutually exclusive. Realist explanations of the world, at least inasmuch as they rely on the idea that power can only be used by an actor or agent, have a harder time incorporating a third dimension of power in which it is understood as a property of a structure. Traditional explanations of international relations are quite accustomed to the notion that power is a property of states. A list of the elements of national power the characteristics of a nation that

qualify it to be regarded as a "great" power, "middle" power, or, more recently, a "superpower" can be found in the majority of ancient textbooks as well as many modern ones. These lists often describe a variety of various qualities that a state may have in order to qualify for a particular position in the world power rankings. The size and calibre of its armed forces, its raw material resource base, its geographic location and size, its infrastructure and base of production, the size and qualifications of its population, the effectiveness of its governmental institutions, and the calibre of its leadership are a few examples.

Although the importance of geographical features can alter relatively significantly over time, geographical position and extent are prominent instances of unchanging factors. Others undergo only gradual change such as population size and economic growth rates, while yet others undergo rapid change such as the strength of the armed forces. These considerations enable us to distinguish between actual power and potential or latent power, that is, between the power that a state actually possesses at any one moment and the power it has the potential to produce over a specific time period. Over time, the importance of any one of these elements in comparison to the others will alter. Population density and geographic scope can only increase a state's authority to the extent that its administrative, communication, and transportation systems let it. For instance, before the Trans-Siberian Railway was built in the 1890s, the fastest way to travel from St. Petersburg or Moscow to Vladivostok was by sea, via the Baltic, North, and Atlantic oceans, as well as the Indian and Pacific oceans.

As a result, Russian land power in the East was at the mercy of British sea power, and under those conditions, Russia's enormous size could hardly ever be considered a true political asset. There are limits to how much more powerful a relatively small country with a highly productive economy can be over a considerably larger country with a less productive economy. For instance, without a sizable enough population base, Singapore, despite its economic prosperity, will never be a great military force. However, the nature of contemporary mechanised warfare may mean that technically skilled civilians can be more effective than old-style warriors, always assuming, that is, that such civilians are prepared to risk their own lives and take those of others. A culture that accords great respect to those who bear arms may be a significant factor in developing effective armed forces. Even though nuclear weapons may be the greatest military power equalisers, it's possible that only regimes with very huge land masses and dispersed populations can actually threaten to use them. These ideas are essentially power politics' conventional wisdom. In other words, since the resources brought to the partnership are what actually matter, we can effectively ignore the relational side of power rather fast.

The argument makes the case that comparing the resources each actor brings to the interaction is the obvious way to determine if one actor will truly be able to exercise power over another in any given situation. According to conventional opinion, God supports the large battalions. Power and Security 83 Despite this, we must develop our analysis in a number of ways if we want to understand why the United States was ultimately defeated by North Vietnam. First and foremost, we must factor into our calculations the calibre of the two countries' leadership and the impact of their domestic political and social structures on the course of the war - for instance, the American media's role in undermining support for the war in the United States, the Vietnamese army's proficiency with irregular jungle warfare, and the United States' inability to find local allies with sufficient support in the region. Since a state's army and political elite have long been considered important sources of power, both of these factors may be incorporated into a basic force model, but only at the expense of adding highly arbitrary parameters to the equation. The advantage of the

basic force model is that it enables us to perform more or less precise calculations; this advantage is lost if we need to evaluate the relative leadership abilities of various nations. The basic force model, however, has two additional fundamental challenges first, the context in which power is exercised matters, and second, many power relationships are unequal. There aren't many contexts where there are only two actors involved in a connection. In general, a large number of other parties are indirectly involved. Numerous outside parties impacted the Vietnam War's result. Simply put, it is impossible to predict what would have happened if the United States had been able to intervene without also considering the reactions of, on the one hand, China and the Soviet Union, North Vietnam's potential allies, and, on the other, America's own allies in the Pacific and Europe.

Pure two-actor power relationships are extremely uncommon, and this did not occur. Asymmetry is, if anything, even more crucial than context. Part of this is the distinction between compellance and deterrence mentioned above. Although the United States' goals in Vietnam were never entirely clear this was one of their issues, they undoubtedly involved some positive changes to the country's political system, including the emergence of a government in the South that could win the support of the populace. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, only wanted the Americans to go; they believed that if they did, they would be able to handle any local opposition, which was in fact the case, as was later demonstrated in 84 Understanding International Relations. The North Vietnamese could wait since their goal was survival rather than altering their relationship with the United States in any way. This reveals a facet of relational power that transcends the conventional force paradigm of power. One definition of power is the capacity to withstand change and shift the burden of adaptation on others.

Typically, the capacity to withstand change requires less risk-taking than the capacity to enact change. The presumption must be that a defensive stance is tactically superior to an offensive one in both international politics and combat. All of this points to the impossibility of combining attribute and relational power into a single algorithm, or at the very least, that such an algorithm would have to be overly complex and hedged in with too many caveats to be able to serve its intended purpose of simplifying the analysis of power. This is bad since there are a variety of situations in which we might genuinely need a measure of power, and assessing a state's impact is always more challenging than evaluating its characteristics. When, for instance, we explore the idea of the "balance of power," we should consider what is being balanced and how we may determine whether a balance exists. It would be beneficial in each case if we could just assume that power is quantifiable in terms of qualities. We will inevitably run into issues whenever we are forced to acknowledge that power-as-influence is not a straight correlate of power-as-attribute.

In any practical situation, there are always going to be a variety of other reasons why an actor's behaviour might have changed that either could have been determining even in the absence of the actions of another or, at the very least, reinforced the effects. This makes measuring influence difficult because what we are looking for are changes in an actor's behaviour that are caused by an attempt by another to exert power. Although the standard literature on decision-making suggests that this type of "essence of decision" is uncommon, there may be some instances where it is possible to pinpoint a specific point in the course of negotiations or in the process of making a specific decision where it can be said that such-and-such a consideration was decisive. Furthermore, even when a specific decision can be pinpointed in this manner, the events leading up to the pivotal moment will always have been complicated and involve a variety of distinct elements. In reality, isolating one component or a specific influence-attempt means creating a counter-factual history to imagine what would have happened if someone had taken a different

course of action. However, these challenges shouldn't be overstated; historians deal with this conundrum constantly. Any historical narrative must deal with the challenge of attributing impact to specific factors, and this tends to get done without too much difficulty. Power and Security 85 Regardless, even though a state's ability to exert influence does not directly depend on the resources it has at its disposal, these resources are still very important. Influence depends on the capacity to issue threats in the event of noncompliance and/or offer incentives for compliance, or, as the saying goes, "sticks and carrots." This capacity is unmistakably linked to the characteristics of power held by a state. States that seek to exert influence or change the international environment merely through the use of persuasive arguments or the abilities of their officials are likely to be let down. The ability of a state to issue credible threats or promises will typically be known and taken into account by interested parties without having to be made explicit, therefore this does not imply that all influence-attempts rely on them.

In reality, it is more common for explicit threats to be made when there is doubt about the message's effectiveness or when one's credibility is at risk. It should be noted that threats and rewards do not necessarily have to be related to concrete things; for example, some governments may be so prestigious that other states want to be associated with them. A variety of current international relations events can be used to illustrate these claims. The good offices of a number of parties, ranging from the government of Egypt to private individuals in Norway, were used to mediate the negotiations in 1993 and 1994 that resulted in real progress in the relations between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organisation as well as the establishment of limited self-rule in some areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. When an initial agreement was reached, however, the signing ceremony was held on the White House grounds because it was thought important by all parties that the United States' power be connected with the result. Only the United States has the power to promote growth and penalise stagnation; support from Norway or Egypt would not suffice. We started with the state, considered how states make decisions about foreign policy, took a brief diversion to consider the claim that state action is entirely determined by the international system, came to the conclusion that this was not entirely true, and then we moved on to the topic of foreign policy implementation. 'Self-help' that, if unchecked, may be expected to lock them into an extremely disastrous arms race. States have the ability to misinterpret the signals supplied by the system, even in a multipolar system where such control is more challenging. In contrast, structural power, which is really part of a society's common sense, does not need to be read at all. It simply is. In Waltz's system, states alternate between being agents and automatons, with too much of the latter for foreign-policy analysts seeking greater autonomy and too little of the former for a really structural analysis of the system.

Here, once more, we see the influence of rational choice theory on international relations; governments are rational egoists acting in anarchic environments, and no matter how much Waltz tries to deny it, his model is actor-oriented. There are more effective iterations of structural power elsewhere in the literature on international relations. The knowledge structure, the financial structure, the production structure, and the political structure are Susan Strange's four main arguments for the presence of these structures in world politics from the perspective of international political economy Strange 1988. Each of these structures operates with structural power and has a logic distinct from that of its constituents. The four fundamental structures identified by historical sociologist Michael Mann are ideological, economic, political, and military Mann 1986/1993. His is a book of extensive historical sociology, and he is interested in changes

in the relative significance of each structure over time as well as how each of these structures affects outcomes [4]–[6].

Insecurity, fear, and power

An emphasis on the intrinsically harmful aspect of international interactions is one of the characteristics of realism explanations of international relations, and of state-centric accounts in general. International interactions seem to require a level of vigilance, if not anxiety, that would be considered paranoid in other situations. A quick recap of the previous events will make it clear why this is the case. State-centric accounts of international relations begin with the premise that states determine their own goals and objectives within the international system, and that foremost among these goals and objectives will be a concern for survival, both in the concrete sense of a concern to maintain the state's territorial integrity and, in a more ethereal sense, a concern to maintain the state's ability to control its own destiny and way of life. This assumption is based on the idea that the state is sovereign and wants to keep it that way.

Therefore, it doesn't matter whether the state is a Machtstaat or a Rechtstaat, an absolutist monarchy or a liberal democracy; states want to keep their sovereignty no matter what. Second, it is a tenet of state-centric theories of international relations that, in the absence of a global government, or of a system that would allow for the pursuit of interests in the hope of obtaining authoritative judgement, the pursuit of interests is carried out by attempting to exercise power in the world, where power is defined as the capacity to issue threats and make concessions. The use of coercion is a choice that sovereign states reserve for themselves, and any commitment not to use coercive means is conditional on the circumstances. Furthermore, coercive means are a part of the arsenal of positive and negative sanctions at states' disposal in their conduct of foreign affairs. Together, these two premises each of which is nothing more than an expansion of the implications of a system of sovereign states ensure that international interactions will always be marked by a sense of unease and anxiety.

The most basic circumstances lead to this conclusion, and the various ways in which flesh can be added to these circumstances may make them more or less dangerous, but they do not and cannot generate the qualitative change that would be required to completely eliminate danger. Because it adds the presumption that people have inherently aggressive tendencies that can only be restrained by the coercive force of government, the traditional realist account of state-centric international relations clearly makes life even more dangerous than the basic situation would suggest. States will have a drive to dominate, not just because it is a structural need but also because people generally have that ambition. Their goal is to rule. It's possible, as Carl Schmitt hypothesises, that as between states, the visceral hatreds of a "friend-foe" relationship can transform into the political hostility of a friend-enemy relationship, and the impersonal nature of this relationship may mitigate some of the worst aspects of our primal aggressiveness. Contrarily, whatever inherent restrictions we have acquired as a part of our animal nature may be undermined by the sheer impersonality of modern instruments of violence.

Whatever the case, aggression and violence are fundamental aspects of who we are, according to a classical realism, regardless of how these traits are understood theologically, socio-psychologically, or sociobiologically. This idea of aggression is eliminated from the equation by the neorealist emphasis on systemic imperatives as a source of behaviour. Not the type of the people who must operate in the global anarchy, but the fundamental circumstance, is harmful. Additionally, states are presumptively reasonable in their decision-making and unlikely to

succumb to irrational fears or hatreds. Every state always obeys them, but in the sense that even when breaking them, states will show their commitment to them by making excuses or claiming that their actions are entirely unusual Frost 1996 105 . These laws are supported by diplomacy, a profession with its own culture focused on discussion and problem-solving rather than coercion and force. States may be sovereign, but this does not prevent them from following the law most of the time; some vigilance is appropriate, but not the level of anxiety that fully developed realist theories say is typical. This has two issues, one of which is very evident and the other may require further explanation. First of all, no international society theorist has ever asserted that all states will always abide by the laws, raising the prospect that there may be disgruntled customers in the global market who will be willing to utilize [7]–[9].

CONCLUSION

The international system is not as chaotic as these ruminations would have you believe when it comes to managing instability. The majority of the time, there is some sort of order in the world, and while insecurity is always present, it is kept under check. How? According to the state-centric approach, there are two institutions of international relations that help to keep the international system somewhat orderly and secure. The first is the balance of power, which is to be expected. It is the concept that while force is what defines the international system, certain patterns of force can also lead to some degree of stability. Contrary to popular belief, interstate war is the second institution used to manage insecurity. In the conventional state-centric view of the world, war, while still devastating, nevertheless plays a significant part in the real preservation of the system, whereas from a commonsense perspective it is a catastrophe and marks the breakdown of order. Understanding International Relations. It is conceivable that none of these institutions can function in the manner in which tradition would have them, and this may be still another argument against maintaining a state-centric perspective on the globe. The objective of the following chapter is to conclude the argument before we can justifiably draw this conclusion. It is quite difficult to think of means to validate them other than the exchange of anecdotes because, like with other examples of folk knowledge, there are alternate and contradicting interpretations of each claim. In any case, the majority of the time in international relations, we are more interested in power as a relational term than in power as a characteristic of nations. Indeed, all of the aforementioned characteristics only make sense when they are viewed in a relational context; for instance, it is evident that a country's population size can only be judged in connection to other countries. Naturally, relational power also brings up the idea of influence.

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CHAPTER 8

A BRIEF STUDY ON POWER BALANCE AND WAR

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ABSTRACT:

The state-centric perspective on the world, particularly in its realism version, presents a picture of extreme unease and apprehension. States are required to be on the lookout for ways to increase their own power and decrease that of others because they are worried about their own security and may want to dominate others. States must take care of their own security because they aren't constrained or protected by any global government, even though they can't help but be aware that doing so can make others feel insecure. So it appears that the stage is being prepared for a miserable world in which the concept of an international "order" would be absurd. However, there is some degree of order in the world; although there is no formal administration, international interactions are not completely anarchic in the sense of being uncontrolled and disordered. How is this possible. Two important institutions, the balance of power and war, are said to be responsible for maintaining some sort of order in international relations, in accordance with realist theory. To say that conflict is a source of order seems counter-intuitive, improbable, and, in fact, somewhat repugnant, but the idea that the balance of power generates order is reasonable enough.

KEYWORDS:

Miserable, World, Order, Administration, International, Interactions.

INTRODUCTION

Although revolting, this concept must be accepted because using war as a political tool is something that does happen. It does so in two ways first, as a component of the balance of power because, in contrast to some theories, war is a necessary mechanism for maintaining a balance and, second, as a conflict-resolution mechanism that accomplishes what the balance of power cannot, namely bring about change as opposed to frustrate it. In other words, war completes and complements the power structure. The balance of power could not work as an institution of an international system or society without conflict. War and the balance of power stand together or, perhaps, fall together, as there may be aspects of international relations in the early twenty-first century that make it impossible to defend an account of the world in which war plays a central role, both morally and practically.

If this is the case, it will further bolster the doubts already voiced in Chapters 4 and 5 about state-centric international relations. The first section of this chapter will look at the balance of power. After a brief look at the lengthy history of balance of power thought in the European states system, two contemporary versions those of Kenneth Waltz and Hedley Bull will be studied, or in one instance, reexamined. In contrast to other theories of war that emphasise its irrational, catastrophic nature, the next section will discuss the political, Clausewitzian theory of war and the function of war as a conflict-resolution tool in traditional international relations. The conclusion will provide several arguments as to why this account of war and the account of international relations it is based on are no longer tenable in light of the state of affairs [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

Decline of International Relations Centred on States

The Balance of Power and War 99 ignored imperial rivalry and abandoned a protracted strategy of non-entanglement during peacetime to successfully align themselves with these two nations in 1904 and 1907, respectively. In short, attempts were made to cope with incipient disequilibrium using both of the strategies mentioned above. Three fascinating observations can be made about this narrative, but we'll save the third until the end of this paragraph. The first is that when coalitions solidify, the system becomes less flexible because it starts to resemble a bipolar system, and in a bipolar system, disturbances to stability can only be addressed internally rather than through alliance building. The ideal number of states in a balance, according to classical balance of power theorists, is five. This is because it allows for three versus two forms that may be modified as necessary, as opposed to bipolar systems, which are by their very nature rigid. But according to Kenneth Waltz, power management is simpler in a bipolar system since two people may reach stability more quickly than a bigger group.

This first remark is a little obscure, but the second point the difficulty of considering the balance of power while utilising conceptually advanced ideas of "power" is more important. Since Claude, for example, defines power in military terms throughout his work, balance of power theorists tend to consider power as a state quality and are therefore committed to a "basic force" model of influence. But as demonstrated in Chapter 5, fundamental force models are either false or self-referential. On the other hand, if we attempt to work with power-as-influence as our starting point, the straightforward narratives used by balance of power proponents end up being immensely complex. The argument that German power was the main disruptive impact, for instance, hinges on a fundamental force concept of power; yet, once we look at influence as shown in results, things start to seem extremely challenging. We discover that the German government was generally on the losing side in the diplomatic crises of the time, unable to effectively translate its undeniable physical superiority into beneficial outcomes at the negotiating table. Because they were aware of their lack of influence while others were aware of their plenty of power, the German political elite in the years leading up to 1914 had a strong sense that the rest of the world was against them. How are power relations established?

Since he is well aware that power balances do not always exist, Morgenthau's claim that a balance will 'of necessity' emerge when states pursue their national interests and seek to dominate the world is quite doubtful Morgenthau 1948. His support for balance of power policies would be difficult to understand if he weren't so aware of it; one does not need to preach about something that is 'of necessity' going to happen in the first place. Furthermore, the historical record offers little evidence in favour of the notion that power balances are somehow "natural" phenomena; rather, as Martin Wight notes, it demonstrates a tendency towards the concentration of power rather than its balanced distribution Wight in Butterfield and Wight 1966 167 . More generally, anyone who wants to make the claim that power imbalances will always occur must give some explanation of agency, or how this process automatically results in state policy. Bull and Waltz provide two accounts of the power balance that successfully meet or avoid this condition. In Chapter 3, Waltz's theory as presented in Theory of International Politics was briefly examined. According to him, the 'balance of power' is what will occur if states pay attention to their surroundings, modify their policies in response to shifts in the global balance of power, and, crucially, if the actual distribution of power is such that a balance can form [4]–[6].

The Power Equation

One idea that has practically become inextricable from the language of international relations as it has evolved over the last three or four centuries is the balance of power. Although not to pre-modern times; according to Hume, the Greeks were unaware of it 1987, the phrase dates back to at least the fifteenth century and was theorised in the eighteenth century and beyond. It can be found in treaties such as the Utrecht Treaty of 1713, in the autobiographies of statesmen and diplomats, as well as in the works of historians and lawyers. The Ancien Régime's ambassadors believed that this was the fundamental idea behind stability. To radical liberals like Richard Cobden, however, it was just a chimera a meaningless collection of sounds Cobden in C. Brown, Nardin, and Rengger 2002. All of the major international actors have referenced it at some point throughout the twentieth century. Unfortunately, there is no consensus as to what it represents. In the writings or speeches of its believers, at least eleven alternative meanings have been disclosed, according to scholars Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield.

Additionally, there is no internal consistency in how specific authors use the term; for instance, Inis Claude notes that Hans Morgenthau switches between several different meanings in his chapter on the subject in Politics Among Nations, a chapter that is specifically meant to dispel misunderstandings Claude 1962. Almost every other writer could undoubtedly be exposed in the same manner. What can be done to clear up this ambiguity? A balance of power system is just the name we give to a system that is founded on sovereignty and the absence of global governance. Claude more or less gives up and attempts to limit the phrase to a description of the system of states as a whole. This is a touch too pessimistic, though. There is a key concept at play here, and it would be unfortunate to lose sight of it as a result of earlier misunderstandings. In an anarchic world, stability, predictability, and regularity can only exist when the forces that states are able to exert to get their way in the world are in some kind of equilibrium. This fundamental idea is that only force can counteract the effect of force. If the word "balance" conjures up images of two scales, that metaphor fails miserably since it implies that only two forces are at equilibrium. The representation of a chandelier is preferable, though less traditional.

If the weights that are linked to the chandelier are distributed beneath it so that the forces they exert in this case, the downward pull of gravity are in equilibrium, the chandelier will remain level stable. This metaphor has two benefits first; it makes some of the more puzzling applications of the idea more difficult to understand. For instance, it would become clear that "holding the balance" is rather difficult, while a balance "moving in one's favour" is extremely dangerous if one were to be standing under a chandelier. More importantly, it communicates the idea that equilibrium can be upset in two different ways, and that it can be restored in two other ways. If one of the weights on the chandelier increases in weight without being balanced out let's say one state gains power over others due to endogenous factors, such a quicker rate of economic growth than other states the chandelier will shift away from the level. Additionally, it becomes unstable if two weights are shifted closer together without a corresponding shift elsewhere, as may occur, for instance, when two states create a closer bond than they have in the past. Another weight increasing or two other weights moving in closer proximity can also restore stability. To put it otherwise, arms races, alliance policies, or some combination of the two can cause disruptions and possibly fix them. Consider a greatly skewed picture of the international system in Europe after 1871 to put these arguments into more tangible words. First, by 1871, the system had largely reached equilibrium as a result of Prussia's victories over Austria-Hungary 1866 and France 1870–1871 ; more importantly, Bismarck had decided against using these victories to forge a Greater Germany

by incorporating portions of the Dual Monarchy into the new German Empire. Although there were conflicts and shaky, transient alliances between states, the system as a whole was in balance. According to one interpretation, in contrast to Bismarck's plans, German strength rose in the late nineteenth century as a result of German industrialism and population growth, to the point where a German superpower started to develop. This industrial might translated into a proactive foreign policy for Germany through steps like a stronger army and the creation of a navy almost from scratch.

The other European countries' response was to first re-align, forging new military alliances, and then to try to increase their own power by, for instance, extending military training periods in France and naval building in Britain. When discussing the bipolar nature of the then-current 1979 world, he remarks that France and Russia ignored ideological differences and signed a formal alliance in 1892, Britain as an example. He furthers that the most likely shift away from bipolarity would be towards unipolarity that is, an end to the anarchical system if the Soviet Union were unable to remain in competition with the United States Waltz 1979. Instead, he is making the point that other states would not want this to happen and would do everything in their power to prevent it from happening by realigning and improving their own capabilities. Neorealists have been making this argument since the end of the Cold War. According to Waltz, the system affects agents by using the rules of rational decision-making.

Being a rational egoist in the face of a certain set of circumstances, notably in response to changes in the distribution of power that can negatively impact a state's potential for self-preservation, entails acting in such a way that balances of power arise. It is important to emphasise that states do not, at least not as a first preference, want to establish power balances. This holds true for bipolar balances as well, possibly much more so. Both parties would be willing to take action to make the other disappear if they could do so without running the danger of getting caught. The second best' option, since this is obviously not an option, is to jointly manage a bipolar equilibrium. Bull 1984; Bull and Watson 1984 International system. However, Frost has argued that there is no need to believe that this is a uniquely European attitude because it is simply one of the "settled norms" of the modern system, norms that have been implicitly accepted by almost all states. These norms include a commitment to the continuation of the system and the need to maintain a balance of power.

The political understanding of warfare

In the 20th century, the common perception of war changed to one in which it was seen as a pathological phenomenon, a malfunctioning of the international order, or possibly a sign of the immaturity of a people or a civilization, according to Freud 1985. However, it is important to recognise that this is incorrect in order to comprehend the function of war in a system of balance of power. War is a common occurrence in international relations and is not pathological in any way, despite the possibility that it may be unfortunate. Before describing the view of war that makes sense of this position—the Clausewitzian or political theory of war it is necessary to quickly review several alternative views of the causes of conflict. It is remarkable that Kenneth Waltz, the author of Theory of International Politics, the book that dramatically raised the level of theoretical discourse in the field in 1979, should also have written Man, the State the Balance of Power and War, the standard work in question, in 1959. However, from some perspectives, the later book could be regarded as an elaboration and re-working of t Three "images" of the causes of conflict are identified by Waltz in the 1959 edition, with the third serving as the foundation for his

subsequent research. The first image highlights the human condition. The argument that conflicts arise because of some part of human nature might be expressed in religious, psychological, psychoanalytic, or, more recently, socio-biological terms. We are violent by nature because we are fallen beings who were expelled from the Garden of Eden. The death-wish thanatos has us under its control. It should be emphasised that although this is popularly believed to be true, we are the only species that kills intra-specifically and lacks an inhibitor to stop us from killing our own kind.

These are complex arguments that might hold some truth, but they do not provide an explanation for why war occurs. War is a social institution, and as such, calls for a social explanation. It is not comparable to murder, severe bodily injury, or individual acts of violence. It is "reductionist" to explain social phenomena in terms of an individual's nature; Waltz would use this phrase to considerable effect in his later research. Instead, then emphasising human nature, the second image emphasises the character of societies. There are many different types of societies that might lead to war; among them are autocracies and monarchies according to the liberal viewpoint, democracies according to the autocratic viewpoint, capitalist societies according to the Leninist viewpoint, and communist societies according to the capitalist viewpoint.

Again, one may make a compelling argument for why each of these social structures is prone to violence, but each justification overlooks an important factor. As far as we can tell, every society that has interacted with other civilizations on a regular basis even democracies that don't engage in direct conflict with other democracies seems to have gone through some form of war. There are just a few unusual instances, like with the Inuit in the Arctic, where extreme climatic conditions render conflict practically impossible. These are the only exceptions to the rule that violence is ubiquitous. This implies that neither the second nor the first image can adequately explain war in general terms. The last image is the third, which, as was to be expected, highlights the international system as the primary driver of armed conflict. Any extended explanation of this argument would be unnecessary given how often it has already been discussed above. States have interests that occasionally may conflict; in anarchy, there is no way to resolve such a conflict that is binding on the parties; most of the time, the parties do not wish to resolve their difficulties through violence, but occasionally they do; war is the last resort of states who see no other way to have their interests met.

It should be highlighted that the third image just illustrates the possibility of war; in order to explain why any real conflict occurs, we must also include societal and personal variables. The distinction between a civil war and an international conflict can be emphasised as a final means of illustrating the same concept. Since a civil war involves a breach of normality, it is a pathological condition. In theory, states have ways to resolve disputes without resorting to violence, but occasionally a problem arises that cannot be solved by these means, and bloodshed - possibly even civil war - results. This is not the case with international war; as between states, fighting is the ultimate means of resolving disputes. This is a political explanation of war that portrays it as the result of a deliberate decision made after assessing the advantages and disadvantages of using force for political ends. This may sound rather contemporary, however the author who first presented this viewpoint and listed the main aspects of the argument did it around 200 years ago. against the enemy, which is provided by "the people," the army's role in managing contingencies, and the political leadership's choice of the war's goals and objectives. It is important to distinguish between these three points; while the army has the right to request from the government those resources be provided for the job at hand, this is not their responsibility. Although it sets goals, the government shouldn't meddle in how those goals are achieved. While the army and government should have

public backing, their freedom of action should not be constrained. The Balance of Power and War 105 In a few pages of Clausewitz, we can see the key elements of the realist worldview and, perhaps, of any state-centric worldview although Wendtian constructivists and theorists of international society would disagree with this conclusion. The degree to which neorealist thought and Clausewitzian concepts overlap is startling. The former clearly understands what he means by the instrumentality of war even though he does not use the terms "costs" and "benefits."

Whether Clausewitz was a "offensive" or "defensive" realist, to use the modern word, is an intriguing subject. Offensive realists believe that states will try to solve their security problems by striking first if they can get away with it, while defensive realists believe that states are essentially reactive, ready to defend their position but not likely to pre-empt potential opponents see Chapter 3 for more information on the two positions. He might have been sympathetic to the latter view, but at the very least, the careful, deliberate approach he recommends forbids crusades and vendettas. Furthermore, war is fought on behalf of the nation and is supported by the nation, but it is not fought by the nation, according to Clausewitz and his intellectual contemporaries. War is for armies, and a clear line must be created between fighters and non-combatants, as in the writings of his great contemporary Hegel.

Civilian, or at least political, control is essential. Clausewitz would have agreed with Lloyd George's maxim that war is too important to be left to the generals, and he would not have shared their admiration for the bombast of some twentieth-century commanders or their belief that war is a technical endeavour and that politicians should not get involved in matters of strategy. Many catastrophes in the 20th century could have been avoided with a Clausewitzian strategy. The drawbacks are also obvious a willingness to use force that doesn't seem to understand the moral gravity of the choice to use violence for political ends; acceptance of the idea that states must always be the judges in their own cases; and an inability to look beyond the borders of a country to a wider humanity. In the nineteenth century, we might agree that a Clausewitzian understanding of war is a more complete one than the alternatives and an accurate account of the state of affairs. There were numerous grounds to dispute this throughout the 20th century [7]–[9].

The twentieth century saw war

International lawyers in the nineteenth century generally agreed that the doctrine of sovereignty was a corollary to the idea that war was a legal act of state. War could be fought lawfully and without regard to any legal interest in the grounds for this act of state, provided that the entity that declared war has the capacity to do so and followed the required legal procedures a proper declaration of war, for example, as in Chapter 106 Understanding International Relations. The situation has changed. Together, the 1919 League of Nations Covenant, the 1928 Paris Pact, the 1945 United Nations Charter, and the 1945 London Charter which established the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal have established a new legal order under which war is only permissible in two situations as an act of self-defense or as a measure of law enforcement to aid others in defending themselves. This is not only the current legal position, but it also seems to reflect how the majority of people perceived war in the 20th century, that is, as a catastrophe that should be avoided at all costs. In fact, the current law on war is more likely to face criticism for being too lenient than for restricting the activity too strictly. A Clausewitzian conception of war seems inappropriate now, both morally and legally. Of course, all of this is irrelevant from a realist perspective. If states continue to wage war under Clausewitzian lines, then it is irrelevant if the law and the general public are against them. At best, it explains some of the peculiarities of contemporary warfare,

particularly the unwillingness to call a spade a spade. For example, the British Government never refers to the Falklands War but rather the South Atlantic Conflict of 1982 because the difficulties of fighting a declared war are simply too great to consider. But do nations still wage war as a wise course of action? Some people attempt it occasionally, but generally speaking, the circumstances of the 20th century prevented war from being fought according to Clausewitzian calculations. Here, there are two points the first is about the calculations themselves, and the second is about how calculations affect wartime judgements. The first point is straightforward over the 20th century, the costs of war drastically increased while the benefits either stayed the same or, more frequently, decreased. Norman Angell observed this in the years prior to 1914, as was indicated in Chapter 1 above, and it has only been more evident after 1945. From the destruction caused by machine guns, breechloading artillery, and barbed wire in the First World conflict to the strategic bombing of the Second to the fear of nuclear devastation in a potential Third World War, the destructiveness of conflict has increased exponentially. War erodes political stability, destroys social economic structures, and wastes financial resources.

CONCLUSION

We have seen a few fractures start to show up in the state-centric International Relations theory during the last three chapters. We have seen that decision-making theorists have challenged the premise that domestic politics and foreign policy are fundamentally distinct from one another. These studies make it challenging to argue that states act in their citizens' best interests. The emphasis placed on domestic variables in structural theories of international relations is somewhat undermined by the phenomena of the "democratic peace," which shifts the focus away from foreign policy but leaves them unable to address the issue of agency. Power is a concept that initially seems straightforward and simple to comprehend, but many of the conventional assumptions about how power functions vanish once the contrast between power-as-attribute and power-as-influence is presented. Once again, the concept of the balance of power has some intuitive credibility but disintegrates when its underlying logic is revealed. The Balance of Power and War 111 On one level, the lack of a strong political notion of war is just another reason to be wary of state-centricity and another illustration of some aspect of international relations not acting exactly as it should. In actuality, the problem here is considerably more severe. A Clausewitzian understanding of war is necessary for the balance of power to function; the two institutions stand together, and if, as suggested here, they crumble together, the entire state-centric structure is destroyed. This is true for any version of realism or society, and if they are having problems, so is everything else. Nevertheless, state logic.

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CHAPTER 9

FIVE APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

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ABSTRACT:

The most significant theories in international relations are undoubtedly realism theory and neorealist theory. Their function as a guide for the political decisions made by US administrations from the end of World War II through the 1970s and then again since the 1990s can be used to understand this. In the US, the study of international relations was and frequently still is closely linked to a practical political goal to improve American foreign policy in "new" international political contexts, such as superpower rivalry after World War II, global economic instability due to oil price shocks in the 1970s, the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, or the current situation with regard to new rising powers like China. Early on, American foreign policy was impacted by Hans Morgenthau's realism as outlined in his 1948 book Politics among Nations, as well as the writings of John Herz, Reinhold Niebuhr, Henry Kissinger, who would later become US Secretary of State, and Arnold Wolfers. The various strands of neorealist thought today, as well as neo-realism, which Waltz originated as a critique of early realism, have also mostly been produced and updated in the US. Without considering the importance of a neo realist world perspective, it is impossible to understand the frequently discussed shift of the US from multilateralism to unilateralism since the 1990s and the hopes that the Obama administration would bring a new multilateralist approach to US actions.

KEYWORDS:

Cold War, International Politics, Neorealism, Power, State, Theory.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines five IR theories, starts with this unit. Neorealist theory, as established by Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics 1979, will be at the centre of this course. We will learn about the specific viewpoint on international politics that neorealist theory offers by thoroughly delving into the explanatory model and basic assumptions of the theory. There are various good reasons to start with neorealist theory when learning about theoretical perspectives on international relations. Neorealist theory, continually developed by Kenneth Waltz starting in the 1950s and fully developed in his book "Theory of International Politics" 1979, is the first "scientific" theoretical approach to IR within the academic subject of IR. Waltz set out to develop a broad theory of IR that could explain how all aspects of international politics operate. Neorealism is based on the firm conviction that a broad, legal-like understanding of international politics is attainable. Waltz was the first academic in IR to base his theoretical reasoning on a set of distinct presumptions regarding the players and structures in international politics. The least complex or most economical theory of international relations is neorealism. It is simple to begin with just because of this. The position neorealism occupies within the academic field of international relations IR makes it all but necessary to start theoretical studies with it, making it even more significant than being the first "scientific" theoretical approach. You will discover that nearly every

theoretical approach uses neorealism as a point of comparison to hone its own theoretical claims. Realism is the oldest "theory" of international politics in terms of "intellectual traditions". Please be aware that we are currently discussing realism as an IR theoretical subfield. It shouldn't be mixed up with realism as a scientific philosophy which is covered in Part 1 of the book.

DISCUSSION

1. Background and the Main Query

A useful place to start when describing the history of the development of neorealist theory is the distinction between realist thinking and neorealist theory in contemporary usage of the words. After World War II, the foundation of IR was realist thought, which was centred on the concepts of "political power" and "national interest," and this trend grew stronger with the start of the Cold War. However, since the 1950s, approaches to international organisations and conflict studies have also played a significant role in the academic study of IR; their significance should not be downplayed. Up until the late 1950s and early 1960s, the American discipline's reaction to politically charged concerns was the predominance of realist 126 inside IR. There was a shift at this time towards more fundamental or basic research. It has been attempted to find scientific explanations for international relations through comparative studies, which use systematic comparison as a method to find general explanations for international relations since the 1950s, and theories that apply game theory to the social sciences/international relations especially since the 1960s.

A shift in emphasis from political to foreign policy studies led to a significant domination of decision-making methods to international relations in the US Snyder, C.R., Brock, H.W., and Sapin, 1962. The basis of these theoretical programmes was the American decision to support the Korean War as a matter of foreign policy. Theory-wise, the contentious issue was whether these studies were in the category of international relations studies or studies of foreign policy. The level-of-analysis issue, which was a topic of discussion in Unit 4 of the book, is directly related to these queries. In terms of "locating" the most important explanatory variables, they highlight the fundamental issue of how to most effectively explain international politics. Kenneth Waltz asserted that there is a dearth of true international political theory within the field because he felt that theories of foreign policy do not provide adequate explanations of international politics. Explanations of international politics can be found at the level of the international system, not at the level of the state or the political decision-maker. His theoretical endeavour primarily entails the development of an IR system level theory.

With his doctoral dissertation on Man, the state, and the state system in theories of the causes of war at Columbia University in New York 1954 and his book Man, the State and War A Theoretical Analysis 1959, he pioneered ideas about such a systemic theory of international politics in the 1950s. Waltz contends that we must examine the systemic level of international politics in order to study international conflict. Human behaviour or the internal workings of the state do not contain the reasons. Waltz subsequently created a whole system-level theory of international politics, which was released in 1979 under the title Theory of International Politics. A theoretical explanation of war and peace in international politics is the central issue for the theory's development. Specifically, he was interested in how the major nations frequently created power balances in international systems. The goal was to develop a broad theory of international politics that would be useful in identifying regularities resembling laws under the constrained context of international politics. These patterns can then be explained by these regularities. Waltz believed

that such a comprehensive theory needed to be both a system theory and a theory of the balance of power. Thus, the academic and intellectual foundation for the development of neorealist theory as a system theory is provided by the quest for the "right" theory of international politics within the field of IR [1]–[3].

2. Actor and Structure Presumptions

The foundation of neorealist theory is a clear demarcation between domestic and foreign politics. National politics are thought to be the purview of other realms or domains than international politics. The international system serves as the foundation of neorealist theory. The structure of the system and the states as active and interacting "units" within the system are considered to make up the international system in order to create a theory. Theory in the social sciences is always predicated on presumptions about the most important actors, their characteristics, and their behaviour, as we have learnt in Part 1 of the book. They are presumptions, not something the theory explains. In order to build the theoretical argument and, by extension, to explain it, assumptions are essential. The premise of neorealism is that states are the most significant and pertinent actors in international affairs. States are homogeneous actors.

Neorealist theory presupposes that states are at a minimum seeking their own survival and preservation and at a maximum aiming for universal control within the international system with regard to their motivations and interests, or to put it another way, the driving forces of their behaviour. As a result, states aim to improve their internal military and economic capabilities as well as their external alliances. In order to forward the goals of the state, power is thought to be the most significant political tool in international politics. State objectives are arranged in a clear hierarchy, with security high politics at the top. Waltz agrees that non-state players and transnational operations are significant in international politics and does not dispute the existence of other actors outside states Waltz 1979. He does not, however, believe that this renders a state-centric understanding of world politics outdated. The neorealist assumption that states are unitary actors, together with the most pertinent ones, serve as a crucial role for the concept of structure, as we will see in Step 3 later.

The neorealist line of reasoning concludes with the "structural realist" explanation of international politics as a result of this function. Now think back to what you studied about the social environment of actors and their interactions in the fourth unit of Part 1. Social contact and action take place in a structural setting. The international system serves as the structural context for states according to neorealism. Anarchy is the fundamental structural component of the global system. Anarchy, which is the reverse of hierarchy, is the absence of a higher authority in the international system that establishes the norms for state behaviour and has the authority to penalise non-compliance. This presents a significant security conundrum for states. A security dilemma, in the words of John Herz, is "a social constellation in which units of power such as states or nations in international relations find themselves whenever they exist side by side without higher authority that might impose standards of behaviour upon them and thereby protect them from attacking each other," according to his famous book International Politics in the Atomic Age.

Anarchy forces states to rely on themselves, so they coexist, act, and interact in a self-help system. Herz 1959, emphasis mine. In such a condition, a sense of insecurity derived from mutual suspicion and mutual fear compels these units to compete for ever more power in order to find more security, an effort which proves self-defeating because complete security remains ultimately unattainable. According to Waltz 1979, "a self-help system is one in which those who do not help

themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer." Self-help is the principle of action within structures for which anarchy is the central feature. Neorealist theory makes the following assumptions States are unitary actors "units" of the international system and the most significant actors in international politics; Power is the most important political tool used by actors; High politics security is the actor's state's primary goal; Low politics all other issue areas is the actor's state's secondary goal; The international system is anarchic; The actor the "units"/states" is motivated by self-interest because of the security dilemma

Neorealist Theory's Account of World Politics

Analysis Level

After going over the fundamental presumptions, we'll look more closely at how a neorealist theory explains how international politics turn out. We described the results of international politics as patterns of interaction like conflict, war, peace, and collaboration in the fourth unit of the first section. These are the things that an explanandum for an international politics theory must explain. These results are explained by the explanans. Where the explanans is "located," or where to focus our investigation in terms of levels of analysis, is a key question. Whether the causes begin with man, the state, or the state system, Waltz believes that statements concerning war and the prerequisites for peace in international politics are made in accordance with the level at which they are located Waltz 1959. He makes it obvious that he prefers to discuss global politics at the structural level. A theory of international politics is actually a system level theory in Waltz's view. He draws a clear distinction between reductionist and systemic theories to explain his preference for the systemic level. Please be aware that Waltz's usage of the word "reductionist" and the definition of "reductionism" as it was introduced in Part 1 should not be confused.

Reductionist theories focus causes at the individual or governmental levels. Waltz contends that there are two types of theories of foreign policy reductionist theories and systemic theories of international politics. Reductionist theories attempt to explain international politics by looking at state bureaucracies or by attempting to explain international politics by understanding the characteristics and interactions of the parts the states of the system the states. According to reductionist theories, national or subnational-level "elements" or "combinations of elements" determine international results; internal factors cause outward effects. According to Waltz, reductionist theories do not adequately explain how international politics plays out. His "project" entails developing a non-reductionist, system-level theory. In this way, Waltz expands on his critique of the preeminent international politics studies of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Study independently by carefully reading chapters 2 and 4 of Waltz 1979 Theory of International Politics. Why are reductionist theories ineffective as explanations for global politics? Consider the neorealist thesis that the only "real" theory of international politics is a system's level theory.

The idea of structure in neorealism

A particular kind of system theory serves as Waltz's counterargument to reductionist views. Without initially understanding the central idea of structure in this theory, it is impossible to comprehend. The foundation of the neorealist theoretical programme is to conceptualise any political system, whether it be national or global, in terms of its structural components. This is the reason Waltz's formulation of neorealist theory is referred to as "structural realism". Please keep in mind that the word "structural" is distinct from the word "structuralism" holism. By including

the idea of "structure" as part of the neorealist explanation, "structural" links to the reformulation of classical realism; it is a structural realist explanation and will be covered in more detail below. In contrast, "structuralism" holism, refers to a perspective in the philosophy of science that is both ontological and methodological. According to Waltz, the element of a political system that makes it feasible to view it as a whole is its structure. His goal is to independently describe the "elements" of a political system, whether it be at the national or international level. He does this by defining structure as well as units and processes. According to him, doing so is essential to "disentangle" various causes i.e., not "mix" levels of analysis and to enable the precise characterization of structural causes and effects Waltz 1979. It is essential to define structure independently of the "units" in order to understand the restrictions that all states are subject to. The idea of structure serves as an explanation for why some behavioural similarities are anticipated under systemic constraints.

According to the definitional method, structures must be specified independently of the characteristics and interactions of their constituent parts. The definition of structure excludes the characteristics of the units, their behaviour, and their interactions the cultural, economic, and military interactions of states, as well as the types of political systems, political leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments of states. They fall under the level of the unit state. To distinguish between variables at the unit level and variables at the system level, this omission was made Waltz 1979. Thus, the issue of how units are "arranged" or situated within the system is all that needs to be considered in order to identify a structure. According to Waltz, the arrangement or positioning of the units/states is a system trait rather than a characteristic of the individual units. It is described as a "positional picture" by Waltz 1979. Simply put, the way a system's components are arranged and the arrangement's underlying concept determine its structure.

Each unit behaves differently, and when positioned or arranged differently within the system, they result in varied interactional results. Waltz explains his notion of structure by explaining domestic political structures in order to make the idea clearer and help readers comprehend how it applies to international politics. In order to describe the structure of a political system, he poses three questions

i. Ordering principle How are the components of the system arranged?
ii. Unit and function differentiation What are the formal functions of the differentiated units?
iii. Capability distribution How is power dispersed among the units?
iv. A national political system, or domestic political systems, are centralised and structured according to a hierarchy; hierarchy is the guiding principle.

The unit’s institutions and agencies within the state are arranged in hierarchical relationships with one another. The degree of their authority and the tasks they carry out actors in charge of jurisdiction, legislators, bureaucratic players, etc. distinguish political actors within the state formally. The guiding concept in international politics is different. The guiding premise of the international system is anarchy, not hierarchy. International systems are chaotic and decentralised. The absence of agents with system-wide power prevails over any formal connections of super- or subordination. In the international system, we can only discover coordination of formally equal units in place of ties of super- and subordination [4]–[6].

Buildings as causes

Political structures must be specified in a way that makes it possible to identify their causal consequences in order for a system theory of international politics to work. The term "causal effects" refers to the way a structure "acts" as a restraining and displacing "force" in a system. The structure of the system has an impact on all of the activities taken by agents and agencies as well as their interactions and the results of those interactions. International political outcomes cannot be predicted based on the goals and actions of the actors the "inside" states, but rather must be explained in terms of the "external" structures. They are only structurally explicable. As structures alter, effects change. According to Waltz, the only way to respond to the central query of neorealist theory why do recurrent patterns of state behaviour, repeated and enduring patterns in the history of international politics, cycles of war and peace, and periods of conflict and stability in the international system occur is through a structural realist explanation i.e., through his concept of structure.

Neorealist theory seeks to explain why behaviour patterns repeat, why things happen in cycles, and why the range of possible outcomes is constrained by specific parameters Waltz 1979. Reductionist ideas cannot explain recurrences and repeats inside a system. International politics' recurring patterns and traits are explained by the structure's consistency. According to Waltz, a structural realism theory may characterise the circumstances that increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict but cannot forecast the start of specific battles. Waltz 1979 claims that some "big, important and enduring patterns" are explained by structures. These are the systemic continuities. The "big and important" patterns are periods of stable international systems and periods of turmoil and war.

It is not the goal to explain specific, isolated incidents and instantaneous results in world politics. At the state level, theories fall under this category. Therefore, the fundamental query is What are the causal effects of a system with an anarchical structure and a particular capability distribution? Here, Waltz offers an analogy to describe how the international system's structure affects state behaviour in a similar manner to how the market forces of a competitive market economy affect the behaviour of individual businesses. Find more about the comparison that is used to describe how international systems work. Under the restrictions of market forces, do states behave like businesses?

Politics of the Power Balance

How do states respond to structural limitations? What kind of politics must people select? As we all know, in the neorealist theory, the motivation for behaviour in a world where state security is not guaranteed is survival security dilemma. Security is the top priority in anarchic societies because existence must be ensured in a system without laws established by a central authority. The prevailing conditions in such a system include mistrust and confusion regarding the objectives of other governments. The neorealist theory claims that anarchy in the system "encourages" the units to look for security Waltz. Each state's future depends on how it reacts to other states' actions, which is why there are arms races, rivalries, and imitations in the realm of military technical advancements. The acquisition of power a combination of military, economic, and technical might is a means, not an end, to creating security. As a result, states' key concerns are maintaining their place in the system and balancing power rather than trying to increase it Waltz 1979. States are compelled to act in a way that seeks the balance of power in an anarchical system that is defined

by the distribution of power. States can maintain a balance of power by, for instance, bolstering their armed forces or forming and joining alliances.

This claim, however, mostly pertains to the major players in the system. The emphasis on great powers is a characteristic of neorealist theory because these are the "units" that have the most influence over state behaviour. "Paying attention to the states that have the biggest impact on international politics as a system is necessary. The great powers must be the foundation of any broad theory of international politics, according to Waltz. This is based on a strong belief that the necessities of politics are derived from the unrestrained competition between states and that calculation based on these necessities can lead to the policies that will best serve a state's interest. "Secondary", less important and less capable states typically join the weaker of two coalitions or alliances. The ultimate measure of a policy's effectiveness is whether it preserves and strengthens the state, Waltz. Such policies yield outcomes at the system level that may not be included in any actor's motivations or as aims in the actor's policies, but which can be explained by a balance-of-power theory.

One way to think of balance-of-power theory is as a progression of system theory. It provides forecasts in terms of trends States can be anticipated to act in ways that lead to power balances. The freedom of the individual units is constrained by the dynamics of the system. Because of this, their actions and the results of those actions become predictable. To sum up According to neorealist theory, the distribution of power among the major political actors in a given era defines international structures. As a result of the "structural constraints" of international politics, the units act in a way that tends to establish power balances. International politics, which are the results of the activities and interactions of 136 nations and are determined by the restrictions of the system, result in a balance of power. A system level theory is the sole explanation for a balance of power. A high trend towards balance is predicted by this hypothesis for the system. Power balances develop frequently because balances will be upset and then restored. A theory of international politics makes the claim that it can explain some facets of national foreign policies, particularly in relation to the global context that these policies must operate [7]–[9].

The international system is peaceful and stable

Neorealist theory aims for explanation and prediction how can one account for repeated patterns of conflict and peace in the global system? According to the notion, the goal is to specify the prerequisites for peace. The theory's "policy advice" results in a commitment to balance-of-power politics. The absence of major conflict and war, brought about by periods of power balance, is what is referred to as peace and stability. Waltz supports a "loose coupling" and some degree of control exercised by big governments to assist promote peace and stability in the absence of authoritative regulation anarchy. Control not regulation and prevention not coordination are the two factors in international politics that are most crucial Waltz 1979. Waltz believes that the prospect of using force will stop the use of force in international politics. Therefore, the most crucial method of control in security politics involves using the threat or actual use of force to alter state policies.

States with more power in anarchical systems might "absorb" unstable developments simply because they have more power Waltz 1979. Thus, neorealist theory might be interpreted as a forceful argument in favour of major powers engaging in "constructive management" of international affairs Waltz 1979. The fundamental characteristics of anarchy will prevail in such a system, and state interactions and behaviour will perpetuate this condition. The security

conundrum is insoluble. International politics is "timeless" in the sense that it is a never-ending cycle of warfare and peace, under the control of the balance-of-power theory. Recap your knowledge now by carefully reading the overview below and responding to the review questions.

CONCLUSION

As we all know, the discipline has always been centred on discussions of war and peace. How can we explain that history exhibits stages of war and strife while other periods proved to be stable and peaceful? was a question that particularly fascinated Waltz. He became interested in establishing a theory to explain these persistent patterns of state behaviour and repeating and enduring patterns in the history of international politics after observing these cycles of war and peace in international politics. States prefer to balance power rather than maximise it in which case they would side with the stronger side. No balances would develop if states sought to maximise their authority. The structural limitations of anarchical systems "encourage" the states to practise "Realpolitik" in terms of politics Waltz 1979. The system thus gives a "rationale" for them as well as a general indication of the "methods" by which foreign policy is conducted. Despite differences in people and governments, the approaches are frequently utilised for a reason the "structure of the international system" promotes a particular kind of politics where a state's interests serve as the justification for acts. Within a national political system, there is a certain distribution of capacities power. Political processes differ according to diverse structures in a country political system because political structures influence political processes. Structures under autocratic or democratic systems, for instance, will vary from one another depending on the type of political system, as will those in presidential and parliamentary democracies. Depending on the structural characteristics of the system, the actions of the units the political system's actors and the results of their interactions will vary.

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CHAPTER 10
A BRIEF STUDY ON GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

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ABSTRACT:

Early social policies were lax, and the majority of economic activity was small-scale, local, and agrarian. The breadth and scope of economic activity grew, as well as the options for social policy, with the advent of manufacturing and the factory system and the realisation that efficiency benefits - economies of scale - could be gained via output for a wider market. The first result was an increase in the ideal size of states; by removing regional trade barriers, Britain and France formed "single markets," and Germany transitioned from a Customs Union to a single state. The International Telegraphic Union was founded in 1865, an International Bureau of Weights and Measures was established in 1875, and the International Labour Office was established in 1901 as a result of the needs of the new societies going beyond these initial steps Murphy 1994. The League and UN systems increased the institutionalisation of functional cooperation in the 20th century, while organisations like the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO made attempts to control ever-wider spheres of state activity. Although each of these new institutions originated from the exercise of sovereign authority, they each represented a reduction in that authority because the powers at hand require some degree of sovereign pooling in order to be used efficiently.

KEYWORDS:

Trade, Global, European, Economic, State.

INTRODUCTION

Some restrictions on the use of military force are imposed by the numerous Hague and Geneva Conventions, the legal prohibitions in the UN Charter, and the creation of customary limits on the use of force. These reflections basically suggest that although there is no global government because states have refused to give up their legal status as sovereign, their attempts to exercise political sovereignty have resulted in extensive networks of global "governance" an archaic term that originally meant "government," but has been adopted as a convenient way to describe the combined effects of the various variables. This chapter will look at some theories of international cooperation, including functionalism, neo-functionalism, federalism, regime theory, and collective security. It will also look at the core institutional framework of global governance. Finally, it should be noted that the applicability of "global governance" varies considerably depending on the topic at hand and the geographic location. It would be incorrect to believe that global governance is steadily intruding on all spheres of international life and all geographical locations of the globe. The most accurate way to understand both domestic and international politics in many parts of the world is to adopt a harsh Hobbesian realism, and in some areas of international politics, no state has so far demonstrated a willingness to cede its sovereign rights. In conclusion, and to emphasise a previous point, global governance is not the same as global government, much less accountable and representative government; the degree to which the globe is generally orderly and norm-governed can never be overstated [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

Functionalism

There are good reasons for starting this survey with a look at functionalism, even though federalist ideas can be traced back at least to the peace projects of the eighteenth century and are thus, strictly speaking, the earliest attempts to understand the development of international institutions. The most extensive, intellectually challenging, and ambitious endeavour to date to comprehend the emergence of international institutions as well as to predict their future development trajectory and address their normative ramifications is functionalism. Though similar in scope to realism, it is an original collection of ideas that has little to do with previous diplomatic custom. Despite the fact that David Mitrany has a strong case for being the father of functionalism, other scholars have adopted and used his view of the world in case studies and theoretical work, including Joseph Nye, Ernst Haas, J. P. Sewell, Paul Taylor, A. J. R. Groom, and John Burton as well as world society theorists Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks.

Even if functionalism is undoubtedly the most significant approach to international institutions to have evolved in the 20th century, not all of its ideas or even the majority of them stand up to serious analysis. Understanding functionalism requires realising that, despite the fact that it provides an explanation for the historical development and potential future development of international institutions, this is not its primary goal. It is a description of the circumstances that lead to peace. It first appeared in the 1940s in opposition to state-centered methods of maintaining peace such federalism and collective security. According to Mitrany, these strategies failed because they were not radical enough, not because the demands they placed on nations were too radical, as is usually argued. States may be legally required to act in particular ways, but they still have the freedom to break the law when it suits them. Collective security leaves unchanged the sovereign capacity of states to choose whether or not to respond to its imperatives. States may no longer be able to behave in this manner due to federalism on a global scale, but for this same reason, states are reluctant to federate.

Both strategies fall short because they try to work inside the parameters of sovereignty while delivering outcomes that do the opposite. For example, a frontal assault on legal sovereignty while maintaining political sovereignty is doomed to fail. Instead, Mitrany contended that a "working peace system" could only be built from the ground up, by promoting forms of cooperation that avoided the question of formal sovereignty and instead steadily decreased the ability of nations to act as sovereigns Mitrany 1966. 'Form follows function' and 'Peace in Parts’ Nye 1971 are two formulas that can be used to summarise this claim. A variety of ideas are collapsed by the adage "Form follows function." First, cooperation will only be successful if it is concentrated on distinct and specialised tasks or "functions” that are now carried out by nations but may be carried out more successfully in a larger framework. Second, the nature of the function in question should dictate the shape that such cooperation takes; for certain purposes, a global organisation will be adequate, whilst for others, regional or even local institutions would suffice.

Sometimes simply exchanging information suffices, but in other circumstances, decision-making authority may need to be delegated to effective organisations. Medical professionals and health managers should be concerned with the eradication of disease, while employers' groups and labour unions should be concerned with labour standards. Each functional organisation should be organised in a way that allows it to perform its specific function in an effective manner. The desired overall result of these particular instances of functional collaboration is "peace in parts." The

political aspect of sovereignty, which was previously discussed, is given priority according to the functionalist concept of sovereignty. A collection of powers makes up sovereignty. The state's ability to exercise sovereign authority will eventually decline as these functions are gradually transferred from the state to operational organisations. Political psychology plays a role in this because it makes the premise that people's devotion to states is a result of what those states do for them and that if those activities are performed by other institutions, that loyalty would wane. Furthermore, the idea that form follows function will cause functional collaboration to erode the territorial foundation of the system rather than result in the creation of a new, larger, more effective state [4]–[6].

Federalism, Integration Theory, And Neo-Functionalism

Functionalism envisions the emergence of a new global order in which the sovereign state will be marginalized. The development of new states through the integration of existing states, typically on a regional basis, and possibly, in the long term, the creation of a single global state are the goals of integration theory, in contrast. The following discussion of federalism and neofunctionalism has a European focus because Europe has served as the most significant testing ground for ideas on integration since 1945. It should be noted, however, that many of the forefathers of the European process saw this as a first step towards, possibly in the very long run, the integration of the world. Many Western European leaders in the immediate post-war era looked to the establishment of a United States of Europe, a federal or maybe confederal organization in which the sovereignty of its members would be restrained, out of concern to prevent a third European conflict.

This aspiration was initially represented by some early institutions, most notably the Council of Europe, but it became clear throughout the 1940s that an attempt to directly undermine the sovereignty of European states would fail. This fact was finally confirmed by the failure of plans for a European Defence Union EDU, which were scuttled by the French National Assembly in 1954. Instead, the Marshall Plan experience and some functionalist principles were used by the founding architects of European integration, Monnet, De Gasperi, and Schuman, to forge a different path towards European unification. Functionalists aim to weaken state sovereignty from the bottom up by slicing away the state's authority piecemeal, like a salami. For example, in the Marshall Aid Committee for European Economic Cooperation, which later became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD, the recipients of Marshall Aid were required to come up with a common plan for its distribution.

Combining this strategy with that experience led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community ECSC in 1952, followed by Euratom and the European Economic Community EEC in 1956, which served as a bridge to European political unification. Later, these three organisations came together to form the European Community EC, which is today known as the European Union EU. These organisations were and still are distinctive. The European Commission, a body of appointed bureaucrats now with one Commissioner from each member state, has the ability to initiate policy, the European Court is empowered to decide many intra-Community disputes, and, more recently, a directly elected European Parliament has some significant powers it can employ independent of state control, even though in formal terms, much of the decision-making power in the EU rests with state representatives in the Council of Ministers. Together, these institutions represent a singular process of intergovernmental institutional collaboration that involves the current twenty-five member states and 400 million residents of the Union. How should this procedure be interpreted? In two crucial ways, it obviously diverges from the functionalist ideas

of Mitrany and his associates. The initial goal was, and still is, to establish a new state through the development of international institutions; the intended outcome has always been the con federal Europe that could not be established through direct action. Although some politicians may find it expedient to deny this ambition, particularly in Britain and Scandinavia, it nonetheless remains important, even though there is disagreement over what federalism actually means in this context. In any case, the European institutions were not and are not constructed in accordance with the notion of "form follows function," which is why many integrationists disagree with the quasi-functionalist idea of a "two- or "n"- speed Europe," in which different regions of the Union integrate at various rates. The second variation from functionalism is maybe even more significant in terms of global governance. Similar to functionalism, the goal of institutional cooperation was to grow as states learned that cooperation in one area naturally led to cooperation in another. However, in the European system, this growth or 'spillover' is, and was intended to be, an overtly political process. The political urge to as nearly equalise production and transportation costs as possible is created by the elimination of internal tariffs between member nations.

International financial institutions Bretton Woods and beyond

The EU is the most ambitious modern international institution when it comes to global governance and the undermining of sovereignty, but there are other institutions operating on a global scale that are almost as spectacular. Here, some background history is required. Prior to 1914, the world economy was ostensibly "self-regulating"; however, in reality, British economic power provided some degree of actual regulation. The majority of countries were also on the gold standard, which meant that no complex international monetary institutions were required and trade was largely unrestricted, in line with the principles of economic liberalism which will be covered in more detail in the following chapter. It was intended that this would only be temporary and that the previous liberal international economy would be restored once the war was over. However, this economy collapsed under the weight of the conflict, with the majority of the participants imposing physical controls on exports and imports and leaving the gold standard, breaking the direct link between their currencies and the price of gold. This proved to be impossible, and following a brief period of prosperity in the 1920s, the Wall Street Crash of 1929, and bank failures in Europe in 1930 and 1931, almost every nation enacted strict monetary regulations and high levels of trade protection.

The leader of the previous system, Britain, finally abandoned free trade and followed the example of the extremely protectionist Hawley-Smoot Tariff that the United States Congress had approved in 1929 by leaving the gold standard permanently in 1931 and establishing an Imperial Preferences system in 1932. Between 1929 and 1933, global trade collapsed, falling by the last year to less than one-fourth of its 1929 value. Contrary to, say, the recessions of the 1980s, when commerce actually expanded year over year even while overall output declined, the Great Depression of the 1930s was driven by trade. When the 1930s' economic recovery started, it was based on trade blocs like the Dollar Area, the Sterling Area, the Gold Franc Area, and so on. Bartering was also frequently used, often on the basis of political rather than economic advantage, as in some of the barters arranged by the Nazis in the late 1930s, where Romania would be required to trade its oil for cuckoo clocks and other non-essentials. This entire period was a catastrophe in the collective memory of the global capitalist system, and it is still true that the Great Depression's memory is one of the things that encourages collaboration in the global economy today.

According to some sources, the slump was caused by a lack of leadership since Britain no longer had the capacity and the United States lacked the resolve to do so. In any case, by the middle of

the 1930s, the United States was already leading at international trade conferences. With the start of the war and the emergence of the United States as the world's foremost financial power and the arsenal of democracy, America was in a position to shape the future of the global economy alongside its now subordinate partner, Britain. A commitment to free trade or at least the replacement of physical controls and trade blocs by tariffs and the restoration of convertible currencies through the abolition of currency blocs and exchange controls were both necessary, according to the US perspective, to restore the old liberal order after the war. These distinct organisations would be operational UN agencies that were kept as far away from the Security Council and other UN entities that dealt with 'political' concerns as feasible; in reality, the UN has had no real influence over these bodies. Additionally, the new institutions were to be led by boards of directors and managing directors who would have fixed terms of office and be expected to function rather than act as political representatives, despite being appointed by states in proportion to their relative economic strength - there was no question of "one state, one vote" here. Technical fixes for technical issues would be the focus. Second, these organs were supposed to be more managerial than regulatory. As a result, the World Bank would only have a limited amount of its own money.

Regime theory and global regimes

The intricate interconnectedness model of international relations from the 1970s gave rise to the idea of an international regime, which was a major topic of discussion between neoliberals and neorealists in the 1980s. For the first time, a definition of a regime that is broadly accepted though still somewhat debatable states that it is a collection of "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" Krasner 1983. Consider the current trade regime using Krasner's extensions of the important phrases as an example. The trade regime is founded on the tenets that commerce is beneficial, free trade is superior to restricted trade, and free trade advances peace. These tenets are known as "beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude." These values make up the "embedded liberalism" of the trading regime and continue to operate covertly even when opposing actions are encouraged. The norms of the regime provide these concepts some real-world application as "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations."

Since physical quotas interfere with the market more and have a more discriminatory effect, it is generally accepted that tariffs are a superior method for restricting trade if it is impossible for trade to be free. The WTO Charter, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement MFA and other legal and quasi-legal documents contain the rules also known as "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action" of the trade regime, which outline what these norms entail in detail and list the authorised exceptions to those norms. The WTO meetings, the conference diplomacy of organisations like UNCTAD, and, at a separate level, the trade dispute procedures outlined in the WTO Charter are the focal points of the decision-making procedures also known as "prevailing practises for making and implementing collective choice" in this context. Both explicit and tacit rules, conventions, and decision-making processes exist. Implicit norms are understood without being recorded, whereas explicit rules are recorded somewhere. Thus, even though they are obviously discriminatory, "customs unions" and "free trade areas" like the European Union and the North American Free Trade Area are officially licensed, whereas "voluntary export restraints" VERs are implicitly accepted. VERs are agreements wherein one-party pledges to restrict exports to the other.

These constraints are discriminatory and violate the rules and values of the trade regime, but they are permissible because everyone buys into the lie that they are voluntary. This situation involves an "implicit" regulation of the trading regime, and it is just as significant as the explicit rules outlined in the many treaties that constitute the regime. The key phrase is "around which actors' expectations converge." This is where the real meat of the issue is. The "actors" in global trade companies, states, and individual consumers have expectations about the norms, guidelines, and methods of decision-making that will be used; if these expectations converge, a regime exists; if not, there is none. Converge is a word that was purposefully picked to avoid connotations such as expectations always having to match one another, which they frequently do not do. It also avoids connotations such as rules always being followed, which is also not always the case. Instead, the idea that "expectations converge" implies that most of the time the actors will have similar expectations and most of the time they will be realised. As a result, there is, for instance, a degree of predictability and regularity about trade matters that is appreciably greater than would be expected in the absence of a regime. Regimes are unmistakably viewed as a component of global governance, but despite the WTO's significance in the trade instance, it should be observed that they plainly depart from the BWS's emphasis on institutions. The WTO is significant, but so are other organisations like UNCTAD and the MFA, and unofficial organisations that operate under implicit rules may even have greater significance than the official organisations [7]–[9].

International law and Collective Security

Since issues of security and insecurity have always been at the core of the anarchy problem, as was implied in some detail in earlier chapters, it might have been expected that a chapter on global governance would start by substantively and directly addressing these issues rather than by examining regional cooperation and economic governance. This was something that most theorists of international organisation in the 1920s and 1930s, who saw the creation and re-design of the League of Nations as their main responsibility, as well as the designers of the "Peace Project" in the eighteenth century, would have anticipated. Even after 1945, the "world peace through world law" movement persisted in favouring the direct approach to peace via functionalism and integration theory above reform of the central security institution Clark and Sohn 1966. Frontal attacks on sovereignty through organisations like the League or the UN have actually been among the least effective inventions of the past 100 years. Why is this? And has the track record actually been as poor as this might imply? The doctrine of "collective security," which sought to replace the pre-1914 "self-help" balance of power system with one that involved a commitment by each state to the security of every other state, was the most significant attempt of the 20th century to directly alter how the world handles security issues.

A second "take" on this failure, focusing more on the institutional side and continuing the story into the post-1945 era, is now required. We have already seen in Chapter 2 how this doctrine fared in the 1930s within the context of the theoretical debate between liberal internationalism and realism. The First World War brought about the creation of the League of Nations in 1919, and the Second World War saw the creation of the United Nations from the remains of the League. However, the origins of these organisations can be found much further back in the history of the European state-system. The plural form of "roots" is crucial because one of the main issues with these organisations has always been their attempts to institutionalise and combine two very different traditions with very different normative approaches to the issue of international order and global governance the tradition of the "Peace Project" and the tradition of the "Concert of Europe." The most well-known "Peace Project" was Kant's "Perpetual Peace" of 1795.

However, despite the fact that the term "perpetual peace" was frequently used by those who developed "Peace Projects" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kant's work was actually different from most others Reiss 1970. Even though they varied greatly in terms of detail, the underlying concept of these programmes was obvious Hinsley 1963. The nations of Europe would create a sort of federal assembly or parliament to settle disputes in an effort to end the scourge of war. Projectors had different ideas about things like voting systems and enforcement procedures, but collective decision-making was crucial because states would lose the ability to serve as judges in their own cases. All people would be treated equally under unbiased regulations. Though the 'projectors' were wary of the international lawyers of the day, viewing them as, in Kant's words,'sorry comforters,' that is, apologists for power politics and the rights of nations, international relations would eventually become a field of law rather than a field of power. The approach taken for the Concert of Europe was substantially different.

This idea first surfaced in the nineteenth century through the formal congresses that addressed the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, and then more casually. The purpose of the Concert was to facilitate consultation and, to the greatest extent practicable, policy coordination among the Great Powers on matters of mutual concern. The fundamental notion was that enormous power came with great responsibility. Managing the system in the interests of all parties was something that the enormous Powers should try to achieve, but it was important to remember that the 'common interest' was heavily skewed in favour of the interests of the Great Powers themselves. Sometimes "managing the system" entails maintaining a balance of power among the powerful at the expense of smaller parties, as was the case with the extensive boundary reorganisations that occurred after 1815. It may occasionally not function at all if the great powers were at odds, with Bismarck being one such example [10].

CONCLUSION

The British disagreed; they were no longer free-trade oriented and were committed to the Sterling Area under the leadership of John Maynard Keynes, the radical economist of the 1930s and a convinced protectionist who was now Lord Keynes and a Treasury insider with significant influence over policy. Though strangely, the US intended to remove power issues from institutional systems, US economic power was ultimately too enormous to be resisted. This is rarely feasible, especially when it comes to fundamental economic issues, as was previously mentioned in relation to functionalism. The Bretton Woods System BWS is the name given to the post-World War II economic order that was negotiated when the British and Americans convened in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The BWS adapted in many ways to American ideas. First, efforts were made to "de-politicize" the global economy by assigning different international problems to different organisations. Therefore, trade issues would be handled by the International Trade Organisation ITO, capital transfers would be handled by the World Bank, and monetary and balance of payments problems would be handled by the International Monetary Fund IMF.

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CHAPTER 11
A BRIEF STUDY ON DIPLOMACY

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ABSTRACT
As the last chapter demonstrated, conflict compels and focuses public attention, clearly impacts human lives, and has a significant impact on how our world is shaped. However, despite its significance, diplomacy seldom receives much attention. Carl von Clausewitz, a military thinker, attempted to normalize the concept of war in contemporary politics when he said, in the early 1800s, that "war is the continuation of policy by other means." His remarks also suggested that states may pursue their goals without resorting to war. Diplomats frequently take these kinds of steps. Additionally, their labor is frequently a far better, more efficient, and more predictable tactic than combat. In truth, diplomacy is what we recognise now as the usual state of things governing international interactions, in contrast to centuries before when conflict was widespread. And in the contemporary era, a variety of non-state players, including the European Union and the United Nations, also engage in diplomacy. Many of the traits and elements shared by modern diplomacy, such as embassies, international law, and expert diplomatic services, were absent from them. However, it should be noted that political communities, regardless of how they were set up, have typically discovered means of communication during times of calm and have developed a wide range of practises for doing so. When you consider that diplomacy can encourage interactions that advance trade, culture, prosperity, and knowledge, the advantages become obvious.

KEYWORDS:

Nuclear, Iran, Unuted, Diplomacy, War.

INTRODUCTION

Starting by considering it as a system of structured communication between two or more people will help you comprehend it the simplest. Since at least 2500 years ago, envoys have travelled between nearby civilisations to maintain regular touch. Diplomacy is a process between actors' diplomats, typically representing a state who exist within a system international relation and engage in private and public dialogue diplomacy to pursue their goals in a peaceful manner. Foreign policy must be distinguished from diplomacy, which is not the same thing. It might be beneficial to think of diplomacy as a component of foreign policy. A nation-state makes foreign policy to further its own interests at home. And a variety of circumstances influence these interests. The two main components of a state's foreign policy are, in essence, its actions and its strategy for accomplishing its objectives.

The conduct of a state towards another is regarded as an act of foreign policy. Usually, this activity is accomplished through diplomatic conversations between members of the administration. Without diplomacy, a state's foreign policy would typically be limited to espionage or conflict primarily war, but also through economic sanctions. In that regard, diplomacy is a crucial tool needed to function effectively in the current international system. The majority of diplomacy today, in a system controlled by nations, can therefore be said to be done between states. In actuality, only

nations are mentioned as diplomatic players in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, the applicable international law that controls diplomacy. But there are also strong actors who are not states in the contemporary international order. International governmental organisations IGOs and non-governmental international organisations INGOs frequently fall under this category [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

Describe Diplomacy

These players frequently engage in diplomatic activities and frequently have a major impact on results. For instance, in the case studies discussed later in this chapter, the United Nations and the European Union two IGOs had a tangible influence on diplomacy. Additionally, a variety of INGOs, including Greenpeace, have made significant strides towards treaties and accords in crucial fields related to the well-being and advancement of humanity, such international environmental discussions. Given how commonplace war is in modern life, readers of this book will already have a basic understanding of war; nonetheless, diplomacy may seem foreign or far away. This is a result of what diplomacy is and how it is done, on the one hand. Representatives of states or non-state actors frequently engage in diplomacy, usually behind closed doors. In these situations, diplomacy is a covert procedure carried out by clerical diplomats and representatives in its everyday and frequently quite complex form. Perhaps not the ideal place to introduce newbies about diplomacy is here.

On the other hand, briefings, declarations, or - less frequently - complete disclosures of a Diplomacy 22 diplomatic topic are occasionally made available to the general public. These typically gain attention when they involve important global topics and attract high-ranking people. Examples from this kind of diplomacy are provided in this chapter to provide a more appealing access point because they do make headlines and end up in history books. This chapter will utilise two connected case studies to help the reader understand what diplomacy is and why it is crucial. The first case study focuses on efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States of America US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USSR, also known as the Soviet Union, became the two nuclear-armed superpowers that dominated the second half of the 20th century. Few other nation-states produced nuclear weapons in this stressful environment thanks to diplomatic efforts.

Therefore, the diplomatic achievement of reducing the spread of nuclear weapons is significant and engaged both nation-state and non-state players. The second case study focuses on US-Iran ties. From the end of World War II to the present, this case spans several significant decades. The structure of international relations evolved with the times, frequently leading to substantive changes in the diplomatic patterns between the two countries. By looking at that connection, it is feasible to analyse the significance of the European Union, an international governmental body, in addition to demonstrating the significance of high-level diplomacy between two crucial governments. The case studies were picked because they provide a glimpse of diplomatic relations between nations that had previously been sworn foes and had little in common because of diametrically opposed political, economic, and even religious systems. However, they were able to avert war and find ways to advance in the most important sectors through diplomacy. regulating nuclear weapons After the US dropped its first atomic bomb on Japan in August 1945, everything changed.

The two bombs that the US launched on Nagasaki and Hiroshima completely destroyed both cities, as seen in reports and photos, proving that warfare had changed for good. There is no way to compare the damage from the atomic bomb with anything we have ever seen, as one reporter put it when describing the situation. Atomic bombs leave nothing behind, whereas bombs leave standing the framework of destroyed buildings. Hoffman 1945 23 International Relations While other countries were working on the technology, the US was the first to successfully detonate a nuclear weapon. The Soviet Union 1949 became the second nation to successfully detonate a bomb. Following were China 1964 , the United Kingdom 1952 , and France 1960 . There were valid concerns that these lethal weapons might spread uncontrollably to many other countries as the number of countries with nuclear weapons rose from one to five. There were other factors at play in proliferation.

Weapons that were more advanced than those dropped on Japan grew to be orders of magnitude more destructive, posing a serious threat to all of humanity. Nuclear weapons that could wreak havoc hundreds of kilometres outside of the impact zone had already been developed by the early 1960s. The Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to be a race to possess the most and best bombs, with each country trying to outdo the other. The existence of nuclear weapons on both sides made a traditional battle between the two nearly unthinkable, which is why the Cold battle was so named. They both possessed the ability to completely destroy the other if they were to come into direct confrontation, endangering human civilization as a whole. Despite their offensive capability, nuclear weapons are primarily viewed as defensive instruments and are therefore unlikely to be ever utilised, which may sound surprising. This is because of the idea of deterrence. Such an opponent is unlikely to attack you if you are holding a weapon that can completely eliminate them. Particularly if your weaponry can withstand that attack and still allow you to strike back. Having a nuclear arsenal was a technique to achieve deterrence and a level of security that was otherwise unattainable in a climate as unstable as the Cold War. There was no doubt that states would find this appealing.

Nuclear Weapons Control

Due of this, attempts to establish a global system of nuclear arms restraint during the Cold War seemed futile. To the brink and back The United Nations UN, which was established in 1945, strove in vain to outlaw nuclear weapons in the late 1940s. This was done in part to provide international diplomacy a focal point and to create a more secure world. Following that failure, a number of less rigid objectives were put out, most notably to control nuclear weapon testing. Weapons development required test detonations, and each test exposed ecosystems and people to danger by releasing significant amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. By the late 1950s, high-level diplomacy conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and known as Diplomacy 24 had succeeded in putting an end to nuclear testing by the US and the USSR. However, testing resumed in 1961 as a result of increased tension and an atmosphere of mistrust between the two countries.

The Soviet Union attempted to plant nuclear weapons in Cuba, a small Caribbean Island nation fewer than 150 km off the southern coast of the United States, one year later, in 1962, bringing the world to the verge of nuclear war during what is now known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Following a failed US-sponsored invasion by anti-Castro troops in 1961, Cuban leader Fidel Castro asked for the weaponry to prevent the US from interfering in Cuban affairs. The "two most powerful nations

had been squared off against one another, each with its finger on the button," as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev described it in 1962, "each with its finger on the button."

Back from the brink

After pushing each other to the breaking point, US president John F. Kennedy and Khrushchev discovered that they might agree to a compromise through diplomacy that met the other's fundamental security demands. Over the course of several agreements, Soviet missiles were taken out of Cuba in exchange for the United States taking their missiles out of Turkey and Italy. Due to their antagonism, the two sides could not entirely rely on one another, thus the diplomacy was built on the idea of verification by the UN, which independently checked for compliance. After the immediate Cuban crisis was handled, high-level negotiations went on. A direct hot line was set up connecting the Pentagon in Washington and the Kremlin in Moscow because neither nation wanted another severe breakdown in communication to happen [4]–[6].

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation

Building on this momentum, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which only allowed nuclear testing at subterranean facilities, was ratified in July 1963. Even though the answer wasn't ideal, it represented progress. And in this instance, it was motivated by the desire of the leaders of two superpowers to defuse a dangerous situation. The faith Kennedy and Khrushchev had in developing diplomacy was crucial in the course of the Cold War and permitted additional progress in identifying points of agreement, notwithstanding the mixed results of the early attempts to manage nuclear weapons. As the superpowers attempted to engage in diplomatic dialogue with one another on a number of subjects, including a significant arms limitation treaty, Cold War diplomacy reached a high watermark phase in the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis, which became known as a time of 'détente' between the superpowers. Progress on nuclear proliferation was also made in that environment.

America and Iran

The Non-Proliferation Treaty the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons 1970, also known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT, entered into force at the beginning of the 1970s, building on prior advancements. The Treaty aimed to divert nuclear technology towards peaceful purposes and acknowledge the destabilising impact that increased nuclear weapon proliferation would have on the global society. It was a diplomatic victory. The treaty's genius lay in the fact that it took into account the current state of world affairs. It was not a disarmament agreement since major states refused to give up their nuclear arsenals out of concern for their security. Therefore, the Non-Proliferation Treaty attempted to maintain the number of nuclear-armed states at the five that already had them the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China, rather than pursuing the unattainable objective of eliminating them. In order to prevent them from becoming enticed to develop nuclear weapons, those five nations were simultaneously urged to share non-military nuclear technologies with other countries, such as civilian nuclear energy. In other words, nuclear weapons owners might keep them.

The non-military research and development of the current nuclear powers would be made available to those who lacked them. The pact has been acknowledged to be extremely successful as a result of its well-thought-out design and implementation. The Nonproliferation Treaty was officially extended in 1995 when the Cold War ended. Although the number of nuclear-armed states has not

been reduced to five, it is still less than ten, which is much less than the twenty or more predicted by officials on both sides of the Atlantic when the treaty went into effect in 1970.

The hostage situation in Iran

States who had just begun developing nuclear weapons programmes, like Brazil and South Africa, gave them up in order to sign the treaty in response to international pressure. Only a few states are currently outside of its boundaries. Israel, Pakistan, and India all rejected membership because of their contentious nuclear ambitions, which they were unwilling to give up for reasons of national security. In 2003, when North Korea decided to revive past intentions to acquire nuclear weapons, they withdrew from the deal rather than break it, underscoring the importance of the Non-Proliferation deal. North Korea is still the only country that has left the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The fact that North Korea is still trying to proliferate despite international pressure is the best example of how imperfect the non-proliferation regime is. It is also a biassed system because some countries are permitted to possess nuclear weapons merely because they were the first to create them. This is still the case, regardless of how these countries behave. However, despite the fact that humanity has created the ultimate weapon in the nuclear bomb, diplomacy has been successful in controlling its spread. The world community always reacts with widespread worry when a country is said to be working on a nuclear weapon, as in the case of Iran.

Iran's nuclear program

In IR, concepts that are accepted as norms are known as norms. One of the main conventions supporting our international order is non-proliferation, which is a result of deft diplomacy from decades past. Iran and the United States Iran found itself in a geostrategic hotspot after the Second World War. It served as a geographical barrier to any Soviet incursions into the Middle East because it shared a lengthy border with the Soviet Union to the north. The Persian Gulf, which encompasses a larger portion of Iran, is where the world's greatest known oil reserves are found. A consistent supply of this resource was essential for sustaining Western-oriented economies. Iran, which is often considered to be a weak and impoverished state, was therefore deemed relevant due to a confluence of time, place, politics, and economics. The United States and the British collaborated to engineer a clandestine coup in 1953 to reinstate Iran's king, known as the Shah, who had been marginalised by a strong left-leaning administration. During the Cold War, the United States worried that left-leaning political trends would lead to a communist revolution at home or an alliance with the Soviet Union, which was communist. Because of this, the United States occasionally intervened to stop the development of communism.

The coup marked a turning point in US-Iranian relations. As a result, the Shah established a pattern of tight ties with the US that would persist for 25 years in a volatile region. The United States and Soviet Union's geostrategic rivalry during the Cold War was not the only cause of this volatility. Decolonization and the ensuing phenomena of Arab nationalism, regional opposition to the establishment of Israel, and a significant ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan all contributed to a number of crises in the wider region. This part of the planet was extremely unstable to live in both then and now. Iran has always aspired to higher status internationally, or at the very least regional domination, notwithstanding many expressions of its internal shape and character. For instance, the Shah had lofty ambitions for Iran to become the leading country in the Middle East before his dictatorial reign was overthrown by the 1979 revolution that overthrew his government and established the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States, which provided Iran with cutting-edge non-nuclear weapons while the Shah was in power, shared this ambition.

The United States thought that by backing the Shah, he would be able to expand and consolidate Iranian power in order to contribute to regional stability. Iran currently shares many similarities with Iran under the Shah, including its existence within the same borders and its composition of similar ethnic groups. The role that Iran intended to play regionally and globally under the Shah, however, was essentially in line with American priorities, but the one that the Islamic Republic of Iran envisions is profoundly adverse to nearly 27 International Relations every aspect of American politics. As a result of their history and the different routes they have taken, the US and Iran have ties that are full of insight and intrigue. The Iran Hostage Crisis We don't need to look too far back to an incident known as the Iran Hostage Crisis to establish a link between our US-Iran case study and the topic of diplomacy. A group of Iranian students broke into the US Embassy in Tehran, the nation's capital, in November 1979 and took hostages among the staff members they discovered. This happened after the exiled Shah settled in New York to receive cancer treatment. The demonstrators wanted his return so that he might be tried for various crimes his dictatorship had perpetrated, such torturing political dissidents.

In order to use the prisoners as a negotiating leverage, the majority of whom were US diplomats, their release was demanded in exchange for the Shah's release. When the hostage-taking was sanctioned by Iran's new government, headed by the exiled anti-Shah cleric Ruhollah Khomeini, the United States and Iran found themselves in uncharted seas. Despite being located on foreign soil, an embassy is not open to the host state's citizens without their permission due to established diplomatic protocol. As a result, when the Iranian demonstrators broke into the US Embassy in Tehran, they transgressed a fundamental principle of diplomacy that had been evolved over many years to give ambassadors the freedom to conduct their jobs. This is the reason why Julian Assange, the creator of WikiLeaks, was able to avoid being arrested by British police by moving into a rather normal-looking terraced house in London.

The house is actually the Embassy of Ecuador, and police were refused admission. Unbelievably, police officers were then posted outside the door ready to apprehend Assange should he chose to escape. This operation cost the British public millions of pounds. The Assange case demonstrates how highly esteemed such diplomatic traditions are by nations and how rarely these changes over time - even when those states are at war. Iran's disdain for accepted diplomatic norms was surprising and excessive in this situation. Not only did it go against accepted diplomatic norms, but the Geneva Conventions also classify hostage-taking by a state as a war crime. As was to be expected, the United States rejected Iran's demands, and the hostage situation developed into a tense diplomatic standoff that lasted 444 days. It made Iran an international pariah because the world was outraged at its disrespect for both human decency and the rules of the international community as it paraded the hostages in front of TV cameras while shackled and gagged. It also signalled a new anti-Western political direction for objected, saying its programme was only intended for civil and peaceful uses.

However, few did so because of Iran's reputation abroad. It was a stressful time since the United States had just declared its "Global War on Terrorism" in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The United States had little interest in engaging Iran in nuclear negotiations in 2002. As part of its drive to purge the Middle East of regimes that would provide a haven for international terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, the US had already invaded Afghanistan in late 2001 and was poised to invade Iraq in early 2003. The United States also had a more significant objective to bring about a regime change in Iran, which it saw as the primary state sponsor of terrorism in the world. According to that reasoning, if the main terrorist in the

world was not the objective of the war on terror, it would be pointless. This would be accomplished by the US invading Iran's neighbours to show off its power; note that Iran's eastern and western borders are shared by Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. The Iranian government would then be under internal pressure to reform on its own initiative, and another revolution might even be sparked as a result. If that didn't work, the US was prepared to engage Iran in some way in order to destroy its nuclear research facilities and perhaps organise a military-led regime transition, as it had done in Iraq and Afghanistan. President George W. Bush's oft-repeated statement that "all options are on the table" while dealing with Iran best captures this; it is further explained by the passage from the following official government document behavior [7]–[9].

CONCLUSION

Due to the absence of a major war since 1945, the modern age is frequently referred to as the "long peace" Gaddis 1989. As a result, the complexity of diplomacy has increased. A description of diplomacy today shouldn't be based on activities taken to prevent or end a war between states. Today, diplomacy is essential to ensuring that our long period of peace continues and that the world in which we live is as conducive as possible to the advancement of both the person and the state. As the world is more interconnected and interdependent than ever, effective and shrewd diplomacy is essential to ensure that humanity can navigate an ever-growing list of shared challenges like climate change, pandemics, transnational terrorism, and nuclear proliferation that could be our downfall if left unresolved. These challenges include pandemics, pandemics, transnational terrorism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, even while you might not be familiar with the names of many people involved in diplomatic efforts or see much of their labour in the media, their work is more crucial than ever to all of us. The Iranian government backs terrorism, threatens Israel, tries to impede Middle East peace, sabotages Iraqi democracy, and suppresses the freedom aspirations of its own people. Only if the Iranian dictatorship decides to reverse these policies, open up its democratic system, and provide its people freedom will the nuclear issue and our other issues ultimately be handled. The ultimate objective of American policy is this. In the interim, we'll keep taking all essential precautions to safeguard our economic and national security from the negative repercussions of their awful

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CHAPTER 12

DIGITAL DIPLOMACY AND ONLINE ACTIVISM

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ABSTARCT

Cross-border pollution poses many of the same problems as intra-border pollution, including how to cost what economists refer to as "externalities," whether to view pollution control as a general charge on taxation or something that can be handled on the basis that the polluter pays, and other issues. Cleaning up the Rhine which flows through several states is more complicated than cleaning up the Thames, but poses the same sort of problems. Once the issue is acknowledged, capitalist economies deal with questions of this nature less frequently than one might anticipate. Although private ownership can impede collective action, it also makes it theoretically possible to identify and hold responsible those responsible for environmental deterioration. The post-communist states, which inherited dead rivers and urban industrial nightmares, have reason to be aware, draw an interesting comparison between the present situation and the far greater difficulties communist industrial powers encountered in controlling direct pollution. In those cases, 'public ownership' provided a justification for ignoring problems of a similar nature. The second factor, a growing awareness that there might be "limits to growth," was of greater long-term relevance and contributed to the increased prominence of environmental issues. It was maintained that the continued rapid consumption of materials whose supply was, by definition, finite was essential to industrial civilisation. Fuels based on hydrocarbons that were produced over millions of years were being used up in a matter of decades.

KEYWORDS:

Cross-border pollution, Externalities, Globalization, Environmental deterioration, Industrial civilisation.

INTRODUCTION

Given that Strange doesn't actually give a solution, this is a powerful argument—and a somewhat bleak one. The topic of a global central bank, which is particularly interesting to Strange, has already been briefly discussed and will be revisited later in the context of "humanitarian intervention". Instead, the focus will be on environmental degradation, which is both a grave problem and highly illuminating in terms of what it tells us about modern IR. The control of local economic activity and natural resources is one of the fundamental tenets of old international law. Modern political forms have been territorial since at least the seventeenth century, and territoriality involves a claim of ownership over 172 Understanding International Relations natural resources. This is in contrast to, for example, some mediaeval institutions. Furthermore, it was inevitable that when capitalist economies evolved during the same time period, "ownership" would not be regarded as "stewardship," but rather as "dominion" in the advanced industrial countries. Landowners, the government, and potentially even the populace at least in contemporary welfare capitalist societies were able to profit from the exploitation of natural resources. Even in this case, however, "the people" refers to "citizens of the state in question" and not to "people generally" because, until relatively recently, it would have seemed impossible for a state to be held globally

responsible for economic activities carried out on its territory. Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this mindset started to shift. First, it became evident that certain types of economic activity might have fairly significant impacts outside the boundaries of the state in issue. The "acid rain" phenomena is an example of this, as is deforestation [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

New world issues a "Westfailure"?

This is a topic that could be discussed for a very long time, but we need to move on and look at some of the specific issues that globalisation has brought up. The main problem in this situation is how our current global political structure seems unable to address the issues brought on by globalisation. Susan Strange, a British academic who detested the later term, gave an excellent analysis of the situation in her final paper, "The Westfailure System," which was published after her death. She makes the uncontroversial argument that sovereign governments with the exclusive right to use force inside a given region grew up in harmony with a capitalist market economy. However, she goes on to assert that the latter today presents issues that cannot be resolved within the parameters provided by the former. These issues specifically relate to the global credit/finance system, which is a cause of ongoing, unresolvable crises because states are unwilling to delegate authority to an international central bank; the sovereignty system's incapacity to address environmental degradation because the absence of authoritative decision-making and effective enforcement undermines collective action; and the humanitarian failures brought on by both the world's inequalities, which are a source of ongoing, unresolvable crises;

In other words, she contends that Westphalia is a "Westfailure" since the system has not been able to meet the long-term requirements for sustainability. generated by industrial pollutants that originated in Britain, Germany, or the United States, for instance, in Scandinavia or Canada. Despite the fact that they are major concerns, they don't present any particularly intriguing theoretical challenges. In concept renewable resources like wood and agricultural products were in short supply because demand was rising faster than supply, which could lead to shortages in the future. The problem with these relatively gloomy forecasts was that, unlike conditions like acid rain, they raised doubts about the likelihood of continuous and sustained economic expansion, which is the main engine and foundation of modern industrial civilization.

The politics of the advanced industrial nations would be dramatically reshaped by such a challenge if it were to be sustained, but the 'developing' world would face far greater difficulties because it was, if anything, even more dependent on the positive effects of global economic growth than the rich world. In actuality, these issues were postponed for a while. The 1970s economic crisis decreased the need for raw materials, while new technical developments like the microprocessor revolution required less material input than older technologies did. The 'limits to growth' predictions were, in any case, likely overly pessimistic and, moreover, and happily, self-defeating, since they focused minds to a much larger amount on energy conservation, recycling, and the creation of new resources. We have obviously still got a long way to go before we hit the boundaries of growth in the sense that the phrase was used back then. However, the discussions of the 1970s served as a valuable practise run for the genuine issues that surfaced in the 1980s and 1990s. Similar challenges to the civilization of productivity are posed by climatic changes such as ozone layer depletion and global warming, rising water levels, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and the desertification of large portions of Africa. The key distinction is that these challenges are much better supported by scientific opinion and much less amenable to piecemeal solutions. If we,

or "our" states, can muster the willpower to do so, it actually does seem feasible that "we," all of us, may have to modify the way we live.

It is instructive to look at the situation of chlorofluorocarbons CFCs, which damage the ozone layer. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, the protocols of Montreal in 1987 and London in 1990, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNCED in Rio in 1992, and a number of subsequent forums, particularly Kyoto in , all attest to the importance that people place on ozone depletion and the requirement to reduce CFC emissions. How did this perception come about is an interesting issue? It is obvious that there are some very good if shortsighted reasons why states might decide against addressing this issue. Although they are harmful, the technologies used to make CFCs are unquestionably less expensive than the alternatives. Developing nations who want to promote increasing refrigeration use want to adopt the least expensive technology available, which produces CFCs; developed nations are also hesitant to stop using technologies that they have grown to rely on.

Everyone has a long-term stake in keeping the earth's protective layer intact, but everyone also has a short-term stake in not taking the initiative in this area. Although few would consider the international community's response as entirely satisfactory, the issue is at least on the agenda. This is a classic collective action problem that is notoriously difficult to address. Why? Where did it come from? The consensus among scientists that it was an issue that could no longer be avoided seems to be the reason why it arrived at that point. Based on this consensus, governments were lobbied and, frequently unwillingly, persuaded that they had to take action. This is an illustration of an intriguing new development in international relations the formation of multinational "pressure" groups, whose power comes from having access to highly specialised technical expertise rather than more traditional political resources. To describe these organisations, Peter Haas coined the term "epistemic communities" in 1989.

It is obvious that they can be quite effective under the correct conditions; governments can be persuaded that their only choice is to act in accordance with the consensus of science. The basic influence exercised by epistemic communities arises simply from their ability, or at least the public's belief in their ability, to provide a dominant interpretation of the nature of the problem. There may frequently be a barely disguised political threat here act or we will reveal to the public your willingness to expose them to life-threatening risk but this is not what drives the majority of their influence. Epistemic communities are important, but their importance shouldn't be overstated. To be effective, they need the proper circumstances, which include a near-consensus among the knowledge holders who are relevant and a problem that does not affect the fundamental interests of nations. The absence of democratic legitimacy in epistemic communities is an intriguing characteristic.

The story of Greenpeace International stands out because it is frequently cited as an example of a pressure group that uses scientific knowledge to advance its cause in international civil society. Large swathes of Western public opinion value Greenpeace scientists highly and take their advice seriously. The Brent Spar affair of 1995 is a case in point, when a Greenpeace campaign involving a public relations blitz and consumer boycotts succeeded in overturning a decision by Shell and the British Government to scuttle the Brent Spar oil platform in the open sea. They have the ability to achieve quite significant political successes. However, what is intriguing and, in some cases, potentially sinister is that the unelected, unaccountable Greenpeace scientists were able to sway public opinion and override the wishes of a democratically elected government and its scientific

advisors. It turned out that Greenpeace's calculations were flawed, and it is still debatable whether disposal at sea was the most environmentally sound strategy.

Resilience and the Security of Global Health

There is an additional irony in this situation despite the fact that many of Greenpeace's followers hold a highly doubtful opinion of the authority of science in general, it is the public's lack of cynicism on this topic that lends the organisation its influence. Moving away from epistemic communities, environmental politics have had a significant influence on the normative question of global justice, most significantly Globalisation by bringing to light the conflicts between theories of justice that emphasise local concerns and those that emphasise global issues. Around a generation ago, it was simpler to understand the problem of global inequality and the solution to the world's poverty, though, of course, taking actual action to eradicate poverty was a different story. The consensus in favour of "development" ranged from free-market liberals to dependency theorists via old-style Marxists. Poor states were 'underdeveloped' and thus needed to 'develop'; there were intense debates about whether development was possible under the current global economic system, but the goal itself was less at issue. Simply put, this developmentalist viewpoint was most recently expressed in the Washington Consensus.

The one thing we know for sure about the future is that it will not involve a global industrial civilization where the developing nations become developed and possess advanced industrial economies on the model of the West in the 1950s and 1960s. Or, at the very least, if such a future does come into existence, the price paid will be intolerable unless some quite extraordinary technological advancements are made. Where does this leave those nations, whose current status is such that even the scenario of a raped and pillaged environment might rate as an improvement? If the dream of development has turned into a nightmare. There appears to be a stark contrast between the demands and interests of the entire world and those of specific nations. On the one hand, it is obvious that applying the Western model of industrial development to China, the Indian subcontinent, Africa, and Latin America would be disastrous for everyone, including the residents of those regions. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that the governments of the South will favour this approach unless they are given strong enough incentives to take a different course. If the eventual outcome is a world in which the peoples and governments of the North are permitted to keep the undeniable benefits of an industrial civilization denied to the South, then no such incentive plan is likely to succeed [4], [5].

On the other hand, it is equally obvious that action must be taken to reduce carbon emissions in the United States, which has refused to sign or ratify the Kyoto Accords and which continues to oppose taxing petrol at levels that would discourage waste - and even permits the ubiquitous Sport Utility Vehicle SUV to flout those controls on waste materials from auto exhausts that are already in place. The problems in both of these cases are not the result of special interests or political elites; rather, they are caused by ordinary people who want affordable refrigeration in China and affordable petrol, central heating and air conditioning in the US. While some oil companies have lobbied against Kyoto in the latter case, the failure to ratify that treaty is largely due to the fact that no Senator wants to face their constituents after endorsing major treaties. Understanding International Relations 176 This issue goes against the foundational principles of the established rules of the contemporary international system. The governing presumption of this order is that individual nations have the right to independently pursue their own ideas of the Good without

interference from outside forces, and that the system's rules are intended to encourage coexistence rather than problem-solving.

The threat posed by environmental destruction is one way in which this guiding principle is in jeopardy. It is a classic case of "Westfailure" in which the rise of a global industrial civilization appears to have outpaced the political structures at our disposal. One solution to this circumstance has, somewhat ironically, been to broaden the definition of security, one of the central ideas of the previous Westphalian system. In the post-Cold War era, as concern over military security has waned, a broader conception of security has emerged, promoted by the "Copenhagen School," whose leading figures include Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, and the Critical Security Studies movement, whose most prominent members can be found at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. The new security studies are concerned with issues that pose a threat to people's safety, such as the denial of human rights, mistreatment and persecution based on gender or sexual orientation, and the privations of starvation and poverty. Copenhagen and Aberystwyth are both aware that there is a question regarding whether it is actually appropriate to "securitize" these issues.

It could be argued that securitization induces highly inappropriate reactions to some of these problems. For instance, the way that asylum-seekers have been vilified as "bogus" in a lot of recent political discourse in Britain may reflect the idea that these innocent individuals are represented as posing some kind of threat. In the case of the main topic of this section, it could be argued that the impact of securitizing the environment actually makes the problem of environmental degradation more difficult to solve because the tendency might be to view other people's behaviour as a threat to oneself, and thus, mentally and possibly physically, to blame others for the cost of change rather than treating this as a common problem for humanity as a whole. Globalisation 177 It may also be argued that in our contemporary "risk society," placing an undue focus on security is incorrect; instead, it may be more important to learn how to live creatively with uncertainty than to spend too much time worrying about the types of secure identities that can no longer be maintained back. This may be a fascinating entry point for a discussion of the broader societal effects of globalisation.

The world's civic society?

Some sociologists have discussed how much globalisation has altered our ideas of society, as Beck's Risk Society concept demonstrates, but for the purposes of this book, a more crucial question is whether there is an emerging truly global society and, if so, what is its nature. The first of these questions has received favourable responses from numerous authors and schools of thought, and there is now a growing body of literature on the concept of "global civil society," including the incredibly helpful Global Civil Society Yearbook. The idea of 'civil society' first appears in eighteenth-century philosophy and refers to a social space that organises itself independently of and maybe in opposition to the state and the extended family, the two social institutions that previously dominated human existence. This idea was created by Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and, in a different method, G.

In response to the fall of communism, which many believed had been inadequate precisely because it systematically denied the idea of such a place, W. F. Hegel was revitalised in the 1980s and early 1990s. Parallel to the establishment of the institutions of global governance discussed in Chapter 7, the concept of a "global civil society" also emerged. While the institutions serve as a stand-in for the state, the existence of informal, non-state, transnational pressure groups often in the environmental field but also encompassing human rights, animal rights, the anti-global capitalist

movement, pro-capitalist groupings like Davos and Bilderberg, religious movements, transnational political parties, and so on and their reinforcement as a universal phenomenon by cross-cult organisations also serve to define global civil society. This last argument is crucial since one of the most noticeable aspects of our world is the existence of global branding and global media. The McDonald's arches have come to represent a single global brand, though Starbucks has since supplanted McDonald's as a more sophisticated example of global branding. The Nike's woosh' is also well-known, and some contend that Michael Jordan, the basketball-playing symbol of Nike, is the most recognisable man on the planet except in the UK, where basketball hasn't yet established itself as a popular spectator sport LaFeber. This description of the world's civil society has a few aspects that are noteworthy page 178 of Understanding International Relations.

First, it should be recognised that the majority of international pressure groups and almost all global brands come from a very limited number of nations in the sophisticated industrial world. Regarding the first point, it is undeniable that the notions of a globalisation of foreign culture and 'Americanization' have converged. It has become customary for opponents of globalisation to view these forces as the instruments of American cultural imperialism; trashing a McDonald's or a Starbucks has become the twenty-first-century equivalent of the traditional protest of attacking the local AmericInn; the majority of global brands are undoubtedly American in origin, as are most of the players in the infotainment business although in the Arab world the Al Jazeera network has eclipsed CNN and the BBC.

The globalisation of the world, however, poses a greater threat to American culture than to other cultures; whereas French bistros and cafés will continue to exist, the American roadside diner is swiftly vanishing. The success of McDonald's in many parts of the world rests precisely on the standardisation of quality despised by gourmets; the assurance that the hamburgers they are eating are made of materials that pass rigorous health tests is a major attraction for many consumers in parts of the world where this cannot always be guaranteed. In parenthesis, it is important to remember the extent to which global brands actually extend choice and improve quality. Similar to how Americans and Britons who appreciate decent coffee should be grateful that chains like Starbucks and the Seattle Coffee Company exist.

The success of global businesses ultimately depends on the consumer, and even when the consumer behaves for reasons that are not as rational as those here attributed to British coffee drinkers, there is no excuse for not respecting their decisions. The fact that the transnational organisations at the centre of the idea of global civil society are typically Western in origin may be more significant in the long run. These organisations typically assert that they are working on behalf of the world's poor and dispossessed, and they frequently carry out vital and required tasks. Nevertheless, there is a de haut en bas quality to this action, with Lady Bountiful giving aid to the peasants. The fact that these groups are distinct in kind from their immediate predecessors accentuates this sensation. International organisations like the Red Cross made a point of their neutrality and non-judgemental approaches to conflict, sometimes taking this attitude to extremes, as in the case of the Red Cross's refusal to comment on the Nazi death-camps in the Second World War and instead focusing on the conditions of regular Prisoners of War [6]–[8].

New organisations, like Médecins Sans Frontières MSF, are explicitly political and aim to act as international advocates for those who are suffering, which invariably involves meddling in local politics. MSF was founded by French doctors as a breakaway from the Red Cross during the Biafra conflict in the late 1960s. A second set of inquiries regarding the world's civil society are brought

up by globalisation. The groups that make up this organisation are literally irresponsible; this does not mean that they act carelessly, but rather that they are accountable to no one. The original concept of civil society included the presumption of an effective state, which would prohibit any one group from wielding excessive power. However, this limitation is far less clear at the international level. MSF and Greenpeace International, among other organisations, frequently operate above democratically elected governments in order to wield as much influence as they can. Although Greenpeace International is just as capable of getting the science wrong as anyone else, progressives of good will may not be overly concerned about the activities of these specific organisations. However, global civil society is not only made up of progressive organisations; fascists, drug dealers, and religious extremists also form transnational organisations and are less benign, while it is not just organisations like Greenpeace that can use such tactics. In the same way that British truckers who blockaded power plants in the Autumn of 2000 in opposition to environmentally friendly taxes on petrol consumption were members of global civil society, French farmers who blockade roads throughout France to defend agricultural subsidies that are detrimental to the interests of developing nations are also doing so.

Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, so well-intentioned protesters who brazenly flout the law in the sake of, in their opinion, the greater good shouldn't be surprised when others employ the same strategies for various goals. However, despite being intriguing given the progressive backgrounds of most of its proponents, the fact that global civil society may be deeply anti-democratic and patronising to the poor does not solve the fundamental problem of how large this phenomenon actually is. Does the idea of a global civil society actually have any capacity for explanation? Sociologists from the "Stanford School" contend that global society is progressively influencing nation-state identities, institutions, and behaviours, and that "world culture celebrates, expands, and standsa1dises strong but culturally somewhat tamed national actors" Meyer et al. 1997. Three aspects of the current international order, which will be covered in the next three chapters, must be taken into consideration before the global civil society can accomplish much.

First of all, while globalization, understanding International Relations fosters uniformity, it also fosters opposition to it. A new global politics of identity is developing. Second, if a global civil society is to arise, it must be based on some sort of normative framework, maybe in international law and the global human rights system. Before continuing, however, a point that has been sidestepped throughout this chapter must now be addressed what exactly is globalisation? The first of Jan Aart Scholte's central hypotheses on the topic is as follows "Globalisation is a transformation of social geography marked by the growth of supraterritorial spaces but globalisation does not entail the end of territorial geography; territoriality and supraterritoriality coexist in complex interrelations" Scholte 2000. As we have seen, the initial definition and the qualifier hit the nail on the head.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental idea for both groups is that "security" is an ontological situation, that of feeling secure, which at any given time may be under threat from a number of different ways, regardless of whether the referent object of security is an individual, group, state, or nation. A clear example of this is an external military threat, but others include ozone layer loss, widespread unemployment, large-scale drug trafficking, criminal activity, and the influx of numerous migrants into a country. Additionally, because people are part of communities, their security is also affected by these dangers. Perhaps more significantly, however, is the possibility that the state itself could

pose a threat to an individual's security. Although it should be emphasised that English School writers on the concept of International Society also talk about the "taming" of national actors, this is a fairly strong argument. 'Cultural taming' is a good, if euphemistic, term to describe this process. In the nineteenth century, this was known as imposing the 'standards of civilization' on regimes that did not uphold the rule of law or respect property rights in ways that the members of the, then primarily European, society of states considered adequate.

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CHAPTER 13

A BRIEF STUDY ON GLOBALIZATION

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ABSTARCT

A realistic description of this rate of change would be "runaway world". It should be highlighted that most of this growth is not being motivated by a necessity. For word processing, e-mail, Internet access, and spreadsheet use that is, for the tasks for which most people purchase PCs high processing speeds are largely irrelevant, and large memories are only required due to the existence of complex programmes that contain features that most people do not need, as well as ongoing operating system upgrades, the advantages of which are, once more, dubious for regular users. The fact that Bill Gates of Microsoft is really a businessman rather than a scientist or engineer rather than the one person who is the most potent emblem of the new technology is not without significance. Although it might be argued that the technology has now advanced to the point where the dynamic is self-sustaining, it is worldwide business that is advancing it. The way people live in the modern industrial world has already undergone a change as a result of the new technologies. The vast majority of this book's readers will be Globalisation engaged in education in some capacity, and they will already be familiar with the ways in which the Internet can be used to disseminate knowledge. International collaboration is simpler than ever thanks to the World Wide Web and e-mail, where researchers may share their discoveries. However, not just the intellectual proletariat has seen a change in their lives; the person who reads your petrol metre.

KEYWORDS:

Economy, Globalization, Globaloney, International, Self-Sustaining.

INTRODUCTION

The 'globaloney' is really annoying, but the typical professional distortion of the IR professor, which is to deny that anything ever changes, or even might change on this side of the apocalypse, is almost equally erroneous. However, it would be truly extraordinary if the significant changes in how everyday people live around the world did not have some bearing on both international relations and the theories, we develop to understand these relations. It may well be that some aspects of human nature do not change, and that is why, for example, Thucydides or Hobbes are still helpful guides to the darker side of social life. Therefore, the task is to maintain composure, which entails acknowledging change while also recognising continuity and constantly remembering that this is an unequal and divided world. As a result, things that seem important to the wealthy and powerful are unlikely to be perceived in the same way by the poor and weak, and any account of globalisation that fails to consistently emphasise this fact will be radically lacking.

In light of all of this, this chapter will be divided into four sections. The evolution of the global economy is crucial to any logical explanation of globalisation, a fact that the hyperglobalizers got right despite getting so many other things wrong. To start, the political economy of globalisation needs to be explored. Second, it's important to evaluate how this change has affected the political economy ideas covered in the previous chapter. Third, it is necessary to explain the issues that the

old Westphalian system cannot address as a result of the processes of worldwide change; international environmental deterioration is a clear but not only focus here. Last but not least, it's important to investigate the alleged establishment of a worldwide civil society. Is it true that common consumer habits and global media are fostering the emergence of a new, truly global social order?

DISCUSSION

A fresh economy

A few significant shifts in the global economy over the past 25 years were discussed at the conclusion of the previous chapter, most notably the increasing importance of large corporations operating as "multinationals" and integrating production on a global scale, as well as the emergence of a 24-hour, integrated, global capital market produced by the fusion of national capital markets. The impetus driving these changes, which has been the information technology sectors' explosive expansion, has made all the difference. These transformations, or more simply the establishment of an integrated global economy, are at the heart of any explanation of 97lobalization. In the field of information technology IT, change is occurring at an astounding rate. 'Moore's Law,' named after the co-founder of Intel, Gordon Moore, predicts that the performance of processors will double every 18 to 24 months; physical constraints on what can be done with silicon may put an end to this process within the next decade, but 'molecular electronics may extend exponential growth into the 2050s Overton 2000.

As one technology reaches its saturation point, another one replaces it. This is true of the number of personal computers PCs, mobile phones, and users of e-mail and the Internet. When repairs your refrigerator, the data will be downloaded to a laptop, modem, and mobile phone, and you may buy replacement parts in the same way. Many professions and occupations experience de-skilling and re-skilling; some things get harder and require more skills, like when bank tellers stop manually adding up the day's transactions and shop assistants stop using their cash registers. Other things get easier and require fewer skills, like when fridge repairmen didn't need basic IT skills ten years ago. All of this has happened in the past ten years; even fundamental innovations like the photocopier, fax machine, and word processor are only 25 years old. Today's students look at you with blank incomprehension when you describe how mimeos were "run off" in the 1970s.

All of this occurs in the developed world; on the overall, the rise of IT has had a significant impact on rich-poor relations, highlighting the distinctions between countries and continents, but not in a way that would allow for the South to once again be spoken of as a distinct entity. The rich world is home to approximately 19 out of every 20 Internet users and has three-quarters of the world's telephone lines, which is the single most significant indicator of the ability to employ new technology. However, there are differences elsewhere as well. For example, although Thailand is not yet a developed nation, it is thought to have more mobile phone users than all of sub-Saharan Africa. Even the relatively affluent citizens of African cities cannot consistently access the Internet via the faulty telephone lines at their disposal, however this segment of the population will profit in the near future from the introduction of low-cost satellite phones.

On the perimeter of the global economy, however, there have been a few glaring winners. India's "Silicon Valley" in and around Bangalore has benefited greatly from the presence of a well-educated, English-speaking population that is conveniently located a number of time zones away from the US; software problems can be passed from New York and Los Angeles at the end of the

American working day in the hope that solutions can be found overnight to Indian programmers – and many Indian programmers have made successful careers in the US as valued migrants. It is a sure bet that the service centre in South India will take your call for assistance if the computer you purchased in the UK develops a problem because the call was rerouted across the Internet. Speaking of peripherals, New Zealand has one of the highest rates of Internet usage worldwide [1]–[3].

Retraining and downs killing of IR

The main characteristics of the political economy of globalisation become clear when you combine the impact of IT with the trend towards a globally connected economy 166 Understanding International Relations. They are the production's dematerialization and disembedding. Dematerialization refers to the idea that the most cutting-edge aspects of modern capitalism involve manipulating symbols rather than producing actual products, which is increasingly done in the more politically stable regions of the old South. US Steel and General Motors used to represent American global dominance; today, Microsoft, Intel, Time-Warner, and Disney do so, while the majority of the physical items they are still engaged with, like Intel's Pentium chips, are produced outside of the US.

By realising there was more money to be earned from creating the operating systems used by computers than from creating the computers themselves, Bill Gates transformed Microsoft into a global powerhouse in the early 1980s. The once-dominant IBM let him rule the software market and almost went out of business. Gates almost made the same error in the 1990s, permitting the birth of a rival Internet browser. As a result, Microsoft's attempt to eliminate Netscape immediately resulted in an antitrust lawsuit, which may perhaps lead to the company's partial demise. Google, a search engine that works with both Netscape and Internet Explorer, was established as a public corporation in August 2004 and was initially valued at about $25 billion. The next step after dematerialization is disembodying.

When the products were tangible goods, the location of the manufacturing process was important and the concept of a national economy was still tenable. Is it still the situation? It is possible to overstate the degree to which national economies have vanished. Even your new BMW, Mercedes, or Saab will be made out of many components imported from lower wage economies, as Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson have eloquently and persuasively argued, there are still a lot of actual material things being produced in the advanced industrial world. However, these products are frequently top-of-the-line, niche products rather than genuine mass market goods. However, the integration of global production, the creation of global financial markets, and the impact of new technology do suggest that conceptualising the idea of a national economy is more challenging now than it was in the past. What are the implications of these patterns for the political economy theories presented in the previous chapter, then?

Neoliberalism's Detractors

The resurrection of liberal political economy, which is now sometimes referred to as "neoliberalism" not to be confused with the liberal institutionalism, has been the most significant response to these tendencies over the past 20 years. According to the neoliberal viewpoint, many of the options that appeared to be available to governments in the years following 1945 are no longer available. Apart from the communist command model, there were many different economic models coexisting in the immediate post-1945 period. Different levels of planning and welfare

provision were implemented in various nations or groups of nations, and Keynesian ideas of demand management were embraced with varying degrees of zeal.

Many European polities were controlled by social democratic and quasi-corporatist politics. Most developing nations embraced socialist ideologies of some description, though usually with a significant private sector participation. With the development of the above-described linked global economy since the late 1970s, the potential range of economic systems appears to have shrunk significantly. The complete collapse of the communist model after 1989 at least in part as a result of its inability to keep up with the West has been the biggest single change, but social democratic and capitalist economies have also been under a lot of strain. The issue with social democracy is that it depends on the state's capacity to regulate important economic factors like interest rates and employment levels, which requires the capacity to shield specific nations from global trends. This capacity is being threatened by the forces mentioned above. Even the minimal autonomy needed for social democracy to function is challenging to accomplish because of centralised financial markets and huge corporations' dominance over important industrial regions. States can limit the ability of foreigners to acquire domestic firms and eliminate foreign competition, but doing so comes at a very high cost.

Local national firms will only be able to survive in technology-driven areas if they enter into R & D agreements with foreign corporations; otherwise, their products will become more and more out-of-date and unattractive even to domestic customers, which is what happened to car manufacturers in the US and the UK. On the other hand, allowing foreign investment pays off in the form of jobs, tax income, and exports just look at the rejuvenated Anglo-Japanese auto industry but in order to be appealing to international businesses, undesirable domestic adjustments could be required. These reasons have put enormous pressure on welfare states in Scandinavia and the English-speaking world, and demand management as a policy has all but been abandoned. Neoclassical economic liberalism has grown to dominate the field of economics, and its political manifestations, Thatcherism in Britain and "Reagonomics" in the US, have solidified their position. In practise, the New Labour 1997- and New Democrat 1993-2000 administrations in the UK and the US, as well as social democratic governments in the majority of the rest of the globe, have accepted a considerable deal of the economic philosophy of their Conservative/Republican predecessors.

Neoliberalism is only seriously resisted at the government level in France, Belgium, and to a much lesser extent, Germany; even in those nations, it is uncertain how long the costs of an extremely expensive welfare state will be politically tolerable. In summary, it is becoming more and more general knowledge that economies should be as open to the rest of the world as feasible, that physical constraints, price controls, and planning are ineffective, and that markets should be as free as possible. The 'Washington Consensus', which served as the intellectual foundation for the IMF and World Bank programmes recommended for developing countries seeking their assistance, mandated the prioritisation of low inflation, the lifting of price controls, and the reduction of government spending. This 'neoliberal' position dominated the major economic international organisations in the first half of the 1990s. The idea of "good governance," which essentially meant implementing Western forms of administration to make these emerging nations more appealing to foreign investors, was and still is a part of this package. This has been a progressive step in some ways because a non-corrupt democratic government and the rule of law are not only beneficial to MNCs but also to the majority of the local populace.

However, attempts to impose US accounting standards have occasionally been met with hostility. In any case, it is important to keep in mind that this policy initiative is largely considered as having failed, even among the IMF, World Bank, and US Treasury officials who originally designed it. There are many instances of increasing suffering for regular people and very few success stories for the Washington Consensus; expenditure cuts in government were frequently made for the poor, and the removal of price restrictions on staple products made matters worse. People like Joseph Stiglitz, the Chief Economist at the World Bank from 1989 to have admitted as much and have started to be quite critical of neoliberal concepts Stiglitz 2004.

However, there hasn't been a return to socialism or social democratic economic theories, and neoliberal concepts now predominate the global political economy in a significant way. Neo-Gramscian critics claim that this is a case of a new type of hegemony being established. Hegemony in this perspective is not the same as the hegemonic stability mentioned in Chapter 7. Hegemony in that context referred to a certain type of domination exercised by a specific person, albeit with the permission of others. Hegemony in this context refers to the process through which particular types of ideas are perceived as being so ingrained in a society's common sense that they stop being recognised as "ideas" at all and instead become a part of "how things really are." Gramsci created this idea of hegemony in the 1920s by building on Marx's concept of ideology, but it is not always associated with Marxist or radical worldviews. Insofar as they have successfully captured the general sense of the day regarding economic issues, neoliberal concepts are hegemonic on a worldwide basis.

Dematerialization

The action of neoliberalism's detractors reveals this hegemony; it is notable that while many organisations have made compelling arguments against economic globalisation, there are far fewer effective alternatives in practise. For instance, the protestors in the "Battle of Seattle" during the major WTO conference in November and on numerous occasions afterward agreed they were against the WTO and "world capitalism," but they were much less clear about what they supported. When alternatives were put forth, they tended to be mutually incompatible. Economic nationalists, socialists, "deep-green" critics of industrial society, as well as more moderate environmentalists and human rights activists, were among the opponents. Their inability to agree on even the most basic components of a common agenda gravely undermines their ability to exert pressure. Even if it was intended as a joke, a May Day protester in London in 2001 carried a banner that read, "Replace Capitalism with Something Nicer." This is as simple a demonstration of the lack of a cogent alternative to neoliberalism as one could hope for, as well as evidence of the latter's hegemony.

It is not necessary to be a Marxist to believe that the triumph of neoliberalism represents the triumph of particular types of interests, though it is obvious that Marxists will have a particular account of the types of interests that will shape systems of thought. Neoliberalism has been treated in the discussion above as a set of ideas, but it is, of course, much more than that. The rise of massive businesses, many of whose interests are served by neoliberalism's tenets, has been one of the driving forces behind neoliberalism. In turn, the rise of the huge corporation has been influenced in part by the spread of neoliberal concepts. It is hard to conclude that one of these forces caused the other in this situation due to the dialectic at play. The restructuring of the global industrial system over the past 20 years has accelerated the spread of neoliberal ideologies, and vice versa. However, it might be wise to consider whether the options open to states are really as

constrained as both neoliberals and their Gramscian critics claim before adopting the hegemonic stance of neoliberalism [4]–[6].

Although globalisation has rendered some types of state intervention ineffectual, the political challenge it poses has motivated nations to create new ways and, perhaps most importantly, new mindsets. The role of the state may have altered, but it has not disappeared. The rise of a new type of diplomacy involving businesses and states may be what we are currently witnessing Strange 1992, 1996. As technology increasingly controls manufacturing methods, businesses in sophisticated industries discover that their capacity to do the R & D that will keep them at the forefront of their industry is essential to their long-term survival. Absolute scale is vital here which implies access 170 Understanding International Relations to markets is crucial, either directly or via relationships with other enterprises. States have some control over the actions of businesses because they can, in an emergency, restrict access to markets and approve or disapprove takeovers or franchising agreements.

On the other hand, states desire prosperous, technologically advanced businesses to be situated on their soils because inward investment creates jobs, supports regional policy, acts as a tax base, and increases a nation's ability to export. It follows that businesses have something to offer states and are in a strong negotiating position. To put it another way, "market share" is a concern for both governments and businesses; businesses want to have the highest market share possible, while states want businesses with the largest market share possible on their territories. The new diplomacy focuses on the means by which organisations and nations accomplish their goals. A triangle diplomatic structure is used. States bargain and negotiate with one another about gaining access to one another's markets, as well as, within the European Union, about the crucial rules governing the amount of "local content" necessary for, for example, a Toyota Corolla built in Britain to qualify as a British rather than a Japanese car. States and businesses bargain and negotiate over a variety of issues, including the terms and conditions under which the latter are permitted to operate on the former's territory, the tax benefits that new investment will bring, the location of the investment, the jobs it will create, and, at the moment in the UK's case, the implications of joining or not joining the single European currency [7]–[9].

CONCLUSION

Firms haggle and negotiate with other firms about co-production, sharing R & D, franchising, and occasionally co-ownership. Each of this diplomacy's three sides has an impact on the other two. The ability of one state to guarantee access to the markets of other states state-state diplomacy and the extent to which incoming firms are able to negotiate deals with at least some of those already in the market firm-firm diplomacy will often determine which state is more desirable than another as a location for new investment state-firm diplomacy. The focus on MNCs has changed as a result of this new diplomacy. Much of the prior literature on MNCs placed a strong emphasis on the repatriation of earnings, with the inference that foreign businesses were abusing the local economy to benefit rentiers at home. Any company today, no matter how big or little, that does not devote the majority of its income to research and development will not be around for very long to distribute dividends to its shareholders. Most importantly, though, is how seriously misguided the idea of "sovereignty at bay" is Vernon, 1971. As we have seen, sovereignty in the traditional sense of having complete control over a territory is unlikely to have ever existed and is, in any case, long gone. On the other hand, being effectively sovereign today that is, being able to meet the needs of one's population and encourage economic growth depends heavily on developing positive

relationships with international business. A strong state is one that can employ MNCs for its own purposes rather than one that excludes them or forbids them from making money. The "good governance" that was mentioned before in relation to emerging nations is vital at this point since corrupt, undemocratic, and irresponsible local elites will not be successful in utilising MNCs for national objectives, even though they may be quite successful at funding their own offshore bank accounts.

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CHAPTER 14

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT:

The future directions of international relations also encompass shifts in cultural identity and societal values. The recognition of diverse narratives and the role of civil society movements will influence diplomatic practices and global norms. Addressing issues of gender equality, social justice, and human rights will demand an intersectional and inclusive approach that acknowledges the complexities of identity. In conclusion, the future of international relations is characterized by both uncertainty and promise. The field must adapt to the changing dynamics of power, technology, and globalization, while remaining rooted in principles of cooperation, diplomacy, and mutual understanding. The challenges that lie ahead require collaborative efforts that transcend borders and ideologies, recognizing the interdependence of our increasingly interconnected world. As the global landscape continues to evolve, the study and practice of international relations will play a vital role in shaping a more just, secure, and prosperous future for all nations and peoples.

KEYWORDS:

Future, Global, Directions, Power, Dynamics.

INTRODUCTION

In an ever-evolving global landscape, the realm of International Relations IR stands as a dynamic arena that continually adapts to shifts in power, technology, and ideologies. As the world hurtles forward into the 21st century, the study of international relations finds itself at a crossroads, poised to embark upon new and uncharted trajectories. These future directions in international relations are shaped by a combination of emerging challenges, transformative technological advancements, changing power dynamics, and evolving paradigms of cooperation. This essay delves into the key contours of these anticipated future directions, exploring how they will impact the conduct of nations and the course of international diplomacy. One of the most prominent facets shaping the future of international relations is the rapidly changing global landscape driven by advancements in technology. The digital revolution, characterized by the proliferation of artificial intelligence, big data analytics, and block-chain, is redefining the ways in which nations interact and wield influence on the global stage. The future of international relations by examining how states are adapting, how power dynamics are changing, and how global governance structures are being reconsidered to address the complexities of our interconnected world. It's important to note that the content of the chapter would depend on the author's perspective, the time period it covers, and the specific context

DISCUSSION

Evolving Role of States

The integration of technology into diplomacy is becoming increasingly significant, enabling new modes of communication, surveillance, and cyber operations. This shift not only brings forth

opportunities for enhanced cooperation but also poses formidable challenges related to cybersecurity, data privacy, and the potential weaponization of information. Moreover, the global community is confronted with a range of transnational threats that transcend borders, such as climate change, pandemics, and migration. As these challenges intensify, a new paradigm of multilateral cooperation is taking shape. Future international relations will likely witness a shift towards collaborative efforts to address these shared concerns, fostering innovative frameworks for collective action. The success of initiatives like the Paris Agreement and global health collaborations in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic underscore the growing importance of coordinated responses to cross-border predicaments. Power dynamics in international relations are also undergoing a transformative reconfiguration. The longstanding unipolar world order is gradually giving way to a more multipolar arrangement, with emerging powers like China and India ascending the global hierarchy. This shift challenges existing norms and institutions, necessitating recalibrations in diplomacy, trade, and security arrangements [1]–[3].

Shifting Power Dynamics

The future will likely be characterized by a delicate balancing act among established powers, rising contenders, and regional players, potentially leading to both collaboration and contention as new alliances are forged and old ones reevaluated. Furthermore, the traditional boundaries of state-centric diplomacy are blurring, as non-state actors gain greater influence and agency. Non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and grassroots movements are actively shaping international outcomes. This trend suggests a future where diplomacy transcends traditional government-to-government interactions and engages with a diverse array of stakeholders to address global challenges comprehensively.

In the realm of economic relations, the future holds intricate possibilities driven by evolving trade dynamics, economic interdependence, and the proliferation of digital commerce. The rise of economic nationalism in some quarter's contrasts with the ongoing efforts towards deeper regional integration and globalization. The push-pull dynamics between protectionism and free trade will likely continue to influence the global economic landscape, necessitating adept diplomatic strategies to navigate these complexities.

In conclusion, the study of international relations is on the precipice of a paradigm shift, poised to navigate a landscape that is marked by technological revolutions, shifting power dynamics, and a growing array of transnational challenges. The future directions in international relations will require innovative approaches, adaptive strategies, and a commitment to collaborative action. As the world grapples with both the promises and perils of an interconnected global order, the discipline of international relations stands as a crucial vantage point from which to understand and shape the course of human interaction on the international stage. Through embracing these future directions, nations and global actors have the opportunity to forge a more cooperative, secure, and prosperous world for generations to come.

Future Directions in International Relations Navigating the Evolving Landscape the study and practice of International Relations IR are perpetually shaped by the dynamic interplay of global events, power dynamics, and emerging challenges. As the world continues to evolve, so too does the field of IR, adapting to new paradigms and setting forth on future directions that will define the interactions between nations and shape the global landscape. This essay delves into the key themes that are likely to influence the future of International Relations, spanning issues of global governance, power shifts, technology, environment, security, economics, culture, health, gender,

and ethics. One of the prominent future directions in IR revolves around the reimagining of global governance and multilateralism. The world is facing a myriad of transnational challenges that demand collective action, such as climate change, pandemics, and terrorism. To address these challenges effectively, the international community will need to revitalize existing institutions like the United Nations and craft new frameworks for cooperation. The future of IR may see an emphasis on building stronger international partnerships and enhancing multilateral mechanisms that enable collaborative decision-making and the pooling of resources to tackle shared problems.

Power shifts and the rise of multipolarity constitute another compelling direction in IR. The traditional landscape of power dominated by Western nations is gradually giving way to a more multipolar world, with rising powers like China, India, and others exerting greater influence. This shift necessitates careful navigation as nations forge new alliances, renegotiate global power dynamics, and grapple with issues related to economic and political competition. The future of IR will likely see the emergence of new power-sharing arrangements, the rise of non-Western perspectives, and the potential for both cooperation and conflict among nations striving to safeguard their interests in this evolving environment.

Reimagining Global Governance

Technological advancements have already transformed the way nations interact, and this trend is poised to intensify. The realm of technology and cybersecurity is a critical future direction in IR. Rapid developments in artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and biotechnology offer unprecedented opportunities and challenges. States will need to collaborate on cybersecurity protocols, data privacy regulations, and ethical norms surrounding the use of emerging technologies. The ability to safeguard critical infrastructure, prevent cyberattacks, and navigate the potential pitfalls of unchecked technological progress will greatly shape the future landscape of international relations. Environmental concerns, particularly climate change, have gained paramount importance in the global agenda [4]–[6].

This direction underscores the need for greater cooperation in addressing environmental challenges that transcend borders. The future of IR will likely involve negotiations over climate agreements, sustainable development goals, and strategies to mitigate the impact of climate change. Environmental diplomacy will become a central component of international relations as states work to strike a balance between economic growth and ecological preservation, considering the well-being of current and future generations. The concept of security is also undergoing a profound transformation. Human security, encompassing the safety and welfare of individuals, is increasingly at the forefront of international discussions. Preventing conflicts, undertaking humanitarian interventions, and protecting human rights are becoming integral aspects of future IR.

The international community will need to grapple with ethical dilemmas, sovereignty concerns, and the imperative to intervene when populations are at risk, all of which will shape the evolving norms and practices surrounding security and conflict resolution. Economic interdependence is a timeless facet of international relations, but its significance continues to grow in the context of globalization. The future of IR will involve intricate negotiations over trade agreements, investment policies, and strategies to address economic inequality. As technology reshapes industries and economies, nations will need to balance domestic interests with the benefits of interconnected global markets.

The direction of economics in IR will be marked by the search for equitable solutions that promote prosperity while safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders. Cultural diplomacy and the projection of soft power represent an intriguing future direction in IR. As societies become more interconnected through media, travel, and communication, the influence of culture in shaping international perceptions and relations becomes more evident. The ability to engage and persuade through cultural exchange and diplomacy will be pivotal in building mutual understanding and fostering peaceful interactions between nations.

The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the need for health diplomacy as a central aspect of future IR. Global health crises have ripple effects that transcend borders, necessitating collaborative efforts in vaccine distribution, pandemic preparedness, and health governance. The future of IR will likely involve discussions on how to strengthen international health systems, share medical expertise, and ensure equitable access to healthcare resources, in order to prevent and mitigate future health emergencies. Inclusivity and gender considerations are emerging as important facets of international relations. Gender equality, women's empowerment, and LGBTQ+ rights are gaining prominence in diplomatic discussions. The future of IR will involve addressing these issues more comprehensively, recognizing that diverse perspectives contribute to more robust and effective policies that reflect the needs of all segments of society [7], [8].

CONCLUSION

Ethics and norms in international behavior constitute a perpetual concern in IR, but evolving challenges continually prompt reevaluation. The future of IR will encompass debates over the application of international law, human rights norms, and responsible state conduct in a rapidly changing world. Striking the balance between safeguarding national interests and upholding universal principles will be an ongoing endeavor, influencing the norms and standards that guide state behavior. In this context, envisioning the future of international relations requires a commitment to inclusive dialogue, collaboration, and the pursuit of shared solutions. Embracing change while upholding the principles of mutual respect, diplomacy, and cooperation will be pivotal in shaping a world that effectively navigates the complexities of the 21st century. The chapters on future directions in international relations beckon us to be proactive architects of change, striving to build a world that transcends old boundaries and fosters a more interconnected, peaceful, and prosperous global community. As we embark on this journey into the future, it becomes evident that international relations are no longer confined to the interactions of states alone. The intricate web of connections among states, non-state actors, transnational issues, and technological advancements necessitates a holistic and interdisciplinary approach to address global challenges.

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CHAPTER 15

ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS NAVIGATING MORAL DILEMMAS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

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ABSTRACT

The realm of international relations, marked by the complex interactions between sovereign states and non-state actors, is increasingly under scrutiny for its ethical dimensions. This abstract explores the multifaceted challenges and moral dilemmas that arise within the framework of international relations, as well as the evolving strategies employed to navigate these challenges in an interconnected and globalized world. The ethical considerations in international relations encompass a wide range of issues, including the use of military force, humanitarian interventions, economic policies, environmental sustainability, human rights, and cultural diversity. These issues often give rise to tensions between state sovereignty and global human rights standards. The principles of realism, liberalism, and constructivism have traditionally dominated the theoretical landscape of international relations, each offering unique perspectives on how to address ethical concerns. Realism, rooted in the pursuit of national interest, emphasizes state security and stability as paramount. While realist approaches may prioritize self-preservation, they can sometimes neglect the human rights and well-being of other nations and peoples. In contrast, liberal theories advocate for the promotion of democracy, human rights, and economic interdependence as mechanisms to foster cooperation among nations. However, even liberal approaches can inadvertently lead to neo-imperialistic interventions or unequal economic relationships. Constructivist theories highlight the role of ideas, norms, and identities in shaping international behavior, offering insights into the potential for diplomacy, dialogue, and shared values to bridge ethical divides.

KEYWORDS:

Actors, Challenges, Ethical, Global, Shared.

INTRODUCTION

In the complex tapestry of global interactions, the ethics of international relations emerges as a fundamental cornerstone that guides the conduct of nations, shapes diplomatic decisions, and influences the trajectories of international cooperation. As the world grapples with an array of intricate challenges and opportunities, the ethical dimensions of interactions among states, as well as between states and non-state actors, come into sharper focus. The study of the ethics of international relations delves into the moral principles, norms, and dilemmas that underpin the behavior of nations on the global stage. This introductory discourse seeks to illuminate the multifaceted landscape of ethical considerations within international relations and highlight their profound implications for the world's collective future. In the face of these ethical complexities, international actors have developed various strategies to promote responsible behavior and mitigate moral dilemmas. Multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, attempt to provide a platform for diplomatic negotiations, conflict resolution, and the enforcement of international

norms. The development of international law, through treaties and agreements, seeks to establish a framework for just conduct among nations.

DISUCSSION

Ethical Theories and International Relations

However, enforcement mechanisms and the willingness of states to comply with these norms remain significant challenges. Humanitarian interventions, often undertaken to prevent mass atrocities and protect vulnerable populations, raise questions about the ethical use of military force. The "Responsibility to Protect" R2P doctrine has gained traction as a normative framework for justifying interventions when states fail to protect their own citizens. Yet, the application of R2P has sparked debates regarding the potential for abuse and selective enforcement, as seen in cases like Libya and Syria. At the heart of the ethics of international relations lies the intricate interplay between sovereignty, human rights, and the pursuit of national interests. Nations are endowed with the sovereignty to govern their internal affairs, yet this sovereignty is increasingly intersecting with universal principles of human rights and responsibilities toward the global community. The tension between the prerogatives of states and the imperative to protect and promote human dignity underscores the complexities of ethical decision-making in international relations. The events of the 20th and early 21st centuries, from the Rwandan genocide to the Syrian conflict, have starkly revealed the moral dilemmas that arise when the international community grapples with how to respond to egregious human rights abuses within sovereign boundaries [1]–[3].

Furthermore, the ethics of international relations navigates the intricate terrain of power politics and the moral implications of various foreign policy strategies. Realpolitik, which emphasizes the pursuit of national self-interest and security, often stands in tension with ethical considerations such as humanitarian intervention, conflict resolution, and the promotion of democracy and freedom. The choices made by states in addressing conflicts, engaging in diplomacy, and forming alliances are infused with ethical dimensions that weigh the potential for positive outcomes against the risks of exacerbating tensions or causing harm.

In recent years, the interconnectedness of the globalized world has brought to the forefront the ethical challenges posed by transnational issues that transcend borders. Climate change, pandemics, terrorism, and cyber warfare underscore the urgency of cooperative action to safeguard the common good. The ethics of international relations grapples with the responsibilities of states to collaborate in addressing these shared challenges, while also considering the potential ethical pitfalls of unequal burdens and the erosion of national autonomy in the face of global imperatives.

Moreover, the role of non-state actors, including multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and international courts, adds layers of complexity to the ethical fabric of international relations. These entities wield influence and agency in shaping global outcomes, prompting ethical inquiries into their responsibilities, accountability mechanisms, and their interactions with sovereign states.

Ethics, as a foundational principle of human interaction, plays a pivotal role in shaping the behavior, decisions, and interactions of individuals and societies. In the realm of international relations IR , the ethical considerations that guide the actions of nations and international actors hold profound significance. As states navigate a complex global landscape characterized by diverse cultures, interests, and power dynamics, ethical frameworks become essential in addressing moral

dilemmas, promoting cooperation, and mitigating conflict. This essay explores the multifaceted nature of the ethics of international relations, delving into key ethical theories, the challenges of balancing national interests and universal values, human rights, humanitarian intervention, environmental ethics, and the role of non-state actors in shaping international ethical norms. The foundation of ethics in international relations is deeply rooted in various ethical theories that offer frameworks for analyzing and evaluating international actions. These theories guide both state behavior and the moral judgments of international actors.

Realism

Realism, which emphasizes the pursuit of national interests and power, often places ethical considerations in the background. Realist scholars argue that the anarchic nature of the international system necessitates a focus on self-preservation, national security, and power dynamics. Critics of realism, however, argue that an exclusive focus on self-interest may lead to a disregard for human rights and ethical norms.

Idealism/Liberalism

Idealism and liberalism place a stronger emphasis on ethical considerations in international relations. These perspectives prioritize international cooperation, human rights, and the rule of law. Ethical considerations are often integrated into the creation of international institutions, multilateral agreements, and efforts to promote peace and stability through diplomacy.

Constructivism

Constructivism asserts that international norms, identities, and interests are socially constructed and evolve over time. Ethical norms emerge from interactions between states and non-state actors. Constructivist approaches highlight the role of ideas, values, and cultural influences in shaping ethical considerations in international relations [4]–[6].

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism argues for a global community where individuals' rights and responsibilities transcend national boundaries. This ethical perspective emphasizes the importance of addressing global challenges, such as poverty, human rights abuses, and environmental degradation, through collective action.

Balancing National Interests and Universal Values

One of the central ethical challenges in international relations lies in striking a balance between national interests and universal values. States often prioritize their own interests, such as security, economic prosperity, and political influence. However, ethical considerations call for the recognition of universal values, including human rights, justice, and the well-being of all individuals. The tension between these two aspects is evident in scenarios where a state's pursuit of national interests conflicts with broader ethical principles. For instance, the arms trade, economic sanctions, and support for authoritarian regimes for strategic purposes raise questions about the ethical implications of prioritizing geopolitical gains over human rights and humanitarian concerns.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention

The ethical dimensions of human rights are at the core of international relations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR established a universal standard for the treatment of individuals, regardless of their nationality or ethnicity. Upholding human rights is both a moral imperative and a legal obligation for states. The concept of humanitarian intervention presents a moral dilemma. While states have a sovereign right to govern their internal affairs, the international community faces ethical quandaries when confronted with cases of egregious human rights abuses, genocide, or mass atrocities. The Responsibility to Protect R2P doctrine, endorsed by the United Nations, asserts that the international community has a responsibility to intervene when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from serious harm. However, the practical application of humanitarian intervention raises complex ethical questions. Intervention without proper authorization or careful assessment of the consequences can lead to unintended negative outcomes, including escalation of conflict and destabilization of regions.

Environmental Ethics in International Relations

As environmental challenges intensify, the ethical dimension of environmental protection gains prominence in international relations. Environmental ethics necessitate that states consider the long-term impacts of their actions on ecosystems, biodiversity, and future generations. The pursuit of economic growth often clashes with environmental concerns, highlighting the tension between immediate gains and sustainable practices. Issues such as climate change, deforestation, and resource depletion require international cooperation and ethical considerations that extend beyond national borders. Negotiating climate agreements, setting emission reduction targets, and ensuring equitable distribution of environmental burdens become ethical imperatives as the global community seeks to address shared ecological challenges [7]–[9].

Non-State Actors and Ethical Norms

Non-state actors, including international organizations, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks, play an increasingly influential role in shaping international ethical norms. NGOs, for example, advocate for human rights, social justice, and environmental sustainability. They often bridge the gap between state actions and global ethical expectations, pushing for greater accountability and transparency. Multinational corporations, on the other hand, are under growing pressure to adhere to ethical business practices that respect human rights, labor standards, and environmental conservation. International organizations like the United Nations and the International Criminal Court contribute to the development of ethical norms through treaties, conventions, and resolutions. Their efforts reinforce the importance of shared values and standards that guide state behavior on the global stage. Ethics in international relations also compels us to grapple with the complexities of power dynamics. Historically, the pursuit of power has been at the forefront of international politics, often leading to conflicts and exploitation. Ethical considerations prompt a reevaluation of power, urging states to utilize their influence for the common good rather than self-serving interests. This resonates with the growing recognition that true power lies not in military might alone but in the ability to foster cooperation, ensure justice, and uplift societies on a global scale.

Moreover, ethical international relations demand that economic, social, and environmental dimensions be woven into the fabric of diplomatic engagements. The pursuit of economic growth should not be detached from concerns about inequality, poverty, and sustainable development. The

exploitation of resources should not come at the expense of the environment and the well-being of future generations. In this interconnected world, ethical international actors recognize that prosperity achieved through injustice or environmental degradation is unsustainable and counterproductive in the long run. In the age of rapid technological advancement, the ethics of international relations extends to the digital realm. Cybersecurity, data privacy, and the responsible use of emerging technologies become paramount considerations. The virtual landscape introduces novel challenges that require international norms and cooperation to safeguard against potential harm while fostering innovation and global progress. As we reflect on the ethics of international relations, we are confronted with the realization that our actions reverberate across time and space. The decisions we make today shape the world our children will inherit tomorrow. The ethical compass that guides our interactions on the global stage is a reflection of our shared humanity and a testament to our capacity for empathy, collaboration, and moral growth.

CONCLUSION

The ethics of international relations constitute a complex web of principles, theories, and practical considerations that guide the behavior of states and international actors. As the global landscape evolves, ethical considerations remain at the forefront of international interactions. The dynamic between national interests and universal values, the promotion of human rights, the ethics of humanitarian intervention, environmental ethics, and the role of non-state actors collectively shape the ethical foundations of international relations. As the world becomes more interconnected and interdependent, ethical considerations gain greater importance. The responsibility to address global challenges while upholding moral principles is a shared endeavor that requires collaboration, diplomacy, and a commitment to universal values. The ethics of international relations provide a framework for navigating the complexities of a rapidly changing world, promoting peace, justice, and the well-being of all humanity on the global stage.

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CHAPTER 16
WOMEN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT:

The role of women in international relations has evolved significantly over the past decades, as societies worldwide recognize the imperative of gender equality and inclusivity. This abstract delves into the progress, persistent challenges, and potential avenues for greater participation of women in the field of international relations, shedding light on the multifaceted impact of their engagement on global diplomacy, conflict resolution, and policy-making. Historically marginalized, women have gradually carved a place for themselves within the realm of international relations. Feminist theories have offered critical insights into power dynamics, gender norms, and the intersections of gender with other identities. These theories have exposed the gender biases embedded within traditional international relations paradigms and underscored the importance of incorporating diverse perspectives for a more comprehensive understanding of global dynamics. In recent decades, there have been notable advancements in women's participation in international organizations, diplomacy, and peace negotiations. The United Nations, for instance, has championed the cause of gender equality through resolutions such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which recognizes the vital role of women in conflict prevention and resolution. Women have increasingly occupied high-ranking diplomatic positions, amplifying their influence on policy formulation. The rise of female leaders, such as Angela Merkel and Jacinda Ardern, has demonstrated the potential for transformative leadership in international affairs.

KEYWORDS:

Equality, International relation, Women, Gender, Policy-making.

INTRODUCTION

The contributions of women in international relations extend beyond representation alone. Research and scholarship by women in the field have unveiled new insights and perspectives that challenge conventional wisdom and enrich the understanding of global dynamics. As scholars, women have explored issues ranging from conflict resolution and human security to gender-based violence and development. Their research has highlighted the interplay of gender, power, and international relations, elucidating how gender inequalities intersect with broader global challenges. Moreover, women's involvement in international relations has brought attention to critical issues often overlooked in traditional diplomatic circles. The recognition of women as agents of change has prompted a broader discourse on women's rights, gender equality, and social justice within the context of global governance. Initiatives such as the United Nations' Women, Peace, and Security agenda underscore the profound impact that women's participation can have on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction[1]–[3].

As the world moves forward, the inclusion of women in international relations is not merely a matter of fairness, but an imperative for sustainable and effective global governance. Women's

perspectives, experiences, and voices are essential for crafting comprehensive policies that address the multifaceted challenges of the modern era. By embracing women's contributions and championing their leadership roles, the field of international relations can better reflect the diversity of the global community and, in turn, foster more inclusive and equitable outcomes on the world stage. The field of International Relations IR has long been dominated by male voices, reflecting historical biases and systemic gender inequalities. However, the role of women in shaping and participating in international affairs has evolved over the years, gradually challenging traditional norms and stereotypes. This discussion explores the complex journey of women in international relations, highlighting the historical context, barriers and challenges faced by women, the progress made in achieving gender equality, the role of feminism, and the importance of inclusivity in redefining the field.

DISCUSSION

Historical Context and Gender Disparities

Historically, women were often marginalized in international relations, both in academia and in practice. Their voices were largely excluded from diplomatic negotiations, foreign policy formulation, and international forums. The field was dominated by a masculinized narrative that emphasized power politics and state-centered approaches, sidelining perspectives that focused on human security, gender, and social issues.

Barriers and Challenges

Representation Gap The underrepresentation of women in high-ranking positions within governments, international organizations, and academia persisted for decades. This representation gap reinforced gender stereotypes and hindered the integration of diverse viewpoints into decision-making processes.

Gendered Norms

Traditional gender norms and expectations influenced perceptions of women's roles in international relations. Women were often viewed as less capable in matters of security and diplomacy, limiting their opportunities to contribute to key discussions.

Glass Ceiling

The glass ceiling phenomenon prevented many women from advancing to leadership positions in the field. Stereotypes about women's ability to handle strategic and geopolitical issues created barriers that were difficult to overcome.

Gender-Based Violence

Women in conflict zones often faced gender-based violence, including sexual assault and trafficking. This not only affected their personal security but also limited their ability to engage in diplomatic efforts and peace negotiations.

Progress and Achievements

Over the last few decades, progress has been made in addressing gender disparities in international relations, though challenges persist. More women have entered the field of international relations,

both as practitioners and scholars. This has led to a broader range of perspectives and a greater emphasis on gender issues and human security.

Promoting Women's Leadership

International organizations and governments have taken steps to promote women's leadership roles. Initiatives such as gender quotas, women's empowerment programs, and leadership development workshops have aimed to level the playing field.

Feminist Foreign Policy

Some countries have embraced feminist foreign policies that prioritize gender equality, women's rights, and social justice in international affairs. These policies challenge traditional power dynamics and contribute to a more inclusive approach to diplomacy.

Role of Feminism

Feminist theories have played a significant role in reshaping the landscape of international relations and promoting gender equality.

Gender Mainstreaming

Feminist scholars advocated for gender mainstreaming, which involves considering the gendered impact of policies and initiatives across all sectors. This approach challenges the androcentric perspectives that dominated traditional IR.

Intersectionality

Intersectionality, a key concept in feminism, recognizes that gender intersects with other social categories like race, class, and sexuality. This framework highlights the unique challenges faced by women with diverse identities and experiences.

Global Sisterhood

Feminism in international relations emphasizes solidarity among women across borders. This concept challenges the notion of a homogeneous "global women's experience" and recognizes the importance of understanding diverse cultural contexts.

Deconstructing Masculinity Feminist IR critiques the masculinized language and behaviors prevalent in international relations. By deconstructing traditional notions of masculinity, this approach contributes to a more inclusive and balanced discourse [4]–[6].

Inclusivity and Future Directions

Achieving gender equality in international relations requires continued efforts to break down barriers and promote inclusivity. Education and Mentorship Encouraging women to pursue education and mentorship in IR can help bridge the gender gap in academia and practice. Mentorship programs provide guidance and support to young women aspiring to enter the field. Policy Advocacy for policies that support gender equality in foreign policy, international organizations, and peace negotiations remains essential. Incorporating a gender perspective in decision-making processes can lead to more comprehensive and effective policies.

Diverse Representation Increasing the representation of women, particularly from diverse backgrounds, in international forums and negotiations enhances the quality and inclusivity of discussions. Challenging Gender Norms Addressing ingrained gender norms and stereotypes that perpetuate inequality is crucial. Efforts to challenge these norms within and beyond the field of IR contribute to a more equitable global society.

The pages of history have long been adorned with tales of women who defied norms, shattered glass ceilings, and left an indelible mark on the canvas of international relations. The study of women in international relations is a reflection of the gradual, yet transformative, evolution of a field that was once dominated by male voices and perspectives. As we draw the curtains on this exploration, it is evident that the narratives of women in international relations are not mere footnotes; they are essential chapters that enrich our understanding of global dynamics and challenge us to aspire for a more equitable and inclusive world. The journey of women in international relations embodies resilience and tenacity. It is a testament to the determination of countless women who, despite the barriers before them, strode forward to shape policies, influence diplomatic negotiations, and champion human rights. From Eleanor Roosevelt's instrumental role in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to Madeleine Albright's trailblazing tenure as the United States Secretary of State, women have proven time and again that their voices are indispensable in shaping the contours of international discourse.

The inclusion of women's perspectives in international relations is not just a matter of representation; it is a recognition of the unique insights they bring to the table. Women's lived experiences, often deeply intertwined with issues such as social justice, education, and healthcare, provide a nuanced lens through which global challenges can be comprehended. Women's involvement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding endeavors has underscored their capacity to foster empathy, bridge divides, and facilitate dialogue in ways that complement traditional diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, the study of women in international relations amplifies the significance of intersectionality the recognition that women's experiences are shaped by a multitude of factors, including race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality. Intersectionality prompts us to abandon monolithic narratives and instead embrace the complexities of the human experience. This lens exposes the varying degrees of privilege and marginalization that women from different backgrounds encounter, urging us to create spaces where all voices are heard and valued [7]–[9].

CONCLUSION

Yet, the journey of women in international relations is not without its challenges. Gender disparities persist in various facets of the field, from underrepresentation in leadership positions to the prevalence of gender-based violence during conflict. The glass ceiling remains stubbornly intact in many corridors of power, reminding us that while progress has been made, the path toward gender equality in international relations is far from complete. The study of women in international relations is a call to action, an invitation to dismantle structural barriers and create an environment where every individual's potential can be fully realized. It beckons us to recognize that gender equality is not solely a women's issue it is a human issue that affects us all. It challenges us to question the traditional notions of power and leadership, and to redefine success based on qualities such as empathy, collaboration, and a commitment to justice. In closing, the narratives of women in international relations inspire us to continue the journey toward a world that reflects the aspirations and contributions of all individuals, regardless of gender. As we honor the pioneers who paved the way, we are reminded that the torch they carried is now in our hands. Let us carry

it forward with dedication, knowing that the transformational power of women's voices in international relations can guide us toward a future that is not only more equitable but also more enlightened, compassionate, and harmonious.

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CHAPTER 17
A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON TRADE STUDIES

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ABSTRACT:

The realm of international law and norms plays a pivotal role in establishing a framework for global governance and shaping the behavior of states and non-state actors in the international arena. This abstract delves into the multifaceted nature of international law and norms, their sources, functions, and the challenges they face in an ever-evolving world order. International law, derived from treaties, customary practices, and general principles, serves as a guiding force in regulating interactions among sovereign states. These legal obligations provide a common ground for resolving disputes, ensuring stability, and upholding fundamental human rights. Furthermore, international law offers a foundation for diplomacy, trade, and cooperation, fostering an environment of predictability and trust among nations. Norms, both legal and non-legal, form an integral part of the international landscape. Legal norms are codified in international agreements and treaties, such as the United Nations Charter or the Geneva Conventions, while non-legal norms emerge from shared values, customary practices, and expectations of behavior. Norms shape state conduct by influencing their policies, decisions, and interactions, thereby contributing to the establishment of social order and cooperation on a global scale.

KEYWORDS:

studies, trade, performance, legal, criteria.

INTRODUCTION

Trade studies are an essential part of the decision-making process in system engineering when building and creating complex systems. Trade studies entail analysing and contrasting several alternatives, choices, or design possibilities to find the optimal course of action that meets the needs and goals of the system. Trade studies are intended to carefully analyse and quantify the trade-offs between numerous parameters, including performance, cost, schedule, reliability, maintainability, and other pertinent criteria. System engineers may make educated judgements and improve the performance of the system by performing trade studies to get insight into the possible repercussions and consequences of various design decision. The selection of assessment criteria is made by system engineers using the goals and specifications of the system. Performance indicators, costs, schedules, risks, safety concerns, environmental effects, and user satisfaction are a few examples of the criteria that may be included. System engineers analyse and assess each possibility in light of the established criteria. To evaluate the benefits, drawbacks, and trade-offs of each alternative, this may include using simulations, mathematical modelling, performance testing, cost analysis, or other relevant techniques. System engineers make well-informed judgements and suggestions based on the findings of the assessment. They weigh the trade-offs between the various options while taking into consideration the needs, limitations, and stakeholder preferences of the system [1]–[3].

The results of the trade research, as well as the conclusions of the assessment and the suggested course of action, are recorded and distributed to the relevant parties. This promotes accountability and justifies the decision-making process. Trade studies provide an organised, methodical approach to system engineering decision-making. They provide system engineers the ability to assess the effects of various design options and make wise choices that enhance the system's functionality, efficiency, and overall success. Trade studies assist in reducing risks, spotting possible problems, and improving awareness of the system's trade-offs by carefully analysing all available option.

DISCUSSION

In the intricate web of global interactions, international law and norms stand as the guiding principles that shape the conduct of nations, facilitate cooperation, and maintain order in an increasingly interconnected world. The study of international law and norms delves into the intricate framework of rules, agreements, and shared understandings that govern the behavior of states, as well as the evolving dynamics of state-society relationships. As the international community navigates an era marked by unprecedented challenges and opportunities, the examination of international law and norms becomes more imperative than ever. This introductory exploration seeks to illuminate the multifaceted nature of these fundamental concepts, tracing their historical origins, analyzing their contemporary significance, and contemplating their role in shaping the global landscape.

International law, often referred to as the "law of nations," encompasses a complex network of agreements, treaties, conventions, and customary practices that govern the interactions between sovereign states. Rooted in centuries of diplomatic tradition and legal philosophy, international law provides the foundation for resolving conflicts, facilitating trade, protecting human rights, and addressing transnational challenges. Its evolution mirrors the changing priorities and power dynamics of the global community, as well as the quest for a balance between state sovereignty and shared responsibilities [4]–[6].

Norms, on the other hand, represent shared expectations and standards of behavior that guide state conduct and interactions. These norms emerge from a combination of legal agreements, customary practices, and the evolving values of the international community. Norms encompass a wide spectrum of issues, from the prohibition of aggression and the protection of human rights to environmental conservation and the pursuit of disarmament. They play a vital role in shaping state behavior by creating a framework of expected actions and consequences.

The study of international law and norms is intrinsically tied to the pursuit of order and cooperation in a world marked by diversity and complexity. International law provides a mechanism for resolving disputes between states and serves as a basis for diplomatic negotiations. It offers a means of holding states accountable for their actions and upholding the principles of justice and equity on the global stage. The existence of norms, as shared standards of behavior, fosters predictability and stability in state interactions, facilitating the building of trust and the pursuit of common objectives.

The contemporary global landscape presents a multitude of challenges that underscore the importance of international law and norms. Issues such as climate change, terrorism, human trafficking, and cyber warfare transcend national borders, demanding coordinated responses that are guided by shared norms and legal frameworks. The effectiveness of international law and

norms in addressing these challenges depends on the willingness of states to uphold and enforce them, as well as the adaptability of these principles to changing circumstances.

However, the realm of international law and norms is not without its challenges. The balance between state sovereignty and global responsibilities remains a constant point of tension, particularly in cases where the enforcement of international norms impinges on a state's perceived interests. Additionally, the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the diverse interpretations of certain legal provisions can hinder the effectiveness of international law in achieving desired outcomes. Establishing a precise definition of the issue or choice that has to be made is the first stage in any trade study. This involves knowing the precise design feature or parameter that has to be assessed and being aware of the needs and limitations of the system. The next step for system engineers is to discover and develop a list of workable alternatives or design solutions that may be able to satisfy the system's criteria. These options could come in the form of various components, technologies, designs, or combinations

International Law and Norms Shaping Global Order and Behavior

International law and norms serve as essential pillars in the architecture of international relations, providing a framework for the conduct of states, organizations, and individuals on the global stage. These legal principles and shared expectations guide behavior, promote cooperation, and contribute to maintaining a semblance of order in an otherwise anarchic international system. This explanation delves into the significance of international law, the formation and evolution of international norms, their relationship, enforcement mechanisms, challenges, and their role in shaping the behavior of states and the international community.

International Law A Foundation of Order

International law refers to a body of legal principles and rules that govern the relations between sovereign states and other international actors. It encompasses a range of legal agreements, conventions, treaties, and customary practices that outline rights, responsibilities, and obligations of states in their interactions. International law serves several critical functions: Conflicts Resolution International law provides mechanisms for resolving disputes between states, preventing conflicts from escalating into violence. Adherence to legal processes fosters stability and peaceful resolution. Cooperation Treaties and agreements facilitate international cooperation in areas such as trade, environment, human rights, and security. States collaborate on common goals, bolstering global governance. Protection of Rights International law safeguards the rights of individuals and groups across borders. Instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set standards for the treatment of individuals. Prevention of Aggression International law sets limits on the use of force by states, discouraging aggression and ensuring respect for the sovereignty of nations.

International Norms Shaping Behavior and Expectations

International norms are shared expectations and standards of behavior that influence state actions and interactions. While not always legally binding, norms create a sense of moral obligation and conformity within the international community. Norms are shaped through a complex process involving state practice, diplomatic interactions, and evolving perceptions of acceptable behavior. They are categorized into three main types:

Constitutive Norms These norms define the basic structure of international relations. Examples include the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition of the use of force. Procedural Norms Procedural norms outline how international relations are conducted. They include diplomatic protocols, rules of engagement, and dispute settlement mechanisms. Regulative Norms Regulative norms guide specific issue areas such as human rights, environmental protection, and nuclear non-proliferation.

Formation and Evolution of International Norms

The formation and evolution of international norms are intricate processes influenced by state interests, public opinion, international organizations, and transnational actors. Several stages characterize this development. Emergence A norm emerges when a shared expectation gains traction among states. It often starts with a pioneering state advocating for a particular behavior, which gains legitimacy as more states adopt it. Customary Practice Consistent state behavior over time can transform an emerging norm into a customary international law, creating a legal obligation for states to adhere to that norm. International Organizations International organizations play a role in shaping norms by advocating for certain behaviors, facilitating negotiations, and disseminating information about best practices. Transnational Actors Non-state actors such as NGOs, corporations, and advocacy groups can influence the development of norms by raising awareness, mobilizing public opinion, and pressuring states to adopt certain practices.

Relationship Between International Law and Norms

International law and norms are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, yet they have distinct characteristics and roles. International law provides a formalized and legally binding framework, while norms operate within a broader moral context. Norms often precede legal codification, as customary practices and shared expectations gradually gain recognition and acceptance, eventually leading to their incorporation into international treaties and agreements.

The relationship between international law and norms is illustrated through various examples. The norm against the use of chemical weapons, for instance, existed before it was legally codified in treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention. Similarly, the norm of not attacking cultural heritage sites during armed conflict has evolved over time, culminating in legal protections under the Hague Convention [7]–[9].

Enforcement Mechanisms and Challenges

The effectiveness of international law and norms hinges on enforcement mechanisms, which vary depending on the nature of the norm and the willingness of states to comply.

Soft Enforcement

Many norms rely on reputational concerns and diplomatic pressure for compliance. States fear reputational damage and isolation if they violate widely accepted norms.

Hard Enforcement

Legal instruments and institutions provide a more formalized mechanism for enforcing norms. Courts such as the International Court of Justice ICJ adjudicate disputes between states, while international criminal tribunals prosecute individuals for violations of international law.

Challenges to International Law and Norms

State Sovereignty States sometimes resist the imposition of international norms that they perceive as infringing on their sovereignty. This tension can hinder the universal acceptance of certain norms. Power Dynamics Stronger states may evade accountability for violating norms due to their geopolitical influence, highlighting the unequal application of international law. Cultural Relativism Cultural differences can lead to divergent interpretations of certain norms, particularly in areas such as human rights and gender equality. Emerging Technologies Rapid technological advancements pose challenges in adapting existing norms and legal frameworks to novel issues like cyber warfare and artificial intelligence. Role of International Law and Norms in Shaping Behavior

International law and norms play a significant role in shaping state behavior and interactions:

Conflict Prevention Norms against the use of force and the protection of civilians in armed conflict aim to prevent violence and promote peaceful resolution. Human Rights International human rights norms hold states accountable for respecting the rights and dignity of individuals, contributing to global standards of justice and equality. Environmental Protection Norms related to environmental sustainability influence state policies, encouraging cooperation on issues like climate change and conservation. Global Health International norms guide responses to global health crises, fostering cooperation in areas such as disease prevention, vaccine distribution, and pandemic preparedness. Trade and Economics International trade norms facilitate economic cooperation and prevent protectionist measures, fostering global prosperity.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, international law and norms form the scaffolding upon which the edifice of global interactions is constructed. They embody our shared aspirations for a world where conflicts are resolved through dialogue, where justice prevails over impunity, and where the dignity and rights of every individual are upheld. They challenge us to rise above self-interest and recognize the interconnectedness of our fates. As we navigate the complexities of the 21st century, the relevance of international law and norms remains undiminished. Their continued evolution, alongside the ethical dimensions of international relations, the roles of states, and shifting power dynamics, promises a more just, peaceful, and cooperative world. It is our collective responsibility to nurture and fortify these foundations, ensuring that the principles they represent guide us toward a future marked by harmony, prosperity, and respect for all. The principle of state sovereignty sometimes clashes with the imperative of collective action to address global challenges. Struggles for compliance and the absence of enforcement mechanisms underscore the need for continued efforts to strengthen the system. Additionally, cultural relativism and differing interpretations of norms can lead to complex debates about the universality of certain principles, highlighting the delicate balance between respecting diverse cultures and upholding fundamental human rights.

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CHAPTER 18
A BRIEF STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF IDENTITY

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ABSTRACT:
The three aspects of contemporary international politics that these chapters will focus on appear at first sight to point in different directions and to contradict each other. First impressions may be correct here. There is an old joke connected with unreliable television reception in the early days of the medium that may be apposite here – do not adjust your sets, reality is at fault. There is no guarantee that the most salient features of contemporary international relations will hang together in a coherent way. On the one hand, we live in a world undergoing change at an unprecedented rate, while on the other we live in a world whose basic institutions are inherited from another age; in the circumstances a certain amount of dissonance is to be expected. The three dissonant features of contemporary international relations to be examined in these chapters are the rise of identity politics, that is, the increasing salience of nationhood, ethnicity and religion; the increasing importance of the individual as an international actor, as expressed through the international human rights regime and changing conceptions of international law; and the concentration of power in the hands of one actor, the United States, such that talk of an emerging imperial system is not wholly far-fetched.

KEYWORDS:

Human rights, Industrialization, International relation, Imperial system, Nationhood.

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters of this edition of Understanding International Relations offer a somewhat different approach to International Relations theory from the first nine. The emphasis will remain on theory, on developing a conceptual understanding of the subject, but the context will no longer be quite so dependent on the development of the discourse itself as in the earlier chapters. From now on the driving force will come from events in the world rather than the academy arguably this has always been the case with International Relations theory, but here the relationship between theory and practice is much clearer. The agendas of these three chapters are set by the international politics of the last decade and will be readily recognizable by practitioners as well as scholars, by informed members of the public as well as students of the social sciences. Again, that power may be welcomed by those fearful of the consequences of a revived and sometimes violent politics of identity. There are complicated dialectics at work here, and it is difficult to discern a clear path through the various contradictions. This chapter will focus on the new international politics of identity. One way of framing this latter issue is to ask whether there is today a model of politics and the political process that can reasonably be seen as universal, at least in the weak sense that most countries over time will gravitate towards it? To ask this question nowadays is to invite the immediate answer 'no'; in spite of, or perhaps because of, the spread of globalization and the emergence of a 'human rights culture', it is clear today that political forces driven by nationalism,

ethnicity and religion are incredibly powerful and act as a powerful counterpoint to these universal categories [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

Politics in industrial societies

Of course, this diversity might be on the wane, and in the 1970s, the advanced industrial capitalist countries did indeed seem to be settling down. Understanding International Relations into a kind of common pattern shaped by the process of industrialization itself. Most of the industrial societies had been through a nationalist phase, a period of nation-building, but in most cases, nationalism was no longer the dominant force in domestic politics, although it could still be powerful in particular regions. In many European countries, political identity had in the past been associated with religion, but, again, these associations were, mostly, weakening; thus, for example, the post-1945 Christian Democratic parties in Europe had become moderate conservative parties, no longer based on the Catholic Church, while in Britain the association of Anglicanism with conservatism and nonconformity with radicalism, although still statistically significant, was nowhere near as strong as it once had been.

The few places, such as Northern Ireland, where national and religious identities reinforced each other seemed to be the exception rather than the rule. Instead, politics revolved around notions of 'left' and 'right', progressive and conservative, that essentially related to economic issues, and in particular, property relations. Most of the advanced industrial countries had political parties that claimed to represent the interests of industry, commerce and the middle classes, and parties that claimed to represent the interests of organized labour; these parties operated in a world of cross-cutting social pluralism which prevented the division between them from becoming too extreme. Depending on the voting system and social structure, one might find multiparty systems where different interests were represented by different parties, or two-party systems where the two parties in question were themselves coalitions of interests, but, in any event, politics in the advanced industrial world had become a matter of compromise, adjustment and accommodation.

In contrast with the immediate past, there were very few masses political movements or parties whose aims involved large-scale social or economic change; even in France and Italy, where large-scale communist parties had survived, they had largely lost interest in revolution. This is a snapshot of politics in the advanced industrial world but the general assumption was that the developing world would, in the longer run, take the same path. The international system into which these new nations had been born or, in the case of older polities that had not been subjected to direct imperial rule, into which they had now been admitted was, in its origins, clearly European, and the expectation was that they would adapt to it by becoming themselves, in their politics at least, rather more European. Notions of state and nation-building and models of development all pretty much assumed that the aim of the exercise was to make the non-industrial world look a lot like the industrial world.

Whether this could be achieved within the capitalist system was a serious issue the 'structuralists' thought not but most of the alternatives to capitalism looked increasingly implausible. The critics of capitalist development models usually had in mind some kind of Marxist alternative, but those Marxist regimes that did exist looked less and less plausible as alternatives to the The International Politics of Identity capitalist West. In the 1940s and 1950s there were many observers who genuinely believed that communist planning methods had solved the problems posed by the boom-

and-bust pattern commonly observed under capitalism, but by the 1970s it had become increasingly difficult to believe that this was the case – the regimes of 'really-existing socialism' were very obviously not providing the kind of material success to be found in the capitalist West. Neither was it possible to argue that these societies were more socially just than their competitors in the West; the terrifying repression of the Stalinist totalitarian era may have passed in Eastern Europe by the 1970s and 1980s, but personal freedom was still very limited and the regimes were widely perceived by their own citizens as lacking legitimacy [4]–[6].

Communist regimes

In any event, in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, communist regimes in Europe unravelled and were replaced by political systems that aspired to be like the political systems of the advanced capitalist world. The reasons for this collapse are complex and inevitably disputed; the impact of Western, especially American, pressure, the internal dynamics of a process of change that got out of hand, the role of particular individuals Gorbachev, Pope John Paul II, Ronald Reagan, the role of ideas the list of candidates for the role of prime agent of change is long and debates will continue, but the key point is that communism as a system of rule fell apart. The kind of convergence between East and West that many had envisaged as the probable outcome of the Cold War did not take place. Instead, the East adopted the ideas of the West. The significance of this was immediately noted by some of the more perceptive thinkers of the period. A key text here is 'The End of History' a much-misunderstood piece by the American political philosopher and policy analyst Francis Fukuyama 1989.

This was a Hegelian analysis of the consequences of the end of the Cold War which temporarily captured the Zeitgeist, attracted immense media interest and led to a major book, The End of History and the Last Man 1992. In essence, Fukuyama argues that in vanquishing Soviet communism, liberal democracy removed its last serious competitor as a conception of how an advanced industrial society might be governed. In the early nineteenth century, the shape of liberal democracy emerged as a combination of a market-based economy, representative institutions, the rule of law and constitutional government. Since then, there have been a number of attempts to go beyond this formula, but each has failed. Traditional autocracy, authoritarian capitalism, national socialism and fascism each failed in wars against liberal societies. Liberalism's most powerful enemy and also one of its earliest was Marxian socialism, which held that the freedoms which liberalism offered were insufficient and could be transcended specifically that political freedoms were undermined by economic inequality and that ways of running industrial society without the market and via the rule of the Party rather than representative government were viable.

Understanding International Relations

The events of the 1980s demonstrated the falsity of this claim. The societies of 'really-existing socialism' proved unable to keep up with liberal capitalist societies in the provision of consumer goods, and their citizens became increasingly unwilling to accept that party rule could substitute for genuinely representative government. Eventually these regimes collapsed and have been replaced by political systems which are, at least in principle, liberal democratic. Fukuyama describes the victory of these principles as 'the End of History', employing Hegelian categories which suggest that the triumph of 'liberalism' amounts to the firm establishment of the only kind of human freedom that is possible. Since 'History' was about the shaping and development of human freedom and since this task is now complete, History is over indeed, Hegel believed that History ended in 1807, so we have been living in post-historical time for nearly two centuries. This

piece of Hegelian language is perhaps unfortunate and certainly off-putting; the key point is that there is not now and, more importantly, will not be in the future any systematic alternative to liberalism non-liberal regimes will persist on an ad hoc, contingent basis, but without being able to mount a coherent challenge to liberalism. It should be noted that this is not the triumphalist position it is often taken to be Fukuyama actually regrets the emergence of a politics in which all the big issues have been solved. History ends, according to Fukuyama, but this does not mean that there will be no future events; international relations will continue but will no longer involve the big issues, which are now settled.

Post-Cold War Era

Others argue that although international relations will continue, they will do so on a different basis. The Democratic Peace thesis states that democratic states, while as war-prone in general as any other kind of state, do not fight each other – an argument we have met before in Chapter 4 in the context of a more general discussion of the relationship between domestic and international structures, but an argument that seemed likely to take on a new salience in the post-Cold War era. Major research projects in the 1980s and 1990s found the basic hypothesis to be remarkably 'robust' – which is to say that whatever definition of democracy is employed, and however war is defined, the result comes out in much the same way. Constitutionally stable democracies do not fight each other, although they do engage in as much war as other states with non-democracies. Clearly, the more sophisticated and sensitive the indicators are, the more likely it is that there will be minor exceptions to the proposition, or 'near-misses' as Russett puts it, and it may be that the law-like statement that democracies never fight one another will not stand. Nonetheless, the research suggests that the general proposition is perhaps the best supported empirical hypothesis that contemporary International Relations can offer. A statistically well-supported hypothesis is not the same thing as an explanation; how do we account for the democratic peace? Russett offers The International Politics of Identity 189 two possible explanations. First, there is the cultural–normative model. In stable democracies, decision-makers will expect to be able to resolve internal conflicts by compromise and without violence, and, hypothetically, they will carry over this expectation when dealing with decision-makers in other stable democracies which have similarly non-violent conflict-resolving mechanisms. Conversely, decision-makers in non-democratic systems are more likely to use and threaten violence in domestic conflict resolution, and this attitude is also likely to spill over internationally. Knowing this, and to avoid being exploited, democracies will adopt non-democratic norms in dealing with non-democracies. A second model stresses structural– institutional factors. Systems of checks and balances, and the need to generate public consent, will slow down decisions to use large-scale violence, and reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be taken. Recognizing this, leaders of other democratic states will not fear surprise attacks, and will allow peaceful conflict-resolution methods to operate. Leaders of nondemocratic states, on the other hand, are less constrained, and can more easily initiate large-scale violence. Being aware that democratic leaders do not have this option they may be tempted to exploit what they see as a weakness – but being aware that this is so, leaders of democracies may set aside institutional constraints when dealing with non-democracies in order to avoid being exploited. These two models are not the only explanations for the democratic peace that could be offered – although others, such as that of David Lake 1992, can be assimilated to one or the other – and neither are they entirely separable; as Russett remarks, norms underlie and are buttressed by institutions. Probably a later account will merge the two. In any event, what is striking about the thesis is the support it gives or, perhaps, gave to the idea that a universal liberal internationalist

world order might now be possible. From the vantage point of 1989 it looked as if the history of ideological conflicts was coming to an end, and if the now dominant liberal capitalist states are unlikely to engage in violent conflict with each other, then it was not unreasonable to expect an era of relative peace and security would dawn. Instead, of course, the last two decades have seen the wholesale revival of political identities based on ethnicity and religion, and not simply in the developing world – the hopes for a new kind of international relations post-1989 have largely been dashed. What happened, and why?

Identity politics post-1989

Most of the post-communist regimes of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia declared a determination to become, as their people often put it, 'normal' polities, which they understood to mean the kind of pluralist political 190 Understanding International Relations systems found in Western Europe. Some have succeeded, more or less; in 2004, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and the Baltic Republics all entered the European Union as full members whose political systems had passed the necessary tests. Byelorussia and Ukraine are by no means model democracies but they have, on the whole, avoided largescale political violence. Elsewhere the picture has been less encouraging. The Russian Federation has survived as a quasi-democratic presidential regime but with many violent ethnic conflicts amongst its southern republics, and the new states to the south of Russia that emerged on the collapse of the Soviet Union have been riven with national, ethnic and religious conflicts. In the Balkans, only Slovenia of the Republics carved out of the Yugoslav Federation has been more or less peaceful, and Croatia, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo have been sites of major conflicts that have involved the UN, the EU and NATO.

Even in the People's Republic of China, where a form of 'market Stalinism' has emerged based around capitalist economic forms combined with firm party-rule, nationalism remains a serious issue in China's 'Wild West' region of Xingjian with its Muslim Uighur population and in Tibet, while, in spite of fierce persecution, religious movements such as Falun Gong simmer in the background as a latent threat. Many of these ethnic/national conflicts could be seen as hangovers from an earlier era, actually preserved by communism. The kind of national conflicts that were resolved elsewhere in Europe by the operation of pluralistic politics were frozen in place by communist dictatorship; to use a common if rather unpleasant metaphor, whereas in the West ethnic divisions were healed by the need for different groups to cooperate in the political process, in the East, similar divisions were simply covered over by the bandage provided by authoritarian communist rule take away the bandage and the sores re-emerged, unhealed and festering.

Moreover, there are features of communism and nationalism that make it relatively simple for communist leaders to translate themselves into nationalist leaders as has happened so frequently in the Balkans most strikingly perhaps in Croatia, where a wartime communist partisan, Franjo Tudjman, used fascist, wartime Ustache symbols to lever himself into power, roughly the equivalent of a Zionist adopting the swastika as a motif. Both doctrines involve thinking in monolithic terms whether of class or nation, which undermines the legitimacy of the intermediate, cross-cutting groups that make pluralism work, and both provide seemingly compelling reasons to override individual rights in the name of the collectivity Puhovski 1994. All this may be true, but what it does not explain is why the 1990s also saw a revival of this kind of politics in Western as well as Eastern Europe. With the exception of the conflict in Northern Ireland, which has become marginally less violent, other identity-based conflicts in the West have persisted and their numbers have increased with, for example, the addition of a The International Politics of Identity 191 more

virulent form of regionalism in Italy demonstrated by the rise of the Northern League. More generally, conflicts have arisen in most of these societies revolving around immigration, refugees and asylum-seeking, and such conflicts have been increasingly cast in religious as well as ethnic terms, with especial reference to the problems posed by the integration of large numbers of Muslims into Western societies. Alongside these conflicts has emerged, in many advanced industrial countries, a strategy of conflict-avoidance based on the politics of multiculturalism and group rights; whereas the politics of industrial society described in the first section of this chapter worked to lessen conflict by creating overlapping groups, this new politics takes for granted the existence within a given society of a multiplicity of groups whose identities will not weaken over time and the ethos of this politics is that conflict can be avoided if each group is recognized as having its own distinctive contribution to make to the wider society Kymlicka 1995. Old-style egalitarians and socialists regret this development Barry 2000 [7]–[9] .

Muslim-Majority Political

Returning to the general issue, the revival of identity politics has not simply rested on ethnicity or nationalism, and neither has it been confined to Europe or Eurasia. A striking feature of the politics of the last twenty years has been the increasing number of people who have adopted a political identity based on religion, and, especially, on 'fundamentalist' religious movements; this convenient term has somewhat misleading Christian connotations, but the phenomenon of radical religious movements is very widespread. The rise of radical Islam is an obvious reference point here; Islamicist politics have posed threats to most Muslim-majority political systems over the last decade or so, and Islamic terrorism has become a major concern for the world as a whole the events of 9/11 in the US discussed are simply the most extreme manifestation of this issue. However, radical Hindu movements have been equally powerful in the relevant context, going a long way to reshape the politics of approximately one-sixth of humanity in India, and, it should not be forgotten, the rise of fundamentalist Christianity in the US is having a major impact on that political system. In the latter case, there are very direct foreign policy implications; evangelical Christian support for Israel on the basis that the establishment of the Jewish state is a forerunner of the Second Coming has added a new factor into the US–Arab–Israeli relationship, a factor which is making that relationship more difficult to manage than ever before.

Equally, in Latin America, the rise of evangelical Protestantism as a genuine challenge to the Roman Catholic Church has been a striking feature of the last two decades. Meanwhile, in Africa, the contest between Christian and Islamic missionaries continues but a striking feature of the last decade or so has been the rising political significance of witchcraft and other traditional animist religious beliefs, which have proved surprisingly capable of adapting themselves to the changing circumstances of their constituencies. It is important to note that when we examine the rise of religious movements of this kind we are observing a phenomenon that is simultaneously domestic and international. Consider, for example, the aforementioned rise of evangelical Protestant Christianity in Latin America. This clearly reflects the very well-financed missionary work of North American evangelicals, but it also reflects features of the domestic societies in question. It has been noted, for example, that in many of these societies Protestantism has been particularly attractive to women because, it is argued, it is less tolerant of male domestic violence and drunkenness than traditional Catholicism; it is also the case that as Catholic Christianity has become more left-wing in these societies, so the political right has looked to the evangelicals.

CONCLUSION

A generation ago, however, it would not have been unreasonable to assume that uniformity rather than diversity would be the dominant motif of twenty-first century politics. The shift from an assumption of uniformity to one of increasing diversity, and the implications of this shift for international politics, is one way of looking at the subject matter of this chapter. Before embarking on this discussion, it is worth noting that this is not simply a forward-looking question; it also relates to the origins of the contemporary international order. We live today in a world in which nearly 200 states are members of the United Nations; the international community of the twenty-first century must accommodate Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Jews, as well as millions of people with no religious affiliations. All races and ethnicities have a claim to be part of this international community. And yet the core institutions and practices of the international community, the sovereign state, diplomacy and international law, are the product of one particular part of the world, one particular cultural heritage – that of Europe, or, to be more specific, that part of Europe whose cultural heritage was shaped by Catholic Christianity and the Western Roman Empire. The contrast between the cultural specificity of the current international order, and the cultural diversity demonstrated by its members, provides a backdrop to the following discussion.

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CHAPTER 19

A BRIEF STUDY ON POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT
The point is that the international and the domestic interact and cannot readily be separated. The same is even more obviously true of the rise of radical Islam. The importance of Saudi money in financing Islamic education based on their particular, rather austere version of Islam is clear, and radical groups such as Al Qaeda clearly operate as international non-governmental institutions albeit of a particular, postmodern kind, as networks without a formal, hierarchical, command structure but the impact of these international movements is also dependent on local conditions. The attractions of radical Islam in Britain and France owe a great deal to the sense of alienation felt by Muslim youth in those countries – what Al Qaeda and other, less radical, international groups provide is a way for these young people to make sense of their situation superior to that provided by the dominant society or by older Muslim networks. Similarly, the attraction of radical Islam in countries such as Indonesia lies in its apparently offering an alternative to the corruption of local elites.

KEYWORDS:

International, world, politics, new, society.

INTRODUCTION

There is always a dialectic between the international and the domestic at work in these situations. In short, Fukuyama may be right to think that there is no systematic alternative to liberal democracy on the horizon – and none of the movements mentioned above offer the kind of globally relevant systematic conception of society characteristic of communist ideology – but the number of nonsystematic, local and particularist alternatives is very striking, and cannot be explained away in terms of the short-run impact of the end of communism. There does genuinely seem to be a new kind of politics emerging, with considerable implications for international relations. A generation ago, however, it would not have been unreasonable to assume that uniformity rather than diversity would be the dominant motif of twenty-first century politics. The shift from an assumption of uniformity to one of increasing diversity, and the implications of this shift for international politics, is one way of looking at the subject matter of this chapter. Before embarking on this discussion, it is worth noting that this is not simply a forward-looking question it also relates to the origins of the contemporary international order. We live today in a world in which nearly 200 states are members of the United Nations; the international community of the twenty-first century must accommodate Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Jews, as well as millions of people with no religious affiliations. All races and ethnicities have a claim to be part of this international community. backdrop to the following discussion [1]–[3].

DISCUSSISON

Globalization and postindustrial society

Nationalists and the fervently religious explain their commitments in simple terms. In the first case, the nation or ethnie is taken to be a pre-existent phenomenon – it is simply a fact about the world that it is composed of nations which shape the political identities of their members and once this The International Politics of Identity 193 is recognized it follows for the nationalist that it is natural for each of us to orient our political actions towards 'our' nation or ethnic group. The so-called revival of nationalist politics, on this account, is simply the re-assertion of a truth that ideologies such as communism and liberalism suppressed. Religiously-minded people take a similar view; the truth about the world is to be found revealed in the Koran or the Bible or in the Hindu scriptures and so on these books tell us how to behave towards our fellow believers and towards others, and what needs to be explained is why most people do not follow the word of God, not why some people do.

Again, the increased salience of religion is not to be explained in terms of social factors but in its own terms, terms that have been de-legitimated by the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment secular politics of the last two hundred years but whose relevance is constantly being re-asserted by witnesses to the faith. As social scientists, students of International Relations may wish to contest these self-understandings after all, contrary to the claims of nationalists it is quite impossible to identify any objective characteristics of a nation, and, contrary to the claims of religious fundamentalists, it is clear that the holy scriptures on which they rely do not interpret themselves the word of God never comes through eclair. It is, however, important to recognize that the interpretations that social scientists offer for the revival of identity politics are not those that the individuals concerned would usually accept. We are not obliged to accept the explanations of the true believers, but we are obliged to try not to patronize them by 'explaining away' their beliefs. Still, and bearing this proviso in mind, it is possible to identify one clear explanation for the revival of identity politics, or, better, a family of explanations namely that the kind of political identities described above are a reaction to the new social/economic/political forces conveniently summarized by the portmanteau word 'globalization'.

The central argument here is simple; globalization potentially creates a uniform world with global production and consumption patterns gradually ironing out the differences between peoples and societies – gradually we are all coming to do the same kind of jobs, wear the same kind of clothes, eat the same kind of food, watch the same kind of television programmes and so on. But so, the argument goes, people need meaning in their lives as well as material goods; generally, we have interpreted our social world precisely through the kind of differences that are now being removed or undermined. National stereotypes were sometimes still are a crude illustration of the point very few Englishmen have ever worn bowler hats and roast beef was always expensive, the beret was equally unusual across the Channel and the French diet does not consist of frogs' legs and snails – but the sense that Englishmen were genuinely different from Frenchmen, crudely expressed by these caricatures, was engrained in both societies and has been an important part of their respective self-understandings. In so far as global brands 194 Understanding International Relations eliminate difference tee-shirts, denims and hamburgers being universally consumed by English and French alike many people feel that something important has been lost.

This feeling potentially creates the social basis for a reaction in favour of an exaggerated version of difference, and this is where the new identity politics comes into its own, assuring us that we

are not simply the product of global branding, but can control our own destinies by asserting ourselves as Christians, Scots, Sikhs or whatever. Benjamin Barber captures this nicely in his amusingly but misleadingly titled Jihad vs. McWorld 1996. McWorld is a convenient way of expressing the rise of an unimaginative and somewhat bland sameness but 'Jihad' is less well-chosen since its Islamic connotations may seem to limit its applicability in fact, Barber intends this word to summarize all the reactions to McWorld of whatever faith or region. His jihadists could as easily be American or Indian as Saudi or Iranian, Christian or Hindu as Shia or Sunni. The central point is that globalization creates its own antibodies. People do not want to become cogs in a global machine so they look for ways of asserting themselves. Sometimes this involves taking part in global movements against globalism redefined for the purposes as 'global capitalism' by the antiglobalization campaign but, equally, faced by the challenge of homogenizing external forces, some individuals and groups have responded by returning to their roots national or religious or at least to a sanitized version of the roots they imagine themselves to possess. Often, it should be said, these roots are preserved or propagated by the very technology that allegedly threatens them; satellite television and the Internet are now widely used by nationalist and religious groups.

Whereas once diaspora communities grew apart from their original culture, often exaggerating some features, understating others so that, for example, the average Dubliner nowadays has very little in common with a Boston Irish American whose forefathers left at the time of the Famine nowadays communications between new and old homelands is so easy that this sort of gap does not emerge so readily; although, probably because they do not have to live with the consequences, diasporas are often more oriented towards radical identity politics than their stay-at-home cousins. In any event, the gap between a nationalist and an anti-capitalist reaction to McWorld is sometimes very narrow. It is striking how many prominent individuals seem to straddle this gap – the classic case being the French farmer José Bové who has himself become almost a global brand on the basis of his opposition to McDonald's in France, but whose own politics are dedicated to protecting the interests of French farmers, which often directly contradict the interests of farmers in Africa or Asia. In the new politics of identity, old-style economic interests are downplayed – Bové opposes 'McDo's' and that is good enough for the anti-globalization coalition. It is plausible to suggest that part of the reason for the revival of identity politics lies in this opposition between the global and the local, but there may The International Politics of Identity be deeper causes involved, especially when it comes to the postindustrial world.

International community

And yet the core institutions and practices of the international community, the sovereign state, diplomacy and international law, are the product of one particular part of the world, one particular cultural heritage that of Europe, or, to be more specific, that part of Europe whose cultural heritage was shaped by Catholic Christianity and the Western Roman Empire. The contrast between the cultural specificity of the current international order, and the cultural diversity demonstrated by its members. As noted above, what we think of as modern politics revolved around the production process, taking the form of a contest over the distribution of the gains from the increases in productivity that capitalist industrialization created, a contest in which the rights of property-owners were contrasted with the needs of the poor, and the power of the vote was, eventually, set against the power of money and capital. Postmodern politics, corresponding to post industrialism, does not take this shape, largely because the oppositions that shaped the old politics no longer exist in the same, politically-relevant, form. Of course, in the advanced industrial world the poor still exist in large numbers – especially if poverty is defined in relative terms, as ultimately it has to be

– but they are not employed in the kind of jobs where unionization is relatively easy, and neither are they unemployed and pushed towards the breadline and potential support for extremist parties. Instead, they work in call-centres and flipping burgers, making enough to get by but not enough to build much of a stake in society; very importantly, often they are not citizens but illegal immigrants or guest workers, but even when they are entitled to vote they tend not to – the percentage of the electorate that turns out on election day has been declining in all the advanced industrial countries. Political parties of the left who have not acknowledged this change, and have tried to mobilize on the old basis, have tended to lose out, while those who have reshaped themselves – Bill Clinton's New Democrats, Tony Blair's New Labour and other 'third way' groups – have done well by de-emphasizing the old ideological divides and emphasizing managerial competence. However, although such policies may be electorally effective, they do not heighten the emotions; 'the worker's flag is deepest red, stained with the blood of comrades dead' sang the old Labour Party these are extreme sentiments perhaps, and not many workers have been murdered by the forces of reaction in Britain since the Trafalgar Square riot of 1886 which inspired the song, but they used to reach out to people in a way that the anodyne pop songs McMusic? which have replaced the Red Flag do not. And so people look elsewhere than to the regular political parties to make sense of their lives and to give meaning to the rapidly changing social context in which they are situated hence the rise of political identities based on ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity rather than ideology, or on religious beliefs. Approached from another angle, politics is always and essentially oppositional; that is, about division, about who's in and who's out or about 'friends' and 'enemies' as Carl Schmitt 1932/1996 more formally defined the process.

United Nation Contribution

If class position and the economy no longer shape these oppositions, then something else will, and political entrepreneurs concerned to increase their own influence will look for and promote that 'something else' 196 Understanding International Relations be it a religious, an ethnic or a national identity. This is not wholly new; the mid-nineteenth century belief that conservative, pro-capitalist political parties would not survive the impact of universal suffrage was proved wrong precisely because many of these parties realized that working men would not define themselves simply by their class interests and could be persuaded to support patriotic, imperialist parties. Political entrepreneurs such as Benjamin Disraeli and Otto von Bismarck were very successful employers of this strategy. Today, though, things have gone much further. In the US, where the process has gone further than in other industrial societies, elections seem to be very largely fought around 'values' and lifestyle issues. Hollywood stars, who benefit massively from President Bush's tax cuts for the rich, campaign almost exclusively for the Democrats, while the rural poor of the American mid-West who have been hit hard by his policies vote Republican. These are positions that make little sense in terms of economic interest, but perfect sense in terms of the new divisions in American society. A leaked document from Bush's leading strategist Karl Rove summarized things nicely; the Democrats, he is said to have written, have the labour unions, but we have the Christians – and he didn't need to say that the 40 per cent of Americans who describe themselves as 'born-again' Christians are a far more powerful voting bloc than the unions, if, that is, they can be persuaded to vote as a bloc. In short, in any political order there will be some basis for division; if it is not economic interest then it will be something else. Think of this process happening on a world scale and not just in America, and the shape of international politics in the twenty-first century starts to look easier to explain – but not necessarily easier to manage [4]–[6].

Democracy promotion, Asian values and the 'clash of civilizations'

The last two decades have seen a revival of the politics of identity – but they have also seen movements in the other direction, some of which will be traced in Chapter 11. Under the influence of West Europeans and liberal North Americans, a serious attempt has been made to strengthen the international human rights regime, develop a doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and, more generally, establish the individual as an international actor and both the object and subject of international law. Needless to say, this trend goes against much of what has been discussed above. In the realm of religion both Islam and Christianity are, in principle, universal movements, but in practice they oppose fully-developed notions of universal rights because such notions usually involve legitimating practices that are anathema to religious fundamentalists, such as abortion, gender equality and the right to change religion. Nationalists begin from a perspective.

The International politics of identity, where individual rights are understood as generated by the group, which, again, goes against the kind of universalism discussed in the next chapter. There is a clear tension here, but whether it is made manifest has been a matter of practical politics; in practice, the key issue has become whether the West would attempt to generalize from its victory over communism and promote its values on a global scale. It is fair to say that in the early post-Cold War years, the answer to this question was 'no'. In the late 1980s and early 1990s some aid agencies began to insist that aid recipients carried out reforms to promote human rights and good government, Western-style, but this version of 'conditionality' received little support from the US or the other major Western powers. Indeed, when President George H. W. Bush attempted to promulgate a 'New World Order', pluralism was built into his thinking Bush 1990.

The essence of the New World Order was to be the sovereign state as the key unit of international relations; respect for the norms of non-aggression and non-intervention; and support for international law and institutions. This is, in effect, the liberal internationalist position of the immediate post-First World War era, restated for the post-Cold War world, but with one important difference. In 1919, a crucial element of Wilson's vision was that peace loving states would be liberal-democratic. Bush, on the other hand, offered a New World Order in which all states of whatever political complexion would receive the protection of the norms of non-intervention and nonaggression if they were prepared themselves to endorse these norms. There is no sense here that the US or any other state ought to engage in the promotion of democratic politics, and neither is there any suggestion of an elaborated doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In any event, with the ambiguous end of the 1990/91 Gulf War Kuwait liberated, but Saddam still in power and massacring his own people the reaction of most commentators to Bush's formula was, perhaps predictably, somewhat jaundiced.

'The New World gives the Orders' was a characteristic jibe and it did indeed seem that the New World Order was simply a slogan designed to give international legitimacy to US policy preferences. The incoming Clinton Administration did not endorse Bush's vision, but instead promised to take the idea of 'democracy promotion' seriously. Anthony Lake, Clinton's leading foreign policy adviser seemed particularly taken with the idea that 'democracies do not fight democracies' – the 'Democratic Peace' thesis discussed above and seemed to be looking forward to an era in which the US would actively push to promote Western/American values in the world, in particular, getting behind moves to strengthen the international human rights regime. A major UN Conference was designed to do just that in the Summer of 1993 in Vienna. But before this conference a number of regional conferences were held, and from one of these the Bangkok

Declaration emerged, which expressed the desire of many Asian 198 Understanding International Relations leaders to call a halt to this process and to resist the idea the drive towards universalism.

The burden of Huntington's

The Bangkok Declaration did not explicitly reject the idea of universal values, but it circumscribed them quite sharply in the interests of allowing regional and religious distinctiveness to dominate the so-called 'Asian Values' perspective, a position that was largely recognized in the final declaration of the Vienna Conference, much to the chagrin of many human rights activists. Asian Values is a misnomer because many Asians do not share the preference for authoritarianism expressed by proponents such as Singapore's elder statesman Lee Kwan Yew while many non-Asians do, and over the last decade the salience of this position has risen and fallen in accordance with the shifting politics of the era – in particular, the Asian Crash of 1997 undermined the strength of many Asian governments, and their ability to push their vision of the world. Moreover, perhaps predictably, the commitment of the Clinton Administration to democracy promotion proved fickle at best. But the general issue raised by this controversy has remained of interest and was given a scholarly focus by the American political scientist Samuel Huntington in his influential paper, and later book, 'The Clash of Civilizations' 1993a and 1996. The burden of Huntington's thesis is that, with the end of the Cold War, a new basis of division has emerged in the world; the ideological conflicts of the past will be replaced by conflicts between 'cultures or civilizations. Huntington identifies as the major contemporary civilizations the Sinic sic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic and Western, with Orthodox and Latin American civilizations as possible derivations of Western civilization with identities of their own, and Africa perhaps making up the list. In any event, on his account, there are three civilizations which are likely to generate serious potential problems in the near future the declining West, the rising Sinic, and the unstable Islamic. As this formulation might suggest, the first two components go together economically, demographically and, ultimately, militarily, the West is losing power to the Asian civilizations and in particular to China Huntington anticipates that China will come to dominate Japan and that the Japanese are likely to accept, tacitly, a subordinate status.

This was, of course, written before the collapse of the Asian economic boom, but it is a moot point whether this would change the basic argument here. An increasingly successful and powerful China will not accept a world in which its values are regarded as inferior to those of the West and will not accept global socio-economic institutions which limit its possibilities and Huntington acknowledges that the existing structure of international institutions is indeed a product of Western/American hegemony and reflects Western values. Only by the West adopting a policy of coexistence and recognizing the legitimacy of the Chinese way will violent conflict be avoided between these two civilizations. The International Politics of Identity, Chinese civilization will pose, indeed is posing, problems particularly for the West but also for Japan because of its success; the world of Islam will pose, indeed is posing, problems for all its neighbours because of its failure.

Demographic pressures in Islam and the lack of any core Islamic state with the potential of China, or even the 'baby tigers' of Southeast Asia, will lead to frustrations; moreover, Islam is a proselytizing religion and Islamic civilization has borders with most of the other world civilizations. These borders 'fault-lines' will be, indeed already are, the site of many crosscivilizational conflicts, from Bosnia and Chechnya to Kashmir and the Sudan. Ending such conflicts may be virtually impossible, certainly far more difficult than the daunting enough task of promoting coexistence between Chinese and Western civilizations. It is easy to pick holes in

Huntington's work; right from the outset his account of 'civilization' is ad hoc and muddled; civilizations are systems of ideas, and, as such, it is difficult to see how they could clash, although individuals and groups claiming to represent these ideas certainly can. Moreover, these systems of ideas are not now, nor have they ever been, self-contained or impermeable, a fact that Huntington acknowledges, but the significance of which he perhaps underplays. On the other hand, he deserves considerable credit for attempting to break up what was becoming in the early 1990s a rather sterile debate about the post-Cold War world. In his response to critics, 'If not Civilizations, What?', Huntington suggests that the only alternative models for what he is interested in are the old statist paradigm and a new 'un-real' vision of one world united by globalization. In effect, Huntington is providing a non-statist, but nonetheless realist, account of the world, which is an interesting addition to the conceptual toolkit of contemporary international relations theory.

Moreover, the attack on the World Trade Center of September 2001 seemed to many to vindicate his pessimism. The deep sense of solidarity with the people of New York that was felt throughout Europe contrasted sharply with the scenes of rejoicing in Palestine and the general satisfaction expressed in the street and the bazaar elsewhere in the Middle East. Huntington's original article was widely referenced, and, indeed, reprinted in the London Sunday Times where it was described as 'uncannily prescient' 14 October 2001. On the other hand, again, there are some who argue that Huntington's work amounted to an attempt to identify a new 'other' to take the place of Soviet communism, and that the desire to see the world in these terms actually increased the tensions out of which 9/11 emerged connolly 2000. One of the reasons for the general academic rejection of Huntington's thesis is that, although not statist, it remains spatial/territorial. His prevailing metaphor is of the physical 'fault-lines' between civilizations.

There are two problems with this notion; first, the analysis underplays the extent to which key dividing lines are man-made and recent in former Yugoslavia, for 200 Understanding International Relations example, the recurrent crises of the 1990s owe more to the success of Slobodan Milosevic in mobilizing political support behind the nationalist cause of Greater Serbia than they do to, largely spurious, ethnic and religious differences, much less historical divides that go back to the Middle Ages or earlier. Such differences and divides certainly exist and have always existed, but their current political significance is the result of contingency rather than some inevitable process in effect, Huntington takes the self-interpretations of nationalists too much on their own terms. Second, and rather more important, the 'tectonic' notion of civilizations does not recognize sufficiently the extent to which civilizations are already interpenetrated. The clash of civilizations, in so far as it exists at all, is as likely to take the form of the politics of identity, multiculturalism and recognition in the major cities of the world as violent clashes on the so-called 'fault-lines'; policing problems in London or Los Angeles are, thankfully, more characteristic of this kind of politics than the violence of Kosovo or Chechnya, horrifying though the latter may be [7]–[9].

Pluralism and international society

Huntington's work is best seen as a reaction to two bodies of contemporary International Relations theory on the one hand, the work of neo- and classical realists who argue that, one way or another, the state remains at the heart of IR and will continue to act in terms of ends–means rationality, and, on the other, the work of theorists of globalization who see the emergence of a borderless world in which legal structures will no longer be dominated by the state. Plausibly enough, Huntington argues that both are mistaken but both have caught hold of one aspect of the emerging world order – realists are right that intergroup conflict will continue to be a central feature of that order, while

globalizers are right to doubt that the state will remain the most important actor within that conflict. Instead, conflict will persist but be inter civilizational unless, that is, the West gives up its attempt to impose its values on the rest of the world, in which case the basis may exist for a, somewhat uncomfortable, modus vivendi. In fact, there is a body of work that comes close to addressing the question that Huntington poses while remaining statist in inclination namely the work of the English School and theorists of international society, encountered above, in the context of the constructivist critique of neorealism. As noted there, English School writers focus on the state rather than sub-state or universal categories, but

in contrast to neorealists they argue that when states interact, they may form a society, a norm governed relationship whose members accept that they have at least limited responsibilities towards one another and to the society as a whole. The International Politics of Identity 201 These responsibilities are summarized in the traditional practices of international law and diplomacy. The international society that these writers describe was, in its origins at least, a firmly European phenomenon, but there are at least two reasons to think that it could be made to work in a largely non-European world. First, although as we have seen the modern world is incontestably and increasingly multicultural in social terms, the Western invention of the nation-state has proved remarkably attractive to a great many different cultures even those societies that are very critical of allegedly Western notions such as human rights are strong promoters of the equally Western notion of the sovereign state. Whether because they genuinely meet a need, or because, given the existing order, sovereign territorial political units are more or less unavoidable, nation-states seem to be desired everywhere at least by political elites.

The only part of the world where the institution is under serious threat from an alternative form of political organization is at its place of origin in Western Europe in the form of the European Union. A more fundamental reason for the possible relevance of notions of international society in a multicultural world is that, on some accounts, the very rationale of the idea is precisely its ability to cope with cultural diversity. An important writer here is Terry Nardin, whose account of international society as a 'practical association' has been highly influential in recent years Nardin. Nardin's point is that, unlike a 'purposive association' such as NATO or the WTO which is built around a concrete project collective defence or the expansion of trade and assumes common purposes amongst its members, all of whom have voluntarily joined the organization in question, international society is an all-inclusive category whose practices are authoritative on every state precisely because they do not involve common purposes or a concrete project. The only common purpose is to live together in peace and with justice, and in this context, justice is a procedural rather than a substantive notion. It is clear that, if these distinctions hold, the origins of the practices of international society in the European states system are irrelevant to their authority today.

These practices are authoritative precisely because they do not privilege any one conception of the 'Good', and this means that they are ideally suited for a world in which many and various such practices are to be found. Their point is that although an international society constitutes a rational political order for humanity taken as a whole because problems of scale make global government impossible, laws lose their effectiveness at a distance, and tyranny is less likely if political society occurs on a human scale, the ultimate referent object of international society ought to be individual human beings rather than states as such. The telos of international society is not, in the last resort, simply to preserve a multiplicity of separate states, but ultimately to promote human flourishing; thus, although theorists of international society from Grotius, Pufendorf and Burke through to Bull and Nardin have argued that this goal is best achieved via a society of legally autonomous,

sovereign states, sovereign rights cannot be employed to justify conduct that clearly prevents human flourishing, such as large-scale human rights violations. It should be noted that this solidarist version of international society cannot drift too far away from the pluralism more normally associated with the idea of a society of states without losing contact with the tradition as a whole. Gross violations of human rights may be regarded as a modern version of 'gross violations of human dignity', justifying external intervention on the part of any one who can prevent them, but this is a long way away from the cosmopolitan notion that universal standards in all areas of human life should supplant the local. Adherents to the idea of a society of states may agree that there are some things that ought not to be tolerated, but they are coming at matters from a different angle from human rights activists, and alliances between these two groups will always be uneasy and unstable. The solidarist account of international society amounts to a reimagining of what is involved in a society of states, an amendment to pluralist accounts rather than an alternative to them.

CONCLUSION

To summarize a rather complex discussion; in the twenty-first century we are seeing the emergence, at both the international and the domestic level, of a new politics of identity. A feature of twenty-first-century life in many of The International Politics of Identity the advanced industrial societies is the demand for respect and esteem made by groups of one kind or another who consider themselves to have been marginalized and undervalued by the dominant, patriarchal, heterosexualist, white culture. 'Multiculturalism' is one response to this situation, as is a politics based on uniting the fragments in a 'Rainbow Coalition' which would challenge the status quo on behalf of all oppressed groups. The problem with this latter strategy is clear. Although each of the fragments opposes the dominant culture, this does not mean that their demands are compatible with each other; Quebecois nationalists routinely deny that aboriginal Bands would have the right to secede from Quebec, while popular cultural representatives of African–American men, such as rap artists, routinely spread misogynist and homophobic attitudes. 'Multi-faith' education in schools attempts to instil respect for all religions, but while some liberal Christians may be happy with the thought that their faith is one among many valid possibilities, few other religions take such a relaxed attitude towards the truth of their basic tenets.

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CHAPTER 20
THEORY OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

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ABSTRACT:

This 'pluralist' conception of international society has received quite a lot of attention in recent years, most noticeably via a major book by Robert Jackson 2000, and does, on the face of it, appear to offer a way to cope with the new politics of identity that is, in certain respects, superior to Huntington's call for a modus vivendi between civilizations, or the frequent suggestion that the world should engage in a large-scale inter-civilizational dialogue to iron out our differences. Rather than relying on the hazy and controversially essentialist notion of a 'civilization', the pluralist account rests upon an institution – the state – which is concrete and widely accepted. Still, pluralism, Understanding International Relations does seem to rule out the very notion of an international human rights regime – it would be difficult to argue that respect for human rights is a necessary practice for international society on a par with, for example diplomatic immunity – and many people would be reluctant to abandon this notion altogether, even if they are conscious of how the pursuit of universal human rights could indeed create the kind of clashes that Huntington describes. There is a genuine dilemma here, one response to which has been offered by 'solidarist' theorists of international society, in particular Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne Wheeler.

KEYWORDS:

Civilization, Human rights, Inter-civilization, International Relations, International Society.

INTRODUCTION

You studied world-systems analysis as a non-positivist methodology in the previous unit. It is founded on a holistic ontology, a methodological holism, and an interpretivist epistemology or "understanding". Social constructivist theory, developed by Alexander Wendt, will be at the center of the present unit. In addition to Immanuel Wallerstein's writings, social constructivist theory offers another particularly intriguing case when seen in the light of this book's philosophy of science perspective. First, Alexander Wendt's stated goal is to "find a via media between positivism and interpretivist by combining the epistemology of the one with the ontology of the other" 2006 182, my italics. This is just one of several reasons why this learning unit will use Wendt's works as its reference theory. The epistemology of positivism and what he considers to be the ontology of "interpretivist" are thus what he strives to combine as opposed perspectives. Second, social constructivism in IR emerged as one of the main challenges to positivist IR theorizing during the so-called "positivism versus post-positivism debate" or "Third Debate "in the 1980s and 1990s see Ashley 1984 for an early critique of neorealism; Kratochwil/Reggie 1986 on regime theodicy. Third, Wendt's use of the term "interpretivist" refers to ontological holistic social constructivism in IR has been linked to Alexander Wendt's work, particularly his meta-theoretical stance on agency and structure as mutually formed entities and the theoretical thesis that "anarchy" is a social creation 1992. Third, Wendt's work belongs at the center of this learning unit because he is one of the most knowledgeable IR theorists in terms of meta-theory. This recognition of as one of the

major representatives of social constructivism in IR is largely due to his seminal Social Theory of International Politics. His publications provide a very clear and organized illustration of his philosophy of science ideas, making them the perfect fit for the theme of this book [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

The position of "structure" ontologically as an observable and a "object" of scientific study

Fourth, being aware of the intellectual shifts makes in his philosophy of science positions between 1987 “The agent-structure problem in international relations theory” and his more recent writings 2006 "Social Theory as Cartesian Science" and 2010 "Flatland Quantum Mind and the International Hologram" and his forthcoming 2014 Limits of International Relations may be crucial to being well-prepared for upcoming met theoretical debates in IR. Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics 1980 re-emphasizes an ontological shift in favor of philosophical viewpoints of scientific realism, which is a shift that can be observed in practically all social sciences, including economics. Because of this, this trend presents an especially compelling case for more general met theoretical talks in IR. Furthermore, Wendt's more recent work is the first attempt to apply quantum theory to international relations through its ontological and epistemological reorientation towards philosophical interpretations of quantum physics. Recently entirely changed his constructivist Social Theory of International Politics' philosophical underpinnings.

As a result, even though Wendt's new lines of thought depart from his social constructivist approach in Wendt's Social Theory, they will be covered at the end of this text unit. Before we begin to learn more about Alexander Wendt's social constructivist perspective, we must keep in mind that "social constructivism" in general does not qualify as a coherent theoretical perspective in IR. In the field of international relations, there are numerous social constructivist theories that are founded on a variety of ontological and epistemological tenets. As a result, the phrase "social constructivism" encompasses a wide range of methodologies. Constructivism itself can be viewed as a philosophy of science Jorgensen. Theory is "constructivist" if it adheres to constructivism's core tenets as a scientific philosophy. The word can therefore be used to describe a variety of IR theories that have constructivist components in common such as world-systems theory, a variety of postmodern theories, Neo-Gramscian approaches, etc., but there isn't a single social constructivist theory of IR. Constructivist presumptions are shared in varied degrees by some IR theories.

It should not come as a surprise that all of the social science disciplines underwent a "constructivist turn” and not just in the social sciences that gave rise to a variety of social constructivist-informed theories in those disciplines. In fact, this is ontologically true for almost all post-positivist approaches. In fields like sociology Berger/Luckman 1966 and political geography Reuben et al. 2003, for instance, social constructivism is prevalent. In linguistics, a constructivism is also present that draws from the so-called linguistic turn Ludwig Wittgenstein, John R. Searle 1995, pointing to the ontological position of acts of language and speech in social reality. Social constructivist IR theories all share the common trait of challenging the ontology of these theories contend that reality is socially created in various ways and for a variety of reasons. The term "social factors" is typically used to refer to "collectives" rather than specific people.

There are many different social constructivist theories of international relations for an excellent overview, see Reggie and Jorgensen 2010. To support the claim made in the previous sentence that

social constructivism is a philosophy of science, it might be helpful to review what you learned in our previous units about the distinction between epistemology and methodology. To it as "first- and second-order theorizing"; you are already familiar with "second order theorizing" from the first part of the book. "Second order" refers to philosophical positions regarding the nature of human agency, its relationship to structure, the role of ideas and material factors, etc. It includes all of the ontological, epistemological, and methodological presumptions also known as the philosophy of science that underpin the development of any hypothesis. "Social theory" is what refers to. First order, on the other hand, refers to "substantial," domain-specific ideas. A "substantial theory" in IR might be something like neorealist, new liberal, or neoinstitutionalist theory, among other things. According to, theories are "domain-specific" in that they pertain to certain social systems, like the international system, a specific institution, like sovereignty, and the specific relevant actors functioning within these specific structures, like states or non-state actors. Understanding the distinction between "social theory" and "International Relations theory" is essential when it comes to the central issue of Wendt's theoretical work.

In contrast, "second order theory" or "social theory" refers to the abstract categories of "actor," "structure,", "system," etc. and how these categories are interrelated. is concerned in the effects of first-order theorizing, or the substantive theory of IR, on second-order theorizing philosophy of science. This strategy is what he refers to as "applied philosophy". Following the logic of the preceding paragraphs, it then becomes clear that a substantial theory of IR first order theory would qualify as "social constructivist" when it shares assumptions of constructivism second order, the philosophy of science or other constructivist theories. Using his terminology of "social theory" for second order theorizing philosophy of science, the title of his seminal book perfectly reflects the approach he takes Social Theory of International Politics my italics The ontology of positivist IR theory is challenged by social constructivist IR theories.

Following along in this vein, Wendt's work is claimed to be ontologically "social constructivist" because of his theoretical position on the ideational nature of the deep unobservable structure of the international system that constitutes the agents and actors within it. Ontologically social constructivist theorizing is different from positivist IR theorizing because it focuses on shared meaning and norms; reality is perceived as a social construction. Informed by social constructivism, IR theorizing can be related to a variety of distinct ontological, epistemological, and methodological assertions. This is true more broadly of "post-positivist" IR theory. The only thing these methods have in common is that none of them are positivist. Though they are significantly different in terms of the fundamental philosophical viewpoints that underlie them, "post positivism" artificially unifies a range of methods with conflicting perspectives. It reflects a larger effort to find distinct, alternative met theoretical underpinnings for the development of IR theories after or "post"-positivism [4]–[6].

The ontological position of "structure" as a collection of ideas Collective and common knowledge

Thus, the term "post-positivism" unites theories from a wide range of fields, such as post-structuralism genealogical, discourse-analytical, and deconstructive studies drawing on the works of French philosophers Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, or Francois Leotard , critical theory based on the work of the Frankfurt School, normative IR theory, different types of feminist IR theory, Neo-Gramsci an and Neo- The variety of the so-called "post-positivist" perspectives will be made clear from the perspective of philosophy of science. It will also draw attention to the

similarities among positivist methodologies. To return to our discussion of Wendt, this argument is still applicable there as well. Wendt's work is essentially post-positivist in that it rejects the positivist ontology. In contrast, most traditional textbook presentations illustrate the differences between IR theories within a positivist philosophy of science approach. Although he seeks to maintain a positivist epistemological perspective, his post-positivist approach is more explicitly ontologically social constructivist. Ontology, or what the world is composed of, and epistemology, or the questions we should be asking, are the two main topics of the so-called "Third Debate" in international relations. According to him, the former should be the subject of the meta-theoretical Third Debate rather than the latter see also Wight 2006. Argues that the "content" of substantive IR theory i.e., ontology is distorted, necessitating a shift to the "nature" of the problems in international politics. When we apply philosophy i.e., philosophy of science as described above, the central question for in his social theory of International Politics, emerges as "given a similar substantive concern as Waltz, in other words, he envisions a brand-new kind of systems theory for international politics. In Step 1, we'll look at the ontological tenets of this brand-new kind of systems theory. Please take a moment to review your understanding of the consequences of various philosophical viewpoints for the study, explanation, and consequently practise of international politics before moving on.

We come back to this topic in more detail in this unit. This chapter may be the most theoretically challenging and sophisticated one in the book, as you probably noticed while reading the introduction. Step 1 The ontological status of "structure" as an unobservable and "object" of scientific inquiry The Social Theory of International Politics as developed by Alexander is based on a systems-theoretic standpoint 2006 217, my italics. As a result, you will likely need to allot more time for your work than has been the case for other units in the book. Wendt's goal is to develop a new method of structural theorizing that applies to international relations, emphasis added. This method is unique because it uses a new ontological position for "structure" as an unobservable. The idea of "structure" of the international system has been ontologically re-thought in comparison to other forms of "structural" theorizing mentions neorealism and world-systems theory. It is best to start with a reflection on his critique and a comparison of what he perceives to be two different types of "structural theory" in IR neorealism and world-systems theory. His renowned article "The agent-structure problem in International Relations" contains the fundamental justifications.

The paper, along with one by Dressler, signaled the start of the "constructivist turn" in international relations in the latter half of the 1980s. They are a component of the introduction's discussion of the post-positivist critique of positivist theory. The comparison and critique of neorealism and world-systems theory is formulated in of Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics. In the wake of these publications, the IR community has focused heavily on meta-theoretical questions related to the interaction of "actors" and "structures" in international politics see also Wight 2006 for an excellent overview. His central claim is that both attempts to establish a structural theory of international politics are founded on different ontologies neorealist theory is based on an individualist ontology, whereas world-systems theory is based on a holistic ontology. Both viewpoints are reductionist in Wendt's view either the actors are taken to be ontologically prior to the structure and thus "given" ontological individualism/neorealism or the structure is taken to be ontologically prior to the actors and thus "given" ontological structuralism/world-systems theory.

Self-study recap what you have learned about neorealist theorizing and about world systems theory. The agent-structure dilemma in International Relations, after that. Find out about the

ontological and methodological holistic state of "structure" in global systems theory vs the ontological and methodological individualist status of "structure" in neorealism. Complement and expand your understanding of the scientific philosophies that underlie neorealism and world systems theory. Wendt's attempt to develop a new structural theory has its philosophical foundation in scientific realism basically drawing on the work of Roy Bhakra and applies structuration theory from sociology Giddens to international relations. For didactic reasons, it is not advised to read the entire text, but rather to concentrate on pages before returning to the unit text. The "meta-physical foundations" of Wendt's new method of theorizing international politics are scientific realism and structuration theory, which are both necessary in order to base IR theory on a new ontology. Adopting them would have consequences for the "substantial" IR theory he envisions. We will now take a step-by-step look at the ontological perspective that underpins Wendt's novel approach to structural theorizing. Stated that "we cannot see the structure of the international system, whether conceptualized in material or social terms" while discussing the position of "unobservable" phenomena in scientific investigation. The validity of using unobservable like the structure of the international system as research subjects is called into question by this issue. How can we be certain of things we cannot see? Proposes a solution that centers I theory on a scientific realism interpretation of science. Please keep in mind that "scientific realism" refers to a philosophy of science, making it on par with positivism in that regard. The next section will begin with scientific realist assumptions about "structure" in order to understand more about the "new ontology" in depth. It should not be confused with "realism" as a substantive theory of international relations.

Interdependence between agents and social structures a "mutual constitution"

It should be emphasized that Wendt's choice to draw on scientific realism is part of a larger movement of re-orientation in the social sciences towards realist ontology. We shall discuss the importance of scientific realism for the scientific study of international politics. In this way, using Wendt's work accomplishes two goals at once it illustrates and reflects a broader ontological reorientation philosophy of science aspect while also demonstrating its application to IR theory as shown in Wendt's formulation of a specific theory of IR. The question of ontology is a highly relevant one because it relates to the nature, the "being" or "reality" of the subject of our studies, such as the state and according to him, this is true for both the social sciences the structures of any social organization and the world of natural sciences, where instances of unobservable "structures" include the atom and the double helix of DNA. Although it is argued that structures are real and knowable, scientific realism's ontological viewpoint is that they are unobservable.

The premise that structures are real and knowable but unobservable indicates that the state system and the state are taken to be "real structures" ontology for the sake of studying the international system. The reality of structures is presumed to be unrelated to human thought. They are also knowable, genuine scientific things epistemology since they are real structures that exist independently of human mind. More specifically, while being unobservable, they can be approached and studied by science because they are real and independent of the human mind. Scientific theories serve to describe the world of "observables" and "unobservable" in it. Thus, theory is seen as a reflection of reality "ontology before epistemology," which is the opposite of positivism "epistemology before ontology". To better explain these ideas, we can contrast them with the empiricist perspective of positivism. In scientific realism, the terms "states system" and "structure" refer to actual structures, whereas in empiricism terms like "the international states system" or "structure of the international system" are only tools or devices for the purpose of

organizing our experience i.e., concepts that refer to the real world. In brief Theories about unobservable are treated instrumentally rather than realistically in positivism. As we learned in the second unit of the book, observation enjoys a more favorable epistemic standing in positivism than theory "What we can claim to exist depends on what we can know, and we can only know what we can see". Empiricism holds that only observable reality exists and can be understood through science. This explanation implies that there is "no being" for the concept of "structure" in neorealism. As "structure" is a notion and a tool to organize our observation, it is not an ontological entity. Thus, in the positivist approach, structure is operationalized by "translation" into observables the distribution of power, with a concept of power as the capability of the state measurable. Despite these differences in the treatment of theoretical terms, scientific realism and positivism do share an important feature "Scientific realism assumes that reality exists independently of human beings - that subject and object are distinct - and can be discovered through scientific methods. This is true for unobservable as well, though, according to scientific realism, which is the opposite of positivism.

Causal Justification

At the heart of Wendt's work is an interest in the scientific investigation into the unobservable "deep structure" of the international system. He takes this approach with the intention of developing an argument against the claim from positivist IR that structural analysis of unobservable is unscientific. However, faces a fundamental problem sock realist interpretation of science depends on a distinction between subject and object. This is due to social systems' conceptual nature. This nature throws into question the claim that social ideational systems are independent of the human mind and casts doubt on the separation of subject and object, a requirement for knowledge through both positivist and realist science. Because it is based on a materialist ontology where an object-subject difference is possible, a scientific realist view of natural science appears to be uncontroversial. But what about social science based on scientific realism? Here, the major concern is how social types can continue to be "objective" despite their shared conceptual foundation.

How can it be said that they are genuine scientific objects in the same way as natural kinds are? The primary query, in Wendt's words, is "How is it conceivable to accept an idealist and holistic ontology while upholding a dedication to science, or positivism broadly construed". Is the social world’s ontology in line with scientific realism? is certain about this. Let us therefore proceed on to the line of argument for this affirmative position. We now know that Wendt's goal is to present a scientific realism perspective on the structure of social systems. Social structures are also genuine and legitimate "objects" of scientific study. He borrows the phrase "social kinds" from John Searle. The Construction of Social Reality and uses it in his publications. The phrase is used to describe "things in the social world," such as "society," "the state," "money," the "family," the "school," etc. It is in the nature of "social kinds" to be "made of ideas". More information on the social i.e., intrinsically ideational nature of "social kinds" will be studied and learned later. To establish the legitimacy of social structures as subjects of science that is, as objects of scientific inquiry for which a fundamental subject/object difference is shown to be possible in accordance with scientific realism we shall first begin with the arguments.

Remembering the "problem of social kinds" If social kinds are comprised of ideas, we can scarcely assert that they exist independently of humans and their minds, languages, etc. This issue is referred to as the mind/body or mind/matter problem on a more general, abstract, and philosophical

level Are the material/nature and the ideational separate beings or not? Wendt's response to this issue is philosophical materialism/physicalism, which holds that nature provides the ultimate, fundamental foundation for the social world. Despite the fact that nature is seen as the material basis of society, he maintains that society cannot be reduced to it, my italics. Wendt's position, which is known as philosophical materialism or physicalism, is defined as the idea that everything in the world is ultimately constituted of material components, most notably subatomic particles matter/material nature that can be investigated by physics. Commits to a social science that is not separate from the natural sciences, to put it briefly. The essential premise is that because to intrinsic206thought-independent patterns, the universe eventually comprises "natural kinds," or material beings with "causal power." Thus, "reality constraints" are created by the material entities. In other words, social science ideas should be consistent with what is known about natural types matter in natural science.

Constructive Justification

How can "social kinds" remain "objective" despite their foundation in common beliefs, as described by the positivist perspective known as "naturalism" in the second unit of Part 1? The response is a philosophical claim that society and/or the social world have physical, material properties as their ultimate material foundation. As a result, human beings are seen as "natural sorts" with "intrinsic material properties" like brains or genetic predispositions". The physical world body/matter/material, physical world is where the mind ideas/theories/the social, etc. Ultimately rests "In the end, a theory of social kinds must refer to natural kinds, including human bodies and their physical behavior, which are amenable to a causal theory of reference". Argues that there is a need for a theory that "is anchored to external reality", my italics while also taking into consideration the contribution of mind and language. "Constructivism without nature goes too far!" is how his materialist viewpoint summarizes. Emphasis added. Epistemological individualism naturalist viewpoint, often known as "constructivism with nature," enables one to think of "social kinds" as being "objective" and hence capable of being understood by human beings.

Wendt's argument, however, takes a second step that weakens the idea of an object-subject distinction for social kinds "Even though social kinds are not mind/discourse-independent of the collectivity that constitutes them, they are usually independent of the minds and discourse of the individuals who want to explain them", italics in the original. Social types are by their very nature formed jointly. This is an epistemological viewpoint known as "objectivism" that is connected to an ontologically idealist position to be explained in more depth in Step 2. The ability to view of the social environment as "confronting the individual as objective social facts" is provided by this attachment. The international system confronts the IR theorist as an objective social truth that is independent of his or her opinions, according to Wendt's definition of epistemological individualism, my italics. The same is true, according to Wendt, for those in charge of making political decisions "As lay scientists, foreign policy decision-makers experience a similar dualism of subject and object in their daily efforts to negotiate the world". In conclusion, argues that "social kinds" like a "state" or the "states system" confront researchers as objective facts. They need to be "reified" in order to become objects. The "states system" is believed to exist independently of social scientists as a result of reification. As a result, it becomes a valid subject for scientific study or for political judgement by foreign policy-maker.

CONCLUSION

Unlike the natural world, however, maintains that the subject object distinction varies when it comes to the social world, my italics because the degree to which material forces determine social kinds varies. The impact of material forces is regarded as a variable that may be objectively investigated. The "rule" of an object-subject distinction, however, ultimately holds true because of the fundamental naturalist viewpoint. Exceptions to this rule occur "when collectives become aware of the social kinds they are constituting and move to change them, in what might be called a moment of "reflexivity", emphasis added. Compared to the natural world, the social world is the only one that has this capacity for reflexivity. Accordingly, "if a social kind can 'know itself,' then it may be able to recollect its human authorship, get over the subject-object barrier, and produce new social kinds. Social scientific theories might become a part of their reality in such "moments of reflexivity". Only then does the line between subject and object become hazy and theory starts to influence reality. For Wendt, however, this occurs very infrequently and only as an exception. A different stance, according to Wendt, would make it difficult to take a scientific realist approach to the social world.

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CHAPTER 21
GLOBAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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ABSTRACT

The "ultimate argument for realism" is that science has been successful in helping to manipulate the world against the backdrop of the stance "ontology before epistemology" i.e., reality/ontology conditions theory/epistemology; theory as a reflection of reality. By developing scientific theories, we are gradually understanding the world and moving closer to the unobservable structures of reality. In accordance with scientific realism, contends that a theory is "true" to the extent that it captures the causal organization of the universe also known as the "correspondence of truth". We cannot know for sure that a claim of reference is true since there is only "approximate truth" because theories are always tested against other theories rather than against pre-theoretical foundations realism is anti-foundationalism. Summary for Wendt, the ideational structure of the social world does not preclude a scientific realist approach to the study of this world. Scientists must thus rely on "mature theories" that have succeeded in the real world. This is due to his opinion that social types have inherent powers and dispositions that exist independently of the mind/discourse of people who desire to know them and that there is an ultimate material basis for social types albeit to varied degrees.

KEYWORDS:

Epistemology, Ontology, Foundations, Realism, Sovereignty.

INTRODUCTION

There are main arguments establish the ontological status of unobservable social structures as "real" and as acceptable objects of scientific inquiry, irrespective of the topic of inquiry itself. is a social constructivist who is concerned in the impact of ideas? In contrast to Waltz, believes that there are other considerations that affect how the international system is structured. The role of the material base in international politics is relatively small, according to Wendt, even though it is still crucial for maintaining a causal theory of reference. This discussion now brings us back to the ideational nature/ontology of social structures in more detail. The ontological status of "structure" as "made of ideas". The position emphasizes the intersubjective nature of the social world, the importance of ideas, the function of constitutive laws and norms, and the endogenous formation of interests and ideas. Reality is socially produced, based on collective ideas. These features show various claims and presumptions about the "substance" of international politics when compared to ontologically positivist theorizing, and they also produce different theoretical conclusions about such crucial international political concerns as "anarchy" or "sovereignty". Wendt's first association with social constructivism was due to his emphasis on the ideational aspect of structure in his words, "Anarchy is what states make of it" a social construction that fluctuates based on the collective ideas that create the structure. Both the institution of "anarchy" and the structure of "sovereignty" are conceptualized theoretically as "social kinds"; they are created by the actions of individuals and depend on the collective beliefs they hold.

DISCUSSION

Human Rights Framework

Claimed that any social system has three "elements" to its construction a material structure, a structure of interests, and an ideational structure. In this section, we will learn more about the idealist ontology of social constructivism. He merely treats themes distinct structures separately for analytical reasons. The ideational aspect of social structure is particularly pertinent for Wendt; he defines the ideational structure of any social system as the "distribution of knowledge". According to Wendt, "the task of structural theorizing ultimately must be to show how the elements of a system fit together into some kind of whole." The conceptual "substance" of structure is knowledge, which may be shared or kept private. Individual actors' thoughts and views are classified as either private or "common" knowledge. Other actors do not share them. On the other hand, shared knowledge is communal knowledge; it is knowledge that is socially shared or "culture".

The intellectual foundations of Wendt's thought on collective ideas can be found in Emile Durkheim's work from Durkheim Individual and Collective Representations; see also Reggie. Through interaction, private beliefs can also develop into a social structure of knowledge. In other words, when individual ideas are combined, a systemic phenomenon emerges. Individual knowledge held by individual actors cannot be equated with collective knowledge, or "culture" as the ideational structure suggests holistic ontological and methodological perspective. Culture can take many different shapes, including customs, laws, institutions, beliefs, groups, etc. Wendt's idealist, holistic ontology thus points to a cultural structure of the international system. Three cultures of anarchy, to learn more about the ideational or cultural structure of the international system. He is curious about the impact that ideational structures have. Although this is ultimately an explanation-related topic, we need to learn more about the new ontology in order to comprehend the theoretical viewpoints that address it.

Agency and Social Structure Ontological Interdependence as "Mutual Constitution" recall what you already know about the ontological as well as epistemological aspects of the so-called "agent structure-problem" before moving on to the next step, which will outline the meta-theoretical perspective on agency and structure at the core of Wendt's theory. The ontological issue is crucial for Wendt's attempt to develop a "social theory" of international politics based on a new ontology. Individualists and holists both agree that agents and structures are somehow interdependent. The specific solution to the ontological aspect of the agent-structure problem is the key to understanding Wendt's project of formulating a new type of structural theorizing in IR.

Actors are considered to be ontologically prior to structure for ontological individualism such as neorealist theory, neo institutionalism, and new liberal theory. In this way, structure can be reduced to the characteristics and interactions of individual agents. Structure is thought to be ontologically prior to actors by ontological holists and structuralisms such as world-systems theory. Goes beyond the two positions by selecting a third way of thinking about agency and structure that draws on structuration theory from sociology Giddens. Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Ontologically, structure has irreducible emergent, systemic properties. An ontological perspective of the joint constitution of agency and structure is advanced by structuration theory. The agent-structure dilemma is addressed using it as an alternative social ontology to individualist and structuralism methods. The essential theoretical presumptions of agents and structures as mutually constitutive, or codetermined, beings can be summed up as follows

1 Agents and structures are considered to be mutually constitutive, but ontologically distinct, things. There is a reciprocal dependence and co-determination rather than an ontological hierarchy of agency or structure or what refers to as "dialectical synthesis". Agents and structures both have an impact on one another.
2 Actors and their interests are made up of structures. Actors constantly create and replicate structure at the same moment. Thus, the practices that make up such social systems operate as both a medium and a product of the structures of social systems. Social structures are the results of both intentional and unintentional human behavior. The structural context, on the other hand, assumes and mediates those acts.

Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism

The constitutive rules and norms inherent in structure allow it to constrain and permit action. Social structures are connected to spatial and temporal structures they are space-time specific. This is also known as the duality of structure a term from Giddens. In particular, theoretical research needs to incorporate time and space. Social theories are not Trans historical. In other words, the central tenet of structuration theory is the idea that agents and structure are ontologically interdependent. Although it is supposed that agents and structures are ontologically independent of one another, they are assumed to be ontologically distinct from one another. Please remember that structuration theory is a meta-theory and NOT a substantive theory. The ontological dependency is as "mutual constitution" or co-determination. It falls under what refers to as "second order" social theory, which can be used with or applied to first-order substantive IR theory. Thus, structuration theory does not address the specific, concrete social systems, agents, or structures that make up the "substance" of the social world. What are the advantages of using structuration theory to create a new structural theory of IR? Instead, it frames our thinking about it in a meta-theoretical way.

Because the perspective preserves the "generative and relational aspect" of structuralism while at the same time conceptually and methodologically NOT drawing on a separation of structures from the self-realizations and practices of human agent's duality of structure, no "reification" of structure, according to Wendt, structuration theory assists in moving beyond reductionist structural. The reasons for this can be found in the various ontological stances of the agent-structure problem as described above. The generative and relational aspect of structure can be characterized as a "set of internally related elements" such as agents, practices, technologies, territories, etc. These "elements" are part of the social structure of the system. They cannot be defined or independently of their place in the social structure because they are internally related, we know this position from the world-systems theory.

When applied to IR, the structuration theory viewpoint asserts that the internal relations of the system produce or constitute the state's agency. States can therefore only be described or as "states" in terms of their place in a global systems structure. The concepts of "state," "state power," and "foreign policy" are all made possible by structures, which also serve as the conditions of existence for states and state action. Structures also produce agents and their behavior. The characteristics of a relation's elements are inherent to the relationship; they do not exist independently of its neorealism, which holds that structures are externally related to preexisting state agents, is in opposition to this viewpoint. It is evident from what has been written thus far and related to the "substantive" theory of IR as the outcome of "applied philosophy" that sees "agency" as the "state." Sovereignty is an example of a structural relation; sovereignty is an organizing principle of the interstate system. The central question is thus how the generative and

relational aspects of structure constitute states agency. Social structures do not, however, exist independently of the actions and behaviors of agents. Only through the actions of states do the deep structures of the state system exist. The structuralism of world systems theory, in contrast, asserts that structure has an ontological priority and determines or prescribes the actions of the actors. According to Wendt, there are two types of structure that are pertinent internal organizational structures and external social structures.

With an emphasis on structuration theory and a comprehensive ideational perspective on structure, agents are primarily perceived as being constituted by external social structures. Both constitute a "constituting social structure," a set of relationships that define a social kind as samples for this include water being constituted by an atomic structure, human beings constituted by genetic structure and brain, or states constituted internally by organizational structures. Because of their internal structure "anatomy", actors are able to reflect on their activities. Reasonable action, reflection and adoption of behavior, and the ability to make decisions are all therefore possible 1987 359 applies the idea of internal structure to states and treats them as agents/persons a position that has been heavily criticized but revised in his later work for a critique and auto-critique of the treatment of the state as an agent/person see the contributions in Guzan/Leander

The distinction of internal organizational structures and external social structures is demonstrated by using the example of state sovereignty here, "internal structure" refers to exclusive political control and territorial monopoly and the legitimate use of violence. For example, "internal sovereignty", is treated as the intrinsic properties and causal powers of agents/states. "External sovereignty" exists because of states' mutual recognition of each other's sovereignty, a relational, generative aspect. Sovereignty is an institution social structure between states that is decisive for their rights. Sovereignty as the external social relation does not exist independently of or prior to these internal rights. On the other hand, internal rights do not exist when they have not been constructed by the external social relations of mutual recognition see in more detail. The ontological and conceptual interdependence of agents and structures as mutually constitutive agencies as derived from structuration theory thus has implications for explanation. We will learn about the specific approach to explanation in the next step. For this purpose, please keep in mind that Wendt is interested in the effects of unobservable ideational structures [4]–[6].

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

A question-driven approach just as structuralism holistic and agent-based individualist approaches are distinct in their underlying ontology, structural and individualist approaches are distinct in their explanation of social action. An explanation that takes "structure" as the starting point such as in the structuralism approach of world-systems theory epistemologically usually draws on "understanding" or interpretation. Recall what you have learned about interpretation in our learning unit on world-systems theory. An explanation that takes actors as the starting point actor-centered approach, such as in neo-institutionalism or new liberal theory usually involves "explanation" recall "explanation" in neo-institutionalist and new liberal theory. For Wendt, such a distinction between an "insider approach to knowledge" understanding and a "outsider approach to knowledge" explaining is not helpful. What he is criticizing is the "second-class status" for "understanding" in the social sciences; for explaining and understanding.

Explaining and Understanding International Relations: Traditionally, only "explaining" is associated with "science". This comprises an epistemological perspective that equates positivism with science a position. Takes a position against the view that there is a distinction between

explanation and understanding as science and non-science. For him, explanation and understanding are not mutually exclusive. Explanation and understanding should not be distinguished by drawing a line between "science" versus "non-science", but by the type of questions that the researcher is asking. Hence epistemologically suggests a "question-oriented approach". For him, non-causal inquiry traditionally associated with understanding can be explanatory "The distinction between Explanation and Understanding is not one between explanation and description, but between explanations that answer different kinds of question, causal and constitutive" my italics. Both are necessary elements of a complete explanation of social action 1987. This epistemological position will be elaborated in the next section in more detail.

In order to understand the question-oriented approach to explanation, it is important to keep in mind that scientific realism emphasizes "ontology before epistemology". In other words, as opposed to positivism, it is ontology and not epistemology that legitimates scientific practice 91, see also Step 1. For the purposes of explanation, this reversal implies that the form of scientific explanation depends on the nature and causal properties of entities. In short, the type and form of explanation depends on ontology. Explanation in turn depends on the object of the question, on "what is taken to be problematic" 1987. The position of an ontological and conceptual interdependence of agents and structures as "mutually constitutive" structuration theory thus has implications for explanation. These implications emerge because, ontologically, both agency and structure are involved in the production of the social world mutual constitution, co-determination. Makes a distinction between two types of questions: "Why did X happen rather than Y? and "How is action X possible and what?" The former is a causal question to be answered by causal theory, the latter constitutive question to be answered by constitutive theory. Causal theory historical explanation Causal theory offers answers to Why-questions and requires a type of explanation in the format "X causes Y". It is the classical form of explanation that rests on independent and dependent variables and establishes a causal relation between them. That is, X and Y exist independently of each other, X precedes Y in time, and without X, Y would not have occurred. This type of causal explanation is an explanation of changes in the state of some variables. Factors of a change in the dependent variable exist independently and temporally prior to the transition.

Dependency Theory

It establishes causal relation of temporally sequenced observed events. Explanation is thus a generalization about observable, sequenced behavior. Calls it a "historical explanation" see. Constitutive theory structural explanation. The type of questions answered by constitutive theories is different; at the core are how-possible-questions and what-questions. Remember, underneath is the ontological position of a mutual constitution of agency and structure. An answer to a low-possible-question thus is to show how the properties of a social system are constituted. Constitutive theory offers knowledge about the conditions of possible natural and social kinds. How-possible questions explain "how the elements of a social kind are composed and organized so that it has the properties that it does" also called "morphological" explanation, a term borrowed from Hague land 1978. In contrast to how-possible-questions, what-questions are requests for what it is that "instantiates" a phenomenon not why. It is also called "explanation by concept". An example for a what-question is, what kind of po-216litical system is the EU.

In the absence of the structures, the properties of a phenomenon would not exist. This is a "conceptual" necessity, NOT a causal one as described above for the case of causal theories and explanation. Presents the example of the Cold War the factors constituting the social kind "Cold

War" define what a Cold War is but no causal determination. Here the assumptions of causal explanation, i.e., dependent and independent variable plus temporal sequence if A, then B, are not applicable. The factors constituting the Cold War do not exist apart from a Cold War nor do they ontologically precede the "Cold War" in time. Rather, according to Wendt, "when they come into being, a Cold War comes into being with them, by definition and at the same time" my italics. When the constituting conditions vary, the effects of constitutive structures vary. However, in this case the dependency in this variation is conceptual and not causal. Answers to constitutive questions of the what-type are descriptive but explanatory.

They classify observations and "unify" them as parts of a whole. "Explanations what explain by subsuming observations under a concept as opposed to a law" emphasis orig. Explanation by concepts is thus about achieving explanatory power by "unification" Self-study Learn more about the type "explanation by concept", that is, explanation by classifying and unifying complex phenomena under a concept, based on the example of the EU in the text. What is the Unmake use of the concepts of "federation", "international state", "postmodern state", "confederation", "international regime", "governance without government", "neo-medievalism". Summary In line with scientific realism, a constitutive explanation is usually the identification and description of the underlying causal mechanisms of the structure that generated the social phenomenon. Underlying causal mechanisms make an event naturally necessary ontology before epistemology. There is a need for abductive inference from observable phenomena to the existence of underlying naturally necessary relations between cause-and-effect unobservable structures and their effects. Explanation thus is showing how the unobservable causal mechanism which makes observable regularities possible works. Explanation is a process of abduction based on the question "what must exist for these events to happen?" It is about abstracting from the observable phenomena to the social and internal organizational structures which make the phenomena and events possible. A hint These statements of explanation are easier to understand if you always bring them back to their ontological positions remember the positions on agency and structure of structuration theory, and that ontology is before epistemology. For example, structures do NOT CAUSE the properties of social kinds as being antecedent conditions for a subsequent effect; instead, they constitute these properties, they make those properties possible. Social kinds are constituted in a holistic way by the external structures in which they are embedded. What these kinds are what or how they come into being how possible is dependent on the specific social structure[7]–[9] .

CONCLUSION

This is exactly the line that a constitutive explanation takes because ontology before epistemology reflects ontology. In sum holds that "ideas or social structures have constitutive effects when they create phenomena – properties, powers, dispositions, meanings, etc., that are conceptually or logically dependent on those ideas or structures, that exist only 'in virtue of' them". A constitutive explanation describes causal mechanisms and inference ranging from observable phenomena to underlying causal mechanisms unobservable structures and their constitutive effects, not subsuming events under laws and regularities. To ask constitutive questions is usually the domain of interpretivists, critical theorists and postmodernists, and requires interpretive methods. Constitutive theories thus have a large descriptive dimension, but there is also an explanatory function for this type of theory. In fact, what offers is epistemologically quite a "relaxed" position. The prosecution of Milosevic at the ICTY is the first instance in history of a former head of state being tried for crimes against humanity, and Jean Kumbanad's conviction as Rwanda's former prime minister was the first instance in which a head of government was found guilty of the crime

of genocide. Despite the international community's desire to hold those responsible for crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia accountable, the tribunals quickly revealed significant flaws. The biggest of these is the lengthy process and exorbitant cost.

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CHAPTER 22

HUMANITARIAN CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW

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ABSTRACT

This book's focus has mostly been on what may be referred to as the structural elements of international relations, such as the state system, power, economy, and war. This is consistent with how international relations has developed as a field of study. Both neorealism and neoliberalism regard the level of the international system as the most fruitful level of analysis and the only one capable of producing condensed and practical insights into the most crucial topics under study. Constructivists prefer to focus on the state as the most important player, while they have showed a little more interest in "agency" than "structure." This chapter will look at the people who live in different states and within them, sharing some similarities with the previous one. At first, it can be difficult to understand why people should matter in international relations. After all, there are numerous other fields of study that might provide light on people inside political bounds. Our main concern must surely be how those collectives of people states, respond to the limitations of the international system and to one another. Indeed, this argument would be valid if states were considered sovereign in accordance with conventional standards. The Westphalian system of legend, though, might today be nothing more than that.

KEYWORDS:

Humanitarian Conflict, International Relations, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, Sovereign

INTRODUCTION

The shift's support for normative reasoning in IR is the most important theoretical implication of this. In contrast to normative theories, the mainstream theories of international relations assert that they are explanatory and value-free. on ethics in the global system has often been viewed as utopian or pointless. States in anarchy make the judgements they must base on systemic imperatives and for the neorealist national-interest calculations. Morality only exists inside the boundaries of the sovereign state, which upholds and supports its citizens' values and so makes morality feasible; as a result, IR theorists are unconcerned with morality. While normative theorists take issue with the second assumption regarding the connection between morality and state borders, post-positivist thinkers contest the first claim that the prevailing theories are value-free. The question of whether or not the state facilitates morality becomes in importance as the Westphalian system is questioned. The ethical relationships between individuals and states, as well as between individuals living in different states, are currently being studied with a new vigor, and normative theorists feel validated in their claim that studying how agents should behave as well as how they actually do is essential if we are to understand a rapidly changing world. This is a theory of the structure of the international system, and a good question would be how structure relates to ‘agency’ – what does it mean to say that states must behave in certain kinds of ways? Again, how can it be assumed that a balance of power will always emerge or that states will be able to manage

a bipolar system, given that they do not consciously wish to create balances – indeed, most states would prefer to eliminate potentially threatening states [1]–[3].

DISCUSSION

World Wide human rights

The establishment of the human rights regime saw a spike in activity after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights created the notion that people have rights as human beings that they should be able to assert against their own governments, but until recently, little progress had been made in ensuring that all people could assert these rights. Human rights were frequently utilized as a geopolitical bargaining chip during the Cold War in order to pressure or humiliate Eastern European regimes. After 1989, governmental obstacles to the idea of human rights' universal adoption were removed, and technological advancements allowed NGOs working to advance human rights to exercise greater influence than ever before. The number of states ratifying the six key human rights agreements and covenants, which has expanded significantly since 1990, may be the most striking illustration of the increased activity. Over the course of the decade, the number of states that have ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights increased from around 90 to almost 150. The fact that over 170 nations took part in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, when participants reaffirmed their commitment to upholding human rights, also served as further evidence of the regime's broad support. Such a gathering hadn't happened in 25 years; thus, this was a first. The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly agreed to establish the position of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which carries with it the responsibility of directing the UN human rights programmer and fostering widespread respect for human rights. The amount of human rights-related activities carried out by UN field operations, such as the observation of human rights abuses, as well as other advisory services, increased significantly in the 1990s. This is partially a result of persistent pressure from non-governmental organizations NGOs advocating the "mainstreaming" of human rights in UN operations, which stems from the idea that efforts at conflict prevention and reduction need to be linked with steps meant to reduce human rights violations. Thus, as an essential component of post-conflict peace building, UN operations in El Salvador, Cambodia, Guatemala, Haiti, Burundi, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have all given priority to establishing a framework of respect for human rights. The dissemination of human rights concepts in the 1990s was greatly aided by NGOs. By 2000, there were 37,000 officially recognized worldwide NGOs, with many of them professing to serve as a "global conscience," advocating for widespread human interests beyond national boundaries and concentrating on human rights problems. NGOs have a variety of effects on the human rights system. Organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC, Doctors Without Borders, and Oxfam not only seek to alleviate suffering directly on the ground but also advocate on behalf of the patients they care for to encourage the adherence of human rights treaties and humanitarian law. The main goals of groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are to keep an eye on how businesses and governments behave and to raise awareness of violations of human rights. They exert pressure by obtaining media attention, a skill they have mastered over the past ten years as media mentions of human rights NGOs have grown tremendously, and they have achieved a number of major successes. Making private actors' part of the conversation about human rights and turning it into the "business of business" has been a major accomplishment. Prior to the 1990s, MNCs argued that their proper position in international trade was to maintain objectivity and

refrain from interfering in the political processes of the governments of the countries they were doing business in. By the middle of the 1990s, significant initiatives by Amnesty International in the UK and Human Rights Watch in the US were in motion to urge large business to take on economic and social obligations proportionate to their influence and power, particularly in the area of human rights. Companies like Gap, Nike, Reebok, Levi IR, and Individual 209 Strauss significantly improved the working conditions in their overseas factories and integrated internationally acknowledged human rights standards into their business practices as a result of these campaigns and the consumer pressure that accompanied them [4]–[6].

International law and Human rights

Oil companies have also been under pressure, though with less success. By organizing tens of thousands of people against Shell in 1993, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in Nigeria was able to make the issue a global one. They pushed the biggest oil corporation in the world to temporarily halt production, but the Nigerian government retaliated by detaining, imprisoning, and occasionally killing Ogoni campaigners. Additionally, campaigns have drawn attention to the operations of British Petroleum in Colombia, Mobil Oil in Indonesia, Total and Unocal in Myanmar, and Enron in India, all of which were said to be supporting grave violations of human rights. Most frequently, these efforts have led to a flurry of press releases from the companies involved and some well-planned public relations activities, but little actual change. At the end of the decade, when a number of multinational corporations, notably Shell, BP-Amoco, and Statoil, the state-owned oil company of Norway, unveiled policies that included a focus on human rights, the UK saw the most substantial consequences. NGOs have also succeeded by applying pressure to governments and intergovernmental organizations IGOs. The Mine Ban Treaty of 1997 was made possible by the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, a coalition of more than 1,400 NGOs in 90 countries that won the Nobel Peace Prize. 25 million people signed the Jubilee 2000 Campaign for Developing World Debt Relief petition, which had such a significant impact on Western governments and international financial institutions that $30 billion in debt was erased. The Rome Conference and Treaty that founded the International Criminal Court ICC, which is discussed in the following section of this chapter, was greatly aided by the Coalition for an International Criminal Court. Human rights organizations have gained a significant influence over many IGO activities as a result of their success in influencing public opinion and applying pressure. They assist in developing and frequently staff the human rights operations that now go along with UN missions and keep an eye on how well peace accords or UN Security Council resolutions are being carried out locally. The development of the concept of human rights to cover social, economic, and women's rights has also been driven by NGOs, but it is in these areas that the criticisms of the human rights regime are most effectively made. The human rights system is based on concepts of substantive fairness, of what we can demand of others and what we owe to others because of our shared humanity, although there is a tendency in Western human rights theory to priorities civil and political rights over social and economic rights. The separation of global distributive justice from the more general objective of global justice has been questioned by socialist states, Asian leaders who signed the Bangkok Understanding International Relations Declaration, and increasingly by Western NGOs and thinkers like Henry Shoe, Charles Beit, and Thomas Page. When so many people around the world live in abject poverty, can human freedom be sufficiently promoted? Shue contends that a person cannot enjoy any other rights until they have the necessities for a relatively healthy and active existence, such as clean air and water, enough food, clothing, and housing, as well as some basic health care or subsistence rights. He

argues that these economic rights are a fundamental requirement for the concept of rights and not an add-on Shoe 1980. The allocation of material resources is important for justice, according to Beit and Page, who also contend that economic disparities cannot be explained by morally arbitrary factors like national boundaries. Thus, any debate of human rights should include the problem of global inequality. This idea has encountered a great deal of opposition in the West, in part because of the reasonable concern that, if economic rights prove to be very difficult to achieve, the entire human rights regime may suffer, and, one suspects, in part because of the much less justifiable worry that, if economic rights were to be acknowledged as being important for achieving human flourishing, the West would have to give up some of the advantages it has long enjoyed. The nature of the rights bearer himself the gendered phrase is used here on purpose is also a topic of discussion in critiques of the human rights regime, in addition to the relative importance of certain rights. A human right suggests a form of universal human identity that goes beyond the national, ethnic, and religious identities that were the subject of the previous chapter. People who support human rights believe that everyone has these rights simply because they are human, regardless of the group, society, or country they are a part of. This view, which is frequently referred to as "cosmopolitan," is justified by the assumption that because people are so similar, the things we have in common must have political significance. A counterargument asserts that humans have very little significance as individuals, which underlies the objections of critics from the West and the East. Instead, rather than being created before social contacts, our identities come from being entrenched in them. On this ground, the concept of human rights cannot legitimately assert its universal applicability. Numerous feminist criticisms of the system of universal human rights are based on this claim. In Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was created to protect the rights of both men and women, it is stated that human rights apply to all people equally and "without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, or other status." Feminist critics contend that the regime's gendered vision of the individual is at its core the typical rights holder is a guy who serves as the head of his household and the primary wage earner. According to Jean Bethe Alsatian, the Classical Greek division between the private and public spheres can be used to pinpoint the origins of IR and the Individual 211 definition of the rights holder Alsatian 1981, 1987. The rights described in the Declaration are intended to safeguard the person against arbitrary governmental interference while they are acting in their official capacities as members of the polity or workers, without affecting their private lives. Women's experiences of violation—justified by family, religion, or culture—are not covered by the human rights framework since historically they have been restricted to the private realm, where they seek protection from other people rather than the state. Domestic abuse, rape during marriage, and unequal property rights are nonetheless legal in many places and too often overall. The division between public and private appears to have had an impact even during times of war. Although the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 stipulates that women must be safeguarded from any assaults on their "honor," including rape, these crimes against women have traditionally been seen as spoils of war, weapons, or unavoidable side effects of battle. On how to most effectively advance the welfare of women within the international framework, feminist academics and activists disagree.

Humanitarian assistance

According to theorists like Catherine MacKinnon 1993, the regime itself is so strongly gendered that a few tiny tweaks here and there would never be sufficient to adequately take into account the experiences of women. They contend that as many women are marginalized, excluded from public life, or do not have access to the social and economic conditions and freedom from the danger of

violence that give citizenship meaning, the language of rights has no resonance for them. It has been proposed that the idea of human rights be fully replaced by ideas like empowerment and a "capabilities approach," which are purportedly more equal and responsive to the various demands of individuals under diverse social structures. Others, like Hilary Charlesworth 1994, contend that changes can be made to the current human rights system to better reflect feminist concerns—changes that have already been made to some extent. They believe that in order to challenge long-held beliefs about the inferior status of women, a commitment to the idea of a universal humanity and the equality of persons inherent in it is required. They cite successes like the criminalization of gender and sexual violence in the Rome Statute and the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CEDAW by 177 states as of March 2004 as proof of the human rigor. The remarkable number of states as of August 2004 that have ratified international human rights agreements like CEDAW and the Mine Ban Treaty, the predominance of human rights discourse in the daily operations of international financial institutions like the MNCs, the IMF, and the World Bank, and the unprecedented growth of human rights-based NGOs all point to the possibility that. The human rights regime was unquestionably seen as impregnable by many states and international organizations by the end of the 1990s. The 9/11 attacks on the US, however, had consequences that call into question that assertion. According to a 2004 assessment by Amnesty International, armed group violence and government reactions to these groups have led to the most persistent assault on human rights and international humanitarian law in 50 years. Domestic security has been pushed for further up the Bush Administration's agenda as a result of the War on Terror. The US has received harsh criticism for its "pick and choose" approach to international humanitarian law, while being a driving force behind the improvement of human rights over the past 60 years. The way it treats "enemy combatants" at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, its willingness to suspend the Convention against Torture if it is required for national security, and its failure to publicly condemn atrocities done abroad in the name of counterterrorism are all cited as examples. Since 2001, the US and numerous other states have implemented legislation that permits the detention of suspected foreign terrorists without charge, broad ‘stop and search' and surveillance powers, and considerable restrictions on political and religious opposition. It should be highlighted that many of the new measures are being justified in terms of the human right to security, making it unlikely that these recent changes in law and policy would result in a longer-term global rejection of human rights norms. Nevertheless, disregarding international norms may have damaged the US's reputation to the point where it will now be much more difficult for it to demand specific standards of other countries when it comes to how they treat either their own citizens or American citizens and service members. Rights and international law the concept of human rights was codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The Preamble to the Declaration states that human rights should be safeguarded by the rule of law, but significant progress was not made in this direction until the 1990s. The evolving framework, which comprises of numerous treaties, ad hoc tribunals, regional courts, and the future International Criminal Court, is focused on protecting people from the egregious human rights violations associated with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. According to the human rights regime, some behaviors, such as torture, slavery, and arbitrary imprisonment, may be illegal regardless of their legal standing in a given country and the status of the perpetrator. The execution of this position poses a serious challenge to the idea of the sovereign state, and the protection from prosecution that Heads of State and other state leaders have always had. Major nations, including the US, Russia, and China, oppose this challenge, but Slobodan Milosevic's trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is still

ongoing as this book is being written. This is the first time in history that a former head of state has been tried for such crimes on 66 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. In order to comprehend how the apparent revolution of the 1990s came about, this section will explore significant advances in international law and concepts of responsibility throughout the twentieth century. War crimes investigations and prosecutions are not new. Although there are records of such trials dating back to Ancient Greece, up until the 20th century, alleged war criminals were only tried in national tribunals under domestic law, which in practice meant that the offenders would not be held accountable if they held high positions within the state. One of the International Committee of the Red Cross's founders, Gustav Moniker, advocated for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. Its development spanned more than 100 years, and the majority of the steps were taken at the conclusion of significant wars. There were proposals for the international prosecution of belligerent state leaders for acts of aggression and flagrant violations of the rules of war during both the First and Second World Wars. A special international court was established by the Treaty of Versailles to trial the Kaiser and German military leaders. Despite the fact that no cases were ever brought against anyone because Germany refused to turn over suspects and the Netherlands offered shelter to the Kaiser, the demand signaled a shift in public opinion in favor of holding war criminals accountable on a global scale. The Allies rejected the idea of an international criminal court during World War II and instead established temporary International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo.

These tribunals rejected the notion of sovereign immunity, started the process of making major human rights breaches international crimes, and started focusing on individuals as the relevant actors rather than states or organizations. The UN and its many bodies experienced severe divisions as a result of the Cold War, and progress on international criminal law virtually ceased for more than three decades. Demands for a permanent, centralized system didn't start to increase again until 1989. The campaign for an international criminal court was not started by the West, which is perhaps surprising given the claims made by various scholars that the international institutional system is a tool of Western hegemony, but rather Trinidad and Tobago, who were attempting to control activities related to the international drug trade taking place on their soil and requested that the UN reconvene the International Law Commission to establish a permanent institution in 1989. Reports of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia surpassed the Commission's work, leading to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ICTY by the Security Council in 1993. A year later, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTR was founded as a subsidiary body of the Security Council in reaction to the deaths of an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. There are still questions about whether the tribunals were a proper response to these atrocities or merely a cynical, inexpensive means to satisfy the demand that "something be done." Nevertheless, the tribunals have established a number of crucial precedents regarding the circumstances and individuals that fall under the purview of international criminal law. Previous war crimes trials had all focused-on acts that occurred during interstate hostilities; however, the ICTY has the authority to prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity whether they were committed during an external or internal armed conflict, and the ICTR Statute makes no mention of armed conflict at all, implying that these crimes can occur in a state's territory during times of peace. This is a very important step towards upholding human rights as well as a test of state sovereignty. The prosecution of Milosevic at the ICTY is the first instance in history of a former head of state being tried for crimes against humanity, and Jean Kumbanad's conviction as Rwanda's former prime minister was the first instance in which a head of government was found guilty of the crime of genocide. Despite the international community's desire to hold

those responsible for crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia accountable, the tribunals quickly revealed significant flaws. The biggest of these is the lengthy process and exorbitant cost [7]–[9].

CONCLUSION

Even though the ICTY has received about $700 million since 1993 and the ICTR has gotten more than $500 million since 1996, the number of successfully concluded trials is incredibly low. These sums of money have funded 51 trials at the ICTY in ten years and 19 trials at the ICTR in eight years. The wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia each had a unique impact on the development of the movement for an ICC. In doing so, they demonstrated the advantages of having a permanent international body devoted to the administration of criminal justice. They also brought attention back to widespread human rights violations that occur during times of conflict and highlighted the significant practical challenges encountered in establishing and operating ad hoc tribunals. According to Schabas 2001 vii, the tribunals served as an important "laboratory" for international justice that advanced the cause for the establishment of an ICC. At the UN Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which took place in Rome, representatives from 160 governments, 33 IGOs, and a group of 236 NGOs gathered. A draught statute was created and approved by the IR and Individual 215 final session with a majority vote. A total of 120 governments supported the Rome Statute; 21 states including India and a number of Islamic, Arab, and Caribbean states abstained; and 7 states voted against it. Although the votes were not recorded, it is widely believed that the US, China, Israel, Libya, Iraq, Qatar, and Yemen abstained. The Statute became effective on July 1, 2002, following ratification by 60 states.

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CHAPTER 23

THEORIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

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ABSTRACT

The trial of a former head of state for violations of human rights against foreign nationals during peacetime in the sovereign territory of his own state in a foreign court. Pinochet was ultimately extradited to Chile in 2000 for medical reasons, and despite the Chilean Supreme Court removing his immunity from domestic prosecution in August 2004, it is doubtful that he will be tried due to ongoing rumors of his poor health. Human rights organizations have been working to pursue charges against several former dictators who are currently living in exile, including Hessen Haber, the former president of Chad, and Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia. The Pinochet ruling has a range of effects. According to Marc Weller, it is a significant triumph for the notion of the rule of international law and signals a change in perspective about the foundations of non-intervention and state sovereignty Weller. These pillars of the Westphalian system can today be viewed as global constitutional privileges, granted to states only to the extent required to sustain peaceful international relations. The House of Lords decided that Pinochet would still be entitled to immunity if he were still the head of state, which might have a negative impact. Future tyrants may be enticed to hold onto power for as long as possible and at the expense of immense suffering for the people of their states if they are aware that quitting office would immediately result in the loss of their immunity. The European Court of Human Rights is the organization that possibly sovereigntists should be most concerned about. It is considered that this Court is the most effective international mechanism in the world for the defense of human rights. It was established to uphold the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

KEYWORDS:

Convention, Fundamental Freedoms, Human rights, Protection, Public Health.

INTRODUCTION

The Court is now operational, and investigations into atrocities perpetrated in Northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are ongoing. Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and maybe acts of aggression are all crimes that could be prosecuted under the Rome Statute. However, the Court will only have jurisdiction over these crimes if a definition can be agreed upon, which is improbable. The Court is not a department of the UN but a separate organization. State Parties those that have accepted the Rome Statute, voluntarily made donations, and the UN all contribute to its funding. The Court has the authority to bring charges for offences committed after the Statute came into effect and committed either on the soil of a State Party or by one of its citizens. In recognizing that crimes against humanity and genocide can be prosecuted in both periods of peace and internal armed conflict, it follows the precedent set by the ICTY and ICTR. But only when there is an armed conflict within a country May war crimes be prosecuted. Individuals are treated equally before the Court, which also follows the tribunals, and those who have positions in the government, bureaucracy, parliament, or military do not receive special treatment. There are three ways that cases might be presented before the court. They may be

referred by State Parties, the Security Council, or the Prosecutor; non-State Parties, NGOs, and private citizens may also participate in the process by requesting that the Prosecutor open an inquiry.

DISCUSSION

Interdependence of economies

The location of the crime and the perpetrator's nationality are irrelevant when a matter is referred by the Security Council since the Court has jurisdiction as a result of the Council's superior legal standing. This last provision, which establishes automatic jurisdiction and no longer requires state agreement, is especially concerning to non-State Parties. Parties, whether State or non-State, may choose to have cases heard there. The Court will only use its jurisdiction in accordance with the complementarity principle if the states that ordinarily have national jurisdiction are unable or unwilling to do so. The ICC cannot become involved if a national court is prepared and able to exercise jurisdiction in a specific instance. The Rome Statute's proposed role for the Security Council is highly debatable, and the Court's relationship with the Council may ultimately determine the Court's success. As a result of the Security Council's principal role under Chapter VII 216 Understanding International Relations of the UN Charter for maintaining international peace and security, all states must abide by and implement the Security Council's decisions. The Council's potential to obstruct the Court's work was a major worry at the Rome Conference. States who weren't Council Permanent Members opposed politicking of the international judicial system. Permanent Members made the case that judgements about potential criminal charges shouldn't be made while talks to advance global peace and security were ongoing. The agreement struck enables the Council to bar the Court from using its jurisdiction by adopting a favorable resolution that is renewable every year and has the effect of postponing investigations for periods of up to a year. It is important to note that any member of the Permanent Five may veto a deferral but not an investigation or prosecution because the Council must be acting in accordance with Chapter VII. The Court's role in identifying and prosecuting war criminals may help the Council in its mission to uphold international peace and security. In theory, the connection between the Court and the Council will be mutually beneficial. Due to its capacity to effectively provide the Court universal jurisdiction when it receives a case referral, the Council in turn could assist the ICC in enforcing international criminal law more generally. The likelihood of ongoing conflicts appears to be higher, in large part because of US hostility towards the Court as the most potent member of the Council. The US is not the only country that opposes the ICC. Only the United Kingdom and France, two of the Permanent Five and perhaps the weakest, have accepted the Rome Statute. The Court is presided over by European, Latin American, and African states, and none of the nuclear powers outside of Europe have ratified the pact. Even yet, although not alone, the US's lack of assistance is the most concerning. It is exceedingly challenging to imagine how any significant international institution could succeed without the US. One only needs to reflect on the demise of the League of Nations, which was largely attributed to a lack of US support. US assistance was crucial in bringing Milosevic to justice internationally the US required Milosevic's extradition before Serbia could receive a sizable economic aid package, and American intelligence technology allowed for his tracking and capture. Therefore, it is important to look closely at the American stance on the Court. The US Government backed the creation of an ICC from 1995 to 2000, but it consistently lobbied for a Court that could be overseen by the Security Council or that exempted US officials and citizens from punishment. The United States signed the Rome Statute on the last day of the Clinton Administration, expressing a wish to continue the discussion. The deal was fundamentally

faulty, according to President Clinton at the time, and would not be sent to the Senate for passage. The Bush Administration adopted a far more assertive strategy. Since then, it has passed the American Service members Protection Act, which gives the president the power to use "all necessary" means, including perhaps invading the Netherlands, to free Americans who have been taken into custody by the court. It renounced the US signature on the Statute as well as any legal IR and Individual 217 implications that might have resulted from it. Additionally, it states that the US will stop providing military support to ICC State Parties that refuse to sign BIAs bilateral immunity agreements with the US. These accords state that neither party will submit any of the other's current or former military members, government officials, or other citizens to the ICC's authority. The US wants all states to sign BIAs, and as of June 2004, 89 states were reported to have done so.

Finance and Trade

In order to win support for UN Security Council Resolution 1422, which guaranteed that non-State Parties contributing to UN forces were excluded from the Court, the US also threatened to veto all upcoming peacekeeping missions. The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse crisis in 2004 prevented the Council from passing this resolution again after it was passed and renewed in 2003. Today, the US relies on BIAs to shield its staff from legal action. So why is the US so adamantly opposed to the Court when it is a nation renowned for its long-standing support for human rights and dedication to promote them around the globe? Their objection is mostly based on two concerns the risks to US military troops and uncertainty about the scope and nature of international law. Practical worries center on the expectation that the US will send its military to "hot spots" more frequently than other nations because it is the only superpower still in existence. This makes it more susceptible to charges and trials with political overtones. This argument has merit, but it does not explain why the US is unwilling to adopt the British stance, which is to ratify the Statute while pledging to investigate any claims through its domestic judicial system, prohibiting its citizens from testifying before the judicial. The most influential part of the US stance is more focused on the developing international social structure. Politicians like Jesse Helms and lawyers like David B. Rifkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey have both made the "new sovereigntist" argument that the Court poses a serious threat to state sovereignty because it could potentially have jurisdiction over US citizens even if the US does not ratify the treaty. This is seen as a fundamental violation of both customary treaty practice and UN Charter protections of national sovereignty. The critique also takes a stance on international ethics, contending that since there is no universal agreement on moral questions, the shift from state to individual responsibility is wrong and ought to be reversed. Without such agreement, it is illegal and an infringement of national sovereignty for an international body to take control of national legislatures and delegate authority to specific people. China and India, who see the ICC as a Western project dominated by Western moral convictions and political power, share this viewpoint. These problems are difficult to overcome 218 Understanding International Relations. The Statute is fully compliant with US law and the US Constitution, according to supporters of the Court, but this is not the point. The US protests to losing its authority as the only legislative, limited to enacting laws it approves of. Additionally, many people find attraction in the skepticism of a universal moral agreement. The Court currently appears to be very much a European project, supported by very unimportant players from Africa, South America, and Canada. The beginnings of a global agreement indicated in the first section of this chapter could be lost, along with the notion that international relations can be governed within a legal framework, if the Europeans move too quickly to establish a dominant Court. However, the

Court may be able to establish itself as a very valuable component of the system if it makes significant steps to broaden its geographic appeal, is prepared to deal with views of the US and other powerful discontents, and can accumulate a stock of sensible rulings. In order to prosecute for violations of human rights under national laws, the US recommends improving domestic legal systems; nevertheless, a more recent development in the area of rights protection is the exercise of domestic courts' "universal jurisdiction." No matter where the crimes were perpetrated or the nationality of the offenders or victims, every state has an interest in prosecuting those responsible for the worst international crimes, according to the universal jurisdiction principle.

Development and Unfairness

As a result of a nation's historical adherence to pertinent international declarations, treaties, and norms, universality can result from either universal custom i.e., a principle or deed considered by general practice to be law or an international treaty regime. Unless and until the crime is sufficiently established in international law and custom to be recognized as really universal, only parties to the treaty will be required to recognize the crime's universality. Since the end of World War II, further crimes against humanity such as slavery, piracy, genocide, torture, war crimes, apartheid, and others have been added to the list of offences that give rise to universal jurisdiction. According to this principle, domestic courts have the power to bring criminal charges for crimes committed anywhere in the globe as long as their legal system acknowledges this power. The British House of Lords decision to permit the extradition of former General Pinochet to Spain for trial on charges of state-sponsored murder and torture allegedly committed against Spanish nationals while he was Head of State in Chile is of enormous significance for the prospects for the future protection of human rights because universal jurisdiction has rarely been exercised. There were many legal issues raised during the trial, but the one that matters the most to us is whether the Westphalian principle of sovereign immunity applies in situations involving alleged crimes against humanity, or more specifically, whether a court other than one in Chile has the authority to try Pinochet for actions taken while he was that nation's head of state. Chile, which won the IR and Person amnesty for life in 1978, vehemently pushed for the preservation of sovereign immunity. The Spanish state, whose citizens the alleged victims were, was hesitant to participate in the discussion because it had never tried offenders from the Franco era maverick Spanish judge had issued the arrest warrant for Pinochet. In contrast, the British House of Lords adopted a more constrictive yet constructive stance. As they took the position that sovereign immunity was designed to protect a Head of State acting correctly and that torturing people was not appropriate behavior for such a person, they ruled that immunity cannot be claimed in respect of acts that constitute both global crimes and crimes in the UK. The Convention is formally and legally binding upon signatories unlike the Universal Declaration, which is a resolution of the General Assembly and as such not binding, and the Court's jurisprudence, built upon more than 1,000 decisions and drawing from both the Convention and international human rights law, has had a significant impact on the laws and practices of the 44 member states. If Pinochet had been extradited, it would have resulted in another first for international criminal law. Two causes contributed to the expansion of the 220 Understanding International Relations Court in the 1990s. First, when the Cold War came to an end and the Council of Europe grew to include more nations, including Russia, the Court expanded its jurisdiction. Second, the Council of Europe adopted an amendment to the 1950 Convention in 1994 that permits individual applicants to file claims with the Court. Before this, the sole resource available to people was the Commission, which issued reports with no legal force. Now, in addition to states, people and non-state organizations have access to the Court, and

governments found to have violated the Convention are obligated to take remedial action, typically by revising domestic law. Although there is little that can be done to enforce the Court's rulings, a system where compliance is the norm has been created thanks to the EU membership carrot and the trade and commercial penalties stick for governments with a bad track record before the Court. The success of the European Court of Human Rights is practically impossible for the realist to explain, despite the fact that the high level of integration in Europe is the exception rather than the rule in world politics. Why would self-interested participants in an international anarchy freely decide to cede their independence, commit themselves to international organizations, and permit their citizens to be governed by rules that have no national-level origins? As the ICC has the potential to become just as strong over its State Parties as the ECHR, the same question can be posed to those that have accepted the Rome Statute. Explaining why states would jeopardize their own security and finances in order to militarily interfere in the affairs of others when human rights are being violated is even more difficult for the realist. The topic of humanitarian intervention will be discussed in the chapter's concluding part. Humanitarian intervention the 1990s saw developments in the promotion of human rights and the ways in which they were protected by international law, as well as the emergence of a brand-new, more aggressive phenomenon in the defense of rights "humanitarian intervention."

Globalization's Detractors

Innovative international action marked the beginning and end of the decade in 1991, 'Safe Areas' were established for Kurds in Northern Iraq, and in, NATO engaged in Kosovo. What should we make of these behaviors? This section will explore whether humanitarian intervention is a long-term feature of global society in the twenty-first century or if it was a transient phenomenon made possible by the relative quiet of the 1990s and now considered to be failing after the second Gulf War. As it includes the invasion of sovereign territory using military force, humanitarian intervention poses a more serious threat to the sovereign state than either the principle of human rights or the growth of international law. The Westphalian system, according to thinkers from the English School, the International Society, and Individual, can only function if states acknowledge one another's sovereignty. Rulers are aware that recognizing other people's rights is necessary for them to be able to enjoy their own, primarily the right to exclusive authority over their region. As a result, non-intervention is one of the system's main norms. To ensure the safety of its own borders, each state must respect the borders of other states. The fact that there have been so many invasions, incursions, and threats to territorial borders since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 does not imply that states always respect national boundaries. The argument is that nonintervention is a "settled norm," or a value that all members of international society acknowledge to be true even if they do not always adhere to it Frost 1996. Others may ask wrongdoers to justify their actions or to demonstrate that they adhered to the norm when it appears that the norm has been broken. This rule was reaffirmed as a tenet of the international order, alongside the promotion of human rights and universal self-determination, in the UN Charter, so it is not a mysterious holdover from a bygone era. The emergence of humanitarian intervention, the forced invasion of sovereign territory by one or more nations, with or without the support of international organizations, allegedly motivated by the intention to relieve suffering within that state, fundamentally upset the status quo throughout the 1990s. Such behavior appears to be wholly at odds with the foundational tenets of the sovereign state system. Its rise can be attributed to the human rights regime's growing influence, notably to the regime's view that legitimate state sovereignty derives from individual rights. States were held to new criteria of legitimacy based on their adherence of international

human rights rules and norms as a result of the expansion of the human rights regime in the 1990s. State autonomy and non-intervention came to be regarded as privileges, subject to adherence to international norms. The natural conclusion of the argument that human rights take precedence over state sovereignty is that intervention in support of human rights is now acceptable and perhaps even necessary. This viewpoint dates back to the 1960s, or possibly earlier, although operations in Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Uganda in the 1970s that might have been perceived as humanitarian were not because of a fear of superpower involvement and adherence to conventional conceptions of sovereignty.

CONCLUSION

As protectorates fell apart and nationalism expanded throughout former communist governments, the end of the Cold War simultaneously reduced the likelihood of superpower conflict and increased the number of potential beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance. The United Nations banned imperialism after World War II and mandated that all governments should transition to self-government as soon as feasible. State capacity, or what Robert Jackson would refer to as their "positive sovereignty" Jackson 1990, was not taken into consideration, and states with strategic value but insufficient capacity frequently turned into informal protectorates of the superpowers. These states were frequently left behind by their sponsors after the Cold War ended, and the international community effectively took up their well-armed and unpredictable duty. This was not the case with the first humanitarian intervention in Northern Iraq during the 1990s which was prompted by Western worries about the Iraqi force that had just been routed in Kuwait, as well as more conventional worries about international peace and security, but it most certainly was the case with the second intervention. Up until 1977, Somalia was linked with the Soviet Union, but in exchange for significant military assistance, it changed its allegiance to the US. The US ended its backing in 1989 because to breaches of human rights.

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CHAPTER 24
MANY ACTORS, ONE WORLD

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ABSTARCT

The foundations for comprehending our world as one shaped by millennia of conflict have been laid out in the previous two chapters. At the same time, we have created diplomatic methods for 'getting along'. In light of this framework, we must now explore how the academic field of international relations examines the world. Interactions between states have traditionally been the subject of international relations IR. This traditional viewpoint, however, has evolved over time to encompass interactions across a wide range of political institutions or "polities" , such as societies, people, multinational enterprises, and international organizations. The rising connectivity of people, old and new security measures, debates over ideas, conflicts over ideologies, the environment, space, the global economy, poverty, and climate change are just a few of the many subjects that are covered by IR. It might be difficult to keep track of all the actors and topics that are important to IR. Due to this, it may appear impossible to study different IR topics while also attempting to understand the wider picture. The analytical tools that academics have created in an effort to simplify the subject not just for novices to the discipline but even for themselves are all the more crucial. In general, social scientists spend a lot of time considering the best ways to organise their thoughts and deal with the complexity of the world they are trying to research, examine, and understand.

KEYWORDS: Analysis, Global, Level, States, System.

INTRODUCTION

This kind of analytical sense-making frequently takes the form of theories in IR. Theories are used by academics to capture and explain the significance of actual events through generalized assumptions and abstract interpretations. One the one hand, theories may be "empirical"—based on quantifiable experiences, typically obtained through observation or experimentation. In general, empirical theories strive to describe the world as it is. However, theories can also be "normative," which means they are based on precepts and expectations for how social relationships ought to work. In other words, normative theories typically attempt to portray a vision of the world as it should be. However, scholars make what frequently a subconscious choice is regarding the emphasis of their analysis before they establish or embrace any specific ideas. After then, people typically don't give other options much thought and stick with their original decision. As IR students, it can be beneficial to arm ourselves with a fundamental understanding of the viewpoints one can use when examining virtually any topic. This chapter will accomplish this by examining various "levels of analysis," which are one of the most popular ways to organize academic arguments in IR. Levels of analysis when considering several levels of analysis in IR, it is important to remember that the observer or analyst may choose to concentrate on the entire system as a whole, various system component that are in interaction with one another, or a few system components specifically. Again, it depends on your point of view what constitutes the system's sections or components. nations, groups of nations, organizations, societies, or people living within

or interacting with those societies can all be considered to be a part of the international system. System, state, and individual are the three levels of analysis that IR often distinguishes between, however group level analysis should also be taken into consideration as a fourth level.

DISUCSSION

Identity, Culture, and Soft Power

We must be certain of our main areas of interest if we hope to use the level of analysis as an analytical tool. When discussing a specific theme or issue pertaining to the 'international' sphere, we must first define for ourselves what it is precisely that we wish to look at. There are different angles to use while studying, debating, and presenting a subject. For instance, if we were to research and comprehend the 2008 global financial crisis and its effects. We would need to identify these levels and pose some questions to ourselves in order to establish the level of analysis, which we can examine below. At the individual level, would we consider how people have reacted to the financial crisis in light of their respective roles or responsibilities? For instance, a prime minister meeting with the head of another country to negotiate a significant financial arrangement, the CEO of a major company making a decision to save their company, or even the circumstances of specific residents and their opinions on austerity measures? One World, Many Actors 34 The group level Would we be more interested in the behaviors of groups of people, such as all of a nation's voters and how they express their opinions during a general election, political parties focusing on the issue in their campaigns, or social movements forming to counter the crisis' effects on society? Would we be interested in activist/pressure groups like 'Anonymous' that aim to sway the global discussion concerning the winners and losers of globalization and capitalism? The state level Would we consider states to be independent actors, acting as though they were distinct entities with preferences, and as a result, look at their deliberations and decisions to find the answers to our analytical questions? Would we then be examining how states engage in interstate relations to address the situation, or their foreign policy? How do they build on one another's ideas and respond to global events and trends? How do they work together, for example, within the framework of international organizations? Or should we view them as rivals and enemies who are each vying for a greater place within the framework of the global economy? The system level Lastly, could we try to take a look at the large picture, the global level, and try to understand more expansive processes that emerge from the global economic ‘system' to affect its different components, including states, national economies, societies, and people? Daniel W. Dresdner financial crisis admirably. He observed how diverse system components interacted to reduce negative effects on a larger scale. Even though we refer to it as the "global financial crisis," little has actually changed since then; in fact, one might argue that the system has continued to operate as usual. 35 International Relations How the level of analysis affects our conclusions Being aware of numerous potential points of view aids in our ability to decide where we stand as analysts and observers. It also directs us while we do our research and analysis. The kind of data we would need to gather and examine in order to be able to answer our questions and draw meaningful conclusions is first determined by the specific perspective we adopt. One would need to take into account global links that go beyond simple interactions between states in a system-level or "systemic” analysis. It would have to consider issues like how the power dynamics between states affect what transpires in international politics. This could apply to innovations like the internet, the global economy, or transnational terrorism that are even beyond the immediate control of any one state or set of states. The kind of states we are looking at how they are arranged politically, their geographic location, their historical relationships and experiences, and their economic standing would all need to be

carefully taken into account in a state-level study. It would probably also examine each state's foreign policy, or its method of dealing with and engaging with other states. The comments of top-level politicians, the policies presented and adopted by governments, as well as the function and conduct of diplomats and the bureaucratic institutions that surround them, are important markers of a state's foreign policy. A group level study would once more need to make an effort to segment the analysis into different types of groups, how they link to the state level, and how they situate themselves in relation to the global scope of the problems they are facing. The work of Engle et al. 2012, which discusses the global financial crisis as the "misrule of experts" and emphasizes the politicized function of technocratic circles and the comparatively weak democratic control over the boards of large banks and corporations, is an illustration of this. A group-level analysis with a focus on foreign policy might examine, for instance, the function of lobbying organizations and how they affect how a country makes decisions on a certain subject. We would probably also need to discuss the implications of human nature if examining the conduct of specific individuals. This is evident in the psychology and feelings that drive people's behavior and choices, in their anxieties and visions, as well as in their knowledge of the world and ability to affect change. Psychological elements are important at all levels of society and groups, not only at the level of an individual member. They play a significant role in the understanding of foreign policy whenever certain political leaders' mindsets and views of One World; Many Actors 36 crucial players may affect those individuals' choices and actions. Which of these particular perspectives we choose will have a significant impact on our results. In other words, the outcome of our scholarly research is determined by the focus or depth of analysis. Naturally, the actual events we are evaluating have not changed in the interim. That is a crucial factor to take into account if we want to draw generalizations from our findings. In a strict sense, the range of the level of analysis we selected to focus on would be the only range in which our conclusions would be appropriate. Other views' insights would continue to fall outside the purview of our analysis.

Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy

Let's go with the previous example of the global financial crisis to demonstrate this as it is one of the more contentious issues in modern politics. If we looked at the global financial crisis from a system-level vantage point, for example, we may expect to learn more about the global dynamics that shape the global financial system. By concentrating on the large picture, we can create a thorough model of explanation that may be able to explain the states and national economies that make up that global system. However, the explanations we draw from this systemic model may overstate the system-level elements that contributed to the global financial crisis. As a result, we risk omitting many psychological and sociological problems that would be the focus of a group- or individual-level analysis. If we looked at the same subject from the perspective of each state, we would learn more specifics about the circumstances in each state and how they interact with one another. The separation is not quite as sharp in practice, as will be explored further down, as the state level is typically examined in the context of a larger system rather than in isolation. For the purposes of our example, this would entail using the global financial system as the operating environment for state actors, meaning that state action is frequently influenced by external variables. If we looked at the problem from the perspective of the group, we would discover something quite different. We might highlight elements of the global financial crisis that would be missed by a more thorough investigation at the global level. This involves examining how the crisis has. Finally, focusing on the individual level and, say, the specific activities of particular public figures, such as politicians, diplomats, or bankers, would force us to reach new conclusions

regarding the origins and effects of the financial crisis. The wider picture in short, it's critical to be aware of and acknowledge any observational gaps, or everything that is not specifically covered by our viewpoint or degree of analysis. It's also crucial to do our analysis with rigour. These standards for academic inquiry are used in a wide range of academic fields, including the natural sciences. Scholarly writings, however, are not always explicit about their particular perspective or level of analysis. German theoretical physicist Werner K. Heisenberg noted that when it comes to research in his field, "we have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning." As a result, if an argument is presented to us that seems to cross two potentially incompatible analytical lenses, it is crucial that we remain sceptical, pay attention, and ask questions. Always keep in mind the value of analytical clarity when you begin to read more in-depth on certain IR issues. Never be afraid to demand it, especially from well-known authors and reputable publishing houses. Be aware that having a clear understanding of one's level of analysis does not preclude the possibility of combining multiple views; on the contrary. Many of the political issues of today are so complicated, as will be demonstrated further below, that our analysis must include a range of levels. The analysis of states' foreign policies is a critical area where the need to deepen our levels of analysis is crucial. We should be able to states. By examining the 38 government policies and diplomatic choices in One World, Many Actors separately, we may examine foreign policy at the state level. Governments nevertheless play a role in what are known as international relations and function as players on the global stage. As was previously mentioned, understanding foreign policy also requires a closer look at the individual, for instance, the psychological and political influences that influence decision-making among leaders and their advisors

Soft power tactics and national branding

These choices in turn influence federal choices that have an impact on the state level and in respect to other states. Thinking of foreign policy behavior as something that is influenced by a variety of circumstances can be useful. Some of them exist within a state, in its political customs, socioeconomic makeup, political party structure, or in the ideologies of powerful politicians. Others originate from the global system, which creates the framework for which states function. This does not imply that all of these factors must be included in order to have a meaningful discussion on foreign policy; rather, investigations at one level should be used very carefully in order to make conclusions about another level. Where the levels overlap, we need to be mindful that each level will call for a particular type of evidence to be considered. We can use the example of Tony Blair, the former prime minister of the United Kingdom, to assist cement the foreign policy example. For his decision to lead the UK into combat with Iraq in collaboration with the US in 2003, Blair is well-known. We could draw on Blair's own convictions as a dedicated anti-terrorist with a strong moral sense based on his Christianity to assess this significant foreign policy choice from an individual level. This enabled him build a common human relationship with the US president, George W. Bush. When we shift our attention to the state level, it is possible to make a crucial bilateral relationship if he had followed the example of some of his European counterparts and refused to support the war. We now proceed to the global or systemic level. Since the systemic level frequently assumes that forces working at the international level are what influence conduct, we are not as much focused on Blair personally in this situation. According to this interpretation, Blair would have felt obligated to take part in a change in the global order that was symbolized by the presence of hazardous transnational terrorism on the one hand and a coalition led by the United States fighting terrorism on the other. Of course, as has already been mentioned, you might also

contend that Blair's motivations may have come from more than one of these levels, if not all of them. International Relations Levels of analysis and a discipline's shifting goals Being aware of the issue of different levels of analysis can also help us better understand how the academic discipline of IR has evolved over time, in addition to making us more critical and astute readers. To start, much of what may be called traditional or conventional IR did not consider potential distinctions between various levels of yet another advantage to considering IR as something that can be explored from several, unique angles. Knowing what level of analysis we are using can help us avoid engaging in analytical cherry-picking, which is the practice of haphazardly collecting data from several levels of analysis in an effort to find an answer to our research questions. This "vertical drift," as Singer refers to it, has the potential to skew our observations and cast doubt on the veracity of our conclusions. As a result, some of the information that may otherwise have been crucial to a thorough explanation may become obscured. This does not imply that all scholarly works must ignore information from various levels of analysis. However, we must do it freely and transparently when switching between different levels of analysis. We also need to be aware of the analytical repercussions of shifting across levels, such as the requirement for a thorough evidence search and the possibility of having to consider a different set of information or sources for each new facet. For instance, you may want to consider both the external influences and the personal motivations of German chancellor Angela Merkel if you were trying to understand why Germany decided to open its borders to hundreds of thousands of refugees in 2015.

International relations and identity politics

You would look into both economic indicators, refugee flows, and key partners' the issue as they emerge from statements and important career decisions. Each would add to a comprehensive explanation, but you would need to be ready to look at several types of data. One World, many an increasing number of IR academics have worked to more precisely define the subject of their analysis. Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State and War A Theoretical Analysis 1959, which developed an analytical framework for the study of IR and distinguished between what he referred to as different "images" of an issue—the man, the state, and the international system—is the most notable example. Waltz's contributions to the field sparked curiosity on studying the international system as a hub of state interactions. According to this viewpoint, the global system refers to the framework or environment in which states interact, compete, and engage in conflict over matters of mutual interest. It might be thought of as a level above the state. The distribution of power among states, or whether there is a single major concentration " , is particularly significant in that setting. The capacity and opportunity of individual nations and groups of states to pursue their interests in cooperative or competing ways are considered as being conditioned by global circumstances. The idea that our international system is "anarchic" originates from the view of states being embedded in a global setting. An anarchic system is one in which there is no worldwide contributions to the IR literature mention the global or system level as a backdrop of anarchy, the state continues to be the primary object of study. The relative "state-centrism" of the discipline is the term used to describe this pervasive concentration on the state and, consequently, on the state level of analysis. This indicates that IR experts typically view states as the primary unit of study in addition to serving as a point of reference for other categories of actors. According to this viewpoint, the state serves as the setting in which state representatives, legislators, and decision-makers interact. The state is regarded as the foundation of society and as the individual's primary point of reference. The assumption that IR academics have made that the state also serves as the primary locus of power inside the international realm significantly relates to this predominance of

the state focus. The Cold War, which served as the historical environment in which some of the most well-known IR experts worked, must be contrasted with the notion that the state is where power is principally concentrated and located. It was a time when it seemed like most international matters were managed through state channels and in accordance with specific state interests. Other characters, such as those examined in the book's later chapters, who we would regard as significant from a modern standpoint, appear to have had little influence during the Cold War. This was due to the systemic conflict's great power clash and the overwhelming military force of both sides throughout the time period. International Relations Despite the end of the Cold War, most of today's political life is still governed by the state and is centered on concerns like internal stability, domestic cohesion, and national security. States continue to hold what renowned German sociologist Max Weber called the monopoly on violence, the exclusive right to the legal use of physical force. States are the primary type of actor in major international organizations like the United Nations, they are prominently discussed in the global discourse on most of the major challenges of our time. States still matter; thus, they must be taken into account when determining what occurs in the globe and why.

CONCLUSION

Both the state as an analytical unit and frame of reference and the interactions between states as a crucial level of analysis in IR won't disappear any time soon. For instance, particular site or area is merely one conceivable perspective. Given that it concentrates on the location, or "locus," of interactions on various platforms that serve as the stage for specific events and examples of international relations, he refers to this as the "arena" approach. He distinguishes this "arena" approach from what he refers to as the "processual" approach, which holds that international relations should instead be thought of as a complex web of processes that take place between people rather than something that happens in a specific location or at a specific level of analysis. assess system performance, metrics must be well-defined, quantifiable, and in line with system goals. The abstract then discusses the many uses and advantages of several metrics categories, such as process metrics, product metrics, and resource metrics. The abstract also discusses system architecture metrics including modularity, coupling, and cohesion metrics that are used to evaluate the complexity, design quality, and maintainability of system components. The abstract also looks at metrics for requirements engineering, such as those for completeness, consistency, and traceability.

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